1
8. Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification
of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August
31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate

their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the
law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may
or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
2
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
9. JACOT VS DALG.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the
Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division2 disqualifying
him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He
filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California.
The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioner’s
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the
Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing
petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held.
Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US
citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship.
3
HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of
Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain
their Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to
the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino
has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship,
despite his foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in
the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to
run for public office in Philippine elections.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.20
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos,
who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired

or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
10. Cordora vs Comelec
FACTS:
Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against
Tambunting asserting that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election
in 2001 and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency
requirements.Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American:
upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the
Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that
Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did
not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s
claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy
of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American
citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
4
Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is
not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November
2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
The Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of complaint because it
failed to substantiate the charges. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and
the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was
convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence. Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate
opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner
Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen.
Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed
his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner
filed a MR but was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.
HELD:
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-
130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims
that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American

by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American
citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the
American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed
nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the
2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it
is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his
certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
5
11. Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)
Facts:
• Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost
his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On
the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.5
• On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
• On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
• Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.

• On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
• After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence exparte.
• Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
• It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
• Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it
as one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he
is a Filipino citizen.18The Court ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
• Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
6
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in favor of arnado
• Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, There
are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed
seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
Issues:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
SC:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has
not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
• Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,

actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American,
• Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
• By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was
a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local electiv.
3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is not a second-
placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.
• Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a
secondplacer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner
in the elections.
7
• The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47
• This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
• A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in
that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
• The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the
highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could
not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material
time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been
passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to
hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a
candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications

as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
• The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
• It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism.
It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice
spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
• With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
• We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
• Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
• Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
8
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
• There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the
voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification
and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere
obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed
second to ineligible ones.
• The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
• That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office
is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.
• The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which
is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already
been elected, from holding the office.
 9

• The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987
being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect May 1987. The COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr.
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
• Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to Issue:
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United
all in the May 201 0 elections. States
• Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been Held:
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
Code will not apply.
merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
12. Caasi vs. Comelec (EN BANC, G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)
immigrant’s (not a visitor’s or tourist’s) visa.
Facts:
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite
Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of municipal mayor of
green card or authority to reside there permanently (See Question 21 of Miguel’s
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of 18 January
application). To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law
1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and on the ground that he is a
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.”
of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident
States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may
or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested
freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
 10

by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was “disqualified to run for any elective office. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on 18 January 1988, he was disqualified to run for
said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
13. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at
the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St.
HELD:
Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House
in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in
of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he
the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
district for the following reasons:
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
 11

Representative of the First District of Leyte.

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
14. AGAPITO A. AQUINO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a
MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, G.R. No. 120265
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and
September 18, 1995
concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-

merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for

right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence Facts:
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of

which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created)

by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino

milestones. stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla
Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify

Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate

May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should

order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
 12

election. Mr. Nolledo:

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency
in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run
in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco
with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May
15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional
qualification of residence.
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of elections.…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given
to it was domicile.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders. Mrs. Braid:

On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
Issue:
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile”
…
to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
Mr. De los Reyes
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just
residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in. So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence.
Held:
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with
domicile.
“domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
wherein this principle was applied.

and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks
of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing
in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given
area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation,
which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running
in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he
established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency
prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates
that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that
Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter
13
of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the
fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro
Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his
lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional
elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.

Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case
after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which
is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to
promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue
of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the
Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one
year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the
one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created
political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in
disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was
14
repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of
new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support
the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot be better.
15. Llamanzares vs COMELEC , GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is
a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before

assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the
natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she
satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may
run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical
features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos
such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is
15
a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration
with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the
framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is
supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.
16. ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.G.R. No. 209835, September 22,
2015
FACTS:

Rogelio Batin Caballero, the petitioner and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.,
the respondent were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality
of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. The private
respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy
claiming that he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
However, the petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October
3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a
dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No.
9225.Furthermore, he asserted that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Caballero was cancelled. Petitioner was
proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes, on May 14, 2013. On May 16, 2013,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc but the
same was denied. Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and private respondent took his Oath of
Office on December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
16
Upon the numerous claims of the petitioner, the court was not
persuaded. It is true that the petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and
raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes.
Nevertheless, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. It is settled
ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. In the case at bar, the petitioner permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Therefore, he
had in effect abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile
of choice in Canada. Furthermore, the court held that the frequent visits of the
petitioner visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot
be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
More so, in this case, the records showed that petitioner failed to prove that
he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately
preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.
The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or RA No. 9225 ,
declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-
acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.
However, it does not mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino. The petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.

