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SOFTWARE

Guidance on performing transportation


risk analysis of hazardous materials
Spend your time reducing transportation risks rather
than spending time producing numbers

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Contents

 The hazards and risks of transporting hazardous materials


 Transport Risk Assessment
 TRA challenges
 Mobile transport unit TRA Case Study
 Pipeline TRA Case Study
– Before we get started
– The results
– Risk reduction options
 References

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The hazards and risks of transporting
hazardous materials

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Pipeline Accidents

 Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 2014: Gas pipeline leak and explosions, 25 fatalities, 257
injured
 Qingdao, China, 2013: Oil pipeline leak and explosion, 62 fatalities, 136
hospitalized. (Wikipedia - 2013 Qingdao pipeline explosion, 2014)
 Dalian, China, 2010: Oil release to sea from port for 90km, covering 946km2.
Fatalities and injuries occurred, number not reported. Extent of environmental
damage also not reported. (Wikipedia - 2010 Xingang Port oil spill, 2013)
 San Bruno, California, natural gas pipeline explosion, 8 fatalities. (Wikipedia -
2010 San Bruno pipeline explosion, 2014)
 Ghislenghien, Belgium 2004: 24 fatalities, 120+ injuries. (French Ministry of
Sustainable Development, 2009)

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Mobile Transport Accidents

Oil rail tank car


 Lac-Mégantic, Canada, 6/6/2013, 42 fatalities, 5 missing presumed dead. 66 of
69 downtown buildings destroyed (30) or to be demolished (36).
 West Virginia, USA, 16/2/15, Fireball, Fires, two towns evacuated, no injuries or
fatalities. Using CPC 1232, not DOT 111 tank cars.
 Timmins, Ontario, Canada, 14/2/15, 29 tank cars derailed, fires, no reported
injuries or fatalities.
Road
 Kannur, India, 27/8/12, 16 tonne road tanker collision with road divider, 41
seriously injured.
 Kannur, India, 13/1/14, 18 tonne LPG tanker car collision and overturned, fire, no
injuries.

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Transport Risk Assessment

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Questions TRA can answer

 What would an accident from my pipeline look like?

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/201 (Lutostansky, 2012) – 35 kW/m2 Radiation


0/09/photogalleries/100910-san-bruno-fire- Contour for San Bruno Pipeline Rupture
explosion-nation-gas-location- calculated by Safeti
pictures/#/california-san-bruno-gas-explosion-
francisco-cars_25824_600x450.jpg

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Questions TRA can answer

 What is the risk to people, property and the environment?

(UK HSC, 1991) Major Hazard Aspects of the Risk Contours with impact on surrounding population
Transport of Dangerous Substances

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Questions TRA can answer

 What are the benefits of prevention measures that I can take?

Plot of wall thickness to incident frequency

(EGIG 2011)

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Questions TRA can answer

 What mode of transport should I use?


 Which route should I take?
 What operating conditions optimise production, reliability and safety?
 Which sections of my route requires most attention?
 Where and how frequently should I place my ESD systems?
 What pipeline design shall I use?
 What is the cost-benefit of risk reductions measures?
 Do I comply with regulations?
 Has anybody encroached into my ‘High Consequence Area’?

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TRA Framework (CCPS, 2008)
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TRA workflow (CCPS, 2008)
TRA challenges

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Scope is large

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Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Operating Procedures
Ignition

Meteorology

Failure Rates

Toxicity

MSDS
Regulations

Population

Maps
Traffic information

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Large x Large = Very Large!

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How do we handle a very large scope?

TRA study cube (CCPS, 1995)

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What does this mean?

 We can’t do everything at once, we need to be strategic


 We need to systematically screen a broad study set and then zoom-in
 “Zoom in” means:
– Use more quantitative methods
– Get more accurate local information
– Smaller “step sizes” in the calculations
 When should we zoom in?
– Sensitive area
– Uncertain of the results
– When we have detailed data available

 We need to be efficient and systematic using consistent, validated models

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Mobile Transport Unit TRA Case
Study

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Mobile transport unit releases

 We can think of rail cars and tank trucks as vessels which move along a route
 We can assess the reasons why the containment can fail due to:
– Operation
– Accident initiated event (collision, allision, overturn, derailment)
– Non-accident initiated event (corrosion crack, overpressure, valve/fitting leaks)
 This means we can define a fixed set of cases and then move them along the
route
 We can supplement the route releases with fixed point rest stops or high risk
locations such as cross roads

