1. Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 2.
2. The temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in
2. Pantranco South Express, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 191 SCRA 581 (1990)
3. Department of Health vs. Camposario, 457 SCRA 438
4. Carmelo vs. Ramos, 116 Phil. 1152 (1962)
5. Masangcay vs. COMELEC, 6 SCRA 27 (1962)
6. Gaoiran vs. Alcala, 444 SCRA 428 (2005)
7. Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304 (2001)
8. Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99 (1975)
9. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Phils. vs. Duque, III, 535 SCRA 265
10. Philippine National Oil Co. vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32
11. Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386
12. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sutton, 473 SCRA 392 (2006)
13. Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation, 567 SCRA 354
(2008)
14. Republic vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., 718 SCRA 153 (2014)
15. Bacobo vs. Commission on Elections, 191 SCRA 576 (1990)
16. Suñga vs. Commission on Elections, 288 SCRA 76 (1998)
17. Melendez, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 319 SCRA 262 (1999)
18. People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 58 (1937)
19. Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 (1931)
20. Besaga vs. Acosta, 756 SCRA 93 (2015)
------------------------------------
1. Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160
FACTS:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country”. The
Decree is founded on: the Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the
suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped. On November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.” The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June
18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale
No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United
States. Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to
the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a
copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA.The DOJ secretary:
1. refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a
preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies;
2. denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article
7that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.
Jimenez sued the DOJ Secretary (Franklin Drilon). The lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
WON Jimenez was deprived of due process.
Held:
Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to
the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition
process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages:
1. The provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request &
court.
Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation
stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of
a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. The Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative
proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a
preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing
of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty.
Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) &
(2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary
right to access to official records & documents.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present
their side.
In view of the foregoing premises, the petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence.
2. Pantranco South Express, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 191 SCRA 581 (1990)
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order seeking
to annul the order of public respondent Board of Transportation dated January 4, 1979.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On August 5, 1971, the then Public Service Commission granted certificates of public convenience to
private respondent Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. (BLTB) for the operation of twelve (12) bus
units on the Pasay City — Legaspi City line (Case No. 70-5749); six (6) bus units on the Pasay City —
Bulan, Sorsogon line (Case No. 70-5750), and ten (10) bus units on the Pasay City — Sorsogon line
(Case No. 70-5751) (pp. 59-64, Rollo).chanrobles law library : red
On April 4, 1975, petitioner Pantranco South Express, Inc. (PANTRANCO) filed a complaint against
BLTB before public respondent Board of Transportation (BOT), docketed as Case No. 75-31-C, charging
it with abandonment of services on said lines from August, 1971 to April, 1975 and praying for the
cancellation of BLTB’s certificates of public convenience (pp. 69-70, Rollo).
On March 24, 1976, in Cases Nos. 70-5749, 70-5750 and 70-5751, PANTRANCO filed an urgent petition
charging BLTB with abandoning said services from March, 1975 to March, 1976 and reiterating its prayer
for the cancellation of the certificates of public convenience (pp. 77-78, Rollo).
BLTB did not file any written answer either to the complaint in Case No. 75-31-C or to the urgent petition
in Cases Nos. 70-5749, 70-5750, and 70-5751. Rather, in a Motion dated July 26, 1978, BLTB, referring
to hearings before the BOT on March 24, 1977 and April 13, 1977, alleged (pp. 126-128,
Rollo):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. At said hearings, Respondent admitted non-operation of the bus services authorized in Cases
Nos. 70-5749,70-5750 and 70-5751 and thus the need for Complainant to present evidence in both
proceedings may be dispensed with.
"4. At the said hearings, Respondent advanced affirmative defenses on Complainant’s Urgent
Motion of March 24, 1977 (sic) which Respondent, in its Rejoinder of May 5, 1977, adopted also as its
affirmative defenses with respect to Case No. 75-31-C.
"Briefly, these affirmative defenses are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Respondent actually registered under PUB denomination all the twenty eight (28) buses
authorized for operation under the certificates sought to be cancelled (Annex ‘A’);
(b) The following supervening factors which are beyond Respondent’s control however, arose
and prevented Respondent from operating the lines at issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The gasoline crises starting 1971;
(2) The destructive big floods in 1972 and 1974;
(3) The general troubled conditions of peace and order in 1971 and 1972 leading to the
declaration of martial law;
(4) Starting 1973 and on to 1974,1975 and 1976 the nearly prohibitive cost of units and spare
parts (if available at all), the higher costs of operations and acute tire shortages particularly in 1974;
(5) All these, which are of general public knowledge and known to the Board, brought the whole
land transportation industry in what might be termed as in extremis condition causing the bankruptcy of
many operators, big and small; and
(6) Complainant Pantranco South Express, Inc. was not spared the ill effects of these adverse
conditions to the extent that up to the present it has not registered all the buses required for its regular
bus operations (Annex ‘B’, ‘B-1’).
