A COMPILATION OF DIGESTED CASES ON

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

LLB IV-C
Class 2016-2017

Professor: Judge Eidil-wasif Baddiri

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

ARTICLE II NATIONAL TERRITORY

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A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
ARTICLE I: NATIONAL TERRITORY
1. Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968
Facts: A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is
raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American
corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He
would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the
United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond
our jurisdictional function to tax.
Held: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there
of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms.
That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction
of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor
does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does
not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
2. People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476
FACTS: The accuse Loreta Gozo brought a house and lot located inside the US Naval
Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house
without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. Then, she
was charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which
requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was
convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of
Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base
of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not, does the city government has administrative jurisdiction and should
enforce its Municipal Ordinance over the US Naval Reservation?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but
also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty,
the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot
located within the US Naval Base. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
3. Magallona v Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
FACTS: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in
1961. The law’s purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was
deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress
amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined
new base points of the archipelago. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of
RA 9522.
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ISSUE: W/N RA 9522 (AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC
BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) is constitutional.
HELD: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it
clear that it has merely demarcated the country’s maritime zones and continental shelves in
accordance to UNCLOS III. The Court found that the framework of the regime of islands
suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines’ enjoyment of territorial
sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough.
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
LEGAL VALUE OF ARTICLE II
4. Tondo Medical vs Court of Appeals 527 SCRA 746
Facts:
In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five
general areas of reform:
To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
Secure funding for priority public health programs;
Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP)
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH.
Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole
provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical
assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units.
A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-
2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9,
10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly
pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-
being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-
executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide
guidelines for legislation.
5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of
the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring
about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political
department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
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As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which
the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v.
Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled
that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the
equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this
provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would
still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or
transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order
No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.
The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the
President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed
by this Court.
5. Bases conversion and development authority vs. Commission on
election 580 SCRA 295
Facts:
-On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was approved, creating the Bases Conversion and
DevelopmentAuthority (BCDA). Section 9 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board)
shall exercise the powersand functions of BCDA. Section 10 then states that function of the
Board also includes the adoption of acompensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to
the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
-On 20 Dec. 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme that grants
year-endbenefits to each contractual employee, regular employee, and Board member. Aside
from this, they alsogranted it to full-time consultant later on.
-On 25 Aug. 1997, Board Chairman Basco recommended to President Ramos the approval of
the newscheme. It was approved on 9 Oct. 1997.
-On 20 Feb 2003, COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2003-004 stating that the
grant ofyear-end benefits to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and
Management CircularLetter No. 2002-2. On 8 Jan. 2004, COA issued a Notice of Disallowance
No. 03-001-BCDA-(02) to disallow the year-end benefit to the Board members and Full Time
Consultants. BCDA filed a notice of appeal dated 8 Sept. 2004 and an appeal memorandum
dated 23 Dec. 2004 to COA.
-In Decision No. 2007-020, the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end benefit granted
to Board members and full-time consultants and held that good faith did not apply to them. As
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stated in DBM Circular letter No. 2002-02, the members and ex officio members of the Board
of Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. Good
faith is in question because despite the prior notice, the BCDA still enacted a new
benefit scheme including them in it.
-Thus the petition for certiorari is filed. It seeks to nullify Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April
2007 of COA.
Issues:
Whether or not Art. 2, Sec 5 and 18 of the constitution are binding as a legal basis for the claim
of granting year-end benefit.
Held:
No. The court dismissed the claim. Article 2, based on its title, is only a statement of general
ideological principles and policies. The said provision of Article 2 is not a source of enforceable
rights. In a previous similar case (Tondo Medical Center Employees Association V. Court of
Appeals), the court held that Sec. 5 and 18, Art. 2 of the Constituiton are not self-executing
provisions. Thus, the said provisions are not legal basis for the said claim.
Section 1. Philippine as a Democratic and Republican State
6. In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno, 210 SCRA 589
FACTS:
On November 14,1990, Associate Justice Reynato Puno wrote the Court seeking the
correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
As a background, petitioner was first appointed as Assoc. Justice of the Court of Appeals on
June 20,1980 and took his oath of office for the said position on November 29,1982.
On Jan. 17,1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
pursuant to Batas Pambansa 129. Subsequently, the petitioner was appointed as Appellate
Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the IAC.
On Nov. 7,1984, the petitioner accepted his appointment as Deputy Minister of Justice –
ceasing his membership in the Judiciary.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 33, affecting reorganization in the Judiciary.
A Screening Committee recommended the return of the petitioner as AJ of the new Court of
Appeals and listed him as number 11 in the roster of Appellate Court Justices. However, when
the appointment papers were signed by President Aquino on July 28,1986, Justice Puno’s
seniority ranking changed from No. 11 to No. 26.
On Nov. 29, 1990, the Court en banc issued a Resolution granting the petitioner’s request.
Later, Associate Justices Jose Campos Jr. and Luis Javellana, two (2) of the justices affected
by the ordered correction, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the present CA is
a new court and that the courts where the petitioner was previously appointed have already
ceased to exist and therefore the petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court nor
claim that he was returning to his former court.
When the Court asked the petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration, Justice
Puno argued that, by virtue of E.O. 33 read in relation to BP 129 and by President Aquino’s
pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Constitution) that “no right provided in
the ungratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution,” his seniority
ranking should now be at number 5.
Petitioner likewise claimed that although he power of appointment is executive in character and
cannot be usurped by any other branch of the government, such power can still be regulated
by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by EO 33 for the
power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law
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ISSUE:
The main issue is whether or not the present Court of Appeals is now a new court such
that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority.
HELD:
The Court granted the motion for reconsideration and recognized and upheld the
seniority ranking of the members of the Court of Appeals, including that of Assoc. Justice
Puno, at the time the appointments were approved by President Aquino in 1986.
7. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan GR no. 104768, July 21, 2003
FACTS:
President Aquino issued Executive Order no. 1, creating a Presidential Commission on
Good Governance (PCGG) task to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinate and close associates. Based on the mandate of EO
no. 1, AFP board investigated reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
Josephus Q. Ramas and alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano.
They confiscated sum of money, communication equipments, jewelries and land titles
in a search they conducted at the house of Ms. Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the confiscated items is valid.
HELD:
No, since the government under Pres. Cory Aquino is a revolutionary government
established by the authority of the legitimate sovereign, and established in defiance of the
1973 Constitution. The action taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with law. Sec.1 of Art.
II provides that “The Philippines is a Democratic and Republican state. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.
8. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 113
FACTS:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the
Japanese).
ISSUES
Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto
government.
HELD
Yes, civil case filed can be continued since the the government establish during the Japanese
occupation is a de facto, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done
under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the
continuance and control of said government remain good.
9. ACCFA vs CUGCO
Facts:
On 4 Sept 1961 a CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA. The
said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA
the unions held a strike on 25 Oct 1962. And 5 days later CUGCO, the mother union of ASA
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and AWA filed a complaint against ACCFA due to unfair labor practices among others which
CUGCO was able to win in court. On 25 Apr1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the
appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. On 17 Mar
1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have sole bargaining rights with ACA.
While this petition was not yet decided upon, on 19 March 1964, EO 75 was also passed which
placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest
legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA.
HELD:
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by
virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a
governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down
to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However,
the growing complexities of modern society have
rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete.
Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are
absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards
a greater socialization of economic forces.
10. PHHC Vs Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA 296
Facts:
The PHHC seeks a reversal of the Resolution of the CIR en banc in ordering them to pay
private respondents wage differential for work. The Philippine government and World Food
Program (WFP) entered into an agreement in a plan for the Sapang Palay resettlement area in
the PHHC proposing a self-help project to be undertaken by the squatter families for the
construction of two dams. The undertaking is for the purpose of water irrigation to be used for
additional food production. In recruiting participants to the program, the WFP issued an
application form mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be rendered. The participants
were assigned to work on canals and roads; however, the projects agreed between the PHHC
and WFP were never fully implemented. They were ordered to accomplish a time sheet which
is the basis for the payment of 50 centavos/day and a weekly food ration. They were also
provided with work tools and assigned a work supervisor to manage and administer the
Sapang Palay project in which the latter also conducted ocular inspection in the area.
However, the participants went to the Department of Labor complaining about their work and
compensation which Secretary Ople suggest that the workers in the said project must be paid
in minimum wage law. After that, petitioner suspended work and the workers assert their
minimum wage and the 50 centavos be paid to them. The petitioner answered before the CIR
that they were exercising governmental functions and that they did not hire private respondents
and CIR had no jurisdiction over them. The Court dismissed the action of the petitioner since
there was no evidence that private respondents rendered overtime work. The petitioner moved
to reconsider before the CIR but denied the claims. Thus, they elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and/or controlled
corporation performing governmental function.
Held:
The Court ruled that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over labor disputes
involving GOCC but not the performing governmental functions. Since the National Housing
Association was created, the Philippine government has carried mass housing and
resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos. The PHHC is governmental institution
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performing governmental functions. Thus, the Court grant the petition and set aside the
assailed resolution of the Court of CIR.
11. Spouses Fontanilla Vs Hon. Maliaman GR Nos.55963, February 27,
1991
Facts: On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary
employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of
petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s
driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P
12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as
moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely
and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia,
who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration
on January 26, 1990.
NIA believes this bases on:
PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the
NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers’ Union
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA,
exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does
not show that it was intended to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or
pecuniary profit”, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government
entity exercising proprietary functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his
contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services
were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment
had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be
removed except for valid cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had
not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the
contract.
ISSUE
Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the
damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent
HELD: YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent
and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered
as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus
considered as optional.
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 The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While
it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and
purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in thePhilippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as
a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from
the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601
provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the
National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval
of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have
representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for
emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems
constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be
necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost
of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government
policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation
of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation
development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land
benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all
other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all
fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of
Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and
objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government
agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere
agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it
may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent.
12. People V Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
FACTS: Lozeta Gozo was charged by the City Engineer’s Office of the City of Olongapo for
violating a municipal ordinance which required residents to secure mayor’s permit prior to the
construction, demolition or repair of a building in the city. Court of First Instance of the said city
convicted her. She appealed the decision and argued that the local government unit of the City
of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the Naval Base of Americans where her
house was erected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the local city government has administrative jurisdiction over naval
bases of foreign country located within the city?
HELD: Yes. There is no portion in the Philippine territory that is not ours, and beyond our
power and control. Within our territory, any statutory powers maybe exercised freely and
legally. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses commiteed
therein. The consent to the bases of foreign countries were given/ granted on the basis of
comity, courtesy and expediency. Military bases are not and cannot be of foreign territory.
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SECTION 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
13. Agustin versus Edu, 88 SCRA 195
FACTS : Petitioner Agustin asserts that Letter of Instruction 229 and Administration Number 1
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos and LTO Commissioner respectively requiring all
vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled , are unlawful and unconstitutional as it
violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of
police power.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative
Order issued are unconstitutional
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition as the LOI and LTO
Admin order are not unconstitutional. The LOI was based on the resolutions of the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the
United Nations, and hence the SC adopted this International Law as part of the law of the land
on the basis of the provisions on the 1987 Philippine Constitution in Article II Section 2.
14. JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR No. 653,Oct. 25,1983
Facts: Petitioner retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition [ABC],
sought a permit from the city of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983
from 2-5pm, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gate of the U.S. Embassy. However,
such permit was denied due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the
advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners may able to exercise their constitutional rights to free speech
and assembly, with an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of their rights, all the
necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally."
Held: Negative. On the grand that the holding of rally in front of the U.S. Embassy violates
Ordinance No. 7295 of the city of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstration within the radius of five hundred (500) feet from the foreign mission or chancery;
and for other purposes.
15. Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18
G.R. No. 118295.
FACTS: Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence
by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued and contended that the
“national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in
contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the
phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
ISSUES: Whether or not, does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization?
HELD: NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization.
[The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.]
[The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”]
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 16. BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
FACTS
The Philippines and United States joined into an agreement until its expiration in 1991 but the
defense and security relationship continued between RP-US pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty. On July 18, 1997, there were negotiations by both panels and eventually the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) was approved by President Fidel V. Ramos. It was later on ratified on
October 5, 1998 by President Joseph E. Estrada, which was transmitted to the Senate thru
Executive Secretary Zamora and agreed by the Senate where it was approved by a 2/3 vote of
its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes
between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
ISSUE
Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
HELD
No. The VFA is not unconstitutional. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains provisions
requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 2, Art. II
some generally accepted principles have been incorporated in treaties. It is inconsequential
whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Sec. 21, Art VII “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate”. Sec. 24, Art. XVIII provides
“After the expiration in 1991of the agreement between RP and the US concerning military
bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state”.
17. Lim vs. Executive Secretary, GR 151445, April 11, 2002
Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by Arthur Lim and
Paulino Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo Reyes, to bar the holding
of
Balikatan Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US Armed Forces started to send and
deploy their troops in the Philippines. The petitioners said that under the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty, “mutual military assistance” can only be held in case of an armed external attack.
However, under the Visiting Force Agreement, the US Armed Forces are allowed to engage in
“activities” but not in “combat operations except for self-defense.”
Issue: Whether or not the respondents in the case have committed “grave abuse of discretion”
by
holding Balikatan 02-1.
Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms of the Visiting
Force Agreement. The US Armed Forces can engage in any activity except combat operations.
18. Mijares v. Ranada G. R. No. 139325
FACTS:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights
violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of
the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary
damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This
Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of
the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the
value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos
however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati
dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as
it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of
money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the
12
proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
HELD:
Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for
“other actions not involving property”. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should
be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in
litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly
based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err
in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so
capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level
court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the
B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refer to instances
wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or
a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129
reveal that the complaint for13 enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary
estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US
District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also
an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule
141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the
enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”
19. SHANGRI-LA V DEVELOPERS
GR NO.159938 March 31, 2006
Facts:
At the core of the controversy are the “Shangri-la” mark and “S” logo. Respondent, Developers
Group of Companies, Inc (DGCI) claims ownership of the said mark and logo in the
Philippines. They filed its registration on October 18, 1982 with the Bureau of Patent,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) pursuant to sections 2 and 4 of RA 166.
On the other hand, Kuok Group of Companies has used the name Shangri-la in all Shangri-la
hotels and hotel-related establishments around the world as well as the “S” logo.
The Petitioner (Shangri-la), contends that they own the “Shangri-la” mark and “S” logo for they
have been using it since 1962 not in the Philippines but in other parts of the world before the
respondent even registered the said mark and logo.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are entitled to protection under both RA 166 (the old trademark
law) and Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
HELD:
The Petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. The fact that international
law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation
as applied in most countries, rule of international law are given standing equal not superior, to
national legislative enactments. However, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior
use, as well as bad faith in the respondent’s registration of the mark, it is evident that the
petitioners cannot be guilty of infringement.
20. Pharmaceutical vs. DOH GR 173034
Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is
deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their
capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued
by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted
to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the pr J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR
No. 65366 October 25, 1983eambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to
give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006,
the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International
13
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties SECTION 3. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY AND AFP ROLE
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of 21. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RONALDO B.
breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take
ZAMORA, 338 SCRA 81 2000
effect on July 7, 2006.
FACTS:
Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President ordered the
(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression.
The IBP questioned the validity of the order on the grounds that the deployment of Philippine
Held: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
Marines is in derogation of ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 of the Constitution.
members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations
under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The
ISSUE:
Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy.
as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because
they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international
HELD:
law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
No. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it
The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
infringe the civilian character of the Police force. The calling of the Marines in this case
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
the marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed.
of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered
SECTION 7. INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY
as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need
of a law enacted by the legislature.
22. Lim v Executive Secretary, GR 15445, April 11, 2002
Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by Arthur Lim and
Paulino Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo Reye, to bar the holding
of Balikatan Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US Armed Forces started to send
and deploy their troops in the Philippines. The petitioners said that under the 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty, “mutual military assistance” can only be held in case of an armed external
attack. However, under the visiting Force Agreement, the US Aimed Forces are allowed to
engage in “activities” but not in “combat operations except for self-defense”
14
Issue: whether or not the respondents in the case have committed “grave abuse of discretion”
by holding Balikatan 02-1.
Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms or the Visiting
Force Agreement. The Us Armed Forces can engage in any activity except combat operations.
SECTION 8: FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS
23. Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence
of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State.”
ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
HELD
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by
a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state.
SECTION 12. FAMILY LIFE; MOTHER; UNBORN
24. ROE Vs WADE, 410 US 113
Facts:
Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality
of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except
on medical advice to save the life of the mother.
Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for
violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought
an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional.
The defendant was county District Attorney Wade (D).
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had
standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was
warranted. The court also ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the
Does’ complaint was not justiciable.
Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion
statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth
15
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that
injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross-
appealed the district court’s judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.
Issues
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on medical advice to
save the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the United States?
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an abortion?
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion?
4. Did the fact that Roe’s pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case was
decided by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot?
5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?
Holding and Rule
1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving procedures
on the mother’s behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage of pregnancy
and other interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy, against state action.
3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her
pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman’s health and
the potentiality of human life at various stages of pregnancy.
4. No. The natural termination of Roe’s pregnancy did not render her suit moot.
5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be left to
the judgment of the pregnant woman’s doctor. In regard to second trimester pregnancies,
states may promote their interests in the mother’s health by regulating abortion procedures
related to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote
their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except
when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review,” is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at
each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. § 1253 does not authorize a party seeking only declaratory
relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed when the case is
brought on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of
both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
The Does’ complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies which might or might
not occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was
unnecessary for the Court to decide Hallford’s case for injunctive relief because once the Court
found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.
25. Meyer V. Nebraska, 262 US 390 ( 1992 )
Fact : In 1919 Nebraska passed a law prohibiting anyone from teaching any subject in any
other language except English. In addition, foreign languages could be taught only after the
child had passed the eighth grade. Robert T. Meyer, the Plaintiff, an instructor in Zion
Parochial School, who taught in German to a ten-year-old child , was convicted under this law
and claiming that his rights and the rights of parents were violated.
Issue : Whether or not the law violated people's liberty, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment?
16
Held : Yes, the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. The legislative purpose of the law was to
promote assimilation and civic development. But such restriction does violence to both the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution.
26. Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510
FACT : Two appellees, non-public schools -Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy,
obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interfere with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control?
HELD :The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the
state.The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right
and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
27. WISCONSIN V YODER 406 U.S 205
FACTS:
Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Amish Church and
respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Mennonite Church. They were charged, tried and
convicted of violating the compulsory-attendance law because they did not enrol their children
in a public or private high school.
Three Amish students, from different families, ceased to attend New Glarus High School in
New Glarus, Wisconsin following completion of 8th grade. The students stopped attending
school as per request of their parents—each student’s parent requested that the youths stop
attending school because of their religious beliefs.
Issue:
Does a state law requiring children to attend school until the age of 16 violate Amish rights
under the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment?
HELD:
After the school district brought a complaint against them, Yoder, Miller, and Yutzy were
charged with violating Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law. The Amish argued that
the law violated their free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Trial
testimony showed the Amish believed that sending their children to high school would not only
expose them to censure by the church community but also would endanger their salvation as
well as that of their children. The trial court determined that the state’s law did interfere with the
Amish freedom to act in accordance with their sincere religious beliefs but that the requirement
of high school attendance until age 16 was a reasonable and constitutional exercise of
governmental power. The parents were convicted and fined $5 each. They appealed to a
Wisconsin Circuit Court, which affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
however, agreed with the parents’ First Amendment argument and reversed their convictions.
The state then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
28. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629 (1968)
FACTS: Appellant, who operates a stationery store and luncheonette, was convicted of selling
"girlie" magazines to a 16-year-old boy in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law.
Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify
two different sets of the population in regards to obscene material and that it was an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. Appellant's conviction was affirmed by the Appellate
Term of the Supreme Court. He was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: Whether or not, does the New York government deprives the freedom of the boy?
17
HELD: No, the New York government does not violates the freedom of the 16-year-old boy as
provided by the constitution that the government shall support the duty of the parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character.
SECTION 16. RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY
29. OPOSA V. FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
FACTS:
An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing Timber License
agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant
deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health (sec. 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution).The
petitioners asserted that they represented others of their generation as well as for the future
generation. The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of
contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court for a writ of review issued by a higher court
to a lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the minors have a legal standing to file the case?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing
to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” particularly in cases
related to ecology and the environment. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an
obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law
on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state
in the interest of public welfare.
30. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that
the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated
the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay Region”.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to
grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…”
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and
the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the
lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake.
18
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua- circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as
culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other
with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
structures otherwise demolition shall be effected. power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state
Issues: powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies
1.Which agency of the government – the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
region – should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the Laguna de Bay.
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? 2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency? cases with authority to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters affecting the
Held: construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of
EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of
the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand
fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay
and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special

