THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have

REVIEW been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Separation of Powers
LAUREL, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his
oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the
election of those who have not been subject of an election
protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
***In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows
the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is
held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election
protest filed by Ynsua.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro

Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before
the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The
following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider
any election protest that was not submitted on or before
December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National

Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s
protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his
motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in

excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest
filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate

exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the
earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should
be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of
the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating
to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
VINUYA VS SECRETARY ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock,
non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation
had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a)
declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their
claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims
for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical
and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the
next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion
in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the
Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign
relations. It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They
are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to
the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or
invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter,
the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this
case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is
this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular
and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy
interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to
overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed
between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the
Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and
whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available
for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system
has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to
bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules
of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may
exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever
extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting.
Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting
consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law,
if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of
municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations
will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the
crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international
law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by
States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential
distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their
very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms
that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in
the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can
be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis.
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only
a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section
1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts
can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment

complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on

Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section

3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the

scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a

determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly

unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate

its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment
is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry
out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which
is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
OCAMPO VS ENRIQUEZ