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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189871 August 13, 2013

DARIO NACAR, PETITIONER,


vs.
GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 23, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98591, and the Resolution2 dated October 9, 2009
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are undisputed.

Petitioner Dario Nacar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against respondents Gallery Frames (GF) and/or
Felipe Bordey, Jr., docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 01-00519-97.

On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner and found that he
was dismissed from employment without a valid or just cause. Thus, petitioner was awarded
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of ₱158,919.92. The
dispositive portion of the decision, reads:

With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondents failed to discharge the burden of showing
that complainant was dismissed from employment for a just or valid cause. All the more, it is clear
from the records that complainant was never afforded due process before he was terminated. As
such, we are perforce constrained to grant complainant’s prayer for the payments of separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement to his former position, considering the strained relationship between the
parties, and his apparent reluctance to be reinstated, computed only up to promulgation of this
decision as follows:

SEPARATION PAY

Date Hired = August 1990

Rate = ₱198/day
Date of Decision = Aug. 18, 1998
Length of Service = 8 yrs. & 1 month
₱198.00 x 26 days x 8 months = ₱41,184.00

BACKWAGES
Date Dismissed = January 24, 1997
Rate per day = ₱196.00

Date of Decisions = Aug. 18, 1998


a) 1/24/97 to 2/5/98 = 12.36 mos.
₱196.00/day x 12.36 mos. = ₱62,986.56

b) 2/6/98 to 8/18/98 = 6.4 months


Prevailing Rate per day = ₱62,986.00
₱198.00 x 26 days x 6.4 mos. = ₱32,947.20

TOTAL = ₱95.933.76

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents guilty of
constructive dismissal and are therefore, ordered:

To pay jointly and severally the complainant the amount of sixty-two thousand nine hundred eighty-
six pesos and 56/100 (₱62,986.56) Pesos representing his separation pay;

To pay jointly and severally the complainant the amount of nine (sic) five thousand nine hundred
thirty-three and 36/100 (₱95,933.36) representing his backwages; and

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.4

Respondents appealed to the NLRC, but it was dismissed for lack of merit in the Resolution5 dated
February 29, 2000. Accordingly, the NLRC sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.6

Dissatisfied, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the CA. On August 24,
2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied in a Resolution dated May 8, 2001.7

Respondents then sought relief before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 151332. Finding
no reversible error on the part of the CA, this Court denied the petition in the Resolution dated April
17, 2002.8

An Entry of Judgment was later issued certifying that the resolution became final and executory on
May 27, 2002.9The case was, thereafter, referred back to the Labor Arbiter. A pre-execution
conference was consequently scheduled, but respondents failed to appear.10

On November 5, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Correct Computation, praying that his backwages
be computed from the date of his dismissal on January 24, 1997 up to the finality of the Resolution
of the Supreme Court on May 27, 2002.11 Upon recomputation, the Computation and Examination
Unit of the NLRC arrived at an updated amount in the sum of ₱471,320.31.12

On December 2, 2002, a Writ of Execution13 was issued by the Labor Arbiter ordering the Sheriff to
collect from respondents the total amount of ₱471,320.31. Respondents filed a Motion to Quash Writ
of Execution, arguing, among other things, that since the Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay of
₱62,986.56 and limited backwages of ₱95,933.36, no more recomputation is required to be made of
the said awards. They claimed that after the decision becomes final and executory, the same cannot
be altered or amended anymore.14 On January 13, 2003, the Labor Arbiter issued an
Order15 denying the motion. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution16 was issued on January 14, 2003.

Respondents again appealed before the NLRC, which on June 30, 2003 issued a
Resolution17 granting the appeal in favor of the respondents and ordered the recomputation of the
judgment award.

On August 20, 2003, an Entry of Judgment was issued declaring the Resolution of the NLRC to be
final and executory. Consequently, another pre-execution conference was held, but respondents
failed to appear on time. Meanwhile, petitioner moved that an Alias Writ of Execution be issued to
enforce the earlier recomputed judgment award in the sum of ₱471,320.31.18

The records of the case were again forwarded to the Computation and Examination Unit for
recomputation, where the judgment award of petitioner was reassessed to be in the total amount of
only ₱147,560.19.

Petitioner then moved that a writ of execution be issued ordering respondents to pay him the original
amount as determined by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision dated October 15, 1998, pending the final
computation of his backwages and separation pay.

On January 14, 2003, the Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution to satisfy the judgment
award that was due to petitioner in the amount of ₱147,560.19, which petitioner eventually received.

Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the re-computation of the monetary
award to include the appropriate interests.19

On May 10, 2005, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order20 granting the motion, but only up to the amount
of ₱11,459.73. The Labor Arbiter reasoned that it is the October 15, 1998 Decision that should be
enforced considering that it was the one that became final and executory. However, the Labor
Arbiter reasoned that since the decision states that the separation pay and backwages are
computed only up to the promulgation of the said decision, it is the amount of ₱158,919.92 that
should be executed. Thus, since petitioner already received ₱147,560.19, he is only entitled to the
balance of ₱11,459.73.

Petitioner then appealed before the NLRC,21 which appeal was denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution22 dated September 27, 2006. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
likewise denied in the Resolution23dated January 31, 2007.

Aggrieved, petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98591.

On September 23, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 denying the petition. The CA opined that
since petitioner no longer appealed the October 15, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, which
already became final and executory, a belated correction thereof is no longer allowed. The CA
stated that there is nothing left to be done except to enforce the said judgment. Consequently, it can
no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution25 dated October 9,
2009.

Hence, the petition assigning the lone error:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED,


COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DECIDED CONTRARY TO LAW IN
UPHOLDING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE NLRC WHICH, IN TURN, SUSTAINED
THE MAY 10, 2005 ORDER OF LABOR ARBITER MAGAT MAKING THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION
OF THE OCTOBER 15, 1998 DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER LUSTRIA SUBSERVIENT TO AN
OPINION EXPRESSED IN THE BODY OF THE SAME DECISION.26

Petitioner argues that notwithstanding the fact that there was a computation of backwages in the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, the same is not final until reinstatement is made or until finality of the
decision, in case of an award of separation pay. Petitioner maintains that considering that the
October 15, 1998 decision of the Labor Arbiter did not become final and executory until the April 17,
2002 Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 151332 was entered in the Book of Entries on
May 27, 2002, the reckoning point for the computation of the backwages and separation pay should
be on May 27, 2002 and not when the decision of the Labor Arbiter was rendered on October 15,
1998. Further, petitioner posits that he is also entitled to the payment of interest from the finality of
the decision until full payment by the respondents.

On their part, respondents assert that since only separation pay and limited backwages were
awarded to petitioner by the October 15, 1998 decision of the Labor Arbiter, no more recomputation
is required to be made of said awards. Respondents insist that since the decision clearly stated that
the separation pay and backwages are "computed only up to [the] promulgation of this decision," and
considering that petitioner no longer appealed the decision, petitioner is only entitled to the award as
computed by the Labor Arbiter in the total amount of ₱158,919.92. Respondents added that it was
only during the execution proceedings that the petitioner questioned the award, long after the
decision had become final and executory. Respondents contend that to allow the further
recomputation of the backwages to be awarded to petitioner at this point of the proceedings would
substantially vary the decision of the Labor Arbiter as it violates the rule on immutability of
judgments.

The petition is meritorious.

The instant case is similar to the case of Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division),27 wherein the issue submitted to the Court for resolution was the propriety
of the computation of the awards made, and whether this violated the principle of immutability of
judgment. Like in the present case, it was a distinct feature of the judgment of the Labor Arbiter in
the above-cited case that the decision already provided for the computation of the payable
separation pay and backwages due and did not further order the computation of the monetary
awards up to the time of the finality of the judgment. Also in Session Delights, the dismissed
employee failed to appeal the decision of the labor arbiter. The Court clarified, thus:

In concrete terms, the question is whether a re-computation in the course of execution of the labor
arbiter's original computation of the awards made, pegged as of the time the decision was rendered
and confirmed with modification by a final CA decision, is legally proper. The question is posed,
given that the petitioner did not immediately pay the awards stated in the original labor arbiter's
decision; it delayed payment because it continued with the litigation until final judgment at the CA
level.

A source of misunderstanding in implementing the final decision in this case proceeds from the way
the original labor arbiter framed his decision. The decision consists essentially of two parts.

The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be disputed because it has been confirmed with
finality. This is the finding of the illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, backwages, attorney's fees, and legal interests.

The second part is the computation of the awards made. On its face, the computation the labor
arbiter made shows that it was time-bound as can be seen from the figures used in the computation.
This part, being merely a computation of what the first part of the decision established and declared,
can, by its nature, be re-computed. This is the part, too, that the petitioner now posits should no
longer be re-computed because the computation is already in the labor arbiter's decision that the CA
had affirmed. The public and private respondents, on the other hand, posit that a re-computation is
necessary because the relief in an illegal dismissal decision goes all the way up to reinstatement if
reinstatement is to be made, or up to the finality of the decision, if separation pay is to be given in
lieu reinstatement.

That the labor arbiter's decision, at the same time that it found that an illegal dismissal had taken
place, also made a computation of the award, is understandable in light of Section 3, Rule VIII of the
then NLRC Rules of Procedure which requires that a computation be made. This Section in part
states:

[T]he Labor Arbiter of origin, in cases involving monetary awards and at all events, as far as
practicable, shall embody in any such decision or order the detailed and full amount awarded.

Clearly implied from this original computation is its currency up to the finality of the labor arbiter's
decision. As we noted above, this implication is apparent from the terms of the computation itself,
and no question would have arisen had the parties terminated the case and implemented the
decision at that point.

However, the petitioner disagreed with the labor arbiter's findings on all counts - i.e., on the finding of
illegality as well as on all the consequent awards made. Hence, the petitioner appealed the case to
the NLRC which, in turn, affirmed the labor arbiter's decision. By law, the NLRC decision is final,
reviewable only by the CA on jurisdictional grounds.

The petitioner appropriately sought to nullify the NLRC decision on jurisdictional grounds through a
timely filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari. The CA decision, finding that NLRC exceeded its authority
in affirming the payment of 13th month pay and indemnity, lapsed to finality and was subsequently
returned to the labor arbiter of origin for execution.

It was at this point that the present case arose. Focusing on the core illegal dismissal portion of the
original labor arbiter's decision, the implementing labor arbiter ordered the award re-computed; he
apparently read the figures originally ordered to be paid to be the computation due had the case
been terminated and implemented at the labor arbiter's level. Thus, the labor arbiter re-computed the
award to include the separation pay and the backwages due up to the finality of the CA decision that
fully terminated the case on the merits. Unfortunately, the labor arbiter's approved computation went
beyond the finality of the CA decision (July 29, 2003) and included as well the payment for awards
the final CA decision had deleted - specifically, the proportionate 13th month pay and the indemnity
awards. Hence, the CA issued the decision now questioned in the present petition.

We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as it essentially


considered the labor arbiter's original decision in accordance with its basic component parts as we
discussed above. To reiterate, the first part contains the finding of illegality and its monetary
consequences; the second part is the computation of the awards or monetary consequences of the
illegal dismissal, computed as of the time of the labor arbiter's original decision.28

Consequently, from the above disquisitions, under the terms of the decision which is sought to be
executed by the petitioner, no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a
necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared by the Labor
Arbiter in that decision.29 A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous computation
has been made) is a part of the law – specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established
jurisprudence on this provision – that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal
case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor
Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision
does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal
dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is
affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.30

That the amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased is a consequence that it cannot
avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter's
decision. Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal in no uncertain terms,
qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation of when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
allowed. When that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes the reckoning
point instead of the reinstatement that the law decrees. In allowing separation pay, the final decision
effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages
are to be computed up to that point.31

Finally, anent the payment of legal interest. In the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,32 the Court laid down the guidelines regarding the manner of computing legal
interest, to wit:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time
it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an


interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.33

Recently, however, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), in its Resolution No.
796 dated May 16, 2013, approved the amendment of Section 234 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982
and, accordingly, issued Circular No. 799,35 Series of 2013, effective July 1, 2013, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following revisions
governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending
Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:

Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be
six percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.136 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1,37 4305S.338 and 4303P.139 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.

This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.

Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that
would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum - as
reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines40and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations
for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - but will now
be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new
rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent
(12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate
of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.

Corollarily, in the recent case of Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and Eduardo B. Olaguer v.
Bangko Sentral Monetary Board,41 this Court affirmed the authority of the BSP-MB to set interest
rates and to issue and enforce Circulars when it ruled that "the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum
rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or
credits, including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as such loans made
by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to
prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and
deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries."

Nonetheless, with regard to those judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
2013, said judgments shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate
of interest fixed therein.
1aw p++i1

To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines42 are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages. 1âwphi 1

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.

When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed
therein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 23, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98591, and the Resolution dated October 9, 2009 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondents are Ordered to Pay petitioner:

(1) backwages computed from the time petitioner was illegally dismissed on January 24,
1997 up to May 27, 2002, when the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 151332 became final
and executory;

(2) separation pay computed from August 1990 up to May 27, 2002 at the rate of one month
pay per year of service; and

(3) interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards, computed from
May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until their
full satisfaction.
The Labor Arbiter is hereby ORDERED to make another recomputation of the total monetary
benefits awarded and due to petitioner in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe Bordey, Jr.
Nacar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by Gallery Frames on January 24,
1997. On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found Gallery Frames guilty of illegal
dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded Nacar P158,919.92 in damages consisting of
backwages and separation pay.
Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the decision became final on May 27, 2002.
After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA for recomputation as
he alleged that his backwages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal
(January 24, 1997) until the finality of the SC decision (May 27, 2002) with interest. The LA
denied the motion as he ruled that the reckoning point of the computation should only be
from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January 24, 1997) until the decision of the LA
(October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that the said date should be the reckoning point
because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.
HELD: No. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal dismissal cases
(referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins, or loses but wins on appeal). The
first part is the ruling that the employee was illegally dismissed. This is immediately final
even if the employer appeals – but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal. The second
part is the ruling on the award of backwages and/or separation pay. For backwages, it will
be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. But if the employer appeals, then the end date shall be extended until the day when
the appellate court’s decision shall become final. Hence, as a consequence, the liability of
the employer, if he loses on appeal, will increase – this is just but a risk that the employer
cannot avoid when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter’s decision. This
is also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code.
Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory damages, the
Supreme Court ruled that the old case of Eastern Shipping Lines vs CA is already modified
by the promulgation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796
which lowered the legal rate of interest from 12% to 6%. Specifically, the rules on interest
are now as follows:
1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans:
a. If stipulated in writing:
a.1. shall run from date of judicial demand (filing of the case)
a.2. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated
b. If not stipulated in writing
b.1. shall run from date of default (either failure to pay upon extra-judicial demand or upon
judicial demand whichever is appropriate and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code)
b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
2. Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)
a. If already liquidated, rate of interest shall be 6% per annum, demandable from date of
judicial or extra-judicial demand (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
b. If unliquidated, no interest
Except: When later on established with certainty. Interest shall still be 6% per annum
demandable from the date of judgment because such on such date, it is already deemed
that the amount of damages is already ascertained.
3. Compounded Interest
– This is applicable to both monetary and non-monetary obligations
– 6% per annum computed against award of damages (interest) granted by the court. To be
computed from the date when the court’s decision becomes final and executory until the
award is fully satisfied by the losing party.
4. The 6% per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively:
– Final and executory judgments awarding damages prior to July 1, 2013 shall apply the
12% rate;
– Final and executory judgments awarding damages on or after July 1, 2013 shall apply the
12% rate for unpaid obligations until June 30, 2013; unpaid obligations with respect to said
judgments on or after July 1, 2013 shall still incur the 6% rate.

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171272


Appellee, (Formerly G.R. Nos. 150047-48)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.

LEOSON DELA CRUZ y ECHECHE, Promulgated:


Appellant.
June 7, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated August 18, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00780, affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated May 17, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Marikina City, Branch 272. The trial court had found appellant Leoson dela
Cruz y Echeche guilty of murder and frustrated murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-
3101-MK and 99-3102-MK, respectively.

The amended informations charging appellant with murder and frustrated


murder, respectively, read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK


(For Murder)
xxxx

That on or about the 20th day of November 1999, in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a kitchen knife, with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength and
using disguise, fraud and craft to enter the dwelling of one JULIANA RICALDE
y RODRIGUEZ, and once inside, did then and there, with insult to or in disregard
of the respect due the latter on account of rank, age and sex, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab said JULIANA RICALDE y
RODRIGUEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly
caused her death. (Underscoring omitted.)

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK


(For Frustrated Murder)
xxxx

That on or about the 20th day of November 1999, in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a kitchen knife, with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, and using disguise, fraud and craft to enter
the dwelling of PELAGIO RICALDE y TAN, and once inside, did then and there,
with insult to and in disregard of the respect due the latter on account of rank,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said PELAGIO
RICALDE y TAN, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which ordinarily
would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of cause independent of his will, that is, due to the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Pelagio Ricalde y Tan which
prevented his death. (Underscoring omitted.)

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.

The facts below as found by the RTC and confirmed by the Court of Appeals were
gleaned from the testimonies of (1) Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde, survivor and husband
of the victim Juliana; (2) Rebecca R. Ricalde, their 19-year-old daughter; (3) Sgt.
Robert D. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3 of the Cinco Hermanos
Subdivision; (4) Godofredo E. Meriel, the responding subdivision guard; (5)
SPO4 Conrado J. Cruz and (6) SPO4 Jaime E. Gamueda,[5] crime investigators
from the Marikina Police; (7) SPO4 Celso J. Cruz, evidence custodian of the
Marikina Police; (8) Drs. Bu C. Castro and (9) Noel B. Minay, medico-legal
officer of St. Lukes Medical Center and the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), respectively; and (10) Aida V. Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI.