17. Limbona vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006. Oct. 16, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Norlanie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, and respondent Malik
“Bobby” T. Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. After
filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition to disqualify the
husband of petitioner for non-compliance with the one-year residence requirement.
Subsequently, respondent also filed the same petition, this time against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed for withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC granted. The
COMELEC granted the disqualification of petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a
new Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate for her husband which was
approved by the COMELEC. Respondent yet again sought Petitioner’s
disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying, sleeping and doing business in
her house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement
HELD:
Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, an intention to remain there, and an intention to abandon the old domicile. A
person’s domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established.
17
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude
a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present and actually residing
in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the court finds no other act that would indicate
petitioner’s intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of
certificate of candidacy in Pantar is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar
as her new residence. In SPA No. 07-611, the commission has even found that she is
not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.
The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of
origin is Maguing , Lanao del norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her
domicile, by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapasun, Marawi City. The
COMELEC Found that Petitioner’s Husband effected the change of his domicile in
favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed
that the Husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that
Petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006.
Hence, failure to comply with the residency requirement, Petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
18. RAMON L. LABO, JR., , vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, G.R. No. 86564

FACTS: The petitioner asks this court to restrain the COMELEC from looking into
the question of his citizenship for his office as Mayor of Baguio City.
In the January 20, 1988 elections, Ramon J. Labo, Jr. was proclaimed as the
new elected Mayor of Baguio City. Six days later, Luis Lardizabal, the private
respondent, filed a petition for quo warranto which according to the petitioner may
not be valid because the filing fee was not paid yet. While the petition for quo
warranto was being argued, the question of the petitioner's citizenship was brought
about. Through the records from the Australian Embassy, it was found that the
petitioner - who had married an Australian citizen, acquired an Australian passport
with the Consular ID - returned in the Philippines in 1980 for the reason that his
marriage became void because of bigamy. It was also stated that he was granted
Australian citizenship in 1976. There was also an Oath of Allegiance taken by
petitioner which renunciation of other allegiance is included.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry about
Ramon J. Labo, Jr. as the newly elected Mayor of Baguio, considering that
the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
2. Whether or not Ramon J. Labo is a Filipino citizen.
3. Whether or not petitioner can hold office in the Philippines.
4. Whether or not Luis Lardizabal, who filed the petition for quo warranto, can
replace the petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. as Mayor of Baguio City.
HELD: WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
18
Mayor of Baguio City. He is ORDERED to vacate his office and surrender the same
to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executor.
The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is lifted.
1. Yes, COMELEC has jurisdiction regarding the petition of quo warranto
being filed against the petitioner was paid on time. It is contrary to the
petitioner’s claim that the court may allow the payment of the said fee
within a reasonable time. Lardizabal was able to pay the said fee within
the required 10-day period.
2. Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is not a Filipino citizen anymore because of the
following requisites based on the Constitution: a.) He is already a
naturalized citizen in a foreign country; b) He renounced his Filipino
citizenship by c) taking and pledging to the oath of allegiance of the
foreign country promising to faithfully observe the laws and fulfill the
duties of an Australian citizen. He also did not make a move in
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by doing the following modes of
action: a) reacquiring by direct act of Congress; b) by naturalization; and
c) by repatriation.
3. No. He cannot hold office in the Philippines because of non-compliance
to Local Government Code Section 42 ( Qualifications about holding a
public office). A foreigner is not entitled to hold public office in the
Philippines.
4. The private respondent is not applicable to replace Ramon J. Labo Jr., as
the mayor because the person who is fit to the position is the elected Vice
Mayor.
 19

