Barrier PS Management

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar
Barrier Based Process Safety Management
Ali Mirzakhani
November 7, 2013
Agenda
 Overview of DNV GL
 O&G Industry Safety Performance
 DNV GL views on effective offshore safety management
 Summary

November 7, 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved. 2
Can we manage the
First…very briefly on DNV GL
cold risks?

November 7, 2013
DNV GL Background
DNV (Det Norske Veritas) and GL (Germanischer Lloyd) merged on Sept 12 2013
- The combined company is about 16,000 staff and operates in all global locations
DNV GL forms
1. the world’s largest ship and offshore classification society,
2. the leading technical advisor to the global oil & gas industry,
3. a leading expert for the energy value chain including renewables, and
4. one of the top three certification bodies in the world.

November 7, 2013
Can we manage
O&G Industry
the
Safety Performance
cold risks?

November 7, 2013
Offshore Development Challenges
 Offshore developments now in dramatic change
- Deeper water & harsher environments
- More subsea and unmanned facilities
- Bigger capital cost projects / higher risk

November 7, 2013
Timeline of Major Accidents
An examination of major offshore

accidents provides two key
lessons:
• Accidents occur globally
• Their frequency is not declining

November 7, 2013
What is working: Occupational Safety
The O&G and Process Industry has achieved close to a 10x improvement in 20 years

November 7, 2013
But Major Accidents are not Declining
Major accident costs (insurance claims) – Piper Alpha still dominates (1988 )
Macondo self insured and not in list ($20b+ on its own)
Similar poor major accidents trends on onshore process industry

• E.g. EPA RMP-star database, EU MARS dataset
November 7, 2013
What is working – North Sea
 North Sea experienced 2 total loses in 1980’s (Alexander Kielland, Piper Alpha)
- But none since then – simple historical trend might suggest 6 total losses avoided
- Major leaks are still occurring – but at a declining rate
- and safety systems are working stopping escalation into major disasters
Minor and Significant leaks trending down

Major leaks down overall – but recent up
kick after order of magnitude decline

November 7, 2013
CanDNV
weGLmanage
View Safety
the
Management
cold risks?

November 7, 2013
Model for Enhanced Safety

November 7, 2013
Performance-based Regulation
 Performance regulations allow the industry to adapt to new problems
 But pure performance is impractical
 Need a BLEND of Prescription and Performance
 To make this work there are two additional needs

- A competent and well funded regulator
- To challenge the Lessee on all relevant hazards, especially on novel aspects
- To be able to be assured that risks have been properly identified and managed
- Some independent verification of the most important aspects

- In UK there is 3rd party verification of safety critical elements and performance standards
 The USA has introduced Performance aspects in the SEMS regulations

- And these must be verified by a 3rd party Audit Service Provider

November 7, 2013
Clear Roles and Responsibilities
 Offshore there are multiple parties – Lease Holder, Drilling Contractor, specialist
contractors, marine service providers, etc.
 All parties must clearly understand their roles and responsibilities
- But if unsafe actions occur – all have the duty to stop the work
- The Montara blowout in Australia showed some clear confusion between the cementing
company and the Lessee (Montara Inquiry). A similar situation existed for Macondo
(Presidential Panel).
 Norway and the USA make it clear that the Lessee has total responsibility, in the UK
it is with the Duty Holder
- However, confusion can still exist
- 3 years after Macondo there is still not a final Interface document

November 7, 2013
Holistic Risk Approach
 Identifying and understanding risks is crucial to effective safe operations
- These risks change over the facility lifecycle as field condition or operations regimes change
 This may mean different risk models at different stages

- Design stage
- Initial simple risk ranking, then CFD explosion / fire modeling, followed by QRA
- Operations Stage
- Barrier diagrams / bow ties, QRA Updates, MOC risk ranking, workforce JSA’s
 Full access to risk results is important for all parties

- Modern tools include a complete risk register
- Lists all important risks, key aspects in their control, any outstanding actions relating to such controls, or
information that the control is degraded

November 7, 2013
Shared Performance Monitoring
 There needs to be clear safety targets
- Both for Occupational and Process Safety
- All parties must collect this data in a similar format and be able to share
- Examples for Process Safety include API 754, OGP456
 The Macondo investigation found evidence of

poor sharing of key risk information between the
offshore staff and the onshore support teams

