G.R. Nos. L-30632-33 April 11, 1972
The Association felt disinclined to follow
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS
ASSOCIATION petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES),
INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS, respondents.
Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo and Ongsiako for private respondent.
VILLAMOR, J.:p
This is an appeal by the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association from the resolution en
banc dated May 16, 1969 of the Court of Industrial Relations affirming the decision dated February
26, 1969 of Associate Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissented
from the resolution of the majority on the ground that the Industrial Court in a representation case
cannot take cognizance of the issue of illegality of a strike and proceed to declare the loss of the
employee status of employees inasmuch as that matter ought to be processed as an unfair labor
practice case. Judge Tabigne's decision covers two cases, namely, Case No. 1484-MC (1) in which
he declared the strike staged on April 22, 1965 by the Association as illegal with the consequent
forfeiture of the employee status of three employees (Jose J. Mapa, President of the Association;
Dominador Mangalino, Vice-President and Herminigildo Mandanas) and Case No. 4344-ULP against
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Ben F. Edwards W.E. Menefee which Judge Tabigne dismissed for lack of
merit and substantial evidence.
The following proceedings gave rise to the present appeal:
The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor
organization of Filipino managers supervisors in Caltex (Philippines),
Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. After the Association was
registered as a labor organization it sent a letter to the Company on
January 21, 1965 informing the latter of the former's registration; the
Company replied inquiring on the position titles of the employees which
the Association sought to represent. On February 8, 1965 the
Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one of the
demands was the recognition of the Association as the duly authorized
bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the Company. To
this the Company countered stating that a distinction exists between
representatives of management and individuals employed as
supervisors and that it is Company's belief that managerial employees
are not qualified for membership in a labor organization; hence, it is
digested that the Association institute a certification proceeding so as to
remove any question with regard to position titles that should be
included in the bargaining unit.
the suggestion of the Company1 and so on February 22, 1965 the
Company initiated a certification proceeding docketed as Case 1484-
MC.
On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike giving the
following reasons:
Refusal to bargain in good faith and to act on demands,
a copy of which is enclosed; resort to union-busting
tactics in order to discourage the activities of the
undersigned association and its members, including
discrimination and intimidation of officers and members
of the association and circulation of promises of
immediate benefits to be given by the company to its
employees, officers and members of this association or
those intending to join the same, if the employees
concerned in due course will vote against the selection
of this association as the exclusive collective bargaining
unit for managers and supervisors of the Company in the
petition for certification the latter filed. (Annex "A" of
Annex "A", Petition).
On March 29, 1965, during the hearing of the certification proceedings,
Judge Tabigne cautioned the parties to maintain the status quo; he
specifically advised the employees not to go on strike, making it clear,
however, that in the presence of unfair labor practices they could go on
strike even without any notice.2
On the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of
acts committed by the Company which the Association considered as
constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22,
1965, after the efforts exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations to settle
the differences between the parties failed. Then, through an "Urgent
Petition" dated April 26, 1965 filed as Case No. 1484-MC(1), or as an
incident of the certification election proceedings (Case No. 1484-MC),
the Company prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this
Honorable Court that:
1. The strike of respondent Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association be declared illegal;
 2. The officers and members of respondent association
who have instigated, declared, encouraged and/or
participated in the illegal strike be held and punished for
contempt of this Honorable Court and be declared to
have lost their employee status;
3. Pending hearing on the merits and upon the filing of a
bond in an amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court, a
temporary injunction be issued restraining respondent
association, its officers, members and representatives
acting for and on their behalf from committing, causing
or directing the commission of the unlawful acts
complained of, particularly obstructing and preventing
petitioner, its customers, officers and non-striking
employees from entering and going out of its various
offices, in its refinery, installations, depots and terminals
and the use or threat of violence and intimidation;
4. After trial, said injunction be made permanent;
5. The damages that petitioner has suffered and will
suffer up to the trial of this action be ascertained and
judgment be rendered against respondent association,
its officers, members and representatives jointly and
severally for the amount thereof.
Petitioner prays for such other and further relief as this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises. (Annex "D", Petition)
Such urgent petition was frontally met by the Association with a motion
to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The motion
to dismiss was opposed by the Company and on May 17, 1965 the trial
court denied the same. Not satisfied with the order of May 17, 1965, the
Association moved for its reconsideration before respondent court en
banc.