"5. At the said hearings also, Respondent prayed that these incidents in these proceedings be
considered and decided in the light of present conditions which are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The certificates of public convenience of Respondent are still valid;
(b) Respondent is willing and desirous to operate (sic) the said certificates;
(c) Respondent has the capability to operate, in fact, has ready the full twenty-eight (28) buses
needed for full operation of the authorized services;
(d) Complainant is not operating all its authorized bus services for lack of sufficient rolling stock;
(e) The need for the services sought to be cancelled is patent, in fact, urgent at the present time;
and
(f) That the public interest is paramount against other considerations such as the incidents in
these cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
On January 4, 1979, the BOT issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 133,
Rollo):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of all the foregoing, this Board, in addition to its rulings mentioned above —
"1. Orders respondent to operate within fifteen (15) days from date hereof the whole complement
of twenty-eight (28) units authorized under the said certificates, utilizing for the purpose such units
presently authorized as RESERVES and inform the Board within ten (10) days from commencement of
operation, the makes and motor numbers of the units to be operated for each line and the case numbers
under which they are authorized for appropriate entry in the records of the above-entitled cases, and
"2. Orders the fine of P10,000.00 imposed above to be paid to this Board within ten (10) days
from receipt by it of a copy of this Order and declares the consolidated complaints filed in the above-
entitled cases closed and terminated.
"Failure of respondent/applicant to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be considered
sufficient cause for this Board to withdraw the authority herein granted.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
It rationalized the non-cancellation of BLTB’s certificates of public convenience, as follows (pp. 128 A-
133, Rollo):chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Obviously, cancellation of a certificate of public convenience is a penalty of the severest degree. Its
consequences are suffered not exclusively by the operator; it extends to the travelling public whose
needs for transportation facilities would further be aggravated by a diminution of needed services.
Consequently, where such a penalty is prayed for, this Board requires the evidence to be strong. Less
than that this Board must apply the less severe penalties provided for by law, but equally disciplinary in
nature.
"Sec. 16 (n) of the Public Service Law empowers this Board ‘to suspend or revoke any certificate . . .
whenever the holder thereof has violated or wilfully (sic) and contumaciously refused to comply with any
order, rule or regulation of the Board or any provision of this Act.’. . .
"Sec. 21 of the same law provides that ‘every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms
and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission shall be
subject to a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos per day for every day of service during which such
default or violation continues . . .’
"A reading of both provisions would show that failure to comply with the terms and conditions of any
certificate of public convenience is basically punished with a fine, unless the violation is willful or
contumacious, in which case the penalty of suspension, or cancellation may be imposed.
"Judged by the foregoing standards, this Board declares the evidence of the complainant to be sadly
lacking in elements that would qualify the respondent’s failure to operate as wilful and contumacious.
True the respondent did not operate on its certificate from the time it was granted on August 4, 1971 up
to the present. It had not justified its non-operation from said date up to September 2, 1972. But on
September 2, 1972, the respondent justified its non-operation by writing to the Board, that because of
unfinished portions of the road it could not render the service authorized by the Board to be rendered.
The Board never overruled the Respondent.
"x x x
"At this point, it must be borne in mind that whether in the case of application for new services, or for the
cancellation of lines already granted, this Board must determine what the public need is.
"This leads us into discussing what the public need is in the areas covered by the certificates of public
convenience in question.
"The Board, in its desire to be responsive to public need, has always kept itself informed of actual and
latest transportation conditions in the provinces, including the Bicol region. Thru reports/complaints from
the general public, from reports of its fieldmen, and from its own personal observations acquired thru
inspection trips, this Board is aware that buses which are operating are very much less than what has
been authorized. This was officially confirmed in a meeting of provincial and Metro-Manila bus operators
held in Malacañang Palace on June 21, 1976, presided over by His Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos himself.
"In Bicol region, for instance, in the past four years (1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977) PSEI (PANTRANCO)
registered and operated less than 50% of its authorized units:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Year Authorized Units Registered
1974 466 159 units
1975 (not available) 162 units
1976 453 227 units
1977 464 221 units
and among the lines not so operated or only partially operated, either through expiration of certificates,
petitioned suspension of operation or for sheer lack of units are long distance lines from Manila to the
provinces of Quezon, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon aside from lines serving
inter-provincial and local needs in Quezon province and the whole Bicol Region. Among them are the
following lines which are concurrert in whole or in portions of the lines Pasay City — Legaspi City, Pasay
— Sorsogon and Pasay — Bulan, all the said lines requiring the operation of some two hundred twenty
seven (227)
"x x x
"The non-operation by PSEI (PANTRANCO) of these more than two hundred (200) buses clearly
requires the entry or operation of an equal number of buses. Any prohibition against an effort to fill up a
public need would be contrary to public interest.
