CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

JURISDICTION

1. A was a stockholder of RPN, a private corporation duly registered with SEC.

In 1986, the government sequestered RPN’s properties, assets and business. In
1990, the PCGG entered into a compromise agreement with A, who ceded all
his shares of stock in RPN to the government, through the PCGG. Upon
PCGG’s motion, the Sandiganbayan directed the transfer of A’s shares
representing 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding stock of RPN. A timely
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that his RPN shares only
represented 32.4% of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. His motion for
reconsideration was not ruled upon. A assumed office as general manager and
COO of RPN. He was appointed to said position by the RPN Board. The
Ombudsman later administratively charged him with grave misconduct and
for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. A was alleged to be an official or
employee of a government-owned or controlled corporation, RPN. An
information for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 was later filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

a. What are government-owned or –controlled corporations?

A corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled corporation only

when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority
or 51% share of the capital stock. (Carandang v. Carandang, G.R. No. 148076,
153161, January 12, 2011)

b. Was RPN a government-owned or –controlled corporation?

No. RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because

the Government's total share in RPN's capital stock was only 32.4%. Although
the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer to the PCGG of A's shares that
represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such
quantification of A's shareholding cannot be controlling in view of A's timely
filing of a motion for reconsideration whereby he clarified and insisted that the
shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN's
outstanding capital stock. With the extent of A's holdings in RPN remaining
unresolved with finality, concluding that the Government held the majority of
RPN's capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled
corporation would be bereft of any factual and legal basis. (Carandang v.
Carandang, G.R. No. 148076, 153161, January 12, 2011)

c. A claims that he is a private individual and hence, not subject to the

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. Is he correct?

 
  

Yes. While it is true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative
cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of
government-owned or -controlled corporations; and the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by public officials and employees, including presidents, directors and
managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, the Ombudsman
and Sandiganbayan have no jurisdiction over A considering that RPN is not a
government-owned or -controlled corporation. A is a private individual and not
subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Carandang v. Carandang, G.R. No. 148076,
153161, January 12, 2011)

RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

1. X was charged with libel. Trial was reset several times because the
prosecution had no witnesses to present, although the prosecution never asked
for a subpoena for their witness. Accused moved to terminate the presentation
of prosecution evidence for failure of the prosecution to present witnesses
despite numerous postponements, which the RTC granted. Private
Complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the RTC’s
order, claiming that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

a. Will the petition prosper?

No. The private complainant did not join the People of the Philippines as a
party in his action for certiorari in the CA. Private complainant sought to set
aside the trial court’s order, which concerned the public aspect of the criminal
case. He ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties
therein. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary
rejection of his petition for certiorari. Also, Private Complainant did not obtain
the consent of the OSG to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should
have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing
thereof, but even that he did not do. He violated Section 35 (l), Chapter 12,
Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987),
which mandates the OSG to represent "the Government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party".
(Golangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September 8, 2009)

b. Will your answer be the same if the petition for certiorari bore the
conformity of the public prosecutor?

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Yes. That conformity alone does not suffice. The authority of the City
Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the
Philippines was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court, and does
not extend to the petition for certiorari with the CA. (Golangco v. Fung, G.R. No.
157952, September 8, 2009)

2. An information charged X with qualified theft that was committed “on or

about the 2nd of January 1996”. X assails the sufficiency of the information
because there was a discrepancy between the charge and some of the
testimonies, which alleged that the crime was committed on 29 December
1995. X claims that the discrepancy in the dates unduly prejudiced her rights
as an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare her
defense. Is the information sufficient?

Yes. The information stated the approximate time of the commission of the
offense through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996," and the
accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she
was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading
whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her
defense. The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the
offense was committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient
of the offense. The offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. December 29,
1995 and January 2, 1996 were dates only four days apart. (People v. Garcia
Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011)

3. X was charged with murder. The information stated, among others, that X,
“with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of
one V by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said V.” The RTC convicted X of homicide only, because the
information did not sufficiently allege the attendance of treachery. Was the
RTC correct?

