Journal of European Integration

ISSN: 0703-6337 (Print) 1477-2280 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/geui20

EU foreign policy: no major breakthrough despite

multiple crises

Patrick Müller

To cite this article: Patrick Müller (2016) EU foreign policy: no major breakthrough
despite multiple crises, Journal of European Integration, 38:3, 359-374, DOI:
10.1080/07036337.2016.1140157

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1140157

Published online: 24 Mar 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 655

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 2 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=geui20

Download by: [Scuola Normale Superiore] Date: 10 January 2017, At: 05:57
Journal of European Integration, 2016
VOL. 38, NO. 3, 359–374
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1140157

EU foreign policy: no major breakthrough despite multiple

crises
Patrick Müller
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)/IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for
Science, Leio Campus, Bilbao, Spain

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The financial crises and profound external relations challenges provide CFSP; CSDP; joint decision
a window of opportunity to upgrade EU foreign policy. Yet, whilst trap; financial crisis
multiple crises faced by the EU today play a prominent role in the
Union’s foreign policy discourse, escape from ‘EU decision traps’ at the
policy level has often not been achieved. Changes were incremental
in nature, were largely pre-structured by the 2009 Lisbon agenda, and
resulted only in the marginal use of scale effects, synergies, and cost
savings at the EU level. Rather than engaging in bold steps towards
greater integration of EU foreign policy, EU countries have favoured
technocratic reforms, closer cooperation among like-minded member
states, reliance on NATO or national action. Though the EU has recently
launched high profile review-processes of its foreign policy, it remains
to be seen whether this will translate into tangible results.

1. Introduction
The financial crisis and the ensuing economic crisis hit the European Union (EU) at a time
when it was facing a series of substantial external challenges. The events following the Arab
Spring and the crisis in Ukraine are frequently described as marking the ‘return of geopolitics’
(see e.g. Mead 2014), posing real threats to the Union’s long-standing objective of facilitating
a zone of peace, stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood. These challenges evolved
at a time when the US was calling for a stronger contribution from its European partners
to provide international security, particularly in the EU’s own ‘backyard’, in the wake of an
emerging multipolar global order. It is a widespread expectation that the more urgent and
the more sizeable crises-related pressures for policy change are, the more likely it will be that
a crisis will actually lead to a policy reform being adopted (see introduction by Falkner). In
this view, the profound challenges faced by the EU today may be turned into an opportunity
for reforming EU foreign policy.
Indeed, the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s has been described as a major ‘catalyst’ for the
evolution of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with the EU often devel-
oping innovative ways to mobilise diplomatic and political resources before they ‘became

CONTACT  Patrick Müller  patrick.muller@ehu.eus

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
360    P. Müller

formally part of the CFSP toolkit’ (Jopp and Diedrichs 2009, 97). Would it thus not be rea-
sonable to expect that the EU’s foreign policy — which had been ‘baptized by fire’ (Ginsberg
2001) — could again be upgraded in the light of multiple challenges? Conversely, crisis-re-
lated pressures do not generate automatic effects on European foreign policy but have to
work their way through the EU decision-making system. Here, institutional features of the
EU foreign policy-making system traditionally constitute significant hurdles for achieving
progress at the policy level. Specifically, this special volume points to the problematique of
‘joint decision traps’ (JDT), where the EU is not able to act due to institutional constraints
related to EU decision-making, whilst the member States lack the ability for effective national
action (see Falkner 2011, 9; Scharpf 1988, 2006). This raises the question of whether the EU
has been able to revamp its international relations in the light of multiple challenges or
whether institutional hurdles — as depicted by the JDT model — constrained its capacity
for policy reform?
This article covers the impact of multiple crises on CFSP and pays particular attention to
its defence component, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which has been
especially challenged by the recent crises. It argues that thus far multiple crises did no sub-
stantially alter the broad trajectory of EU foreign policy and long-standing divisions among
the interests of member states, although they triggered a process of strategic reflection
that is currently in full swing. The EU could frequently only agree on modest, incremental
institutional reforms that were largely pre-structured by the 2009 Lisbon treaty. Whilst EU
member states lacked consensus for advancing CFSP/CSDP integration as a bloc they have
tried, with mixed success, to deflect crises-related pressures through ‘flexible’ cooperation
involving subgroups of member states (both within and outside EU structures) as well as
through their reliance on alternative security institutions, most notably NATO. This article
proceeds as follows. Building on the common conceptual framework, it first briefly deline-
ates the JDT concept and the way in which crisis-related impacts on EU foreign policy will
be assessed. Second, it describes challenges and pressures resulting from the economic
crisis in conjunction with key external challenges for CFSP/CSDP. Third, this article employs
the JDT concept to examine the impact of crises-related pressures on EU foreign policy. The
conclusion highlights the main findings of the article.

2.  External crisis: an opportunity to escape the JDP in EU foreign policy-

making?
A number of insightful studies have examined the impact of the financial crisis and ensuing
economic crisis on different aspects of EU foreign policy (see e.g. Giegerich 2010; Kempin
and Overhaus 2014; Major and Mölling 2013; Mölling and Brune 2011). This article makes a
novel contribution to this debate by relying on the JDT concept, which shifts the attention to
the EU decision-making system (including actors with their interests and perceptions as well
as rules and procedures) as a central intervening variable between crisis-related pressures
and policy outputs. The JDT concept reminds us that policy change at the EU level can be
very difficult to achieve. According to the JDT model (Scharpf 1988, 2006), policy-making in
the EU is likely to result in stalemate or lowest common denominator deals if member states
dominate EU decision-making whilst facing unanimity or quasi-unanimity requirements.
Although the focus of Scharpf’s JDT model initially has been on policy-making under the
Community method problems of joint decision-making also apply to intergovernmental
 Journal of European Integration   361

