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The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal

Author(s): Henry A. Kissinger
Source: World Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 264-280
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
A Reappraisal
By HENRY A. KISSINGER

IT isonlynatural thata periodanxiously seeking towrestpeacefrom

thethreat ofnuclearextinction shouldlooknostalgically to thelast
greatsuccessful effort to settleinternational disputes by meansof a
diplomaticconference, the Congressof Vienna.Nothingis more
tempting thantoascribe itsachievements totheveryprocess ofnegotia-
tion,todiplomatic skill,andto"willingness tocometoan agreement"-
and nothingis moredangerous. For the effectiveness of diplomacy
dependson elements transcending it; in parton thedomestic structure
ofthestatescomprising theinternational order, in parton theirpower
relationship.
Anyinternational settlement represents a stagein a process bywhich
a nationreconciles itsvisionof itselfwiththevisionof it by other
powers.No statecan doubtitsowngoodfaith;it is thevehicleofits
socialcohesion. But,equally,no powercan stakeitssurvival entirely
on thegoodfaithof another;thiswouldbe an abdication of there-
sponsibilityof statesmanship. The wholedomestic effort of a people
exhibitsan effortto transform forceintoobligation bymeansofa con-
sensuson thenatureof justice.Buttheinternational experience of a
stateis a challenge to theuniversality of itsnotionof justice, forthe
stabilityof the international orderdependson thereconciliation of
differentversions of legitimacy. Coulda nationachieveall itswishes,
it wouldstrive forabsolutesecurity, a worldorderfreefromthecon-
sciousness of foreigndanger,and one whereall problems havethe
manageability of domestic issues.But sinceabsolutesecurity forone
powermeansabsoluteinsecurity forall others, it is obtainableonly
through conquest, never as partof a legitimate settlement.
An international settlement whichis accepted and notimposedwill
therefore alwaysappearsomewhat unjusttoanyoneofitscomponents.
Paradoxically, the generality of thisdissatisfaction is a condition of
becausewereanyonepowertotally
stability, satisfied,all otherswould
havetobetotally dissatisfiedanda revolutionary situation wouldensue.
The foundation ofa stableorderis therelative security-and therefore
the relativeinsecurity-of its members. Its stability reflects,not the

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 265
absenceof unsatisfied claims,buttheabsenceof a grievance of such
magnitude thatredress will be soughtin overturning thesettlement
ratherthanthrough an adjustment withinitsframework. An order
whosestructure is acceptedby all majorpowersis "legitimate." An
ordercontaining a powerwhichconsiders its structure oppressive is
"revolutionary." The security of a domestic orderresidesin thepre-
ponderant powerof authority, thatof an international orderin the
balanceofforcesand in itsexpression, theequilibrium.
Butif an international orderexpresses theneedforsecurity and an
equilibrium,it is constructed in thenameof a legitimizing principle.
Becausea settlement transforms forceintoacceptance, it mustattempt
to translate
individual demandsintogeneraladvantage. It is thelegiti-
mizingprinciple whichestablishes therelative "justice"of competing
claimsandthemodeoftheiradjustment. Thisis notto saythatthere
needbe an exactcorrespondence betweenthemaximsof legitimacy
and theconditions ofthesettlement. No majorpowerwillgiveup its
minimumclaimto security-the possibility of conducting an inde-
pendentforeignpolicy-merely forthe sake of legitimacy. But the
legitimizing principle defines themarginal case.In I919, theAustro-
HungarianEmpiredisintegrated notso muchfromtheimpactofthe
war as fromthenatureof thepeace,becauseitscontinued existence
was incompatible withnationalself-determination, the legitimizing
principleofthenewinternational order.It wouldhaveoccurred to no
oneintheeighteenth century thatthelegitimacy ofa statedepended on
unity.It was inconceivable
linguistic to themakersof theVersailles
settlementthattheremightbe any otherbasisfor legitimate rule.
Legitimizing principles triumph bybeingtakenforgranted.
Althoughthereneveroccursan exactcorrespondence betweenthe
maximsof thelegitimizing principleand theconditions ofthesettle-
ment,stability dependson a certaincommensurability. If thereexists
a substantial
discrepancy anda majorpowerwhichfeelsdisadvantaged,
theinternational orderwillbe volatile. Fortheappealbya "revolution-
ary"power to the legitimizing principle of thesettlement createsa
psychological distortion. The "natural"expression of thepolicyof a
status-quopoweris law-the definition of a continuing relationship.
Butagainst a permanently dissatisfied
powerappealing tothelegitimiz-
ingprinciple oftheinternational order,forceistheonlyrecourse. Those
who have mostgain fromstability thusbecomethe advocatesof a
revolutionary policy.Hitler'sappealto nationalself-determination in
theSudetencrisisin I938 was an invocation of"justice," and thereby
contributed totheindecisiveness oftheresistance: itinducedtheWest-

