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    Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION of Constitutional Law tween authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are en- acted with due deference to rights. It is best that the student appreciate this at the threshold, before he en- ters the fascinating world of Constitutional Law. The fundamental powers of the State are the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. Among the safeguards in the Bill of Rights are the right to due process and equal protection, the prohi- bition against unreasonable searches and seizures, free- dom of expression, the impairment clause, and the guarantees against injustice to the accused. These pow- ers and rights countercheck but are not necessarily hos- tile to each other. They have a common objective: co- existence. Their ultimate goal is the same: a well ordered society based on the inviolability of nee which, although they may not be curtailed ee ly, may nevertheless be regulated for the common good. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW deal first with each of the three in- ting as the recognition of au- qua non for the proper enjoy- ment of liberty, with the common weal as the criterion. Then it will proceed to the examination of the different cle III of the Constitution, more com- the Bill of Rights. Once authority is ecessary to define and limit its reach, and the pristine This work will herent powers. This is fit thority is a condition sine provisions in Arti monly known as established, it is n lest regulation become encroachment purity of rights is debased by naked power. everything else, however, a short back- ground study on the basic principles governing constitu- tions in general, their nature, classification, amendment or revision, and interpretation shall be presented. The adoption of the present Constitution of the Philippines in 1987, together with the recent pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court, shall also be reviewed. Before Chapter 2 THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION Definition A ONS NEUTION, according to Cooley, is “that body of rules an 1 maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.” This definition is comprehensive enough to cover the written and the unwritten Constitutions. With particular reference to the Constitution of the Philippines, the more appropriate description is that given by Justice Malcolm, who speaks of it as “the writ- ten instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.” Purposes “The purpose of the Constitution is to prescribe the permanent framework of a system of government, to assign to the several departments their respective pow- ers and duties, and to establish certain first fixed prin- ciples on which government is founded. ee ‘Const. Limitations, 4- ‘ 2 Phil, Constitutional Law, ° *11 Am. Jur. 606. TUTIONAL LAW It should be stressed that when it comes to certain basic individual rights, such as religious freedom, it 14 not the Constitution that creates or confers them. The correct view is that the Constitution merely recognizes and protects these rights and does not bring them into existence. The Constitution is not “the origin of private rights; it is not the fountain of law nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause but the consequence of personal and political freedom.” Supremacy of the Constitution The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all per- sons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its inten- tions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitu- tion must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude, Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.” Classification d into written or unwrit- id or flexible. A written constitution is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents, An un- Constitutions are classifi ten, evolved or enacted, and ri “Watson, 108, * Cruz, Phil. Pol. Law, 1987, p. 11 THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION ce oe woich bave ust bos on the other hand, consists of rules amioatierd eee into a single, concrete various sour: sofa fi ‘ces, such as stat- ee character, judicial decisions, com- . publicists, customs and traditi d certain common law principles, ‘ions, an A conventional constitution is i tion, formally “struck off” at a ree eae following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler. A cumulative constitution, by contrast, is the result of political evolution, “not inaugu- rated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method.” A rigid constitution is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process whereas a flexible constitution is one that can be changed by ordi- nary legislation. The Constitution of the Philippines is written, con- ventional and rigid. Essential Qualities of the Written Constitution A good written constitution must be broad, brief and definite. It must be broad not only because it provides fr izati i t and covers al the organization of the entire governmen persons and things within the territory of the State but m pecause it is supposed to embody the past, to vefloct “the Pp icipate the future. The F i h to provide ituti ust be comprehensive enoug) r ra Sea eontingencY Tt has been said that the constitu- _ * 16 CJS 21. ~ — 6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW tion is “not only the imprisonment of the Past but the unfolding of the future,” to which it may be added that it is also the fulfillment of the present. It must be brief and confine itself to basic princi. ples to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. Otherwise, the constitution would be a prolix and voluminous codi. fication inaccessible to the understanding or even only the interest of the people and unable to adapt readily to changing conditions because of the difficulty of its amendment. It must be clear or definite lest ambiguity in its provisions result in confusion and divisiveness among the people, and perhaps even physical conflict. The ex. ception is found only in those cases where the rules are deliberately worded in a vague manner, like the due process clause, to make them more malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of new conditions and circum- stances. Essential Parts of the Written Constitution A good written constitution contains three essential substantive parts. These are known as the constitution of liberty, the constitution of government, and the consti- tution of sovereignty.” The first consists of a series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of gov- ernment as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.’ These are found principally in Article III of out Constitution, and also in Articles II, IV, V, and XII. * Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 397. * Ibid. TH E NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 The second i _ ee Of a series of provisions outlin- pe ene mn of the government, enumerating its Pp 7 & down certain rules relative to its admini- stration, and defining the ele ® : ctorate.” T) i Articles VI to XI of our Constitution ‘hese are found in The third consists of the provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about.” These are found in Article XVII of our Constitution. Permanence of the Constitution One advantage of the written, conventional and rigid constitution is its permanence, or its capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities. “A Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves.”" Such a constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change. But the very virtue of permanence may at the same time be a disadvantage where the written constitution is unable to adjust to the need for change justified by new conditions and circumstances. The difficulty itself of the amending process may be responsible for the delay in effecting the needed change and thus cause irreparable injury to the public interest. a ° Id. “Id. » Yanhorne v. Dorrance, 1 L., ed. 391. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW In such a situation, the written constitution wil] be come an impediment rather than a spur to Progress, * treadmill to the nation seeking to liberate itself from the shackles of obsolete Tules no longer conformable to theig needs and aspirations. Where this happens, the People may have to resort to a violation of the provisions of the permanent constitution; and if they cannot make a new constitution, they will have to make a revolution.” Interpretation The constitution, like statutory enactments, should be read in accordance with the usual rules on interpre- tation and construction. Chief among these is the canon that it should be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to the intendment of the framers. This intention is discoverable either in the document itself or through the use of extrinsic aids, such as the records of the constitu- tional convention. One recurrent question in this regard is whether the constitution should be interpreted only in the light of conditions obtaining at the time of its adoption or according to the changes inevitably transpiring in the history of the nation. Should the constitution be petri- fied or progressive? The answer is obvious: the constitu- tion must change with the changing times lest it impede the progress of the people with antiquated rules grown ineffective in a modern age. As eloquently put by Justice Winslow, “The political or philosophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next and entirely discarded by the third. The race moves forward constantly, and no Canute can stay its progress.” ? Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. ” Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION Of particular importance als case of doubt, the constitution sho executing rather than ni rather than directory; rospective. ‘o is the rule that, in uld be considered self- on-self-executing; mandatory and prospective rather than ret- directly or antag provision is a rule that by itself is x rectly applicable without need of statu- tory implementation. Examples are the provisions found in the Bill of Rights, which may be invoked by proper parties independently of or even against legislative en- actment. Thus, in Collector of Customs v. Villaluz,"* the Supreme Court held that judges derive directly from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution the authority to conduct preliminary investigations to determine prob- able cause for the issuance of a search warrant or war- rant of arrest, which power may not be withdrawn or restricted by the legislature. A similar observation has been made in a number of cases concerning the Presi- dent’s power of control over all the departments as di- rectly conferred upon him by Article VII, Section 17. ‘A non-self-executing provision is one that remains dormant unless it is activated by legislative implemen- tation, An example is Article II, Section 4, which pro- vides that in the fulfillment of the prime duty of defend- ing the State, “all citizens may be required under condi- tions provided by law to render personal military or civil service.” Such a requirement cannot be imposed until and unless the legislature so wills, through the passage of a law specifying the conditions. Another example is Article IV, Section 3, providing that “Philippine citizen- ship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.” This provision does not cause the loss or recov- “71 SORA 356. = 10 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ery of citizenship. It is the implementing statute that will. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provi. sions of the constitution should be considered’ self executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the law-making body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. Implementation may, however, be imposed as a duty upon the legislature by mandatory language of the Constitution. For example, when Article X, Section 19, provides that “the first Congress elected under this Con. stitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of the organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,” the legislature could not unduly delay their promulgation. While it is doubtful if mandamus would have been available against it, public opinion, if any- thing else, compelled it to act. Again in the absence of a clear showing of a con- trary intention, the provisions of the constitution should be regarded as mandatory. Otherwise, the fundamental law would have no more force and prestige than a set of directions which the government and the people would be free to disregard. “As a rule, therefore, whenever the language used in the Constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and un- equivocal negation; and whenever the language contains a grant of power, it is intended as a mandate, not a mere direction.” * Black, Constitutional Law, pp. 20-21. r THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION oi Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the constitution should be given only a prospective ap- plication unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the constitution. Amendment or Revision Change in the constitution may be effected by a mere modification in its interpretation by the courts of justice. Where the provisions of the constitution are ‘ambiguously worded—perhaps deliberately so—judges may read out of them, in the light of altered conditions, meanings that at an earlier time were considered he- retical. One illustration will suffice. In People v. Pomar,” decided in 1924, our Supreme Court declared unconsti- tutional a law granting maternity leave privileges to female employees on the ground that it impaired the obligation of contracts. At present, however, although the impairment clause has not undergone any change in language since then, such privileges are a commonplace. Social legislation has been sustained under the ex- panded concept of the police power as a valid limitation on the freedom of contract. There are provisions of the Constitution, though, which are not as malleable to judicial interpretation, what Cooley calls the “iron rules,” because they cannot be altered except by formal amendment. Examples are the provisions for the age qualifications of certain offi- * 46 Phil. 440. 12 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW cers or for their term of office. The composition of the /ommission on Audit, to take another illustration, can. not be reduced or increased by a mere court decision, Modification of such provisions may be effected ei. ther by amendment or revision as provided in Article TI. Amendment means isolated or piecemeal change only, as distinguished from revision, which is a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument. Thus, there was mere amendment of the Constitu- tion of 1935 when the term of office of the President of the Philippines was changed from six to four years. But there was a revision when the Constitutional Commis- sion of 1986 re-wrote the Marcos charter and produced what is now the Constitution of 1987. Procedure Two steps are involved in the amendment or revi- sion of our Constitution. The first is the Proposal and the second is the ratification. (1) Proposal The proposal is usually made either directly by the Congress or by a constitutional convention. A special case is provided for where the proposal may be made directly by the people through initiative. The pertinent rules