cooperation within CFSP/CSDP, where member states have carefully guarded their capacity
to take decisions as they deem fit to promote national interests and protect their sovereignty
(see Alecu de Flers, Chappel, and Müller 2011).
Debates on CFSP/CSDP are often shaped by long established patterns of national prefer-
ences rooted in distinct foreign policy traditions, diplomatic cultures and national interests
of EU member states (Aggestam 1999; Balfour, Carta, and Raik 2015; Hoffmann 2000). Some
EU member states have strong transatlantic leanings and give primacy to cooperation in the
NATO framework (e.g. the UK, Poland and the Baltic states), others are rather pragmatic and
rely on transatlantic cooperation (especially for collective defence) as well as the EU (e.g.
Spain and the Czech Republic), whilst a third group of countries tends to give preference to
European foreign policy cooperation. The latter group has traditionally been led by France,
which has recently become more pragmatic and opted for re-integration into NATO. Further
important divisions among the member states relate to the use of force, with the EU’s five
neutral member states having particularly strong restrictions when it comes to using force
in international relations whilst Germany is known for its civilian power identity. Conversely,
countries such as the UK, Poland or France are more willing to use force in pursuit of foreign
policy objectives. Moreover, member states have traditionally been divided over key ques-
tions pertaining to further integration steps in CFSP, with countries like Germany supporting
a more supranational EU foreign policy whilst others, most importantly the UK and France,
prefer an intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP.
Besides highlighting constraints imposed by intergovernmental decision-making in sit-
uations of divided member state preferences, the JDT concept shifts attention to another
important aspect of EU foreign policy that can make cooperation in this area particularly
challenging. Unlike policy-making under the Community method, EU foreign policy does
not involve ‘compulsory negotiations’ (Scharpf 2006, 846) where governments are essen-
tially tied to multilevel policy-making within the EU setting. Rather, CFSP/CSDP represents
a ‘voluntary negotiation system’ that member states can avoid if they feel they can pursue
their preferences more effectively outside the EU framework. CFSP is not the ‘only game
in town’ and EU member states can rely on more than one institution to realise benefits of
multilateral foreign policy cooperation, which can deflect pressure for upgrading EU foreign
policy. Importantly, the existence of NATO – which occupies a similar institutional space and
overlaps with CSDP in terms of membership, mandate and resources — has influenced the
development of CSDP and vice versa (Hofmann 2011).
The recent multiple crises thus not only produce pressures to make CFSP/CSDP fit for
dealing with new challenges, but they also pose intricate questions about the role of CFSP/
CSDP in the broader European security architecture that involves other institutions, most
notably NATO, which has remained the principle framework for collective territorial defence
and the ultimate guarantee for European security (see Howorth 2012). Likewise, EU member
states may opt for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in smaller groups of like-minded
countries. Cooperation among subgroups of EU member states with similar preferences
can help to realise efficiency gains, which in some areas can be very substantial, whilst
circumventing problems of joint decision-making among the EU as a whole (see Mawdsley
2003). The EU Treaty accommodates certain flexible forms of integration in CFSP/CSDP, e.g.
by allowing for ‘enhanced cooperation’ among groups of EU member states within estab-
lished EU structures.1 At the same time, member states participate in cooperation schemes
362    P. Müller

outside formal EU structures, such as cooperation among the Benelux countries and among
the Nordic countries.
Whilst the JDT model highlights important constraints for EU foreign policy-making, it
also shifts attention to a number of ‘exit mechanisms’ from the JDT that may facilitate pro-
gress at the policy level (see Alecu de Flers, Chappel, and Müller 2011). Importantly, external
developments and crisis might lead to an upgrade of the common interest among mem-
ber states through processes of functional adaptation and learning, hence broadening the
scope for political compromise in the Council. At the same time, differences between the
member states might also be resolved through integrative effects of sustained cooperation.
Progressive institutionalisation and processes of elite socialisation have led to the emergence
of a culture of consensus and compromise in EU foreign policy-making, which is particu-
larly developed in the trans-governmental bodies and working groups underpinning CFSP/
CSDP (Alecu de Flers and Müller 2012). The establishment of the European External Action
Service (EEAS) – which was formally launched in December 2010 – further contributed to
this trend, providing a conductive venue for socialisation of national officials who make
up one-third of its staff (see Balfour and Raik 2013, 3). By encouraging reputation building
through information sharing, consultation, the search for compromise and the contribu-
tion to common solutions, the normative environment of CFSP/CSDP can help to bridge
former cleavages. Some scholars even suggest that sustained cooperation and processes
of learning and elite socialisation facilitated the emergence of a nascent strategic culture at
the EU level that complements national attitudes (see Chappell and Petrov 2014, 4; Meyer
2006). In this view, the EU’s strategic culture manifests itself in key foreign policy statements,
declarations and strategic documents such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003
as well as in emerging foreign policy practices in areas such as (civilian) crisis management.
The EU’s strategic culture is made up of substantive (rather than procedural) norms, ideas
and patterns of behaviour that are shared among key EU foreign policy actors, including
shared attitudes towards the military and security priorities incorporated in the so-called
Petersberg tasks and adherence to international law (Meyer 2006, 20).
Simultaneously, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty has strengthened supranational elements in
CFSP/CSDP, creating new opportunities for EU actors and bureaucrats to act as facilitators
and process mangers. Notably, the EEAS – headed by the ‘new’ High Representative – has
been established as a ‘functionally autonomous’ body to assist EU foreign policy. Charged
with providing political steering and building consensus, the High Representative chairs the
monthly meetings of foreign ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council, whilst the EEAS has
been granted important functions in policy coordination at the lower level. Simultaneously,
the Commission may intervene in EU foreign policy-making on matters located between the
security and economic spheres. In particular, recent scholarship highlights the fact that case
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) increasingly touches upon CFSP- /CSDP-related
matters traditionally considered national prerogatives (see Blauberger and Weiss 2013). This
creates opportunities for the European Commission, drawing on ECJ case law, to threaten
member states with unilaterally bringing about a ‘worst case’ solution through ECJ litigation,
which constitutes a well-known exit from the JDT (see Schmidt 2000).
Based on the common conceptual framework, crisis-induced policy change will be
assessed across the two dimensions ‘winners of change’ and ‘orders of change’. The dimension
‘winners of change’ is concerned with the question which actors got strengthened by foreign
policy change. Change may strengthen governments and the European Council through
 Journal of European Integration   363

an entrenchment or expansion of the intergovernmental approach, or it may empower

supranational actors such as the European Commission, the High Representative or the
EEAS through a de facto or de jure shift of authority to EU level. At the same time, crisis-re-
lated pressures may have a substantive impact on the instruments, techniques, priorities or
even the underlying ideas of a policy, as captured in the dimension ‘orders of change’ (see
introduction by Falkner).