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266 WORLD POLITICS
ernpowersto attempt to construct a "truly"legitimate orderbysatis-
fyingGermany's "just" claims. Only after Hitler annexed Bohemia
and Moraviawas it clearthathe was aimingfordominion, notlegiti-
macy;onlythendid thecontest becomeone ofpurepower.
The majorproblemof an international settlement, then,is so to
relatetheclaimsof legitimacy to therequirements ofsecurity thatno
powerwill express itsdissatisfaction in a revolutionary policy,and so
to arrangethebalanceof forcesas to deteraggression producedby
causesotherthantheconditions of thesettlement. This is nota me-
chanicalproblem.If the international ordercould be constructed
like a mathematical axiom,powerswould considerthemselves as
factorsin a balanceand arrangetheiradjustments to achievea per-
fectequilibrium betweentheforcesof aggression and theforcesof
resistance. But an exactbalanceis impossible, and not onlybecause
ofthedifficulty ofpredicting theaggressor. It is chimerical,aboveall,
because while powersmayappear to outsiders as factorsin a security
arrangement, theyappeardomestically as expressions of a historical
existence. No powerwillsubmit toa settlement, however well-balanced
and however "secure," whichseemstotally to denyitsvisionofitself.
Thereexisttwokindsofequilibrium then:a general equilibrium which
makesitriskyforonepowerorgroupofpowersto attempt to impose
itswillon theremainder; anda specialequilibrium whichdefines the
historical relation of certain powersamong each other. The former is
thedeterrent againsta generalwar;thelatterthecondition ofsmooth
cooperation. An international orderis therefore rarely bornoutofthe
consciousness ofharmony. Forevenwhenthereis an agreement about
legitimacy, theconceptions of therequirements of securitywilldiffer
with the geographical positionand the history of the contending
powers.Out ofjustsucha conflict overthenatureoftheequilibrium
the Congress of Vienna fashioned a settlement whichlastedalmost
exactly a century.
For theproblemat Viennawas notsimplyhow to protect Europe
against a renewed Frenchonslaught. Therewasgeneral agreement about
theextentof Francecompatible withthepeaceof Europe,but this
onlysharpened thedisagreements within thevictorious coalitionabout
therelative spheres ofinfluence ofAustria, Prussia, Russia,and Great
Britain.And thiscontest was madeall themoreintractable because
eachoftheprotagonists meantsomething different by the term "equi-
librium"so frequently invoked:WhentheBritish ForeignMinister,
Castlereagh, spokeof theequilibrium, he meanta Europein which
hegemony was impossible; but when Metternich appealedto theequi-

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 267

librium,he includeda Germany in whichPrussian predominance was

impossible.Russia'sdemandforPoland threatened the equilibrium
of Europeand Castlereagh could,therefore, hardlybelievethatany
otherproblem wasworthdiscussing before theTsar'spretensionswere
thwarted.Prussia's insistenceon Saxonymerely imperiled thebalance
withinGermany, but thiswas enoughto absorbthefullenergyof
Metternich. Castlereagh was interested in creatinga CentralEurope
whichwouldbe strongenoughto resistattackfromboththeWest
and the East; Metternich desiredthe samething,but he was also
concerned aboutAustria's relativeposition withinCentralEurope.To
Castlereagh,theContinental nations were ofa defensive
aspects effort;
butto theContinental nationsthegeneralequilibrium meantnothing
ifitdestroyedthehistorical position whichto themwas thereasonfor
theirexistence.To Castlereagh, theequilibrium was a mechanical ex-
pressionofthebalanceofforces; totheContinental nations,a reconcilia-
tionofhistoricalaspirations.
This led to a diplomatic stalemate, madeall themoreintractable
becauseBritain andAustria hadsecured mostoftheirspecialobjectives
duringthewar so thatfewbargaining weaponswereleftto Russia
and Prussia,a stalemate whichcouldbe brokenonlyby addingan
additionalweighttoonesideofthescales.Sincethesoleuncommitted
majorpowerwasFrance,theformer enemyemerged as thekeyto the
Europeansettlement. Thus grewup a mythaboutTalleyrand's role
at theCongress ofVienna, of the diabolicalwit who appearedon the
sceneand brokeup a coalition ofhostilepowers, whothenregrouped
themintoa pattern to hislikingbyinvoking themagicword"legiti-
macy"and froman outcastemerged as thearbiter of Europe.'To be
sure,sincetheTreatyofParishad settled France'sboundaries,Talley-
randcouldafford perhapsthemostdisinterested approach.His wit
andcausticcomments becamefamous, so thatGentzcouldsayofhim
thathe had boththelaughers and thethinkers on hisside.Butthese
effortswouldhaveavailedlittle,had not thethreatof Francebeen
eclipsedby thedangerfromtheEast,had notthedifferences among
theAlliesbecomegreater thantheir common fearofFrance.So long
1 It is a legendspreadby thosewho confuseresultsand causes and by professional
diplomatswontto ascribeto merenegotiating skillwhat is possibleonly throughthe
exploitation of more deep-seatedfactors.It has gained currencybecause Talleyrand,
whosemonarchhad notcometo Vienna,was obligedto writevoluminousreports, and
in order to cementhis shaky domesticposition,the formerForeign Ministerof
Napoleon tended to emphasizehis indispensability. See, for example,Harold G.
Nicolson,The Congressof Vienna,New York, I946; DuffCooper,Talleyrand,New
York, I932; Crane Brinton,The Lives of Talleyrand,New York, I936; Guglielmo
Ferrero,The Reconstruction of Europe,New York,I941.

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268 WORLD POLITICS
as theCoalition
stillbelieved
thatthememory ofthecommon wartime
effortwouldprovidethemotiveforceofa settlement, Talleyrandwas
powerless.Once thisillusionwas shattered,
theissuebecameone of
thelimitsofself-restraint,
whethera powerwouldfailto add a factor
toitssidemerelyforthesakeoftheappearance ofharmony. The logic
of thesituationprovidedtheanswer:Francecameto participate in
Europeanaffairs,becausetheycouldnotbe settled
without her.