are: Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Con- stitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) Aconstitutional convention. THE NATURE oF THE CONSTITUTION 13 sented by at least priatd legislative district must be repre- feral’ Nefamenaieen erent of the registered voters within five ‘his section shall be authorized wor ater Rats following the ratification of this Constitution ner than onee every five years thereafter, The Congress shall ; exorcise of ey shal provide for the implementation of the Sec. — ea 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all ‘mbers, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. It should be noted that through the method of ini- tiative, the people may propose only amendments and not a revision. Where what is intended is a mere amendment or change of particular provisions only, the proposal is better made by direct legislative action. In this case, the vote of at least three-fourths of all the members of the Congress shall be needed. This method will avoid the unnecessary expenditure of public funds and time that the calling of a constitutional convention will entail. But if what is envisioned is the overhaul of the en- tire Constitution, it is advisable to entrust the task to a constitutional convention, which will have more time, opportunity and presumably also the needed expertise to discharge it. The Supreme Court distinguished between an amendment and a revision in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.” Thus — TT ™ GR, No, 174163, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160. 14 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW The framers of the Constitution intended, and Wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution. A people's initiative can only propose amend. ments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of sepa- ration of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly re- fers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally af- fects only the specific provision being amended. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the “sub- stantial entirety” of the constitution by the deletion or altera- tion of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the de- gree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes “change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.” Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles — Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive — affecting a total of 105 pro- visions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unl cameral legislature. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15 A change in ; ' 7 Constitution eas of government is a revision of Unicameral-Parliamentary system: (antat Presidential to a the Office of the Presi Buster, involving the abolition of Congress, is beyond at the abolition of one chamber of ve loubt a revision, not a mere amendment. ere t Braet eres n without affecting any other section or Pate may generally be considered an amendment reat oe ‘or example, a change reducing the voting Hae eats to 18 years is an amendment and not a revi- . Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass, media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amend- ment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college de- gree as an additional qualification for election to the Presi- dency is an amendment and not a revision. ___ However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “repub- lican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article IL of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Con- stitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. Nevertheless, the choice of the method of proposal lies in the exclusive discretion of the legislature. Thus, in 1981, it decided to directly undertake what was prac- tically a revision of the Constitution of 1973 instead of calling a constitutional convention for the purpose. The call for a constitutional convention may be made by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Congress. If they cannot make up their mind, the ques- tion of whether or not to call the constitutional conven- tion shall be submitted to the people themselves, by at least a majority vote of all the members. 16 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW This last alternative is a plainly absurd procedure that permits the members of the Congress to authorize the waste of public funds by calling on their constituents to make a decision that is essentially addressed to the legislators themselves. In effect, they are allowed to “pass the buck” simply because they are unable to agree on the decision the people expect them to make. The 1935 Constitution provided that “the Congress, in joint session assembled, by a vote of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitu- tion or call a convention for the purpose.” Significantly, the phrase “voting separately” does not appear in the corresponding provisions of Article XVII, which author- izes the Congress, “upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members” to propose amendments or a revision directly; “by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members” to call a con- stitutional convention; and “by a majority vote of all its Members” to submit to the electorate the question of calling such convention. Was the omission of the phrase “voting separately” deliberate or a mere oversight? Interestingly, Article VI, Sec. 28(4), which used to apply to the unicameral Batasang Pambansa, continues to require “the concurrence of a majority of all the Mem- bers of the Congress” to a law granting a tax exemption. Article VII, Section 4 provides that a tie in the presiden- tial election shall be broken “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting sepa- rately.” Section 9 requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting sepa- rately.” Under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the Privilege of the writ of ha- beas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Con- THE NATURE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 17 ess, “voting j ), al its Membere.” Wace oO of at least a majority of preiclerantanean n 19, the President is empow- 5 7 Sty “with the concurrence of a major- ity of all the Membe of the Congress” wi nae tion of whether they sh. vongress without indica- r they shall vote jointly or separately. . In Imbong v. Commission on Elections," which was decided under the 1935 Constitution, it was held that the Congress, acting as a constituent body, may with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, call a con- stitutional convention in general terms only. Thereafter, the same Congress, acting this time as a legislative body, may pass the necessary implementing law provid- ing for the details of the constitutional convention, such as the number, qualifications, and compensation of its members. This statute may be enacted in accordance with the ordinary legislative process. The third method is hardly practicable, let alone the fact that it may be availed of only if the implement- ing legislation is enacted. The Congress has apparently not yet done this. Unlike the referendum and initiative in general, the proposal to amend the Constitution un- der Section 2 must be made upon petition of not only ten but twelve percent of the total number of registered voters although the representation of each legislative district is retained at three percent. As if the framers were afraid that this method would be overused, it was not allowed to be employed until 1992, and not oftener than once every five years thereafter. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections,” the peti- tioners, claiming that their initiative petition “had the support of 6,327,952 jndividuals constituting at least was . 