19. CAYAT V. COMELEC RULING:

DISCTINGUISH FROM LONE CANDIDATE BEFORE ELECTION DAY The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat
became final and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one
FACTS:
candidate to speak of.
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an
2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.
election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such,
Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.
misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he
The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the
declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because
present case, if two conditions concur:
he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.
(1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10
Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for
May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias,
reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and
Benguet in the elections; and
hence, it was declared final and executory.
(2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.
Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a
petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly 20 .Maquiling v. COMELEC
elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.
A VOID COC THAT RESULTS IN DISQUALIFIACATION
Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of
FACTS:
rejection of second placer.
• Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence
ISSUE:
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable. his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On

the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.
• On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
• On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
• Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
• On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days
from receipt thereof.
• After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence exparte.
20
• Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
• It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
• Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as
one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is
a Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
• Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in favor of arnado

• Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by
the parties before this
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the
result of the first.
ISSUE:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a enunciation earlier made.
3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.
RULING:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there
has not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
21
• Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American,
• Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
• By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was
a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective .
3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is not a second-
placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.

• Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second
placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
• The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
• This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
• A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in
that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
22
• The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the
highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could
not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material
time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been
passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to
hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a
candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications
as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
• The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other State.
• It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism.
It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice

spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
• With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
• We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
• Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
• Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
**There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the
voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification
and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
• The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
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electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
• That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office
is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.
• The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which
is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already
been elected, from holding the office.
• The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado
being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

• Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at
all in the May 201 0 elections.
• Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply.
21. TAGOLINO VS HRET & TORRES GOMEZ
CAN THE CANDIDATE BE VALIDLY SUBSITUTED?
FACTS:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office
as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the
Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who
was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro
Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng,
Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1)
year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run
for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due
24
course and/or cancelled.The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution
granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification.
Richard thereafter manifested that he is accepting the resolution in order to enable
his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution. The
substitute? His wife, Ms. Lucy Torres-Gomez. Lucy accepted the nomination and
endorsement from the Liberal Party.
Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms. Lucy as Richard’s substitute. Juntilla stated
that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for.
The COMELEC First Division decided in favor of Juntilla, but said that the
substitution was valid. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the First Division’s
resolution. The resolution hinges upon the reasoning that Richard is indeed
disqualified, but one’s “disqualification does not automatically cancel one’s
certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In
effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy
was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a
political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.”
At this point, the COMELEC was close to perpetuate their wrong decision. This was
thereafter corrected by the Supreme Court.
Note: HRET decided in favor of Lucy Torres.
ISSUE:
whether or not the substitution of Richard Gomez as a candidate valid?

RULING.
No, it is not valid.
A substitution is only valid when the candidate is disqualified. If the candidate to be
substituted made material misrepresentation in his CoC, it will result to a denial of
due course/ cancellation of CoC. In disqualification, there is a candidate to be
substituted. In cancellation, there is no candidate to speak of in the first place.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, disqualification is provided under Section 68
(pursuant to Section 77), while cancellation is provided under Section 78. Section 77
expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, “material misrepresentation” cases are not
included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with
candidate substitution.
RICHARD GOMEZ COMMITTED MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION
RESULTING TO THE CANCELLATION OF HIS COC.
The COMELEC First Division decision was the cause of the confusion when it used
the word “disqualification” instead of “denied due course to and/or cancelled”. Still,
the COMELEC en banc could have corrected this confusion. At this point, the
Supreme Court has this to say;
“In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10,
2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement.
The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the
25
February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted
by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and
even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short,
a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due
course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly substitute
by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did
not explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC
should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of
private respondent’s substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal
basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC,
misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements
affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and
citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status”
Reading the case at this point is disheartening, because by the time Juntilla won the
case, Ms. Lucy had two months left before the next elections. Justice was served,
only too late.
The Supreme Court further stated:
“In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the
COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law
Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not

denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private
respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s
ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence,
disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious
error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s
substitution.”
The Court ended:
“Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore
not a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected.
Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on
the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012
Decision rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case
No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
22. CODILLA VS COMELEC
CAN COMELEC CONTINUE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION AFTER
PROCLAMATION?
FACTS:
26
Petitioner Codilla and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001
elections. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga,
Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for
Disqualificationagainst the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of
the Omnibus Election Code. On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division
issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the
disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.On May
11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner
that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was remanded
to the Regional Election Director for investigation.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet
to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of
candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed
that petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent.
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed aMotion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved.
Instead, on June 14, 2001, theCOMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolutionin SPA No. 01-208.

By virtue of the said Resolution,the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were
declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. Respondent Locsin
took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc aPetition for
Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed anUrgent Manifestationstating that he was
deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case. On August 29, 2001, then
COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and
Summary of Votes"reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the
proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation.
Instead, she filed a "Comment and Manifestation"with the COMELEC en banc
questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued.
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Orderconstituting the
members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid
decision.
On September 12, 2001, petitionerCodilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru
respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001
COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and
27
proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letterdated October 30, 2001, stating that:
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC
decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme
Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously."
ISSUES: (a) Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC
Second Division is valid
We find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void for the following
reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election
Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition
for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the
opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure
compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the
return of the summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the
COMELEC when service has been completed.
(a)Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the
service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.

(b)The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the
petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his
disqualification.
(c)the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner
is not based on substantial evidence.
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which
reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx
shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be
proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given
money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other
material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or
corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered
the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to
induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him.
28
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses
are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature.
(d)Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray"
and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
(a)The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
afinal judgment before the electionfor the votes of a disqualified candidate to be
considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified byfinal
judgmentduring the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor
cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in
whom sovereignty resides.For in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona
fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that
the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of government.
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that
thepetitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only
 29

before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be substantially changed.
executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13,
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and
Resolutions reads: The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five
authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes,
(5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all
and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (emphasis supplied)
declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the
elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and
expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects
meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice."
into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election
for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place. ISSUE: (b) Whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity
In Domino v. COMELEC,this Court ruled, viz:
We find no merit in these contentions.
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the
plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc
that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would
to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a
have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind
division, viz:
of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which
has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
InPuzon vs. Cua,even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this
Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the
House of Representatives,could not have been immediately applicable due to the
issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements
themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or
decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a
petition forquo warrantowith the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.In the case at bar, neither the eligibility
30
of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in
question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
A petition forquo warrantoin the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that
respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.
She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a
patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity
for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her
via a quo warranto proceeding.
ISSUE: (c) Assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the
ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the
legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent
Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the

subject of the petition for mandamus is aministerialact or duty, andnot purely
discretionaryon the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a
well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by
respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
RULING:
31
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELECen banc, the constitutional body
with jurisdiction on the matter.The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed
by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign
of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken
his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory.
23. PENERA VS COMELEC
WHO IS CONSIDERED A CANDIDATE UNDER THE NEW AUTOMATION
LAW
WHEN ISONE CONSIDERED TO BE ENGAGED IN PREMATURE
CAMPAIGNING?
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of
Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former
filed her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed

campaign period. When she w e n t t o t h e C O M E L E C O f f i c e f o r f i l i n g
she was accompanied by her party mates.
Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten
motorcyclesrunning around the municipality convincing the residents to
vote for her and the other candidates of their political party.
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging
prematurecampaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which
says: “Electionor partisan political activity outside campaign period. --- It
shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
party, or association of persons, toengage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period.”
She argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that
timeand the campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was
conducted.While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was
voted as mayor andt o o k h e r o f f i c e t h e r e a f t e r .
The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor
thecomplainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning.
L i k e w i s e , w h e n s h e appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision
was affirmed.Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against
her.
It heldthat the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or
partisan politicala c t i v i t y, f a l l i n g u n d e r S e c t i o n 7 9 ( b ) ( 2 ) o f t h e
32
O m n i b u s E l e c t i o n C o d e w h i c h s a ys : “[h]olding political caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar a s s e m b l i e s , f o r
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign
o r propaganda for or against a candidate[.]” Furthermore, it was held that she should
vacatethe position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same
arguments.
ISSUE:Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?
RULING: No, she is not. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that “any unlawful act
or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
Only upon the start of the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start
of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further.
Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what
was decided in the
Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign period, even if the
of
candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet
considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots.
Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place
there is no candidate to talk about.
What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.
JUDGMENT:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A.
Penera’s Motion o r Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the
D e c i s i o n o f t h i s C o u r t i n G . R . N o . 1 8 1 6 1 3 promulgated on 11
September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30J a n u a r y
2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC
E n B a n c , respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall
continue as Mayor of Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte
24. MARTINEZ III VS SALIMBANGON
EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NUISANCE
Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent
Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of
Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate. However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its
Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007
or almost one (1) month after the elections.
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections
for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing
that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as
33
against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three
(67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or
less with only “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” written on the line for
Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on
the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who
had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the
BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the
Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in
the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that
five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C.
MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on
the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter.
The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon
and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez moved for
reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30,
2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the
decision of HRET dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the
duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the
Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof.
ISSUE:

1. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final
judgment after the elections?
2. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be
considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
RULING:
The court finds the petition meritorious.
1.Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes
governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The
prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty
and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain
situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should
effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election
day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral
process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until
elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
2. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same
position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and
34
not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate
by final judgment after the elections.
25. VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City,
vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 154512 November
12, 2002
Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates
of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7,
2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall
election.Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated
seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the
cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for
a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the
city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to
the instant recall election for the same post.
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit.
And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states:
 35

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.”
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes
an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution
known as the Local Government Code, which provides: prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a
“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
third term.
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.”
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election
to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election

26. SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO,G.R. No.
184836 December 23, 2009
FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that
preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended
public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term
should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong
(the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to
cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his
36
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s
favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term
limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007
term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption
of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered
involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision
fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office
to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied
in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years –
during which an official has title to office and can serve
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the
law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a
qualified interruption…
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the
public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
 37

official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the one since no vacancy exists.
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
27. RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served
RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR.,G.R. No. 147927
three consecutive terms…… The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
who filed their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.Private
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,
respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)
was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall
election of May 2000, he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule
after having lost to the latter in the 1998 election.
is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive
Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
terms contending that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as 1
official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
term.Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s
interruption.
incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3 consecutive
terms.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of
stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office

an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.”
Issue: WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of
Lucena City.
Held: No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2
years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by
his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary
renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.
Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack
of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.
38
28. BORJA VS COMELEC
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.
For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as
Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U.
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on
the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term
after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and
declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as
mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the
original decision.
Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of
elective local officials… …shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71)
which states that “…no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was
elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is
not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the
service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.
29. ARSENIO A. LATASA, , vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
ROMEO SUNGA,[G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003]
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in
the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of
39
candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive
terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been
elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact
does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since
this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However,
his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before
election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the
Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for
mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be
counted. Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a
municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from the
municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it
should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms
as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
 40

Held: As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
service for the full term for which he was elected.
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution,
local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned if not abhorred by it.
has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and
Note:
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that
COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying
elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An
the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held
As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of
that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are
hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years. 30 FRANCIS G. ONG, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 163295

FACTS: Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis
Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the
incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. The
petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001
mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties
thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the
office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently
proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an
election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected
mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, 4 albeit the decision came out only on July 4,
2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of
San Vicente
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for the
mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of
the three-term limit rule.
41
HELD: YES
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the
same rule. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein,
thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about
petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the
May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30,
1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling
that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and
actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially
declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the
consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes,
for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for
 42

more than three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet,
Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’
opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the
legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed,
was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the
term of the contested office has expired.

Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998
mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a
duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a
contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre
would — under the three-term rule — be considered as having served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.