II
As theplenipotentiarieswereassembling in Vienna,however, the
courseof eventsseemedby no meansthisclear.It was stillthought
thatthesettlementwouldbe rapid,thatFrancewouldappearas but
thattherestofEuropewouldonlybe calledupontoratify
a spectator,
an instrument draftedin relative
harmony.This was reflected
in the
proceduralschemeagreedto at preliminaryconferences
between Aus-
Russia,and GreatBritain
tria,Prussia, whichplacedtheeffectivecon-
trolof the Congressin the handsof the "Big Four."Talleyrand
protestedstrenuouslyagainsttheexclusionof Franceand theminor
powersfromthe deliberations of the Congress,
butdespitehis bril-
liance and sarcasm,he achievedonlya few minorconcessions. It
was decidedto adjournthe formalopeningof the Congressuntil
I, i8I4, andto havethepending
November examined
questions in
themeantime bytheeightsignatories oftheTreatyofParis,the"Big
Four" plus France,Spain,Portugal,and Sweden.The "Big Four"
leftno doubt,however, thattheyintended to continuetheirprivate
andtotreatthe"Eight"merely
discussions as a ratifying
instrument or
as oneforsettlingperipheral issues.
Talleyrand'sfirstsallyfailed,becausea logicalinconsistency is not
todissolve
sufficient coalitions.Onlyaftertheclaimofspecialrighteous-
ofcoalitions,
ness,whichis characteristic had disappeared in a conflict
whichindicated thattherelations oftheAlliesamongeachotherwere
simplythoseof contending powers,couldTalleyrand emergeas an
equal partner.But firstone moreeffort to determine whetherthe
Tsarcouldbe inducedto limithisclaimswithout thethreatofforce
had to be made.So well had Castlereagh established
himselfas the
primecontender forthe Europeanequilibrium thatit was he who
enteredthearenato trytheTsar'sresolution.
Thereensueda strangeand unrealseriesof interviews between
Castlereaghand Alexander;strange, becausetheirbitterness was ac-
companiedby protestations of unendingfriendship, and unreal,be-

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 269
causeAlexander couldneveragreeon basicpremises.
and Castlereagh
In orderto obtaina framework fornegotiation,theprotagonistscon-
stantly
shifted pretending
positions, toagreewiththeother'sprinciples,
butinterpreting themin a mannerwhichreducedthemto absurdity.
ThusCastlereagh atonestagebecamean aviddefender ofa completely
independent Poland,whileAlexanderon anotheroccasiondefended
toEuropeansecurity.
hisPolishplanas a contribution ThatAlexander
ofAlliedunitydeprive
did notproposeto letprotestations himofhis
Polishspoilsbecameapparenton theoccasionof his firstinterview
withCastlereagh For thefirsttime,he
on thedayafterhis arrival.2
avowedhisPolishplansindetail.He proposed tokeepall oftheDuchy
ofWarsawwiththeexception ofa smallportiontobe cededtoPrussia.
Theseclaims,Alexander argued,werenottheresultof ambition, but
theoutgrowth of a moraldutyand motivated by thesole desireof
achievingthehappiness ofthePolishpeople.In short,sincetheywere
notadvancedin thenameofsecurity, theycouldnotthreaten anyone.
Castlereagh,in reply,
urgedthata Russianappendageextending deep
intoCentralEuropewouldconstitute sourceofdisquietfor
a constant
therestofEurope.ButtheTsarleftno doubtthathe wasunwilling to
withdraw from Theinterview
hisPolishpossession. betweenCastlereagh
and Alexander had thusmadeevidentthatpersuasiveness wouldnot
and thatthenextstageof thenegotiations
suffice wouldhaveto be
basedon forceorthethreat offorce.'

III
WhileCastlereagh was negotiating withtheTsar,he made every
effortto assemblesucha force.As an abstract problemin diplomacy
his taskseemedsimple.But althoughtheequilibrium mightbe in-
it did notappearso to itscomponents.
divisible, The Tsar couldnot
be resisted
without a unitedfront oftherestofEurope,butthepowers
of Europewerenotat all in accordregarding therealdanger.They
did notwishto seethegeneralequilibrium buttheywere
overturned,
notprepared to resistat thesacrifice
ofthatpartofit on whichtheir
historical
positiondepended. A strongRussiamightdominate Europe,
buta toopowerful Prussiawouldoutstrip Austriaand a unitedGer-
manymightmenaceFrance.Hardenberg, thePrussianminister,was
2Castlereagh'sreport.See CharlesWebster,BritishDiplomacy,1813-1815, London,
I92I,pp. I97ff.,October2, I8I4.
8 The exchangecontinuedthroughOctoberin a seriesof memoranda:Castlereagh
to the Tsar, OctoberI2, I8I4, see Duke of Wellington,Supplementary Despatches,
Correspondence and Memoranda,I5 vols.,ed. byhis son,London,I855-1872, IX, p. 332;
reply,November8, p. 4IO.
theTsar's reply,October30, p. 386; Castlereagh's