It appears that around 10:00 a.m. on November 20, 1999, appellant dela Cruz
presented an I.D. with the name Allan B. Reyes to Sgt. Esgana, the guard-on-duty
at Gate 3 of the Cinco Hermanos Subdivision in Marikina City.
Sgt. Esgana recorded the entry in his logbook.[6]
Upon reaching the house of Pelagio, dela Cruz told Rebecca, Pelagios daughter
who met him at the gate, that her father had told him to go there. He stepped in the
small gate in the garage that was already opened, and Rebecca walked ahead of
him to fetch her father. As the father and daughter returned, dela Cruz was already
in the kitchen. According to Rebecca, she first heard the two converse quietly as
dela Cruz asked her father for a job recommendation. It was then that she noticed
dela Cruzs blue backpack. Suddenly, she heard her father
[7] [8]
scream, Becca, tulungan mo ako. She screamed, Daddy, Daddy, as she ran
towards him, and noticed dela Cruz holding a knife. She screamed for help and
saw her mother, Juliana, rushing in. Her father was covered with blood and she
sought help to rush him to the hospital.

According to Pelagio, dela Cruz was a messenger in his law firm who got fired based
on his secretarys recommendation that dela Cruz had been absent without leave at
least three times.[9] This information was corroborated by Priscila M. Dimaano,
Pelagios secretary.[10] When his daughter informed him that dela Cruz wanted to talk
to him, he met with dela Cruz who was by then in their kitchen already. He told him
he did not have his stationery with letterhead and had to still check with the
companies he knew which had vacancies. He said that he would write dela Cruz a
recommendation letter which the latter could pick up from the office. As he escorted
dela Cruz out towards the garage gate, the latter suddenly stabbed him at the back and
kept on stabbing him until he lost his balance. When he managed to turn and face dela
Cruz, the latter kept on stabbing him frontally. He tried to put his arms around dela
Cruz but his attacker shook him off. As he ran towards the kitchen, dela Cruz chased
and kept on stabbing him at the back of his left shoulder. At this point, Juliana
appeared and rushed to him begging, Leo, tama na, tama na, tama na.[11] Dela Cruz
dropped the knife and ran towards the garage.[12]

As Juliana was attending to her husband, dela Cruz suddenly reappeared and
stabbed her at the back with a letter opener. As she jerked backward, she received
another stab below the left shoulder. She tried to ward off the letter opener with her
left hand, but again was stabbed at the back of her left arm. Pelagio
shouted, Huwag Leo, si Julie yan.[13] When the letter opener broke, dela Cruz
dropped the instrument and rushed outside where he was apprehended by Meriel,
the guard-on-duty in Gate 1.

In court, Meriel,[14] SPO4 Conrado J. Cruz[15] and SPO4 Gamueda[16] all identified that
dela Cruz was the person who was arrested in connection with the incident in the
Ricalde residence. SPO4 Gamueda, who recovered the weapons used in the stabbing,
identified the same in court. SPO4 Celso J. Cruz, the evidence custodian of the
Marikina Police, identified the kitchen knife and the letter opener, one bloodied
yellow and blue backpack, one striped blue and white t-shirt with the word MAUI
printed on it with the initials J.G., and one khaki pants marked Geraldo Jelleni with
initials J.G.[17]

Dr. Castro, medico-legal officer of the St. Lukes Medical Center, examined and
described the wounds of Pelagio. He said that the first and second wounds of
Pelagio could have been fatal were they not timely treated; that the knife was made
of aluminum softer than Pelagios bone and was bent as it hit the bone; and that
Pelagio also sustained multiple bruises in the body.[18]

Dr. Minay, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the post-mortem on Juliana.
He described eight stab wounds inflicted on Juliana, and said the first wound
caused her internal bleeding that proved fatal. All the wounds were inflicted by a
pointed instrument with one-sided blade. Three of them were inflicted on her
back.[19]

Forensic chemist Magsipoc testified that the DNA profile of the bloodstain on the
backpack and on the khaki pants, which were presented in evidence, matched the
DNA profile of Pelagio although the stains in the t-shirt did not.

Dela Cruz denied the accusations against him. He admitted that he went to the
Ricalde residence to ask for a job recommendation from Pelagio upon Pelagios
instruction. Pelagio denied he gave this instruction.[20] Dela Cruz said he traveled
one and a half hours and took three rides to get there. He presented his I.D. card to
the guard-on-duty and saw the guard make an entry in the logbook. He said he was
frisked and his bag was inspected. He claimed that he was frequently at the Ricalde
residence and had at times, when the owners were abroad, slept there and watched
the place for them. According to him, when Rebecca led him in and when Pelagio
saw him, Pelagio was red-eyed and was furious when he reminded Pelagio that it
was the latter who had told him to be there. At this juncture, Pelagio shouted at
him, Shit, bullshit, putang ina,[21] then shoved him towards the garage gate. Still
furious, Pelagio continued shouting, Tang-ina
[22]
mo, wala akong kakilalang Leo. Dela Cruz recalled that as he was leaving,
Pelagio was blocking the gate so he just stared back. Then, Pelagio grabbed a
kitchen knife in the nearby sink, three steps away from the gate. Pelagio was about
to stab him so he grabbed the knife and stood up. As Pelagio was still blocking his
exit, he saw Juliana hand a knife to Pelagio. It appeared to him that Pelagio was in a
daze and did not recognize anyone. Pelagio tried to stab him but started hitting
Juliana instead. According to dela Cruz, Pelagio stopped only when Juliana dropped
to her knees. He saw Pelagio embrace Juliana. Then, dela Cruz added, he rushed
outside where he was apprehended and brought to the Marikina Police Station.[23] He
said he did not know how Pelagio got his wounds and how the knife was bent as he
was busy grappling for the knife.[24]

During rebuttal, Rebecca testified that there was no sink in the garage, disputing
dela Cruzs story that Pelagio got the knife from there. She said that the sink was
located in the generator/engine room that could be accessed through a door with an
iron shutter that was always locked.[25] This information was corroborated by
SPO4 Gamueda.[26]

Dr. Rocco B. Paragas, resident surgeon at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center,
treated dela Cruz. He testified that dela Cruz had contusions on the right hand and
left thigh and had wounds on the fifth digit of the right hand. The wounds were
probably caused by sharp object like a knife. They could also be defense wounds.
The hematomas on the hand and on the left thigh were probably caused by hitting a
blunt object or falling hard atop a hard object. [27] He first explained that it was
improbable for dela Cruz to have the incise wounds in the fifth digit of the right
hand, considering the relative positions of the protagonists as they grappled for the
knife, but did not rule out the possibility that the incise wounds were sustained if
dela Cruzs fingers slipped towards the knife, as he was being stabbed by the
attacker or when while holding the knife, he hit a hard object.[28]

On May 17, 2001, the trial court convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads,
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused
LEOSON DELA CRUZ y ECHECHE is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 99-3101-
MK and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH by lethal injection
and the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, respectively, the crime
having been qualified with treachery and attended with the generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The accused is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Atty. Juliana Ricalde y Rodriguez the amount of
P50,000.00 for the latters death, the amount of P200,000.00 as moral
damages and another amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages for
both cases. The court, however, cannot award actual damages for the
death of the victim Atty. Juliana Ricalde y Rodriguez and for the damages
sustained by Atty. Pelagio Ricalde in view of the failure of the
prosecution to substantiate such damages with official receipts and other
documents to support the same.

SO ORDERED.[29]

Following People v. Mateo,[30] the cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals
for review.

On August 18, 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial courts
decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DENIED for lack of merit. The joint Decision dated 17 May 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, in the cases
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Leoson Dela Cruz
y Echeche, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-3101-MK and 99-3102-
MK, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, appellant LEOSON DELA


CRUZ Y ECHECHE is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and dwelling and is hereby
SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.

The appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim


Atty. Juliana Ricalde the amounts of: (a) Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (d) Php25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (e)
Php2,441,423.00 for the victims loss of earning capacity.
In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, the appellant LEOSON
[DELA] CRUZ Y ECHECHE is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER qualified by treachery
with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
dwelling and is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty
of twelve (12) [y]ears of prisionmayor as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The appellant is further ordered to pay the victim Atty. Pelagio


Ricalde the amounts of: (a) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (b)
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) Php30,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

SO ORDERED.[31]
Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opted not to submit
their respective supplemental briefs.[32] However, on record we find their briefs
filed before the appellate court on the following issues brought before it, to wit:
I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE


ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.[33]
III.
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION [WAS] SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED.
IV.
DWELLING WAS ALSO PRESENT.[34]

In sum, the issues for our review are: (1) Did the prosecution prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt? (2) Did treachery, evident premeditation
and dwelling attend the commission of the crimes?

First, appellant contends that in criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof


rests upon the prosecution and unless there is overwhelming evidence of the guilt
of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence applies. [35] He claims
that this burden had not been satisfied by the prosecution. Second, appellant
contends that treachery was not present in this case. He avers that
the informations did not allege treachery with specificity, hence, it was only a
generic aggravating circumstance and he should only be charged with homicide
and frustrated homicide.[36] He points out that his wounds would clearly show that
Pelagio resisted his attack. He also insists that the alleged attack on Juliana was an
afterthought of Pelagio since Juliana saw the danger to her life.

On the other hand, the OSG submits that appellants guilt had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG insists that there was treachery since Pelagio
was totally caught off-guard by appellants sudden attack. Further, as appellants
attack on Juliana was so sudden, it was impossible for her to defend herself. [37]

Likewise, according to the OSG, evident premeditation was present since


appellant planned the death of the victims as reflected in the following
circumstances: (1) he traveled one and a half hours to reach the Ricalde residence;
(2) he presented a fake I.D. upon entering the subdivision; and (3) he was armed
with a knife and a letter opener when he went there. Thus, the OSG claims that
despite sufficient time for reflection, appellant went on with his criminal plan.[38]

Further, the OSG contends that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is


also present because the crimes were committed in the house of the victims who
had not provoked appellant.[39]

Lastly, the OSG contends that the two informations against appellant
specifically alleged the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
dwelling to have attended the commission of the crimes. The OSG cites People
v. Aquino,[40] where we clarified that the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying,
qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by, need not be expressly stated as long as
the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information. [41]

With the prosecutions overwhelming evidence, we see no reason to reverse


the findings of the trial court and of the appellate court as appellants guilt on the
crimes charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We find Pelagios testimony to the minutest detail and his categorical


identification of appellant as the assailant credible, unwavering and consistent.
Both the trial and appellate courts agree on the facts surrounding the attack on the
victims. Positive identification made with moral certainty suffices to convict the
accused.[42] Further, the testimony concerning the death of Juliana and the near
death of Pelagio acquires greater weight since it is amply supported by the
testimonies and medical findings of Dr. Castro[43] and Dr. Minay,[44] who examined
the victims.[45]

On the other hand, appellants defense suggesting that Pelagio, for no motive
or reason at all, would suddenly harm and violently kill his wife is highly
improbable.Appellant insinuates that Pelagio was dazed, red-eyed and beside
himself. However, Pelagios testimony was corroborated by his daughter when she
heard her fathers cry for help and she saw dela Cruz with a knife. Appellants
testimony that Pelagio got a knife from a nearby sink had been more than
contradicted by Rebecca that the sink was nowhere in the garage but in the
generator/engine room. Rebeccas testimony on this point was corroborated by a
police officer who had no reason to lie. Testimonial evidence, to be credible,
should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be
credible in itself, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.[46]

As to the presence of treachery, we agree with both the trial and appellate
courts that the suddenness of appellants attack on the victims ensured the
commission of the crimes, giving no opportunity for Pelagio and Juliana to
defend themselves. At the time of the attack, Pelagio was talking with appellant on
the way out. At that time, Pelagio did not have the slightest idea he was going to be
stabbed and had no chance to defend himself.

Treachery also accompanied the death of Juliana. Juliana was by her fallen
husband when appellant reappeared with a letter opener. The attack on her was
instantaneous and Juliana was not ready to fight back thinking appellant had
left. In People v. Vallespin, we ruled that even if the victim is warned of the danger
to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long as the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend herself or to retaliate.[47]

Appellant further contends that the informations[48] filed against him failed
to allege treachery with specificity in order to qualify the killing to
murder. Appellants contention is disingenuous, to say the
least. The informations sufficiently apprised appellant of the nature of the charges
against him, i.e., that treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling attended the
killing of Juliana, and the attack on Pelagio. It is not the use of the words
qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising
the crime to a higher category.[49]

When treachery is present, an allegation of abuse of superior strength can no


longer be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance.[50] The same holds
true with the circumstance of disregard of the respect on account of rank, age or sex,
which in this case could not be aggravating.[51] In like manner, we do not find that
disguise, fraud or craft attended the commission of the crimes. Also, we find no
intellectual trickery nor cunning resorted to by appellant to lure his victims into a trap
and conceal his identity.[52]

As to the presence of evident premeditation, we find that only the attack on


Pelagio was evidently premeditated. The same cannot be said on the assault on
Juliana.

To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution is burdened to prove the


confluence of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to such
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act.[53]

As testified to by Rebecca, she had never before the incident seen the knife
used by appellant in their home. Pelagio and his secretary also testified that the
letter opener had been missing from the law firm after appellant was dismissed
from employment. These uncontroverted testimonies constitute direct evidence of
appellants pre-conceived plan against Pelagio. Further, as the Court of Appeals
noted, despite the one and a half hours travel time for reflection, appellant still
clung to his criminal plan against Pelagio.

On the other hand, Julianas arrival to help her husband was


unexpected. When Juliana rushed to her wounded husband and begged appellant to
stop, appellant left, but suddenly reappeared with a letter opener and stabbed
Juliana at the back. Appellants momentarily leaving the scene did not give him
enough opportunity to fully contemplate on his resolution to kill Juliana. We stress
the importance of the requirement in evident premeditation of sufficiency of time
between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent,[54] affording such opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on
the meaning and the consequences of what appellant had planned to do, an interval
long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire
and scheme. In the stabbing of Juliana, this element was wanting.[55]

Finally, we agree that dwelling aggravated the commission of the


crimes. Appellants greater perversity was revealed when he deliberately entered
the victims domicile,[56]at the pretext of soliciting help from its owners. The
garage, where the incidents took place, is undoubtedly an integral part of the
victims residence.

Clearly, the presence of the attending circumstances in this case qualified the
killing of Juliana to murder under Article 248[57] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended.

As to the attack on Pelagio, the crime committed was frustrated [58] murder as
appellant performed all acts of execution which could have claimed the life of
Pelagio but because of prompt medical intervention, a cause independent of
appellants will, Pelagio survived.[59]

On the whole, we are fully convinced that there is no ground to reverse


appellants conviction. He is guilty of murder and frustrated murder beyond any
reasonable doubt.

Conformably, in Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK the proper imposable


penalty is death. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, signed into law
on June 24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.[60]

As to Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, applying Article 248 of the RPC, as


amended, in relation to Articles 50,[61] 61, paragraph 2[62] and 64, paragraphs 3 and
6,[63] we affirm the appellate courts sentence of an indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

As to the proper monetary awards imposable in each of the two criminal


cases, modifications are in order.

In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, for the murder of Juliana Ricalde, the
award of civil indemnity is mandatory and must be granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. However, we
modify the civil indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals,
from P50,000 to P75,000 to conform with current jurisprudence.[64]
Because the prosecution failed to present receipts or other evidence to
substantiate actual damages, we could not award such damages. Nonetheless, in
lieu of actual damages, the heirs of Juliana Ricalde may be awarded temperate
damages of P25,000, in accordance with current jurisprudence, as it has been shown
that the family of the victim incurred burial and funeral expenses, although the
amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty.[65]

An award of moral damages is also proper in view of the violent death of


Juliana and the resultant grief to her family. We affirm the reduction made by the
Court of Appeals from P200,000 to P50,000 to conform with current
jurisprudence,[66] as moral damages are imposed to compensate the heirs of the
victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.

Exemplary damages of P25,000 have been properly imposed by the Court of


Appeals to serve as an example and deterrent to future similar
transgressions. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances,[67] as in this case.

It is also proper to award compensation to the heirs of the victims for loss of
earning capacity, pursuant to Article 2206 (1)[68] of the Civil Code. The testimonial
evidence for the prosecution, as corroborated by documents [69] presented, were
sufficient bases for the award. At the time of her death, Juliana was 46 years
old,[70] and was receiving pay in the amount of P215,388 per annum as an
Associate Professor I with a salary grade of 22 at the University of
the Philippines.[71] Applying the formula Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at
time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living
expenses)],[72] we arrive at a loss of earning capacity of P2,441,064.[73]

In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, for the frustrated murder of


Pelagio Ricalde, we grant an award of P30,000 as civil indemnity without proof
other than the commission of the crime and the culprits liability therefor.[74] In
addition, an award of moral damages of P50,000 is proper for the suffering
endured by the victim from appellants criminal acts.[75]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Court of


Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00780 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche is


found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659,
qualified by treachery and with the attendant aggravating circumstance of
dwelling. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,
pursuant to Rep. Act. No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole. Appellant is further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Juliana Ricalde, the amounts of: (a) P75,000 as civil
indemnity; (b) P50,000 as moral damages; (c) P25,000 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P2,441,064 for the victims loss of earning capacity, all with interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.[76]

In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche is


found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
MURDER qualified by treachery with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and dwelling and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant is further ORDERED to pay the
victim Pelagio Ricalde the amounts of: (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b) P25,000
as exemplary damages; and (c) P30,000 as civil indemnity, all with interest at the
legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188602


Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,*
CORONA,
- versus - Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
FORD GUTIERREZ y DIMAANO,
Appellant. February 4, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the March 12, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02680, which affirmed with modifications the August 7,
2006 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 62, in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-3639, 03-3640, and 03-3641-43, finding appellant Ford
Gutierrez y Dimaano (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder.
On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder
and three (3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 03-3639
For: Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with [a] gun, by means of treachery and
abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun towards the person of
LEO SALVADOR REGIS, thereby hitting him and inflicting mortal
wounds which caused his death.[3]

Criminal Case No. 03-3640


For: Frustrated Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with [a] gun, by means of treachery and
abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one
ALEXIS DALIT y BALOSBALOS hitting him on the arm, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of a cause independent of the will of the accused, that is due to
the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said ALEXIS
DALIT y BALOSBALOS which prevented his death.[4]
Criminal Case No. 03-3641
For: Attempted Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a gun, with treachery, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun
towards one Jaypee S. Boneo, thus commencing the commission of the
crime of Murder directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of cause
or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is due to the
fact that he was not able to hit the said Jaypee S. Boneo.[5]
Criminal Case No. 03-3642
For: Attempted Murder

That on or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a gun, with treachery, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun
towards one Randy S. Marcelo, thus commencing the commission of the
crime of Murder directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of cause
or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is due to the
fact that he was not able to hit the said Randy S. Marcelo.[6]

Criminal Case No. 03-3643


For: Attempted Murder
That on or about the 17th day of May 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a gun, with treachery, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fired his gun
towards one Jefferson S. Gallemit, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Murder directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of
cause or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is due to
the fact that he was not able to hit the said Jefferson S. Gallemit.[7]
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summed up the prosecutions


version as follows:

On May 17, 2003 at nine oclock in the evening, the deceased Leo
Salvador Regis, private complainants Randy Marcelo, Jefferson
Gallemit, Jaypee Boneo and Alexis Dalit were talking to each other in
front of the house of the deceased at 477 Narra St.,
Cembo, Makati City. They noticed the presence of appellant along the
street and thought that appellant would just pass by.However, when
appellant was two (2) arms length away in front of them, appellant
suddenly raised his arm and shot the deceased Regis with a .45 caliber
pistol. After he was hit on the chest, Regis said Aray!, embraced Randy
Marcelo who was seated on his left, and fell off his chair to the ground
(TSN, June 2, 2004, pp. 8-11, 17-26).