28. m aeNo 174 3, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160. 18 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters,” whose signatures, according to the petitioners, had been duly verified by election registrars, asked the Commission on Elections to hold a plebiscite for purposes of ratifying the same, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The respondent denied due course to said petition “for lack of an enabling law governing ini- tiative petitions to amend the Constitution,” as held by the Supreme Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elec- tions,” where it declared Republic Act No. 6735 as in- adequate for purposes of implementing the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the re- spondent’s denial of due course to said initiative petition and stated that the “Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition war- rants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court’s ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.” According to the Court, “the essence of amend- ments ‘directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition’ is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential ele- ments must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or represen- © G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106. TH F E NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 19 tative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, t) petition.” Thus — he proposal must be embodied in a - eae clements are present only if the full text express thee aeenentdments is fist shown to the people who titon, Thus, an ‘ent by signing such complete proposal in a pe- ae - ae , an amendment is “directly proposed by the people ‘ough initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amend- ments. | The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so at- tached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impos- sible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. The Court noted that the petitioners did not attach to their petition a copy of the paper that the people were supposed to have signed as their initiative petition. All that they submitted to the Court was a copy of a signa- ture sheet, which contained the following — PROPOSITION: ‘DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERN- MENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOv- ERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFI- CIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; SND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVII AS ‘TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYS- TEM TO ANOTHER?” ndment to the “I hereby APPROVE the proposed camer 1987 Conatitution. My signature herein which shall form 20 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW bart of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitutign signifies my support for the filing thereof.” As conceded by the petitioners, “there is not a sin. gle word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes in the signature sheet. Nej- ther does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it.” Moreover, the Court observed that, considering that the petitioners printed only 100,000 copies of the initiative petition, only 100,000 of the alleged 6.3 mil- lion signatories could have actually seen or read the same, “assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000. With only 100,000 printed copies of the peti- tion, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the sig- nature sheets.” These and other revelations regarding the actual contents of the petitioners’ initiative, such as the pro- posals to lift the term limits for members of parliament, to enable the members of parliament to determine the expiration of their term of office, and to convene an in- THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 21 terim parliament for Purposes of proposing further amendments to the Constitution, all of which were not properly disclosed to the alleged 6.3 million signatories led the Court to declare that “Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.” Thus — This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the pro- posed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiati he 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty, Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the pro- posed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 mil- lion signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections. The Court later added — An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution re- quires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the peo- ple x x x in a petition” — meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amend- ments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s funda- mental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amend- ments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. ‘The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to di- rectly propose amendments to the Constitution, This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition. 22 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and un. Constitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the re quirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution the, the initiative must be “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,” The Court likewise emphasized that Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution entitles the People to file a petition for initiative for Purposes only of Propos- ing amendments to, and not revisions o > the Constity- tion. There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution. The fram intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people’s initiative may Propose only amendments to the Constitution, Where the in- tent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the Power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empow- ered to propose amendments. According to the Court — A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the Present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Uni- cameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitu- tion. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radi- cal change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes @ revision of the Constitution. THI (E NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 23 By any legal test a Bicameral-Presidentia), aa icayaibdietion, a shit. from tem, involving the ant! inicameral-Parliamentary sys- esas 6 the abolition of the Office of the President and vision, Finally, the Court emphasized that — The 6.8 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 | August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for “Raul I.. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners.” In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act ‘together with’ the 6.3 million signato- ries, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as | valid. The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, ‘No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, man- dating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally un- related to the shift in the form of government. Since the pre- sent initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the elec- torate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail. (A) Position of the Constitutional Convention There are three theories on the relative position of the constitutional convention vis-a-vis the regular de- partments of the government. - 24 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW The first, as announced in Loomis v. Jackson; holds that the constitutional convention is supreme over the other departments of the government because the powers it exerc are in the nature of sovereign pow- ers. This theory is thus called the Theory of Conven- tional Sovereignty. The second, as announced in Wood’s Appeal,” con- siders the constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the government since it is merely a crea- tion of the legislature. The third, as announced in Frantz v. Autry,” de- clares that as long as it exists and confines itself within the sphere of its jurisdiction, the constitutional conven- tion must be considered independent of and co-equal with the other departments of the government. The third of these theories, which is the most popu- lar, has been observed in this jurisdiction since the case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito.” (2) Ratification Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Consti- tution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the ap- Proval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elec- tions of the sufficiency of the petition. “6 W Va. 613, *79 Pa 59. * 91 Pac. 193, * 73 Phil. 1. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 25 The i people themselves inthe eect thus involves the i Sin the so i . . tering the fundamental | a eee onaly . aw. In the case of a mere stat- ute, it suffices that it is enacted by their chosen repre- sentatives pursuant to their mandate. But where it is the Constitution that is being framed or amended, it is imperative and proper that approval directly fi the people themselves, pe me IO Proposals to amend the Constitution must be rati- fied within a reasonable time after they are made be- cause they are intended to answer present needs or cor- rect current problems. If they are accepted only after a long delay, they may no longer serve the purposes for which they were made in the first place. Moreover, pro- posals should be voted upon at a time when interest in them is still rife and the electorate is still knowledge- able on the pros and cons of the issues submitted to them. According to Judge Jameson, “an alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the senti- ment and felt needs of today and, if not ratified early while the sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as waived and not again to be voted upon unless for a second time proposed.” One of the issues raised in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections” was the validity of the submission of cer- tain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the —_— ® Constitutional Conventions, 4th ed., Sec. 535. * 91 SCRA 774 (1967). 26 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW people who would be more interested in the issues jn. volved in the election. The Supreme Court, however, declared, in inter. preting Article XV of the 1935 Constitution: “There ig in this provision nothing to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election, The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratifj- cation in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit pro- posed amendments for ratification in general elections.” Justice Sanchez, with whom Justice J.B.L. Reyes concurred, expressed a strong dissent. His argument was that, in order that the proposed amendments could be considered to have been properly submitted, “the people must be afforded opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dic- tates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influence . . . There must be a fair submission, intelligent consent or rejec- tion.” Such fair submission, he believed, would be possi- ble only if the plebiscite were scheduled on a special date. : Despite the soundness of this dissent, the majority view was affirmed in the case of Occena v. Commission on Elections,” decided in 1980. In Tolentino v. Commission on Elections,” the Con- stitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance *" 95 SCRA 755 (1980). * 41 SCRA 702 (1971). THE NATURE op THE CONSTYTUTION 27 Bi to 18, befor eee {0 lower the voting age from then under revigts 8 of the draft of the Constitution prohibit. this 4 i had been approved. The petition to us Pp ebiscite Was granted by the Supreme Court, which strictly interpreted the requirement of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments shall be “approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the People for ratification.” The use of the word “election” in the singular, according to the Su- preme Court, meant that the entire Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only, Fur- thermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. The strict attitude of the Supreme Court in the abovementioned case was relaxed in the Ratification Cases” involving the validity of the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. By so doing, it removed any “further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being consid- ered in force and effect.” Supreme Court held in the Sanidad Case that the aed from September 21 to October 16, or a total of twenty-five days, would give the people sufficient time within which to study the proposed amendments and vote intelligently thereon. i itioner: ‘ht a post- Almario v. Alba,” the petitioners soug! t 2 | pacers the plebiscite on the 1984 constitutional ® Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 (1973). ® 127 SCRA 69 (1984). 28 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW amendments, to give the people more time to study the proposed changes, particularly those relating to urban reform and the inclusion of “grant” as an additional mode of acquiring public lands. The Supreme Court denied, holding there was enough time (67 days for the amendment of Section 11 and 42 days for the amend- ment of Section 12, both in Article XIV). Justices Tee- hankee, Abad Santos, Herrera and Relova dissented, arguing that the proposed changes had not been suffi- ciently disseminated and discussed and that there was really a need for a more careful consideration. To ensure the needed careful study of the proposed amendments, it is now required that the plebiscite be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such proposal. Judicial Review of Amendments From what has already been observed, it is clear that the question of the validity of the adoption of amendments to the Constitution is regarded now as subject to judicial review. The view announced in Ma- banag v. Lopez Vito” to the effect that the question of whether or not the Parity proposal had been validly adopted in Congress was political in nature has been rejected, indeed as early as in the case of Taviada v. Cuenco.” The present doctrine allows the courts to in- quire into whether or not the prescribed procedure for amendment has been observed. a It will be recalled that the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction in the Sanidad Case® over the Solicitor * Supra. * 100 Phil. 1101. “ Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976). cot seco THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION General’s contention that the tution was a political 29 amendment of the Consti- Fi question, : : 5 in the main opinion As Justice Martin put it asa pe Seed General would consider the question at bar view. We disagree, theo ine outside the domain of judicial re THE CONSTITUTION AND THE covRTS (2) Proper Party A proper party is one who has sustained or isin im mediate danger of sustaining aa injury asa result ofthe act complained of” Until and unless such actual or por tential injury is established, the complainant cannot hhave the legal personality to raise the constitutional question, In Stronghold tnsurance Company, Ine. v. Cuenca,® the Supreme Court explained that “itis fundamental that the courts are established in order to afford