"Public interest will better be served if respondent is allowed to operate the service authorized in its
certificate of public convenience. To cancel these certificates at a time when the clamor and demand for
such service have been increasing day to day, prodded by the people’s desire to avail of the excellent
road conditions, which in turn conduces to fast and convenient travel, would be to negate and turn back
the clock of progress which has been seeping steadily and constantly to the long neglected vast
communal area that is the Bicol Region. To authorize the operation of these services will complement
the government’s multi-purpose development effort to hasten the Socio-Economic growth of these areas,
notable among which are the Philippines-Japan Friendship Highway, of which the routes covered by
applicant/respondent’s certificates traverse and the Bicol River Basin Development Project, a program
designed to tap the rich natural resources of the region."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, the present petition.
RULING: As We have ruled before, the BOT is particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on
questions regarding certificates of public convenience are influenced not only by the facts as disclosed
by the evidence in the case before it but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors that are
periodically submitted to it (see La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-19120,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 343). Likewise, the BOT has the power to take into consideration the
result of its own observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision, in connection
with other evidence presented at the hearing of a case (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. N. &
B. Stables Co., Inc., 60 Phil. 851 citing Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. Danon, 58 Phil. 75;
Manila Electric Co. v. Balagtas, 58 Phil. 429).
Taking into consideration BLTB’s letter dated September 18, 1972, it acted in good faith when it did not
immediately operate on those lines and not because of a design to prejudice public interest. Certificates
of public convenience involve investment of a big amount of capital, both in securing the certificate and
in maintaining the operation of the lines covered thereby, and mere failure to operate temporarily should
not be a ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the case at bar, the suspension of the service
was directly caused by circumstances beyond the operator’s control (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v.
F.F. Halili, Et Al., 95 Phil. 694). In the absence of showing that there is willful and contumacious violation
on the part of the utility operator, no certificate of public convenience may be validly revoked (Manzanal
v. Ausejo, Et Al., G.R. No. L-31056, August 4, 1988, 164 SCRA 36). More importantly, what cannot be
ignored is that the needs of the public are paramount, as elucidated by the BOT in its order. In the
exercise of its power to grant or cancel certificates of public convenience, the BOT is guided by public
necessity and convenience as primary considerations (see Dizon v. Public Service Commission, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-34820, April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 500).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The order of the Board of Transportation dated
January 4, 1979 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on January 15, 1979 is LIFTED.
3. Department of Health vs. Camposario, 457 SCRA 438
DOCTRINE: The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the
former’s jurisdiction.
FACTS:
1. Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are former employees of the Department Of
Health – National Capital Region (DOH-NCR).
2. Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident
Ombudsman against Director IV Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera,
and respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles
of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth
P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.
3. Thereafter, Resident Ombudsman recommended filing of a formal administrative charge of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents.
a. Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co-
respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.
4. Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O No. 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate
the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees.
a. It indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC).
Consequently, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH.
5. PCGAC issued a resolution finding respondents guilty as charged. Then President Ramos
issued AO No. 390 dismissing Dir. Majarais from service as recommended by the PCAGC in
their resolution, but remanded the case of the other respondents to the Secretary of Health
for appropriate action. Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against
respondents and Cabrera dismissing them from service.
6. Respondents and Cabrera filed their separate appeal. Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to
the CA the CSC’s resolutions ahead of respondents. It was granted.
7. Respondents brought the matter to the CA
a. PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential
appointees.
i. Thus, Commission had no power to investigate the charges against
respondents.
b. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary
of health failed to comply with administrative due process. Hence, the Petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON PCAGC has Jurisdiction to investigate anomalous transactions involvin the
respondents. YES
2. WON the decision of the Secretary of Health is Valid. NO.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
 PCAGC have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.
From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to
investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees.
 HOWEVER, respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was
authorized under AO No. 298, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against respondents.The Investigating Committee was composed
of all the members of the PCAGC.
 The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to
which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.
SECOND ISSUE:
 The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under
the former’s jurisdiction.
o Health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.
o NOTE: being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the
jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the “power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint.
 As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the
secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.
o The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to
observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
 The health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should be
taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated.
o HOWEVER, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires
a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with
this requirement results in an invalid decision.
 Disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s recommendation,
but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.
o In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing respondents
pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Health
Secretary Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the
Commission’s Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the
recommendation with regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q.
Agustin.
 While the Health Secretary has the power as mentioned above, Due process in
administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles:
 (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) In arriving
at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts
of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the
decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it
and the various issues involved.
 The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present
factual milieu. [number 6 is missing]
DISPOSITIVE: Petition partly granted. Authority of PCAGC under AO 298 is sustained.
HOWEVER, being violative of administrative due process, the orders of the health secretary are
annulled and set aside.
4. Carmelo vs. Ramos, 116 Phil. 1152 (1962)
Facts:
Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies
involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office
of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division. Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo was chairman
of the said committee.
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper
in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear in connection with an administrative case against
Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare Ramos in contempt. The court dismissed the petition and held
that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and
demand that witnesses testify under oath.
Issue:
WoN Camelo (committee) has the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for
their punishment in case of refusal.
