G.R. No.

202354 September 24, 2014

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.

VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO

ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming
authority under them, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated June
20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which
reversed the Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision3 dated
October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-
Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 862.

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with

Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada
Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the
above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household.
Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven
hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st,
Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the
name of petitioner and issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on
August 31, 2007.

The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center

pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the case was returned to the
court.5

After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the

complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of

defendants Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and
Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting
under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with
damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6

The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that
petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of the subject
property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand
letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property
through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang
Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for forcible entry which should
have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since
petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her property through
illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her
discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the
proper remedy considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the
premises after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact
entered into an agreement and she was only forced to take legal action when
respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse
of the period agreed upon.

In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner
did not state that respondents entered her property through stealth and
strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the
request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but
respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It
held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents
unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to
stay there for one year.

With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that
respondents’ occupation ofthe property without petitioner’s consent can be
converted to a contract, such agreement not being prohibited by law nor
contrary to morals or good customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an
unlawful detainer action, the RTC found that petitioner’s complaint was filed
within the prescribed one-year period counted from the time the final
demand to vacate was received by the respondents on July 24, 2008.

The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Silang-Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the defendants and all
claiming under their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property and surrender
possession and control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use
thereof starting from July 2008 until the same is paid in full, with interests
thereon at twelve (12%) percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.7

With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the

reglementary period, the above decision became final and executory.8

On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of

execution. At the hearing heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a
period of ten days within which to file their comment. At the next scheduled
hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a
Formal Entry of Appearancewith Manifestation informing the court that on the
same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction
before the CA, copies ofwhich were served to petitioner thru her counsel and
to the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated
that said manifestation was "tantamount to [a] comment to the pending
motion" and thus gave petitioner’s counsel a period of ten (10) days within
which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be submitted for
resolution.9

On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated

August 22, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial
Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch
17 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10

The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible
entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful
detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her
demand for respondents to vacate the property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful
possessor of the subject property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover
possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publicianaor accion
reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the
judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory. She argues
that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be
justified by unsupported allegationsof the respondents as to supposed non-
receipt of documents concerning this case.

On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the
proceedings before the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said court’s
adverse decision. They also stress that resort to certiorari was proper and the
suspension of procedural rules was justified by compelling circumstances
such as the imminentdestruction of the only property possessed by
respondents who are indigent, respondents’ lack of awareness of unfavorable
judgment rendered on appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case
insofar as the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack
of showing that resortto certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and
there being no prejudice caused to the other party.

After a thorough review of the records and the parties’ submissions, we find
neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.

The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the
complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.13 Such remedy is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.14

The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioner’s complaint

make out a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges

a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by toleranceof the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination ofthe latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.16

In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:

3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st,
Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE
METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the
Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto
attached as Annex "B";

4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property.
She had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However,
sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the
subject property and occupied the same;

5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The

defendants requested for time toleave and she acceded to said request. The
defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the end of May,
2008;

6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to

vacate the subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of
a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the
premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their illegal use and
occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto
attached as Annex "C";

7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay

Lalaan 1st for possible conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still
refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the said Barangay issued a
CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as
Annex "D";

x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as
it does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or
tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the
petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually
tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry
into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered
respondents’occupation in May 2007. Such possession could not have been
legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less
was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the
possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.18

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s

supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner,
still, distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance,

we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and
sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from
the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance"
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge tothe right of
the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the
inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to bespeedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary
nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause
of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible
entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant,

it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts
as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor an
accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through
intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of
petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether
or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property

registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession
thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her
death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property.

xxx

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant

illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential
in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of
action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the
conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by
them, was unsubstantiated.

xxx

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering
that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house
thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them,
their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in
Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216
(1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer
not of forcible entry.

xxx

xxxx

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The
complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color
of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in
the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing
has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the
parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that
this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal
trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and
when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in
May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have enterep the subject
property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA,
would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon
clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of
forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower
court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final

and executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.