reliefs {0 persons whose rights or property interests have been invaded oF violated, or aro threatened with invasion by thers’ ennduct or acts, and to give relief only at the instance of such persons. The jurisdiction of a court of law or equity may not be invoked by or for an individual whose rights have not been breached.” Indeed, “locus standi, which is a mere procedural technicality, has ‘been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury asa resulta the governmental act that is boing challenge.” In Tifeston Utlmann,a physician questioned the constitutionally of «law prohibiting the tse of eontra- cwptives, upon the ground that it might prove dangerous to the life ar health of same of his patients whore phys- «al condition would not enable them to bear the rigors of childbirth. The court dismissed the challenge, holding Ba Pe Levit, 200 US, Gi 108, lh 62019, 672 SCRA 47, cing 59m ae 24 Parc $0 inn Fay Gio The au Serta 52 CONSTITUTIONAL Law that the patents ofthe phys h physician end himself were the proper parties. n4 "2 the Physician In People . Vera it was : it was held that th orale 6 Go, Site Philipines was a proper pate challenge than anyon te Probation Act beret the ny other, it was the government itech More be concerned over the validity ofits ent Taye Sl Nc ar il le i dion bee ee PREY tee he was not claiming the po io incrtinty ix Topacio v. Ong" the Supreme Court he cen oe Petition filed by one who was not estore Sur Ses ofthe respondent as an Associate antes Eantienobavan, Ie said thet the petitions wince etee Selly called for the nutiication ofthe respondent an QR Na ts Jay 6, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 53 ppointment to said court, constituted a collateral attack on a public officer's ttle, The Court stressed that such @ challenge may be done only directly by way of quo war rranto proceedings, which may be fled only by the Solic- tor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exer- cised by another. “For a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office In fact, not even a mere pproferental right to be appointed thereto can lend a ‘modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.” The issue in Paguia o. Office of the President” the power of Congress to limit the President's preraga- tive to nominate ambassadors by legislating age quali. cations despite the eonsttutional rue limiting Congress rule in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commis: sion on Appointments’ confirmation of nominees. The Court dismissed said petition, which was fled by a citi= zen and a taxpayer, “Yr lack of a ease or controversy ‘rounded on petitioner's lack of eapacity to sue and mmootness." ‘The rule before was that an oninary taxpayer did ‘ot have the propor party personality to question the legality of an appropriation fae sinc his interest in the sum appropriated was not substantial snough. Thus, i Custodio v: Senate Present,” a challenge by an ord ay taxpayer tothe validity af law granting bachpay to members of Congres fr the period corresponding the Japanese Occupation was dismissed as having bees ‘eammanced by ane who was aot a proper party $$$ 54 [CONSTITUTIONAL Law Since the frst Emergency the rule has been Tesoayers mus however make 9 cain o¢ beremes of publi finde o thax et eg iene, or deflected to an ieee mea itt there i a wastage of publi funds eee forcement of an invalid ore the government are servi bbursement of publi funda “A Parton suing asa taxpayer, however, st show {atthe act complained of directly involves te ied Aisburseient of public funds derived fam tame et ‘must lio prove that he has sulicient intent ie ye {entng the iogal expenditure of money raced by oe lon and that he will sustain m direct injury becouse of the enforcement ofthe questioned statute or Contact other words, for a taxpayer’ suit to prosper te tel sites mast be met: (1) publie funds derived from taxa tion are disbursed by a paitical susivision or Inst ‘mentality and in doing so» Inw ix violated or some It ‘opie 2, 00 68 SRA ‘pss omit al (2 thepttione i iy fected by he ster A fexpver i considered to have the prope pe sonality o tang tense contol ree wes {ti established that peble fonds fm satin eve non dicured in alleged entrventinn af thea ot {he Constaton™ Thos atxpaper whe in atte lacuance bythe Commission on Av ois Car Ny fe See te ton pe fds oa Seomtea? anata! 2 yaaa “sanding to fle hs aut aa tapye, Ss he ould tener alee yt gl oe a le moe. Ie bear srsing tho tht te Supreme Core Saude cece hte Alb a taxpayer ue Bins mre pedal ch ‘lithe reqremen eis tnd aye wae ithe our ern es dct {hata eae a he pope pry pray 9 Skike phon fa pce or he eestin ot 1 popmced eoasttaonal amendment. Legian have ioral ren ahold a roe ats ae Snvoling slain that the aia sein complained Ure Sai ea a Soe y 56 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ‘infringes upon their Prerogatives as such," Jy, ince of Noth Cotabato. The Government ops lc ofthe Philippines Peace Panel on nened feu the Supreme Court pronounced that “any se other eave that nares the insitation of Congrece oe featve but nonetheless substantial injure that ea be questioned by legislators.” The Count likewise at Fred the lcs stand of legislators in Soe oe ita," claim that a i here being a claim that B.0. 464 infringes on, Local government units can seek relief in. ole or Vat th ova nen ie 8 ‘terests other local government units," i In PHILCONSA », Gimenez,® an organization of ae stew nit se th a Pm a Seal sone ny Sn I it» nino ction” he one Ga ge, tin he tte i pa _ online cea “eon ae fDi Fein on Cte oo emen oe frag Bite Shp get eet rascnagea THE CONSTIeTION AND THE covets locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presi cette reli te i neta the tame or ot Fo the pat ce om Een Sonica Fe do ene tha Tel rer insanty st oll eomani tad ‘ea wll a te pop een be ome armen 58 ‘CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25 te ilo of pss it is expected rs. The lp ang ing then f the pines devs git anda rc fits sound nertin, this Cours herby bru the recede Wiehe espns tre oan vantage a This ruling was reversed hoever in Kilasbayan Morato," on the ground thatthe petitioner had ny ce stantial interest in the contract being challenged It is signifleant though that Kilosbayen was ag nowledged as a proper party in a suit questioning tg cliibilty of an appointee to the Supreme Court os the ‘round of his alleged lack ofa constitutional qualifier, ton, natural-bora citizenship, The Court allowed ity Putition, considering that it involved “an iseue of utes and far-reaching constitutional importance, namely, te ‘qualification — nay, the etizenship ofa person to he ‘ppeinted a member of the Supreme Court” Howeres in Anak Mindanao Pary-List Group ». The Eseoutng Secretary,” the Court ruled that’ people's or nom, ‘governmental organizations, such as the Mamalo De scendants Organisation, In, may not ventilate “gener. alized grievances" agains¢ Executive Orders, In Senate v Ermita” one ofthe petitioners, the po- iia! party PDP-Laban, was, as such, not considered by the Supreme Court as clothed with the requisite logs! standing to question the contitutionality af Executive Order No, 464. Acording to the Court, frit to be “ac corded standing on the ground of transcendental impor. ance, however itmust establish (1) the character ofthe {26ScRA 40905, cma while w: Boma, GR No 7771, Jty 8, 207, 58 ‘OR Ne 1677, Ap 3, ao a6 SRA ‘THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 59 funds (that itis public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear ease of disrogart! of a constitutional or statutory prokibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the govern: ‘ment, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised." In Lozada 1. Commission on Elections,” the peti- tioners