Yes. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. The averments of
the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did . . .
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victim "by then and

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there shooting V with a gun, hitting V", "which was the direct and immediate
cause of the death" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. Merely averring the
killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk
to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. The use of the gun
as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the information.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify
in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the
presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is
being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be
tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of
plain justice. (People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012)

4. May an accused be convicted of murder if the aggravating qualifying

circumstance was proven but not alleged in the information?

No. A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates

his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused
of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the
information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that
regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter. (People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602,
January 18, 2012)

5. X was charged with rape under Article 266-B for rape committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The

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information did not allege any aggravating circumstance in the commission

of the crime rape. If the aggravating circumstance is proven during the trial,
is the information sufficient to impose the maximum period of reclusion
perpetua should the accused be convicted?

No. Although the information alleged the use by the accused of a deadly
weapon (bolo) in the commission of the rape, the court cannot prescribe the
maximum period of reclusion perpetua because the information did not allege
the attendance of any aggravating circumstances. The Rules require the
information to state the "acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances . . . in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance
and for the court to pronounce judgment. The Prosecution became precluded
from establishing any act or circumstance not specifically alleged in the
information if such act or circumstance would increase the penalty to the
maximum period. (People v. Abrencillo, G.R. No. 183100, November 28, 2012)

RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

1. The RTC convicted X of qualified theft and directed X, among others to pay
damages to the victim for the crime X committed. X appealed. During the
pendency of the appeal, X died. What is the effect of the death of the accused
on his civil liability?

By the death of the convict, the civil liability based exclusively on the crime for
which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), is extinguished, because no final
judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil
liability predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict survived the
death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a
separate civil action. (People v. Bunay y Dam-at, G.R. No. 171268 (Resolution),
September 14, 2010)

2. X was convicted of 2 counts of qualified rape committed against D, his

minor child. The Court awarded civil indemnity of Php75,000.00 and moral
damages of Php50,000.00 for each of the 2 counts of rape. Was the court’s
ruling on the civil liability correct?

No. Being the victim of two counts of qualified rape, D, a minor and the
daughter of the accused, was entitled to recover for each count of rape the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity. The moral damages should be

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Php75,000.00. She is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of

Php30,000.00 (due to the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of minority
of D and the relationship between her and the accused). (People v. Taguibuya,
G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

3. Distinguish civil indemnity awarded upon a finding of rape from moral

damages.

Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from
and should not be denominated as moral damages, which are based on different
jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of its discretion. In
contrast, moral damages are granted to the victim in rape in such amount as the
court shall deem just and reasonable without the necessity of pleading or proof.
The fact that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings constitute the bases for moral damages. (People v.
Taguibuya, G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

4. What are exemplary damages and when may they be awarded in criminal
cases?

Exemplary damages, which are intended to serve as deterrents to serious

wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct, are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating
circumstances as used by the Civil Code should be understood in its broad or
generic sense, not in the sense of prescribing a heavier punishment on the
offender; hence, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance should be a distinction that was of consequence only to the
criminal, as contrasted from the civil, liability, thereby entitling the offended
party or victim to an award of exemplary damages regardless of whether the
aggravating circumstance was ordinary or qualifying. (People v. Taguibuya, G.R.
No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the attendance of any aggravating
circumstance (generic, qualifying, or attendant) entitles the offended party to
recover exemplary damages. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a
State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense
for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. The ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the
civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an

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aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the

offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. (People v. Dadulla y Capanas, G.R. No.
172321, February 9, 2011)

5. May courts impose interest on the civil liability (such as on civil indemnity
for rape, exemplary and moral damages) adjudged in a criminal case?

Yes. In crimes, interest may be adjudicated in a proper case as part of the

damages in the discretion of the court, such as when there has been delay in
the recovery. The imposition of interest is a natural and probable consequence
of the acts of the accused complained of. The interest to be imposed is the legal
rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment. (People v.
Taguibuya, G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

6. Can there be an independent civil action to recover the value of a

bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22?

No. Sec. 1, (b), Rule 111 provides that the criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. Upon filing
of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on
the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22
cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the
intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly
lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil,
only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy
laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.

The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means
that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is
filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is

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when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering
the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the
final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial
court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted.