Jefferson Gallemit, Jaypee Boneo and Alexis Dalit stood from


their seats. Appellant fired several shots thereafter, one of which hit
Dalits arm. Boneo and Gallemit ran up the street while Dalit ran in the
opposite direction and hid behind a car. In the meantime, the deceased
Leo Salvador Regis and Randy Marcelo were still huddled together at
the spot where the deceased fell. Appellant stayed at the same spot
where he fired the first shot even after the three ran away. (Ibid., pp. 26-
31).
Appellant then pursued Dalit down the street but did not catch
him, prompting appellant to say: Pagnaabutan ko kayo, pagpapatayin ko
kayo! Dalit then sought refuge at BLISS Makati and contacted the police
from there (Ibid., pp. 31-34).

The police arrived at the scene after twenty (20) minutes. Dalit
was brought to the Ospital ng Makati where his wound was dressed. He
was operated on at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (Ibid., pp. 34-
41). Regis was brought to the Ospital ng Makati by Randy Marcelo
where he died that night (TSN, June 22, 2005, p. 14). [8]

Appellant for his part asserted self-defense. He testified that:

At around 8 oclock p.m. of May 17, 2003, he went to an ihaw-


ihaw restaurant with live band in Guadalupe in order to relax. After
taking two (2) bottles of beer, he decided to go home, took a jeepney ride
and alighted in front of a bakery owned by Barangay Captain Leo
Magbantay, one hundred twenty (120) meters away from his
house. While passing by, he noticed a group of five youngsters who were
at the right side of the street. Among them, he only knew Loloy (Jaypee)
Boneo, whom he used to babysit when the latter was still young.

While walking, one in the group cursed him and shouted tang ina
mo! Since he was the only passerby, he stopped and looked at them, but
two (2) from the group approached him. He was suddenly boxed by
Regis Ado, while Dalit was just beside Ado. When he fell on the
ground, Ado continuously beat him, then suddenly, a gun fell from Leo
Regis. He immediately got hold of it, and when Leo Regis was supposed
to attack him again, he kicked Leo which made him [to fall]
down. When he stood up and saw Regis standing up, he fired a shot at
him. He continuously fired the gun, which was directed towards the
ground so as to warn the others.

Thereafter, he fled the scene, and threw the gun on a vacant


lot. Since he did not know what to do, and confused, he took a jeepney
going to Pateros, but since, he had no money, he alighted somewhere,
and rested. When he finally regained his senses, he went to Cubao and
borrowed money from one of their retailers. [9]

Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted


him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, finding the accused


guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Leo Salvador Regis, the
frustrated murder committed against Alexis B. Dalit, and the three
counts of attempted murder committed against Jaypee S. Boneo, Randy
S. Marcelo & Jefferson S. Gallemit, the court hereby imposes the
following penalties:

1. in criminal case no. 03-3639 for murder of Leo Salvador E.


Regis, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the
amount of Php 102,337.25 as actual damages;

2. in criminal case no. 03-3640 for the frustrated murder


committed against Alexis B. Dalit, the [c]ourt hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years
and 20 days as minimum to 14 years, 10 months and 20 days
as maximum and to indemnify the sum of Php
22,596.50, representing the victims expenses for medical
services and medicine;

3. in criminal case no. 03-3641 for the attempted murder


committed against Jaypee S. Boneo, the court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;

4. in criminal case no. 03-3642 for the attempted murder


committed against Randy S. Marcelo, the court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;

5. in criminal case no. 03-3643 for the attempted murder


committed against Jefferson S. Gallemit, the court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Appellant filed an appeal before the CA, assigning in his brief this lone error
allegedly committed by the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE


ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED, WHEN HIS
GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, BY GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
EYEWITNESSES.[11]

The OSG, on behalf of the People, also filed its brief[12] with a
recommendation for the modifications of the felony and of the award for
damages. It asserted that the trial court correctly gave credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and rejected appellants claim of self-defense. The
OSG insisted that appellants guilt for murder in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 and
attempted murder on three (3) counts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3641-43 was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640,
appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and not for frustrated
murder, since the wound inflicted on Alexis B. Dalit was not life-threatening. The
OSG, therefore, prayed that appellants conviction for frustrated murder be reduced
to attempted murder with the corresponding reduction of penalty. Finally, it prayed
for modification of the actual damages awarded, and for the grant of moral and
exemplary damages to the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis.

On March 12, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, affirming, but
with modifications, the RTC decision, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 7 August 2006


decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62) in
Criminal Case No. 03-3639 for murder
is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. The
award of actual damages in favor of the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis
is reduced to P42,337.25. Moral damages of P50,000.00, temperate
damages of P10,000.00, and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 are
additionally awarded to the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis.
The 7 August 2006 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal Case
No. 03-3640 for frustrated murder is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Ford D. Gutierrez is found GUILTY of committing the crime of
ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum. The award of actual damages in favor of
the victim Alexis B. Dalit is AFFIRMED.

The 7 August 2006 decision of


the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-3641, 03-3642 and 03-3643 for attempted murder
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[13]

Appellant is now before this Court, submitting for resolution the same
matters argued before the CA. Through his Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental
Brief,[14]appellant states that he will not file a Supplemental Brief and, in lieu
thereof, he will adopt the Appellants Brief he filed before the appellate court. The
OSG, likewise, manifests that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief.[15]

Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the
prosecutions evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but
insists that he did so in self-defense.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability


for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused
to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.[16]

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of


self-defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is
placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly.
While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and
foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully
pleaded. [17]
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful
aggression. His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was
found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims
were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on
their part. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the
trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the
appellate court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court
of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the best opportunity to
observe their demeanor.[18] While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such
exceptions obtains in this case.

In Razon v. People,[19] we held:


Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden
of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.[20]

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellants plea
of self-defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.[21]

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to
show that treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified
to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not
proven, and appellants testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot
be given credence. The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and
had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated
as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.

Under Article 248[22] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty
imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant
is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2[23] of the RPC. The
prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 is correct.

We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder,


not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by
Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit
was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. It
is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to
cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's
death.[24]

The CA correctly assessed the penalty to be imposed on appellant for


attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3640 to 03-3643. The penalty for
attempted murder is two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated
felony under Article 51 of the RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision
mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision
correccional, and the maximum penalty to be imposed should be within the range
of prision mayor in its medium period. Hence, for the crime of attempted murder,
appellant was rightly sentenced by the CA to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

And now, the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper
cases.[25]

The CA awarded P42,337.25 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as


temperate damages to the heirs of Regis. In People v. Villanueva[26] and People v.
Abrazaldo,[27] we ruled that temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive
in that both may not be awarded at the same time. Hence, no temperate damages
may be awarded if actual damages have already been granted. The award
of P10,000.00 as temperate damages must, therefore, be deleted.

The grant of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral


damages is proper, and thus, we sustain the same. In murder, the grant of civil
indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof
other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused's
responsibility therefor.[28] Moral damages, on the
other hand, are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim. There is
no need for any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.[29]

Likewise, the award of exemplary damages is warranted when the


commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying,[30] as in this case. Accordingly, we sustain the CAs award of
exemplary damages to the heirs of Regis, but we increase the award to P30,000.00.

Similarly, we affirm the award of P22,596.50 as actual damages to Dalit,


who is, likewise, entitled to moral damages, which this Court fixes in the amount
of P40,000.00.Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the
wounds inflicted on the surviving victims would naturally cause physical suffering,
fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. Finally, the award in the
amount of P20,000.00, as exemplary damages to Dalit, is also in order considering
that the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.[31]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the


Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02680
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.Appellant Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 03-
3639) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of Leo Salvador E. Regis the
amounts of P42,337.25 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of


four (4) counts of ATTEMPTED MURDER (Criminal Case Nos. 03-3640 to 03-
3643) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, on each count, with all the
accessory penalties imposed by law. Appellant is further ordered to pay Alexis B.
Dalit the amounts of P22,596.50 as actual damages, P40,000.00 as moral damages,
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124354 April 11, 2002

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of
the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR.
PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Private respondents De Los Santos Medical Center, Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez
move for a reconsideration of the Decision, dated December 29, 1999, of this Court holding them
civilly liable for petitioner Erlinda Ramos’ comatose condition after she delivered herself to them for
their professional care and management.

For better understanding of the issues raised in private respondents’ respective motions, we will
briefly restate the facts of the case as follows:

Sometime in 1985, petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised
to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was
referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her. The operation was
scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private respondent De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Since neither petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio, knew of any
anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.

Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled operation. By 7:30 in
the morning of the following day, petitioner Erlinda was already being prepared for operation. Upon
the request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was then Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside the
operating room.

At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get in touch
with him by phone. Thereafter, Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the operation might be delayed due
to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. In the meantime, the patient, petitioner Erlinda said to Cruz,
"Mindy, inip na inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor."

By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not around, petitioner Rogelio already wanted to
pull out his wife from the operating room. He met Dr. Garcia, who remarked that he was also tired of
waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or
more than three (3) hours after the scheduled operation.

Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room, heard about Dr. Hosaka’s arrival. While she held
the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez
utter: "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Cruz noticed
a bluish discoloration of Erlinda’s nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka
instruct someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon
attempted to intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained bluish, thus, she was placed
in a trendelenburg position – a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower
than her feet. At this point, Cruz went out of the operating room to express her concern to petitioner
Rogelio that Erlinda’s operation was not going well.

Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg
position. At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in
the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital only four months later or on November 15,
1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August
3, 1999.1

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a civil case for damages against private
respondents. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Essentially,
the trial court found that private respondents were negligent in the performance of their duties to
Erlinda. On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision
and directed petitioners to pay their "unpaid medical bills" to private respondents.

Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. The private respondents were then
required to submit their respective comments thereon. On December 29, 1999, this Court
promulgated the decision which private respondents now seek to be reconsidered. The dispositive
portion of said Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby
modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of
this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda
Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees; and 5) the costs of the suit.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Dr. Hosaka submits the following as grounds
therefor:

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD


RESPONDENT DR. HOSAKA LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF THE "CAPTAIN-OF-THE-SHIP"
DOCTRINE.

II

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING RESPONDENT DR. HOSAKA


LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIM.

III

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RESPONDENT DR. HOSAKA IS LIABLE, THE


HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES THAT WERE CLEARLY
EXCESSIVE AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.3

Private respondent Dr. Gutierrez, for her part, avers that:

A. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY OVERLOOKED


THE FACT THAT THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION DATED 29 MAY 1995 HAD
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS OF 25 JUNE 1995, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THIS HONORABLE COURT OF JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
PETITION;

B. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY OVERLOOKED


SEVERAL MATERIAL FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD INDUBITABLY LEAD TO NO OTHER CONCLUSION BUT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOCTORS WERE NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE IN
RESPECT OF THE INSTANT CASE;

B.1 RESPONDENT DOCTOR PERFECTA GUTIERREZ HAS SUFFICIENTLY


DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE BY SUBSTANTIAL PROOF OF HER
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STANDARDS OF DUE CARE EXPECTED IN HER
RESPECTIVE FIELD OF MEDICAL SPECIALIZATION.

B.2 RESPONDENT DOCTOR PERFECTA GUTIERREZ HAS SUFFICIENTLY


DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE BY SUBSTANTIAL PROOF OF HER
HAVING SUCCESSFULLY INTUBATED PATIENT ERLINDA RAMOS

C. THE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY PLACED TOO MUCH


RELIANCE ON THE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER’S WITNESS HERMINDA CRUZ,
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
RENDERS DOUBT ON HER CREDIBILITY

D. THE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY DISREGARDED THE EXPERT


TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMORA AND DRA. CALDERON

E. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY AWARDED


DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE
ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT DOCTOR.4

Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center likewise moves for reconsideration on the
following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT PETITION AS
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY

II

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE


[RELATIONSHIP] EXISTS BETWEEN RESPONDENT DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER AND
DRS. ORLINO HOSAKA AND PERFECTA GUTIERREZ

III

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT DE LOS


SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RESPONDENT DOCTORS

IV

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN INCREASING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN


FAVOR OF PETITIONERS.5

In the Resolution of February 21, 2000, this Court denied the motions for reconsideration of private
respondents Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez. They then filed their respective second motions for
reconsideration. The Philippine College of Surgeons filed its Petition-in-Intervention contending in
the main that this Court erred in holding private respondent Dr. Hosaka liable under the captain of
the ship doctrine. According to the intervenor, said doctrine had long been abandoned in the United
States in recognition of the developments in modern medical and hospital practice.6 The Court noted
these pleadings in the Resolution of July 17, 2000.7

On March 19, 2001, the Court heard the oral arguments of the parties, including the intervenor. Also
present during the hearing were the amicii curiae: Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., Consultant of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, former Director of the Philippine General Hospital and former
Secretary of Health; Dr. Iluminada T. Camagay, President of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists, Inc. and Professor and Vice-Chair for Research, Department of Anesthesiology,
College of Medicine-Philippine General Hospital, University of the Philippines; and Dr. Lydia M.
Egay, Professor and Vice-Chair for Academics, Department of Anesthesiology, College of Medicine-
Philippine General Hospital, University of the Philippines.

The Court enumerated the issues to be resolved in this case as follows:

1. WHETHER OR NOT DR. ORLINO HOSAKA (SURGEON) IS LIABLE FOR


NEGLIGENCE;

2. WHETHER OR NOT DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ (ANESTHESIOLOGIST) IS LIABLE


FOR NEGLIGENCE; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HOSPITAL (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER) IS LIABLE
FOR ANY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY THEIR VISITING CONSULTANT
SURGEON AND ANESTHESIOLOGIST.8

We shall first resolve the issue pertaining to private respondent Dr. Gutierrez. She maintains that the
Court erred in finding her negligent and in holding that it was the faulty intubation which was the
proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition. The following objective facts allegedly negate a
finding of negligence on her part: 1) That the outcome of the procedure was a comatose patient and
not a dead one; 2) That the patient had a cardiac arrest; and 3) That the patient was revived from
that cardiac arrest.9 In effect, Dr. Gutierrez insists that, contrary to the finding of this Court, the
intubation she performed on Erlinda was successful.

Unfortunately, Dr. Gutierrez’ claim of lack of negligence on her part is belied by the records of the
case. It has been sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the
administration of anesthesia on a patient. Dr. Egay enlightened the Court on what these standards
are:

x x x What are the standards of care that an anesthesiologist should do before we administer
anesthesia? The initial step is the preparation of the patient for surgery and this is a pre-
operative evaluation because the anesthesiologist is responsible for determining the medical
status of the patient, developing the anesthesia plan and acquainting the patient or the
responsible adult particularly if we are referring with the patient or to adult patient who may
not have, who may have some mental handicaps of the proposed plans. We do pre-
operative evaluation because this provides for an opportunity for us to establish identification
and personal acquaintance with the patient. It also makes us have an opportunity to alleviate
anxiety, explain techniques and risks to the patient, given the patient the choice and
establishing consent to proceed with the plan. And lastly, once this has been agreed upon by
all parties concerned the ordering of pre-operative medications. And following this line at the
end of the evaluation we usually come up on writing, documentation is very important as far
as when we train an anesthesiologist we always emphasize this because we need records
for our protection, well, records. And it entails having brief summary of patient history and
physical findings pertinent to anesthesia, plan, organize as a problem list, the plan
anesthesia technique, the plan post operative, pain management if appropriate, special
issues for this particular patient. There are needs for special care after surgery and if it so it
must be written down there and a request must be made known to proper authorities that
such and such care is necessary. And the request for medical evaluation if there is an
indication. When we ask for a cardio-pulmonary clearance it is not in fact to tell them if this
patient is going to be fit for anesthesia, the decision to give anesthesia rests on the
anesthesiologist. What we ask them is actually to give us the functional capacity of certain
systems which maybe affected by the anesthetic agent or the technique that we are going to
use. But the burden of responsibility in terms of selection of agent and how to administer it
rest on the anesthesiologist.10

The conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an operation, whether elective or


emergency, cannot be dispensed with.11 Such evaluation is necessary for the formulation of a plan of
anesthesia care suited to the needs of the patient concerned.