19
31. MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008
FACTS:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed
acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against severalgovernment
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENR’s Water Quality Management Chief,
Renato T. Cruz that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay
showed that the amount of fecal coli form content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-
90.The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to
clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also asserted
thatthe cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled bymandamu
s.The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks
outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in nature
and can be compelled by mandamus.Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA)
states that the MMDA is mandated to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and
solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also
noted that MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in
nature and can be compelled by mandamus.
SECTION 19. SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY
32. Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990
FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation,
formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the
products “naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after
the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant
site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong.
Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that
the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the
ones who risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
20

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of
the investors without considering the national interest
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case,
and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product
naphta as feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he
wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is
shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by
our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the
word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run like hell
by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.
Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken
because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as
well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact
that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that
petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as
provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not
vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
33. Tanada vs Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine Government to
submit to its respective authorities the WTO ( World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek
approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine
Senate ratifying such WTO agreement. This petition was filed questioning the constitutionality
of the WTO Agreement as it violates Sec.19, Art II of the constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO is contrary to
the provisions of sec.19, Art. II of the constitution.
Held:
No, it is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favour of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and
limits protection of Filipino interest against foreign competition and trade practice that are
unfair.
Furthermore, the Constitution policy of a “ self-reliant” and “ independent national
economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
SECTION 26. EQUAL ACCESS TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND POLITICAL
DYNASTIES
21
34. Pamatong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Petitioner: Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the Constitutional Provision Article II, Section 26.
Held:
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of
the Constitution is misplaced.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATION
35. Araneta v Gatmaitan
Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66
and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of
people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in
danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl
operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of
legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.
Held:
VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources
to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in
itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but
show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen.
concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
36. RUBI Vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 PHIL 660 (1918-1919)
Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
(http://digestingcases.blogspot.com/2015/05/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro.html)
22

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty
by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes
in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected
by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to
be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can
be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The
growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred
upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
37. PEOPLE Vs. MACEREN 79 SCRA 450 (1977)
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
be inharmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect itsgeneral
provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agencycannot amend an act
of Congress.
FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 whichpenalizes
electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Lawand the law creating the
23
Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint andheld that the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, hence the executive and judicialdepartments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI
affirmed the dismissal. Hence, thisappeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheriesexceeded
their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does notexpressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect couldhave been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to anexecutive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. It can authorize theissuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the law itself. Where thelegislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority
to promulgaterules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers
and boards,which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do
notrepresent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
38. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA (166 SCRA 533)
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power
EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The
widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based
on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial
expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity
of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2is a violation of non-delegation of power
HELD:
SC held that there was valid delegation of powers .In questioning the validity of the
memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to
promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
39. Tablarin versus Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
FACTS: The petitioners Tablarin, et. al., tried to stop the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring prospective medical students the
taking and passing of the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission to a medical college.
ISSUES : Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD : Yes. The NMAT requirement is constitutional as a condition to the admission to a
medical college on the basis of the “Medical Act of 1959″ in which the basic objectives are to
govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of
medicine in the Philippines.
40. Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. Vs Drilon, 176 SCRA 24(1989)
24
FACTS: Petitioner entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with its employees,
increasing the salaries by P200 for the years 1986 and 1987 and P300 for 1989. It was
stipulated in the contract that if ever there were legislations passed that would increase
salaries greater than the one in the CBA, the company would pay the difference. RA 6640 was
passed which directs minimum daily wage to be increased by P10 per day. The Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Drilon promulgated Implementing Rules
and Regulations for RA 6640, Section 8 of which provides that increases by companies will not
be credited as compliance if these weren’t stated in the CBA in anticipation of RA 6640. The
petitioners argue that the provision is null and void on the ground that it unduly expands the
provisions of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.
HELD: No. Implementing rules cannot provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the
law. Administrative regulations must harmonize with the law and not unduly expand it.
An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Assistant
Regional Director dated April 7, 1988 is modified in that petitioner is directed to pay its 208
employees so entitled the amount of P62.00 each as salary differential for two (2) months and
P31.00 as 13th month pay differential in full compliance with the provisions of Republic Act No.
6640. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in
so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining
agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No.
6440. This decision is immediately executory.
41. Osmeña v. Orbos. 220 SCRA 703
Fact:
Petitioner John H. Osmeña assailed that the delegation of legislative authority to the ERC
violates Sec. 28 of Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, the appellant appealed that there is
unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB of the
exercise of the power of taxation.
Held:
No, The SC finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to levy additional
amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised.
42. Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)
FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress Passed RA 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous
region. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, section 13 or RA 6734 which
authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O
No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
President’s discretion.
25
HELD: No, Congress merely allowed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the
initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is
logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the
administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the
law requires should have regional offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and
political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.
43. RODRIGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
309 SCRA 661
Facts:
The Petitioner is the Mayor of san Nicholas, who represented the people in an agreement to a
construction company that provides electrification of the barangays in the municipality.
The ground for notice is there is misrepresentation on the amounts presented in the reports in
comparison to the petitioner and the Audit of COA.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the case on grounds that the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), received an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether or not there was invalid delegation of the legislative power to the DBM.
Held:
No, The court ruled that there was no undue delegation of powers. The rule is that the powers
delegated cannot be delegated to another.
44. PEOPLE VS. VERA 65 PHIL 56
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four (4) motions for new trial, but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and, thereafter, remanded the case
to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting
of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it
has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC concluded that Section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
26
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action
of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at
rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in
the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no
argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now —
appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No.
4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without the probation system.
45. SOLICITOR GENERAL Vs MMA, 204 SCRA 837
Facts:
This case is a petition assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1998 in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only
as agents of the national legislature.
The petitioners, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Stephen A. Monsanto, Dan R. Calderon, and
Grandy N. Triestesent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of their driver’s
licenses and removal of license plate numbers. The respondents, Metropolitan Manila
Authority enacted Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, which gives them authority to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked
or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila which whichappear to be in conflict with the
decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that
the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions
prescribed in LOI 43.
The said ordinance, as well as Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the
General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. However, the flaw in the
measure was that they violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and
so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for
traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998
in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of
the national legislature are valid
Held:
Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA
and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void;
and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the
license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating
driver’s licenses for traffic violations within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the
principles governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal
ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene
theConstitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and
6) must be general and consistent with public policy. PD 1605 does not allow either the
removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed
in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such
sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution
itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
27
times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
46. Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima 562 SCRA 251
FACT:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.
Petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress has the legislative power to settle the dispute.
HELD:
No, although in Sec.1 Art. VI state that “The Legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum”
There is a limit in a legislative power, the procedural limits curtail the manner of passing law.
48. United States v. Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil 1
Fact
Act no. 2868, "An act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice
and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale of the said
products and authorizing the Governor General, with consent of the council of state, to issue
necessary rules and regulations. On August 1, 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53,
which was publish August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tong Ho, a rice dealer, sold ganta of rice at 80 centivos. The said amount was higher than
what is prescribed in the EO, the sale was done August 6, 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged in violation of the said EO, he was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus 500 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Issue
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
Held
Yes, the conviction of Ang Tong must be reversed since the act is done prior the EO is
published. The law contains no guide for the Governor General in determining if the rise in
price is extraordinary and for determining what the price should be, it fails to present conditions
to be consider in promulgating the law, lastly the said act authorized the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor General.
48. Employers Confederation v National Wages and Productivity Commission GR
No.96196
FACTS: The Employers’ Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) questioned the validity of
Wage Order No. NCR-01-A of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, National
Capital Region, promulgated pursuant to RA No. 6727. The assailed order provided that all
workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving
wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to P125.00 per day shall also receive an
28
increase of P17.00 per day. ECOP contended that wage is a legislative function, and Republic
Act No. 6727 delegated to the regional boards no more "than the power to grant minimum
wage adjustments" and "in the absence of clear statutory authority," the boards may no more
than adjust "floor wages."
ISSUE: Whether there is undue delegation of powers.
HELD: None. It is the Court's thinking that the Act is meant to rationalize wages, that is, by
having permanent boards to decide wages rather than leaving wage determination to
Congress year after year and law after law. The Court is not, of course, saying that the Act is
an effort of Congress to pass the buck, or worse, to abdicate its duty, but simply, to leave the
question of wages to the expertise of experts.
The Court does not think that the law intended to deregulate the relation between labor and
capital for several reasons: (1) The Constitution calls upon the State to protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare; (2) the Constitution also makes it a duty of the State "to
intervene when the common goal so demands" in regulating property and property
relations; (3) the Charter urges Congress to give priority to the enactment of measures,
among other things, to diffuse the wealth of the nation and to regulate the use of property; (4)
the Charter recognizes the "just share of labor in the fruits of production;" (5) under the Labor
Code, the State shall regulate the relations between labor and management; (6) under
Republic Act No. 6727 itself, the State is interested in seeing that workers receive fair and
equitable wages; and (7) the Constitution is primarily a document of social justice, and
although it has recognized the importance of the private sector, it has not embraced fully the
concept of laissez faire or otherwise, relied on pure market forces to govern the economy; We
cannot give to the Act a meaning or intent that will conflict with these basic principles.
The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in
decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that
wage-fixing, like rate constitutes an act of Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress
may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves
sufficient standards.
49. People of the Philippines vs Rosenthal
Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil
Company. The main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell
petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of
selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely
based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No.
2581. Section of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation
attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. Sec 5,
on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and
provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership,
association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership,
association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person,
partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities
named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have
authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or
permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the
period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.” Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is
unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in
determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his
opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers
being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular
Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate
29
or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person,
partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of
this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means
that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act
No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer
to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation
“is in the public interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the
public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky”
and against the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines,
and other like fraudulent exploitations”, — we incline to hold that “public interest” in this case is
a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term “public
interest” is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to
the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public
interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare
without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it
imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . . ”
50. AGUSTIN Vs. EDU, 88 SCRA 1
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the validity of a Letter of Instruction (LOI 229, as
amended) providing for early warning device (EWD) for motor vehicles as an exercise of police
power as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, its implementing
rules and regulations (AO No.1 and MC No. 32) for transgression of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. The assailed LOI was issued prior to a careful study by the
Executive Department, which was recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic
safety.
ISSUE: Whether there is undue delegation of powers.
HELD: None. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of
legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner
taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he
would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited
decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
"safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice
Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect
that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency
with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress
being assumed."
30
51. Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by
the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation
of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer
be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by
the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given
emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming
the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.”
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the
due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This
was due to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances.
There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for
the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they
be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection
between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with
a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both
restrains and is restrained bydure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626
which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it
complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose
sought has a gap.
31
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not
juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method
toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense
and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of powers
The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
52. United states vs. Panlilio, 28 PHIL 608
Doctrine:
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a
statute havethe force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not
a offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS:
In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to the
dangerousand contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of
duly-authorizedagent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of
Masamat, Pampanga;that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being
authorized so to do, and whilethe quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted
and ordered said carabaos to betaken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and
conducted from one place to another;that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants
and agents took the said carabaos from thesaid corral and drove them from one place to
another for the purpose of working them.The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760
relating to the quarantining of animals sufferingfrom dangerous communicable or contagious
diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 withsubsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The accused contendsthat the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE:
Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD:
NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or
madeunlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of
Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon
conviction, bepunished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and
pronounce them as unlawfulare Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them.
A violation of the orders of theBureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a
violation of the provision of the Act. Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, arestatutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offenseunless the statute itself somewhere makes a
violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere inAct No. 1760 is a violation of the orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is suchviolation punished in any way
therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par 2 of the PenalCode which punishes any
person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among
animals.
32
53. SEC v INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION (567 SCRA 354)
FACTS:
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with
Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a
five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation. In exchange, IRC will
issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares
which had a total par value of P488.44 million. The SEC averred that it received reports that
IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider
information. On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC
violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of
1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision on 20 August 1998. It determined that there
were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the
provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. The Court
of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any
suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.
ISSUE: WON ABSENCE OF IRR WOULD INVALIDATE THE PROVISIONS OF LAW
HELD:
The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where
a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities
Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the
implementing rules.
Its refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may
be filed against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act,
due to the absence of any implementing rules and regulations. Thus, the respondents may be
investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities
Regulations Code for violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. The
petition is GRANTED. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents
for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be undertaken by the
proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations Code. No costs.
54. Gerochi v. DENR, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Fact:
Petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi assailed the provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A 9136 and Sec. 2, Rule
18 of the IRR be declared unconstitutional. The appellant appealed that there is unjustifiable
delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
Issue:
Whether or not there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.
Held:
The SC ruled for the dismissal of the petition that there is no unjustifiable delegation of
legislative power to the ERC. Legislative power may be delegated into two exceptions by
immemorial practices or by the Constitution itself.
55. PSL Inc., v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442
Facts:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of
laundry services. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of
Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent
which
showed non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed to
conform tothe regulatory standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5
June 2002, inresponse to the 17 May 2002 request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally
showed compliancewith the effluent standard in all parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA
issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be imposed from the date of
33
initial sampling to the date the request for re-sampling was received by the Authority Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied.
Issue:
WON the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-
delegation of legislative powers.
HELD: LLDA’s power to impose fines is not unrestricted. It was only after the investigation
finding the petitioner failing to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that
the LLDA imposed the penalty of P 1,000.00 per day. The P 1,000 penalty per day is in
accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984.
56. People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640
Facts: Que Po Lay who was in possession of a $7,000 worth foreign exchange like U.S dollars,
checks and money orders, was sentenced to a six month imprisonment with 1,000php fine and
subsidiary imprisonment after he was found guilty of violating the Central Bank Circular No. 20.
The Solicitor General said that under the Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930, the
publication of the circular in the Official Gazette is not required for force and effect
Issue: Whether or not circulars should be published for it to become effective.
Held: Yes, because circulars prescribe a penalty for violation and should therefore be
published before the public sees its content. The people have to be informed of its contents
and penalties.
57. People vs. Dacuycuy 173 SCRA 90
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less
than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A
on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of
statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.
HELD:
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to
determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial powers
not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of
the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section
violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers
58. Carbonilla vs Board of Airllines Representatives
657 SCRA 775
FACTS:
The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No/ 1-2005 (CAO 1-
2005) amending CAO 7-92. The Department of finance approve CAO 1-2005 on 9 February on
23 August 2004, CAO 7-92 AND CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to section 3506 in
relation to section 608 of the Tariff and Costumes Code of the Philippines (TCCP).
BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005 reiterating its
concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 03 March 2005, the Acting
District Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance already approved CaO 1-
2005 on 09 February 2005. As such, the increase in the overtime rates became effective on 16
March 2005. BAR still requested for an audience with the Secretary of Finance which was
granted on 12 October 2005.
34
 On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Eugenio L De Leon, Chief,
Bonded Warehouse Division, BOC NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed
increase in the overtime rates. BAR further requested for a meeting to discuss the matter.
The BOC then sent a letter to BAR's member airlines demanding payment of overtime services
to BOC personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BAR's member airlines refused and
manifested their intention to file a petition with the Commissioner of Customs and/or the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the implementation of CAO 1-2005.
. Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CAO 1-2005 in the exercise of such delegated power valid.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Bureau of Customs is DIRECTED to implement CAO 1-2005 immediate. When
an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise
its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For
the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show
that the question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite
should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately
after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has
not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary
rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the
mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same
SECTION 5. COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
APPORTIONMENT; PARTY LIST
59. Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 (1994)
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend
on the following:
1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule
provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this section
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional.
35
HELD:
Yes. The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with
the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
60. JUANITO MARIANO, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
certain provisions of R.A. No. 7854, An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional on the ground that Sec.
52 of R.A. No. 7854 violates Art.VI Sec.5(4) and not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art. VI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The reapportionment of the legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than general reapportionment law. The petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art.VI of the Constitution for as of the
1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said Section provides that a city
with population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
61. Sema v COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
FACTS:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly by merits of
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the
first district of Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion
of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 maintaining the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
Thus,COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming
the legislative district as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
36
ISSUE:
Whether: 1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces is constitutional. 2. That affirms, whether a province created by
ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives, and Comelec Resolution
7902
HELD:
1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL in granting the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; 2. MMA Act 201 creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan is VOID and COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
62. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008
FACT: Cagayan de Oro City has only 1 Legislative District and so R.A. 9371 also known as
“AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE LONE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
OF THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO” was passed increasing the City’s Legislative District
into two. Resolution No. 7837 was then promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) implementing the said Law. According to Petitioner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, the said
Resolution cannot be implemented without a Plebiscite. Petitoner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and writ
of preliminary injunction to prevent the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on
the grounds that it is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary for the implementation of the Law which
provides for apportionment of a legislative district
HELD: Conduct of a Plebiscite is no longer required since Cagayan de Oro City constitutionally
remains a single unit and its administration is not distributed along territorial lines. Its zone
remains fully intact; there is only the addition of one more legislative district and the delineation
of the city into two districts for purpose of representation in the House of Representatives.
Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is
necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
63. AQUINO III Vs COMELEC GR NO. 189793, April 17, 2010
http://rsbast.blogspot.com/2012/09/digested-cases-in-political-law-iven-b.html
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October
2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for
the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.
HELD: NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
37
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
64. Aldaba V. Comelec, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Fact : On May 01, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City, by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223, 069. The
population of Malolos City on May 01, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will
be 254, 030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Issue : Whether or not the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250, 000 for the purpose
of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos?
Held : Whereas the Supreme Court declaring Republic Act 9591 unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5 (3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitutio. Because it did not satisfy the 250,
000 population requirement.
65. Ocampo versus HRET, GR No. 158466, June 15 2004
FACTS : On May 23, 2001, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark
Jimenez the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the14 May
2001 elections.On 31 May 2001, Ocampo filed with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) an electoral protest against Crespo with the following complaints: (1)
misreadingof votes garnered by Ocampo; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of
electionreturns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots
written byone person or two persons (HRET Case 01-024).Ocampo alleges he be
proclaimedthe duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.On 27 March2003, the
HRET issued a Resolution holding that Crespo was guilty of vote-buying anddisqualifying him
as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
ISSUE : Whether or not Ocampocan be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman.
HELD : No. A second place among the remaining qualified candidates in the election cannot
be proclaimed as the winner. xxxJurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second
placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The fact that
the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective
officexxx
PARTY LIST
66. Ang Bagong Bayani Vs Comelec, 359 SCRA 698 (2001)
FACT:
Ang Bagong Bayani and Akbayan citizens party filed before the comelec a petition under the
rule 65 of the rule of the court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.3785 issued by the
COMELEC. Petitioner seek the disqualification of private respondent, requiring mainly that the
party-list system was intended the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties. The none marginalized and overrepresented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omnibus Resolution No.3785 is constitutional.
38
HELD:
YES! Political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list election. under the
constitution and R.A 7941. Private respondent cannot be disqualified from the party-list
election merely on the ground that they are political parties.
67. VC Candangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009
Fact: Petitioner filed a petition for registration as sectoral organization under R.A 7941.
Further, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution denying the petitioners petition for
registration. Incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show that the COMELEC in denying the
petition for registration gravely abused its discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion for denying their petition for
registration.
Held:
The COMELEC En Banc ruled for the dismissal of the petition. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such unreliable and fanciful exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, petitioner failed to show that the COMELEC, through the questioned issuances,
gravely abused its discretion.
68. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP) VS. COMELEC
Facts
On June 1998, COMELEC proclaimed thirteen party list representatives from 12 parties and
organizations. Petitioner assailed ordering the proclamation of additional thirty-eight previously
defeated parties to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec
5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RE 7941, “The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list”
Issue
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
Held
No, the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is merely a ceiling and not
mandatory. This is to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list
representatives.
However, it is necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions to have obtained at
least two percent of the total cast votes for the party-list system in order to be entitled a party-
list seat. Those who obtained more than two percent will have additional seats but not more
than three seats
Note:
The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list, computed as follows:
No. of party-list =
Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in
order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid
votes cast nationwide, formula shown below:
% of cast votes =
No. of District representatives To be elected
x .20
Votes Cast for the Party .80 representatives
Total Cast Votes Nationwidex 100
(The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining
the total votes cast for the party-list system)
69. Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2013
Facts: A Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation was filed on June 22, 2004 by petitioners
Partido Manggagawa and Butil together with CIBAC against the respondent Commission en
banc, asking for the proclamation of new elected members and an additional seat for each
39
party. On July 31 of the same year, the Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-
011failing to resolve the petitioner's issue. Petitioners Partido Manggagawa and Butil filed an
immediate petition on August 18, 2004, seeking for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec en banc can apply the November 23, 2009 resolution in
Ang Bagong Bayani case.
Held: No. Because in the November 20, 2003 Resolution, the Court granted an additional seat
to
BUHAY because it has obtained more than 4% of the entire votes.
70. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws,
the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the
countrys public service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking
and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20
November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the
COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
in the May 10, 2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys
acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted
by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president
and secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to
CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of
the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of
intent to participate is the official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March
2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis
Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature
as acting secretary-general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For
Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that
Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-general, when she was not even
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted
were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly
authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered
the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents
faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by
the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys Certificate of
Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts,
and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and
40