3.  EU foreign policy and multiple crises — declining resources and

mounting challenges
The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing economic crisis as such did not constitute crises of the
EU’s foreign policy, which is not directly concerned with macroeconomic management. Still,
these crises triggered policy responses and secondary effects that impacted on EU foreign
policy, most notably through austerity measures. In the CFSP/CSDP domain, austerity mainly
affected EU foreign policy through cuts in national budgets. At the EU level, by contrast, the
impact of austerity was not as severe as in other policy domains, reflecting a compromise
between the logic of austerity that guided the EU’s overall crisis response and its ambitions to
preserve capabilities for international action in times of mounting external challenges.2 At a
time when the EU’s total budget for the 2014–2020 period saw a decrease of 3 per cent from
the pre-crisis multiannual financial framework (2007–2013), the budget for the EU’s external
action was increased by 3.3 per cent for the same period, totalling €58.7 billion (European
Commission 2015). Simultaneously, several EU member states cut back their spending on
foreign policy, security and defence following the 2008 financial crisis. Cuts were particularly
severe in the defence domain. Lacking a common army and joint industrial military complex,
the EU principally relies on the voluntary pooling of national manpower and capabilities for
collective action.
The aggregated defence spending by EU member states dropped significantly from €204
billion in 2007, the pre-crisis year, to €190 billion in 2012 (see European Defence Agency 2013,
8). And among the EU member states that are also part of NATO, only the UK, Greece, and
Estonia and Poland met the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) minimal goal of at
least 2 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defence in 2014 (NATO 2015,
6). The described cuts at the national level combined by far outweigh EU level spending,
which amounted to roughly €2 billion for the 2014–2020 financial framework. Yet, whilst the
CSDP is confronted with a reduction of defence spending in the majority of EU countries, not
all countries have responded in the same way to budgetary constraints and not all countries
have similarly been effected by the economic crisis. Particularly, Nordic and Central Eastern
European member states — including Poland and the Baltic states — have recently been
stepping up their defence spending in response to the crisis in Ukraine (Perlo-Freeman et al.
2015). This indicates that in countries particularly exposed to external challenges, security
concerns may counteract budgetary pressures.
As a result of austerity measures, the EU needs to address external relations challenges
with a resources base that has sharply declined. Against this backdrop, numerous policy
reports from think tanks as well as statements and strategic documents from EU actors —
like the High Representative, the EEAS, the European Parliament or the European Court of
Auditors — argued that there is a growing need for realising synergies and scale effects
through greater European integration (see e.g. Ballester 2013; High Representative 2012,
364    P. Müller

2013a; Lehne 2014; Raik and Rantanen 2013). A report by the European Parliament put
the costs of operating at the national rather than the European level at roughly €26 billion
(Ballester 2013, 7). Lacking a truly integrated defence and security policy, there is duplication
in defence ministries, headquarters, armed forces, bases, support functions and defence
industries. If the EU would succeed in upgrading EU defence policies, it could achieve more
with significantly less resources (see European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011,
1). Conversely, if budgetary cuts were carried out in an uncoordinated way, there was a risk
of the emergence of even greater capability gaps, an erosion of solidarity among member
states and growing problems of implementing CSDP.
Challenges posed by austerity to the resource base of European foreign policy came
at a time when security challenges faced by the EU substantially increased, particularly its
neighbourhood. The EU traditionally considers a stable neighbourhood as central for its
own (security) interests. In the EU’s Southern neighbourhood, hopes that the ‘Arab Spring’
would result in a smooth transition towards liberal democratic order proved immature whilst
security challenges in the region increasingly entail a military dimension. Syria and Libya are
facing violent internal conflicts with destabilising effects on neighbouring countries and are
on a path to become failed states. Simultaneously, Jihadists have benefited from regional
turmoil and have expanded their influence. The militant group Islamic State has gained a
strong foothold in Syria and Iraq, controlling significant territory in those two countries.
Regional instability has resulted in a substantial increase of ‘soft security threats’, such as
uncontrolled migration on a large scale, organised crime and terrorism. Civil conflicts in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are at the heart of what has developed into a
major refugee crisis, which also puts to test Europe’s commitment to humanitarian values
and image as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002). Simultaneously, regional conflict and
instability provide a fertile ground for radicalisation and terrorism that has reached Europe,
with attacks taking place in Brussels, Copenhagen and Paris.
Simultaneously, the EU is confronted with an assertive Russian foreign policy in its Eastern
neighbourhood, marked by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its incursion into South Eastern
Ukraine. Besides witnessing the return of power politics to its troubled neighbourhood where
geographic proximity amplifies the risk of negative externalities and a spillover of insecurity,
the EU also has to cope with a changing global environment. The strategic shift of the United
States (US) to the Asia-Pacific region and the relative decline of its influence vis-à-vis the rising
political and economic power of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
poses new challenges in terms of maintaining peace and stability in a changing global order.
Against the backdrop of these geopolitical changes and the growing instability and crises
in the EU’s neighbourhood, the EU faces pressure to adjust its institutional capacity, strate-
gic vision and foreign policy instruments to a fundamentally altered security environment.