Pre-evaluation for anesthesia involves taking the patient’s medical history, reviewing his current drug
therapy, conducting physical examination, interpreting laboratory data, and determining the
appropriate prescription of preoperative medications as necessary to the conduct of anesthesia.12

Physical examination of the patient entails not only evaluating the patient’s central nervous system,
cardiovascular system and lungs but also the upper airway. Examination of the upper airway would
in turn include an analysis of the patient’s cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility,
prominent central incisors, deceased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental
distance.13

Nonetheless, Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda. As she
herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, one hour before
the scheduled operation. She auscultated14 the patient’s heart and lungs and checked the latter’s
blood pressure to determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation.15 However, she did not proceed to
examine the patient’s airway. Had she been able to check petitioner Erlinda’s airway prior to the
operation, Dr. Gutierrez would most probably not have experienced difficulty in intubating the former,
and thus the resultant injury could have been avoided. As we have stated in our Decision:

In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time
on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations
with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda.
She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the
administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient
for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an
act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning
prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s
centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a
clear indicia of her negligence.16

Further, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse its finding that it was the faulty intubation
on Erlinda that caused her comatose condition. There is no question that Erlinda became comatose
after Dr. Gutierrez performed a medical procedure on her. Even the counsel of Dr. Gutierrez
admitted to this fact during the oral arguments:

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Mr. Counsel, you started your argument saying that this involves a comatose
patient?

ATTY. GANA:

Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

How do you mean by that, a comatose, a comatose after any other acts were done
by Dr. Gutierrez or comatose before any act was done by her?

ATTY. GANA:

No, we meant comatose as a final outcome of the procedure.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Meaning to say, the patient became comatose after some intervention, professional
acts have been done by Dr. Gutierrez?

ATTY. GANA:

Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

In other words, the comatose status was a consequence of some acts performed by
D. Gutierrez?

ATTY. GANA:

It was a consequence of the well, (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:

An acts performed by her, is that not correct?

ATTY. GANA:

Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Thank you.17

What is left to be determined therefore is whether Erlinda’s hapless condition was due to any fault or
negligence on the part of Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda) was under the latter’s care. Dr. Gutierrez
maintains that the bronchospasm and cardiac arrest resulting in the patient’s comatose condition
was brought about by the anaphylactic reaction of the patient to Thiopental Sodium (pentothal).18 In
the Decision, we explained why we found Dr. Gutierrez’ theory unacceptable. In the first place, Dr.
Eduardo Jamora, the witness who was presented to support her (Dr. Gutierrez) theory, was a
pulmonologist. Thus, he could not be considered an authority on anesthesia practice and procedure
and their complications.19

Secondly, there was no evidence on record to support the theory that Erlinda developed an allergic
reaction to pentothal. Dr. Camagay enlightened the Court as to the manifestations of an allergic
reaction in this wise:

DR. CAMAGAY:

All right, let us qualify an allergic reaction. In medical terminology an allergic reaction
is something which is not usual response and it is further qualified by the release of a
hormone called histamine and histamine has an effect on all the organs of the body
generally release because the substance that entered the body reacts with the
particular cell, the mass cell, and the mass cell secretes this histamine. In a way it is
some form of response to take away that which is not mine, which is not part of the
body. So, histamine has multiple effects on the body. So, one of the effects as you
will see you will have redness, if you have an allergy you will have tearing of the
eyes, you will have swelling, very crucial swelling sometimes of the larynges which is
your voice box main airway, that swelling may be enough to obstruct the entry of air
to the trachea and you could also have contraction, constriction of the smaller
airways beyond the trachea, you see you have the trachea this way, we brought
some visual aids but unfortunately we do not have a projector. And then you have
the smaller airways, the bronchi and then eventually into the mass of the lungs you
have the bronchus. The difference is that these tubes have also in their walls
muscles and this particular kind of muscles is smooth muscle so, when histamine is
released they close up like this and that phenomenon is known as bronco spasm.
However, the effects of histamine also on blood vessels are different. They dilate
blood vessel open up and the patient or whoever has this histamine release has
hypertension or low blood pressure to a point that the patient may have decrease
blood supply to the brain and may collapse so, you may have people who have this.20

These symptoms of an allergic reaction were not shown to have been extant in Erlinda’s case. As
we held in our Decision, "no evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing – some of the more
common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction – appears on record. No laboratory data were
ever presented to the court."21

Dr. Gutierrez, however, insists that she successfully intubated Erlinda as evidenced by the fact that
she was revived after suffering from cardiac arrest. Dr. Gutierrez faults the Court for giving credence
to the testimony of Cruz on the matter of the administration of anesthesia when she (Cruz), being a
nurse, was allegedly not qualified to testify thereon. Rather, Dr. Gutierrez invites the Court’s
attention to her synopsis on what transpired during Erlinda’s intubation:

12:15 p.m. Patient was inducted with sodium pentothal 2.5% (250 mg) given by slow IV. 02
was started by mask. After pentothal injection this was followed by IV injection of Norcuron
4mg. After 2 minutes 02 was given by positive pressure for about one minute. Intubation with
endotracheal tube 7.5 m in diameter was done with slight difficulty (short neck & slightly
prominent upper teeth) chest was examined for breath sounds & checked if equal on both
sides. The tube was then anchored to the mouth by plaster & cuff inflated. Ethrane 2% with
02 4 liters was given. Blood pressure was checked 120/80 & heart rate regular and normal
90/min.

12:25 p.m. After 10 minutes patient was cyanotic. Ethrane was discontinued & 02 given
alone. Cyanosis disappeared. Blood pressure and heart beats stable.

12:30 p.m. Cyanosis again reappeared this time with sibilant and sonorous rales all over the
chest. D_5%_H20 & 1 ampule of aminophyline by fast drip was started. Still the cyanosis
was persistent. Patient was connected to a cardiac monitor. Another ampule of of [sic]
aminophyline was given and solu cortef was given.

12:40 p.m. There was cardiac arrest. Extra cardiac massage and intercardiac injection of
adrenalin was given & heart beat reappeared in less than one minute. Sodium bicarbonate &
another dose of solu cortef was given by IV. Cyanosis slowly disappeared & 02 continuously
given & assisted positive pressure. Laboratory exams done (see results in chart).

Patient was transferred to ICU for further management.22

From the foregoing, it can be allegedly seen that there was no withdrawal (extubation) of the tube.
And the fact that the cyanosis allegedly disappeared after pure oxygen was supplied through the
tube proved that it was properly placed.
The Court has reservations on giving evidentiary weight to the entries purportedly contained in Dr.
Gutierrez’ synopsis. It is significant to note that the said record prepared by Dr. Gutierrez was made
only after Erlinda was taken out of the operating room. The standard practice in anesthesia is that
every single act that the anesthesiologist performs must be recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez’ case, she
could not account for at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during the administration of
anesthesia on Erlinda. The following exchange between Dr. Estrella, one of the amicii curiae, and
Dr. Gutierrez is instructive:

DR. ESTRELLA

Q You mentioned that there were two (2) attempts in the intubation period?

DR. GUTIERREZ

Yes.

Q There were two attempts. In the first attempt was the tube inserted or was the
laryngoscope only inserted, which was inserted?

A All the laryngoscope.

Q All the laryngoscope. But if I remember right somewhere in the re-direct, a certain
lawyer, you were asked that you did a first attempt and the question was – did you withdraw
the tube? And you said – you never withdrew the tube, is that right?

A Yes.

Q Yes. And so if you never withdrew the tube then there was no, there was no insertion
of the tube during that first attempt. Now, the other thing that we have to settle here is –
when cyanosis occurred, is it recorded in the anesthesia record when the cyanosis, in your
recording when did the cyanosis occur?

A (sic)

Q Is it a standard practice of anesthesia that whatever you do during that period or from
the time of induction to the time that you probably get the patient out of the operating room
that every single action that you do is so recorded in your anesthesia record?

A I was not able to record everything I did not have time anymore because I did that
after the, when the patient was about to leave the operating room. When there was second
cyanosis already that was the (interrupted)

Q When was the first cyanosis?

A The first cyanosis when I was (interrupted)

Q What time, more or less?

A I think it was 12:15 or 12:16.

Q Well, if the record will show you started induction at 12:15?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And the first medication you gave was what?

A The first medication, no, first the patient was oxygenated for around one to two
minutes.

Q Yes, so, that is about 12:13?

A Yes, and then, I asked the resident physician to start giving the pentothal very slowly
and that was around one minute.

Q So, that is about 12:13 no, 12:15, 12:17?

A Yes, and then, after one minute another oxygenation was given and after (interrupted)
Q 12:18?

A Yes, and then after giving the oxygen we start the menorcure which is a relaxant.
After that relaxant (interrupted)

Q After that relaxant, how long do you wait before you do any manipulation?

A Usually you wait for two minutes or three minutes.

Q So, if our estimate of the time is accurate we are now more or less 12:19, is that
right?

A Maybe.

Q 12:19. And at that time, what would have been done to this patient?

A After that time you examine the, if there is relaxation of the jaw which you push it
downwards and when I saw that the patient was relax because that monorcure is a relaxant,
you cannot intubate the patient or insert the laryngoscope if it is not keeping him relax. So,
my first attempt when I put the laryngoscope on I saw the trachea was deeply interiorly. So,
what I did ask "mahirap ata ito ah." So, I removed the laryngoscope and oxygenated again
the patient.

Q So, more or less you attempted to do an intubation after the first attempt as you
claimed that it was only the laryngoscope that was inserted.

A Yes.

Q And in the second attempt you inserted the laryngoscope and now possible
intubation?

A Yes.

Q And at that point, you made a remark, what remark did you make?

A I said "mahirap ata ito" when the first attempt I did not see the trachea right away.
That was when I (interrupted)

Q That was the first attempt?

A Yes.

Q What about the second attempt?

A On the second attempt I was able to intubate right away within two to three seconds.

Q At what point, for purposes of discussion without accepting it, at what point did you
make the comment "na mahirap ata to intubate, mali ata ang pinasukan"

A I did not say "mali ata ang pinasukan" I never said that.

Q Well, just for the information of the group here the remarks I am making is based on
the documents that were forwarded to me by the Supreme Court. That is why for purposes of
discussion I am trying to clarify this for the sake of enlightenment. So, at what point did you
ever make that comment?

A Which one, sir?

Q The "mahirap intubate ito" assuming that you (interrupted)

A Iyon lang, that is what I only said "mahirap intubate (interrupted)

Q At what point?

A When the first attempt when I inserted the laryngoscope for the first time.

Q So, when you claim that at the first attempt you inserted the laryngoscope, right?
A Yes.

Q But in one of the recordings somewhere at the, somewhere in the transcript of


records that when the lawyer of the other party try to inquire from you during the first attempt
that was the time when "mayroon ba kayong hinugot sa tube, I do not remember the page
now, but it seems to me it is there. So, that it was on the second attempt that (interrupted)

A I was able to intubate.

Q And this is more or less about what time 12:21?

A Maybe, I cannot remember the time, Sir.

Q Okay, assuming that this was done at 12:21 and looking at the anesthesia records
from 12:20 to 12:30 there was no recording of the vital signs. And can we presume that at
this stage there was already some problems in handling the patient?

A Not yet.

Q But why are there no recordings in the anesthesia record?

A I did not have time.

Q Ah, you did not have time, why did you not have time?

A Because it was so fast, I really (at this juncture the witness is laughing)

Q No, I am just asking. Remember I am not here not to pin point on anybody I am here
just to more or less clarify certainty more ore less on the record.

A Yes, Sir.

Q And so it seems that there were no recording during that span of ten (10) minutes.
From 12:20 to 12:30, and going over your narration, it seems to me that the cyanosis
appeared ten (10) minutes after induction, is that right?

A Yes.

Q And that is after induction 12:15 that is 12:25 that was the first cyanosis?

A Yes.

Q And that the 12:25 is after the 12:20?

A We cannot (interrupted)

Q Huwag ho kayong makuwan, we are just trying to enlighten, I am just going over the
record ano, kung mali ito kuwan eh di ano. So, ganoon po ano, that it seems to me that there
is no recording from 12:20 to 12:30, so, I am just wondering why there were no recordings
during the period and then of course the second cyanosis, after the first cyanosis. I think that
was the time Dr. Hosaka came in?

A No, the first cyanosis (interrupted).23

We cannot thus give full credence to Dr. Gutierrez’ synopsis in light of her admission that it does not
fully reflect the events that transpired during the administration of anesthesia on Erlinda. As pointed
out by Dr. Estrella, there was a ten-minute gap in Dr. Gutierrez’ synopsis, i.e., the vital signs of
Erlinda were not recorded during that time. The absence of these data is particularly significant
because, as found by the trial court, it was the absence of oxygen supply for four (4) to five (5)
minutes that caused Erlinda’s comatose condition.

On the other hand, the Court has no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Cruz. As we stated in the
Decision, she is competent to testify on matters which she is capable of observing such as, the
statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances and manifest conditions
which are observable by any one.24 Cruz, Erlinda’s sister-in-law, was with her inside the operating
room. Moreover, being a nurse and Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing at that,
she is not entirely ignorant of anesthetic procedure. Cruz narrated that she heard Dr. Gutierrez
remark, "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." She
observed that the nailbeds of Erlinda became bluish and thereafter Erlinda was placed in
trendelenburg position.25Cruz further averred that she noticed that the abdomen of Erlinda became
distended.26

The cyanosis (bluish discoloration of the skin or mucous membranes caused by lack of oxygen or
abnormal hemoglobin in the blood) and enlargement of the stomach of Erlinda indicate that the
endotracheal tube was improperly inserted into the esophagus instead of the trachea. Consequently,
oxygen was delivered not to the lungs but to the gastrointestinal tract. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that Erlinda was placed in trendelenburg position. This indicates that there was a
decrease of blood supply to the patient’s brain. The brain was thus temporarily deprived of oxygen
supply causing Erlinda to go into coma.

The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. As was noted in our Decision,
the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all
under the exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.27 In Voss vs.
Bridwell,28 which involved a patient who suffered brain damage due to the wrongful administration of
anesthesia, and even before the scheduled mastoid operation could be performed, the Kansas
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, reasoning that the injury to the patient
therein was one which does not ordinarily take place in the absence of negligence in the
administration of an anesthetic, and in the use and employment of an endotracheal tube. The court
went on to say that "[o]rdinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as
a consequence of administering such anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these facts
and under these circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge
and observation, that the consequences of professional treatment were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised."29 Considering the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the testimony of Cruz was properly given credence in the case at bar.

For his part, Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in finding him negligent as a surgeon
by applying the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.30 Dr. Hosaka argues that the trend in United States
jurisprudence has been to reject said doctrine in light of the developments in medical practice. He
points out that anesthesiology and surgery are two distinct and specialized fields in medicine and as
a surgeon, he is not deemed to have control over the acts of Dr. Gutierrez. As anesthesiologist, Dr.
Gutierrez is a specialist in her field and has acquired skills and knowledge in the course of her
training which Dr. Hosaka, as a surgeon, does not possess.31 He states further that current American
jurisprudence on the matter recognizes that the trend towards specialization in medicine has created
situations where surgeons do not always have the right to control all personnel within the operating
room,32 especially a fellow specialist.33

Dr. Hosaka cites the case of Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital,34 which involved a suit filed by a
patient who lost his voice due to the wrongful insertion of the endotracheal tube preparatory to the
administration of anesthesia in connection with the laparotomy to be conducted on him. The patient
sued both the anesthesiologist and the surgeon for the injury suffered by him. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that the surgeon could not be held liable for the loss of the patient’s
voice, considering that the surgeon did not have a hand in the intubation of the patient. The court
rejected the application of the "Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine," citing the fact that the field of medicine
has become specialized such that surgeons can no longer be deemed as having control over the
other personnel in the operating room. It held that "[a]n assignment of liability based on actual
control more realistically reflects the actual relationship which exists in a modern operating
room."35 Hence, only the anesthesiologist who inserted the endotracheal tube into the patient’s throat
was held liable for the injury suffered by the latter.

This contention fails to persuade.

That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine
does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual
circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. From
the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the
very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda.

First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he
represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary competence and skills. Drs.
Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery,
he would always engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient.36

Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when
Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to call for another
anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.37
Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez
worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because their
duties intersect with each other.38

While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured primarily for their
performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda,
and that one does not exercise control over the other, they were certainly not completely
independent of each other so as to absolve one from the negligent acts of the other physician.

That they were working as a medical team is evident from the fact that Dr. Hosaka was keeping an
eye on the intubation of the patient by Dr. Gutierrez, and while doing so, he observed that the
patient’s nails had become dusky and had to call Dr. Gutierrez’s attention thereto. The Court also
notes that the counsel for Dr. Hosaka admitted that in practice, the anesthesiologist would also have
to observe the surgeon’s acts during the surgical process and calls the attention of the surgeon
whenever necessary39 in the course of the treatment. The duties of Dr. Hosaka and those of Dr.
Gutierrez in the treatment of petitioner Erlinda are therefore not as clear-cut as respondents claim
them to be. On the contrary, it is quite apparent that they have a common responsibility to treat the
patient, which responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the condition of the
patient while the other physician is performing the necessary medical procedures.

It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner
Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours late for the scheduled operation.
The cholecystectomy was set for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 a.m., but he arrived at DLSMC only at
around 12:10 p.m. In reckless disregard for his patient’s well being, Dr. Hosaka scheduled two
procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at different hospitals. Thus,
when the first procedure (protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda
was kept in a state of uncertainty at the DLSMC.

The unreasonable delay in petitioner Erlinda’s scheduled operation subjected her to continued
starvation and consequently, to the risk of acidosis,40 or the condition of decreased alkalinity of the
blood and tissues, marked by sickly sweet breath, headache, nausea and vomiting, and visual
disturbances.41 The long period that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the
anxiety that she must have been feeling at the time. It could be safely said that her anxiety adversely
affected the administration of anesthesia on her. As explained by Dr. Camagay, the patient’s anxiety
usually causes the outpouring of adrenaline which in turn results in high blood pressure or
disturbances in the heart rhythm:

DR. CAMAGAY:

x x x Pre-operative medication has three main functions: One is to alleviate anxiety.