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the
requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the
COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC
and the COA
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately
succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which to
file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they
cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a
period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while
Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not
be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the
second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by
petitioners on 1 September 2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three
days it took petitioners to file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27
days or until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the
required period.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the
COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of
its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The
Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on
Elections, which uniformly upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by
41
the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers
and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily
involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident
of its power to register political parties.
ELECTION LAW: party-list system law
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their
individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof
state:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or
coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a
list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office
or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall
have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws
in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction
over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each
nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of
Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6
of these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with
the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the
nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive
42
actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-
list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/
organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-
list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing
documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later than
three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.
Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC
First Division and the COMELEC en banc.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-general was
an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit
any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative
authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of
the COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010
by Pia B. Derla.
SECTION 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES
71. Aquino V. Comelec, 243 SCRA 400 ( 1995 )
Facts : Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly
registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for Congressman.
Issue : Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for Congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution?
Held : Yes, what is required is not just temporary residence but domicile as this has been
defined in jurisprudence. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
72: Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 ( 1995)
Facts:
On March 8,1995 petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial
Election Officer, providing the information in item number 8: RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHER I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: ---- years and seven months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position filed a
“petition for the Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that the
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
On March 29, 1995 petitioner filed an amended/ corrected certificate of candidacy
changing the entry seven months to since childhood.
43
 On April 24, 1995, the second division of the commission on election ( COMELEC) by
a vote of 2-1, came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for disqualification
in SPA 95-009 meritorious, striking out the petitioner’s corrected/amended certificate of
candidacy of March 31,1995 and cancelling her original certificate of candidacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner had complied the residency requirement as provided for
in Art VI, Sec. 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
Yes, the petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. A perusal of the resolution of the
COMELEC’s Second Division reveals a starting confusion in the application settled concepts of
“ Domicile “ and “Residence” in election law.
In Co vs Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution adhere to the definition given to the term residence in election law regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile.
73. Domino v. COMELEC
July 19, 1999 (310 SCRA 546)
Petitioners: Juan Domino
Respondent: Commission on Elections, Grafilo, Java, et. al.
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani but the COMELEC promulgated a resolution
declaring Domino disqualified for lack of the one-year residency requirement.
Domino filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied by the
COMELEC en banc. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the
one-year residence requirement.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Held:
No. He did not meet the residency requirement. The term “residence,” as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
“domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The contract of lease
of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile.
While, Domino’s intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that
be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his
previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of
registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August
1997, Domino still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the constitution.
74. Maquera vs. Boraa, 15 SCRA 7
FACTS:
Republic Act 4421 requiring all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices
shall post a surety bond equivalent to one year salary to which he is a candidate.
ISSUE:
The Court was asked to rule on whether Republic Act 4421 is constitutional
HELD:
Republic Act 4421 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As democratic form of government
requires that political rights be enjoyed by the citizens regardless of social or economic
distinctions. Among the political rights of a Filipino citizen is the right to vote and be voted for a
public office.
44
75. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and other
consolidated petitions), November 3, 2008
THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3)
officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6
years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo
a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus
permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA
9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
45

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject
to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly
amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer
to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
SECTION 7. TERM OF REPRESENTATIVES
76. DIMAPORO Vs. MITRA, 202 SCRA 779
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur
during the1987 congressional elections.Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of t h e H o u s e e x c l u d e d t h e
name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec
6 7 o f t h e Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to
resume performing his duties andfunctions as an elected member of the Congress.
Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in theCongress.Dimaporo contended
that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 isnot
operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members
of Congress.Grounds may be termed to be
shortened:1 . H o l d i n g a n y o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y m e n t i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t
o r a n t s u b d i v i s i o n , a g e n c y , o r instrumentality thereof.2.Expulsion as a
disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior3.Disqualification as determined by a
resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest4.Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE:
W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
anothergovernment position
HELD:
No.I n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t h e r e i s a n e w
c h a p t e r o n t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f p u b l i c o f f i c e r s . I n t h e 1 9 3 5 Constitution,
it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve
with the highestdegree of responsibility and integrity.If you allow a Batasan or a governor or
a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for anoffice other than the one
he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandateof the
people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto
resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or
relinquishing his mandateto the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek
another position which he feels he could be of better service.
46
77. Farinas vs Executive Secretary
GR No.147387December 10,2003
FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in
expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9006.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of
the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have
not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this
case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the
House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to
casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the
provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
47
78. Quinto vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who
filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense,
the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison
with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the
two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
SECTION 8. REGULAR ELECTIONS
79. Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
Facts: Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. in the May 14, 2001
elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Filed a “Most Urgent Motion
to Suspend Proclamation, stating “there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the
petitioner is undoubtedly guilty of the charges for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered
voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code. To which the petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election
results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against Locsin’s 53,447 votes. Instead By
virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray
even before said Resolution could gain finality. Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte. And issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the
Winning Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioner filed
an Urgent Manifestation[42] stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification
case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of
his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division
instead proclaimed ruled on in favor of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin. After granting the petition of the
petitioner to declare as null and void the proclamation, the petitioner wrote the House of
Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29,
2001 COMELEC en bancresolution annulling the proclamation of Rep. Locsin, and proclaiming
him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.[
Issue: 1.Whether or not the petitioner is not guilty of violation Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus
Election Code.
2. Whether or not Petition for Mandamus and Memorandum[59] dated October 8, 2001 for
Speaker De Venecia, stating that “there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly
promulgated be compelled.
Held: 1. Affirmative, Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner was denied
of due process during the entire proceedings.
2. Affirmative. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of
the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
Thus, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR.
SECTION 9. SPECIAL ELECTIONS
80. Tolentino v. COMELEC G.R. 148334
FACTS:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-
President.Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-
President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution
48
No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.
ISSUES:
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
validly held on 14 May 2001.
HELD:
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct
the special election within the confines of R.A.No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates
proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84.This Court has consistently acknowledged and
affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
SECTION 10. SALARIES
80. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., petitioner, vs.
Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, respondents
No. L-25554. October 4, 1966
Facts:
The Philippine Constitution Association has filed a suit against the Auditor General of the
Philippines, Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines
seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the
payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No.4131 (approved June 10,
1964) to the speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30,
1969.
Republic Act No.4131 authorized the increase in salary of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. Section 1 of the said Act expressly provides “that the salary
increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”.
Section 7 of the same Act provides “that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the effectively of the salary
increase of Congressmen and Senators.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House of Representatives but also that of all the Senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective.
Held:
The court granted the Writ of prohibition.
49
 In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to “all
the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the
plural, despite the difference in the terms of office thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature.
SECTION 11. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST; PARLIAMENTARY FREEDOM OF SPEECH
82. People vs Jalosjos
Facts:
The accused appellant Jalosjos, pleads that he be allowed to fully discharge his public duties
as a congressman despite having been convicted.
Issue:
Whether or not the fuctions of a public official in Congress may exempt him from the rules that
apply to convicted people in general.
Held:
The Court held that elected as a public official in congress is NOT a reasonable classification
in a criminal law enforcement. The court denied the motion filed.
83. Nicanor T. Jimenez VS Bartolome Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876
FACTS:
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban – they are the persons mentioned in the
open letter of Cabangbang to the President. Bartolome Cabangbang – member of the House
of Representatives and wrote the letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was
not in session which defendant-Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines . A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for recovery of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang. The letter
contains information that: 1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up; 2. There
is a planned coup d’état; 3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with
a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
2. Whether or not it is libelous.
HELD:
1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the
publication: a. was an open letter, b. the Congress was not in session; c. it was not a discharge
of an official function or duty.
2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the
planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part. The order appealed is
confirmed.
84. ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70)
The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in
relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress.
FACTS:
Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP
candidateto the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Works
and Communicationsto the independent LP candidate which divided the LP votes. Antonino
was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when he said that had not Valencia “sabotaged” and
“double-crossed” the LP, its official candidate would have won. On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino
while attending a Senate session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate
the actions of Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Communications in connection with
acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of the formal request was
50
furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be considered in
passing upon Valencia’s appointment to the Cabinet. Two-page press release was issued by
the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were published or reported on
the front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as a
consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and
senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain
serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Antonino then filed the present civil action against Valencia. Valencia filed a counterclaim and
claims that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release and that they were
made in good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character.
Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of
the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of
qualified privilege and defensive libel. Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the
appeal, Antonino died in a plane crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix substituted her
husband as plaintiff-appelle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is protected as
a qualified privilege communication?
HELD:
Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in nature where
malice in law is presumed because they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f
plaintiff. Defendant Valencia made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially
as to be qualifiedly privileged. The malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the
Court observed that had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of
malice, the charges should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees and not
publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers. Defendant-appellant’s claim of defensive
libel is likewise rejected because his argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and
accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libel is based upon a wrong premise.
Plaintiff Antonino’s act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a privileged
communication because the defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a
Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed privately and officially
to the Senate and Commission on Appointments.
Judgment affirmed
85 Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago AC no. 7399, August 25, 2009
FACT:
Senator/Atty. Mirriam Defensor Santiago crossed the limit of decency and good
professional conduct due to the rejection of her nomination as Chief Justice of the Phil.
Supreme Court made by the JBC. She uttered humiliating words to the Philippine Chief
Justice in her privilege speech at the House of Senate, she was quoted as stating “ I want to
spit in the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts of the Supreme Court, and
calling the Supreme Court as “Supreme Court of Idiots”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Senator Mirriam Defensor Santiago be criminally liable or be subjected
to disciplinary actions.
HELD:
No, as Art. VI, Sec. 11of the Constitution provides that “A Senator or member of the
House of the Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privilege from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
question nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any Committee thereof.
The Constitution enshrined parliamentary immunity over the lady Senator, but as being a
lawyer she violated Canon 8 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SECTION 13. PROHIBITIONS ON MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
86. Liban v. Gordon
GR. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Facts:
Dante Liban filed a petition to the supreme court declaring Richard Gordon has having forfeited
his seat in the Senate. Respondent incumbency as member of the Senate of the Philippines,
he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the Board of
Governors, petitioner allege accepting the Chairmanship of the PNRC, respondent has ceased
to be a member of the Senate provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution
51
Issue
Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
GOCC.
Held
No, PNRC is a private organization performing a public functions/services, PNRC Chairman is
elected by Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official. Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat or function, when
he was elected as Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
SECTION 14. PROHIBITIONS RELATED TO THE PRATICE OF PROFESSION
87. Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. 113 SCRA 31 March 25, 1982
FACTS: Justice Istanislao Fernandez, a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa entered
his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero group to which the petitioner Puyat group
objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any
administrative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the
SEC case without violating Sec.II Art.VIII (Now Sec.14 Art.VI) of the Constitution.
HELD: No. Assemblyman Fernandez could not be said to be appearing as counsel. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of the matter
in litigation.
SECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUORUM; DISCIPLINE; JOURNAL/RECORDS
(PAR.1)
88. Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared
the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement
of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
“minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and,
thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners
filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent
as Senate minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply
mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
52
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the
“minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by
a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority
is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.”
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are
more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select
the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in
the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority
parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President
and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the
rules of its proceedings.” xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing
the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept
of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is
not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words
of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe
53
the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the
rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
89. (PAR. 1) AVELINO Vs. CUENCO, 83 PHIL 17 (1949)
FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him
the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s
request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved.
With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the
session then walked out. Only12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next
day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing
so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative,
in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We
refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were
alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection
of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court
being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most,
eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at
any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place beyond the shadow of a doubt.
90. (PAR. 2) People v Jalosjos
GR. No. 132875-76
FACTS: The accused-appellant Romeo F. Jalosjos, a full pledged member of the Congress
who was confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of the house of representatives, including attending at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his
constituents to be represented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant be allowed to attend Congressional sessions
and committee hearings despite being convicted of a non-bailable offense.
HELD: No. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years, is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundation.
54
91. (PAR. 3) Arroyo VS De venecia 277 SCRA 268
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption
and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence
of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chaircalled out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the
Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chairand
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled billwas signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasureof the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House.
92. Osmeña vs Pendatum 109 PHIL 863 (1960)
FACTS:
Osmeña filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary junction
against Congressman Pendatum and 14 others in their capacity as a member of the Special
Committee created by the House of Resolution #59. Osmeña filed the abatement of the
Resolution #59, requiring the petitioner to establish by proof or evidence his charges against
the President. Osmeña was suspended for 15th months for the serious disorderly behaviour.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its member.
HELD:
For unparliamentarily conduct, members of the congress have been or could be censured,
committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
93. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636
55
Facts:
On 20 April 2001, private respondent Dr. Celia P. Morales (Morales) filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against petitioners Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Orlando O. Oanes,
Dante Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. de la Cruz (Mangahas, et al.) for violation of Sec. 3 (f) of
Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint was docketed as
OMB-1-01-0382-D.
In her complaint, private respondent Morales basically alleged that:
1. On June 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, thru
the initiative of Councilor Zaldy G. Matias (nephew of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas),
seconded by Councilor Carlos R. Malaca, persuaded to pass and enact KapasyahanBlg. 39,
taon 1998, granting the request of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas for the conversion of their
agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-125720 into a memorial garden
despite insufficiency of the requirements thereof as provided by law;
2. After receiving a copy of the said Kapasyahan, it appeared that the conversion of the
agricultural land of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas into a memorial garden was hurriedly
done and apparently not in accord with the necessary legal requirements based on their failure
to: (a) notify the adjacent residential lot owners of the said plan and/or development; (b) secure
proper recommendation(s) and permit from different government departments, bureaus and
agencies concerned; and (c) follow and comply with the proper procedures as prescribed by
law;
3. In questioning the same, my son sent a letter dated 13 April 1999 addressed to the SB and
prayed, among others the immediate REVOCATION and CANCELLATION of the said
Kapasyahan;
4. Secretary of the Sanggunian,admitted therein that KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998 was only
a DRAFT RESOLUTION;
6. On 20 April 1999, another KapasyahanBlg. 34, taon 1999 was issued by the SB refraining or
stopping the Manalastas to further develop their project without first securing the proper
permits and certification from the different government departments and bureaus concerned,
unfortunately, however, the same was never implemented;
7. On 14 May 1999, my son decided to send another letter addressed to the SB and prayed
the issuance of a permanent revocation of KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998 in lieu of a
temporary revocation previously issued;
8. My daughter, Felicitas Morales sent another letter dated 28 September 2000 addressed to
the SB, informing them of the presence of persons who had continued and still continue to
develop the project of Manalastas despite the prohibition previously issued to that effect.
However, to our prejudice, no action whatsoever was taken by the said public officials
concerned, thereby extending undue favor to the Manalastas;
9. The undersigned was forced to send another letter dated 24 January 2001 addressed to the
SB
10. On 12 March 2001, another letter was sent by the undersigned addressed to the SB,
requesting that I be given a chance to be heard in a form of public hearing in order to air my
grievances against the illegal conversion of the land and for the unfair, unjust and oppressive
treatment which we suffered and continue to suffer up to the present;
11. Four (4) days prior to the scheduled public hearing on 6 April 2001, the Office of the
Sanggunian headed by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.I. Alvarez sent a notice to all the
members of the SB, namely, Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Danilo A. de Guzman,
Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla, Jocelyn dela Cruz, Crisanto V. Velayo
II, Alfredo M. Alejandria, Jr. and Alejandro C. Velayo, for purpose(s) of informing them of the
said public hearing;
12. When the notice was served to the following councilors, namely: Leoncio D. Mangahas,
Zaldy G. Matias, Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. dela
Cruz, I was informed by the Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and the Secretary of the
Sanggunian, Mr. Eduardo H. Almera, that the said councilors have maliciously refused to sign
the said notice, thereby giving undue advantage in favor of the Manalastas who up to this
present time has been continuously developing their project despite the prohibition thereof;
13. However, despite the fact that they were properly notified, the above-named councilors in
the preceding paragraph have deliberately and maliciously neglected and/or refused to attend
the scheduled public hearing last 6 April 2001, thereby unjustly and oppressively discriminating
the undersigned without sufficient justification whatsoever;
14. Due to the unlawful acts committed by the six (6) councilors, the undersigned most
respectfully submits that they be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practice Act (R.A. 3019 as amended by R.A. 3047, P.D. 77 and B.P. 195) which
provides that: Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on matter pending before him for purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
56
material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue
advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
15. As of this date, no public hearing yet has ever been conducted, hence, to the prejudice of
the undersigned;
16. With full sincerity and honesty, I believe that there will be no more public hearing that will
be conducted due (to) the admission made by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and Mr.
Eduardo H. Almera as contained in their Joint Affidavit.
ISSUES:
A. Actuations of the CA
1. Court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition for having been late for a day
2. Court of appeals erred in denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that no copy
of petition wad furnished to the office of the solicitor general.
B. Actuations in the court
1. The court abused its discretion when it denies the motion to quash and ordered to suspend
the petitioners
HELD:
Premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
94. (PAR. 4) US v. Pons, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)
FACTS: Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. the
customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine
actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was
not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his
witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special
session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act
2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
95. Casco Phil Commercial Co. v. Giminez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, on July 1, 1959, imposed a 25% uniform margin
fee for foreign transactions and issued a memorandum declaring the “exemptions” of charging.
Petitioner Casco Philippine Commercial Co., manufacturer of synthetic resin glues, in
November and December 1959 paid a sum of P33,765.42 for the margin fee of the imported
urea and formaldehyde. Upon Resolution No. 1529, the petitioner asked for a refund of the
amount. The Central Bank refused to grant the reimbursement and said that what was
exempted was urea
Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempted from payment.
Held: No. Because urea and formaldehyde are raw materials for glues and urea formalhyde is
a
synthetic resin.
96. Astorga vs. Villegas 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator
Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The
House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding
officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and
57
thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and
the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued
that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s
due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the
court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The
Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal
is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may
resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that
substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been
duly enacted and did not become a law.”
97. Philippines Judges Association vs. Prado
G.R. No.105371, November 11,1993
FACTS:
THE PHILIPPINES JUDGE ASSOCIATION, President , BERNANDO P ABISAMIS
NATIONAL CONFIDERATION OF THE JUDGES OF THE PHILIPPINES ,petitioner vs.
HONORABLE PETE PRADO Secretary of DOTC, respondent. Petitioners assailed that
statute violates Article VI section26 of the constitution with the presumption the Bill have not
undergone a careful study among the legislature and executive branch. The most serious
challenging of petition of RA 7354 specifically sec 35 violates the EQUAL PROTECTECTION
CLAUSE of the constitution Article III section I
However, respondent assert we are complying the contention of the petitioner as far as the
procedure of deliberation is concern. Accordingly requiring every end and means necessary for
the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to express in its Title could not only
be unreasonable but would actually renders legislation impossible
ISSUES:
Whether the R.A. 7354 specifically SECTION 35 repealing clause violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
DECISION:
The petition partially GRANTED and SECTION 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE privilege shall be RESTORED.
Temporarily restraining order dated June 02, 1992 is made permanent. SO ORDERED
98. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 Mangaliman,
Aileen P.
Facts:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al.,
insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on
provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one
hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the
sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in
agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-
consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that
the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the
absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because “a House provision
cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.”
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the
58
Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They
submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the
occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark
necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory
privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.
Issue:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?
Held:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary
of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and
collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid
out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right,
and a VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory
privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation
of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative
policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the
means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long
as it is within constitutional bounds.
The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.
99_PIMENTEL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, 644 SCRA 741
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings
on the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 706. It was on the ground that the rules adopted by the Senate Committee of
the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar
is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI Sec.16(2) of the Constitution.
HELD:
No. The referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In
the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of Ethics
Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. And as Section 16(3), Article
59
VI of the Philippine Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings.”
SECTION 17. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
100. Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63PHIL134 1936
FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members
of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial
board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of National Assembly and on Nov.
15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
ISSUE: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over Electoral Commission and the subject of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD: Yes, the Electoral Commission has just acted within its legitimate exercise of its
constitutional Prerogative. Therefore the petition for a writ of probation against the electoral
commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.
101. Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil 192)
August 31, 1946
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero, petitioners
Jose A. Avelino et al., respondents
Facts:
On May 25, 1946, a pendum resolution was submitted ordering the following candidates: Jose
O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero to their seats as members of chamber.
Furthermore, they should not swear into office for their success on the elections was proposed
to be invalid. The resolution was passed by their constituents who questioned the validity of
the votes they garnered.
It was reported that during the National Elections, provinces Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac
and Bulacan was under terrorism. Moreover, the election returns of the said provinces were
null or void for they believe that the great majority of voters were coerced or intimidated
suffered from the paralysis of judgment, the people were deprived of their right to suffrage.
The ballot boxes from Nueva Ecija were stolen by armed bands in the barrios of municipalities
of Bongabon, Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba.
Many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their home
towns to avoid being victimized or losing their lives. Moreover, bodies were found with notes
attached to their necks “Bumoto kami kay Roxas” after the election.
Issues:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the powers to intervene with the petition
Whether or not the petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Vera should be
deferred to seat as members of the chamber
Held:
No. The Supreme Court refused to intervene with the petition. According to the constitution,
there should be separation of powers with the three branches namely: the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary. Each is independent from each other and each has specific roles
to perform. The role of judiciary is to foresee that the laws are properly delivered to the society
and that these laws are constitutional. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the case was
not a contest and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be
admitted to its membership.
Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for as mentioned above, the legislative has the
power to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Also, no man or group of men be
permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and
contrary to the principle of freedom of choice.
60