November 7, 2013
People Process and Plant
 The interaction of all 3 is crucial to safe operations
- Process and Plant knowledge has improved dramatically since Piper Alpha
- Fire and explosion science is much better understood
- Models for CFD, QRA and Bow ties are now readily available
 Knowledge of Human and Organizational factors is less complete

- These have been key factors in several recent accidents
- Human issues are partly addressed through behavior programs, but more importantly
through process safety Culture programs

November 7, 2013
Advanced Barrier Management
 Barrier Management derives from the well known Swiss Cheese model
PSA Requirements
Norway
 Neither the number of barriers nor the size of holes is constant

− there are processes at work continuously degrading the noted barriers
− Additional barriers must be inserted to maintain the main barriers at their desired
performance level

November 7, 2013
A Typical Bow Tie Diagram (2)
Step 4 - Preventive Barriers Step 5 – Mitigation/Reactive Barriers
Step 1 - Hazard and Top Event
Step 2 – Causes Step 3 – Potential Consequences

November 7, 2013
Barrier Support Mechanisms
TOP
TO
TOP
TO P
P
Inadequate
Cause EVENT
EVEN
EVENT
EVEN T
T
isolation
Maintenance Work Permit Pre-work Job

Isolation Safety
Procedures Assessment
- Training Program
- ….
- Job Supervision
- ….
- ….
Barrier Support Mechanisms
 A condition that enhances the effectiveness of a Barrier

November 7, 2013
Bow Tie – Example build out one barrier

November 7, 2013
Bow Tie – Example build out one barrier

November 7, 2013
Knowing Barrier Status is Key to barrier Management
 Bow Ties map out the risk management program
 Shell uses these to build a Manual Of Permitted Operations (MOPO)
- These specify what activities are permitted if certain barriers are degraded
- But applying this requires knowledge of barriers status – maintenance, audits etc.
 DNV has developed the BSCAT investigation tool to track barrier status
- every incident means several if not all barriers failed
Since there are many incidents and

near misses every year – BSCAT
provides the richest source of data
on barrier status, and provides a
direct feed to API 754 Tier 3 metrics
No direct barrier data Full barrier performance data

November 7, 2013
Can we manage the
Summary
cold risks?

November 7, 2013
Using Barriers to Improve Performance
 The Business Case
- Barriers are there to help sustain your business performance
- Minimize or eliminate potential threats to your business
- Act to reduce financial loss should an event occur
- Provide a sound foundation for continuous performance improvement
 Major business risks are identified during design

- Prevention or mitigation controls
- People, process or plant
- These are budgeted, purchased, installed, inspected, maintained, and staff trained
 Controls will degrade without active management

- Some threats are infrequent and the reasons for their controls can be forgotten / discounted
- New staff may not have the awareness or knowledge of older staff
- Inspections or maintenance can be delayed

November 7, 2013
Key Advantages of the Barrier Approach
 Focuses on the operations phase
- Ensuring that ongoing operations achieve acceptable
(design) risk levels or continue to improve (CRR) is key
 Addresses risk in much simpler terms than QRA
- QRA is numbers – 5.2 x 10-6pa or an FN log-log graph
- Number of controls, who owns them and how effective
they are
 Senior managers can readily understand the most
critical equipment, processes and activities required
to keep things safe
 Audit’s can focus on critical areas to ensure that these
activities are happening
 It is easier to obtain positive contributions from
operational staff
 Risk communication is significantly enhanced

November 7, 2013
Safeguarding life, property
and the environment
www.dnv.com

November 7, 2013
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.

Barrier PS Management

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Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Barrier Based Process Safety Management

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

An examination of major offshore

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Similar poor major accidents trends on onshore process industry

Minor and Significant leaks trending down

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

 To make this work there are two additional needs

- Some independent verification of the most important aspects

 The USA has introduced Performance aspects in the SEMS regulations

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

 This may mean different risk models at different stages

 Full access to risk results is important for all parties

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

 The Macondo investigation found evidence of

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

 Knowledge of Human and Organizational factors is less complete

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

 Neither the number of barriers nor the size of holes is constant

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Step 1 - Hazard and Top Event

Step 2 – Causes Step 3 – Potential Consequences

Maintenance Work Permit Pre-work Job

 A condition that enhances the effectiveness of a Barrier

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Since there are many incidents and

No direct barrier data Full barrier performance data

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

 Major business risks are identified during design

 Controls will degrade without active management

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

Intsok Mexico – HSE Seminar

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