4.  The winners of change: member state entrenchment and supranational

activism
Thus far, multiple crises faced by the EU did not translate into a common understanding
among EU member states on such essential issues as (re)defining the strategic objectives
and ambitions of CFSP/CSDP, the EU’s relations with NATO (and EU autonomy vis-à-vis the
US) and reforming CFSP/CSDP institutions (see also Howorth 2014). Many of the old divisions
among the member states and traditional concerns about national sovereignty remained
 Journal of European Integration   365

in place, whilst a recent study has diagnosed a ‘pathetic lack of ambition’ when it comes
to the member states’ attitudes towards shaping foreign policy at the EU level (Dempsey
2015). Simultaneously, the management of the financial crises and parallel implementation
of Lisbon reforms absorbed much energy and attention.
Whilst in the 1990s, the lessons learned from the Yugoslav wars resulted in a joint interest
among key member states to strengthen EU foreign policy and its military capabilities, recent
crises did not produce a similar upgrade in the member states’ common interests. Against
this backdrop, the EU’s focus has been on implementing the Lisbon reform agenda rather
than on introducing new bold reform steps that would further tilt the balance in European
foreign policy-making to EU institutions. The implementation of important Lisbon reforms
itself was difficult, with the EU failing to realise the true reform potential offered by the Treaty.
To be sure, the Lisbon Treaty introduced notable institutional reforms of CFSP/CSDP, includ-
ing the creation of a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs (who simultaneously dou-
ble-hats as Vice-president of the Commission), the establishment of the EEAS and a greater
involvement of supranational actors like the European Parliament and the Commission in
CFSP affairs. Yet, during the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, sovereignty reflexes and
national interests of key member states represented a ‘major obstacle to the strengthening
of EU foreign policy capacity’ (Balfour and Raik 2013, 38; House of Lords 2013).
The establishment of the EEAS proved subject to tough negotiations and turf wars between
the involved stakeholders, particularly between the Commission and individual member
states. At the same time, several member states proved reluctant to transfer competences
to the EEAS. Accordingly, issues like consular protection were kept a national competence
(Council 2013, 3), whilst cooperation among EU delegations and member states’ national
representations on issues such as processing and sharing information as well as routines
for interaction and communication was carried out on the basis of non-binding guidelines.
Co-location projects — i.e. the sharing of premises between EU delegations and member
states’ embassies as well as offices of other EU institutions and agencies — developed into
another ‘voluntary’ measure to improve spending efficiency that did not involve the formal
transfer of competences (see EEAS 2014, 7). Over time, however, routine interactions and the
building of trust, in conjunction with budgetary pressures, might mitigate some member
states concerns of cooperating with the EEAS, as indicated by the Council’s recent adoption
of a directive on consular duties which, inter alia, strengthens cooperation between member
states, Union delegations and EEAS headquarters in crisis situations (Council 2015).
In the defence domain, where EU-level cooperation offers the by far most substantial
potential for synergies and ‘efficiency gains’, member states found it especially difficult to
agree on advancing EU level cooperation. Austerity provided a strong rational for greater
European integration, with EU institutions such as the European Parliament making the
case for using the financial and economic crises as an ‘(…)impetus for finally creating and
implementing ambitious reforms long in the making’ (European Parliament Committee
on Foreign Affairs 2011, 5). Specific suggestions included better coordination of defence
planning, the pooling and sharing of certain military capabilities, enhancing cooperation in
research and technological development, facilitating industrial collaboration on defence and
optimising defence procurement through measures such as the removal of market barriers
(see European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011, 5).
However, sovereignty concerns and particular interests of EU member states have placed
clear limitations on the implementation of ambitious CSDP reforms. The case of Permanent
366    P. Müller

Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) illustrates this point. Established by the Lisbon
Treaty, PSCD provided a formula for capability development within the framework of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU). Specifically, PSCD allowed for voluntary cooperation among
willing groups of member states on the development of capabilities, particularly in identi-
fied shortfall areas (see Biscop 2012; Chappell and Petrov 2012). PSCD also involved a top-
down component, with the European Defence Agency (EDA) assessing the performance
of the participating states based on commonly agreed, binding criteria. Yet moving PSCD
forward lacked support by several member states including by the UK who, among other
things, remained sceptical about involving the supranational EDA and the complexity of the
mechanism (see Biscop 2012, 1305).
Following a German–Swedish discussion paper from November 2010 on intensifying
military cooperation in Europe (the so-called Ghent Initiative), the debate on EU capability
development shifted to the concept of ‘pooling and sharing’. Whereas PSCD was based on
the CSDP’s legal arrangements – including an EU mechanism for regular assessment, peer
pressure and even sanctions – pooling and sharing constituted an initiative for intergov-
ernmental cooperation, limiting the role of the EDA to serving as a platform for information
exchange (see Dyson and Konstadinides 2013). Though budgetary pressures arguably facili-
tated the introduction of pooling and sharing (Biscop and Coelmont 2011, 1), its reliance on
intergovernmental cooperation ensured that it would entail minimal costs for national sov-
ereignty. Pooling and sharing serves as an example how flexible cooperation among groups
of committed, like-minded countries may be used as a strategy to circumvent problems
posed by EU decision-making as a bloc. Particularly, the UK has voiced growing scepticism
about deepening interdependence with EU countries that lack commitment and a shared
strategic outlook, which it considers to ‘constrain rather than multiply political and military
options’ (European Parliament 2011, 33).
Pooling and sharing initiatives have emerged among a number of EU countries. Big mem-
ber states such as Germany, France and the UK have all relied on the mechanism and thus
far 20 projects have been generated by the Ghent Initiative, including projects on air-to-air
refuelling, a European air transport fleet and maritime cooperation (see European Parliament
2015, 40). Pooling and sharing initiatives may not only be realised within EU structures,
but have also been carried out within NATO’s smart defence initiative (introduced in 2011)
or through bilateral and multilateral cooperation schemes.3 Cooperation among ‘regional
groupings’ involving subsets of member states with varying degrees of independence from
EU-level initiatives has intensified against the backdrop of multiple crises (see also DeVore
2012; Mawdsley 2011). In 2009, Nordic countries merged existing forms of defence coopera-
tion into the comprehensive NORDEFCO framework (Nordic Defence Cooperation); in 2010,
the UK and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties on bilateral defence cooperation,
and in 2012, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia formed the
Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC). Simultaneously, defence cooperation was
reenergised in frameworks which have existed since the 1990s, including within the ‘Weimar
Triangle’ (France, Germany and Poland) and among the Benelux countries, the Baltic states,
as well as the ‘Visegrad group’ (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).
The level of ambition of these bilateral and multilateral initiatives has differed significantly.
Generally speaking, bilateral initiatives seem to have been more successful (see European
Parliament 2015; Weinrod 2014). Bilateral Franco-British cooperation has been particularly
ambitious, covering sensitive and costly areas such as nuclear arms, the deployment of
 Journal of European Integration   367