Held: No
The rule of Contempt (Rules of Court) applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case,
unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court.
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. — When authority to take testimony or evidence is
conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body,
such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons
witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding paragraph or
who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the power therein defined, refuses to make
oath, give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall
be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or
body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first instance having
jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
However, one who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take
testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant
of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain
city employees.
5. Masangcay vs. COMELEC, 6 SCRA 27 (1962)
FACTS: On 24 October 1957, Benjamin Masangcay — then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to
take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of
their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province— with several others, was charged
before the Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for
the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied
in its resolution promulgated on 2 September 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated 5 March 1957,
inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of
Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal
Party and the Citizens’ Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election
Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Masangcay et.al. complied with the summons issued by the Comelec to appear and show cause why
they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the charge. On 16 December 1957 the
Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other
respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section
5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec as well as its members the power to punish
acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for
in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and
members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the
separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from insofar as Masangcay is concerned, as well
as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him; without
pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt
RULING: No. Under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any
controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it
cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII),
for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to Masangcay in the decision
subject of review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to
punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently,
in the administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its
exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative
function has been held invalid.
The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt
was filed against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for
they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. The Commission, thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in
punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.
RATIO: An administrative agency has no inherent powers, although implied powers may sometimes be
spoken of as "inherent." Thus, in the absence of any provision to punich for contempt which has always
been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of the courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

6. Gaoiran vs. Alcala, 444 SCRA 428 (2005)
FACTS: On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with CHED against Florian Gaoiran
(petitioner), Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial College
(AAIC), a state-supervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer
II of the same school, charged petitioner of mauling him while he was performing his duties. Appended
to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal complaint filed by Castillejo against petitioner and the
sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority was filed
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San Guillermo.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then
OIC of the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the
mauling incident. After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie
case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998.
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges against him. Instead,
he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain
enforcement of the preventive suspension order. Having served the suspension, the case was dismissed
for being moot and academic. Petitioner then sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive
suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was not informed
nor apprised of the complaint against him.
Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of CHED, issued a
Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner on
the ground that the letter-complaint was not under oath. However, Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman
of CHED, unaware of the existence of Mayoâs resolution, issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999,
finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Petitioner was dismissed form service.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction. He alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of Alcala in issuing the Resolution despite
that a previous Resolution already dismissed the administrative complaint against him. The RTC sided
with the petitioner and declared the Resolution of Alcala null and void.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC. It declared as valid Alcalaâs Resolution.
Hence, this petition for review.
The petitioner continuously argued that the letter-complaint is inexistent because it was not made under
oath and does not contain a certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner cites Section 2, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 and Section 4(d) of Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 94-0521 (Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Legislation).
Hence, the formal charge and order of preventive suspension stemming from it is likewise null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-complaint should be deemed inexistent as it was not made under oath.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in Book V of EO No. 292, Sections
46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A. It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint
was not verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that Castillejo filed against the
petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be
considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court
Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous
complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct. It is
not totally uncommon that a government is given wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its
investigative powers. Administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied.
In any case, the letter-complaint of Castillejo is not a âcomplaintâ within the meaning of the provisions
cited. The letter-complaint did not by itself commence the administrative proceedings against the
petitioner. It merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by CHED. The Court cannot uphold the
petitionerâs contention as it would result to an absurd and restrictive interpretation of EO No. 292. It was
the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that constituted the complaint.
Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge in her capacity as the OIC. As the complaint was initiated by the
appropriate disciplining authority under EO No. 292, the same need not be subscribed and sworn to.
Neither is it required that the same contain a verification of non-forum shopping. Jurisdiction was properly
acquired over the case. Petition is denied.
7. Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304 (2001)
FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in
Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of Infanta
inquired about Nery’s Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also
disclosed that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee
for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was eventually revealed that Nery
Remolona’s name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as
indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.Estelito
Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offered
to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there
was no vacancy when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that
America asked for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America
was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted
that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On
recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty
of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion for
Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
HELD: The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably
reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the
service. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for
the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course
of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government
officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts
of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence
and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed
and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent
himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an
administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This
is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the
Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987).
Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries
are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As
such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before the CSC is
entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95 of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within the
discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under review
transmitted to it.[20] Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the case on the bases of the
uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
8. Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99 (1975)
Facts: Evalengista, petitioner, is head of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) created by Executive Order No. 4, which, among others, provides:
“The agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant
to the investigation.”
Respondent Manalastas (Asst. City Public Service Officer of Manila) was issued a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him to appear as witness at the office of the PARGO to testify in a certain
investigation pending therein. Instead of obeying it, he filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for
prohibition, certiorari and restraining order assailing its legality. Judge Jarencio issued a restraining
order. Hence, this action.