102. CHAVEZ Vs. COMELEC 211 SCRA 315
Francisco I. Chavez v Commission on Elections
http://bustaem.blogspot.com/2011/08/constitutional-law-case-digest.html
Facts:
This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the
24th highest senatorial candidate.
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was
received by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
disseminate through the fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor
Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all votes in favor of
Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function thus the
name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to
reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez”
votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Ruling:
It is quite obvious that petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors” in the
certificates of canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed,
petitioner has not even pointed to any “manifest error” in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires
to be rectified. There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the
constitution and the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members…” (Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the exclusivity of
the tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that
this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima
facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
103. Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400
FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly
registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution
HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a
resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52
years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was
also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as
the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his
domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of
petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency
61
required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.
Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.
104. FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 166 SCRA 377
Facts:This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively,
the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in
hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the
Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.
Issue:
WON the SET can function without the Senator members.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the
decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just
let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
105. Bondoc v. Pineda,201 SCRA 792 (1991)
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidate of
Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Who lost the elections held
on May 11, 1987. Filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices
of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution). Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. of LDP is one of the members in the
Tribunal, insisted on a re-appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts which
lead the petitioner to won over the respondent by 23 votes.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP be granted.
Held: Negative. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and
rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal was declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution.
And Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
judiciary enjoy security of tenure.
106. Robles v. HRET 181 SCRA 780 (1990)
FACTS:
The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. (Lazatin v.
House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780). The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election returns and qualifications of its members is beyond dispute.
ISSUES:
Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate of the
UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May
62
11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette
YniguesLerias". Her maiden name is Rosette Ynigues. Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the
administration candidate for the same position.During the canvass of votes for the
congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it
appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which had
been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the
candidates who received the two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with
34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes. In the provincial board's copy of the
certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while
Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the canvass,
Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a
winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of
the certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore,
cannot be used as basis of the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the
explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said
corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of
the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the nine
(9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.
HELD:
The decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner Rosette YniguezLerias is the duly elected
representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte.
107. Arroyo vs. HRET, Syjuco GR. No. 118597 July 14, 1995
Facts
Congressional candidate private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., filed an election protest
before public respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) five days after
the Makati board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker P. Arroyo the duly elected
congressman for the lone district of Makati in the May 11, 1992 national and local elections.
Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of ballots then resulted to declaring Protestant
Augusto l. Syjuco, jr. as the duly elected Representative, Lone District of Makati. Tasked by
public respondent HRET to investigate on the matter, now retired Supreme Court Justice
Emilio Gancayco confirmed the irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET
officials and personnel, they found out that Arroyo votes were consistently reduced at the
revision and the deducted votes were found and included in the stray ballots, while Syjuco was
always constant and “there were instances where ballots were deducted from the protestee
(Arroyo)” and that “another modus operandi is to falsify the revision reports by intercalation,
false entries or simply switching of true results of the counting.
Issue
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Supreme Court can intervene the creation of the Electoral Tribunal.
Held
Yes, the Supreme Court can intervene, Section 17, Art VI. The Supreme Court granted Makati
Cong. Joker Arroyo’s petition to declare that public respondent HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it proceeded to decide in favor of his rival
Augusto Syjuco, Jr.’s election protest based on the latter’s “precinct level document based
anomalies/evidence” theory. On this basis, the Supreme Court has invalidated a final vote tally
made by the Electoral Tribunal.
108. Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002
Facts:
Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary
injunction were filed before the court that the respondents be
ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the
composition of the HRET and CA to include part-list representatives
in accordance with the Party List System Act (RA 7941) and Sec 17 and
18, Art VI.
Having in mind that out of 220 members of the House, 14 of
which are party-list representatives (PLR), the petitioners put
63
forward that LP reps (having a total of 13 members) be ousted and be
replaced by PLR nominees.
Issue:
(I) Whether or not the present composition of HRET and CA
violates the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because no party-list representatives are members
thereof.
Held:
No. There has no violation.
The court dismissed the case on the following grounds:
(I) The present composition of the HRET and CA does not violate
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because:
a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to the House the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members will occupy the seats allotted to the House in HRET and
CA. And even if the PLR comprise the sufficient no. and have their
own nominees, their primary recourse would be the House (and not the
Supreme Court) in accordance with the doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction.
b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the case, thus failed
to meet the requirements set forth for judicial review. The
petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats in HRET and CA and
neither were they nominees to take the seat.
109. AGGABAO vs. COMELEC No. 163756 Jan 26, 2005
Facts:
The petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao is a candidate for Congressional for the 4 th District
of Isabela and respondent Anthony Miranda is a rival for the same during the May 10, 2004
elections. Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds – 1.
Tampered 2. Prepared under duress 3. Deffered from other authentic copies and 4. Contained
manifest errors. Petitioner objected that the ground raise by latter are for pre-proclamation
controversy which is not allowed in election for the member of House of Representatives. May
22, 2004. The Provicial Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded the contested COCVs and used
instead the 4th and &th copies of the COCVs and Base on result Miranda garnered the highest
number of votes for congressman. Aggabao asserted that PBC acted without jurisdiction,
hence he filed petition assailing Resolution No.7233 claimed COMELEC En Banc acted
without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation considering that the Second
Division has not yet resolved the appeal.
Issue:
WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies [ NO]
Held:
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec.17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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110. Limkaichong v. COMELEC, GR No. 17883
FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her
rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong.
Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was
born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by
virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. . About 2 days after the counting of votes,
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This
is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed
Paras’ petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no
longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise
jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
111. BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No: 177508 August 7, 2009
FACTS:
The Congress passed a bill and signed into law as RA 9369 less than four months before the
May 14, 2007 local elections.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner filed a petition alleging that RA 9369 violated Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution, assailing among others the constitutionality of the provisions contained in
Sec. 37.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 37 of RA 9369 violates Sec. 17, Art.VI, of the Constitution.
HELD:
No, it does not violate Sec. 17, Art. VI, of the constitution. The Congress and COMELEC en
banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET (Presidential Electoral Tribunal) and
SET ( Senate Electoral Tribunal), since the powers are exercised in different occasion and for
different purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not 112. Drilon, et al v. Speaker
COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter. GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009
Petitioner: Franklin Drilon et al
HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered Respondent: Jose de Venecia et al
its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the GR No. 183055, July 31, 2009
COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated Petitioner: Sen. Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal
directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively Respondents: Sen. Manuel Villar et al
suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid Facts:
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the
Procedure provides: Commission on Appointments. The petitioner went to respondent then Speaker Jose de
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, Venecia to ask for one seat for Liberal Party in the CA. Because the LP was not represented in
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation the CA, it spawned the filing for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
decision, resolution, order and ruling.
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Issue:
Whether the House of Representatives’ respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in constituting the Commission on Appointments in
contravention of the required proportional constitution by depriving Liberal Party of its
constitutional entitlement to one seat in the CA.
Held:
The first petition GR No.180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a
Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is
withdrawn.
As for the second petition GR no. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she
sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege
that her party was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP Laban possesses personal
and substantial interest to confer on he/ it locus standi.
The constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Thus, even assuming that party list representative comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not of this Court.
113. Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004 July26, 200
FACT: Guillermo Ruiz sough to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of
Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. On may 8, 1998, Farinas filed his Certificate
of Candidacy substituting Chevylle Farinas who widrew on April 3, 1998, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed
winner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the determination of the validity of certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HOUSE OF Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC’s decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction.
114. Garcia v. HRET, GR No. 134792, August 12, 1999
FACTS
On May 29, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against private respondent. The petition attacked
the ineligibility of private respondent to hold office as Member of the House of Representatives,
not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly
paid the required filing fee. On June 10, 1998, the HRET dismissed the petition for failure to
pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. Thereafter, petitioners rectified their
inadvertence and paid the cash deposit on June 26, 1998, at the same time seeking a
reconsideration of the dismissal. The HRET, however, denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUES
whether or not HRET can take cognizance of the petition, and
whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and in refusing to reinstate the same even after payment of the
required cash deposit.
HELD
Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar the Supreme
Court from entertaining petitions which charge HRET with grave abuse of discretion. That the
Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the complained act of the HRET has been
made with grave abuse of discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner
in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit
with the Tribunal. The cash deposit required in quo warranto cases must be paid together with
the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. In the case at bar, petitioners paid the required
66
cash deposit after the dismissal of the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-
eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and
certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET, which is clearly authorized
under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and
legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. Therefore,
the Court found that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules
strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition
for certioraricannot prosper.
115. LAZATIN V. HRET, GR No. 84297, December 8, 1988
FACTS: Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections)
COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and
discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge
of all election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition
had become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already
become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT
of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course because the
proclamation was valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to
proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in
effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A
Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was
illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without
waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin
himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to
the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner
of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as
such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation
(which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in
connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a
matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral
Tribunal.
SECTION 18. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
116. Daza vs Singson 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
Facts:
Daza was removed from the Commission on Appoinments and assumed by Singson On
December 5, 1988, after the chamber elected a new set of representatives.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s removal is unconstitutional.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated
January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as
a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body
pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
117. COSETENG VS MITRA 187SCRA 377
Facts: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives
under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission
on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to
the CA and later on, added RoqueAblan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the
Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party,
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prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in DazavsSingson in that the
and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP). Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other
Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare government branches.
the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the
theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation 118. Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992); MR 219 SCRA 326 (1993)
because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated FACTS:
and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of As the result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed of the
the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority. following members or Senators representing the respective political affiliations:
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence LDP - 15 senators
outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” NPC - 5 senators
clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since LAKAS-NUCD - 3 senators
KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority. LP-PDP-LABAN - 1 senator

Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political
question but because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional
representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the
House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats
in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a
member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an
opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership
and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and
elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected
by the House.
The Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides for the creation of a
Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its membership, as follows:
Section 18
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve senators and twelve members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
members.
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follows:
No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats
Total No. of senators elected
The resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional representation of
each political party with elected representatives in the Senate is:
Political party/
political coalition membership proportional representatives
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 LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
At the organization meeting of the Senate held on Aug 27, 1992, Senator Alberto Romulo in his
capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators
for membership in the Commission on Appointments. The nomination of the eight (8) senator
was objected to by Petitioner, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, as Minority Floor Leader, and
Senator John Osmeña, in representation of the NPC.
To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that the
senate elect 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eight (8) coming from LDP, two
coming from NPC, one from LAKAS-NUCD, one coming from the Liberal Party. The election of
Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of
LAKAS-NUCD and the NPC.
On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, in his behalf and in behalf of LAKAS-
NUCD, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate
President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from
recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eight Senator elected by the
LDP, and Wigberto E. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the
Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator
Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation.
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional representation of the various political
parties with elected senators in the Senate, each of these political parties is entitled to a
traditional membership in the Commission on Appointments. Each political party has a claim to
an extra half seat. The problem is what to do with the fraction of 0.5 to which each of the
parties is entitled.
ISSUES:
Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
if said membership of the respondent senators in the Commission is violative of
theConstitutional provision, did the respondent Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in
electing the respondent senators?
If there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent senate, acting through the LDP majority,
should a writ of prohibition enjoining prohibiting and restraining the respondent senators from
sitting as members of and participating in the proceedings of the Commission on Appointments
be issued?
HELD:
The Supreme Court declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto
Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in violation
of the rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the
said respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist from assuming, occupying
and discharging the functions of members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering
the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of
the Commission on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the membership of the
respondent senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as
members of said commission.
119. Drilon, et. al v Speaker
G.R. No. 180055. July 31, 2009.
Facts:
In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective
contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA).
In the second week of August 2007, petitioners went to respondent then Speaker Jose
de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia
merely said that he would study their demand.
During the session of the House of Representatives on September 3, 2007, petitioner
in the first petition, Representative Tañada, requested from the House of Representatives
leadership one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party.To his request,Representative Neptali
Gonzales II begged the indulgence of the Liberal Party “to allow the Legal Department to make
a study on the matter.”
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 Representative Tañada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA
to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section 18, Article
VI of the Constitution.Representative Tañada also brought the matter to the attention of then
Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the position that since there were at least 20 members of the
Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, the party should be represented in the CA.(FACTS FOR
SECTION 18)
Issue:
Whether the Liberal Party with at least twenty (20) members who signed herein as
petitioners, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the Commission on Appointments.
Whether the House of Representatives’ respondents have committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction constituting to the Commission on
Appointments in contravention of the required proportional constitution by depriving the Liberal
Party its constitutional entitlement to one (1) seat therein.
Ruling:
The Honorable Court ruled, “The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in
the HRET and the CA”.(ruling for section 18 also)Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s
respective electoral tribunal.
The Liberal Party does not possess the requisite number of members that would
entitle the party to a seat in the Commission on Appointments. It is, therefore, not the proper
party to institute the instant petition for quo warranto.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives
seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant
case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is premature.
The acts complained of do not constitute grave abuse of discretion that will justify the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Honorable Court and the grant of the extraordinary writs of
mandamus and prohibition.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. (RULING
FOR SEC.18)
SECTION 21. INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
120. JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Regine Marie S. Gonzales
Facts: Petitioner and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
to appear and testify on “what they know” regarding the “sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez”.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is done in aid of
legislation.
Held: No. it appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent committee is not
really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out WON the relatives of the President or
Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
121. Standard Charter Bank v. Senate
G.R No. 167173, December 27, 2007
Facts:
Standard chartered bank Philippines is engages in banking, trust, and other related operations
in the Philippines. Responden senate committee on banks, financial institutions and
currencies, on the other handm is one of the committees of the senate of the Philippines.
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Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent committee, on his privilege
speech accused SCB of violating the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) for selling
unregistered foreing securities. This had led the senate, through respondent committee, to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation. Petitioner SCB refused to attend the investigation
proceedings on the ground that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same
issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation attended by some who were
invited as resource persons. Meanwhile, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to
those who did not attend the hearing and requested an HDO against them.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the
hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention
of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make
disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in
Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding
the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
Issues:
Did the committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Did it violate petitioners’ right against self-incrimination and right to privacy?
Ruling:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to
state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a
legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,[14] we have held that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is
not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational
basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,[15] there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose,
in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state
that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.
As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not
being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent
merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry.
122. ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the
witnesses called to examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of
the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions
in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who
refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of
the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness’ right to due process of law.
123. Sabio vs. Gordon 504 SCRA 704
FACTS:
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Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted
by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it
means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power
to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting
such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II,
Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
124. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon
Facts: The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of the AFP-RSBS.
72
Issue: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has the authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation on the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the funds of AFP-
RSBS.
Held: YES. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on the respondent
Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged
misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution.
Point: The Senate or House of Representatives or any of its Committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published roles of procedure (Section 21 Article
VI
125. SENATE vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for other
Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the
exercise of its legislative power, the Senate, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of the legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of
officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the AFP, and the PNP.
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials in the Executive
Department for them to appear as resources speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and
the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the president as
provided in E.O. 464, Section 3 in which requires all public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either in the House of
Congress.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2 (b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either in the House of Congress, valid and constitutional?
HELD: NO. Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity be kept confidential in pursuit of public interest. The privilege being by definitions is
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore, and why it must
be respected.
The provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering
its reason therefor. By mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
126. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
G.R. # 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees
and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
(the “NBN Project”), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications (“DOTC”) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”). Petitioner
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated
that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
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President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions
on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these
three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On
November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees
and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the (3) three questions sought by the herein respondent
Senate Committee to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
The communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of
the President, such as the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. The
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo’s cabinet. And there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
127. Case of Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations.
Facts: On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven
(11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin
Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions.
Issues: is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal
system?
Held: YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution.
- The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted
by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case.
- In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec
privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China,
which was the subject of the 3 questions asked.
- If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked
by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption
dictates that the same be recognized.
128. VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007
election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano,
COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable
outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played
during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition
was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was
in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that
the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic
reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make
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such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to
further proceed with their investigation.
Held: The respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution,
use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
Point: Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for
the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the
Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law.
129. Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative v Sangguniang Panglungsod, 155 SCRA 421
( 1991)
Facts:
In 1985, the SP of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of
NORECO II – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the
improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively
with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the Charter of the City of
Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (LGC – BP 337) grants the SP. The SP
averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power
to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in
inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD:
There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-
members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these
powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of
non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena
power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow
local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express
statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no
provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory
process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to
punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said
legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming
that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order
complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power
(and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject
matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
SECTION 24. BILLS ORIGINATING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
130. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)
Facts : The Value Added Tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange goods
and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT System and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code the bill was approved by the House of Representatives as
House Bill No. 11197 last Nov. 17, 1993 and was sent to the Senate on Nov. 23, 1993.and
approved on Feb. 7, 1994 as Senate Bill No. 1630. The House Bill 11197 and its Senate
version 1630 were then referred to a Conference Committee which after meeting four times,
recommended that H. Bill No. 11197 Senate Bill No. 1630 be approved. The Conference
Committee Bill, entitled “An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System, widening its
tax base and enhancing its administration and for these purposes amending and repealing the
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relevant provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended and for other
purposes, which was then presented to the President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. The
petitioners contested that by enacting the RA No. 7716, or the Expanded value Added Tax
Law, Congress violated the Constitution particularly Sec. 24 of Art. VI. Which states that All
Appropriation, Revenue or Tariff Bills, Bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments. And the very essence of the House Bill No. 11197
was completely erased due to these enactment.
Issue : Whether or not RA No. 7716 violate Art. VI Sec. 24 of the Constitution?
Held : Negative. The court said that the “exclusively” means simply that the House
alone can initiate the passage of a revenue bill, such that if the House does not initiate one, no
revenue law will be passed, but once it passed the Senate can completely overhaul it and
come up with one completely different from what the House approved. Hence, only the “bill”
which must exclusively originate from the House; but the “Law” itself is the product of the total
bicameral legislative process which originates from both the Senate and the House.
131. Alvarez v. Guingona – G.R. No. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695
Facts:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House
of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed
in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. Later on it was
signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720.
Issue:
Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
Held:
Yes. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
132. Guingona versus Carague
Facts
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known
as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
President Marcos previously established P.D. No. 81, P.D. 1177s, and P.D. No. 1967, which
authorizes the automatic appropriation of funds for foreign debt services. Petitioners argue that
the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos
became functusoficio when he was ousted in February, 1986, and that there is a need for a
new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the
present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it
cannot be enforced.Thepetitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No.
81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177s, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Assumingthat P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of
President Marcos after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners contend that the said
decrees are inoperative under“Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”, because bills have to be approved by the
76
President,then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. It
is also the contention by the petitioners that the PDs were unconstitutional because they were
not definite and exact in the appropriations.
Issues
Whether or not PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 are still operative under the
constitution.
Whether or not the PD are unconstitutional because bills must originate from the house of
representative to be valid and enforceable.
Whether or not PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 are constitutional even without
stating the definite and exact amount for appropriation.
Held
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with
the duty to implement the same. The petition for unconstitutionality is dismissed.
The existing presidential decrees were “law” which remain in force and effect unless they are
inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. The
presidential decrees were not “bills” as expressed under sec.24, Art VI of the constitution,
which is still subject for approval.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, no
uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown
by the books of the Treasury.
SECTION 25. LIMITS ON POWER TO APPROPRIATE
133. (Par.2) Garcia v. Mata 65 SCRA (1975)
Facts: Petitioner-Appellant Euserbio Garcia filed a petition for certiorari assailing Court's
decision to declare Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP of the Republic Act
1600, which states that reserve officers with at least ten years of active service should not be
reversed to inactive status, as unconstitutional and invalid after said Petitioner-Appellant, a
reserve officer of the AFP who was reversed to inactive status, filed a Mandamus and
Recovery of a Sum of Money on the basis of this above-mentioned provision.
Issues: Whether or not the Court's decision to declare Paragraph 11 of the Special
Provisions for the AFP of RA 1600 as unconstitutional and invalid was right?
Held: Yes. Paragraph 11 of said Provision violates Article 6, Sec. 21, Par. 1 of the 1935
Constitution which states that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement
nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not
fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected
with that subject.
Point: That a reinstatement and emoluments can only be granted to reserve officials who were
reversed to inactive status and had more than ten years of service in the AFP.
134. Demetria v Alba
FACTS:
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the BatasanPambansasought to prohibit Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that “The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.” Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it
violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 25[5], Article VI. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
77
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 25[5].
It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings
in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of
savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law
in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
135. DPWH v. Quiwa GR No. 183444, October 12, 2011
Facts:
After the Mt. Pinatubo tragedy in 1991, DPWH engaged a number of contractors, including
respondent Quiwa and others, for the urgent rehabilitation of the affected river systems. Save
for Chiara Construction and Ardy Construction, respectively owned by Efren N. Rigor and
Romeo R. Dimatulac, the contractors signed written agreements with Engineer Philip Meñez,
Project Manager II of the DPWH.
It is undisputed that the contractors have completed their assigned rehabilitation works.But
DPWH refused to pay the contractors for the reason that the contracts were invalid due to non-
compliance with legal requirements. As such, respondents filed an action for a sum of money
against DPWH. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, in Civil Case No. 96-77180, held
that the contracts were valid and thus directed payment of compensation to the contractors.
DPWH appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which like the RTC, ruled that the respondents
are entitled to their claim of compensation.
Petitioner appealed by certiorari before this Court. In the questioned 12 October 2011
Decision, the Court primarily affirmed the trial and the appellate courts’ judgments in favour of
respondents’ entitlement to compensation against petitioner DPWH.
On 10 November 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration assailing the
aforementioned decision.
Petitioner’s main contention is that respondents did not come to court with clean hands to
assert their money claims against petitioner in view of their failure to comply with the legal
requirements concerning government contracts and in ascertaining the extent of authority of
the public official with whom they contracted. These omissions made the contracts void ab
initio and, as a consequence, petitioner should not be made to suffer by paying respondents
huge sums of money arising from void contracts.
Issues:
Whether or not the contract entered into is valid
Whether or not the contractors are entitled to compensation
Held:
The contract is invalid because it is not written. But even with the respondents’
supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the contract and the authority of the public official
involved in the construction agreements, there is no such confusion as to the matter of the
contract’s validity and the equivalent compensation. As found by the court a quo, petitioner had
assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work that they would do. It has also
been settled in several cases that payment for services done on account of the government,
but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided.The government is unjustified in denying what
it owes to contractors and in leaving them uncompensated after it has benefitted from the
already completed work. Jurisprudence recognizes the principle of quantum meruit.
Accordingly, in the interest of substantial justice, the contractor’s entitlement to compensation
has been and is hereby directed.
136. (par. 5) Philconsa v. Enriquez235 SCRA 506 (1994)
Facts:
Republic Act No. 7180 known as the General Appropriations Act of 1992 provides an
appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside the amount of P75,000,000.00 for the
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DILG's Capability Building Program and also the creation of the task force to design programs,
strategize and prepare modules for an effective program for local autonomy. The proposal was
accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Sarino, who
issued a memorandum for the transfer and remittance to the Office of the President the sum of
P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task force. With an additional cash advance of
as he requested.
It has Two (2) cash advances both in the amount of P300,000.00 were withdrawn from the
Fund by the DILG and transferred to the Cashier of the Office of the President. In the
disbursement voucher states that the transfer of funds was made "to the Office of the President
for Ad-Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy.
The transferring of fund from DILG to the Office of the President to defray salaries of
personnel, office supplies, foods and meals, rentals of an Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency
Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy taken from the Capability Building Program Fund.
Issue:
Whether or not there is legal basis to transfer funds DILG to the office of the president on the
capability building program appropriated in general appropriation act.
Held:
The transfer of funds from the DILG to the Office of the President has no legal basis and that
COA's disallowance of the transfer is valid. The creation of a task force IS to implement local
autonomy. Under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution authorizes the transfer of funds within
the OP if made by the President for purposes of augmenting an item in the Office of the
President. In this case, it was not the President but the Deputy Executive Secretary who
caused the transfers and the latter was not shown to have been authorized by the President to
do so. The COA, in its Memorandum reiterates its position that there is no legal basis for the
transfers in question because the Fund was meant to be implemented by the Local
Government. Transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution may be made only
by the persons mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being already a
delegated authority. Funds transferred must come only from savings of the office in other items
of its appropriation and must be used for other items in the appropriation of the same office.
Point: The Supreme Court ruled that the Congress acted within its power.
137. (par. 5) Sanchez V. COA, 552 SCRA 471
Fact: In 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7180 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act
of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside the
amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability Building Program. The stated purpose for
the creation of the task force was to design programs, strategize and prepare modules for an
effective program for local autonomy. The est. expenses for its operation was P2,388,000.00
for a period of 6 months beginning on Dec. 1,1991 up to 31 May 1992 unless the above ceiling
is sooner expended and/or the project is earlier pre-terminated. The proposal was accepted by
the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino,one of
the petitioners herein, who consequently issued a memorandum for the transfer and remittance
to the Office of the President of the sum of P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the
task force. An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested. Two cash advances
both in the amount of P300,000.00 were withdrawn from the Fund by the DILG and transferred
to the Cashier of the Office of the President. The "Particulars of Payment" column of the
disbursement voucher states that the transfer of funds was made "to the Office of the President
for Ad-Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy. The
transfer of fund from DILG to the Office of the President to defray salaries of personnel, office
supplies, office rentals, foods and meals, etc. of an Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency
Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy taken from the Capability Building Program Fund is
violative of the Special Provisions of R.A. 7180. A Notice of Disallowance dated 29 March 1993
was then sent to Mr. Sarino,et al.holding the latter jointly and severally liable for the amount
and directing them to immediately settle the disallowance.
Issue: Whether the questioned disallowance of the commission on Audit is Valid.
Held: Yes, it is an violation of Section 25(5) of Article VI, transfer of fund under the constitution
may be made by persons mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being already
a delegated authority. The fund transfer must come from savings of the office in other items of
its appropriation and must be used for other items in the appropriation of the same office.
SECTION 26. SUBJECT AND TITLE OF BILLS; THREE READINGS
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138. (par. 1) Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962)
Facts:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this act
expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of
Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain
Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section 19of the amendatory act says that mediation of
tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that
indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.
Issue:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional
provision that “No bill which may been acted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
Held:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long
the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional
provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed
as to cripple or impede proper legislation

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139. (par.1) Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965)
Facts:
PHILCONSA assails the validity of RA 3836 in so far as the same allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and representatives, and to
the elective officials of both houses (of Congress). The provisions on retirement gratuity is an
attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Art. VI Sec. 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes”selfish class legislation”.
The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
“forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Sec. 14 of Art.VI of the Philippine Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional?
Held:
Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads: The Senators and the
members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and
other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their
places of residence. In the case of Senators’, when attending sessions of the congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the house of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos”.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and
members of the house of representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said act, which
was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available there under, without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the senate and the house o0f
representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition
in Art.VI,Section 14 of the constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional.
140. (Para 1) Insular Lumber Company v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710 (1981)
FACTS:
Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire.
The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest
concession. In 1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a
partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964
ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19, 921.37
pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered
by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence,
in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA
ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the
refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires
cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19, 921.37 claimed, only the
amount of P14, 598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14, 598.08 because the ILC’s right to claim the refund of a portion
thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had
already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10, 560.20 only. Both parties
appealed from the decision of the CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this
way. The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide Means for Increasing the Highway Special
Fund.” The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of
miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for
refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5
provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL.
HELD:
The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway
Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The
proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said
proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general
81
subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for
in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on
precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which
passed it.
141. (par.1) Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
G.R No. 105371. November 11, 1993
Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No.7354. These measures
withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The
petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will
be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7354
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A No. 7354 which withdrew
the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect its purposes.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7354 violates the Constitution based on the ground that its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes.
Held: Based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution, “Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining
its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith.”
The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an
index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar,
the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect
and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required
to be briefly expressed in its title.
142. Alalayanvs National Power Corporation GR No. L-24396 24 SCRA 172 (1968)
FACTS : Petitioner Santiago P. Alalayan et.al assails the National Power Corporation in
enforcing Republic Act 3043, which has Section 2A in the increasing of Capital Stock, and
Section 3 in supplying electric power to a franchise holder, and declaring such article
unconstitutional.
ISSUES : Whether or not Article 3043 as amended violated the constitution on Article VI
Section 26 regarding the use of only one subject in a title.
HELD : No. The rule on embracing only one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
statute should be more liberal or practical rather than technical construction, as long as the it
informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them
to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators."
143. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD (151 SCRA 208)
FACTS:
Tio filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise
the videogram industry on the following grounds: (1) Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax
82
of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not
germane to the subject matter thereof; (2) The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive
and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
(3) There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the Presiden tof the vast powers
conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6; (4) There is undue delegation of power and
authority; and (5) There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it
is not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Decree Bo. 1987 is constitutional.
HELD:
(1)Section 10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The express purpose of the decree to
include taxation of the video industry is to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution
of videograms and is therefore not arider.
(2)A tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitelydeters the activities taxed.
The tax imposed by the decree is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted
by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum
have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of
revenue.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need
for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the decree to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.(3)The 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that
grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national
economic recovery program necessitated boldemergency measures to be adopted with
dispatch.(4)The grant in Section 11 of the decree of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the
direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.
(5)
Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying
objective of the decree is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that
public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by
rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films
with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in
theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are
required to engage in business. Therefore, the decree in question is constitutional
144. (par.2) Tolentino Vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 106 (1994)
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that
S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
83
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not
the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

84
145. ROBERT V. TOBIAS, vs. Abalos
G.R. No. 114783 December 8, 1994
239 SCRA 106
Nature of the case:
petition to render RA No. 7675 unconstitutional
Petitioner:
Robert Tobias Ramon Guzman, Terry Lim, Gregorio Gabriel and Roberto R.Tobias,
Jr.
Respondents:
Hon City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, City Treasurer William Marcelino and
theSangguniang Panlungsod, all of the city of Mandaluyong
Facts:
As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.7
675 otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a HighlyUrbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the
enactment of the
statute,M a n d a l u y o n g a n d S a n J u a n b e l o n g e d t o o n e l e g i s l a t i v e d
i s t r i c t . H o n C o n g r e s s i o n a l representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsore
d the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramosbecoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held
on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscitewas only 14.41% of the voting population: 18,
621 voted “yes” while 7,911 voted “no”. Thus, RA7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Issue:
1)
RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for being violative of three
specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that it contravenes
the“one-subject-one bill” rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of the Constitution (everybill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed inthe
title thereof.) this section embraces two principal subjects 1) the conversion
of M a n d a l u y o n g i n t o a H U C a n d 2 ) t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s
t r i c t o f S a n Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.2)Second and third objection
involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the COnsti. Petitionersargue that division of San
Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districtshas resulted in increase in the
composition of the House of representatives and that itpreempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislatives districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).
Held:
Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.
Ratio:
1)The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluy
o n g i s n o t a s u b j e c t separate and distinct from the subject of conversion
into a HUC but is a natural andlogical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. A liberal
construction of the “one title-one subject” rule, it should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. Itshould be sufficient compliance with such requirement is the title
expresses the generalsubject and all the provisions germane to that general subject
2) Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than
250thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative proviso
inthe constitution—the said Act enjoys the presumption of having
Passed through the r e g u l a r c o n g r e s s i o n a l p r o c e s s e s i n c l u d i n g
d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n b y t h e m e m b e r s o f Congress of the minimum requireme
nts for the establishment of separate legislativedistricts.3 ) T h e p r e s e n t l i m i t
of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase “unless otherwisep
rovided by law” indicates that composition of Congress may be increased if
Congressi t s e l f s o m a n d a t e s t h r o u g h a l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t —
t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s e i s n o t unconstitutional
4) Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law- Congress
cannotpossibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (reapportioning of
legislativedistricts5)The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into ahighly urbanized city—the inhabitants of san juan were properly excluded
from the saidplebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of mandaluyong6)On the issue
of GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative districts to favor
aparticular candidate or party)—rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law is the
incumbentrepresentative of the former San Juan/mandaluyong district-by dividing the district
hisconstituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to him
146. BANAT v. COMELEC
G.R. 177508August 7, 2009
85