In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31
of the Civil Code will not apply. (Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547,
February 23, 2011)

7. Will your answer be the same if the civil action was filed before the
promulgation of the cited rules of court?

Yes. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases
pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution. (Heirs of Simon
v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011)

8. Does a case for estafa based on a dishonored check preclude the

institution of a separate civil action, similar with the prohibition in BP 22?

No. The procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these
two distinct crimes of BP 22 and estafa are different and non-interchangeable.
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file
a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22,
however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check, notwithstanding any allegations of fraud and
deceit. (Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011)

9. A contract to sell was entered into and the potential buyer paid the price
by post-dated check. The potential buyer assailed the validity of the contract
to sell on the ground that the potential seller failed to show proof of

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ownership over the thing subject of the contract to sell, the fraudulent acts
of the potential seller that vitiated the consent of the potential buyer, and
alternatively, the breach by the potential seller of the contract. The check
was later dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Is a rescission of a contract
to sell considered a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of
the criminal action for violation of BP 22 where the check was used as
payment of the price in the contract to sell? In answering the question,
discuss the nature of a prejudicial question.

No. The civil action for the rescission of contract is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the criminal actions
upon the violations of BP 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the
dishonored checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On
the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the
breach in the fulfilment of potential seller's obligation warranted the rescission
of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, the
potential seller would be found to have committed material breach as to
warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean
that the accused would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing
the dishonored checks because, as the elements of BP 22 would show, he
already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had
issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the
parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them
with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of
extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission.
Indeed, under BP 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the
offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the
violation of Batas BP. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action
for rescission of the conditional sale

Under the law on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract
unenforceable but merely voidable, the remedy of which would be to annul
the contract since voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are
annulled. On the other hand, rescission of contracts in case of breach pursuant
to Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also presupposes a valid
contract unless rescinded or annulled.

Thus, the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a
prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid
until rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also
deemed to have been validly made, thus demandable. Consequently, there
was no failure of consideration at the time when the subject checks were
dishonored. (Reyes v. Rossi, G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013)

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10. What is a prejudicial question?

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in
the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. (Reyes v. Rossi, G.R. No. 159823,
February 18, 2013)

RULE 119 TRIAL

1. A was charged of Plunder in the Sandiganbayan. After the prosecution

rested its case, A filed a demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of the
Prosecution’s evidence to establish the commission of Plunder, which was
denied. A assailed the denial by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
SC, which granted the Petition. The Ombudsman filed a motion for
reconsideration assailed the SC’s decision granting the petition for certiorari.
Does the motion for reconsideration violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy?

Yes. The consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the
State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy. The consequent dismissal of the Sandiganbayan Case for
insufficiency of evidence amounted to A’s acquittal of the crime of plunder
charged against A. The grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal
and is, thus, final and unappealable. The constitutional prohibition against
placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a
new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after
jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately
upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. With

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the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for
reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution
and subject A to a second jeopardy despite A’s acquittal. (Macapagal-Arroyo v.
People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953 (Resolution), April 18, 2017)
2. What are the three related protections granted by the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy?

The Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused

three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for
the same offense. (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953
(Resolution), April 18, 2017)

3. May a judgment of acquittal be assailed without violation the prohibition

against double jeopardy?

Yes. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding
must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (Macapagal-
Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953 (Resolution), April 18, 2017)

RULE 120 JUDGMENT

1. A and B are arguing ownership over a parcel of land. A charged B with

qualified theft allegedly from stealing fruits on the subject land. B was
convicted by the trial court. The CA affirmed the conviction and rejected B’s
defense of ownership over the subject land. Before the CA affirmed the
conviction, A filed a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession of the
subject land against B. The RTC ruled in favor of A, but the CA later on
reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA decision in the civil
case was issued after the CA decision affirming the conviction. A claims that
the CA conviction has the effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of
the land involved in the civil case considering that the subject land is the same
land involved in the criminal case.

a. What is res judicata?

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Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of
law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad
principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It
has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-
regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and necessity, which
makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation —
reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he
should be vexed twice for one and the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari pro una
et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the
will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity
and happiness. (Spouses Tumbokon v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010)

b. What are the requisites of res judicata?