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270 WORLD POLITICS
moreinterested in Saxonythanin Poland;Talleyrand was almostas
afraidthattheproblemof Polandwouldbe settledwithout him as
thatit wouldbe settled againsthim;and Metternich, whilenotindif-
ferent to theextension of RussiaintoCentralEuropeand of Prussia
intoCentralGermany, did notwishto resistopenlysincethiswould
causethebrunt oftheeffort tofallon Austria, themostexposedpower,
whilesurrendering thepolicyofclosecooperation withPrussiawhich
Metternich considered thekeytoAustrian security."I barricade myself
behindtime,"Metternich toldtheSaxonenvoy,"and makepatience
myweapon."'
Thus Castlereagh's effortto createa unitedfrontagainstRussialed
to an ambiguous seriesofconstellations, of half-hearted coalitionsand
tentative betrayals, of promises of unyielding supportcoupledwith
hedgesagainstbad faith.Matters werefinally brought to a head by
Prussia,thepowerwhichcouldleastafford delay.For althoughthe
treatiesof Kalish,Teplitz,and Chaumont had guaranteed Prussiaits
territorialextentofi805, theyhadneverspecified wherePrussiamight
findtherequisite particularly
territories, ifit lostitsPolishpossessions
toRussia.The availablecompensations, composed offormer provinces
orformer ofFrance,primarily
satellites in theRhineland, wereinade-
quate.Andtheywereundesirable becauseoftheir geographic separation
fromthemainpartofthePrussian monarchy andtheCatholic religion
oftheirinhabitants. ThusPrussiacametolooktoward Saxony, coveted
sincethetimeof FrederictheGreat,contiguous withits own terri-
toriesand with a predominantly Protestant population. ButPrussia's
negotiating positionwas theweakestof thoseof themajorpowers.
UnlikeRussia,it was notin possession ofitsprize.UnlikeAustria, it
had notmadeitsparticipation in thewardependent on obtainingits
specialconditions. If now thePolishquestionwas settled beforethat
of Saxony,Prussiawouldhavepaid thepenalty foritstotalcommit-
ment;ofhavingfought thewarwithso muchfervor thatitsparticipa-
of
tionhad neverbeennegotiable, neglecting the peace becausethe
war,in effect,had becomean endin itself. AndPrussiarequired Aus-
trianacquiescence in theannexation of Saxony, becausetheorganiza-
tionof Germany, the indispensable condition of Prussia'ssecurity,
wouldbecomeillusory if Austriaemerged on theSaxonissueas the
protector ofthesecondary Germanpowers.
It is notsurprising, therefore,thaton October9, i8I4, Hardenberg
submitted a memorandum agreeing to an "intermediary system based
4WilhelmSchwarz,Die Heilige Allianz,Stuttgart,
1935, p. 13.

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 271
on Austria,Prussiaand Britain," and directedagainstRussia.5But
he made Prussia'scooperation on thePolishquestiondependent on
Austrian agreement to theannexation ofSaxonyandtotheprovisional
occupation of SaxonybyPrussiaas a tokenofgoodfaith.In itstenta-
tivequestforallies,in itspedanticeffort to achievetheadvantage of
everycourseof action,theHardenberg memorandum merelyserved
to illustratePrussia's
dilemma:Russiansupport mightgainit Saxony,
butnotlegitimacy; whileAustrian support mightyielditPoland,but
not Saxony.The Hardenberg memorandum was a plea notto leave
Prussiadependent on thegoodwilloftheTsar; to createa European
orderbasedon Austro-Prussian friendship,butalso on Prussianpos-
sessionofSaxony.
But thiseffort to combineincompatible policiesprovidedMetter-
nichwiththe meansto separatethePolishand Saxonquestionby
one of his intricate maneuvers. On October22, he transmitted two
notesto Hardenberg and Castlereagh whosetoneof grudging agree-
menttoHardenberg's proposalobscured thefactthatthemoralframe-
workwhichwasbeingcreated toresist
in Polandwouldproveequally
effectivetoresistin Saxony, andthatHardenberg, inhisefforttohedge
hisrisks,had madehisdefeatinevitable. For Castlereagh in hisover-
ridingconcernwiththe balanceof powerand Hardenberg in his
obsession withSaxonyoverlooked twosubtleandmutually inconsistent
reservations in Metternich's despatches: thatPrussia'sannexation of
Saxonyshouldnot lead to a "disproportionate aggrandizement," a
conditionclearlyimpossible of fulfillment if Prussiaregainedher
Polishprovinces,6 and thatAustria'sagreement on the Saxonpoint
wasconditional on thesuccessoftheeffort tothwart theTsar'sdesign
on Poland7-which, in turn,wouldleavePrussiaisolatedin thein-
evitablecontest overtheinterpretation of thefirst reservation.
But whileMetternich was preparing themoralframework foran
effort to separatePrussiaand Russia,Castlereagh was lookingonlyto
Poland,as if theEuropeanequilibrium couldbe createdwiththene-
cessity ofa mathematical equation.On October 23,hefinallysucceeded
in getting Prussiato agreeto a commonplanofactionagainstRussia
on thebasisof Metternich's memoranda.8 The threepowersunder-
the
tooktoforce issuebyconfronting theTsarwiththethreat ofbring-
ingthePolishquestionbeforethefullCongress ifa reasonable settle-
5Comted'Angeberg, Le Congresde Vienneet les Traite'sde 1815, Paris, i863-1864,
II, p. 1934.
6 Text of noteto Castlereagh,
ibid.,II, pp. I939ff.
7 Text of note to Hardenberg,ibid.,I, pp. 316ff.
8 Castlereagh's
report,Webster,op.cit.,p. 212, October29, i814.

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272 WORLD POLITICS
mentcould not be obtainedby directnegotiations. They proposed
threeacceptable solutions:an independent Polandas it existedprior
tothefirst a rumpPolandon thescaleofI79I, or thereturn
partition,
of thethreepartitioning powersto theirformer possessions.9
The threatof an appealto Europein Congress was thelasteffort
to settletheEuropeanequilibrium bya combination withintheanti-
Frenchcoalition. WhenMetternich calledon theTsar to present the
ultimatum on the Polishquestion, he was dismissedhaughtily and
evenchallenged to a duel.And when,on October30,thethreesov-
ereignsleftto visitHungary, Alexander appealedto hisbrother mon-
archsagainsttheirministers.He failedwiththeAustrian Emperor, but
it didnotprovetoodifficult to convince thestodgyandunimaginative
PrussianKing thatthesecretnegotiations ofthethreeministers were
an actofbad faith. When the monarchs to
returned Vienna, Harden-
bergwas ordered, in the presence of theTsar,to refrain fromany
furtherseparatenegotiations withhisAustrian and Britishcolleagues.
In thismanner, on November 5, thecontest overPolandendedfor
thetimebeing.The effort to achievean internationalorderbasedon
agreement and not on force seemed to havereturned to itsstarting
point.