FACTS
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) partylist petitioned in Court for the
constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352.Petitioner also assailed the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of the said Republic Act and alleged that they were of questionable
application and their validity was doubtful. Petitioner raised the issue whether RA 9369, RA 7166 as amended,
being a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution which states that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." BANAT also questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated
Section17 or Article VI of the Constitution which specifies that the Senate and the House of Representatives
should each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and qualification
contests relating to its Members.
Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections
34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject matter of RA 9369.
ISSUE: Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI?
HELD: No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must
show that there is a clear anunequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Section 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained that the amendments
introduced by Section 37 pertained only to the adoption and application of the procedures on the pre-proclamation
controversies. It did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "enbanc" may entertain pre-proclamation cases for
national elective posts.
147. ABAS KIDA, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011
FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with
the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was enacted. The law reset the
ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every
three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
HELD: NO, the court held that the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when
the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court,
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:
“The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed in its proper context – is
a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one
that is reasonable as well under the circumstances. We find that Congress, in passing RA No.
10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within
due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any
evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord
merit to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.
86
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the
established rule that every statute is presumed valid. Congress, thus, has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute
has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. Any reasonable doubt about the validity of
the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Given the failure of the petitioners to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the
validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13,
2011. No costs.
SECTION 27. PASSAGE OF BILLS; ITEM VETO
148. CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329 [ G.R. No. L-47421, May 14, 1990
Facts:
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf course and
operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests
claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the
last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law".
By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as
operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of
foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970
in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be without
basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.
CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed
but merely the words "hotel, motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the
development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.
Issue:
Does the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax
on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other
eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or
resthouses which refer to RA No. 6110 is valid and enforceable?
Held:
Yes. The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in
the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with
then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and
rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of
Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf
and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it.
149. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION V VALENCIA G.R. No. L-
20740 June 30, 1964
http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/bolinao-electronics-vs-valencia
11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television
(channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then
Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed
that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated
by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the
appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation
87
allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s
department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And
even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is
illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional,
it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
150. Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990)
Facts:
Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As
passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by
the President and on 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared
the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a
“General Provision,” were vetoed. On April 11, 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus
was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales, et.al as members and ex-officio members of the Committee
on Finance of the Senate praying for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order, assailing the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section
55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., et.al from implementing RA 6688 but no
Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et.al cause is anchored on
the grounds that the 1) President’s line veto power as regards to appropriation bill is limited to
item, 2). When the president objects to a provision of an appropriation bill she cannot exercise
the item veto power but should veto the entire bill (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it
the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25
[5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also
vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. The Solicitor
General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the case is a political
question beyond the power of the Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales et al. had a
political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a “rider” because it is
extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the President’s veto; that the power
of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already
been provided for in the Budget Law and that the President is empowered by the Constitution
to veto provisions or other “distinct and severable parts” of an Appropriations Bill.
Issue:
Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of an
Appropriations Bill
Held: No. The item veto power of the President shall apply to items and its specific particulars
and not provisions of policy on augmentation which is essentially a legislative function .
Art. VI, Sec 25 (2) dictates that provisions in General Appropriation Act must relate to specific
particulars and limited to the operation of such appropriation in an item. Sec. 55 and Sec. 16
are not provisions in the budgetary sense because they apply to all items disapproved and
reduced by congress in the bill. Also these supposed “items” are not found in the bill itself. Said
sections are policies on augmentation thus subject to a separate legislation.
151. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105, August 19 1994, 235 SCRA 506
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
88
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic Act No.
7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY
ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of
1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation
for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Section 25,
Article 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void the provision under
Article 16 of the Countrywide Development Fund and the veto of the President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
There were 16 members of the Senate who sought for the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Department of
Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions the constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services.
Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and
(2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for
the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and National Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the
Executive.
HELD:
The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity
of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to
which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury which can be questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of a claim that the
contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain
of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their
capacity as members of Congress.
152. Bengzon v Drilon 208 SCRA 133
FACTS:
On June 20, 1953 – RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions if justices of the
Supreme Court have rendered at least 20 years service either in the Judiciary or any other
branch of the Government .
Retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals ( Justices Manuel P. Barcelona,
Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes Jr and Guardson R. Lood who are currently receiving
monthly pensions under RA910 made an appeal for the readjustment of their monthly pension.
They filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in representation of all retired justices
of the SC and CA.
Respondents Hon Franklin Drilon, Exec Secretary as Secretary of Budget et al , were sued in
their official capacities being officials of the Executive Department in their involvement in the
implementation of the release if funds appropriated in the Annual Appropriations Law.
President Aquino however vetoed House Bill 16297 on July 11,1990 on the ground that it
would erode the very foundation of the Government’s collective effort to adhere faithfully on
the policy of the standardization of the compensation as articulated in RA 6758 known as
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
A petition was filed to review the constitutionality of the veto of the President of certain
provisions of the General appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year 1992.
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ISSUE:
Is the act of the President Aquino to veto a certain provision of the General Appropriation Acts
for the Fiscal Year 1992 constitutional?
RULING:
The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the
1992 Appropriation Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to
automatically and regularly release pursuant to the rant of fiscal autonomy the funds
appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations of the Judiciary.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the
government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
Petition was also granted.
153. LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446
April 24, 1985
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in
affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are
of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by
the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new
civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full
Held:
(1) The court held that all statue including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the laws. The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal
or modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of
the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with
prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon their
approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise
provided” pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.
SECTION 28. POWER OF TAXATION; LIMITATIONS; EXEMPTIONS
154. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co. Inc, 164
SCRA 27
Facts: The respondent taxpayer operates an electric power plant serving the adjoining municipalities of
Lingayen and Binmaley, both in the province of Pangasinan, pursuant to the municipal franchise
granted it by their respective municipal councils, under Resolution Nos. 14 and 25 of June 29 and July
2, 1946, respectively. BIR assessed against and demanded from the private respondent deficiency
franchise taxes and surcharges for the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on
gross receipts from March 1, 1948 to December 31, 1954 as prescribed in Section 259 of the National
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Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Respondent
submits that R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional insofar as it provides for the payment by the private
respondent of a franchise tax of 2% of its gross receipts, while other taxpayers similarly situated were
subject to the 5% franchise tax imposed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, thereby discriminatory and
violative of the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation. Court of tax Appeals ruled in favor of
respondent.
Issue: W/N section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and
equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution.
Held: Yes. The Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional. The said law is discriminatory and
violative of the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation insofar as it provides for the payment by the
private respondent of a franchise tax of 2% of its gross receipts, while other taxpayers similarly situated
were subject to the 5% franchise tax imposed in Section 259 of the Tax code.
A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is
found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike.
155. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the
House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA
7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete
the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means
Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that
what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of
SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only
the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent
with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come
from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version
rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice
of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere
matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt
his over what has been done
156. GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
211 SCRA 219July 3, 1992
FACTS: The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and
other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on
said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The
President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95per liter of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in
the nature of revenue-generating measures.
RULING: The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills
is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they
may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:“The
Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or
imposts…” The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.
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157. CIR v. Santos, GR No. 119252 (August 18, 1997)
FACTS:
Guild of Phil. Jewelers questioned the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that present Tariff and tax
structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive
against other countries., in support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be
an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in
comparison to tax rates levied in the country. Judge Santos of RTC Pasig, ruled that the laws
in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT
FORCE AND EFFECT insofar as petitioners are concerned. Petitioner CIR assailed decision
rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgment
upon the taxation policy of the government. Petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting
that there was no showing that the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of
the government.
RULING:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing
to the contrary. This is not to say that RTC has no power whatsoever to declare
unconstitutional. RTC have the power to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority
does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look
into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed according to the
provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence.
RULING ON THE EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO TAX
SC held that it is within the power of the legislature whether to tax jewelry or not. With the
legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent
(rate), coverage (subject) and situs (place) of taxation
158. Southern Cross V. Philippines Cement G.R No. 158540, July 8, 2004
Fact: Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (“Southern Cross”) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and
exportation. Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama
Corporation, purportedly the largest cement manufacturers in Japan.
Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (“Philcemcor”) is an
association of domestic cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members. While
Philcemcor heralds itself to be an association of domestic cement manufacturers, it appears
that considerable equity holdings, if not controlling interests in at least twelve (12) of its
member-corporations, were acquired by the three largest cement manufacturers in the world,
namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of France, Cemex S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and Holcim Ltd. of
Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere Glaris, Ltd., then Holderfin B.V.).
On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”) accepted an
application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased
quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales
and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought
the imposition at first of provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of
cement pursuant to the SMA. Philcemcor filed the application in behalf of twelve (12) of its
member-companies.
Issues: Whether or not the DTI Secretary is bound to adopt the negative recommendation of
the Tariff Commission on the application for safeguard measure?
Whether or not the DTI secretary has the jurisdiction to impose a general and definitive
safeguard measures on imports of gray Portland cement?
Held: Yes. The implication of the Court of Appeals’ holding is that the DTI Secretary may
adopt a definitive safeguard measure, notwithstanding a negative determination made by the
Tariff Commission. Section 5 plainly evinces legislative intent to restrict the DTI Secretary’s
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power to impose a general safeguard measure by preconditioning such imposition on a
positive determination by the Tariff Commission. Such legislative intent should be given full
force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a
delegated power¾the power of taxation, by nature and by command of the fundamental law,
being a preserve of the legislature.[98] Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
confirms the delegation of legislative power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress to
impose limitations and restrictions on the executive exercise of this power. Are hereby
restrained and prohibited from enforcing the decision dated April 5, 2002 of the Hon. Secretary
Manuel A. Roxas II of the Dept. of Trade & Industry in DTI SG No. 02-2001
Point: The delegation of power over taxation issues.
Provision: Section 28 of Art. VI
159. (par. 3) Abra Valley College, Incvs Aquino GR No. L-39086 162 SCRA 106 (1988)
FACTS : The petitioner Abra Valley College filed a complaint against the Municipal and
Provincial Treasurers to declare null and void “Notice of Seizure” and “Notice of Sale” of its lot
building used as a school from primary to college level, and same time used as residence by
the Director and his family, for the non-payment of taxes amounting to P 5,140.31.
ISSUES : Whether or not the building of the Abra Valley College which is used as a school and
a residence can be exempted to pay taxes.
HELD : No. The building is not used exclusively as an educational institution or school. Article
VI Section 28 paragraph 3 states, “Charitable institutions, churches and personages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”
160. LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City,donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, theparish priest of Victoria’s, Negros Occidental, and predecessorof Fr. Lladoc,
for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for
such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor'sgifttax return. Under date of April 29,
1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued anassessmentfor the donee'sgift tax against
the Catholic Parish of Victoria’s of which petitioner wasthe parish priest.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish
priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victoria’s did not have juridical
personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.
Held:
Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section22 (3) Article VI of the Constitution
contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property
taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes. The imposition of the gift tax on the property
used for religiouspurpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by
way of gift inter vivo.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the realparty in interest in the imposition of
the donee's tax on theproperty donated to the church for religious purpose
161.CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992
Facts:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
invalidate the proceedings and the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB for brevity) on September 4, 1989. The petitioner, the Central Mindanao
University (CMU for brevity), is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the
state and is located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started in early 1910 as a
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farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon. It was formed as a response to the clamor for an
agricultural school in Mindanao. It was transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay,
the provincial capital of Bukidnon, as it expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High
School. In the early 1960's, it was elevated into a college with campus at Musuan, eventually
becoming known as and is presently called the CMU.
In the year 1986, under the presidency of Dr. Chua, the CMU launched a self-help project
called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources,
mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training
in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement among the CMU, the CMU-
Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees,
the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year.
The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project
proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay
P100 as service fee to the CMU and P1,000 per hectare as the participant's land rental fee. In
addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-
IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of their family to
establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and to not use the allocated lot as
collateral for any loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would
exist as a result of the Agreement.
The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the
Court of Appeals, raised the following issues:
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of
Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
Held:
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically,
it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of
the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and
campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.
Also, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before since it
involves a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation
ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be
necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of
jurisdiction and has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case
at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to establish that the fact that the
DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now the subject of a review.
162. Commissioner v CA
Facts: Commission of Internal Revenue issued an assessment to YMCA including surcharge
and interest, for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding tax on wages.
Issue: Whether or not YMCA is exempted from taxes.
Held: YES. It was ruled therein that YMCA cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively
for religious purposes or an institution devoted exclusively for charitable purposes or an
institution devoted exclusively to educational purposes, but it can be truthfully said that it is an
institution used exclusively for all three purposes, and that, as such it is entitled to be
excempted from taxation.
163. JOHN HAY vs. VICTOR LIM
Facts: The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President
Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating
a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. In the present petition,
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature,
unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power
to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition
that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. Moreover, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should
be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the
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Court declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to
the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the Constitution. However, the entire assailed
proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant
to the law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar, may stand and be enforced.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition
Ruling: YES
Rationale: R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the
creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country. The grant by the law on local
government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting
a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities
nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners,
being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and
substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being
challenged. Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and
not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in
the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of
Baguio City. ... Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected
councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties
included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur with the
declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners
Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against
the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)supporting the issuance of the now
challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition
Point: The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are Exclusive only to the Subic SEZ (Special
Economic Zone). Hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support
therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the
other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant
before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
In the John Hay SEZ, there is a 288.1 more or less, of the total 677 hectares of land that will be
exempted from tax and duty free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and
national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.
164. SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE v. CALOOCAN CITY
G.R. No. 146382 August 7, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit educational
institution organized and established in 1997 with business address at 141-143 10th Avenue,
Caloocan City. As such, it enjoys property tax exemption from the local government on its
buildings but not on the parcels of land which petitioner is renting for P5,000 monthly from its
sister companies, Consolidated Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated Assembly) and Pair
Management and Development Corporation (Pair Management). On January 8, 1998,
petitioner requested respondent city government of Caloocan, through respondent Mamerto
Manahan, City Assessor and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to the parcels of land
claiming that the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution and other applicable
provisions of the Local Government Code. Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition
for mandamus with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, which,
however, dismissed it for being premature. Its timely motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court when it ruled: (1) that mandamus does not lie against the public
respondents and (2) that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Does a petition for mandamus is a clear legal right under the Constitution and the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code granting tax exemption on properties
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes?
HELD: NO. Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or
person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
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unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other
is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Where administrative remedies are available, a petition for mandamus does not lie.
Under Section 226 of RA 7160, the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal
assessor in the assessment of property, thus:
Section 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. -Any owner or person having legal interest
in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor
in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the
written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or
city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies
of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.
The authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the
courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies
against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the
courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated,
before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail
of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
Besides, mandamus does not lie against the respondent City Assessor in the exercise of his
function of assessing properties for taxation purposes. While its duty to conduct assessments
is a ministerial function, the actual exercise thereof is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is
the rule that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either. The
instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
165. LUNG CENTER VS. QUEZON CITY - GR 144104 June 29, 2004
Facts:
The lung center is a charitable institution within the context of 1973 and 1987 constitutions.
The elements considered in determining a charitable institution are: the statue creating the
enterprise; its corporate purposes; constitution and by-laws, methods of administration, nature
of actual work performed, character of the services rendered, indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries, and the use occupation of properties. As a gen. principle, a charitable institution
doe not lose its character as such and its exemption form taxes simply because it derives
income from paying patients, or receives subsidies from government; and no money insures to
the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.
Issue:
Whether or not the real properties of the lung center are exempt from real property taxes.
Held:
Partly No. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt
from actually, direct and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Under PD 1823, the lung
center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as
the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the property taxes only. This provision
was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real
properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the
portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes
while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
166. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. vs.
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
FACTS:
Philippine Planters Products (PPI) and Fertiphil Corp. are private corporations incorporated
under Philippine laws, which are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the
aforementioned LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market
to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which remitted the amount collected to the Far
East Bank and Trust Company, the depository bank of PPI. After the 1986 EDSA revolution,
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FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy, for which Fertiphil demanded PPI a
refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465. But then, PPI refused to give in to the
demand. With that, Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI
with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust and
unreasonable, and favoring one privately owned corporation, which is the PPI. RTC's decision
on November 20, 1991 favored Fertiphil and ordered the latter to pay a certain sum of the
previously collected amount with an interest, and some other fees.
ISSUE:
Is the P10 assessment on fertilizer sale a valid exercise of taxation?
HELD:
No. An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted on for
a public purpose and cannot be used for purely private purposes or for exclusive benefit of
private persons. The LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private
company. Thus, this already exceeded the limitation which taxes are supposed to be limited to,
inherently and naturally. Even if the levy was acted for the enforcement of police powers, it is
still unconstitutional because it did not promote public interest. Being void, Fertiphil is not
required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil
code principle against unjust enrichment: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern." The petition was denied.
SECTION 29. FISCAL POWERS OF CONGRESS; LIMITATIONS; SPECIAL FUNDS
167. PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 PHIL 331
FACTS:
In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This provides an amount of 85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension, and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual,
then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of law. He claimed that the appropriation was
actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of
San Antonio Subdivision, owned be Senator Zulueta who was a member of the senate who
passed and approved the RA 920.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appropriation is unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not
cure the constitutional defect.
POINT OF THE CASE:
The subsequent donation of the road did not validate the Law. It depends upon the powers of
Congress at the time of its approval.
168. Guingona versus Carague
Facts
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known
as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
President Marcos previously established P.D. No. 81, P.D. 1177s, and P.D. No. 1967, which
authorizes the automatic appropriation of funds for foreign debt services. Petitioners argue that
the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos
became functusoficio when he was ousted in February, 1986, and that there is a need for a
new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the
present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it
cannot be enforced.The petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No.
81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177s, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
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Assuming that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of
President Marcos after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners contend that the said
decrees are inoperative under “Art. VI, Sec. 29 (l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”, They assert that there must be
definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the
debt service.
Issues
Whether or not PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 are still operative under the
constitution.
Whether or not PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 are constitutional even without
stating the definite and exact amount for appropriation.
Held
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with
the duty to implement the same. The petition for unconstitutionality is dismissed.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, no
uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown
by the books of the Treasury.
169. Gaston vs. Republic Planter 158 SCRA 626
Facts:
Petitioners are sugar producers and planters and millers filed a MANDAMUS to implement the
privatization of Republic Planters Bank, and for the transfer of the shares in the government
bank to sugar producers and planters. (Because they are allegedly the true beneficial owners
of the bank since they pay P1.00 per picul of sugar from the proceeds of sugar producers as
STABILIZATION FEES).The shares are currently held by Philsucom / Sugar Regulatory
Admin.
The Solgen countered that the stabilization fees are considered government funds and that the
transfer of shares to from Philsucom to the sugar producers would be irregular.
Issues
W/N the shares in the bank (paid using these fees) are owned by the government Philsucom
or privately by the different sugar planters from whom such fees were collected?
RULING:
PUBLIC FUNDS. While it is true that the collected fees were used to buy shares in RPB, it did
not collect said fees for the account of sugar producers. The stabilization fees were charged on
sugar produced and milled which ACCRUED TO PHILSUCOM, under PD 338.The fees
collected ARE IN THE NATURE OF A TAX., which is within the power of the state to impose
FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY. They constitute sugar liens. The
collections accrue to a SPECIAL FUNDS. It is levied not purely for taxation, but for regulation,
to provide means TO STABILIZE THE SUGARINDUSTRY. The levy is primarily an exercise of
police powers. The fact that the State has taken money pursuant to law is sufficient to
constitute them as STATE FUNDS, even though held for a special purpose. Having been
levied for a special purpose, the revenues are treated as a special fund, administered in trust
for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance will
be transferred to the general funds of gov’t. It is a special fund since the funds are deposited in
PNB, not in the National Treasury. The sugar planters are NOT BENEFICIAL OWNERS. The
money is collected from them only because they it is also they who are to be benefited from
the expenditure of funds derived from it. The investing of the funds in RPB is not alien to the
purpose since the Bank is a commodity bank for sugar, conceived for the sugar industry’ growth
and development.
Revenues derived from taxes cannot be used purely for private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the ENTIRE
SUGAR INDUSTRY, and all its components, stabilization of domestic and foreign markets,
since the sugar industry is of vital importance to the
country’s economy and national interest.
Main point: The fees collected ARE IN THE NATURE OF A TAX., which is within the power of
the state to impose FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY. They constitute
sugar liens. The collections accrue to a SPECIAL FUNDS. It is levied not purely for taxation,
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but for regulation, to provide means TO STABILIZE THE SUGARINDUSTRY. The levy is
primarily an exercise of police powers. The fact that the State has taken money pursuant to law
is sufficient to constitute them as STATE FUNDS, even though held for a special purpose.
SECTION 30. APPELATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
170. First Lepanto Ceramics V Court of Appeals
237 SCRA 519, G.R. No. 110571, Oct.7, 1994
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the second division’s decision sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal ( CA) over appeals from decision of the Board of Investment
(BOI). Petitioner’s Contention is that, Circular N0. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded
article 82 of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226).
Petitioners question the holding of the Second Division that although the right to
appeal granted by article 82of the code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a
rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal
can be brought are only matter of procedure which the supreme court has the right to regulate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can directly appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the
decision of the Second Division.
HELD:
No, even assuming that there is merit in petitioners’ contention; judicial review of the
decision and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in the Omnibus Investment
code of 1981(P.D. 1989) Article 78 which stated:
Art. 78. Judicial Relief- All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the
provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of
the board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: provided, that all
appeals be filed directly with the supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order
or decision.
Consequently, the Authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it by the BOI
must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P.Blg 129 sec 9. Indeed, there is no reason why
decisions and final orders of BOI must be directly appealed to this Court.
Point:
The constitution now provides that “ No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this constitution without its advice and
concurrence” thus the petitioner cannot appeal directly to the Supreme Court , the decisions of
the second division or the Lower Court.
SECTION 32. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
171. Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279, 1994
Facts: On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipality of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.The
municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited
the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution. However, the Vice Mayor, Hon.
Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a
letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum. On July 6,
1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is “merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.”
Issue: Whether or not the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject
of an initiative?
Held: The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and
set aside. The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of public
officials.” On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds There for.”Sec. 32 of Art. 6
provides “ the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
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exceptions there from, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body.