Issue: WON the PARGO enjoys the authority to issue subpoena in its conduct of fact-finding investigation
Held: YES
(1) Agency is with authority to enforce subpoenas issued. “Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce
subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, WON adjudication is involved, and WON probable
cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is enough that the investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending
charge, but upon which to make one if discovered evidence so justifies. Because judicial power is
reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations, it does
not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have
and exercise powers of original inquiry”
(2) Authority delegated by statute. “The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case of controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative
and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it too may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.
In sum, it may be stated that the subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:
(a) within the authority of the agency
(b) the demand is not too indefinite
(c) the information is reasonable relevant”
(3) Information sought reasonably relevant to the investigations. “There is no doubt that the fact-finding
investigations being conducted by the PARGO upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials
of the City Govt of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the PARGO’s sphere of authority and that
the information sought to be elicited from respondent Manalastas of which he is claimed to be in
possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.”
9. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Phils. vs. Duque, III, 535 SCRA 265
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children,
are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July
7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the
provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of
the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative
Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The
Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The
international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of
the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR. Customary
international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary international
law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation
(opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international
law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did
not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the
WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may
constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states
and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law
of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence
just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory
provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.
10. Philippine National Oil Co. vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32
FACTS: -TirsoSavellano informed the BIR that PNB had failed to withhold the 15% final tax on interest
earnings and yields from the money placements of PNOC, which was violative of P.D. 1931 (which
withdrew all tax exemptions of GOCCs)
-Acting on such information, the BIR requested PNOC to settle the aforementioned tax liability; PNOC
offered to compromise the same by proposing that it be set-off against a claim by NAPOCOR for tax
refund/credit (the amount of the tax refund was supposedly a receivable account of PNOC from
NAPOCOR)
-The proposalwas found premature by the BIR as NAPOCOR’s claim was still under process, so PNOC
amended its offer and offered to pay an amount representing 30% of the basic tax in accordance with
E.O. 44;The same was accepted by BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan
-Meanwhile,Savellano was paid the informer’s reward (15% of the tax collected from PNOC and PNB);
A month after receiving his last installment for the reward, Savellano wrote the BIR to demand payment
of the balance of his reward, to which the BIR (through Comm. Tan) replied that Savellano was no longer
owed by them as he had already received an amount equal to 15% of the compromise agreement
proposed by PNOC; Savellano sought a reconsideration of the decision, questioning the legality of the
compromise agreement between the BIR and PNOC
-While his Motion for Reconsideration was yet pending with the BIR, Savellano filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA claiming Comm. Tan acted with grave abuse of discretion in entering into a compromise
agreement with PNOC which immensely lessened his informer’s reward
-Ultimately, new BIR Commissioner Jose Ong, found meritorious Savellano’s Motion for Reconsideration
and ordered the PNB to pay the deficiency withholding tax on the interest earnings from PNOC’s money
placements
-The CTA later on likewise found the compromise agreement entered into between the BIR and PNOC
as without any force and effect; They likewise ordered that upon payment by PNOC, Savellano was
entitled to the balance of his informer’s reward
-The CA concurred with the CTA decision and affirmed the same, hence the case at bar
HELD: It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that administrative authorities are vested with the power to
make rules and regulations because it is impracticable for the lawmakers to provide general regulations
for various and varying details of management. The interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those
charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the court construing such rule or regulation,
and such interpretation will be followed unless it appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary.[75]
RMO No. 39-86, particularly paragraph 2 thereof, does not appear to be unreasonable or arbitrary. It
does not unduly expand the coverage of E.O. No. 44 by merely providing that applications for
compromise filed until 31 March 1987 are still valid, even if payment of the compromised amount is made
on a later date.
It cannot be expected that the compromise allowed under E.O. No. 44 can be automatically granted
upon mere filing of the application by the taxpayer. Irrefutably, the applications would still have to be
processed by the BIR to determine compliance with the requirements of E.O. No. 44. As it is uncontested
that a taxpayer could still file an application for compromise on 31 March 1987, the very last day of
effectivity of E.O. No. 44, it would be unreasonable to expect the BIR to process and approve the
taxpayers application within the same date considering the volume of applications filed and pending
approval, plus the other matters the BIR personnel would also have to attend to. Thus, RMO No. 39-86
merely assures the taxpayers that their applications would still be processed and could be approved on
a later date. Payment, of course, shall be made by the taxpayer only after his application had been
approved and the compromised amount had been determined.
E.O. No. 44 is not for the benefit of the taxpayer alone, who can extinguish his tax liability by paying the
compromise amount equivalent to 30% of the basic tax. It also benefits the Government by making
collection of delinquent accounts and disputed assessments simpler, easier, and faster. Payment of the
compromise amount must be made immediately, in cash or in managers check. Although deferred or
staggered payments may be allowed on a case-to-case basis, the mode of payment remains unchanged,
and must still be made either in cash or in managers check.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitions of PNOC and PNB in G.R. No. 109976 and G.R.