IV
Butthiswas a mistaken failure
ForifCastlereagh's
impression. had
provedthattheequilibrium couldnotbe achievedthrough a demon-
stration Metternich's
of its necessity, almostimperceptible comple-
mentary efforthad createdthemoralframework forreopening the
issuebyan appealtolegitimacy. whichhadproved
The procrastination
so maddening had in factbeenMetternich's
to Castlereagh mostef-
fectivemeansto overcomehis dilemmas,for delay strengthened
Austria'schiefbargaining weapon,thatlegitimacycan be conferred
butnotexacted, thatit impliesagreementand notimposition.So the
weekshad passedwhileEuropecomplained aboutthe frivolityof
theAustrian ministerand theold schoolofAustriandiplomats raged
thattheir"Rhenish" whomtheynicknamed
minister, PrinceScamper-
lin,was betraying theEmpireto Prussia.But in theadmiration for
thefamousphraseof thePrincede Ligne:"Le Congresdanse,mais
il ne marchepas,"it was overlooked thattheCongress was dancing
itselfintoa trap.
WhenHardenberg offeredMetternich he believed
his cooperation,
re procedure,
Meorandum ibid.,pp. 213ff.

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 273
thathe was clinching hisgainsandthathe wasobtaining a guarantee
ofSaxony, however thePolishnegotiations ended.ButbecauseMetter-
nich'sreplyhad madeAustrian agreement to theannexation of Sax-
onyconditional on thesuccessoftheircommon measures, theeffort to
connectthetwoissuesbecamea meansto separatethem.For if the
Polishnegotiations succeeded,Prussiawouldlosehermoralclaimto
Saxonyin theeyesofEurope.IfPrussiaregained herPolishpossessions,
theannexation of Saxonywouldrepresent the "disproportionate ag-
grandizement" againstwhichMetternich hadwarnedCastlereagh. But
ifthePolishnegotiations failed,Prussiawouldlosehermoralclaimto
Saxonyin theeyesofAustria. Prussia'sisolation wasassurednonethe
becausethefactofresistance
lesssurely, wasalmostas certain toalienate
theTsar as itssuccess.Havingdemonstrated Austria's Europeancon-
cernbyyielding in Saxony, intransigence couldnowbedefended bythe
requirements of theEuropeanand nottheGermanequilibrium. And
Castlereagh,havingobtainedAustrian support in thePolishnegotia-
tions,wouldno longerbe ableto treattheSaxonissueas an internal
Germanaffair. Therecouldbe no doubtof theattitude ofFranceor
ofthesmaller Germanstates. Prussia,in itsefforttoobtainreinsurance,
had onlysucceeded in achieving itsisolation.
When,on November7, Hardenberg informed Metternich of the
King'sordersandofthedifficulty ofcarrying outtheagreedplanwith
respectto Poland,Metternich finallyhad themoralbasisforaction.s
Austriawas interested in theclosestrelationship withPrussia,he re-
plied,butno longerat thepriceofthedestruction of Saxony.1"After
beingforcedto tolerate Russianaggrandizement in Poland,Austria
couldnotacquiescein Prussian aggrandizement withinGermany with-
out upsetting the equilibrium completely. Metternich suggested an
alternativeplanwhichmaintained a nucleusof Saxony,whilegiving
a largepartofit to Prussia, together withothercompensations in the
Rhineland. Butall protestations offriendship couldnothidethefact
thatPrussiawasoutmaneuvered, thatMetternich hadlostoutinPoland
onlyto win in Saxonyand thenpartially to restorethesituation in
PolandbymeansofSaxony.
It didnotmatter that,onNovember 8,theRussianmilitary governor
of Saxonyturnedoverthe provisional administration to Prussia,or
10 D'Angeberg,op.cit.,I, p. 406 (Hardenberg'snote to Metternich).
There is yet
anotherindication,althoughno proof,that Metternichnever intendedthe Polish
as anythingbut a means to isolatePrussiaon the Saxon question:his
negotiations
dismal defeatduringhis interviewwith Alexander.At no othertime in his career
did Metternich
choosea frontalattack,negotiateso ineffectively,
or surrender
so easily.
11Text, ibid., I, p. 505.

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274 WORLD POLITICS

thatthePrussian militarywerethreateningwar.Russia,attheperiphery
ofEurope,mightrestitsclaimon Polandon thefactofpossession, but
a powersituated in thecenterof theContinent couldsurvive onlyas
thecomponent of a "legitimate"orderbothwithinGermany and in
Europe.Thus,althoughby themiddleof DecembertheCongress of
Viennaseemedto have reacheda completestalemate, behindthe
scenea fundamental transformation
was preparing itself.
A stalemate
is nottotaluntilall thefactorsareengagedand Francewas stillun-
committed. The contests duringOctoberandNovember had exploded
themythofAlliedunityand thethreat of Franceno longerloomed
largerthanthatof theerstwhile ally.WhileCastlereagh was despair-
ingaboutthePolishfailureand accusingMetternich ofneverhaving
reallyintended to resist,'2
a combination was forming on theSaxon
questionwhichwas to givea new direction to thecontest.For the
coalitionwhichcould resistin Saxonywas, by definition, also the
coalitionwhichcouldresistin Poland.And theclaimsof powerde-
featedin onequarterwould,almostnecessarily, limittheassertions of
in the other.So it was proved,afterall, thattheequi-
arbitrariness
libriumwas indivisible, althoughthe solutiondid not come about
through a consciousnessofthis.It wasnotin thenameofEuropethat
Europewas saved,butin thenameof Saxony.