Second is to dry up the secretions and Third is to relieve pain. Now, it is very
important to alleviate anxiety because anxiety is associated with the outpouring of
certain substances formed in the body called adrenalin. When a patient is anxious
there is an outpouring of adrenalin which would have adverse effect on the patient.
One of it is high blood pressure, the other is that he opens himself to disturbances in
the heart rhythm, which would have adverse implications. So, we would like to
alleviate patient’s anxiety mainly because he will not be in control of his body there
could be adverse results to surgery and he will be opened up; a knife is going to
open up his body. x x x42

Dr. Hosaka cannot now claim that he was entirely blameless of what happened to Erlinda. His
conduct clearly constituted a breach of his professional duties to Erlinda:

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Two other points. The first, Doctor, you were talking about anxiety, would you
consider a patient's stay on the operating table for three hours sufficient enough to
aggravate or magnify his or her anxiety?

DR. CAMAGAY:

Yes.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

In other words, I understand that in this particular case that was the case, three
hours waiting and the patient was already on the operating table (interrupted)

DR. CAMAGAY:
Yes.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Would you therefore conclude that the surgeon contributed to the aggravation of the
anxiety of the patient?

DR. CAMAGAY:

That this operation did not take place as scheduled is already a source of anxiety
and most operating tables are very narrow and that patients are usually at risk of
falling on the floor so there are restraints that are placed on them and they are never,
never left alone in the operating room by themselves specially if they are already pre-
medicated because they may not be aware of some of their movement that they
make which would contribute to their injury.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

In other words due diligence would require a surgeon to come on time?

DR. CAMAGAY:

I think it is not even due diligence it is courtesy.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Courtesy.

DR. CAMAGAY:

And care.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

Duty as a matter of fact?

DR. CAMAGAY:

Yes, Your Honor.43

Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of petitioner
Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician "to serve the interest of his patients with the
greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill,"44 but also of Article 19 of the Civil
Code which requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone
his due.

Anent private respondent DLSMC’s liability for the resulting injury to petitioner Erlinda, we held that
respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors therefor under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code45 since there exists an employer-employee relationship between private respondent DLSMC
and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka:

In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, x x x the
control exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.
x x x46

DLSMC however contends that applying the four-fold test in determining whether such a relationship
exists between it and the respondent doctors, the inescapable conclusion is that DLSMC cannot be
considered an employer of the respondent doctors.

It has been consistently held that in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties, the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of
services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only
the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end.47
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a consultant, but
rather, accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting
patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary
qualifications, such as accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship and
references.48 Second, it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultant’s fee for services
rendered by the latter.49 Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose
his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital.50 Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a
doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be
given to said patient. The hospital’s obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred
room accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor, the equipment
and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff
who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctor’s orders are carried out strictly.51

After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent
hospital’s position on this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee relationship between
DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury
suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC’s


medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee
thereof, which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the
particular specialty applied for as chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends to
DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of the applicant
physician, and said director or administrator validates the committee's recommendation.52 Similarly, in
cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the
department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee
consisting of the department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts
as ex-officio member of said committee.

Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services
rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in
respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent
hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the
consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and
services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of
the patient.

Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a
failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her
treatment.

For these reasons, we reverse the finding of liability on the part of DLSMC for the injury suffered by
petitioner Erlinda.

Finally, the Court also deems it necessary to modify the award of damages to petitioners in view of
the supervening event of petitioner Erlinda’s death. In the assailed Decision, the Court awarded
actual damages of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,352,000.00) to cover
the expenses for petitioner Erlinda’s treatment and care from the date of promulgation of the
Decision up to the time the patient expires or survives.53 In addition thereto, the Court awarded
temperate damages of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) in view of the
chronic and continuing nature of petitioner Erlinda’s injury and the certainty of further pecuniary loss
by petitioners as a result of said injury, the amount of which, however, could not be made with
certainty at the time of the promulgation of the decision. The Court justified such award in this
manner:

Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation,
the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that
the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those
situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.

In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately
and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary
loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss
certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and
temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct
phases.

As it would not be equitable—and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of
justice—for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their
aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded—temperate
damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.

In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a
comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised
our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of
litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded
for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in
a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for
anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.54

However, subsequent to the promulgation of the Decision, the Court was informed by petitioner
Rogelio that petitioner Erlinda died on August 3, 1999.55 In view of this supervening event, the award
of temperate damages in addition to the actual or compensatory damages would no longer be
justified since the actual damages awarded in the Decision are sufficient to cover the medical
expenses incurred by petitioners for the patient. Hence, only the amounts representing actual, moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit should be awarded to petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby modified as follows:

(1) Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center is hereby absolved from liability arising from
the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda Ramos on June 17, 1985;

(2) Private respondents Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez are hereby declared to be
solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda on June 17, 1985 and are ordered to pay
petitioners—

(a) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(d) P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

(e) the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Facts: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-year old robust woman. Except for
occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she
was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT), she has three children whose names are Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond. Because of
the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sough professional advice. She was told to undergo
an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which revealed that
she was fit for the said surgery. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for
the first time and she was advised by Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy and the same was
agreed to be scheduled on June 17,1985 at 9:00am at the Delos Santos Medical Center. Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to
look for a good anesthesiologist to which the latter agreed to. A day before the scheduled operation, she was
admitted at the hospital and on the day of the operation, Erlinda’s sister was with her insider the operating room. Dr.
Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina when Herminda heard
her say that intubating Erlinda is quite difficult and there were complications. This prompt Dr. Osaka to order a call
to another anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully intubated Erlina. The patient’s nails became bluish and the
patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. After the operation, Erlina was diagnosed to be suffering from
diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged that this was due to lack of oxygen supply to
Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages against petitioner for the result to Erlinda
of the said operation.
Held: Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care
of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate case of her piteous condition.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically follow that it apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to
the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case.
It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common
knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the
usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa
liquitor can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or
of a scientific treatment.

Scientific studies point out that intubation problems are responsible for 1/3 of deaths and serious injuries associated
with anesthesia. Nevertheless, 98% or the vast majority of difficult intubation may be anticipated by performing a
thorough evaluation of the patient’s airway prior to the operation. As stated beforehand, respondent, Dra. Guttierez
failed to observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had
appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could
have been more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the perceived atomic variations in the patient’s
neck and oral area; defects which could have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations
together with a change in technique. In other words, an experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a
thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and potruding teeth.
Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra.
Guttierez negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 023873 affirming with modification the December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph, "
finding accused-appellants Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder as principal and accomplice, respectively.

On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed
against accused-appellants.

On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were
causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by.
At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the
street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted:
"Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a
knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter,
Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante,
meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.6

The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight stab
wounds: five located on the chest area and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal
wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the lower
lobe of the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:

CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.

The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the following expenses
in connection with the death and burial of Alfante:

a) ₱17,000.00 for the coffin

b) ₱3,000.00 for the nicho

c) ₱250.00 for the mass

d) ₱15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and

e) ₱16,000.00 for the burial lot.

Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning ₱500.00 a
day.9

In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10,
2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for
"baon" the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go
to the 7-11 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and
proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of
the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his
side for the duration of the incident.10 Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police
station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his
right palm sustained during the tussle.11

Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination
and treatment of Vergara’s injury caused by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11,
2001.12

After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC
found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders
judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y
PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of
Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the Court hereby sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and the other accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased
Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for
loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus costs (sic).13

Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court.14 The
appeal was accepted by this Court in its Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was
subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16

As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo’s finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven.17 On
March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the
Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs
of the victim, to the exclusion of his common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:
a. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;

b. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and

c. ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.18

Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants’ confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections
on April 11, 2007.20

The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.

On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal
stating that he is no longer interested to pursue an appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June
25, 2008, granted the motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he is
concerned.23

Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergara’s counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a
Resolution dated November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense with its filing.24

We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the
award of damages.

The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis
added.)

Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the
credibility of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.25 People v.
Clores26 reminds us that:

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which
are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is
a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2)
the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect
since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and,
therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)

The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial
courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility.27 On the other hand, this Court is
far detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its
review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its
limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference.

We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that
accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that
it had overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated
that:

The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by
[appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him
repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife handed to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is
an overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and
self-defense. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily
fail.28 (Citation omitted.)

Anent accused-appellant Vergara’s claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be
proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof.
He must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for
self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.30

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely
threatening and intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life."31

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the
witnesses, the victim’s actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force
employed by accused-appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home
albeit drunk when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any
untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergara’s
hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:

The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the appellants
into a fight. Appellant Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the
victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."32

It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused-
appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.

We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara
constituted treachery qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon,
treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.33

Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the
victim’s shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would
befall him. The number and severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was
rendered immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his
arm to ward off the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the commission of the crime.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.34

However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for
death and exemplary damages awarded by the courts a quo.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.35

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial
court, actual damages in the amount of ₱51,250.00 based on the receipts36 they submitted to the
trial court.
1âw phi1

We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC’s award respecting the indemnity
for the loss of earning capacity. As we have already previously ruled that:

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be
duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.

By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s
line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis
omitted.)
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary
evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed
by his common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions
mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:

Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime,
must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable
by the injured party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support
the contention of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning
₱500.00 a day. Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-
wife of the victim which lacks specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation
omitted.)

Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as
follows:

Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence
to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.39(Emphasis omitted.)

We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to conform to existing
jurisprudence.40

We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00 to conform to recent
jurisprudence.41

Lastly, we sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 even in the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.42 As borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victim’s family.43 While no amount of damages may totally compensate the
sudden and tragic loss of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at
least assuage them.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.44

WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02387 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of ₱51
,250.00 as actual damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal
rate of 6o/o per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177827


Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

ANSELMO BERONDO, JR. Promulgated:


y PATERES,
Accused-Appellant. March 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the November 7, 2006 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00386 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Anselmo Berondo, Jr. y Pateres which held accused-appellant Anselmo Berondo,
Jr. guilty of homicide. The CA Decision modified the September 23, 2003
Decision[2] in Criminal Case No. 11760-02 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8 in Malaybalay City, which held accused-appellant liable for murder.

The Facts

At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay
competition at New Danao, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr.
walked home to Puntian, Quezon, Bukidnon. While on the way, he suddenly heard
a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran towards the grassy area by the
roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw accused-appellant, Julie
Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife, walk towards the road and take
turns in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized
the three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and
went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The
next day, he learned that the person stabbed was Genaro Laguna. He later testified
that he did not reveal what he had witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of
getting involved.[3]
At about the same time, Pedro Tero, who was also walking along the road
towards Puntian, saw Tubigon shoot Laguna. After the victim fell, about five to six
persons whom he did not recognize went near the victim. He then immediately ran
away from the scene and no longer saw what had happened next to the victim. On
the following day, he told a certain Hoseas Sagarino what he saw but did not report
it to the authorities.[4]

Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero admitted to Dolores, Lagunas
widow, that they had witnessed the crime. They then reported the matter to the
police and, accordingly, executed their respective sworn statements. Thereafter, an
Information for robbery with murder was filed against accused-appellant, Tubigon,
and Sudario. The Information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of February 1999, in the evening, at


Purok 2, barangay West Dalurong, [Kitaotao], [Bukidnon], Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally take, rob and carry away cash amounting to SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS [PhP 6,500], belonging to
GENARO LAGUNA, to his damage and prejudice in the
aforementioned amount;

That on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above name


accused, acting on the same conspiracy, and to enable them to
consummate their desire, with intent to kill by means of force and taking
advantage of superior strength, armed with a firearm with an unknown
caliber, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally attack,
assault and shoot GENARO LAGUNA, inflicting upon his person
multiple stab and gunshot wounds, which caused the instantaneous death
of GENARO LAGUNA to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
GENARO LAGUNA in such amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in Violation of Article 294 in relation to Article


14 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.[5]
Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant because the two other
accused remained at-large.

In his defense, accused-appellant denied any involvement in the killing of


Laguna. He claimed that in the evening of February 13, 1999, he was with his wife
and daughter watching the activities during the Araw ng New Danao (New Danao
Day) at the Poblacion, New Danao, Sinaysayan. When the activities ended at about
two oclock in the morning of the next day, they went home together. Hours later,
Geno Laguna, the victims cousin, told him about the incident and together they
proceeded to the place where the victims body was found. Further, he alleged that
prosecution witness Nietes was his daughters former sweetheart. Their relationship
became unfriendly after Nietes acted rudely against accused-appellants daughter.[6]

On September 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused ANSELMO BERONDO JR. y
PATERES is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
the crime of MURDER under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
is sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is
further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Genaro Laguna the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP50,000.00) as actual
damages and civil indemnity in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
The case was appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

Affirming the decision of the trial court, the appellate court found credible
Nietes testimony pointing to accused-appellant as one of the persons who stabbed
the victim. It dismissed the imputation of ill motive against Nietes and held that the
clear and straightforward manner in which he testified is worthy of belief. Also, it
held that Nietes delay in reporting the crime was reasonable considering that
eyewitnesses have a tendency to remain silent rather than imperil their lives or that
of their family.

The CA, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the attendance
of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. It held that no
evidence was presented to prove that the three accused purposely took advantage
of their numerical superiority. Thus, accused-appellant was held guilty only of
homicide and not murder.

The CA also modified the award of damages. Finding that there was absence
of proof of actual damages, the CA instead awarded temperate damages in the
amount of PhP 50,000.

The fallo of the November 7, 2006 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is modified. In lieu of


murder, the Court finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide and he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.Appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Genaro Laguna the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php
50,000.00) as temperate damages and fifty thousand pesos (Php
50,000.00) as civil indemnity.[7]

Hence, we have this appeal.

The Issues

In a Resolution dated August 22, 2007, this Court required the parties to
submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. On October 25, 2007, accused-
appellant, through counsel, signified that he was no longer filing a supplemental
brief. Thus, the following issues raised in accused-appellants Brief dated
November 16, 2004 are now deemed adopted in this present appeal:
I.
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
[homicide] despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

II.
The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the
incredible and inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses.[8]

In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses


and the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

Accused-appellants guilt is anchored only on the testimony of


Nietes. Accused-appellant, however, faults Nietes for belatedly reporting the
identities of the assailants. He claims that the delay impaired Nietes credibility;
thus, the latters testimony should be disregarded.

We disagree. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime


does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient
explanation is given.[9] No standard form of behavior can be expected from people
who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience.[10] Jurisprudence recognizes
that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case
or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied
reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; [11] while others shy away
when those involved in the crime are their relatives[12] or townmates.[13] And where
there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must
be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay.[14]
In this case, although it took Nietes more than two years to report the
identity of the assailants, such delay was sufficiently explained. Nietes stated that
he feared for his life because the three accused also lived in the same town and the
incident was the first killing in their area. He only had the courage to reveal to
Dolores what he had witnessed because his conscience bothered him.

Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes


testified in a categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained
consistent even under grueling cross-examination. Such bears the marks of a
credible witness.[15]

As regards the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence, we affirm the


findings of the CA that the crime committed was only homicide and not murder.
As correctly noted by the appellate court, the attendant circumstances of
conspiracy and abuse of superior strength were not proved, thus:
The Court notes that witness Nietes Jr. was not able to identify the person
who shot the victim. It was witness Tero who said that it was accused Julie
Tubigon, but he did not witness the stabbing. Witness Nietes Jr. did. No evidence
exists to show the events preceding the attack and those occurring after. The
simultaneity of the delivery of stabs by the three assailants alone is not sufficient
to prove conspiracy.
The Court likewise finds error in finding that the killing of the deceased
was committed with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was
presented to prove that the accused purposely took advantage of their numerical
superiority.
Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance,
conviction should only be for homicide.[16]

On the award of damages, the appellate court did not grant actual damages
due to lack of proof of actual expenses, but instead granted temperate damages in
the amount of PhP 50,000. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty. In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the victim incurred funeral and burial expenses although the exact amount was not
established. In line with current jurisprudence, the amount of temperate damages
should, however, be decreased to PhP 25,000.[17]

The CA also properly awarded civil indemnity as such is given without need
of proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-
appellants responsibility for it.[18] The trial court, however, failed to award moral
damages. Moral damages are awarded without need of further proof other than the
fact of the killing.[19]Thus, PhP 50,000 in moral damages is additionally awarded in
favor of the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 7, 2006 CA Decision


in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00386 with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision shall read:

WHEREFORE, the accused ANSELMO BERONDO JR. y


PATERES is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.He is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 25,000
as temperate damages, and PhP 50,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

FILOMENA R. BENEDICTO, G.R. No. 185020


Petitioner,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J.,*


NACHURA,**
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,*** JJ.

Promulgated:
ANTONIO VILLAFLORES,
Respondent. October 6, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioner Filomena R. Benedicto (Filomena) appeals by certiorari the


September 30, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
80103, which affirmed with modification the decision[2] dated December 10, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, in Civil Case
No. 674-M-2000.
The antecedents.

Maria Villaflores (Maria) was the owner of Lot 2-A, with an area of 277 square
meters, in Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-84.761 (M). In 1980, Maria sold a portion of Lot 2-A to her
nephew, respondent Antonio Villaflores (Antonio). Antonio then took possession
of the portion sold to him and constructed a house thereon. Twelve (12) years later,
or on August 15, 1992, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan[3] covering the entire Lot 2-A. However, Antonio did not register
the sale or pay the real property taxes for the subject land.

On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same Lot 2-A to Filomena, evidenced
by a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan.[4] Filomena registered the sale with the
Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan on September 6, 1994. Consequently, TCT No.
T-84.761 (M) in the name of Maria was cancelled and TCT No. T-208265 (M) was
issued in the name of Filomena. Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes
for the subject parcel of land.