Because of the settlement between the parties on May 30, 1965 of
some of their disputes, the Association filed with respondent court under
date of June 3, 1965 a manifestation (to which was attached a copy of
the return-to-work agreement signed by the parties on May 30, 1965), to
the effect that the issues in Case No. 1484-MC (1) had become moot
and academic. Under date of June 15, 1965 the Company filed a
counter-manifestation disputing the representations of the Association
on the effect of the return-to-work agreement. On the basis of the
manifestation and counter-manifestation, respondent court en
banc issued a resolution on August 24, 1965 allowing the withdrawal of
the Association's motion for reconsideration against the order of May 17,
1965, on the theory that there was justification for such withdrawal.
Relative to the resolution of August 24, 1965 the Company filed a
motion for clarification which the Association opposed on September 22,
1965, for it contended that such motion was in reality a motion for
reconsideration and as such filed out of time. But respondent court
brushed aside the Association's opposition and proceeded to clarify the
resolution of August 24, 1965 to mean that the Company was not barred
from continuing with Case No. 1484-MC(1).
At the hearing on September 1, 1965 of Case No. 1484-MC(1) the
Association insisted that the incident had become moot and academic
and must be considered dismissed and, at the same time, it offered to
present evidence, if still necessary, in order to support its contention.
Respondent court thereupon decided to secure evidence from the
parties to enlighten it on the interpretation of the provisions of the return-
to-work agreement relied upon by the Association as rendering the
issues raised in Case No. 1484-MC(1) already moot and academic.
Evidence having been received, the trial court ruled in its order of
February 15, 1966 that under the return-to-work agreement the
Company had reserved its rights to prosecute Case No. 1484-MC(1)
and, accordingly, directed that the case be set for hearing covering the
alleged illegality of the strike. Within the prescribed period the
Association filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 1966
order to which motion the Company filed its opposition and, in due
course, respondent court en banc issued its resolution dated March 28,
1966 affirming the order. Appeal from the interlocutory order was
elevated by the Association to this Court in G.R. No. L-25955, but the
corresponding petition for review was summarily "DISMISSED for being
premature" under this court's resolution of May 13, 1966.
After a protracted preliminary investigation, the Association's charge for
unfair labor practices against the Company and its officials docketed in
a separate proceeding was given due course through the filing by the
prosecution division of respondent court of the corresponding complaint
dated September 10, 1965, in Case No. 4344-ULP against Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards. As noted by
respondent court in its decision under review, Case No. 4344-ULP was
filed by the Association because, according to the latter, the Company
and some of its officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the
organization of the Association and he manifested his antagonism to it
and its President; that another Company official, W.E. Menefee issued a
statement of policy designed to discourage employees and supervisors
from joining labor organizations; that the Company refused to bargain
although the Association commands majority representation; that due to
the steps taken by the Company to destroy the Association or
discourage its members from continuing their union membership, the
Association was forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it
declared a strike; and that during the strike the Company and its officers
continued their efforts to weaken the Association as well as its picket
lines. The Company in its answer filed with respondent court denied the
charges of unfair labor practice.
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CAFIMSA'S STRIKE WAS
STAGED FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO
COERCE THE COMPANY INTO RECOGNIZING THE
CAFIMSA AND THAT SUCH STRIKE WAS
UNJUSTIFIED, UNLAWFUL AND UNWARRANTED.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CAFIMSA'S
STRIKE WAS DECLARED IN OPEN DEFIANCE OF
THE MARCH 29, 1965 ORDER IN CERTIFICATION
CASE NO. 1484-MC.

Considering the interrelation of the issues involved in the two cases and V
by agreement of the parties, the two cases were heard jointly. This
explains why only one decision was rendered by respondent court
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
covering both Case No. 1484-MC(1), relating to the illegality of the strike
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING, DESPITE THE
as contended by the Company, and Case No. 4344-ULP, referring to
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
the unfair labor practice case filed by the Association against the
THAT THE STRIKERS RESORTED TO MEANS
Company, W.E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards.