V
Butbefore thisnewcombination couldbe formed, domestic pressures
on CastlereaghnearlywreckedMetternich's finely spunplan.An in-
sularpowermayfight itswarsinthenameoftheEuropean equilibrium,
butit willtendto identify to theequilibrium
thethreats withthreats
to itsimmediate security. Becauseitspolicyis defensive and notpre-
itwillmakethecauseofwardependon an overtactwhich
cautionary,
"demonstrates"thedanger.Butthedangertotheequilibrium is never
demonstrated untilit is alreadyoverturned, becausean aggressor can
alwaysjustifyeverystep,except the cruciallastone, as the manifesta-
tionof limitedclaimsand exactacquiescence as the priceof con-
tinuedmoderation. To be sure,Britainhad entered thefrayagainst
Napoleonat an earlystageand continued thecontest withgreatper-
Butthethreat
sistence. totheequilibrium hadbecomemanifest through
an attackon theLow Countries anda challenge to Britain'scommand
of theseas.Now theissuewas Poland,however, a "distant" country
bothgeographically and psychologically.It was notclearuntilit was
12 Webster,op.cit., pp. 248ff.

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 275
"proven"thattheRhinewas bestdefended alongtheVistulaor that
thereexistedanythreat to peaceexceptFrance.In thisframeofmind
theCabinetconsidered thePolishdisputean irritating outgrowth of
Continental rivalry,threatening a peacedearlywon,and dealtwith
itprimarily undertheaspectofitsimpacton British domestic politics.
On OctoberI4, Liverpool, theBritish PrimeMinister, wroteCastle-
reaghthatthe"lessBritainhad to do with[Poland]... thebetter"
andhetransmitted a memorandum bytheChancellor oftheExchequer,
Vansittart,whosimplydeniedthereality oftheRussiandanger.With
thepetulance of mediocrity convincing itselfthattheeasywayoutis
also thecourseof wisdom,Vansittart arguedthattheabsorption of
Polandwouldadd an element ofweakness to theRussianstatewhile
provingconducive to Britishcommerce.1" Finally,on November 22,
theCabinetsentits firstinstructions to Castlereagh sincehis arrival
in Vienna:"It is unnecessary," wroteBathurst, "formetopointoutto
youtheimpossibility of . . . consenting to involvethiscountry into
hostilities
. . . foranyof theobjectswhichhavehitherto beenunder
discussionat Vienna. "14

Thus,at thecrucialpointin thenegotiations, Castlereagh was de-

privedofhisonlymeansofexerting pressure and at a moment when
theissuewas becomingone of purepower.For Prussiawas being
drawnby Metternich's temporizing intoprecipitate action.As it ob-
serveditsmoraland material basisslipping away,itstonebecamein-
creasinglybellicose.Itsmilitary wereopenlyspeaking ofwarandeven
themoremoderate Hardenberg hintedat extreme measures. But if
possession withoutlegitimacy was illusory, legitimacy through force
provedchimerical. Castlereagh was merely definingPrussia'sdilemma
whenhe toldHardenberg that"he [Hardenberg] couldnot regard
an unacknowledged claimas constituting a good titleand thathe
nevercouldin conscience or honor. . makethemererefusal ofa
recognition a causeofwar...."15 In thissituation Castlereaghdidnot
proposeto followhis Cabinet'sinstructions. To announceBritish dis-
interestwouldremovethemajordeterrent to war and,in its effort
to guarantee peace,the Cabinetwouldhavebroughtaboutwhatit
fearedmost.Or else,a British withdrawal fromthecontest wouldhave
led to an Austriansurrender and to a completeoverturn of the
equilibrium.
So it happenedthatCastlereagh and Metternich foundthemselves
on thesamesidein a battlewhosemoralframework hadbeendefined
13 Ibid.,pp. 220ff. 14Ibid., pp. 247ff.
'5 Ibid.,p. 255. December7, i8I4.