On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with
Cancellation of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and Attorneys Fees[5] against
Antonio. She alleged that she acquired Lot 2-A in 1994 from her grandaunt Maria
by virtue of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. At the time of the sale, she was
not aware that Antonio had any claim or interest over the subject property. Antonio
assured her that there was no impediment to her acquisition of the land, and
promised to vacate the property five (5) years after the sale. In August 1999,
Antonio requested an extension of one (1) year, and offered to pay a monthly rental
of P2,000.00, which she granted. However, in 2000, Antonio refused to vacate the
property and, instead, claimed absolute ownership of Lot 2-A.
Antonio traversed the complaint, asserting absolute ownership over Lot 2-
A. He alleged that he purchased the subject property from Maria in 1980; and that
he took possession of the same and constructed his house thereon. He came to
know of the sale in favor of Filomena only in 2000 when the latter demanded that
he vacate the property.He averred that Filomena was aware of the sale; hence, the
subsequent sale in favor of Filomena was rescissible, fraudulent, fictitious, or
simulated.[6]

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision[7] sustaining Filomenas


ownership. According to the RTC, Filomena was the one who registered the sale in
good faith; as such, she has better right than Antonio. It rejected Antonios
allegation of bad faith on the part of Filomena because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to prove it. Likewise, the RTC found Antonios evidence of ownership
questionable. Nevertheless, it declared Antonio a builder in good faith.

The RTC disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

a) [Filomena] is adjudged the absolute and real owner of the


property-in-question and covered by TCT No. T-208265 (M) registered
in her name;

b) ordering [Antonio] and all persons claiming right under her to


vacate the premises;

c) [Antonio] is declared to be a builder in good faith of his


improvement/building erected in TCT No. T-208268 (M) and the
provisions of Art. 448 of the New Civil Code applies;

d) all other claims of [Filomena] and counterclaim of [Antonio]


are dismissed for lack of legal as well as factual basis.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the RTC denied
the motions for lack of merit.

Filomena and Antonio then filed their separate appeals with the
CA. Filomena assailed the RTC pronouncement that Antonio was a builder in good
faith, and the denial of her claim for damages. Antonio, on the other hand, faulted
the RTC for sustaining Filomenas ownership of the subject lot.

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged


Decision[9] affirming with modification the RTC decision. The CA affirmed the
RTC for upholding Filomenas ownership of Lot 2-A and for declaring Antonio a
builder in good faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings to determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code, and the amount due Antonio.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal of


[respondent] Antonio Villaflores is GRANTED in part. The Decision
dated December 10, 2002 issued by Branch 19, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 674-M-2000
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Antonio Villaflores, being
a builder in good faith, is entitled to reimbursement of the necessary and
useful expense with the right of retention until reimbursement of said
expenses in full. The partial appeal of [petitioner] Filomena Benedicto
is DENIED.

In accordance with the foregoing disquisitions, let the case


be REMANDED to the trial court which is DIRECTED to receive
evidence, with dispatch, to determine the amount due [respondent], the
rights of the parties under Arts. 448 and 546; and to render a complete
judgment of the case.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Before us, Filomena faults the CA for holding that Antonio was a builder in good
faith and was entitled to reimbursement for the necessary and useful expenses
incurred, with right of retention until reimbursement of the said expenses in
full. Filomena asserts that Antonio is not entitled to any reimbursement because he
possessed the property by mere tolerance. Maria merely allowed Antonio to
construct his house on a portion of Lot 2-A; hence, he is not entitled to any
reimbursement or retention.

The appeal lacks merit.

The question of whether a possessor is in good or bad faith is a factual


matter. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[11] The Supreme Court is not
duty bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings
below. This Court is not a trier of facts and does not embark on a reexamination of
the evidence introduced by the parties during trial.[12] This rule assumes greater
force in the instant case where the CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial
court.
It is not disputed that the construction of Antonios house was undertaken
long before the sale in favor of Filomena; that when Filomena bought the property
from Maria, Antonios house which he used as residence had already been erected
on the property. As explained by the CA:

[Antonio] claims not being aware of any flaw in his title. He believed
being the owner of the subject premises on account of the Deed of Sale
thereof in his favor despite his inability to register the same. The
improvement was, in fact, introduced by Antonio prior to Filomenas
purchase of the land. x x x.[13]
Thus, we sustain the finding that Antonio is a builder in good faith.

Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell
the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a
builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full
reimbursement is made.[14]

The RTC found good faith on the part of Antonio. Yet, it did not order the
reimbursement of the necessary and useful expenses he incurred.

The pronouncement of this Court in Pecson v. CA,[15] which was reiterated


in Tuatis v. Escol,[16] is instructive, viz.:

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice


between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago
stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717
(1920)] that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the
rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to
administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one
nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to
him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of
the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would
otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-
unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties
should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market
value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its
finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

Thus, the CA correctly ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.

Filomena then argues that the CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled on
Antonios right to reimbursement and retention. She asserts that this issue was not
raised in the proceedings a quo.

Indeed, the issue of Antonios right to reimbursement and retention was not
specifically raised during the pre-trial because Antonio insisted on his claim of
ownership. However, Filomena is now estopped from questioning the CA for
ruling on this issue because she was the one who raised it in her appeal before the
CA.

More importantly, the CA had to rule on the issue because it is essential and
indispensable for the just resolution of the case. In Villaflores v. RAM System
Services, Inc.,[17] we had occasion to state that issues or errors not raised by the
parties may be resolved by this Court when it is necessary to arrive at a just
decision, and the resolution of the issues raised by the parties depend upon the
determination of the unassigned issue or error, or is necessary to give justice to the
parties.

Finally Filomena faults the RTC and the CA for denying her claim for attorneys
fees. She asserts that there is overwhelming proof on record to support her claim,
and insists on entitlement to attorneys fees and litigation expenses amounting
to P440,700.00

We disagree.
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid
by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by
the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances
specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to
make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of these
enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be
reasonable.[18]

Certainly, Filomena was compelled to file this suit to vindicate her rights.
However, by itself, it will not justify an award of attorney's fees. In Mindex
Resources Development v. Morillo,[19] this Court, in denying a claim for attorneys
fees, held:

We find the award of attorneys fees to be improper. The reason


which the RTC gave because petitioner had compelled respondent to file
an action against it falls short of our requirement in Scott Consultants
and Resource Development v. CA from which we quote:
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather
than the rule and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article
2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where
granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and
not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award
of attorneys fees.

Moreover, a recent case ruled that in the absence of stipulation, a


winning party may be awarded attorneys fees only in case plaintiffs
action or defendants stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and
evident bad faith.

Indeed, respondent was compelled to file this suit to vindicate his


rights. However, such fact by itself will not justify an award of attorneys
fees, when there is no sufficient showing of petitioners bad faith in
refusing to pay the said rentals as well as the repair and overhaul costs.

Thus, we sustain the denial by the RTC and the CA of Filomenas claim for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

In fine, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in the challenged


Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80103 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170942 August 28, 2013

COMSAVINGS BANK (NOW GSIS FAMILY BANK), PETITIONER,


vs.
SPOUSES DANILO AND ESTRELLA CAPISTRANO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A banking institution serving as an originating bank for the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
of the Government owes a duty to observe the highest degree of diligence and a high standard of
integrity and performance in all its transactions with its clients because its business is imbued with
public interest.

The Case

Comsavings Bank (now GSIS Family Bank) seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on November 30, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modifications
the decision rendered on April 25, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, in Makati
City finding it liable for damages to respondents.2

Antecedents

Respondents were the owners of a residential lot with an area of 200 square meters known as Lot 8
of Block 4 of the Infant Jesus Subdivision situated in Bacoor, Cavite, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 316885 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Desirous of building their
own house on the lot, they availed themselves of the UHLP implemented by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). On May 28, 1992, they executed a construction contract
with Carmencita Cruz-Bay, the proprietor of GCB Builders, for the total contract price of ₱265,000.00
with the latter undertaking to complete the construction within 75 days. To finance the construction,
GCB Builders facilitated their loan application with Comsavings Bank, an NHFMC-accredited
originator. As proof of their qualifications to avail themselves of a loan under the UHLP and to
comply with the conditions prescribed for the approval of their application, they submitted their
record of employment, the amount of their income, and a clearance from the Social Security System
(SSS) to the effect that they had no existing loans, among others. On May 28, 1992, they executed
in favor of GCB Builders a deed of assignment of the amount of the ₱300,000.00 proceeds of the
loan from Comsavings Bank.

On July 2, 1992, Comsavings Bank informed respondent Estrella Capistrano that she would have to
sign various documents as part of the requirements for the release of the loan. Among the
documents was a certificate of house completion and acceptance. On the same date, Comsavings
Bank handed Estrella a letter addressed to GCB Builders informing the latter that respondents had
complied with the preliminary requirements of the UHLP, and were qualified to avail themselves of
the loan amounting to ₱303,450.00 payable within 25 years at 16% per annum, subject to the
following terms and conditions, namely: the signing of mortgage documents, 100% completion of the
construction of the housing unit, original certificate of occupancy permit and certification of
completion, and submission of house pictures signed by the borrower at the back.

On August 10, 1992, Comsavings Bank informed respondents of the approval of an interim financing
loan of ₱260,000.00 payable within 180 days, which amount was to be paid out of the proceeds of
the loan from NHMFC. By October 9, 1992, GCB Builders received from Comsavings Bank the total
sum of ₱265,000.00 as construction cost in four releases, to wit:

August 7, 1992

- ₱39,210.00

August 19, 1992

- ₱112,181.00

September 3, 1992

- ₱53,565.00

October 9, 1992

- ₱24,779.253

In late September 1992, after Comsavings Bank had released the total of ₱265,000.00 to GCB
Builders as construction cost, respondents inquired from GCB Builder when their house would be
completed considering that their contract stipulated a completion period of 75 days. Cruz-Bay gave
various excuses for the delay, such as the rainy season, but promised to finish the construction as
soon as possible. The year 1992 ended with the construction of the house unfinished.4

In February 1993, respondents demanded the completion of the house. In reply, Cruz-Bay told them
to give the further amount of ₱25,000.00 to finish the construction. They requested a breakdown of
the amounts already spent in the construction considering that the ₱303,450.00 that Comsavings
Bank had been paid by NHMFC on their loan had been more than the contract price of the contract.
Instead of furnishing them the requested breakdown, GCB Builders’ counsel sent a demand letter for
an additional construction cost of ₱52,511.59.

On May 30, 1993, respondents received a letter from NHMFC advising that they should already start
paying their monthly amortizations of ₱4,278.00 because their loan had been released on April 20,
1993 directly to Comsavings Bank. On June 1, 1993, Estrella Capistrano went to the construction
site and found to her dismay that the house was still unfinished. She noted that there were no
doorknobs; that the toilet bath floor was not even constructed yet because the portion of the house
was still soil; that there were no toilet and bathroom fixtures; that the toilet and bath wall tiles had no
end-capping; that there were cracks on the wall plastering; that the kitchen sink had no plumbing
fixtures; and that the main door installed was a flush-type instead of the sliding door specified in the
approved plans.

On July 5, 1993, respondents wrote to NHMFC protesting the demand for amortization payments
considering that they had not signed any certification of completion and acceptance, and that even if
there was such a certification of completion and acceptance, it would have been forged.

On July 14, 1993, respondents again wrote to NHMFC requesting an ocular inspection of the
construction site.

On November 11, 1993, Atty. Ruben C. Corona, the Manager of the Collateral Verification &
External Examination Department of NHMFC, informed the counsel of respondents that the
inspection of the construction site conducted on August 4, 1993 showed the following:

1) That the subject unit is being occupied by tenant, a certain Mr. Mark Inanil;

2) That the toilet/bath and kitchen counter are not installed with Plumbing fixtures;

3) That there are no door knobs on bedroom and no handles on Kitchen cabinet;

4) That the toilet bath has no concrete flooring and the tiles has no end/corner cappings; and
5) That there are hairline cracks on flooring.5

On July 12, 1993, respondents sued GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank for breach of contract and
damages,6praying that defendants be ordered jointly and severally liable: (1) to finish the
construction of the house according to the plans and specifications agreed upon at the price
stipulated in the construction contract; and (2) to pay them ₱38,450.00 as the equivalent of the
mortgage value in excess of the contract price; ₱25,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses
incurred by reason of the breach of contract; ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; ₱30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Respondents amended their complaint to implead NHMFC as ab additional defendant. Aside from
adopting the reliefs under the original complaint, they prayed that NHMFC be directed to hold in
abeyance its demand for amortization payment until the case had been finally adjudged; that
NHMFC, GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees; and that GCB Builders and Comsavings be directed to pay ₱4,500.00 as
monthly rental from the filing of the complaint until the house was turned-over and accepted by
them.7

In their respective answers,8 GCB Builders, Comsavings Bank and NHMFC asserted that the
complaint as amended stated no cause of action against them. On its part, GCB Builders claimed
that the construction of the house had been completed a long time ago; that respondent had failed,
despite demand, to occupy the house and to pay a balance of ₱46,849.94 as of August 23, 1993;
and that it had received only ₱239,355.30 out of the ₱303,000.00 loan, inasmuch as the balance
went to interim interest, originator fee, service charge and other bank charges. Comsavings Bank
averred that respondents were estopped from assailing their signing of the certificate of house
acceptance/completion on July 2, 1992 considering that they had the option not to pre-sign the
certificate; and that it did not make any representation as to the conditions and facilitation of the loan
with NHMFC when it submitted the certificate of house acceptance/completion to NHMFC after the
completion of the house on April 20, 1993 because such representations were normal and regular
requirements in loan processing of the conduit banks of NHMFC. Lastly, NHMFC alleged that it
administered the UHLP of the Government by granting financing to qualified home borrowers
through loan originators, like Comsavings Bank in this case; and that respondents had applied and
had been granted a housing loan, and, as security, they had executed a loan and mortgage
agreement and promissory note for ₱303,450.00 dated July 2, 1992.

Decision of the RTC

On April 25, 2003, after trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents.9 Specifically, it
found that although the proceeds of the loan had been completely released, the construction of the
house of respondents remained not completed; that the house had remained in the possession of
GCB Builders, which had meanwhile leased it to another person; that GCB Builders did not comply
with the terms and conditions of the construction contract; and that NHMFC approved the loan in the
gross amount of ₱303,450.00, and released ₱289,000.00 of that amount to Comsavings Bank on
April 20, 1993. It concluded that respondents were entitled to recover from all defendants actual
damages of ₱25,000.00; moral damages for their mental anguish and sleepless night in the amount
of ₱200,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00; and ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. It ruled,
however, that only GCB Builders was liable for the monthly rental of ₱4,500.00 because GCB
Builders was alone in renting out the house; and that NHMFC was equally liable with the other
defendants by reason of its having released the loan proceeds to Comsavings Bank without verifying
whether the construction had already been completed, thereby indicating that NHMFC had connived
and confederated with its co-defendants in the irregular release of the loan proceeds to Comsavings
Bank.

The RTC disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:

Defendants GCB Builder, COMSAVINGS BANK, and NATIONAL HOUSING FINANCE MORTGAGE
CORPORATION (sic) jointly and severally:

1.1 To complete the construction of the house of plaintiff Spouses DANILO and ESTRELLA
CAPISTRANO within thirty 30 days;

1.2 To pay said plaintiffs:

1.2.1 ₱25,000.00 in actual damages;

1.2.2 ₱200,000.00 in moral damages;


1.2.3 ₱100,000.00 in exemplary damages;

1.2.4 ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Defendant GCB Builder to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱4,500.00, as rentals from the date of the
filing of the Complaint until the construction of the house is completed, turned over to and accepted
by the plaintiffs;

Defendants NHMFC to hold in abeyance the collection of the amortizations until 30 days from the
completion and acceptance by the plaintiffs of the house in question.

SO ORDERED.10

GCB Builders, Comsavings Bank and NHMFC appealed to the CA.

Decision of the CA

GCB Builders assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE IN QUESTION WAS NOT COMPLETED.

IN FINDING THAT GCB BUILDERS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE TERM AND CONDITIONS OF
THE CONSTRUCTION.

IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE LIABLE TO PAY DEFENDANT GCB THE AMOUNT
OF ₱45,000.00.

IN RENDERING WITHOUT LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS THE DECISION, THE DISPOSTIVE
PORTION OF WHICH READS, AS FOLLOWS:

xxxx

IN NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE COUNTERCLAIM;

IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.11

Comsavings Bank phrased its assignment of error thuswise:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT COMSAVINGS BANK


IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS GCB
BUILDERS AND NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION TO PAY
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY’S FEES.12

NHMFC ascribes to the RTC the following errors, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT NATIONAL


HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS GCB BUILDERS AND COMSAVINGS
BANK TO PAY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT NATIONAL


HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION SHOULD HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
COLLECTION OF AMORTIZATION UNTIL 30 DAYS FROM THE COMPLETION AND
ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLAINTIFFS OF THE HOUSE IN QUESTION.13

On November 30, 2005, the CA promulgated the appealed decision,14 affirming the RTC subject to
the modification that NHMFC was absolved of liability, and that the moral and exemplary damages
were reduced, viz:
xxxx

The Court a quo held appellant Comsavings Bank jointly and severally liable with appellant GCB
Builders since it likewise committed misrepresentations in obtaining the mortgage loan from the
NHMFC in the name of the appellees. We concur. The records show that it was appellant
Comsavings Bank which called up the appellee Estrella Capistrano and had her sign various
documents as part of the documentary requirements for the release of the construction loan. One of
these documents, was the Certificate of House Completion and Acceptance, which, upon appellant
Bank’s representation was signed by the appellees even if the construction of the house had not yet
started. On July 2, 1992, Comsavings Bank informed appellant GCB Builders that appellees had
provisionally complied with the preliminary requirements under the Unified Home Lending Program
of appellant NHMFC and qualified for a loan in the amount of ₱303,450.00 payable in twenty-five
(25) years at an interest of 16% per annum. One condition for the approval of the loan was "100%
completion of the construction of the housing unit located on the property described plus: Original
Certificate of Occupancy Permit and Certification of Completion and Submission of House pictures
signed at the back by the borrower. However, the loan documents which appellant Bank submitted
to appellant NHMFC were false. Appellant Comsavings Bank in order to show that the construction
of the subject house had been completed, submitted a photograph of a toilet/bath with plumbing and
fixtures installed when in the truth, as admitted by appellant GCB Builders, the plumbing fixtures had
not (been) installed as the appellees were still indebted to GCB. Comsavings Bank also submitted
photographs of wall tiles of the toilet/bath showing them to be brown or mustard, but the color of the
wall tiles actually installed was white per testimony of appellee Estrella Capistrano and corroborated
by appellant GCB Builders’ witness Leopoldo Arnaiz. The appellees complained to appellant
NHMFC that the house which they bought was unfinished on the basis of which NHMFC conducted
an inspection of the housing unit and found the complaint to be true.