No. 112800, respectively, are hereby DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decisions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29583 and CA-G.R. SP No. 29526, which affirmed the decision of the
CTA in CTA Case No. 4249, with modifications, to wit:
(1) The compromise agreement between PNOC and the BIR, dated 22 June 1987, is declared void for
being contrary to law and public policy, and is without force and effect;
(2)Paragraph 2 of RMO No. 39-86 remains a valid provision of the regulation;
(3)The withholding tax assessment against PNB, dated 08 October 1986, had become final and
unappealable. The BIR Commissioner is ordered to enforce the said assessment and collect the amount
of P294,958,450.73, the balance of tax assessed after crediting the previous payment made by PNOC
pursuant to the compromise agreement, dated 22 June 1987; and
(4) Private respondent Savellano shall be paid the remainder of his informers reward, equivalent to 15%
of the deficiency withholding tax ordered collected herein, or P 44,243,767.61.
11. Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to allow
provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or below the LTFRB official
rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the transport sector which the
government intends to implement and to make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires publication and
notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus Operators Assoc. of the
Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate increase, which was granted by LTFRB.
In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of
procedures to implement the Department Order & to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB
Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c was
denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily granted by
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above existing authorized
fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas
delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable because a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru instrumentality of his
own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the
delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give provincial buses the power to charge their fare
rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it necessary.
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the
difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the
transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation.
With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies
laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence
to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC
and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other
public service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB
Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB
are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating
to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed
transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant
for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the
proposed service to the oppositor.
12. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sutton, 473 SCRA 392 (2006)
FACTS: Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made
a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under
the law. a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock,
poultry and swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR this
Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR
a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and
thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993 which
provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. The DAR Secretary issued an
Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL but
applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9. Respondents moved for reconsideration.
They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-
raising and appealing that the DAR A.O. No. 9 be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum
retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?

HELD: The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform
and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities
and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine
and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR has
no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage
of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitioner
DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform
beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and
regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in
modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial
review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body
concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must
be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-
making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by
Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.

13. Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources Corporation, 567 SCRA 354
(2008)

`
NOTES: For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no civil,
criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents in connection with
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing rules. These
provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. Their requirements are specifically set out,
and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. In particular, Section 8[55] of the Revised Securities
Act is a straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities and the particular
matters which need to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The Decision, dated 20 August
1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC from such requirements. The lack of
implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any
cogent reason to prevent the SEC from exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation of
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act.

14. Republic, represented by the BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (now FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION) vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., 718 SCRA 153 (2014)

FACTS:

The FDA was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720, otherwise known as the "Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act," primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for
foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic products. On March 15, 1989, DOH issued Administrative Order
No. 67 entitled Revised Rules and Regulations of Pharmaceutical Products. It required drug
manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine with the FDA before they may be released to the
market for sale. It also required a bioavailability/ bioequivalence (BA/BE) test for a manufacturer to
secure a Certificate of Product Registration (CPR) for its products. The implementation of the BA/BE test
however was put on hold because there was no facility capable of conducting the same. FDA then issued
Circular 1 which resumed the implementation of the BA/BE test. Thereafter, FDA issued Circular 8 which
provided for additional details concerning the test requirement.
Respondent is a drug manufacturer of a drug brand named Refam for the treatment of persons suffering
from pulmonary and extra- pulmonary tuberculosis. When Refam was subjected to the required test, it
resulted that the product was not a bioequivalent with the reference drug. FDA warned respondent that
is CPR will never be renewed unless it submit satisfactory results of BA/BE test.
Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for prohibition
and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH, and not the
FDA, which was granted the authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720. As such, the
issuance of the aforesaid circulars and the manner of their promulgation contravened the law and the
Constitution. They further averred that that the non-renewal of the CPR due to failure to submit
satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only affect Refam, but their other products as well.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997
HELD: Yes
Political Law- An administrative regulation that is merely an interpretative rule needs nothing further than
its issuance
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent
rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-
statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congressand effect a change in existing
law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.
Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations
under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the
statute being administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say
what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging
to the same class which may be covered by the said rules.Finally, contingent rules are those issued by
an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement
of the law depends.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive
Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing,
and publication in order to be valid and binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule.
This is because when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed.
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the issuance of
CPRs covering certain pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an administrative regulation a
legislative rule to be exact issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority
granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be
registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the
validity of its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements of prior
hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the government in
the exercise of its official duties.
The FDA then issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 to supplement Circular No. 1, s. 1997 in that it reiterates
the importance of the BA/BE testing requirement originally provided for by AO 67, s. 1989. Circular Nos.
1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement
a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the
FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including those
covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA
has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights
of the parties that they seek to govern as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the
first place no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.
15. Bacobo vs. Commission on Elections, 191 SCRA 576 (1990) – full text
Petitioner Daniel T. Bocobo and private respondent Luisito M. Reyes were candidates for Governor in
the Province of Marinduque in the elections held on January 20, 1988. Reyes won with a margin of 3,145
over Bocobo, who in due time filed an election protest with the Commission on Elections.