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276 WORLD POLITICS
by thewilyAustrianMinister. The moreintransigent Prussia'satti-
tude,thestrongerbecameMetternich's position.
Without thenecessity
forabstract Austriaemergedas theprotector
discussion, of the sec-
ondarypowers.WhenMetternich proposed an allianceto Bavariaand
Hanoverand theconstruction of a GermanLeaguewithout Prussia,
he was simplygivingexpressionto a generalconsensus.It was at this
point,whenthelastvestiges of theAllianceweredisappearing, that
Talleyrandreappeared on thescene.He emerged becauseMetternich
put him on the stageand his eloquencewas but a reflection of
desireforanonymity,
Metternich's forMetternich was notinterested
in appearingas theagentofPrussia'shumiliation.It was Metternich's
desirethateventsshouldcomeabout"naturally," becausethatwould
minimizethedangerof personalschisms;it was Talleyrand's effort
thattheyshouldappear"caused,"forthatwouldcementhis shaky
domesticposition.
Talleyrandwas givenhis opportunity by Metternich, who com-
municated to himtheAustrian noteto Hardenberg and thusmade
clearthattheBigFourhadnotbeenabletosettle theissue.'"Talleyrand
repliedin a trenchant memorandum, whichasserted thesuperiority
of theclaimsof legitimacy overtherequirements of theequilibrium
and deniedthepossibility ofdeposing kings,becausesovereigns could
notbe tried,leastof all bythosewho covetedtheirterritories. It was
notforPrussiatostatewhatshewouldtake,Talleyrand arguedboldly,
butforthe"legitimate" KingofSaxonytodefine howmuchhe would
yield.'7It was a masterly summary of all theinconsistencies of two
of
months acrimony, but this was not its Talleyrand
significance. had
servedFrancebetter byremaining "available"thanbywriting mem-
oranda.The real importance of the exchangelay in the factthat
Francewas onceagainpartoftheconcert of Europe.
Onlya shortstepseparated Talleyrand fromfullparticipation in the
deliberations.Castlereagh,who had hopedto avoidso drastica step,
finallyagreedon December27. When,on December3I, Castlereagh
and Metternich proposed thathenceforth Talleyrand participate in the
meetings of theBig Four, it was clear that the specialclaims of the
Alliancehad ceasedbeforePrussiahad gainedthefruitsof its war
EventheTsar,in Castlereagh's
effort. words, "wouldnotadvisePrussia
to resistnow thathe has securedhis own arrangement in Poland."
Thus drivenbackon itslastresources, Prussiathreatened war.
16ClemensMetternich, Aus Metternichs NachgelassenenPapieren,8 vols., ed. by
Alfonsvon Klinkowstroem, Vienna,i88o, II, pp. 503ff.
7 Ibid., pp. sroff.,Decemberi9, i8I4; D'Angeberg,op.cit.,pp. 546ff.

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 277

But the reactionmerelyservedto indicatePrussia'simpotence.

Castlereagh repliedsharplythat"suchan insinuation mightoperate
upon a powertrembling forits own existence but musthave the
contrary effectuponall aliveto theirown dignity; and I addedthat
if sucha temperreallyprevailed, not
we were deliberating in a state
of independence and it was better to breakup theCongress."'8 That
sameday,Castlereagh proposeda defensive alliancebetweenFrance,
Austria, andBritain. To be sure,Talleyrand wasrequired toguarantee
theLow Countries and to reaffirm theprovisions of theTreatyof
Paris.ButTalleyrand's greatestachievement at Viennawas precisely
thisexhibition thisrefusalto attempt
of self-restraint, to sellFrench
participation in thealliancefora territorialadvantage, an effort which
wouldhaveunitedall theotherpowersagainsthim.As a resulthe
gainedsomething moreimportant, theendof theisolation of France
and therealrecognition ofitsequality.
If the defensive allianceprovidedthe crisisof the Congressof
Vienna,it alsopavedthewayforitsresolution. In anynegotiation it
is understood thatforceis theultimate recourse. Butit is theartof
diplomacy tokeepthisthreat tokeepitsextent
potential, indeterminate,
andto commit it onlyas a lastresort.For oncepowerhasbeenmade
actual,negotiations in thepropersensecease.A threatto use force
whichprovesunavailing doesnotreturn thenegotiation to thepoint
beforethethreatwas made.It destroys thebargaining positionalto-
gether, forit is a confessionnotoffinite powerbutof impotence. By
bringing matters to a head,Prussia found itselfconfronted by three
powerswhosedetermination couldnotbe doubted, although thetreaty
itselfremained secret.AndtheTsarproveda lukewarm ally.A series
of partialsettlements had isolatedPrussiabecause"satisfied" powers
will notfightfortheclaimsof another, if an honorable alternative
presents itself.
Castlereagh, therefore,tookup theproposalof Metternich's memo-
randumof Decemberio by whichPrussiawas to obtainpartof
Saxonyand extensive in the Rhineland.It soon became
territories
apparent thatPrussiawouldnotcarryoutherthreat ofwar.ByJanu-
ary3, i8i5, afterMetternich and Castlereagh had refused to negotiate
withoutTalleyrand, to
Hardenberg, saveface,himself recommended
Talleyrand's participation.'9On January 5, Castlereagh couldreport
that"thealarmofwaris over."20 The Saxonquestionwas henceforth
officially discussedby the now Big Five and was resolvedlargely
18 Webster,
p. 278, Januaryi, i815.
OPOcit.,
"IIbid.,P. 280. 20Ibid.,P. 282.