BEYOND THE PALE OF THE LAW IN THE
PROSECUTION OF THE STRIKE AND IN
The Association assigned the following errors allegedly committed by DISREGARDING THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE
respondent court: STRIKERS MERELY EMPLOYED LAWFUL ACTS OF
SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE.
I
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1). RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF J.J. MAPA,
II CAFIMSA'S PRESIDENT, AND OTHERS, OR IN
OTHERWISE PENALIZING THE STRIKERS.
ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1), IT VII
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SAME
ALREADY BECAME MOOT WITH THE SIGNING OF ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS FOUND
THE RETURN TO WORK AGREEMENT ON MAY 30, BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, IN
1965. DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE COMPANY DAMAGING TO ITS CAUSE, OR
III ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED THE
SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE AGAINST
ASSUMING LIKEWISE THAT RESPONDENT COURT THE COMPANY, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1), IT
 NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF IN PARI
DELICTO.
VIII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT THE COMPANY IS BARRED UNDER SECTION
9(e) OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 875 FROM
SEEKING THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN CASE NO.
1484-MC(1).
IX
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY
ABSOLVING THE COMPANY FROM THE UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE AND IN DISREGARDING
THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE
RELATIVE THERETO AGAINST THE COMPANY.
X conditions under which the employer is to give work and the employees
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RENDERING
JUDGEMENT FOR THE CAFIMSA IN CASE NO. 4344-
ULP AND IN NOT ORDERING THE COMPANY TO
PAY BACK WAGE AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
XI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN PREMATURELY
IMPLEMENTING THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF
J.J. MAPA AND DOMINADOR MANGALINO (Brief for
the Petitioner, pp. 1-4).
To our mind the issues raised in this appeal may be narrowed down to
the following:
1. whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over
Case No. 1484-MC(1);
2. Whether or not the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965
is illegal and, incident thereto, whether respondent court correctly
terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa, Dominador Mangalino
and Herminigildo Mandanas and reprimanded and admonished the
other officers of the Association; and
3. Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the respondents
in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor practice charge.
Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be
tested by the allegations of the "Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965
filed by the Company in relation to the applicable provisions of law. A
reading of said pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief
under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Carta of Labor); for
contempt, obviously pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103
in conjunction with Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and for
forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their
participation in what the Company considered as an "illegal strike."
It is well known that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for achieving
industrial peace rests essentially on a free and private agreement
between the employer and his employees as to the terms and
are to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by judicial or
administrative intervention. On this premise the lawmaking body has
virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive relief involving or growing
out of labor disputes.
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a
comparable bargaining power with capital and must be liberally
construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
79 F. Supp. 485, Certioraridenied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335 U.S. 867, cause
remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App.
D.C., certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is
said that the prohibition creates substantive and not purely procedural
law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 49 F. Supp. 886). Within the purview of our ruling, speaking
through Justice Labrador, in Social Security Employees Association
(PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100,
July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there can be no injunction issued
against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor
dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the national interest and
such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court
of Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
875. As a corollary to this, an injunction in an uncertified case must be
based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875; the
purpose of such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only
unlawful activities. To the extent, then, that the Company sought
injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875, respondent
court had jurisdiction over the Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April
26, 1965.
As to the "contempt aspect" of Case No. 1484-MC(1), the jurisdiction of
respondent court over it cannot be seriously questioned it appearing that
Judge Tabigne in good faith thought that his "advice" to the Association
during the hearing on March 29, 1965 not to strike amounted a valid
order. This is not to say, however, that respond court did not err in
finding that the advice given by Judgre Tabigne during the hearing on
March 29, 1965 really constituted an order which can be the basis of a
contempt proceeding. For, in our opinion, what Judge Tabigne
statement during said hearing should be construed what actually was —
an advice. To say that it was an order would be to concede that
respondent court could validly enjoin strike, especially one which is not
certified in accord with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. To adopt the
view of respondent court would not only set at naught the policy of the
law as embodied in the said statute against issuance of injunctions, but
also remove from the hands of labor unions and aggrieved employees
an effective lawful weapon to either secure favorable action on their
economic demand or to stop unfair labor practices on the part of their
employer.