were held without legal standing t demand the fling of vacancies in the legislature because they had only “a generalized interest” shared with the rest ofthe citizenry. A similar ruling was rendered in Guazon e. De Villa,” where “well-meaning citizens with only second ‘hand’ knowledge of the events” were not considered proper parties to challenge the saturation drives or *zonas" being conducted by the military When, in Intgrated Bor of the Philippines Zamora," the petitioner questioned the deployment of the Marines in Metro Manila to combat eriminality, the Supreme Court hold through Justice Kapunan ‘Te 1B? pinay anchors sting it leped ld the neo aw aad the Contain Aer tt aonb ct oe sein suppor af sc tl Thm wind te tlt ii ice eo opie td slant intra the cio foe 208A 997 a5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Te has tevise ben ued that, though gy member ranted standing to assert the rights ofits “the mere invocation by the Interated Bar of tee ippins or any member ofthe legal profesan op duty preserve the rl oi des nat uct ge it with standing.” to ask for the return or reimbursement of all the eit it, had Paid for each bag of fertilizer it sold unde So oral ofthe ley tot haunt een ict uy Ppa et oe ny, ei te eed by the Court om Tas epithe Pat ‘apr "Ge Plone Pec nl oe Ne ests anh soe Seek iif th Contato» The Covent ofthe ‘THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 61 ‘The petitioner in Gareillano v. House of Representa- tives” justified his standing to file his petition by alleg- ing that he was the person alluded to in the “Hello Gare" tapes, the playing of which in Congress he sought to restrain. The Court acknowledged that “his voice was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one ofthe voices in the reeordings, Obvi ously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be d= rectly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for probibition.” Gar- illano’sco-petitioners, who both alleged “an interest in tho executian of the laws," and an intervenor, who as- serted his “constitutional right to due process,” were Tikewise acknowledged as proper parties in this case, considering that the issues raised in their petitions were “of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and shouldbe resolved forthe guidance ofall” According to the Court, they all satisfied “the requisite personal take inthe outome ofthe controversy by merely being Gtizens ofthe Repub” Indeed, it has been ruled that ordinary citizens ‘may be considered as clothed with locus ston and would satiety the requirement of personal interest when the proswding ivolves the assertion ofa public right,” wher the right to information is invoked,” or when reodom of expression, which has been considered as issue of overarching significance to our society, “Fanaie dey Ibe Howe of Repeat, GB Ne 0, Norn 1,200 118 Sa He Pepa ng 2 SCRA 351200, 7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW volved" There must be a showing though that the js. es raised by them are of transcendental importance svhich mst bo settled erly.” When the issue concerns ube ght its sfcent thatthe petitioner isa eities Ad ha an atrest in the execution ofthe Tas,” In Francisco v. Fernando,” the petitioner, a lawyer and ataspaver, questioned the legality ofthe “wet flag scheme” ofthe Metro Manila Development Authority CQIMDA), claiming thet said scheme had no legal basis {ecu th MIDAS srering bd the eto Nani aunel, didnot authorize it; violates the due process cise beusia umaryponishment fray ing; disregards the constitutional protection’ against crue, degreting, and inhuman punishment; and vio. lates pedestrian rights as it exposes them to vations tential hazards. The Court dismissed his petition. Te sid — A i as ‘ise «ential qotion only when {usec hott he a ronal sled eos eh threatened iy ease ote allegedly loa cont te traceable to the shllenged fers hey ay i: ad forte action wil ely rede the iy “Chaar Goat “an OW No 16898, brary 15, 208,545 “Dav Ar, ae Na 17196, May 3, 2006, 49 SCRA The Prac of Kath Gon om iin es Blo ear of he No 11, Nominee 200 Go Seka Tile CONSTITUTION AND THE couRTS 63 Net thre mest option cet the Cort shld re he sig quem es the scendenal imprest tes Aa oto othe staning eure, he encode a Jevtane of th nes raed mast the mer ot pt ian Ths he partion mast show, ong ors te recne ofa car read e's or rite, Peston st shown sch car oneal ar attr lt Intervenors may be given legal standing upon showing of fats that satisfy the requirements ofthe law authorizing intervention, such as 2 legal interest in the ‘matter in litigation, or jn the success of either of the chal: parties." Chaves 0. Judicial and Bor Council” wa lenge against the constittionality of the composition of tive Judicial and Bar Council made by a lawyer ko had withdrawn his nomination forthe post of Chief Justice precisely because of his objetions against the right of Gangress to have two representatives theroin, The Su jpreme Court took cognizance of the petition, declaring that, “while is true tha a ‘personal stake’ onthe case Ss imperative to have locus ston, this is not to say that only official nominees far the post of Chief Justice can ume to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional.” The Court added — once, cian bat 9 ih orig tls question tthe cout ot wth gel sanding and the same tne, SSS ih ef nso patance society Te Haaren ection the JBC gal and wont BE ie er eetmor, not ut fr amis 3 “The Pron of Noth Catabta The Gvenmnet of he epai ikePipines Peace Pe! on Aneel Doi re. tS Ne 20250 daly 172018, 76 SORA 5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ci pos bt fall etzens who ave the right o sek judi Se eaten eg andes, el Voters may be considered as proper parties with yo. yc tote iplenetaton fection lave prvi Earth mst be shoving of obvious interes ed validity of the election law in question.”* In Capala Commission on Elections," the Court, citing Guingona v, Commission on Elections," brushed aside technieal ob; Jeetions regarding the partis’ locus standi in connection ‘with their petition questioning the award by the re. ‘spondent of its automated poll project to the Private ‘dent Te Cort snow a the coe tac an easing pb importaney ae ira y pation, he adnan ses ‘sgt ont loved oan ne ay ‘if the ends of justice would not be subserve i ‘adherence to the rules of procedure.” iii [a Galitov. Aquino," the Supreme th peter to has no vested ight to ele legal standing to assail an der providing el ean nal an Erect Sr ne ®) Earliest Opportunity etl thatthe cnstittionsl question must be tis ere ‘TS atteate pni operant tras in the pig, annt Se een at ‘THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 65 the trial, and, if not considered atthe trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” ‘This general rule, however, is subject to the follow ing exceptions: (1) In criminal eases, the constitutional question can be raised at any time in the discretion ofthe court. (2) In civil cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any stage it is necessary to the dotermi- nation ofthe case itself (3) In every case, except where there is estoppel, the constitutional question may be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction ofthe court." Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Question ‘The reason why courts will as much as possible avoid the decision of a constitutional question can be traced to the doctrine af separation of powers which enjoins upon each department 2 proper respect forthe o Te ag ip a 8. sexy Sa ater ara tn ah le Sa echt See sae eats ede Fa arcane Ge re et inane Comps, Ne 17S Sener 6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW acs othe ale departments, very law has nits ay the presumption of validity Unless and until a spec rosin of tol is ddared invalid ana unconati onal the same i valid and binding for ll intone se purposes Tn ine with this pole, courts indulge qe resumption of constitutonality and go by the may tht “to doubt ito sustain” The theory ie tha, as junta of the leiative and executive authoritoa law is supposed to ave been careflly studied and i termined tobe constitutional before it was finally acted" Hence as long as there is some other bsis they Gan be used by che courts for its decision, the consi thls ofthe challenged law will not be touched acy ‘he case willbe decided on other available grouncless As held in Laurel o. Garcia” “the Court wil not Pass upon a constitutional question although pr Bresented bythe record ithe eae can be dome ‘Size other ground such asthe application ofa storage or general law.” Jeter eld in Spouse Mirasol ». Court of Ape at — peo {the cos wil ant rece the cnt ho nah cote ane sete op ey 7 ey he ct a aig sent tl Dahage Cassin veyron on, GNA ata Geter See sony sith Boat Cton e Caneieee ASE Lei acre at 80 echinacea 11187 Sc aor case0) So “40 a se THE CONSTITUTION AND THE counts gy weston nd to presume thatthe acts ofthe pla depart iets are ali, absent a car and unmistakable shoe {he cueay. To dub ist stan This presumption eB nthe doctrine of seperation of pes This means tot ihe, ‘meatre had fst been crf tid bythe leptin ad ecutive departnents and found toe in acd with the (Constitution bei wa fly enacted and appre, Moreover, the Court has likewise made it clear that “for reasons of public poliy, the consitutonality of a law cannot be collaterally attacked" jersan cannot question the validity of law under ‘hich he had previously acepted Benes, the Supreme "Fine Natal Bk Pn, pa; Rag aw tag Ba So Ine Dever 20759 SCRA 7 emai 68 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Court ed tht anda va stoped rom npg th cnsttuinalty a the aii eorgmizaton Bat when in 156 similar aw was passed by Cy gress and was at later assailed onthe ground thao Wolted judicial security of tenure, the Supreme Con! cout nat avid ruling on the constitutional quest ralsed The patitoners inthis eas,” unlike Zandone hhad not accepted new positions created by the lane ater A had legislated them out of their former courts "Te Brindle of esopel could therefore not be applied“ them andthe Supreme Court consequently had te See caer whether or not the challenged law veg constitutions. Greer, a8 determined hy the Court of Men Thethor o- not the respondents camping Sie Should be considered as a maniecatn ofa ne Ofinent to coma intngener 1 Gerera Ciro" the Court alo cose not to Fue, on the consttuionliy af the neporae ointments in height oa subsequent erg Providing fr the eel ofthe ane ee Orde fant * Seo date, GR LTO, Ja. 1,188 1 oc. ERS :16070, January 48,208 570. ScRA 2 19150 March, 011, ee Sa ook —_ pee EERE ‘THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CouRTS 69 constitutionality of said appointments as not the lis ota, or the “cause of the suit or action,” of the case. “From the submitted pleadings,” said the Court, “what is decisive is the determination of whether the peti- tioner has a cause of aetion to institute and maintain this present petition — a quo warranto against respon dent Urro, Ifthe petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion of the constitu. tionality of the appointments ofthe respondents is ren- dered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of the petitioners action since he does not even allege that he has personal and substan- tial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are concerned.” In Demetri w. Alba,” the Supreme Court cited the so-called “seven pillars" of limitations of the power of Judicial reviow, as written by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Asiwander v. TVA, as follows: 2 ag eid ete LIS SR mae Seer teen tie tof he i i cin A el aur us. a8 ss 0 CONSTITUTIONAL Law 8, The Cut wil emule a fan ts tra seedy he pei ial tobe spit” its 4, Me Cat il tps sn 9 ent Sn ich or rnb te we i bs ne herd pn ih ee Dole ib dna vse pg ‘acne del itr nr ha nil gine ars ca ne Se Cn i wu ate chalet the Feel Conta = cat ee the Cour wil at ps apn the vali fa imran otto owt ee Some Atag he may apn: pty ote he iter ott pao ampere ih. Tha hee Sita ues oli the prernnae oun flat eran Paredes Ce aan isl of sit boveh fy ica gee Neth Ameen see ci ality ofan act fhe Congress eden crn frou dou of osttninalg e in nies ela rail tha this Cart wa SES eH fe mars a eh be gesting be ee Aa srestd in os : Fencing. Court of Appeal i Sasi that the mater of costisatonal pee "580 ScRa 02209, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CouRTS 7 rule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the ease and raised and argued at the earliest opportunity. Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality ‘There are two views on the effects ofa declaration of the unconsttutionality ofa statute, The first is the orthodox view. Under this rue, as announced in Norton v, Shelby County" an unconstitu- tional act isnot a aw; it conor rights; imposes no tes; ards no protectin; eexeates no of; in logal contemplation inoperative, as if had not ben passed. It is therefore stricken fom the statue books and considered never to have existed at all Not ony the partis bt all persons are bound by the declaration of teonsitutialty, whieh means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply tin subsequent cases. ei in other words, a total ality. ‘The second or madera view isles stringent. Under this view the court in passing upon the question ofn- sttutonality des not annul or repeal the statue Fit finds tin confit withthe Constiaton. Ie simpy fuses to rangnize it and determines the rights of the Parties jst aif such sate had no existence, The dourt may give is rezone for ignoring or deregardng the law but the decon affects the partes only and theres nj gn te atte, Pe poo sone ofr ert a reef St he state om te state Fok does ot ‘pen, supersede, rake, or ann the sata The 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW paris othe stare conde by the juen one else is bound. ment, buy The ethoieviw has been applied by ours preme Court as ear sin the ese of Springer oo ernment of the Philippine Islands." Iq Subsequens cases however ita observed that a relists ap {as ein he general dtrne and that the eet ‘reese atte porto itdecrain of ae tetonlty was an operative fact that might hace uences which could ot justly be ignore SY SS Pent argued tht the prescriptive period led bee Stapended by the Moratorium Lave but the defeaden MramassettPeltted this contention and, applying ons Geratios of equity, relaxed the operation setia eae “Sept Ben os. Pe ORF¥i iin Conminion No 3,10 SCRA 148 (OM No 418, aber 10 BOSC =~ re THE CONSTITUTION AND THE couRTS 79 ‘The foregoing notwithstanding, the Supreme Court, in nullifving a Letter of Insteuction imposing a levy on the sale of fertilizer products, affirmed in Planters Products Inc. o. Fertphil Corporation" thet the “gen- eral rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It pro- duces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no pro tection. It has no legal effect, is, in legal contempe- tion, inoperative as if it has not been passed." The Court added — "he dria opera at, an eption ten: ra rae ely apie tro ely td Te liste ees ofan tent ay cing that the ester oa state prio 2 dtemiaton fu onstitionaly ia sper it andar ve se ors ih xant say pred. The tea ‘Sorbremd by ane ud late, plate wn declan of wn aig i ipa ned snes to ane eel onthe ial ow Tas was applied fo a emia Seven dlrs yan ea po S's a or al rat it In League of Cites of the Philippines © COME: 1 the Cour farther explained — the te dt, the rei cunt ith tit mes erro si afl steed a ‘ne ote dn py tenon gee rt a Se a

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