By submitting false or forged documents to the NHMFC, appellant Comsavings Bank violated the
warranties contained in the purchase of the loan agreement with appellant NHMFC. On the strength
of such warranties, NHMFC issued Check No. 425824 in the amount of ₱1,382,806.63 that include
the mortgage loan of the appellees. It must be recalled that the agreement provided among others
that "the housing loan extended to the appellees would be released to and received by Comsavings
Bank, and the latter warrants the genuineness of all loan documents it submitted to NHMFC.
Incidentally, Carmencita B. Cruz, owner and proprietor of appellant GCB Builders admitted that she
is even not an accredited builder of housing units under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP)
of the NHMFC in the area. Appellant Comsavings Bank in allowing appellant GCB Builders to
participate in the UHLP program undermined and defeated its real purpose, to help low income
families build their own homes, to the damage and prejudice of the appellees.15

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion finding the NHMFC jointly and severally liable with the
other appellants for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, is hereby deleted; the
awards of moral and exemplary damages are reduced to ₱100,000.00 and ₱50,000.00, respectively,
and the amount of rentals to be paid by GCB Builders is to be reckoned from August 4, 1993.

SO ORDERED.16

Hence, this further appeal by Comsavings Bank.

Issue

Comsavings Bank submits the lone issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER BANK


JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH GCB BUILDERS TO PAY RESPONDENT ACTUAL,
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.17

Comsavings Bank insists on its non-liability, contending that it committed no misrepresentation when
it made respondents sign the certificate of house acceptance/completion notwithstanding that the
construction of the house had not yet started; that they agreed to pre-sign the certificate, although
they had the option not to; that it made them sign the certificate to enable them to avoid the
inconvenience of returning back and forth just to sign the certificate; that it made clear to them during
the pre-signing that the certificate would be submitted to NHMFC only after the completion of the
house; that it submitted the certificate to NHMFC after the completion of the construction of the
house on April 23, 2003; that they had thus been informed beforehand of the conditions in pre-
signing the certificate; that choosing to pre-sign the certificate estopped them from questioning the
procedural aspect of the documentation; and that the practice of pre-signing documents was not
expressly prohibited considering that they were not induced to pre-sign the certificate.18
Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

1.

Comsaving Bank’s liability was not based on its purchase of loan agreement with NHMFC but on
Article 20 and Article 1170 of the Civil Code

The CA rightfully declared Comsavings Bank solidarily liable with GCB Builders for the damages
sustained by respondents. However, we point out that such liability did not arise from Comsavings
Bank’s breach of warranties under its purchase of loan agreement with NHMFC. Under the purchase
of loan agreement, it undertook, for value received, to sell, transfer and deliver to NHMFC the loan
agreements, promissory notes and other supporting documents that it had entered into and
executed with respondents, and warranted the genuineness of the loan documents and the
"construction of the residential units."19 Having made the warranties in favor of NHMFC, it would be
liable in case of breach of the warranties to NHMFC, not respondents, eliminating breach of such
warranties as a source of its liability towards respondents.

Instead, the liability of Comsavings Bank towards respondents was based on Article 20 and Article
1170 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Based on the provisions, a banking institution like Comsavings Bank is obliged to exercise the
highest degree of diligence as well as high standards of integrity and performance in all its
transactions because its business is imbued with public interest.20 As aptly declared in Philippine
National Bank v. Pike:21 "The stability of banks largely depends on the confidence of the people in
the honesty and efficiency of banks."

Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties;22 it is a negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.23It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.24

There is no question that Comsavings Bank was grossly negligent in its dealings with respondents
because it did not comply with its legal obligation to exercise the required diligence and integrity. As
a banking institution serving as an originator under the UHLP and being the maker of the certificate
of acceptance/completion,25 it was fully aware that the purpose of the signed certificate was to affirm
that the house had been completely constructed according to the approved plans and specifications,
and that respondents had thereby accepted the delivery of the complete house. Given the purpose
of the certificate, it should have desisted from presenting the certificate to respondents for their
signature without such conditions having been fulfilled. Yet, it made respondents sign the certificate
(through Estrella Capistrano, both in her personal capacity and as the attorney-in-fact of her
husband Danilo Capistrano) despite the construction of the house not yet even starting. Its act was
irregular per se because it contravened the purpose of the certificate. Worse, the pre-signing of the
certificate was fraudulent because it was thereby enabled to gain in the process the amount of
₱17,306.83 in the form of several deductions from the proceeds of the loan on top of other benefits
as an originator bank.26 On the other hand, respondents were prejudiced, considering that the
construction of the house was then still incomplete and was ultimately defective. Compounding their
plight was that NHMFC demanded payment of their monthly amortizations despite the non-
completion of the house. Had Comsavings Bank been fair towards them as its clients, it should not
have made them pre-sign the certificate until it had confirmed that the construction of the house had
been completed.

Comsavings Bank asserts that it submitted the certificate to NHMFC after the construction of the
house had been completed on April 23, 2003. The assertion could not be true, however, because
Atty. Corona of NHMFC testified that he had inspected the house on August 4, 1993 and had found
the construction to be incomplete and defective.27

Contrary to the claim of Comsavings Bank, the records contain no showing that respondents had
been given the option not to pre-sign the certificate of acceptance/completion; that Comsavings
Bank had made respondents sign the certificate so that they would not be inconvenienced in going
back and forth just to sign the certificate; and that it made clear to them during the pre-signing that
the certificate would be submitted to NHMFC only after the completion of the house. Felicisima M.
Miranda, the loan officer of Comsavings Bank and its sole witness during trial, did not attest to such
option not to pre-sign. Also, Estrella Capistrano (Estrella) mentioned nothing about it during the trial,
testifying only that after signing several documents, including the certificate, she was told by
Comsavings Bank’s personnel that the documents would be needed for the processing of the
loan.28 Clearly, the supposed option was Comsavings Bank’s lame justification for the pre-signing of
the certificate.

The submission of pictures of the fully-constructed house bearing the signatures of respondents on
the dorsal sides was a requirement for the release of the loan by Comsavings Bank to GCB Builders,
and for the Comsavings Bank’s reimbursement of the loan from NHMFC.29 The signatures were
ostensibly for authentication of the pictures. In its compliance, GCB Builders submitted pictures of a
different house sans the signatures of respondents on the dorsal sides.30 Ignoring the glaring
irregularity, Comsavings Bank accepted the unsigned (hence, unauthenticated) pictures, released
the loan to GCB Builders, and turned over the pictures to NHMFC for the reimbursement of the loan.
Had Comsavings Bank complied with its duty of observing the highest degree of diligence, it would
have checked first whether the pictures carried the signatures of respondents on their dorsal sides,
and whether the house depicted on the pictures was really the house of respondents, before
releasing the proceeds of the loan to GCB Builders and before submitting the pictures to NHMFC for
the reimbursement. Again, this is an indication of Comsavings Bank’s gross negligence.

2.

Comsavings Bank is liable for damages

As to the damages that should be awarded to respondents, moral and exemplary damages were
warranted.

Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered for the acts or actions
referred to in Article 20 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for
any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.31

In their amended complaint, respondents claimed that the acts of GCB Builders and Comsavings
Bank had caused them to suffer sleepless nights, worries and anxieties. The claim was well
founded. Danilo worked in Saudi Arabia in order to pay the loan used for the construction of their
family home. His anxiety and anguish over the incomplete and defective construction of their house,
as well as the inconvenience he and his wife experienced because of this suit were not easily
probable. On her part, Estrella was a mere housewife, but was the attorney-in-fact of Danilo in
matters concerning the loan transaction. With Danilo working abroad, she was alone in overseeing
the house construction and the progress of the present case. Given her situation, she definitely
experienced worries and sleepless nights. The award of moral damages of ₱100,000.00 awarded by
the CA as exemplary damages is proper. 1âw phi 1

With respect to exemplary damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded by the CA as exemplary
damages is sustained. Relevantly, we have held that:

The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. The business
of a bank is affected with public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession of diligence and
meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. For this reason, the bank should guard against
injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. The banking sector must at all times maintain
a high level of meticulousness. The grant of exemplary damages is justified by the initial
carelessness of petitioner, aggravated by its lack of promptness in repairing its error.32

However, the award of actual damages amounting to ₱25,000.00 is not warranted. To justify an
award for actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence
can be given only to claims duly supported by receipts.33 Respondents did not submit any
documentary proof, like receipts, to support their claim for actual damages.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that they had suffered substantial losses. Article 2224 of the Civil
Code allows the recovery of temperate damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. In lieu of actual damages, therefore,
temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 are awarded. Such amount, in our view, is reasonable under the
circumstances.

Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows recovery of attorney’s fees when exemplary damages are
awarded or where the plaintiff has incurred expenses to protect his interest by reason of defendant’s
act or omission. Considering that exemplary damages were properly awarded here, and that
respondents hired a private lawyer to litigate its cause, we agree with the RTC and CA that the
₱30,000.00 allowed as attorney’s fees were appropriate and reasonable.

A defendant who did not appeal may be benefitted by the judgment in favor of the other defendant
who appealed.34Thus, the foregoing modifications as to the nature and amount of damages inures to
the benefit of GCB Builders although it did not appeal the ruling of the CA.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on November 30,
2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that Comsavings Bank and GCB Builders are further ordered
to pay, jointly and severally, to the Spouses Danilo and Estrella Capistrano the following amounts:
(1) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; (3) interest of 6% per
annum on all the amounts of damages reckoned from the finality of this decision; and (4) the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 120921 January 29, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN, accused-appellants.

ROMERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19,
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay jointly and solidarily —

1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY


THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the amount of THIRTY
FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P35,755.00), with
interest;

2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the total
amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS
(P61,785.00), with interest;

3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND


THREE PESOS AND FORTY CENTAVOS (P2,003.40), and moral damages in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), with interest;

4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the
amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest.

5. The costs.

The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full time during
which they had undergone preventive imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, they shall be credited in the service thereof with only four-fifths of the time
during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment.1

In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino,
Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and
Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos
Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall at Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not tarry
for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who
were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided
to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.

The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired
upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the "topdown" jeep
and landed just beside it. He scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His younger
brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died.2 Carmelo Agliam,
Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh,
and legs and thighs, respectively. 3 The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to
move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney.4 He did not
survive. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.

Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros,
Galo and Bulusan were issued. Charged with the crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder, an information was filed as follows:

That on or about (sic) May 28, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasuquin, Ilocos
Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, nighttime purposely sought, with evident premeditation
and treachery, confederating and mutually helping one anotlner, did then and
there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot
Eduardo Tolentino Sr., Jerry Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert
Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, with the use of firearms which caused the death
of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino
having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of Murder,
but which did not by reason of causes independent of the will of the defendant,
namely the able and timely medical assistance given to said Vidal Agliam,
Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino which prevented their
death.

All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive
results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.

In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions
at the basketball court, as alleged by the complainants. Having been found with gunpowder
residue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that
he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just consumed eight
cigarette sticks prior to the test. He further asserted that paraffin tests are not infallible, and
that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which
is urine. Lastly, he said that he was not even present at the crime scene when the firing
incident took place; hence, he could not have been one of those who strafed the jeep.5

For his part, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the court that, on May
28, 1991, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he went to a nearby store to purchase some
cigarettes. He returned home within thirty minutes and cleaned his garlic bulbs before
retiring at 9:00 o'clock. The next morning, he busied himself with some chores, which
included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers without gloves.
To counter the finding of traces of nitrates on his left hand, Ballesteros maintained that he
uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes, as it was very painful for him to use his right hand.
He likewise informed the trial court that he had no motive to kill the victims.6

Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating that he saw only Galo on
the evening of the dance but did not talk to him. He denied joining the two later that night
because after the dance, he went straight to the house of Michael Viloria, where he spent the
night he went to work at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day.7

The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified
by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused now come to the High Court on appeal, praying that the decision of the trial
court be reversed and that a new one be entered acquitting them of the charges.

The principal question to be resolved has to do with the merits of the decision of the lower
court. Was it correct in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt? We
answer in the affirmative.

Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam
recognized them as the assailants. This claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonies, Carmelo
and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. The shooting took
place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte, where the air is free from
darkening elements and turbidity. It being a summer evening, there could not have been any
fog to becloud the atmosphere and hamper the vision of the victims, which would have
prevented them from clearly seeing their assailants. They pinpointed the location of the
malefactors to be approximately three meters from where they stood.8 Considering the
luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly
identify their assailants. It must be noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo and his
brother, a butcher, since he used to deal with them in his business of buying and selling
cattle.9 Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal at Cadaratan School. Generally, people in rural
communities know each other both by face and name. 10Bulusan and Agliam were, not only
townmates, but former classmates as well. The constant interaction between them through
the years would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, one
would have been able to recognize the other easily.

That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. A distinction


is herein timely made between motive and intent. Motive is the moving power which impels
one to action for a definite result. Intent, on the other hand, is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such result. 11Motive alone is not proof of a crime. 12 In order to tip the scales
in its favor, intent and not motive must be established by the prosecution. Motive is hardly
ever an essential element of a crime. A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be led
to commit a crime, without a real motive but a just for the sake of committing it. 13 Along the
same line, a man who commits a crime with an apparent motive may produce different
results, for which he is punished. As held in a line of cases, the rule is well-settled that the
prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been
positively identified as the author of the crime. 14 Lack or absence of motive for committing
the crime does not preclude conviction thereof where there were reliable witnesses who fully
and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony. 15

Accused-appellant's attempt to offer wild excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder
traces found on their hands is futile. Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers
and urine may leave traces of nitrates, but these are minimal and, unlike those found in
gunpowder, may be washed off with tap water.

The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellants must likewise fail. As


consistently enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he was at some other place at the time of
the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. 16 This accused-appellants failed to
satisfactorily prove. On the night of May 28, 1991, Galo and Bulusan attended the dance at
the barangay hall. After the dance, they went their separate ways but remained within the
barangay. Galo lingered in the premises. Bulusan slept over at the house of Michael Viloria,
which was within walking distance from the dance hall.

The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactorily evidence, the
reason being that it is easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be
given credence. 17 This is especially true in case of positive identification of the culprit by
reliable witnesses, 18 which renders their alibis worthless. 19 Positive identification prevails
over denials and alibis.20

Accused-appellants are under the common misconception that proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires total freedom from any quantum of doubt. This is not so. Under Section 2,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,

(p)roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge.
The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable
doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable
possibilities and unsupported by evidence. 21Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest
easy upon the certainty of guilt. 22 A precise example would be the uncorroborated alibi of
accused in the case at bar where accused-appellants individually interposed the wavering
defense of alibi. Galo failed to elucidate on his whereabouts after the dance, whereas
Bulusan claimed to have slept in the house of one Michael Viloria. Ballesteros attested that
he was not at the dance hall at all. None of them, however, attempted to corroborate their alibi
through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never attempted to present as witnesses
those who would have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. Had
they done so, the presentation of corroborative testimony would have reenforced their
defense of alibi. As held in People vs. Ligotan, 23 an alibi must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is
fatal to the accused.

The Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery. Under
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, "(t)here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." The requisites of
treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself ; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method
or form of attack employed by him. 24 As regards the second requisite, the accused must
make some preparation to kill his victim in such a manner at to insure the execution of the
crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or
retaliate. 25 There must be evidence that such form of attack waspurposely adopted by the
accused. 26 Here, it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect
on their heinous plan. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a
result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations of their evil designs were already
apparent as early as the time of the dance. They were well-armed and approached the
homebound victims, totally unaware of their presence, from behind. There was no
opportunity for the latter to defend themselves, the attack being so sudden and Eduardo
Tolentino was shot right where he sat.

The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages
may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. 27 Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained, 28 whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced
mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had
furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or
omission. 29 In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such
must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, 30 as
corroborated by his testimony. 31 Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the
victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts
accumulated by them and presented to the court. 32 Therefore, the award of actual damages is
proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and
Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity,
and not as compensatory damages. 33 As regards moral damages, the amount of
psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although
inestimable, 34 may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason
to disturb its findings as to this matter.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119311 October 7, 1998


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO DIANOS, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

Romeo Dianos has taken an appeal to this Court questioning the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City, Branch 6, which has found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Murder, Frustrated and Attempted Murder, after being indicted and tried in Criminal Cases
Numbered 8524-R to 8528-R, inclusive. The five separate informations against him read:

Criminal Case No. 8524-R

The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and "JOHN DOE" of the crime of
MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and fire at TERESITA ORTIZ y PABLO, with an armalite
rifle, causing upon the latter, acute respiratory failure due to a complete transection
of the spinal cord at the level of the 2nd cervical vertebra due to a gunshot wound
through the neck, which directly caused her death.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
use of motor vehicle.