With respect to the alleged "illegality of the strike," as claimed by the
Company, and the consequent forfeiture of the employee status of the
strikers, we believe these matters which are neither pertinent to nor
connected with a certification case as opined by Judge Paredes, to
which we agree. Respondent court, therefore, initially erred in
entertaining this issue in Case No. 1484-MC(1). No prejudice, however,
has resulted since, as correctly pointed out by respondent court, the
illegality for the strike was squarely raised by the Company as a defense
in Case No. 4344-ULP and, in any event, we observe that the
Association was given all the opportunity to put forward its evidence.
We now come to the important issue as to whether the strike staged by
the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal. From an examination of the
records, we believe that the lower court erred in its findings in this
regard.
To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965
as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more
important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same
"must yield to the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the
Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of the
safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind
when the Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work
agreement that all employees will be taken back "with the same
employee status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made
manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-
MC, (c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that
there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows:
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending
shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC.
we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and
intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC(1)
while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars
the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light of
the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back
with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22, 1965. The
records disclose further that, according to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara
when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously disputed
by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the return-to-
work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness, "to secure the
tenure of employees after the return-to-work agreement considering that
as I understand there were demotions and suspensions of one or two
employees during the strike and, moreover, there was this incident Case
No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the
language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan
Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-7478, May 6,
1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this
proceeding and in the light of the records.
... the matter had become moot. The parties had both
abandoned their original positions and come to a virtual
compromise and agreed to resume unconditionally their
former relations. To proceed with the declaration of
illegality would not only breach this understanding, freely
arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive animosities to the
prejudice of industrial peace. (Emphasis supplied)
Conceding arguendo that the illegality incident had not become moot
and academic, we find ourselves unable to agree with respondent court
to the effect that the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965
was unjustified, unreasonable and unwarranted that it was declared in
open defiance of an order in Case No. 1484-MC not to strike; and that
the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the
prosecution of the strike. As adverted to above, the Association filed its
notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons therefor any one of
which is a valid ground for a strike.
In addition, from the voluminous evidence presented by the Association,
it is clear that the strike of the Association was declared not just for the
purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by respondent court, but
also for bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by
reason of unfair labor practices committed by its officials. But even if the
strike were really declared for the purpose of recognition, the concerted
activities of the officers and members of the Association in this regard
cannot be said to be unlawful nor the purpose thereof be regarded as
trivial. Significantly, in the voluntary return-to-work agreement entered
into between the Company and the Association, thereby ending the
strike, the Company agreed to recognize for membership in the
Association the position titles mentioned in Annex "B" of said
agreement.3 This goes to show that striking for recognition is productive
of good result in so far as a union is concerned.
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Carta of
Labor is the right to self-organization and we do not hesitate to say that
is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of labor legislation. Indeed,
because of occasional delays incident to a certification proceeding
usually attributable to dilatory tactics employed by the employer, to a
certain extent a union may be justified in resorting to a strike. We should
not be understood here as advocating a strike in order to secure
recognition of a union by the employer. On the whole we are satisfied
from the records that it is incorrect to say that the strike of the
Association was mainly for the purpose of securing recognition as
bargaining agent.
As will be discussed hereinbelow, the charge of unfair labor practice
against the Company is well-taken. It is, therefore, clear error on the
part of the Association is unjust, unreasonable and unwarranted.
We said earlier that the advice of Judge Tabigne to maintain the status
quo cannot be considered as a lawful order within the contemplation of
the Magna Carta of Labor, particularly Section 10 thereof; to so regard it
as an order would be to grant respondent court authority to forbid a
strike in an uncertified case which it is not empowered to do. The fact
that the strike was not staged until April 22, 1965 is eloquent proof
enough of the desire of the Association and its officers and members to
respect the advice of Judge Tabigne. However, as shown in this case
during the pendency of the certification proceedings unfair labor
practices were committed by the Company; hence, the Association was
justified in staging a strike and certainly this is not in violation of the
advice of Judge Tabigne on March 29, 1965.