aircraft carriers or complex weapons such as missiles. Cooperation between Germany and
Poland has also yielded some notable results, e.g. in the area of maritime cooperation. Among
smaller countries, Benelux defence cooperation is fairly advanced, including the integration
of naval structures and staff, air force cooperation and projects for cooperation in areas
such as military education, defence acquisition and joint military operations (EU Observer
2015). Cooperation among CEDC countries has also progressed, including on the policing
of airspace (between Slovenia and Hungary), on the training of Special Operations Forces
and on logistics (The Slovenia Times 2014; Interview 2). Cooperation within other initiatives,
such as NORDEFCO, in turn, experienced significant setbacks over recent years, particularly
with regard to projects related to the development of armaments and the coordination of
procurement (see Dahl 2014, 6).
Critically reflecting on the achievements of pooling and sharing initiatives at EU, NATO
and member state levels, a study by the European Parliament recently concluded that the
progress that has been made was not adequate in the light of the substantive challenges
posed by multiple crises, calling for a greater EU-level involvement and a change in mindset,
particularly with respect to national sovereignty concerns (European Parliament 2015, 1).
The European Parliament’s critical assessment of the state of play of pooling and sharing
reflected broader concerns in EU foreign policy circles about a general lack of progress of
CSDP. Annual reports on the implementation of CSDP by the European Parliament (European
Parliament 2012) as well as a report by the EU’s High Representative (High Representative
2013b) and assessments by the European Commission (Commission 2013) all expressed
concerns about the EU’s inability to effectively realise the potential of the Lisbon Treaty in
times of multiple crises.
Against the backdrop of a lack of member state leadership, supranational actors have
stepped up their involvement. The Commission has stood out as a process manager in CSDP,
focusing its activities especially on promoting a more competitive and efficient European
defence market. The Commission had long disapproved of the member states’ extensive
use of security exemptions granted by the treaties (Art. 346, TEU), which enabled them
to disregard European single market rules in the area of defence-industrial cooperation.
Benefiting for ECJ legislation that (re)interpreted security considerations in a narrow sense,
the Commission has pursued common EU solutions even against competing member
state interests. Importantly, the Commission was able to facilitate the adoption of direc-
tive 2009/81/EC, which introduced more competitive tendering procedures and regulated
large parts of the supply chain in the area of defence procurement. Here, the Commission
successfully employed a ‘lesser evil strategy’ to promote exit from the JDT, threatening the
member states with ECJ litigation to turn a blocking majority into legislative consensus
(Blauberger and Weiss 2013, 1120). At the same time, recent research has identified the
Commission’s strategy of ‘reframing’ matters of defence-industrial cooperation as economic
issues as another way to enhance its policy relevance in this domain (see Fiott 2015), par-
ticularly with respect to dual-use goods (which have a civilian and military purpose).
The activities of the Commission also helped to keep issues related to Europe’s defence
market on the European agenda, including at the level of the European Council (see European
Council 2015). Still, given the intergovernmental nature of CSDP, the Commission’s influence
remains restricted to areas located between the market and security spheres. Within the
institutional realm of CFSP/CSDP, supranational EU actors lack the ‘hard power tools’ avail-
able to the Commission and found it more challenging to provide leadership and to act as
368    P. Müller

process managers. For the most part, the High Representative and the EEAS did not succeed
in influencing European foreign policy in a decisive way, which has remained dominated by
the (larger) member states (see Balfour and Raik 2013, 8). The High Representative’s main
focus has been on developing the institutional capacity of the EEAS, which was little sur-
prising given the novelty of the EEAS (see e.g. Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Whilst
some notable exceptions exist – including activities of the High Representative to set new
strategic priorities for the EU’s policy towards its neighbourhood or efforts to develop a
more consistent approach towards the Middle East peace process – important issues like
defence received little attention. At the same time, the member states supposed demand
for leadership often stood in an uneasy relationship with a lack of member state support for
the High Representative (see Balfour, Carta, and Raik 2015, 205).

4.1.  CFSP/CSDP and multiple crises: the impact on strategic priorities, techniques
and instruments
Multiple crises did not only stimulate debate on advancing the EU’s institutional capacity
as a foreign policy actor, but also triggered reflections on strategic priorities, techniques
and instruments of CFSP/CSDP. In particular, the debate on a ‘grand EU strategy’ – which is
concerned with common EU foreign policy priorities and interests and relates means to large
ends – has intensified in recent years (see e.g. Biscop and Coelmont 2013; Howorth 2010).
The existing ESS of 2003 has frequently been described as outdated and vague, not least
as it does not account for the effects of the financial and economic crises, the deteriorating
security situation in the EU's neighbourhood and substantial geopolitical changes marked
by the emergence of a multipolar world order (see e.g. Biscop 2012). Advancing the EU’s
common strategic vision has proven to be difficult and time-consuming, however, as member
states have their particular geopolitical priorities, threat perceptions and strategic cultures.
When France pushed to revisit the ESS in 2008, it faced opposition from other member states
including from the UK, which did not want to become engaged in a debate over Europe.
Germany, by contrast, sought to avoid strategic reflections on the EU’s relationship with
Russia at that time (see De France and Witney 2013). Still, against the backdrop of mounting
external challenges the strategic debate at the EU level has intensified. The European Council
of December 2013 invited the High Representative to elaborate foreign policy priorities and
to assess changes in the global environment. High Representative Federica Mogherini, who
assumed office in October 2014, then launched a process of strategic reflection on EU foreign
policy that involves member states, EU institutions, think tanks and academia. And in June
2015, the European Council gave a formal mandate to the High Representative to prepare
an ‘EU global strategy on foreign and security policy’ within a year (European Council 2015,
5). Simultaneously, substrategies have been established on issues such as cyber security
(2013), maritime security (2014) as well as on Syria, Iraq and the Da’esh Threat (2015).
Member states have succeeded in the past to formulate core strategic priorities, a pro-
cess that has been linked to the evolution of a nascent strategic culture (see above). Yet, to
effectively deal with recent crises, the EU and its member states face particularly difficult
strategic choices, especially with respect to defining EU foreign policy towards the neigh-
bourhood. Initially, the EU responded to the Arab Spring through relatively moderate reforms
of the soft power tools located within the framework of the ENP (High Representative and
European Commission 2011). Characterised by a great deal of continuity, the revised ENP
 Journal of European Integration   369