Criminal Case No. 8525-R

The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and "JOHN DOE" of the crime of
ATTEMPTED MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to kill ZALDY ORTIZ, by firing an armalite rifle, causing injuries on
his right leg, thus commencing the commission of the crime directly by overt acts, but
did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
Murder, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
use of motor vehicle.2

Criminal Case No. 8526-R

The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and "JOHN DOE" of the crime of
ATTEMPTED MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to kill VIRGILIO ORTIZ Y PINLAC, by firing an armalite rifle,
causing injuries on his thigh, thus commencing the commission of the crime directly
by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of Murder, by reason of causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely arrival of people from the
neighborhood who extended assistance to the complainant.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
use of motor vehicle. 3

Criminal Case No. 8527-R


The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and "JOHN DOE" of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and fire at LIZETTE ORTIZ, with an armalite rifle, thereby
inflicting upon the latter, penetrating gunshot wound in her abdomen, which wound
would have caused or led to the death of the said LIZETTE ORTIZ, were it not for the
timely and able medical assistance extended to her, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, by the timely medical assistance rendered to said LIZETTE ORTIZ,
which prevented her death.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
use of motor vehicle. 4

Criminal Case No. 8528-R

The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and "JOHN DOE" of the crime of
MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and fire at RICARDO PABLO y PALUA, with an armalite
rifle, causing upon the latter, hypovolemic shock secondary to massive hemorrhage
due to penetrating wounds of the heart, lungs, aorta and pulmonary vessels due to
multiple gunshot wounds on the chest, which directly caused his death.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
use of motor vehicle.5

At his arraignment, accused Dianos entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. His co-accused
remained at large.

The witnesses for the prosecution came up during the trial with accounts of the incidents brought up
in the various accusations.

Involved in the unfortunate saga were all residents of Cypress Point Village, Irisan, in Baguio City.
The otherwise friendly relationship among them was marred by a transaction apparently gone awry
between Teresita Ortiz (Teresita) and Josie Ortiz Santos (Josie), on the one hand, and accused
Romeo Dianos, on the other hand, over a piece of land occupied by the latter. The ensuing "bad
blood" led to the fatal denouement.

On 31 December 1990, at about five o'clock in the morning, Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) saw the
accused throw a hand grenade near the house of her parents. Josie, who was standing near the site
of the explosion was hit with a shrapnel on the left leg. A grenade pin and several shrapnels were
recovered from the scene.

Later that day, at around 9:30 in the evening, the accused, donned in military camouflage uniform
and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, was seen traversing the Cypress Point Road. Following
closely behind was his passenger jeepney with three unidentified men on board.

Meanwhile, that same evening, Teresita, together with her husband, Virgilio Ortiz (Virgilio), her
daughter, Corazon Ortiz Ihanda (Corazon), her brother, Ricardo Pablo (Ricardo), and her son, Zaldy
Ortiz (Zaldy), were on the terrace of their new house waiting for the other Ortiz children to arrive in
time for the New Year's eve celebration. The three men, Virgilio, Ricardo and Zaldy, momentarily left
the terrace, Virgilio to relieve himself by the side of the house, Zaldy to repair home and Ricardo to
go to the house of Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) across the street. Ricardo met the accused near
the waiting shed. Without any warning, the latter suddenly struck Ricardo on the face with the butt of
an armalite causing him to fall to the ground. The accused then fired at Ricardo, hitting him on the
chest and left arm. The accused then directed his armalite at Virgilio. The latter was hit on the
buttocks. The accused thereupon fired indiscriminately at the house of Zaldy. Zaldy received a bullet
injury in his right thigh, while his daughter, Lizette Ortiz (Lizette), was hit in her abdomen and wrist.
The accused moved towards the direction of the new house and fired at the terrace. Teresita took a
bullet wound on the neck from the volley of shots, while Corazon escaped unscathed.

The accused, right after the shooting, boarded his jeep and sped towards Baguio City.

In the aftermath, two were found dead, namely, Teresita and Ricardo, while three others, Virgilio,
Zaldy and Lizette, sustained injuries. The latter were all rushed to the Baguio General Hospital
where they were treated for gunshot wounds.

P/Sgt. Albert Gaydowen of Sub-station 1, upon receiving the report on the incident, immediately
dispatched Pat. Ruben Forte (Pat. Forte), Pfc. Marianito Cosape (Pfc. Cosape) and Pat. Robert
Credo (Pat. Credo) to the crime scene. Pfc. Cosape was able to gather several pieces of spent
cartridges from the waiting shed and surrounding areas. At the police station, Sgt. Danilo Santos
(Josie's husband) who tagged along with the investigating team from the crime scene, requested
P/Sgt. Gaydowen to contact Camp Bado Dangwa to intercept the passenger jeepney of the
accused. P/Sgt. Gaydowen was yet searching for the telephone number of Camp Dangwa when the
accused's jeepney was seen near the sub-station coming in from Baguio City. It was promptly met
with a burst of gunfire. Somehow, the accused was able to escape.

Meanwhile, Zaldy and Virgilio were discharged from the hospital shortly after treatment. Having
sustained lacerations on her liver and large intestines, as well as multiple pilferages on her small
intestines, Lizette had to be confined. The doctors who attended to her testified that the gunshot
wound she had sustained were serious enough to cause her death had it not been for the immediate
surgical and medical attention given to her. She also sustained a fractured wrist which would leave
her left hand permanently disabled. She was treated for a total of thirty-three days in the hospital.

The post mortem report on the bodies of Teresita and Ricardo readily disclosed that their death were
due to the gunshot wounds they had sustained. Teresita had gunshot wounds on her neck and right
side of the face that caused an acute respiratory failure. Ricardo sustained gunshot wounds on his
left chest and left upper arm. He died from hypovolemic shock secondary to massive hemorrhage
due to penetrating wounds in the heart, lungs, aorta and pulmonary vessels.

Anent the damages incurred by private complainants: Virgilio testified that he had spent P1,000 for
medications for his thigh injury. A riprap contractor, he was not able to work for seven months
depriving him of his monthly income of P2,000 for the period or the total amount of P14,000. He
asserted that he had incurred P110,000.00 for funeral services for his wife Teresita. Nenita Pablo
(Nenita) said in her testimony that she had spent P15,000.00 for the autopsy and coffin of Ricardo,
P3,000.00, by way of doctor's fee and P8,000.00 for the wake. Zaldy testified that he had spent
P500 for the treatment of his injury.

The accused proffered the jaded apologia of denial. He disclaimed any knowledge of, or participation
in, the grenade throwing and shooting incidents. He recounted that while he was getting his
passenger jeepney out from the carport, an unidentified man poked a gun at his back and instructed
him to proceed to Cypress Point Road to fetch a companion. When they were near the waiting shed
area, he saw the unidentified man's companion, a "military man," clad in military camouflage uniform
and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, altercating with Ricardo. Moments later, he saw the gun-
wielding man shoot Ricardo and spray bullets at Zaldy's house and the "new" house before boarding
the passenger jeepney. The accused was ordered to proceed to La Trinidad, Benguet, where the
"military man" alighted from the vehicle. The other fellow got down from the vehicle in Puliwes Camp
7, Kennon Road. The accused proceeded to Sub-station 1 to report the incident but he was met with
a burst of gunfire. Sustaining an injury in his thigh, he then drove to Sub-station 2 to seek police
assistance. Sgt. Giovanni Gallardo (Sgt. Gallardo) and Pat. Edward Ayochok (Pat. Ayochok) took
him to the St. Louis Hospital. On the way, the accused had the chance to narrate to the two police
officers the shooting incident in Irisan.

The RTC rendered its decision on 10 May 1994 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes with which he was charged; the trial court adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal case No. 8524-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify
the heirs of deceased Teresita Ortiz the sum of P50,000.00 for her death and the
sum of P110,000.00 as Actual Damages for expenses incurred for the wake, funeral
and burial services, both indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence.

2. In Criminal case No. 8525-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Article 6 and Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of 1
Year 7 months and 11 days of prision correccional as Minimum to 6 years, 1 month
and 11 days of prision mayor as Maximum, to indemnify Zaldy Ortiz the sum of
P5,000.00 as Moral Damages for the injuries sustained by him without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence.

3. In Criminal Case No. 8526-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Articles 6 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of one year, 7
months and 11 days of prision correccional as Minimum to 6 years, 1 month and 11
days of prision mayor as Maximum, to indemnify Virgilio Ortiz the sum of P1,000.00
as actual damages for the expenses incurred for his medical treatment for the
injuries sustained by him and the sum of P14,000.00 as unearned income for 7
months at P 2,000.00 a month for being unable to work as riprap contractor during
the treatment of his injuries and the sum of P5,000.00 as Moral Damages for the
injuries sustained by him, both indemnifications being without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence.

4. In Criminal case No. 8527-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
him to an imprisonment ranging from 6 years, 1 month and 11 days of prision
mayor as Minimum to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum, to indemnify Lizette Ortiz the sum of P20,000.00 as Moral Damages for
the injuries sustained by her without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.

The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of the preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence.

5. In Criminal case No. 8528-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify
the heirs of deceased Ricardo Pablo the sum of P50,000.00 for his death and the
sum of P23,000.00 as Actual Damages for expenses incurred for the wake, funeral
and burial services, both indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The accused being a detention (prisoner) is entitled to a full credit of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence.6

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant ascribes the following errors supposedly committed by the
trial court:

. . . IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT "IF REALLY ACCUSED HAD NOTHING TO DO


WITH THE FIRINGS AND KILLINGS, THE ASSAILANTS COULD VERY WELL
USED OTHER VEHICLES" INSTEAD OF THE ACCUSED'S VEHICLE;

II

. . . [IN NOT TAKING] INTO CONSIDERATION THE VITAL AND VERY


IMPORTANT EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED (not a single portion of the
testimonies of Police Officers Gallardo and Ayochok, as well as those of the
prosecution's witnesses showing his lack of motive to perpetrate the offenses
charged, were mentioned nor passed upon in the decision) WHICH IF
CONSIDERED IMPARTIALLY COULD HAVE RESULTED IN HIS ACQUITTAL;

III

. . . IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE VERY CONVINCING EVIDENCE


PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER
PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT HE HAD NO MOTIVE TO PERPETRATE
SUCH A DASTARDLY ACT AGAINST THE VICTIMS SINCE WHATEVER
DIFFERENCES HIS FAMILY HAD WITH THEM HAD LONG BEEN SETTLED AND
FORGOTTEN ACCORDING TO NO LESS THAN VIRGILIO ORTIZ, THE FATHER
OF JOSIE SANTOS AND HUSBAND OF THE LATE TERESITA ORTIZ;

IV

. . . IN COMPLETELY ADHERING TO THE RULE THAT POSITIVE


IDENTIFICATION PREVAILS OVER EVIDENCE OF LACK OF MOTIVE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THOSE WHO TESTIFIED AS HAVING POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
THE ACCUSED ARE BIASED, HOSTILE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICED TO HIM;

. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE PARAFFIN EXAMINATION RESULT IS NOT


IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE ACCUSED MIGHT HAVE USED GLOVES OR
KNOWS HOW TO REMOVE IT AND WASHED AWAY THE POWDER BURNS AND
THAT "THE EXAMINATION WAS DONE ONLY ON JANUARY 2, 1991 OR TWO (2)
DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT; (AND)

VI

. . . IN HOLDING THAT IT IS "TOO MUCH TO BELIEVE" THAT ACCUSED WAS


REALLY GOING TO REPORT THE INCIDENT WITH THE PNP SUBSTATION 1 OF
BAGUIO CITY ALONG NAGUILIAN ROAD INSTEAD OF REPORTING THE SAME
TO THE PNP HEADQUARTERS NEAR CITY HALL AND THAT SUCH ACT OF THE
ACCUSED IS A MERE "PRETENSIONS" ON HIS PART." 7

Accused-appellant, verily, faults the court a quo for giving full faith and credit to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and, on the other, for failing to accord any evidentiary value
to the testimonies of Sgt. Gallardo and Pat. Ayochok to whom he narrated the Irasan incident, and
for disregarding the negative results of the paraffin test on him.

It is doctrinally entrenched, at least in this jurisdiction, that the issue on the credibility of witnesses is
a question mainly addressed to the trial court for it to gauge and to pass upon. Not only are its
determination and findings accorded with great respect,8 but also even often treated with finality.
Accused-appellant belabors the fact that all, but one, of the prosecution witnesses are related to the
victims. He asserts that such relationship taints their credibility. Mere relationship by a witness to the
victim, however, does not necessarily impair credibility. 9 The annals of our criminal justice system
could be filled with countless unresolved cases if courts were to hold otherwise. Not too infrequently,
crimes are committed with just the relatives of the victim being around. Verily, too, it is natural for the
immediate members of the family of the victim to have a strong urge to see the real culprit, not just
anyone, penalized for a grave offense. Unless the Court is convinced that the witnesses are clearly
impelled by ulterior motives, it will not discard their testimony. No such strong ill-motive has been
shown here to make the Court conclude that the prosecution witness would thereby wish to have the
wrong man callously sent to jail.

Accused-appellant argues that his "utterances" made in the presence of, and later testified to, by
Sgt. Gallardo and Pat. Ayochok on their way to the hospital should have been deemed constitutive
of the res gestae and given due evidentiary weight. Evidently, accused-appellant is under a
misconception. Res gestae rules relate to the admissibility of evidence and not to its weight or
sufficiency. 10 By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims,
or spectators to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the
crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement 11 become admissible in evidence against
the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. In order to admit such hearsay statements as part
of res gestae, there must be a confluence 12 of the following essential conditions: (1) that the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements are made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statement must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a
number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the
place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,
(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. 13The Court,
in People vs. Manhuyod, 14 has explained the import of the first four factors; thus:

. . . (C)ases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the
occurrence of the startling event and the making of the declaration. What is important
is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made "so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or
explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
ideas of design or deliberation."

As to the second factor, it may be stressed that "a statement made, or an act done,
at a place some distance from the place where the principal transaction occurred will
not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible."

Anent the third factor, "[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the
time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an
inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he
had just received a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense
excitement. Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool
demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in
making a statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a
different statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence."

With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened
between the event or transaction and the making of the statement relative thereto,
any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus
restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation.

The startling occurrence of consequence to this case is not when accused-appellant was fired upon
at police substation 1 but the shooting at the Cypress Point Village. If at all, what might be so
considered as part of the res gestae would be the statements of appellant when he was shot at near
the police station, but this incident is not at all the subject matter of the case against him. Clearly, the
fourth element, i.e., that there is no intervening event between the startling occurrence concerned
and the making of the statement relative thereto, is not here extant.

Accused-appellant capitalizes on the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on him. A
paraffin test has never been considered to be foolproof. On the contrary, it has been held to be
highly unreliable. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 15 this Court has held:

Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of
nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from
this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances
which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans
and alfalfa. A person who uses tabacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on
his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tabacco." In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may
bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when
the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the
shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of the
firing. 16

Anent the actual damages, the uncorroborated testimonies of private complainants cannot suffice.
Such damages to be recoverable must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. 17In Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court has ruled:

Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him
answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of
the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such
claim. This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured
party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.

The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by
the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating
that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina.
However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the
expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those
supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in
connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be granted. 19

There is, however, no doubt that injury was sustained by private complainant due to appellant's
actions. In the absence of competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered,
private complainants are entitled to nominal damages. 20 The Court deems the amounts of
P15,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 8524-R and 8528-R, P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8527-R,
and P5,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 8525-R and 8526-R to be reasonable given the circumstances.

Finally, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence relative to Article 2206 21 of the Civil Code, the
award of P50,000.00 indemnity for each of the death of Teresita Ortiz and Ricardo Pablo must be
affirmed. Moral damages, in addition to the awards made by the trial court in favor of the injured
victims, are also recoverable under paragraph (3) of Article 2206, in relation to Article
2217 22 and paragraph (1) of Article 2219, 23 of the Civil Code, which the Court hereby fixes at
P30,000.00 for each of the two deceased victims payable to their respective heirs.

On this score, the Court finds it opportune to clarify certain notions dealing on the recovery of these
various damages.

There is a significant distinction, in the context of Book IV, Title XVIII, of the Civil Code on
"Damages," between the terms "damages" and "damage." Damages refer to the sum of money
which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an
injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of either a breach of a contractual obligation or
a tortuous or illegal act, while damage pertains to the actionable loss, hurt or harm which results
from the unlawful act, omission or negligence of another. 24 In fine, damages are the amounts
recoverable or that which can be awarded for the damage done or sustained.

An award of actual or compensatory damages requires actual proof of pecuniary loss. An exception
from the rule, pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, are "damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict" which can be awarded forthwith to the heirs of the victim by proof alone of such fact
of death. No proof of pecuniary loss is likewise necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, 25and it is quite enough that proof of damage
or injury is adduced. Being incapable of exact pecuniary estimation, the assessment of such
damages, except for liquidated damages which the parties themselves fix, is left to the sound
discretion of the court.

Akin to, but not exactly in the same category as actual or compensatory damages, is the civil
indemnity ex delictoparticularly so referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 104, in relation to Article 100,
of the Revised Penal Code as "indemnification for consequential damages." 26 These two species of
damages differ basically in that civil indemnityex delicto can be awarded without need of further
proof than the fact of commission of the felony itself while actual or compensatory damages to be
recoverable must additionally be established with reasonable degree of certainty (except. as
aforesaid, in the case of the indemnity for death under Article 2206 27 of the Civil Code). In fine, the
first species merely requires proof of damages or injury (similar to that needed in an award of moral
damages) to be recoverable; the second kind requires, in addition, proof of damages or pecuniary
loss in order to warrant recovery.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with modifications in that the actual damages
awarded to Virgilio Ortiz, Nenita Pablo and Zaldy Ortiz are deleted and in lieu thereof nominal
damages in the following amounts are hereby awarded: P15,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8524-R
and No. 8528-R; P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8527-R; and P5,000.00 in Criminal Case No.
8525-R and No. 8526-R. Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 are also hereby awarded to
the heirs of each of the two deceased victims.

The Court orders that copies of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Governments which agencies are enjoined to take the lead in
apprehending and bringing to justice the other accused who have remained at large.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez,
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

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