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between
the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject
matter, and (c) identity of cause of action. (Spouses Tumbokon v. Legaspi, G.R.
No. 153736, August 4, 2010)

c. What are the 2 aspects of res judicata?

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior
judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action; the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the
rule of auter action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in
a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action and has the effect of preclusion of
issues only. (Spouses Tumbokon v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010)

d. Did the CA conviction have the effect of res judicata on the issue of
ownership of the land involved in the civil case considering that the subject
land is the same land involved in the criminal case?

No. First, bar by prior judgment is not applicable because the causes of action in
the civil and the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The
civil action is for the recovery of ownership of the land filed by A, while the

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criminal action was to determine whether the act of B of taking the coconut fruits
from the trees growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of
qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the legal ownership of the land,
but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The
issue of guilt or innocence was not dependent on the ownership of the land,
inasmuch as a person could be guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he
were the owner of the land. Second, Conclusiveness of judgment is not also
applicable. A commenced both actions, and fully and directly participated in the
trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the CA to
determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in the civil
action applied only to A, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the
civil action after the CA had ruled adversely against A.

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to exceptions, such as

where there is a change in the applicable legal context, or to avoid inequitable
administration of justice. Applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments
to this case will surely be iniquitous to B who rightly relied on the civil case, not
on the criminal case, to settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for
recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of
the property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in
the criminal case was only the response to the B having raised the ownership as a
matter of defense. (Spouses Tumbokon v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010)

RULE 122 APPEAL

1. The RTC convicted X for infringement of trademark and unfair competition.

X appealed the conviction to the CA, which affirmed the conviction.

a. What is the mode of appeal to review the conviction where the penalty
imposed is other than reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment?

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, the appeal is by petition
for review on certiorari to the SC. (Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16,
2009)

b. In his appeal with the SC, X alleges that he was not present during the NBI
search, he was not identified in court by the NBI raiding agents and that aside
from the bottles of Fundador Brandy, the rest of the confiscated items were not
found in his house. Are these assigned errors proper for a petition for review
on certiorari?

No. These errors require a re-appreciation and re-examination of the trial

evidence. They raise issues evidentiary and factual in nature. The appeal is
dismissible on that basis, because, one, the petition for review thereby violates

  13  
  

the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the SC, not being a
trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were
mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin. The factual findings of
the RTC, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of
their probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless
cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if considered, would alter the
outcome of the case, were ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted. To accord
with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court's
findings of fact, the SC will not disturb such findings of fact of the RTC,
particularly after their affirmance by the CA, especially since X did not
sufficiently prove any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from
such doctrine. (Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16, 2009)

c. Distinguish question of law from question of fact.

There exists a question of law when there is doubt on what the law applicable to
a certain set of facts is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise when there is
an issue regarding the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. Questions on
whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded probative value or
whether the proofs presented by one party are clear, convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition are issues of fact. Such questions are not subject to review
by the SC in a petition for review on certiorari. As a general rule, the SC reviews
cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law raised and
distinctly set forth in the petition. (Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16,
2009)

2. Is the right to appeal a natural right?

No. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
law. The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with
the manner thus prescribed. (Bejaresco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2,
2011)

RULE 124
PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

1. X was convicted for grave threats and grave oral defamation in the MTC of
Sibonga, Cebu. The RTC affirmed the conviction. Almost 2 years later, X filed
a petition for review with the CA (after his counsel filed 2 motions for
extension of time to file petition), and claimed that his lawyer recklessly
abandoned him and disappeared without leaving a trace. The CA denied the
petition for review. X filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC on

  14  
  

the ground that he was deprived of his day and court due to his counsel’s
reckless and gross negligence, which should not be binding against him.
Should the petition with the SC be given due course?

No. The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even
mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a
counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at
least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority
is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself. A
recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply,
however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own
negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in
respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case.
Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is
rendered against him. A litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of
his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of
his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to
time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; 4
hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is
being taken care of is not enough.