for the most part did not touch on contested issues among the member states and enjoyed
widespread support. In particular, the first ENP review strengthened the EU’s commitment
to democratic reforms through its emphasis on ‘sustainable and deep democracy’ and the
so-called more-for-more principle, i.e. offering more trade and a stronger partnership in
return for political and economic reforms. At a technical level, the ENP reforms concerned
funding arrangements and policy tools that came under the label ‘money, mobility, markets’,
including the establishment of the SPRING program (Support for Partnership, Reforms and
Inclusive Growth) in 2011 focusing on pressing socio-economic challenges.
It soon became evident, however, that the EU’s initial strategic response to the Arab Spring
was based on overly optimistic assumptions concerning the future trajectory of the region.
The ENP has never been designed as a policy for addressing security crises, but rather as
a tool to manage long-term cooperation and transformation processes. Accordingly, the
ENP increasingly appears out of sync with a political reality in the neighbourhood where
countries experience revolutions, civil wars and state failure, producing a situation where a
conditionality-based policy approach does not work. The Ukrainian crisis that erupted in late
2013 further enhanced the need for adapting EU foreign policy towards the neighbourhood
(see also Lehne 2014; Whitman and Wollf 2012, xiii). Against this backdrop, a fresh review
process of the ENP has been launched jointly by the EU’s High Representative Federica
Mogherini and neighbourhood Commissioner Johannes Hahn that is directed towards a
more substantive overhaul (High Representative and European Commission 2015). There
is growing awareness in EU foreign policy circles that the EU needs to clarify its strategic
ambitions as a security provider in the neighbourhood (Interview 1; High Representative
and European Commission 2015). As an observer has noted, taking the lead in stabilising
the European neighbourhood is crucial for the Europeans, as no other actors, including the
US, will do it for them (see Biscop 2015, 11). In line with its commitment to a ‘comprehensive
approach’, the EU’s new strategy towards the neighbourhood also needs to consider how a
new ENP links to CFSP/CSDP instruments (Interview 1).
To enable the EU to take up the responsibility as a regional security provider, the EU’s
new security strategy must also provide guidance how to match EU objectives with appro-
priate means. This also implies thinking about how to strengthen the CSDP, where reforms
have proven notoriously difficult, as well as about its relations to NATO on hard security
issues such as military crisis management. Preoccupied with managing the financial and
economic crises in the absence of clear strategic guidance and leadership, the EU has been
slow in agreeing on concrete measures for advancing CSDP instruments and techniques. The
European Council of December 2013 identified priority areas for upgrading CSDP, including
initiatives on the development of specific capabilities such as air-to-air refuelling, remotely
piloted air systems and satellite communications. Yet important issues were postponed to
a follow-up process and key shortcomings remain, including ongoing problems to solve
commonly identified shortfalls in military capability, a lack of an adequate cost sharing
mechanism (including the funding mechanisms for battlegroups), as well as insufficient
planning capabilities.
The current strategic debate takes place at a time when the EU’s military crisis manage-
ment has itself entered into crisis. As an observer has noted, civilian missions — which enjoy
widespread support among EU member states but are of little strategic significance — do
not constitute a raison d’être for CSDP and could also be organised in the framework of the
UN (Major 2013, 61). Simultaneously, member states’ refusal to reduce redundancies in the
370    P. Müller

defence domain and their growing reluctance to contribute to EU missions and existing
military CSDP instruments raise concerns (Interview 3). The failure for joint operational action
through the CSDP framework during the Libya crisis in 2011, and the EU’s inability to make a
decisive contribution to stabilise Libya after the military intervention through NATO, raised
further doubts about the EU’s willingness and ability to assume responsibility as a regional
security provider (see Howorth 2012). Whether the current strategic review process will be
able to re-energise the CSDP project remains to be seen.

5. Conclusion
The EU has not been successful in acting upon the opportunities provided by the recent cri-
ses. Reducing the ‘costs of non-Europe’ and advancing the effectiveness of EU foreign policy
have become ever more important to deal with crises-related pressures, particularly with
respect to advancing CSDP that was hit hard by national budgetary cuts. Yet, for the most
part, profound multiple crises have not led to an upgrade of the common interest among
EU member states when it comes to cooperation on CFSP/CSDP.
The institutional constraints imposed by intergovernmental foreign policy cooperation
privileged slow, incremental reforms that were largely pre-structured by the Lisbon treaty
and carefully constructed compromises over bold innovations and timely responses to new
policy developments. Repeatedly, the member states found themselves stuck in ‘decision
traps’, where powerful national interests and sovereignty concerns trumped collective EU
interests and the realisation of the public good through common action and further inte-
gration. Accordingly, reforms of CFSP/CSDP instruments and techniques have generally
remained below the potential offered by the Lisbon Treaty. In some instances, interventions
in EU foreign policy-making by supranational actors have facilitated exit from JDT situations,
yet they cannot replace leadership by the member states. In particular, the Commission has
become more assertive in using its influence, including the threat of ECJ litigation, to advance
integration in areas located between the market and security spheres such as procurement
and dual-use goods. The ability of the High Representative and the EEAS in facilitating pro-
gress at the policy level, in turn, has been more circumscribed, with much of their activities
being absorbed by implementing Lisbon reforms and building up the institutional capacity of
the EU’s new diplomatic service. Whilst supranational actors like the EEAS might be described
as the ‘winners’ of the CFSP/CSDP reforms agreed at Lisbon, the member states have been
largely able to safeguard their authority during the implementation stage.
Rather than supporting bold steps towards greater pan-European integration, the mem-
ber states have tried with mixed success to deflect crises-related pressures by enhancing
bilateral and multilateral cooperation with like-minded member states within the EU frame-
work, NATO as well as at the member state level. Whilst cooperation among smaller groups
reduced interest heterogeneity and avoided the pitfalls of joint EU level decision-making, it
has also raised concerns about undermining collective European efforts that offer far greater
synergies and cost savings. Simultaneously, geopolitical changes, declining resources and
instability in the European neighbourhood remain great concerns. Against this backdrop,
the EU is currently in a process of reflecting on its global role, ambitions and objectives. It
thus might be premature to make a concluding judgement on the question of how much
the current crises are going to ‘transform’ the EU as an international actor.
 Journal of European Integration   371