It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the

proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
of and to render judgment on the action.20 Indeed, a void judgment for want
of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

PRESBITEO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 30-43. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo
and concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Edwin D.
Sorongon.
2
Id. at 100-107. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Emma S. Young.
3
Id. at 66-87. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero.
4
Records, pp. 1-6.
5
Id. at 54-56.
6
Rollo, p. 87.
7
Id. at 107.
8
Records, p. 202.
9
Id. at 203-209, 212-229.
10
Rollo, p. 42.
11
Pagadora v. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14, 30.
12
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. − Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs.
13
Pagadora v. Ilao, supra note 11, at 30-31, citing Delos Reyes v. Odones,
G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334 and Sarmienta v.
Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA), G.R. No. 182953, October
11, 2010, 632 SCRA 538, 545-546.
14
Del Rosario v. Sps. Manuel, 464 Phil. 1053, 1057 (2004).
15
604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009).
16
As cited in Canlas v. Tubil, 616 Phil. 915, 925 (2009).
17
Records, pp. 2-3.
18
Canlas v. Tubil, supra note 16, at 924, citing Valdez v. Court of Appeals,
523 Phil. 39, 46 (2006).
19
Id. at 47-51.
20
Sales v. Barro, 594 Phil. 116, 123 (2008), citing Figueroa v. People, 580
Phil. 58, 76 (2008).
21
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 318 (2001).
BIENVENIDO BARRIENTOS, G.R. No. 169594
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,* J.,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 20, 2011

MARIO RAPAL,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set

aside the Decision[1] dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68482, and the Resolution[2] dated September 1, 2005
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:

On April 15, 1988, respondent Mario Rapal acquired a 235 square

meter parcel of land located at No. 2 Misamis St., Luzviminda Village,
Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, from one Antonio Natavio via a
notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right. The said parcel of land was
said to be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
4136. Thereafter, respondent constructed a semi-concrete house on the lot
and took actual possession of the property by himself and through his
caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.

Sometime in 1993, respondent allowed petitioner Bienvenido

Barrientos and his family to stay on the subject property as caretakers on the
condition that petitioner shall vacate the premises when respondent would
need the property. However, when respondent demanded petitioner to vacate
the subject property, the last of which was made on July 14, 1997, petitioner
refused to leave the lot. The parties later underwent barangay conciliations,
but to no avail.

Thus, on April 13, 1998, respondent filed a case for Unlawful

Detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 19889.

On February 21, 2000, after submission of the parties' respective

position papers, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] in favor of the
respondent, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds

in favor of the plaintiff entitled to the prayer sought and hereby orders
defendant to:

1. vacate and all persons claiming under him

that house structure located at No. 2 Misamis Street,
Luzviminda Village, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City;
2. pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 per
month, as compensation for the use of said house structure
beginning July 14, 1997 until he vacated the place; and

3. pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as

attorney's fee plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[4]
 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the Decision of
the MeTC and resolved in favor of petitioner, reasoning that respondent has
not shown any prior lawful possession of the property in question. [5] The
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the decision of

the lower court is reversed and set aside. The court finds no basis to award
any counterclaim.[6]

Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the CA assigning the

following errors committed by the RTC, to wit:
1. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding
that the petitioner has not shown any prior lawful possession of the
property in question.
2. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding
that the respondent and his family who were merely invited to live in the
house out of Christian charity and human compassion, has possessory
rights over the same lot and house.
3. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in injecting the
issue of ownership over the lot.
4. That the Lower Court has grievously erred in concluding
that the petitioner has propositioned himself as an awardee-grantee of the
property in question.[7]

On April 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision[8] reversing

the decision of the RTC and reinstating the decision of the MeTC, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the extant Petition is

hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The assailed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 92-Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered REINSTATING the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metro Manila, Branch 39-Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.[9]
 In ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA touched upon the issue of
ownership since both claimed ownership over the disputed property. The CA
found that both parties presented weak evidence of ownership. Hence, the
CA determined who between the parties was first in possession and
concluded that respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,[10] but it was denied

in the Resolution[11] dated September 1, 2005.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

I
WHETHER THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CAN BE INITIALLY
RESOLVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF
POSSESSION.

II
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO
BE A TRANSFER OF POSSESSORY RIGHT CAN PREVAIL OVER
THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP AND THE LATTER'S
ACTUAL POSSESSORY RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY.[12]

Petitioner maintains that he has a better right over the subject property
as against the respondent. Petitioner insists that even
assuming arguendo that the subject property was registered in the name of
the Rapal family and occupied by him as caretaker, this only bolsters his
claim that he has been in actual occupation of the property. Moreover,
petitioner contends that since respondent's claim of ownership was derived
from a void title, he did not have a better right to possess the property as
opposed to by the petitioner who actually occupied the same.