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Route modelling schematic

Route

Effect Zone

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Route Model Capabilities

 Safeti contains a Route model


 We define a folder of potential
accidents
 We define routes along which the
vehicle may travel
 This can be used for road tankers, rail
cars, barges, ships
 The hazard zones are calculated and
then the risk model spreads them
along the routes
 The failure frequency/distance is
applied to the hazard zone when it is
placed in each location

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Route Model Example - CCPS TRA Guidance 1995 Case Study

 From ‘Here’ To ‘Eternity’


 Along either Route 27 or Route 46
 Population changes along each
 Which is the best risk option?

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CCPS TRA 1995 Case Study - Safeti Results Summary

 Route 27 PLL: 30/yr


 Route 46 PLL: 0.011/yr

 Who is being impacted and where?

Route 27 section 1 7.21


Route 27 section 2 8.89
Route 27 section 3 14.09
Total PLL/yr 30.19

pop density? distance?

frequency?

consequence?

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How is this helping you to overcome TRA challenges?

 You can define a large, coarse route and get an overview based on semi-
quantified parameters
 For example
– Put in broad population locations
– Put in broad ignition values
– Put in different routing with different failure frequencies
 Zoom in and apply more details when you see risks are getting relatively larger or
when hazards are near populations
 Phast and Safeti’s discharge, dispersion, pool, fire and explosion models are
validated against a wide range of experiments
 By systematically approaching this problem you are saving time to apply your
skills to managing safety, not crunching numbers

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Pipeline TRA Case Study
(adapted from CCPS 1995 case study 7.1)

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Pipeline releases

 Pipelines are continuously variable along their length


 We cannot use the ‘moving vessel’ approach without significant compromise
 A breach occurs, a depressurisation zone is created and the material flows from
upstream and downstream sections out of the breach
 ESD systems may detect a pressure drop or increase in mass flowrate and close
sections of the pipeline
 Long distances to consider

Release

Pressure Front Pressure Front

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Variable factors to consider when analysing pipeline risks

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New pipeline risk modelling capabilities in Safeti 7.2

 Define your pipeline


– Draw it on a map
– Specify where valves are and the valve properties
– Define sections of the pipeline which differ:
– Elevation
– Pipe wall thickness
– Diameter differences
 Safeti creates a complete pipeline definition containing segments to be modelled
 Create breaches of interest (small, medium, large etc.) which will be modelled for
all sections along the pipeline
 In addition to the systematic breaches you can produce detailed results from a
location of interest along the pipeline

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Pipeline Case Study – adapted from CCPS 1995

 Stakeholders want to investigate level of pipeline protection needed


 Study focusses on generic hazards, not those specific to this pipeline
 Sour Gas transported 50 miles, past populations from Facility A to Facility B
 Failures considered by using generic failure rates:
– Corrosion leaks
– 3rd party damage
– Construction defects
– Material defects
– Other causes
 These are modelled as:
– One inch holes
– Full bore rupture
– Pinholes are omitted
(adapted)

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Case Study Data

 Pipe: 5 inch OD, 0.337 wall, 4.663 ID


 Buried 3 feet
 Flowrate 0.2 kg/s
 Pressure: 80 barg
 Product temperature: 30°C
 Valve stations: 7 (evenly distributed)
 Consequence scenario inputs:
– Elevation 0 ft
– Angle 10° from horizontal
– Weather conditions: 12°C, D11mph, F4.5mph

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Frequency Estimation

 Using (EGIG 2015) we can obtain


failure frequency information
 It is a very sophisticated data
source which allows us to analyse
the frequency of events in detail
 We can look at total failure rates
per breach size
 Or we can look at rates for pipe
diameters
 Given that around 5 inch diameters
sees a peak we can use those
values for our case

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before we get started…

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The problems with modelling pipelines

 For the reasons discussed above, every outcome location has different
consequences
Pipeline

Village

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The problems with modelling pipelines

 We need to create individual scenarios for continuously changing release locations


 This requires:
– Pipeline pressure at the release location
– Distance to closure valves
– Local pipe wall thickness
– Local burial depth

 The solution in Safeti is to automate this process

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Manually sectioning the pipeline…