Notes
1. 
Procedures for ‘enhanced cooperation’ are particularly elaborated in the domain of security
and defence cooperation (Art. 44–46 Treaty on European Union).
2. 
Entitled ‘Global Europe’, it covers all external action by the EU including the CFSP/CSDP,
development assistance and humanitarian aid, as well as the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP). The relatively small budget for CFSP/CSDP predominately goes to the funding of
operational activities in civilian crisis management, whilst military missions that often require
substantial resources are funded through national budgets.
3. 
For overview of projects undertaking in the framework of NATO’s smart defence initiative, see
Weinrod (2014).

Acknowledgements
I thank the participants in several workshops held at the Institute for European Integration Research,
Vienna University and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

References
Aggestam, L. 1999. Role conceptions and the politics of identity in foreign policy. ARENA working Papers
WP 99/88 Oslo: ARENA.
Alecu de Flers, N., L. Chappell, and P. Müller. 2011. The EU’s foreign and security policy: incremental
upgrading of the common interests and the effects of institutionalized cooperation. In The EU’s
joint decision traps: comparing EU policies, ed. G. Falkner, 162–180. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alecu de Flers, N., and P. Müller. 2012. Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member
State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues. Journal of European Integration
34, no. 1: 19–35.
Balfour, R., C. Carta, and Kristi Raik. 2015. Conclusions: adaptation to the EU or to the changing global
context? In The European external action service and national foreign ministries, eds. Rosa Balfour,
Caterina Carta, and Kristi Raik, 195–209. Farnham: Ashgate.
Balfour, R., and K. Raik. 2013. Introduction. In The European external action service and national
diplomacies, eds. Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, European Policy Centre (EPC) Issue Paper, no. 73,
1–13. Brussels: European Policy Center.
Ballester, B. 2013. The cost of non-Europe in common security and defence policy. Study of the European
Parliamentary Research Service 2013, no. 4: 1–86.
Biscop, S. 2012. The UK and European defence: leading or leaving? International Affairs 88, no. 6: 1297–
1313.
Biscop, S. 2015. Global and operational: a new strategy for EU foreign and security policy. IAI Working
Papers July 2015, no. 15: 1–16.
Biscop, S., and J. Coelmont. 2011. Pooling & sharing: from slow march to quick march? EGMONT Security
Policy Brief 2011, no. 23: 1–4.
Biscop, S., and J. Coelmont. 2013. Defence: the European Council matters. EGMONT Security Policy Brief
2013, no. 51: 1–4.
Blauberger, M., and M. Weiss. 2013. ‘If you can't beat me, join me!’ How the Commission pushed and
pulled member states into legislating defence procurement. Journal of European Public Policy 20,
no. 8: 1120–1138.
Chappell, L., and P. Petrov. 2012. The European defence agency and permanent structured cooperation:
are we heading towards another missed opportunity? Defence Studies 12, no. 1: 44–66.
372    P. Müller

Chappell, L., and P. Petrov. 2014. The European Union’s crisis management operations: strategic culture
in action? European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 18, no. 2: 1–24.
Council. 2013. EU Council conclusions on the European External Action Service (EEAS) review. 17 December
2013. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
Council. 2015. Council Directive on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular
protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union. 31 March 2015. Brussels: Council of the European
Union.
Dahl, A. 2014. NORDEFCO and NATO: ‘Smart Defence’ in the North? NATO Research Paper, May 2014,
no. 101: 1–12.
De France, O., and N. Witney. 2013. Europe’s strategic cacophony, European Council on foreign relations.
Policy Brief ECFR 2013, no. 77: 1–15.
Dempsey, J. 2015. Europe suffers from a pathetic lack of foreign policy ambition. Newsweek, 10 August
2015.
DeVore, M. 2012. Organizing international armaments cooperation: institutional design and path
dependencies in Europe. European Security 21, no. 3: 432–458.
Dyson, T., and T. Konstadinides. 2013. European defence cooperation in EU law and IR theory. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
EEAS. 2014. 2013 annual activity report. 9 April 2014. Brussels: European External Action Service.
EU Observer. 2015. Benelux countries sign air defence pact. 5 March 2015. Brussels: EU Observer.
European Commission. 2013. Towards a more competitive and efficient European defence and security
sector. Press Release, 24 July 2013. Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-734_en.htm.
European Commission. 2015. Budget, website of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/
figures/fin_fwk0713/fwk0713_en.cfm#cf07_13.
European Council. 2015. Conclusions — 25 and 26 June 2015. 26 June 2015, Brussels: European Council.
European Defence Agency. 2013. Defence data 2012. Brussels, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-
source/eda-publications/defence-data-booklet-2012-web.
European Parliament. 2011. Annex: the impact of the financial crisis on European defence, study by
the DG for external policies of the Union Directorate B Policy Department, May 2011. Brussels:
European Parliament.
European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2011. Report on the impact of the financial crisis on
the defence sector in the EU Member States (2011/2177(INI)). 30 November 2011. Brussels: European
Parliament.
European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2012. Report on the implementation of the common
security and defence policy (2012/2138(INI)). 31 October 2012. Brussels: European Parliament.
European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies. 2015. State of play of the implementation
of EDA’s pooling and sharing initiatives and its impact on the European defence industry. June 2015.
Brussels: European Parliament.
Falkner, G. (ed.). 2011. The EU’s joint decision traps: comparing EU policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fiott, D. 2015. European defence-industrial cooperation: from Keynes to Clausewitz. Global Affairs 1,
no. 2: 159–167.
Giegerich, B. 2010. Budget crunch: implications for European defence. Survival 52, no. 4: 87–98.
Ginsberg, R.H. 2001. The European Union in international politics: baptism by fire. Oxford: Rowman &
Littlefield.
High Representative. 2013a. EEAS review. Brussels: European External Action Service.
High Representative. 2013b. Preparing the December 2013 European Council on security and defence: final
report by the high representative/head of EDA on the common security and defence policy. Brussels:
European External Action Service.
High Representative Catherine Ashton. 2012. Opening address by EU high representative Ashton at the
European Defence Agency (EDA) annual conference. 31 January 2012, Brussels.
High Representative and European Commission. 2011. A new response to a changing neighbourhood:
a review of European neighbourhood policy. Joint Communication by the High Represenative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission. COM (2011) 303.
Brussels.
 Journal of European Integration   373