Petitioner points out that he was even awarded a Certificate of Project

Qualification by the Office of the President through the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council. Petitioner argues that since the property
in controversy is a government property, it is the government through the
National Government Center (NGC) that can award the same to qualified
beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 9207, or the National
Government Center Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003, which it in
fact did when he was given a Certificate of Project Qualification.

On his part, respondent argues that the CA did not commit any
reversible error by ruling in his favor, considering that the CA initially
looked into the issue of ownership only for the purpose of determining who
between the parties has a better right to possess the subject property. In
addition, petitioner failed to substantiate that he has a better right to possess
the subject property.

The petition is without merit.

Ejectment cases forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary

proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possessionde
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's
title to the property is questionable.[13] In an unlawful detainer case, the sole
issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may
pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the
property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not
bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.[14]
 In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondent were claiming
ownership over the subject property. Hence, the CA correctly touched upon
the issue of ownership only to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the subject property.

True, as found by the CA, both petitioner and respondent presented

weak evidence of ownership. Respondent on his part based his claim of
ownership over the subject property on the strength of a notarized Deed of
Transfer of Possessory Right from a certain Antonio Natavio. The subject
land, however, was said to be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which this
Court has declared null and void in the case of Intestate Estate of the Late
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals[15] as such,
respondent could not derive any right therefrom.

Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his contention that he has a

better right to possess the property on the fact the he is in actual possession
of the property and that he was awarded a Certificate of Project
Qualification by the Office of the President through the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council. However, although petitioner claimed
ownership over the subject lot, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence
therefor, or even sufficient reason on the manner by which he acquired
ownership.
Having settled the issue of ownership, it was but just and proper for
the CA to have reminded the courts a quo to have settled the case by
restricting their resolution to the basic issue of possession.
 From the various evidence submitted by the respondent, it can be
clearly inferred that respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject
lot. As aptly found by the CA:

To recall, in its (sic) Answer, respondent (defendant herein)

alleged:

4. That defendant also DENIES the allegations in

paragraphs 6 and 7 of complaint, the truth of the matter
being that defendant is the exclusive occupant of said lot
since 1989 and that he built thereon a residential house
from his own resources as a consequence of which he has
been registered as the qualified beneficiary of the property
as is (sic) indicated in the Beneficiary Evaluation and
Qualification Form issued by the National Government
Center Housing Project on August 18, 1997, copy
attached as ANNEX C hereof. (Answer, p. 2; Records, p.
167) (Emphasis supplied)

Going over Annex C (records, p. 24) or the Beneficiary Evaluation

and Qualification Form which bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1, Our
attention was caught by the words CARETAKER written on the top of the
entry BIENVENIDO/GLORIA BARRIENTOS.

We also find, appended to petitioner's Reply to Answer with

Special Defense and Counterclaim (records p. 50), a Census Survey
Certificate that bears TAG NO. 94-02-01787-1 with a notation Registered
to Rapal family.

xxxx

But considering Our preceeding (sic) findings and the fact that the
Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form submitted by the
respondent himself bears no indication that it was tampered, We are
inclined to believe the version maintained by the petitioner. The mark
CARETAKER purports what it explicitly states; that is, Bienvenido C.
Barrientos was only a caretaker of the subject lot.

Consequently, and taking into consideration the great number of

affidavits and evidence in favor of the petitioner, We find that the
petitioner was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.[16]

Thus, based on the evidence presented by the respondent, it can be

deduced that petitioner's occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance
only. Petitioner was initially permitted by respondent to occupy the lot as a
caretaker. Petitioner even admitted this fact in his Beneficiary Evaluation
and Qualification Form. Moreover, all other supporting evidence, such as the
Census Survey Certificate[17] and construction material receipts,[18] bolster
the fact that respondent was in prior possession of the property before
petitioner entered the same by mere tolerance of the respondent.

Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent clearly makes out a case

for unlawful detainer, since petitioner's occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them.[19]

It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits,

under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore
physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been
illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of
the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate
proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order
by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their
claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de
facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are
provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.[20]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 29, 2005 and
the Resolution dated September 1, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 68482,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1042 dated July 6, 2011.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 42-51.
[2]
Id. at 58-59.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 24-26.
[4]
Id. at 25-26.
[5]
Decision dated July 10, 2001; id. at 27-28.
[6]
Id. at 28.
[7]
CA rollo, p. 4.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 42-51.
[9]
Id. at 50.
[10]
Id. at 52-56.
[11]
Id. at 58-59.
[12]
Id. at 116.
[13]
Carbonilla v. Abiera, G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461, 469.
[14]
Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15,
2010.
[15]
333 Phil. 597 (1996).
[16]
Id. at 48-49.
[17]
Records, p. 69.
[18]
Id. at 74-75.
[19]
Beltran v. Nieves, G.R. No. 175561, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 242, 249.
[20]
Samonte v. Century Savings Bank, G.R. No. 176413, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 478, 486.
 G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ARTURO LOO