After revision of the ballots in 25% of the contested precincts indicated by the protestant, the First Division
of the COMELEC issued an order requiring the parties (particularly the protestant) to show cause why
the protest should not be dismissed. A hearing thereon was scheduled on December 11, 1989, where
the parties agreed to submit their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the Third Division dismissed the protest, declaring in part as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Gleaned from the foregoing review and re-appreciation of the ballots of the contested precincts,
protestant has failed to establish a trend that the result of the election would be altered, to justify the
further revision of the remaining SEVENTY-FIVE (75%) per centum of the protested ballots still
unrevised.
It appearing, therefore, that on revision of the ballots representing TWENTY-FIVE (25%) per centum of
the contested precincts the result of the election would not be altered, no sufficient basis exists to order
the continuation of the remaining unrevised ballots of the protested precincts as protestant cannot
overcome Protestee’s lead.
This decision was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc in its resolution dated June 24, 1990, denying the
protestant’s motion for reconsideration. Bocobo then came to the Court in this petition for certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the public Respondent.
The petitioner urges reversal of the Commission on Elections on the ground that it misinterpreted and
misapplied the partial determination rule embodied in Rule 20, Section 7, of its own Rules of Procedure.
He also maintains he was denied due process when certain ballots protested by him were admitted by
the public respondent without giving him an opportunity to support his objections.
The partial determination rule reads in full as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 7. Partial determination of the case. — The Commission or the Division concerned may direct
the protestant and, in case there is a counter-protest, the counter-protestant, to state and designate in
writing his or their choice of the precincts, numbering not more than twenty-five (25%) per centum of the
total number of precincts involved in the protest or counter-protest, if any, whose ballot boxes shall first
be opened, and shall thereafter make a partial determination of the case based on what appears from
an examination of said ballot boxes and their contents or the revision of the ballots therein. If such a
determination shows that the results of the election would not be affected, the protestant shall be required
to show cause why the protest or counter-protest, as the case may be, shall not be dismissed.
The same rule shall apply to a protest-in-intervention.
The petitioner contends that the COMELEC violated this rule when it immediately issued a show-cause
order without first making an initial evaluation on the basis of the ballots already revised, thus
disregarding the two-step process required by the provision.
It is settled that the best authority to interpret a rule is the source itself of the rule (Advincula v.
Commission on Appointments, (5 SCRA 1179), in this case the COMELEC. The COMELEC rejects the
petitioner’s interpretation as a misreading of the rule. Its own interpretation must prevail, of course. At
any rate, it is established that there was in fact such an initial evaluation and that the ballots revised were
actually examined by the Third Division before it issued the show-cause order. The record belies the
petitioner’s allegation that the COMELEC sent for the ballots only after its show-cause order.chanrobles
law library
The respondents dismiss the petitioner’s complaint that he was denied due process, pointing out that he
was in fact given an opportunity to substantiate his charges at the hearing and also in the memorandum
he later submitted. For refusing to do so on the mistaken ground that evidence aliunde was not
necessary, he should be deemed to have waived the right to be heard on his objections.
They are correct insofar as the petitioner’s claim of terrorism, coercion and other similar irregularities are
concerned. Evidence was really needed to support these charges. With regard, however, to the ballots
claimed to be marked, written by two or more persons, in groups written by only one hand, or fake, no
evidence aliunde was indeed necessary to appreciate them.
In admitting all the ballots protested on these grounds for failure of the protestant to submit extrinsic
evidence, the COMELEC was less than judicious. The ballots are the best evidence of the objections
raised. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed
to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao,
52 Phil. 718). As for the allegedly fake ballots, no better authority than the COMELEC itself can determine
their authenticity, having itself ordered and supervised the printing of all the official ballots.
We find that the public respondent committed no error in issuing the show-cause order in accordance
with its own interpretation of its own rule. We also agree that the petitioner should have submitted
evidence to support his allegations of terrorism, coercion, and other irregularities committed during the
election. But with regard to the ballots objected to as fake, marked, written by more than one person or
in groups written by the same person, an examination thereof should suffice; no evidence aliunde is
necessary for their appreciation. Hence, the petitioner’s objection should not have been summarily
rejected for lack of such evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision and resolution are SET ASIDE and
the protest is REINSTATED, without prejudice to a new partial determination of the case being made in
accordance with Rule 20, Section 7, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the rulings in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
16. Suñga vs. Commission on Elections, 288 SCRA 76 (1998)
Facts: Petitioner was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Cagayan
in the May 1995 Elections. Private respondent Trinidad was then the incumbent Mayor, was a candidate
for re-election in the same municipality.
Sunga filed a complaint accusing Trinidad of violation of the Omnibus Election Code for using threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence
while Trinidad opted not to submit any evidence.
The election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes while Sunga trailed
second.