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278 WORLD POLITICS
through unofficial in whichCastlereagh
negotiations playedtherole
of theintermediary betweenMetternich and Talleyrand on theone
sideandtheTsarandHardenberg ontheother.
In his endeavorto achievea finalsettlement, Castlereagh had to
resistan attempt by Prussiato movetheKing of Saxonyto theleft
bankof theRhineand an effort byAustriato savetheElbe fortress
of TorgauforSaxony.But withtheaid of theTsar,he convinced
Prussiathatin the interest of the Europeanequilibrium she would
haveto assumethedefense of theRhineland, and he madeclearto
Austriathatthedefensive allianceextended onlyto an actualattempt
to overthrow theEuropeanequilibrium, notto internal Germanar-
rangements.2' The dangerofwarhadalsomadetheTsarmorepliable.
WhenCastlereagh suggested someconcessions in Polandin orderto
makethe Saxon arrangement morepalatableto Prussia,Alexander
agreedto return thecityofThorntoPrussia.On February ii, a final
agreement was reached.In Poland,Austriaretained Galiciaand the
district
ofTarnopol, whileCracowwas constituted a freecity.Prussia
retained thedistrictofPosenand thecityofThornwhichcontrolled
theupperVistula.The remainder of theDuchyof Warsawwitha
population of 3.2 millionbecametheKingdomof Polandunderthe
Tsar of Russia.In Germany, Prussiaobtainedtwo-fifths of Saxony,
SwedishPomerania, muchof the leftbank of the Rhine,and the
DuchyofWestphalia. Austriahad alreadybeenassuredcompensation
in Northern Italyand predominance in all ofItalythrough theestab-
lishment of dependent dynastiesin Parmaand Tuscany.
On June9, i8i5, thefinalactsof Viennawereratified by Europe
assembled in congress.It was the onlymeetingof the Congressof
Vienna.
VI
Therearetwowaysofconstructing an international
order:bywillor
by forceor legitimacy.
renunciation, For twenty-five yearsEurope
had beenconvulsed by an effortto achieveorderthrough forceand
its lessonwas
to contemporaries not its failure its
but nearsuccess.
UnderNapoleonEuropehad beenunifiedfromtheNiemento the
Bay of Biscaybut its cohesionwas suppliedby the powerof the
GrandeArmee.It is notsurprising,then,thatin theireffortto create
thestatesmen
an alternative ofViennalookedbackto a periodwhich
had knownstability and thattheyidentified thisstability
withits
21 Ibid.,p. 295, January
29, i815.

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 279
domesticarrangements. Nor was thisassessment as ludicrousas a
self-righteoushistoriography madeit appearlateron. For one of the
reasonswhichhad impelledNapoleoneverfurther was his often
repeatedconviction thatthe survivalof his dynasty in a worldof
"legitimate" monarchs dependedon thesuccessofhisarms.In short,
Napoleonconfronted Europewitha revolutionary situation because
he considered the unimpaired maintenance of the other sovereign
statesas incompatible withhisownexistence.
Bycontrast, oneof thereasonsforthesuccessof theViennasettle-
mentwas precisely theabsenceof suchan ideological gulf.Whena
powerconsiders thedomestic notionof justiceof anothersovereign
statea mortalthreat toitsownsurvival, no basisfornegotiation exists.
Safetycan thenonlybe foundin physicalextent;diplomacy is re-
ducedto maneuvering forposition and suchadjustments as do occur
have but a tacticalsignificance: to preparethe groundforthe in-
evitableshowdown. This is notto saythatdomestic structures must
be identicalbeforemeaningful can
negotiations take place. It is
enoughthatthereexistsno powerwhichclaimsbothexclusiveness and
universalityforitsnotionofjustice.For diplomacy theartofrelating
powersto each otherby agreement can function onlywhen each
majorpoweracceptsthelegitimacy oftheexistence oftheothers.
In Vienna,of course,theconsensus wentfurther thanthis.There
existeda generalagreement aboutthenatureof "just"domestic ar-
rangements, whichby limiting risksmadeforflexibility of relation-
ship.The problem ofrelating a state's
visionofitselftothevisionofit
bythepowers,definedin thebeginning as one of thekeyproblems
of an international settlement, was rarelysimplerthanat Vienna.
This was the reasonforthe success-forthe possibility-of "secret
diplomacy," thatintangibles wereunderstood in thesamemanner. To
be sure,theresults oftheViennaCongress reflected
tono smalldegree
theskillof thediplomats in makinguse of theiropportunity. Both
Metternich and Castlereagh wereextraordinary negotiatorscapableof
shapinga conference to theirends:Castlereagh through hisabilityto
reconciledifferent points of view and a singlemindedness which
enabledhim to keep discussions focussedon essentials; Metternich
throughthe art of defining a framework whichmade concessions
appear, not as surrenders, but as sacrifices
to thecommoncause.But
whatever theskillof thediplomats, thesecondreasonforthesuccess
oftheCongress is no lessfundamental: thatin thefaceofall protesta-
tionsoffriendship and ofa realmeasure ofideological agreement the
importance of power-relationships was neverlostsightof. The con-

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280 WORLD POLITICS
ofthestatesmen
viviality mustnotobscure thefactthattheEuropean
orderemergedfromthethreatof war and theformation, however
temporary, oftwohostilealliances. The issuewas decidednotonlyby
thepersuasiveness ofthestatesmen butbytherelative strengthofthe
opposingcamps.
The settlement provedall themorelastingbecausethenegotiators
at Viennadid not confusethe atmosphere of the conference table
withthe elements of stability
of the internationalsystem.A states-
man cannotmakethe survival of his chargeentirely dependent on
the continuedgood will of anothersovereign state;not onlybe-
causehe has no controloverthecontinuation of thisgoodwill,but
moreimportantly becausethebestguarantee foritsremaining good
is notto temptit bytoogreata disproportion of power.The Vienna
settlementtookintoaccount thisrelationship
ofsecurityandlegitimacy.
It did notreston unsupported good faith,whichwouldhave put
too greata strainon self-limitation; nor on the efficacyof a pure
evaluation of power,whichwouldhavemade calculation too inde-
terminate. Rather,therewas createda structure in whichtheforces
weresufficientlybalanced,so thatself-restraint
couldappearas some-
thingmorethanself-abnegation, butwhichtookaccountof thehis-
toricalclaimsof components,thatitmetgeneralacceptance.
its so No
powerfeltso dissatisfied thatit did not preferto seek its remedy
withintheframework of theViennasettlement ratherthanin over-
turningit. Sincetheinternational orderdid not containa "revolu-
tionary" power,eitherideologically or in powerterms,its relations
becameincreasingly spontaneous,basedon thegrowing certaintythat
a catastrophicupheavalwas unlikely. The resultwas a century with-
outa majorwar.

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