High Representative and European Commission. 2015. Joint consultation paper: towards a new European
Neighbourhood Policy. JOIN(2015) 6, Brussels.
Hoffmann, S. 2000. Towards a common European foreign and security policy? Journal of Common
Market Studies 38, no. 2: 189–198.
Hofmann, S. 2011. Why institutional overlap matters: CSDP in the European security architecture.
Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1: 101–120.
House of Lords. 2013. The EU’s external action service. HL Paper no. 147. London: Authority of the House
of Lords.
Howorth, J. 2010. The EU as a global actor: grand strategy for a global grand bargain? Journal of Common
Market Studies 48, no. 3: 455–474.
Howorth, J. 2012. CSDP and NATO post-Libya: towards the Rubicon? Security Policy Brief 2012, no. 35:
1–6.
Howorth, J. 2014. European security post-Libya and post-Ukraine: in search of core leadership. Imagining
Europe 2014, no. 8: 1–37.
Jopp, M. and U. Diedrichs. 2009. Learning from failure: the evolution of the EU’s foreign, security and
defence policy in the course of the Yugoslav crisis. In Crises in European integration. Challenges and
responses, ed. L. Kühnhardt, 95–107. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Kempin, R., and M. Overhaus. 2014. EU foreign policy in times of the financial and debt crisis. European
Foreign Affairs Review 19, no. 2: 179–194.
Lehne, S. 2014. A window of opportunity to upgrade EU foreign policy. Carnegie Europe Report. Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Major, C. 2013. Chancen und Grenzen der GSVP im Nachwind der großen Wirtschafts- und Fianzkrise.
In Parameter europäischer Sicherheit: Die GSVP zwischen strategischer Herausforderung und
nationalstaatlicher Räson, eds. J. Frank and W. Braumandl-Dujardin, 61–71. Wien: Bundesministerium
für Landesverteidigung und Sport.
Major, C., and C. Mölling. 2013. The dependent state(s) of Europe: European defence in year five of
austerity. In The state of defence in Europe: state of emergency? EGMONT Paper 62, ed. S. Biscop and
D. Fiott, 13–19 Brussels: EGMONT.
Manners, I. 2002. Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies
40, no. 2: 235–258.
Mawdsley, J. 2003. Arms, agencies, and accountability: the case of OCCAR. European Security 17, no.
3: 367–385.
Mawdsley, J. 2011. Towards a merger of the European defence and security markets? In The EU defence
market, eds. A. Bailes and S. Depauw, 11–20. Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute.
Mead, W.R. 2014. The return of geopolitics: the revenge of revisionist powers. Foreign Affairs, 93(May/
June): 69–79.
Meyer, C.O. 2006. The quest for a European strategic culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mölling, C., and S. Brune. 2011. The impact of the financial crisis on European defence, Study by the DG
for External Policies of the Union Directorate B Policy Department. Brussels.
NATO. 2015. Financial and economic data relating to NATO defence. Press Release, 22 June 2015.
Perlo-Freeman, S., A. Fleurant, P.D. Wezeman, and S.T. Wezeman. 2015. Trends in world military expenditure,
2014. SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2015, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=496.
Raik, K., and T. Rantanen. 2013. Managing the decline of European Diplomacy. Helsinki: The Finnish
Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Comment 4/2013.
Scharpf, F. 1988. The joint-decision trap: lessons from German federalism and European integration.
Public Administration 66, no. 3: 239–278.
Scharpf, F. 2006. The joint-decision trap revisited. Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 4: 845–864.
Schmidt, S.K. 2000. Only an agenda setter? The European Commission’s power over the council of
ministers. European Union Politics 1, no. 1: 37–61.
The Slovenia Times. 2014. Hungarian fighters policing Slovenian airspace, The Slovenia Times (online
edition), www.sloveniatimes.com/hungarian-fighters-policing-slovenian-airspace (accessed 17
January 2014).
Vanhoonacker, S., and K. Pomorska. 2013. The European external action service and agenda-setting in
European foreign policy. Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 9: 1316–1331.
374    P. Müller

Weinrod, B. W. 2014. Pooling and sharing: the effort to enhance allied defence capabilities. AEI National
Security Outlook, August 2014.
Whitman, R.G., and S. Wollf (eds.). 2012. The European neighbourhood policy in perspective: context,
implementation and impact. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

List of interviews
Interview 1: Phone interview with a senior official of the EEAS charged with the European Neighborhood
Policy, 9 February 2015.
Interview 2: Interview with a member of the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sports, Büro für
Sicherheitspolitik, Vienna, 2 February 2015.
Interview 3: Phone interview with a policy advisor of the European Parliament, Directorate-General
for External Policies of the Union, 16 January 2015.