Respondent court picked out a number of incidents, taking place during
the strike, to support its conclusion that the strikers resorted to means
beyond the pale of the law in the prosecution of a strike. Thus, it made
mention of the blocking by a banca manned by two striking supervisors
by the name of Dominador Mangalino and one Bonecillo of the Caltex
M/V Estrella when it was about to depart; the blocking at the refinery of
the Company in Bauan, Batangas of the LSCO WARA, the Hills Bros
Pinatubo, and the Mobil Visayas so that they could not dock; the
blocking by the strikers of incoming vehicles, non-striking supervisors,
and rank-and-file workers to prevent them from entering the refinery
gate in Bauan, Batangas, at the Poro Terminal, at the Company's Padre
Faura office in Manila, and at the Pandacan Terminal; that at the
Legaspi and Mambulao Bulk Depots the striking supervisors refused to
surrender to their superiors the keys to the depots and storage tanks;
and that also at the Legaspi Depot the truck ignition keys were mixed up
or thrown at the seats of the trucks in violation of the Company
regulations in order to create confusion and thus prevent the trucks from
being used.4 To refute these and similar findings of respondent court the
Association, drawing chiefly and abundantly from the Company's own
evidence,5 called attention to the exculpatory declarations of the
Company's own witnesses6 either establishing or tending to establish
that the picketing the strikers was generally peaceful and orderly. We
find that such, indeed, was the real situation during the strike and it
would be the height of injustice to rule otherwise in the face of the
records before us.
In ignoring strong evidence coming from the witnesses of the Company
damaging to its case as well as that adduced by the Association also
damaging to the Company's case, we believe that respondent court
clearly and gravely abused its discretion thereby justifying us to review
or alter its factual findings (see Philippine Educational Institution vs.
MLQSEA Faculty Association, 26 SCRA 272, 278).7 There is thus here,
to employ the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa
sa Peter Paul vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 96 Phil., 63, "an
infringement of cardinal primary rights of petitioner, and justified the
interposition of the corrective powers of this Court (Ang Tibay vs. Court
of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, 69 Phil., 635):
 (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief
Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.
Ct. 906, 80 Law Ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of
the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice
or consideration." (Ibid., p. 67)8
We are convinced from the records that on the whole the means
employed by the strikers during the strike, taking into account the
activities of the Company and the non-striking employees on the same
occasion, cannot be labeled as unlawful; in other words, the Company
itself through the provocative, if not unlawful, acts of the non-striking
employees9 is not entirely blameless for the isolated incidents relied
upon by respondent court as tainting the picketing of the strikers with
illegality. As we said through Justice Fernando in Shell Oil Workers'
Union vs. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.,
L-28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276:
6. Respondent court was likewise impelled to consider
the strike illegal because of the violence that attended
it. What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity
of cessation of work in order that a union's economic
demands may be granted or that an employer cease and
desist from the unfair labor practice. That the law
recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of
the utilization of force to attain such an objective. For
implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the
maintenance of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid,
if violent, in character, be placed beyond the pale. Care
is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor
practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality
just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid
rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike,
responsibility in such a case should be individual not
collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of
course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is
pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably
concluded then that even if justified as to end, it
becomes illegal because of means employed. (Ibid., p.
292; emphasis supplied).
In the same case we further observed:
... Barely four months ago, in Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd., there is the recognition by this Court, speaking
through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being
"inherently explosive". It is thus clear that not every form
of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a
strike or to cause the loss of employment of the guilty
party. (Ibid., pp. 293-294; emphasis supplied)
In the cited case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Employees' Association-
NATO, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU
and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular
Life insurance Co., Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, et al., L-25291, January
30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244, we held through Justice Castro, and this is
here applicable to the contention of theAssociation, as follows:
... Besides, under the circumstances the picketers not
legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from
the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be
in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every
reason to defend themselves and their rights from any
assault or unlawful transgression. ... (Ibid., p. 271)
In this cited case, by the way, we reversed and set aside the decision of
the Court of Industrial Relations and ordered the Company to reinstate
the dismissed workers backwages.
Let us now examine the charge of unfair labor practice which
respondent court dismissed for lack of merit and substantial evidence.