X took nearly 16 months from the issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA,
and almost 22 months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he
actually filed his petition for review in the CA. He ought to have been sooner
alerted about his dire situation by the fact that an unreasonably long time had
lapsed since the RTC had handed down its dismissal of his appeal without his
lawyer having updated him on the developments, including showing to him a
copy of the expected petition for review. X could have himself verified at the CA
whether or not the petition for review had been filed, especially upon realizing
that his lawyer had started making himself scarce to him. X's failure to know or
to find out the real status of his appeal rendered him undeserving of any
sympathy from the Court vis-à-vis the negligence of his former counsel.
(Bejaresco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011)

RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. X was charged with selling dangerous drugs. In the course of the

proceedings in the RTC, X filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence or
personal effects seized, including a car that belonged to A. PDEA proposed the
delivery to the RTC of listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held in
court throughout the duration of the trial. The prosecution objected to the

  15  
  

return of the car as it was the vehicle used in the sale of dangerous drugs. The
RTC directed the return of the car to A. The PDEA assailed the RTC order in
the CA by petition for certiorari. The CA ruled that there was no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC because A, the registered owner of the car,
is not accused of a crime nor was A charged with any crime.

a. Was it proper to release the car to A during the pendency of the

proceedings?
No. The release of the car was premature. The third paragraph of Sec. 20, RA
9165, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or
income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional
Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income
derived therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time and that no
bond shall be admitted for the release of it.

Article 45, RPC provides that every penalty imposed for the commission of a
felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed. Such proceeds and
instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed. Thus, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty
to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be
made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. (Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency v. Brodett, G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011)

b. Will your answer in (a) be the same if photographs of the car were taken
before its release?

Yes. The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTC as being in custodia legis is
primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as
such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court
and the parties access to it as evidence. That photographs were ordered to be
taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the
evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC's assailed orders were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165. (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency v. Brodett, G.R. No. 196390, September 28,
2011)

  16  
  

2. State the rules on releasing property confiscated in criminal proceedings.

In a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the
power to order upon conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the instruments
to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that are the
necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first,
the accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the
right to possession of property through his unlawful act. As justification for the
second, to return to the convict from whom the contraband was taken, in one
way or another, is not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a
violation of the law for possessing the contraband again. The court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the right to dispose of property used in the
commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to be
imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable
for the offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are
absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government. But it is required that the
property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be
said to be within its jurisdiction.

According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection

with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search
warrant, the personal property that may be seized may be that which is the
subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or that which has been used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense.

If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous

weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the
commission of an offense. Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in
which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person
from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a
matter of course, except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may
order the return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be
unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution. The order for the
disposition of such property can be made only when the case is finally
terminated.

Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter
of disposing of property claimed as evidence, and this discretion extends even to
the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was

  17  
  

wrongfully taken from him. The trial court has the power to return property held
as evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally
seized by the Government. Property used as evidence must be returned once the
criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject
to forfeiture or other proceedings. (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency v. Brodett,
G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011)

EVIDENCE

RULE 130 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

1. What is res gestae?

The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative
of such act." In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the
principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an
utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. (People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011)

2. V was in the kitchen when W1, saw through the window, Gilberto at the
rear of the kitchen aiming his firearm at the door. Gilberto saw W1 and
pointed to gun towards W1, who dropped to the ground. W1 then heard
gunshots. W2, who was exiting the bathroom, heard the gunshots, causing W2
to jump into a hole, where he saw and recognized Gilberto aiming his gun
upward. W3 heard the gunshots from the sala. V then went to W3, saying he

  18  
  

was shot by “Berting” Is V’s statement to W3 admissible against Gilberto?

Should V have mentioned Berting’s surname to identify Gilberto as the
assailant?

Yes. V’s statement uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he
was the victim — was a true part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible
against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule
130. The requistes for admissibility of a statement as part of res gestae are
present. Firstly, the principal act — the shooting of V — was a startling
occurrence. Secondly, V’s statement to W3 about being shot by Berting was made
before V had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered
immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the
startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of
the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being
uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

There was no need for a surname to be attached to the nickname Berting in order
to insulate the identification by V from challenge. The victim's res gestae
statement was only one of the competent and reliable pieces of identification
evidence. Gilberto was competently incriminated also by W1 and W2 in a
manner that warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were the
assailants. Also, that Berting was the natural nickname for a person whose given
name was Gilberto, like herein accused Gilberto, was a matter of common
knowledge in the Philippines. In fine, the pieces of identification evidence,
including V's res gestae statement, collaborated to render their identification
unassailable. The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for
conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness;
otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm
the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused. (People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011)

3. Are pictures of official ballots as scanned and recorded by the PCOS given
lesser probative weight than the original official ballots?

No. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded
as the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. The picture images
of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots”
that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. That the two documents —
the official ballot and its picture image — are considered "original documents"

  19  
  

simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when
either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
However, this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and
the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the
picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice
to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots
and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots
adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the
primary or best evidence of the voters' will. In that regard, the picture images of
the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are
lost or their integrity has been compromised. (Maliksi v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203302 (Resolution), April 11, 2013)
4. Why is hearsay evidence considered unreliable and untrustworthy?
A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived
the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be
examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not
upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving
the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore,
be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into
any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that
she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay
testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and
before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. (Patula v.
People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012)
5. What are the 2 solutions under the Rules of Court that address the problem
of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a
dispute while also safeguarding a party's right to cross-examine her
adversary's witness?
The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing
be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132. The

  20  
  

second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination

by the adverse party under Section 6, Rule 132. Although the second solution traces
its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14,
(2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to
face . . .," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally
applies to non-criminal proceedings. (Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11,
2012)
6. When is an utterance hearsay in character but not considered legal hearsay?
Give an example.
If an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter
asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay
rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness
testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is
hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does
not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies. (Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012)
7. Plaintiff presented the warehouse accountant as a witness to testify on a
Statement of Account she prepared showing the liability of the defendant.
Defendant argued that he could not be liable for the balance stated in the
Statement of Account on the ground that the document was a hearsay being a
mere statement of account. Defendant argued that the witness was not shown
to be either an accountant, or bookkeeper, or auditor or a person
knowledgeable in accounting. The testimony on the statement of account was
allegedly limited to stating that she had prepared the statement of account
contained therein; that she did not affirm the correctness or veracity of the
contents of the document; and that, consequently, the statement of account had
no evidentiary value as proof of the total liability stated therein.
a. Is Defendant correct?
No. The Statement of Account is a private document and its authentication
pursuant to the rules on evidence is a condition for its admissibility. The
authentication was made in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 132.
b. Defendant alleges that the contents of the Statement of Account is in
violation of Section 43, Rule 130 as it did not constitute entries in the course of
business. Is Defendant correct?
No. The invocation of the rule is misplaced because Section 43, Rule 130 speaks
of a situation where the person who made the entries is dead or unable to testify,

  21  
  

which was not the situation here. (Spouses Dela Cruz v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R.
No. 158649, February 18, 2013)
c. Do entries made in the course of business enjoy the presumption of
regularity?
Yes. If properly authenticated, the entries serve as evidence of the status of the
account of Defendant. Such entries are accorded unusual reliability because their
regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit
of precision; and that if the entries are financial, the records are routinely
balanced and audited; hence, in actual experience, the whole of the business
world function in reliance of such kind of records. (Spouses Dela Cruz v. Planters
Products, Inc., G.R. No. 158649, February 18, 2013)

RULE 132 BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

1. What is the burden of proof of an accused that invokes the

justifying circumstance of self-defense?

Upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused assumes

the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing
evidence. This is because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on
the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the Prosecution's
evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his
admission. (People v. Mediado, G.R. No. 169871, February 2, 2011)

RULE 133 WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

1. Is alibi a credible defense?

No. Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to

fabricate and difficult to disprove. (People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6,
2010)

2. How is the defense of alibi established?

To establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another
place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when the crime was
perpetrated. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place
where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where the crime
was committed, as well as to the facility of access between the two places. (People
v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010)

  22  
  

3. Why is the determination of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses,

when affirmed by the appellate court, accorded full weight, credit and great
respect?

It is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of

witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and
credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made
by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling
examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.
(People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010) Such evaluation, when
affirmed by the CA, is binding on the SC unless facts or circumstances of weight
have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered,
would materially affect the disposition of the case. (Atizado v. People, G.R. No.
173822, October 13, 2010)

4. Is it correct to say that an accused may only be convicted if there is direct

evidence from an eyewitness who saw the accused committing the crime?