Local wall thickness Pipeline

ESD Valves

Culverted section

Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 3 Section 4

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Automatically Sub-sectioning the pipeline

Δ pressure drop
Δ mass flowrate
Sub section 1

Sub section 2

Sub section 3

Sub section 4

Sub section 5

Sub section 6

Sub section 7

Sub section 8
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4

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Continuously variable scenarios

 We can now calculate release scenarios for every sub-section


 Each sub-section will comprise location specific properties
 Safety systems are modelled, giving rise to cases for:
– Valves close
– Upstream valve fails to close
– Downstream valve fails to close
Sub section 1

Sub section 2

Sub section 3

Sub section 4

Sub section 5

Sub section 6

Sub section 7

Sub section 8
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Lets take a look at the results…

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Study set up

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Pipeline construction

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Auto sectioning results

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Pressure drop along pipeline

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1 Inch Breach

Average Release Duration vs Downstream Distance


1800

1600

1400
Average Release Duration (s)

1200

1000
No Isolation
Full Isolation
800
Successful Upstream Isolation

600 Successful Downstream Isolation

400

200

0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000
Downstream distance (m)

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1 Inch Breach

Average Mass Flowrate vs Downstream Distance


20

18

16

14
Mass flowrate (kg/s)

12
No Isolation
10
Full Isolation
8 Successful Upstream Isolation
Successful Downstream Isolation
6

0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000
Downstream Distance (m)

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Full Bore Rupture

Release Duration vs Downstream Distance


700

600

500
Release Duration (s)

400
No Isolation
Full Isolation
300
Successful Upstream Isolation
Successful Downstream Isolation
200

100

0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000
Downstream Distance (m)

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Full Bore Rupture

Average Release Rate vs Downstream Distance


100

90

80
Average Release Rate (kg/s)

70

60
No Isolation
50
Full Isolation
40 Successful Upstream Isolation
Successful Downstream Isolation
30

20

10

0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000
Downstream Distance (m)

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Risk Contours

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FN Curve

Is this as low
as reasonably
practicable?

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Risk reduction options

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Failure frequency effects of pipe wall thickness (EGIG 2015)

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Failure frequency correlations

Discrete Exponential interpolation


Failure Frequency
Wall thickness (mm)
(/km.yr)

wt<5 0.00056
F = 0.0015e-0.333t

5<wt<10 0.000167 Caution!


Failure frequency and Wall Thickness
10<wt<15 0.00002 0.0007

0.0006

Failure frequency (/km.yr)


Discrete Failure Frequency and Wall
Thickness 0.0005
0.0006
0.0004
Failure Frequency (/km.yr)

0.0005

0.0004 0.0003

0.0003 0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001

0 0
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15
Wall Thickness (mm) Wall thickness (mm)

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Translating trends into practical tools

Failure Frequency
We didn’t use
Wall thickness (mm) Factor
(/km.yr) this failure
wt<5 0.00056 frequency
3.35 for
5<wt<10 0.000167
our1 base case

10<wt<15 0.00002 0.12

We used a failure frequency of 0.401/1000 km.yr as per EGIG table 3.


This is important as we wanted to account for the adverse influence of our
5” diameter pipeline.
They are easier to break!
We must therefore use the Wall Thickness failure frequency effect as a
factored influence on our base case, rather than as an absolute frequency.
Our 0.401/1000km.yr can be factored by 0.12 to 0.04812/1000km.yr

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Risk reduction measures 1 – use 12mm pipe wall everywhere

x10 reduction

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Risk reduction measures 1 – use 12mm pipe wall near towns

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Societal Comparison

Can make a cost


benefit decision
about steel costs
and risk reduction

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References

CCPS. (1995). Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis. New York:
AiChE.
CCPS. (2008). Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Safety, Security and Risk
Management. Hoboken: Wiley.
Lutostansky, E., Shork, J., Ludwig, K., Creitz, L., & Jung, S. (2013). Release
Scenario Assumptions for Modeling Risk From Underground Gaseous Pipelines.
Global Congress on Process Safety. AIChE CCPS.
EGIG. (2015). 9th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group.
Groningen: European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group.
OGP. (2010 - 434-7). Consequence Modelling Report - 434-7. London: :
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers.
Safeti. DNV GL. dnvgl.com/safeti

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