Under Sec. 14(c) of Republic Act No. 875, the parties themselves are
required "to participate fully and promptly in such meetings and
conferences as the (Conciliation) Service may undertake." In this case,
the parties agreed to meet on April 21, 1965 and yet, notwithstanding
this definite agreement, the Company sent no representatives. The
Company's claim to bargaining in good faith cannot be given credence
in the face of the fact that W.E. Menefee the Company's Managing
Director, conveniently left Manila for Davao on April 17 or 18, 1965, as
admitted by W.E. Wilmarth. 10
Nowhere is there serious claim on the part of the Company that it
entertains real doubt as to the majority representation of the
Association. Consider further that admittedly the certification election
proceeding for the Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company had been
pending for six (6) years already. From all appearances, therefore, and
bearing in mind the deliberate failure of the Company to attend the
conciliation meetings on April 19 and 21, 1965, it is clear that the
Company employed dilatory tactics doubtless to discredit CAFIMSA
before the eyes of its own members and prospective members as an
effective bargaining agent, postpone eventual recognition of the
Association, and frustrate its efforts towards securing favorable action
on its economic demands.
It is likewise not disputed that on March 4, 1965, the Company issued its
statement of policy (Exh. B). At that time the Association was seeking
recognition as bargaining agent and has presented economic demands
for the improvement of the terms and conditions of employment of
supervisors. The statement of policy conveyed in unequivocal terms to
all employees the following message:
We sincerely believe that good employee relations can
be maintained and essential employee needs fulfilled
through sound management administration without the
necessity of employee organization and representations.
We respect an employee's right to present his
grievances, regardless of whether or not he is
represented by a labor organization. (Emphasis
supplied)
An employee reading the foregoing would at once gain impression that
there was no need to join the Association. For he is free to present his
grievances regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor
organization.
The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of April
22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's attention. It will suffice to mention
typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the
Company had interferred with the Cebu Supervisors' Union by enticing
Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of promotion in Manila;
shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations, had
inquired into the formation and organization of the petitioner Association
in this case. During the strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the
Company already narrated above, due significance must be given to the
inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the Association's
President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion
cases filed at that time and their subsequent elimination from the
charges the initiative of the Company after the settlement of strike; 11 the
cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association members in the
refinery; and the use of a member of the Association to spy for the
company. 12 The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against
active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company
committed unfair labor practices as charged. 13 Victims of discrimination
are J.J. Mapa, A.E. Buenaventura, E.F. Grey, Eulogio Manaay,14 Pete
Beltran, Jose Dizon, Cipriano Cruz, F.S. Miranda and many others. The
discrimination consisted in the Company's preferring non-members of
the Association in promotions to higher positions and humiliating active
unionists by either promoting junior supervisors over them or by
reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to them before the
strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions. 15
Then, effective July 1, 1969, the Company terminated the employment
of J.J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino, President and Vice-President,
respectively, of the Association at that time. And this the Company did
not hesitate to do notwithstanding the Association's seasonable appeal
from respondent court's decision. We perceive in this particular action of
the Company its anti-union posture and attitude. In this connection, we
find merit in the claim of petitioner that the dismissal of Mapa and
Mangalino was premature considering that respondent court did not
expressly provide that such dismissal might be effected immediately
despite the pendency of the appeal timely taken by the Association. The
situation would have been different had respondent court ordered the
dismissal of Mapa and Mangalino immediately. As the decision is silent
on this matter the dismissal of said officers of the Association ought to
have been done only upon the finality of the judgment. Because appeal
was timely taken, the Company's action is patently premature and is
furthermore evidence of its desire to punish said active unionists.
Verily, substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on record
establishing beyond doubt the charge of unfair labor practices in
violation of Sec. 4 (a), Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6), of Republic Act No.
875. And pursuant to the mandate of Art. 24 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines that courts must be vigilant for the protection of one at a
disadvantage — and here the Association appears to be at a
disadvantage in its relations with the Company as the records show —
adequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must be awarded to
the strikers. It is high-time and imperative that in order to attain the
laudable objectives of Republic Act 875 calculated to safeguard the
rights of employees, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed
in favor of employees and strictly against employer, unless otherwise
intended by or patent from language of the statute itself.