No. The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for

conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness;
otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
eyewitnesses. Trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the
identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused. There are 2 types of positive identification: (a) that by direct evidence,
through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that which
forms part of circumstantial evidence, where although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime, such as
where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the
crime. The second type of positive identification, when taken together with
other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to
the exclusion of all others.

If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively
identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be
convicted unless there is an eyewitness. It is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw
its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not
be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence,
then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper
protection. (People v. Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011)

  23  
  

5. X was charged with and convicted of rape with homicide. W, the lone
witness, claimed that she heard the victim’s anguished cries coming from an
area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for W to see what was
going on. W allegedly then heard sounds of beating that soon ended the
victim’s cries. W proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening. She
saw a man dragging the victim’s body to the river. W could not see the
assailant’s face, whose back was turned towards her but W insisted that the
assailant was X, whose physical features were familiar to her as she had seen X
pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident.

a. Was W’s identification reliable and positive enough to support X’s

conviction?

No. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its

imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such
distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical
features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other
physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity. A witness'
familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive
identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the
possibility of mistake.

No matter how honest W's testimony might have been, her identification of X by
a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive
enough to generate that moral certainty about X being the perpetrator of the
killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be the victim's killer.
Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and
uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be
so many other individuals in the community where the crime was committed
whose backs might have looked like X's back.

Many factors could have influenced W’s perception, including her lack of
keenness of observation, her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to
suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent
of such factors are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could
not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors
could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known
phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with one
another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through
a sheer view of another's back. An identification that does not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.
(People v. Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011)

  24  
  

b. Will your answer in (a) be the same if W noticed that the assailant was
wearing gray short pants bearing the number “11” mark?

Yes. W’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number
"11" did not enhance the reliability of her identification of X. Such pants were not
one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet,
even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could
have been linked to X without proof of his ownership or possession of them in
the moments before the crime was perpetrated. (People v. Caliso, G.R. No. 183830,
October 19, 2011)

c. Will your answer in (a) be the same if it was established that W has no bad
faith or ill motive to impute the killing to X?

Yes. The lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of W to impute the killing to X
does not guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The
dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any
human error in W's identification of X rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive
irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be
mistaken about her impressions of persons involved in startling occurrences such
as the crime committed against the victim. It is neither fair nor judicious, to have
the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of W raise her identification to the
level of moral certainty. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed
to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the
evidence for the Prosecution. (People v. Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011)

6. X was charged with rape committed against his own daughter, D, a minor. D
testified against X. The RTC found D’s testimony credible, and convicted X.
The CA affirmed the conviction. X assails the conviction for being based solely
on D’s testimony. Is X’s contention correct?

No. It is settled that the accused in a prosecution for rape can be convicted on the
basis of the sole testimony of the victim provided the victim and her testimony
are credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things. Conviction or acquittal in a prosecution for rape has often
depended more often than not almost entirely on the credibility of the victim's
testimony, for, by the very nature of the crime, the victim is usually the only one
who can testify on its occurrence. The worth of witnesses has been based on their
quality, not on their quantity. (People v. Taguibuya, G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution),
October 5, 2011)

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7. Will the failure to present receipts proving that the payments by the private
complainant was in consideration of his recruitment negate the guilt of the
accused in a charge for illegal recruitment?

No. The absence of receipts evidencing payment does not defeat a criminal
prosecution for illegal recruitment. The absence of receipts in a criminal case for
illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal
to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses has positively shown
through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the
prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the want of
receipts.

The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentation of
receipts in order to prove the existence of recruitment agreement and the
procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may be proved by
the testimony of witnesses. As long as the State establishes through credible
testimonial evidence that the accused engaged in illegal recruitment, the
conviction shall be justified. (People v. Abat, G.R. No. 168651 (Resolution), March
16, 2011)

8. What is circumstantial or presumptive evidence?

Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence,

consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is
sufficient to sustain a conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; ( b)
the facts from which the inferences were derived have been established; and ( c)
the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. (People v.Nuyok, G.R.
No. 195424, 15 June 2015)

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