PO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the
October 31, 2014 Decision2 and the March 6, 2015 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 which affirmed the September
16, 2013 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC)
in SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC decision, in turn, sustained the March 21,
2013 Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC),
which dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner Fairland
Knitcraft Corporation (Fairland) against respondent Arturo Loo Po (Po) for
failure to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.

The Antecedents

In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 19429, filed
before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of Condominium Unit
No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City. The said unit
was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement, with a rental fee of
P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each month. From
March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland
opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore.

On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7 to Po demanding that he

pay the amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and that he
vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day
period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor
vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was
constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po
had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so. Hence, on
February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.8

In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered the case submitted for
decision.

On March 1, 2013, Po's counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render
Judgment.10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations
against him and commented that there was no supporting document that
would show that Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease
contract between them; that there were no documents attached to the
complaint which would show that previous demands had been made and
received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the
amount of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the
case was one of ownership; and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction
over the case.

The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po's answer to the complaint.

Considering, however, that the case fell under the Rules of Summary
Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion was
denied.11

The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit due to Fairland's failure to prove its claim by preponderance of
evidence. The MeTC explained that although the complaint sufficiently
alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove that it was entitled to the
possession of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to
support its claim against Po either.

Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC under Rule 40
of the Rules of Court. Being an appealed case, the RTC required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.

In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case was a

special civil action governed by summary procedure. In cases where a
defendant failed to file his answer, there was no need for a declaration of
default. Fairland claimed that the Rules stated that in such cases, judgment
should be based on the "facts alleged in the complaint,"13 and that there was
no requirement that judgment must be based on facts proved by
preponderance of evidence. Considering that the presentation of evidence
was not required when a defendant in an ejectment case failed to appear in a
preliminary conference, the same should be applied when no answer had
been filed.

Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment case was
tantamount to an admission by the defendant of all the ultimate facts alleged
in the complaint. There was no more need for evidence in such a situation as
every allegation of ultimate facts in the complaint was deemed established
by the defendant's acquiescence.

On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and countered that there was
no merit in Fairland's insistence that evidence was unnecessary when no
answer had been filed. The facts stated in the complaint did not warrant a
rendition of judgment in the plaintiffs favor. The court had the discretion to
rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of the allegation of facts.

Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations which
were not substantiated by any competent evidence. Po asserted that there
was no proof presented to show that the subject property was indeed owned
by Fairland; that there was no lease contract between the parties; that he
never received the demand letter, dated January 30, 2012; and that the
amount stated in the prayer of the complaint did not coincide with the
amount of unpaid rent. Po also reiterated that the case involved an issue of
ownership over the condominium unit he was occupying.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that
Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance of evidence. There was
nothing on record that would establish Fairland's right over the property
subject of the complaint. Though it had been consistently ruled that the only
issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the party-litigants, the court may go beyond the question of
physical possession provisionally. The RTC concluded that even assuming
that Po was not the lawful owner, his actual physical possession of the
subject property created the presumption that he was entitled to its
possession thereof.

Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching its condominium

certificate of title16 over the subject property, but it was denied by the RTC in
its Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.

Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review18 under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court before the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed the
petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not lie against
Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained and the limited
pleadings it allowed, the Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules
on evidence. In order for an action for recovery of possession to prosper, it
was indispensable that he who brought the action should prove not only his
ownership but also the identity of the property claimed. The CA concluded,
however, that Fairland failed to discharge such bounden duty.

Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its
assailed Resolution, dated March 6, 2015.

Hence, this petition.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS

I
IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS SEASONABLY
FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE JUDGMENT ON
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

II

HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE SHOULD HAVE

BEEN ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT IS AN ERROR OF
LAW.19 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was

undertaken through the submission of position papers but the same was
dispensed with when the defendant failed to file an answer or when either
party failed to appear during the preliminary conference. In an ejectment
case, the scope of inquiry should be limited to the sufficiency of the cause of
action stated in the complaint when no seasonable answer was filed. The
attachment of documentary evidence to the Complaint was not a
requirement and was even proscribed by law.