ARTICLE VII: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1. EXECUTIVE POWER; PRIVILEGES; IMMUNITIES

172. MARCOS v MANGLAPUS, 177 SCRA 668, 1989;MR,178 SCRA,1989

FACTS:
Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family.

ISSUE:
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 Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcos’s from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes, As a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
173. Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797, 1990
Facts:
Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
Government under the reparation agreement entered into with the Japan on 09 May 1956.
Rappongi property consists of the land and building for the chancery of the Philippine
embassy. It becomes the site of the Philippine embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on 22 July 1976.
On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or
utilization of Philippine Government properties in Tokyo and Khobi. The president issued
executive order 496 entitling non Filipinos citizens or entities to avail of reparation, capital
goods and services in the event of sale, least or disposition before properties in Japan
including the Roppongi where specifically mentioned on the first clause. Amidst opposition by
various sector, the executive branch of the Government has been pushing, with great vigor, its
decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The temporary
restraining order of which has granted by the court on February 20, 1990. In GR No. 92047 a
writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondent to fully disclosed to the public the
basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property in spite of strong
public opposition and explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of the
Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.
Issues:
1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?
2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agent, have the authority and jurisdiction,
to sell the Roppongi property?
Held:
No, the Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through
reparation agreements. They were assigned to the Government sector and that the Roppongi
property was specifically designed under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy. It is
of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual embassy
service doesn’t automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens
only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration
on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
174. Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001)
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On
October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a
vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that
hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their
support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued
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a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed
a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella
and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
Held:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In
the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20,
2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on
the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in
the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the
opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that
time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about
its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The
inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres.
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a
resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also
passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon
petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is
a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
175. ARTHUR BALAO vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 186050 December 13, 2012
FACTS:
October 2008-The petitioner Arthur Balao, et.al., complained before the RTC Baguio City
regarding the enforced disappearance of their FATHER in La Trinidad Benguet. Witnesses
revealed that members of the PNP intelligence unit kidnapped him and brought him to Camp
Dangwa in Baguio City. After all efforts, they could not find a way to locate his father. He filed a
WRIT OF AMPARO relief before the court.
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January 2009-RTC included in the respondents President Arroyo and all other high ranking
official to wit: DILG, DND, Chief of Staff AFP, PNP Chief, Baguio City Police Officer, and other
intelligence unit officers.
December 2011- Supreme Court released decision
ISSUES: Whether or not President Arroyo be excluded as respondents in Writ by virtue of
Presidential immunity from suit?
HELD: Yes. The President is enjoying immunity from suits filed against her. Clearly RTC erred
in holding that President Arroyo cannot invoke his immunity in Amparo proceedings.
176. Rodriguez vsMacapagal-Arroyo GR No. 191805 November 15, 2011
FACTS :Petitioner Rodriguez filed a Writ of Amparo and a petition for Habeas Data with
prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of place, and Production of Documents and
Properties against Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo among others, for his abduction and tortures
and being coerced to sign documents by soldiers of the Arm Forces of the Philippines, and
declared that president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has command responsibility.
ISSUES : Whether or not President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has command
responsibility in the abduction and tortures of the Petitioner.
HELD : No. The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
account of her presidential immunity from suit. Article VII Section 1 states, “The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” The privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction.
177. Soliven vs. Makasiar
167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal’s finding of a
prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988.
With these developments, petitioners’ contention that they have been denied the administrative
remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review
by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and
the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit
DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.
178. Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia,
the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
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Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project,
others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the
role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid
and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
179. AKBAYAN vs. Aquino G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.The JPEPA, which
will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another
country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which
includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of
natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and
settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.
Held:
Decision: Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception
to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
180. Neri v Senate Ermita, G.R. No. 180643, Sept. 5, 2008
FACTS:
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On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven hours
on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project).Petitioner disclosed
that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner's discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive
privilege."Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner's answers to the q
uestions byrequiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. However, petitioner did not
appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive
privilege on the date set. Subsequently, the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his
arrest, Neri then filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim of executive privilege. Thus, this petition for
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Committees.
ISSUES:
Are all presidential communication presumed privileged? Had the Senate controverted the presumption of
privilege?
RULING:
No. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the p
ublic, isrecognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the
mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure. Moreover, the privilege being an extraordinary power must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. Yes, the Senate controverted the presumption of
privilege when it failed to consider that those three questions which petitioner refused to
answer were covered by a legitimate executive privilege and subsequently cited said petitioner
of contempt for his refusal to answer such questions. The court ruled that the contempt order is
arbitrary and precipitate because the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive
privilege and instead dismissed Neri’s explanation as unsatisfactory. This is despite the fact that
Neri is not an unwilling witness.
184. Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, &183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by
the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation
that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRPgrants the authority and
jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the
present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as wellas the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which
voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to
build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship
of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility.
It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework”
shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Before the signing, however, the
Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon,
invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to
have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents
to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.
Issues and Ruling:
105

1.W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes
shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional
as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propos constitutional
amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is
implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the
course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty.
182. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION v. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 - 235 SCRA 506
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A.
Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void:
(a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for
Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9
Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the
President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-
105)
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.
Held:
Partly Yes. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH,
there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject
to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether
they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On
Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
183. Webb vs De Leon 247 SCRA 652
184. Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
Facts: Pursuant to the Executive Order 464 issued by then President Gloria Arroyo on
September 28, 2005, which sought to observe separation of powers and was made prior to the
Senate's invitation to Executive Secretary Ermita and some of the AFP staff to appear on a
hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005, Petitioners filed a petition for Certiotari and
Prohibition, seeking for the nullification of said Executive Order as prior to its issuance,
respondents claimed that the Executive Order prevented them from appearing on scheduled
hearing unless with president's consent.
106
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order 464 is unconstitutional and the Respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion by using said Executive Order as an excuse to not
appear on said hearings?
Held: Yes. While Section 3 of said Executive Order ensures “respect for the rights of public
officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation, the impairment of the right of the people to
information as a consequence of it is just as direct as it's violation of the legislation's power of
inquiry.”
Point: The Executive Order issued by the president cannot be used against the Senate's call
for hearing as the public has the right to know.
185. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply
of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head
of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and
an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUE:
W/N the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
Held:
Yes, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the president ,i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement of other
countries. This authority of the president to enter into an executive agreement without the
concurrence of the legislature has traditionally recognized in Philippines jurisprudence.
Second, the communication are “received” by a close advisor of the president. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
186
Tecson Vs. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
ALI, MATHNIYA S.
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ
and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
107
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Main point: But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
187
MACALINTAL V. COMELECG.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2009
Mangaliman, Aileen P.
FACTS
The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal.
The petitioner filed the petition as a taxpayer and lawyer. He claimed that the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 suffered from constitutional infirmity. Heargued that
Section 18.5, which empowered COMELEC to order the proclamation ofwinning candidates, is
unconstitutional since it violates paragraph 4, Section 4 ofArticle VII of the Constitution. The
said provision gives Congress the duty to canvassthe votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president .
ISSUES
Whether or not Section 18.5 of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act violate theconstitutional
mandate of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
HELD:
It Is Congress' duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for the president
and Vice-President.The phrasing of Section 18.5 was “sweeping” that it included
theproclamation of the president and vice-president. It was repugnant to the
Constitution in the sense that it disregarded the authority given to Congressto do the
canvassing and make the proclamation for the president and vice-president. Congress would
not have allowed COMELEC to usurp the power thatconstitutionally belongs to it. The
Constitution, as the fundamental law of theland, should be read together with the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
POINT:
Allowing the Congress to amend, approve, revise and review the Implementing Rules and
Regulations by the COMELEC would be to undermine the independence of the body.“Once a
law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete.”
Therefore, Congress doesn’t have the power to review rules promulgated because of the
delegated rule-making power. Only the Supreme Court has the power to do so if there is a
grave abuse of discretion.
188
Lopez V. Senate and House
Facts:
108

During May 10, 2004 election the joint public Session of Congress adopted the rules on
canvassing on the President and Vice President. The joint session constituted a “Joint
Committee of both senate and House of Representatives to conduct a preliminary canvass on
the votes for President and Vice President, and submit the final report to the Joint Public
Session for approval.The Joint Committee, conscious of the constitutional mandate for
Congress to proclaim before noon of June 30, 2004, the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates garnering the highest number of votes, held meetings pursuant to the Rules on
canvassing of votes. The Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants (PICPA) assisted
the Joint Committee and the internal auditors of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in the canvass. The actual canvass of votes began at 8:00 o’clock in the evening of June 4,
2004 and ended at 8:19 o’clock in the evening of June 20, 2004. The Joint Committee met
from Monday to Friday, working on a Saturday and a Sunday, often for more than eight hours a
day.
Issue:
Whether or not Congress may delegate the preliminary count of votes for President and Vice
President to a Joint Committee?
Held: Section 4 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly empowers congress to
promulgate its rules for canvassing of COC for President and Vice- President, thus, the
congress, may delegate the preliminary canvassing to a Joint Committee provided that the
Committee will submit Committee Report for the approval of Congress as a body.Congress
may validly delegate thepreliminary determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee constituted under the Rules
adopted by the Joint Session of Congress.
189
PIMENTEL v JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE,JUNE 22,2004
SSIO,CLIFF EUGENE T.
FACTS:
Petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates following the adjournment of Congress. The
petition corollary prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to
cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint
Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
ISSUE:
Does the Congress continue the canvass even after the final adjournment of
its sessions?
HELD:
Yes, the final adjournment of Congress does not terminate an unfinished
presidential/vice presidential canvass. Adjournment terminates legislation but not the non-
legislative functions of Congress such as canvassing of votes
190_Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, Nov. 23, 2010, Abduracid, Ben-khaishir I.
Facts:
Par. 7, Szec 4, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: ”The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rule for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII nof the Constitution provides: The members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law not be designated to other agency performing quasi
judicial or administrative functions.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec. 4, Art. VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec. 12, Art VIII of the
constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
109
 1. Yes. The explicit reference of the members of the constitutional commission to a Philippines who has received the second or third highest number of votes may timely contest
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the election of the proclaimed winner. Furthermore, a public office is personal to the public
the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “ constitutionalized what officer and is not a property capable of being transmitted to his heirs upon his death. A real
was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the supreme court by the same constitution is party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Thus, Susan Roces, is not a real-party-in-interest to the
by the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Article VII of the constitution to decide presidential and vice election protest of her husband FPJ
presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one supreme court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the constitution and
statutes characterized the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supremem Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

191_Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo PET Case No. 002 (March 29, 2005) _Muksan & Santiago

FACTS:

Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) against the proclaimed winner of the 2004 presidential elections. During the pendency of
the case, FPJ died. His widow, Susan Roces, claimed before the PET that there was an urgent
need for her to substitute her husband in the election protest that he had filed as it is of
paramount interest to the Filipino people.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the widow can substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s presidential protest case?

RULING:

No. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules. It provides that only the registered candidate for President or Vice President of the
110
192 THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN RULING THAT THE INSTANT
RESOLUTION PETITION/PROTEST ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION SUFFICIENT TO CONTEST
QUISUMBING, J.: PROTESTEE’S VICTORY IN THE 10 MAY 2004 VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.[2]

In a Resolution[1] dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) confirmed
the jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee Noli L.
de Castro for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to
undertake measures for the protection and preservation of the ballot boxes and election
documents subject of the protest.
On February 4, 2005, protestee filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said resolution.
Protestee contends therein that:
I the allegations were merely copied from a pleading in another election protest.[9] He further
THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN RULING THAT IT CAN RE-CANVASS THE
ELECTION RETURNS AND OTHER CANVASS DOCUMENTS DESPITE THE AVAILABILITY
OF THE BALLOTS.
II
THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAS THE POWER TO
CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE ELECTION RETURNS OR CERTIFICATES OF
CANVASS.
III
THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN TRANSFORMING ITSELF INTO A CANVASSING
BODY.
IV
Protestee argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best
evidence are the ballots;[3] that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates
of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies;[4] that once the
canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can
be made;[5] that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to
determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the
established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns;[6]
that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate
to form a valid cause of action;[7] that the allegations are not supported by facts;[8] and that
claims that since the errors sought to be corrected are no longer clear and obvious, it would be
impossible for the Tribunal to correct the alleged errors at this stage.[10]
In her Comment, protestant avers that protestee’s motion was merely a reiteration of the
issues already resolved by the Tribunal.[11] However, although protestee’s contentions may be
mere reiterations of his previous pleadings and arguments, and he does not raise new
substantial issues, nonetheless, in order to write finis to the controversy on jurisdictional
issues, we now revisit our resolution of January 18, 2005.
Protestee contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of
votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC). But it is not suggested by any of the parties
that questions on the validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President
and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.[12] There is no
necessity, in our view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the ambit of its
constitutional function.

111
We also note the apparent ambivalence of the protestee relative to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
over re-canvass of the election returns. He claims the Tribunal’s authority to re-canvass is
“inexorably linked to [its] constitutional mandate as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
presidential and the vice-presidential elections.”[13] Contrarily, he states that the Tribunal
cannot re-canvass and must resolve the protest through revision of ballots. If he contends that
the Tribunal has the authority to re-canvass, there is no reason why it cannot perform this
function now. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an
election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is
involved.[14] However, we do not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the
protest, considering that the protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot results,
concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee, and reflected in the
election returns.[15] Protestant merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in
the process of different levels of transposition and addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case
of manifest errors, in these circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the
proceedings.
On the matter of sufficiency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce new substantial
arguments to reverse our ruling. We hold that while Peña v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal[16] on requisites of sufficiency of election protest is still good law, it is
inapplicable in this case. We dismissed the petition in Peña because it failed to specify the
contested precincts. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces,
municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The
protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a
challenge to protestee’s title to his office. In our view, the instant protest consists of alleged
ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.
On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion[19] prays for ocular inspection and
inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of watchers. However, the Tribunal has
already ordered the protection and safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued
also the appropriate directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no showing of an
imperative need for the relief prayed for, since protective and safeguard measures are already
being undertaken by the custodians of the subject ballot boxes.
WHEREFORE, protestee’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for
lack of merit. Protestant’s reiterating motion for ocular inspection and inventory-taking with
very urgent prayer for the appointment of watchers is also DENIED for lack of showing as to its
actual necessity.
Further, the protestant LOREN B. LEGARDA is ORDERED to specify, within ten (10) days
from notice, the three (3) provinces best exemplifying the manifest errors alleged in the first
part of her protest, and three (3) provinces best exemplifying the frauds and irregularities
alleged in the second part of her protest, for the purpose herein elucidated.
Lastly, the Tribunal hereby ORDERS the Commission on Elections to SUBMIT, within 30 days
hereof, the official project of precincts of the May 2004 Elections.
SO ORDERED.

Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress that
nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only
sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case
pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules.[17] Although said rule only pertains to revision of
ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of
manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.[18]
112
193_defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996_Dua Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn the protest, or at

FACTS: very least, abandoned her determination to protect or pursue the public interest involved

The presidential election of 1992 was clouded with much uncertainty as to who is the in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or

real winner. However, Congress sitting as Board of Canvassers proclaimed Fidel V. withdrawal operates to render moot and academic the instant case.

Ramos as duly elected President of the Republic. Protestant filed before the Presidential Moreover, the resolution of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate
Electoral Tribunal (PET) for annulment of proclamation on grounds of
the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections. Petition was
massive fraud and electoral sabotage among others. While the election contest is still
DISMISSED.
pending, Miriam Defensor-Santiago was elected Senator of the Republic in the mid-term

election in 1995.

ISSUE:

WON by assuming the position of a Senator, did Defensor-Santiago have effectively

abandoned her Presidential Election protest?

HELD:

YES. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest. In

the case at bar, when protestant entered into a political contract with the electorate as

Senator, she impliedly waives her vested right to the election contest. More so,

corollary to her position is the discharge of her functions. In assuming the office of the

113
194
197 Estrada Vs. Desierto
Facts:
This is a petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Philippines by
President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent
Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo claims she is the President.
At about 12:00 noon of January 20, 2001, Chief justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacanang Palace. He issued the following press statement:
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of
our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of the Vice – President on July 20, 2001 was constitutional?
Ruling:
Yes, In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case
of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate, or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.
195
Facts:
This case pertains to the oath-taking on 20 January 2001 of then Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The Court ordered for these and other
cases to consolidate because they involve the same subject matter.
Petitioner Oliver Lozano prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame
Arroyo" be declared null and void or that she be "declared acting President and President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave."
Issue:
Whether or not, the oath-taking and proclamation of Arroyo is null and void.
Held:
Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed
by a letter to the Court, the Court resolved unanimously to CONFIRM the authority given by the
twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to
administer the Oath of Office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have not shown any direct
and personal injury as a result of President Arroyo's oath-taking.
196
Estrada Vs. Desierto
Facts:
114
This is a petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Philippines by
President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent
Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo claims she is the President.
At about 12:00 noon of January 20, 2001, Chief justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacanang Palace. He issued the following press statement:
Yes, In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case
of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate, or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.

STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of
our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!

Issue:

Whether or not the assumption of the Vice – President on July 20, 2001 was constitutional?