The complaint filed by Sunga was denied by COMELEC ruling that the petitions filed shall be deemed to
be the amended petition filed on May 11,1995 which was clearly filed after the election mandates the
dismissal of the disqualification case.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can hear and decide disqualification cases against winning candidates
even after the election.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and has
assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the
hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. The fact that the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. Hence, Sunga cannot claim the right to take the oath for the mayoral office because the Local
Government Code clearly provides that in case of disqualification of the one proclaimed for the said
office, the vice-mayor shall assume office.
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall signifies
that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be
enforced.[11] The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows
what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC
which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority.
Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect
harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect.
By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited.
Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of
Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996 Resolutions
of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-
213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad, for disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its
bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.
17. Melendres, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 319 SCRA 262 (1999)
Facts:
Melendres (who lost the Brgy. Chairman position to Concepcion in the May 1997 elections) filed an
election protest at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig contesting results of the elections. After preliminary
hearing, it was found that no filing of docket fee was paid by Melendres (which was required in Sec.6,
Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure) so Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on grounds of
failure to comply with it. Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and said that the case should be
continued on the ground that the filing of docket fee is merely an admin. procedural matter and not
jurisdictional. Concepcion elevated the case for COMELEC to decide on and ruling was that the Trial
Court should cease and desist form further acting on the Election case.
Main issue:
W/N COMELEC acted with a grave abuse of discretion in its ruling
Sub-issue:
W/N payment of filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional req’t
Held:
Sub-issue: No. The payment of filing fee is an admin. procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an
admin. body. Sec 6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure is explicit and does not speak of
conferment of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of
filing fee. Contemporaneous construction is resorted for certainty and predictability in laws esp. those
involving specific terms having tech. agencies.
Main Issue: No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling. The interpretation of
an admin. gov’t agency is accorded with great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. When it renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Courts give weight to gov’t agency or officials charged with the implementation of law, their competence,
expertness, experience and informed judgment.
NOTES: As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability
in the laws, especially those involving specific terms having technical meanings.
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous,
or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or
readily understandable to any ordinary reader.
Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.[23] Thus an action by an administrative agency may
be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the
COMELEC conforms to rather than conflicts with the governing statute and controlling case law on the
matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
18. People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 58 (1937)
FACTS:
Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the
criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case
as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, HSBC.
He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated
to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the
Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the
petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging,
among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV
of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the
Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to
make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different
provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those
provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers
would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this
is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer,
probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
19. Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 (1931)
FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported
by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which
at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also
asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the
country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared unconstitutional
and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and
(2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because
of petitioner’s failure to file another complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg
contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in
his complaint, still the petitioner cannot be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that,
while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.
ISSUES: 1. WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
2. WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-
General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful
delegation of the legislative powers
3. WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
RULING:
1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication.
The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so. Aside from
the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to
protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the
public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the
police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At the time the Act No. 3155
was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature
exceeded its power in passing the Act.
2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit
the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but
merely supplemental to Tariff Law.
20. Besaga vs. Acosta, 756 SCRA 93 (2015)
The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan,
which are parts of a six-hectare timberland.
On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for
Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a bathing establishment. According to the petitioner, the lots are
covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father, the late Arturo Besaga, Sr. who allegedly
occupied the land during his lifetime.
On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied for
SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. According to the respondent spouses,
they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed
by Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.,10 and Digna Matalang Coching (another respondent in this
case), also registered survey claimants.
On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the DENR.
On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order giving due course to the petitioner's SLUP application
and rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. The RED later denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration on July 26, 2004.
The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on. August 25,
2004, through registered mail, an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy
furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. The appeal fee was paid on September 10,
2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and
filed her appeal (which adopted the appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16, 2004.
While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate of
Finality11 declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final and executory for failure of the
respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.
On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the
SLUP12 to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514. On November 18, 2005, the SLUP
was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).
We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was timely
filed, albeit not directly to the office which issued the order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the full
appeal fees although beyond the 15-day period.
We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's
right to due process was not breached.
Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner does not
claim that her right to due process was violated as a result of the wrong mode of appeal. The petitioner
merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87 and affirm the orders of the RED, which according
to her, have attained finality.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009 decision
and October 1, 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616, affirming the August
13, 2007 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 06-K-398.

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003 and
July 26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii) amending the coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to cover Lot
No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the SLUP of the respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos. 4512
and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed his
August 6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held that the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004
orders of the RED have attained finality because: (i) the respondent spouses filed an Appeal
Memorandum, instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the
DENR Secretary and not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent spouses failed to pay the required appeal
fees within the reglementary period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.

HELD: It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of
justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite
justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, x x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure.

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the
requirements of due process.

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial
and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due process
is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of administrative rules of procedure is
whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the gravity of the
violation of the rules is such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly
applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.

We uphold liberality.

First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply
Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the respondent spouses right to due process as this would result
to a denial of their right to appeal.