In his Comment,20 Po countered that the present petition raised a question of

fact. Although couched in different words, the issues raised here were
substantially the same as the issues raised before the CA. There was no legal
basis in Fairland's assertion that evidence was dispensed with when no
answer to the complaint had been filed. Such argument would undermine the
inherent authority of the courts to resolve legal issues based on the facts of
the case and on the rules on evidence. Contrary to Fairland's position, the
court decided the case on the basis of the complaint which was found
wanting in preponderance of evidence.

In its Reply,21 Fairland posited that the petition did not raise mere questions
of fact but one of law as what was being sought for review was the erroneous
dismissal of the ejectment case for lack of preponderance of evidence. Since
no answer was filed and the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action
for unlawful detainer, it became the duty of the MeTC to decide the case in
its favor.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for
filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Section 1. - Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the
provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of
possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The possession of
the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the
plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. The
defendant's possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded
that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant
refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be
instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.22

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it

recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year
from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.23

There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately alleged a

cause of action for unlawful detainer. The pertinent portion of the said
complaint reads:
xxx

3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant, the
premises mentioned above as the residence of the latter;

4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff and the

defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the former the amount of
Php2o,ooo.oo as rent at the beginning of each month. Thus, the term of the
lease agreement is renewable on a month-to-month basis;

5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the aforesaid rent
despite plaintiffs repeated demands;

6. Due to defendant's continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff reached a

decision not to renew the lease agreement. It sent a formal letter, x x x
demanding defendant to pay the amount of Php220,000.00, representing
defendant's twelve month rental arrears beginning January 2011, and to
vacate the leased premises, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said
letter;

7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the fifteen day
period given to comply with plaintiffs demand, defendant neither tendered
payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the leased premises. Worse,
defendant has not been paying rent up to now;

x x x24
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland

was the owner of the subject property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral
agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate
before the complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted. The complaint was
seasonably filed within the one-year period prescribed by law. With all the
elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in the complaint for
unlawful detainer.

Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not

considered when a judgment is rendered based on the complaint

The question now is whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack
of preponderance of evidence. Fairland posits that judgment should have
been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint itself and not on its
failure to adduce proof of ownership over the subject property.

The Court agrees with Fairland's position.

The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served upon
Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the MeTC found no ground
to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer.25Nevertheless, Po failed to file his
answer on time and the MeTC had the option to render judgment motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. In relation thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of
the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on
the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be
deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall
be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be
filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which
they are pleaded.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable,
without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, if there are two or more defendants.

[Emphasis supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the
court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiffs
motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer
and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every
allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in
this situation26 except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint.27

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the
rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer
the complaint within the period provided, the court has no authority to
declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.28

This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino Realty and Development
Corporation v. Florentino,29citing Bayog v. Natino,30 where the Court held
that there was no provision for an entry of default under the Rules of
Summary Procedure if the defendant failed to file his answer.

In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper
service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient justification to
excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be rendered
by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.

Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a sufficient

cause of action; evidence need not be attached to the complaint

The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on

the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its
ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do
not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence to the complaint because, at
this inception stage, he only has to file his complaint to establish his cause of
action. Here, the court was only tasked to determine whether the complaint
of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render judgment
thereon.

Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint

because the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action for
unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are insufficient
to form a cause of action shall the attachment become material in the
determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of Summary
Procedure,31 it is not mandatory to attach annexes to the complaint.

In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where judgment was

rendered based on the complaint due to the failure of the defendant to file an
answer under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written that:
x x x To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all
documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly when
referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, however, that the inquiry is
into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in the
complaint. Thus, consideration of the annexed documents should
only be taken in the context of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint.

[Emphasis supplied]
In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the complaint were not
considered because the complaint already alleged a sufficient cause of action
for collection of sum of money. Those assailed documents were not the bases
of the plaintiffs action for sum of money, but were only attached to the
complaint to provide evidentiary details on the alleged transactions.

Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for documentary

attachments to prove Fairland's ownership over the subject property. First,
the present action is an action for unlawful detainer wherein only de facto or
material possession is required to be alleged. Evidently, the attachment of
any deed of ownership to the complaint is not indispensable because an
action for unlawful detainer does not entirely depend on ownership.

Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of

possession over the subject property. These allegations were evidently
manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease
the property to Po. The Court is of the view that these allegations were clear
and unequivocal and did not need supporting attachments to be considered
as having sufficiently established its cause of action. Even the MeTC
conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid cause of action for
unlawful detainer.33 It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached
documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations in the complaint.

Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed

period, he was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in the complaint
including Fairland's claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure of the
defendant to timely file his answer and controvert the claim against him
constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.

In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file

Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment, which was belatedly
filed and so was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the allegations
against him without even bothering to aver why he claimed to have a
superior right of possession of the subject property.34

Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on factual issues shall be
presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. - Within five (5) days after the
termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order
stating the matters taken up therein, x x x

Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. - Within ten (10) days
from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties
shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the
factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers
setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

[Emphasis supplied]
Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9 and
10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties will be
required to present and offer their evidence before the court to establish
their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of preliminary
conference, the parties are not yet required to present their respective
evidence.

These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure which are
also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve their purpose to
immediately settle ejectment proceedings. "Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination
thereof. It is a 'time procedure' designed to remedy the situation.35 Thus, as
a consequence of the defendant's failure to file an answer, the court is simply
tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.

As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a judgment can already be

rendered

In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of unlawful

detainer cases, a remand of this case to the lower courts is no longer
necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.

To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be

rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without the need to
consider the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint of
Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish the

allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of possession over
the subject property. Po's failure to file an answer constitutes an admission
of his illegal occupation due to his non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland's
rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment must be rendered
finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po from the subject property.

The Judicial Affidavit Rule

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the
Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where documentary or object
evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable
because such evidence are required to be attached to a judicial affidavit, not
to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only on January 1, 2013, it
cannot be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December
12, 2012.

Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially

remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this Court.

In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object

evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be a pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier,
where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court shall render judgment,
either motu proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there
is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or
hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct
testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five
days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with
respect to motions and incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses,

which shall take the place of such
witnesses' direct testimonies; and

(2) The parties' documentary or object

evidence, if any, which shall be attached
to the judicial affidavits and marked as
 Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of
the complainant or the plaintiff, and as
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of
the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or
object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same has been
identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a faithful
copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall
bring the original document or object evidence for comparison during the
preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures,
failing which the latter shall not be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of

the original when allowed by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014 Decision and
the March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
134701 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po
is ORDERED TO VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar
Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.

Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well

as the rentals accruing in the interim until he vacates the property. The
unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
January 30, 2012, when the demand to pay and to vacate was made, up to
the finality of this decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until full payment is made.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur. chanrobleslaw

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 3-14.

2
Id. at 16-21. Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with
Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaftez and Associate Justice Carmelita S.
Manahan, concurring.

3
Id. at 23-24.

4
Id. at 62-63. Penned by Presiding Judge Amorfina Cerrado-Cezar.
5
Id. at 42-44. Penned by Presiding Judge Judge Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao.

6
Id. at 25-28.

7
Id. at 29.

8
Id. at 32-33.

9
Id. at 35.

10
Id. at 36.

11
Id. at 39.

12
Id. at 47-52.

13
Section 6, Rules on Summary Procedure.

14
Id. at 53-61.

15
Id. at 64-66.

16
Id. at 67-70,

17
Id. at 78-80.

18
Id. at 81-91.

19
Id. at 6-9.

20
Id. at 141-158.

21
Id. at 171.

22
Jose v. Alfuerto, 699 Phil. 307, 316 (2012).

Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508,
23

516.

24
Rollo, pp. 25-26.

25
Section 4, Rules of Summary Procedure.

26
Luceres, Bernardo M., Revised Rule of Summary Procedure, 1st Ed., p. 14
(2011).

27
Section 6, Resolution of the Court En Bane, dated October 15, 1991,
providing for the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure for Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.

28
Riano, Willard, Civil Procedure, The Bar Lecture Series, Volume II, p. 456-
457 (2012).

29
372 Phil. 882(1999).

30
327 Phil. 1019(1996).

31
Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines that the case falls
under summary procedure, it may, from an examination of the allegations
therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case
outright on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil
action. If no ground for dismissal is found it shall forthwith issue summons
which shall state that the summary procedure under this Rule shall apply.

32
642 Phil. 710 (2010).

33
Rollo, pp. 42.

34
Id. at 36-38. Though unnecessary and even not sanctioned by the Rule,
Fairland, nevertheless, attached the Condominium Certificate of Title (Rollo,
p. 67) under its name to its motion for reconsideration with the RTC to
remove and doubt as to its ownership of the subject property. The said
certificate was entered into the books of the registry as early as October 13,
2005.

35
Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882
(1999).