Ruling:
115
197
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
Domato, Junaid E.
Facts: The petitioner challenged Executive Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet
members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the
Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations
imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was
violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple
positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his
positions.
Issue: Whether or not Executive order no. 284 allowed cabinet members and etc. to hold other
positions in the government.
Held: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in
the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing
so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be
derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties
and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.
The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as
compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7,
par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII,
Sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein w/o addition compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.
198
DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec.
3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million
worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and
Youth Council (or NMYC).
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a
business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which
he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council,
which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
HELD:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business
which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the
DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure,
...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall
immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such
investigation.
116

199
Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2
Flores v. Drillon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993
Facts:
Mayor Gordon was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority pursuant to Sec l3 (d) of RA 7227 or as Bases Conversion and Devt Act of l992.
Petitioners assail the statute for violating Sec 7 of Art lX-B stating that no elective official shall
be eligible to appointment or designation of any capacity to any public office or position during
his tenure.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointed Chairman and Chief Executive is void and unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment
pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID,
hence NULL and VOID.
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution.
On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position,
his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of
eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution.
200
Bitonio V COA GR NO. 147392, March 12, 2004
Penaflor, Myra Grace C.
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks the annulment of the Decision of the COA denying his motion for the
reconsideration of the COA Notices of Disallowance involving the per diems the petitioner
received from the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). In 1994, petitioner Benedicto
Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the
Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the
PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the
years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment
of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the
holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to
their primary office and the receipt of compensation.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties
Union case (Appointive officials are not covered by the prohibition) became final, it authorized
the payment of per diems. Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of
the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.
ISSUE:
Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance
in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
RULING:
Yes. The decision of COA is affirmed. The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem
for his board meetings sitting as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of
Directors of the PEZA in accordance to Sec. 13, Art VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as
representative of the Secretary of Labor. He is actually and in legal compensation performing
the primary function of his principal office.
Constitution is more superior than a statute. RA No. 7916 was later amended by RA No. 8748
to cure the defect
The petition is DISMISSED.
117
201_Public interest group v. Elma, GR No. 138965,_ Maghanoy, Emerita A.

Facts:

On October 30, 1998, Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman of
the Presidential Commission on Good Governance ( PCGG). Thereafter, on January 11, 1999,
during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed as a Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He took his oath of office as CPLC the following day, but
he waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.

Public Interest Group petitioned for the issuance of the extra ordinary writs of prohibition and
mandamus, as well as temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Elma from holding and
and discharging the duties of both positions and from receiving any salaries, compensation or
benefits from such positions during the pendency of this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the concurrent appointments of Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC
is constitutional?

Held: No. because Elma could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG
Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and
the primary functions of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Article VII
of the 1987 constitution does not apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG nor the
CPLC is a cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary .

118
202 be considered later expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution. The
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta AM No. 98-5-01-SC | Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments signed by the President on
November 9, 1998 March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta VOID.
FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the
Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety."
On May 12, CJ received from Malacanang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC
mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court
resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took
oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It
should be noted that the originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent to and
received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latter’s office and had not been transmitted yet.
According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacanang copy of his
appointment. In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential election, Art8 shall
apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art7 must be
considered where the President shall not make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the
reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight
appointments.
ISSUE:
WON the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4 and9, during
the appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.
HELD:
Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Article7 Sec15. Thus, the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so.
Likewise, the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. The
Court also pointed out that Article8 Sec4and 9 should prevail over Article7 Sec15 as they may
119
203.
De Rama vs. CA G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado
De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said
employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII,
Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of
the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s
allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the constitutional
provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the
appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the
appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.
Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art.
VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
“midnight appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.
Main point: constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those
made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

120
204 De Castro vs. JBC GR no. 191002 April 20, 2010 & May 1, 2010
Kursum Penaflor Tiplani

FACTS:
On May 17, 2010, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno compulsory retired as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. This actuation of retirement made by Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno occurred just days after the Presidential Election on May 10, 2010 and gave rise to
many legal problems. These dilemmas rooted from the consideration of the Sec. 15 Art. VII
and Sec. 4(1) Art. VII of the Constitution. It is now the questioned on who should appoint the
next Chief Justice and will the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should the
incumbent president not prohibited to do so.
Petitioner who is in behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue of appointment,
petitioned for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy.

HELD:
No, since the court held that the case being premature because the JBC has until May 17,
2010 at least with in which to submit the list of the candidates/nominees to the President to fill
the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
Sec. 15 of Article VII does not apply to the appointments to the Judiciary.

121
205
Government v. Springer 50 PHILS 259, 1927
Jeffrey M. Espos (Group 8)
Facts: Sometime in 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power...shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which
divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO
emphasized that the voting right should solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head
of the government (President that time was considered the head of the state but does not
manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and
the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well
as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General,
still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning
the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
Issue: W/N the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board
Members of NCC.
Held: No. E.O. 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to
do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to the public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was
created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate
President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of
executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this
rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be
found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch
– this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

122
206 When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999 officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion
FACTS: of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of
The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main contestants government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive departments,
in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting bureaus and offices.”
views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary,”
Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be
position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in
Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President,
coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the
took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority,
(Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission,
of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for
prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After
hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued
its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the
order reconsidered met with a denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President
can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD:
The petition is denied. An “appointment” to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating
or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the
duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last
act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter
by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the
exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.
123
207
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon
of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor
shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners
maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners
also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to
appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since
they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the
distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the
condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the
Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the
President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of
whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

124
208_Baustista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989) _Muksan & Santiago Further, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be
invoked by Malilin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President
FACTS: for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.
On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed Petitioner Bautista as permanent
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her office on December
22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointment (COA) wrote a letter to
Bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of COA on
January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under the COA’s review, hence this petition filed
with the Supreme Court.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Malilin as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights but he was not able to sit in his
appointive office because Bautista’s refusal to surrender her post. Malilin involved EO 163-A
which provides that the tenure of the chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be
at the pleasure of the President, thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as
well.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the President’s appointment is considered constitutional.
Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation.
Whether or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.

HELD:
The court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the
constitution, that she appoints Executive Officials. The second sentence of the provision
Section 16, several government officials. The position of chairman of CHR is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of COA. It
therefore, follows that the appointment of the chairman of the CHR by the President is to be
made and finalized even without the review or participation of COA. Bautista’s appointment as
the chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as
the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.

125
209
Sarmiento V. Mison 156 SCRA 254, 1992
Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept
of Budget from disbursing payments for Mison’s salaries and emoluments on the ground that
Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason
of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand,
respondents maintain theconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments CA).
Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president
without the consent/confirmation of the CA?
Held: Yes. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation on the Commission on Appointments (CA) except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore,
the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is
not required. Wherefore the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby
dismissed. Without cost.

Point: There are some appointee appointed by the President no need to be confirm in the
Commission on Appointments.
Provision: Section 16 of Art. VII

126
210_Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Appointment, 177 SCRA 259, 1989_Dua

FACTS:
The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of
the Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the
Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be
confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or
assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V. Mitra,
Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled
at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to
the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?

HELD:
The petition is dismissed. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by
express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the
first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments

127
211 provision of that law appertaining to the confirmation by the
Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code Commission onAppointments transgresses the Constitution and is therefore, without any legal
(PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: basis.

“The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be The Supreme Court held that the provisions of RA 6715, Sec. 13 isunconstitutional because:
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
the sector which nominated the predecessor.” thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and
Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors.
The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance
of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued
Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the
newly appointed commissioners.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended
by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC,
without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to
RA 6715 as amended. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has
in its favor the presumption of validity and which he contends that the law is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive as provided for in the Constitution, as
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission onAppointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
The Court further stated that “the legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.”
Thus, the Supreme Court said the appointment to NLRC positions do not require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, as the provision in RA 6715 is declared unconstitutional.
The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners are among those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint.

Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government
officers, in addition to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution.

Held: No. The provisions of first paragraph Art. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution is exclusive and
cannot be expanded by mere act of legislation. Even the Solicitor-General stated that the
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212
Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999
Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act
6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the
PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation bythe Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to
permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to
Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then
Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other
emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of
subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975
requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent
and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution
specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or
effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and
illegality of theirappointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional
Held:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vestin the
President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointmentsof respondent officers
who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot
by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a
regular force necessary for the security of the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State
shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the
military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the
first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
129
3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the
Commission onAppointments to confirm the appointments of public
officials whose appointmentsare not required by the Constitution to be confirmed
are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when
provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of
theunconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other
provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections. (Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369, August 11, 1999)

130
213 whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002 disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Matibag vs. Benipayo Congress.”
Gonzales, Regine Marie S. Point: Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
FACTS: adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Such
appointmentwas renewed in “temporary” capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and
then by
Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,
andBorra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took
theiroaths of office and assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on
Appointmentsdid not act on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of thead
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointmentprohibited
by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office byBenipayo,
Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interimappointments and
subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate theprohibition on reappointment
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

RULING:
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second
paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,

131
214 ranking officers of CCP. In the case at bar, only one seat was vacant due to Ma Osa’s expiration
Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13 term.
Domato, Junaid E. 4-year term: Endriga group maintained that under CCP Charter, the trustees’ fixed 4-year term can only be
terminated “by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause” thus Pres.’ action was
Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the 1997 rules of civil unnecessary because 10 incumbent trustees had the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy
procedure. First case, GR No. 139554, represented by the Solicitor General, collectively known as the of the board.
RUFINO group seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution Sec. 3 of PD 15 - Endriga refuses to accept CCP is under the supervision and control of the President as
denying the motion for the reconsideration. Sec. 3 states – “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation”
CA’s decision (to be set aside)
Declaring petitioners, ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respective offices elected Issue: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:
by the CCP board up to expiration of 4-year term A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;
Ousting respondents, Rufino group, except respondent Tantoco, from their respective offices B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision
and excluding them therefrom over the CCP
Dismissing case against Tantoco Held: Unconstitutional. CA’s decision: declared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as
Second case, GR No. 139565, the Endriga group, seeks to assail the Resolution issued by the CCP trustees and ousting Rufino group from board.
Court of Appeals in same case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of
the Decision. History of PD 15: Marcos’ In 1966, Marcos created EO 30 Creation of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines” as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of 7 members
to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees were all pointed by
Pres. Marcos.
In 1972, after declaration of Martial Law - Pres. Marcos issued PD 15 which converted CCP into a non-
municipal public corporation free from “the pressure or influence of politics” and increased 7
members to 9. EO 1058 issued in 1985 increased 9 to 11.Aquino - 1986, after People
Power Resolution, Aquino asked incumbent CCP trustees for courtesy resignation and
appointed new trustees to the Board. Ramos - started Endriga group Estrada - appointed 7
new trustees to CCP board with term of 4 years to replace the Endriga group, except for
Tantoco. Thus Rufino group took respective oaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in
1999.Endriga vs. Estrada
Endriga group files Petition for Quo Warranto questioning Pres. Estrada’s appointment of 7
new member of CCP board.
Alleged that under Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 – “vacancies of the CCP Board shall be filled by
Election by majority vote of trustees held at next regular meeting” - only when the board
is entirely vacant may the President of the Phil. fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with
132
215
Pimentel vs Ermita
Pritzel Ann A. Reyes

FACTS:

This is a petitioner file a centiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita to Florencio B. Abad,
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G.
Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap as acting secretaries of their respective
departments. The petitioner also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of
department secretaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, RA Sec. 16 and 17 is constitutional
HELD:
Yes!! The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the
Constitution and laws

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216
Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Fact:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A No. 10153. Several laws pertaining to the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act
(RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and
refined the basic ARMM structure. On June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
Held
The SC dismissed the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of R.A. No. 10153 for lack of
merit and upheld the constitutionality of the said law in toto. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this
power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in
order to be recognized.
Main point:
The constitutionality of the grant of the power to appoint.

134
217 multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an
Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 21 SCRA 395, 1967 auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that
FACTS: Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any
ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands,
over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of may issue.
Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is
already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain
any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon
the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be
further delegated by the Exec Sec.

HELD: The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over,
confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it
may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President’s power of control over the executive departments. And control
simply means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter.”

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in
person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his
Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person.
Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
135
218_MACEDA VS MACARAIG, 197 SCRA 771
Submitted by: MARCERA, Ella

FACTS:
The National Power Corporation was given a TAX EXEMPTION privileges by RA 358. EO 93,
the latest of these removed the tax exemptions, provided upon Fiscal Incentives Review board
or FIRB recommendation, these can again be restored. The FIRB resolved to restore the
exemption with the approval of President Corazon Aquino. Secretary Ordonez issued Opinion
77 opining that there was undue delegation of power by the FIRB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary may alter a construction of statute given by the
Secretary of Justice.

HELD:
YES. There is no undue delegation of legislative power.

POINT OF THE CASE:

The Executive Secretary , by the authority of the President may alter a construction of the
statute given by the Secretary of Justice.

136
219 Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
Roque v Director of Lands GR no. L-25373 the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
LADJAGAIS agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
FACTS: act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
A special civil action was filed by Roque praying after due hearing, the order of Director of such departments, performed and Promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
Lands and the decision of the Asst. Executive Secretary be set aside on the alleged ground disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
that the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, consisting of unqualified reliance and Executive." 20 Clearly then, there is nothing to prevent the President to disapprove or reprobate
biased report and recommendation of the Asst. Land Inspector Andres Arias, and on the the act of a department head. That was what happened in this case
factual allegation that the decision of the Asst. Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction
disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein petitioner having
already paid is for the price of the same, and praying further that the decision of the Honorable
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained.
As set forth at the outset, there is no justification for a reversal. The facts argue against it and
the law, in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution no less, is on the side of private
respondent Facun.. It would be a plain defiance of the settled policy of the law if the
homestead application of private respondent Facun would not be honored and the sales
application of petitioner Roque sustained.

ISSUE:

W/N the office of the President, thru the respondent Asst. Executive Secretary lacks power to
overrule the Department of Agriculture and National Resources.
W/N
HELD:

No. executive secretaries when acting by authority of the President may reverse or affirmed
with the decision of any Department. Executive and administrative function of Chief Executive
are performed by and thru executive departments.
Under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12,
137
220 courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose
Ang-Angco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619 appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their
Facts: removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not .
covered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Significance:
Ang-Angco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the administrative case of an
secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office employee under classified service even with the authority of the President without submitting the case to the
wrote a letter to Ang-Angco which stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates Commissioner of Civil Service.
but could not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary
of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector
Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he
filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been
discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered
his judgment against the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified civilservice.

Previous History:
Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative
casein subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government.
Holding:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civil service.
Reasoning:
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid down
in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due
process as guaranteed by said law. The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to
investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for
as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which
says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
138
221_NAMARCO v Arca 29 SCRA 648, (1969) the constitutional power of the president to review and reverse the decision of the BOD. (
Akarab, Safrazhad Samsi Art.VII, Sec. 17)

FACTS:
Petitioner, National Marketing Corporation ( NAMARCO) enjoins respondent Judge
Francisco Arca from enforcing his order dated Jan. 12, 1966, directing petitioner to reinstate
respondent Juan T. Arive to his former position in NAMARCO as the Manager of the Traffic-
Storage Department.
Arive was dismissed on Nov.4, 1960 after due hearing and he was found guilty of his
alleged violation of Management Memorandum Order dated Feb 1,1960. On March 2, 1961,
Arive appealed from the decision of the NAMARCO to the President of the Philippines.
NAMARCO was advised by the office of the President of the appeal and was asked to forward
the records of administrative case. On Jan 26,1965, then Executive Secretary Ramon A. Diaz,
handed a decision setting aside the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors and
reinstating Juan T. Arive to his former position.
Petitioner wrote a letter for reconsideration to the Office of the President and
contented that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to review any decision of the
NAMARCO Board of Directors removing, suspending or otherwise disciplining its subordinate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines had authority to reverse the decision of
the Board of Directors of NAMARCO and to order the reinstatement of herein respondent Juan
t. Arive.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court find that the President’s action through his Executive
Secretary of reversing the NAMARCO Board of Directors’ decision and ordering the
reinstatement of respondent Arive to be an act of justice due respondent.

Point:
Under our governmental set-up, Government Owned and Controlled Corporation like
NAMARCO, partake the nature of government bureaus and offices, and therefore it is within
139
222
222_Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, 1994
Facts: Secretary of Justice Drilon had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC declared Section 187
of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of
Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the
President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. Drilon
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the nullification of the Manila Revenue Code by the Secretary of Justice
is Constitutional?
Held: Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it
with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise
or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad
law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the
city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
but of mere supervision. Under the Constitution Section 4 of Aricle X, The president of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.

140
223

141
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142
225_DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724 (August 19, 2003)_Muksan & Santiago his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in
Facts: person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The DENR Secretary
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the DENR for Region XII issued a can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices
Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not
pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary. expressly repudiated the same.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. On December 8,
1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from
implementing the assailed Memorandum. Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in
enjoining it from causing the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices, considering that it was
done pursuant to DENR Administrative Order 99-14.

Issue:
Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.

Ruling:
YES. It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. This doctrine is corollary to the
control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads: Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise
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226
Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
Submitted by:Mana-ar

FACTS: Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In
1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused
losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended
Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was
recommended that she be removed. The president then issued an AO removing Villaluz from
his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he
is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under
Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed
from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” . There is some point in the argument that
the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or
remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential
appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to
those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that
`the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone,
in the courts, or in heads of department.

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227_Tondo Medical Center Employees vs. CA GR,No.167324, July 17,2007_Dua

Facts:
President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions
and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the
roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to
being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the
devolution of basic services to local government units.

Issue:
WON Executive order 102 is constitutional?

Held:
YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to
the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They
claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article
III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the
1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free
medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.

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147

230
Philip Sea food Corporation vs BOI
Facts:Phillips Seafood is registered with respondent Bureau of Investments (BOI) as an
existing and expansion producer of soft shell crabs and other seafood products, on a non-
pioneer status under Certificate of Registration No. EP 93-219. When Phillips relocated its
plant to Roxas City, it filed with BOI an application for registration, which the latter granted. In
effect, Petitioner’s Certificate of Registration No. EP 93-219 was extended up to 12 August
2000, pursuant to Article 39 (a) (1) (ii) of Executive Order No. 226. Petitioner changed its
corporate name from PS-Masbate to its current name of Phillips Seafood (Philippines)
Corporation, which was approved by respondent BOI on 16 February 2001.
In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI informed petitioner that the ITH
previously granted would be applicable only to the period from 13 August 1999 to 21 October
1999 or before petitioner’s transfer to a “not less-developed area.” Petitioner wrote respondent
BOI requesting for a reconsideration of its decision. But denied the said reconsideration and
elevated the matter to the office of the president. The office of the President denied the
petitioners appeal . And on April 01, 2005 petitioner filed again a review in the Court of appeals
questioning the dismissal of the office of the President.
After respondent BOI filed its comment on the petition, petitioner filed an omnibus motion
asking for leave to file an amended petition to counter the issues raised in the comment for the
first time and to suspend the period for filing a reply.
On 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed resolution denying
petitioner’s omnibus motion and dismissing its petition for review. The appellate court denied
petitioner’s omnibus motion on the ground that the same was filed with intent to delay the case.
Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for having been filed out
of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the President instead of filing a Rule 43
petition to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for review for having filed out of
time.
HELD:
NO,Indeed, under E.O. 226, when the action or decision pertains to either of these two
instances: first, in the decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation
of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered enterprises or
investors and government agencies under Article 7; and second, in an action of the BOI over
applications for the Office of the President is available. E.O. No. 226 contains no provision
specifically governing the remedy of a party whose application for an ITH has been denied by
the BOI in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36 thereof allow recourse to the Office of the
President in certain instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the catch-all provision
allowing the appeal to the courts from all other decisions of respondent BOI involving the other
provisions of E.O. No. 226. The intendment of the law is undoubtedly to afford immediate
judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases mentioned under Articles 7
and 36.In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly includes respondent BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose
judgments or final orders are appealable to the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for
review. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule
of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal to the Office of the
President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows recourse to the Office of the President,
applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a registered enterprise and a
government agency and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise,
respectively. Expresiouniusestexclusioalterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other
controversies outside of its purview, including petitioner’s entitlement to an ITH, can invoke
only the appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant case, the denial of
petitioner’s application for an ITH is not within the cases where the law expressly provides for
appellate recourse to the Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have
elevated its appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
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