The Court takes judicial notice of the considerable efforts exerted by

both parties in the prosecution of respective cases and the incidents
thereof both before lower court and this Court since 1965 to date. Under
the circumstances and in conformity with Art. 2208, No. 11, the Civil
Code of the Philippines, it is but just, fair and equitable that the
Association be permitted to recover attorney's fees as claimed in its
tenth assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, respondent court's resolution en banc dated May 16,

1969, together with the decision dated February 26, 1969, is reversed
and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Case No. 1484-MC(1), the Court declares the strike of the Caltex
Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association as legal in all respects
and, consequently, the forfeit of the employee status of J.J. Mapa,
Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas is set aside. The
Company is hereby ordered to reinstate J.J. Mapa and Dominador
Mangalino to their former positions without loss of seniority and
privileges, with backwages from the time of dismissal on July 1, 1969.
Since Herminigildo Mandanas appears to have voluntarily left the
Company, no reinstatement is ordered as to him.

2. In Case No. 4344-ULP, the Court finds the Company B.F. Edwards
and W.E. Menefee guilty of unfair labor practices and they are therefore
ordered to cease and desist from the same. In this connection, the
Company is furthermore directed to pay backwages to the striking
employees from April 22, 1965 to May 30, 1965 and to pay attorney's
fees which are hereby fixed at P20,000.00.

Costs against private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar,. JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006
ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES
UNION, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 22, 2004
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74519, which
affirmed with modifications the June 28, 2002 Resolution2 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CN RAB IV 5-
10035-98-1, and its April 15, 2005 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which
owns and operates the St. John’s Academy (later renamed St. John
Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a
secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80
teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St.
John Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union).
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between SJCI and the
Union was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective
bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for
an increase in worker’s benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock
which led to the holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10,
1997. In order to end the strike, on November 27, 1997, SJCI and the
Union, through the efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction:
AGREEMENT AND JOINT PETITION FOR ASSUMPTION OF
JURISDICTION
Both parties agree as follows:
1. That the issue raised by the Union shall be referred to the
Honorable Secretary of Labor by way of Assumption of
Jurisdiction. Note this will serve as a joint petition for Assumption
of Jurisdiction.
2. Parties shall submit their respective position paper within 10
days upon the signing of this agreement and to be decided
within two months.
3. That management shall grant the employees cash advance of
P1,800.00 each to be given on or before December 5, 1997
deductible after two months payable in two installments starting
January 31, 1998. The decision re: assumption [of] jurisdiction
has not been resolved.
4. Union shall lift the picket immediately and remove all
obstruction and return to work on Monday, December 1, 1997.
5. No retaliatory action shall be undertaken by either party
against each other in relation to the strike.4
After which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Subsequently, the
SOLE issued an Order dated January 19, 1998 assuming jurisdiction
over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. The
parties were required to submit their respective position papers within
ten (10) days from receipt of said Order.
Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of
Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution
recommending the closure of the high school which was approved by
the stockholders on even date. The Minutes5 of the stockholders’
meeting stated the reasons therefor, to wit:
98-3 CLOSURE OF THE SCHOOL
The President, Mr. Rivera, informed the stockholders that the
Board at its meeting on February 15, 1998 unanimously
approved to recommend to the stockholders the closure of the
school because of the irreconcilable differences between the
school management and the Academy’s Union particularly the
safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing
CBA negotiations.
After due deliberations, and upon motion of Dr. Jose O. Juliano
seconded by Miss Eva Escalano, it was unanimously resolved,
 as it is hereby resolved, that the Board of St. John Colleges, Inc.
be authorized to decide on the terms and conditions of closure, if
such decision is made, to the best interest of the stockholders,
parents and students.6
Thereafter, SJCI informed the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), parents,
students and the Union of the impending closure of the high school
which took effect on March 31, 1998.
Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high
school agreed to the closure. On April 2, 1998, SJCI informed the DOLE
that as of March 31, 1998, 51 employees had received their separation
compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the same.
On May 4, 1998, the aforementioned 25 employees conducted a protest
action within the perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of
strike with the NCMB only on May 7, 1998.
On May 19, 1998, SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before
the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-5-10035-98-
L. It claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural
requirements for holding a valid strike under the Labor Code.
On May 21, 1998, the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits
against SJCI before the NLRC which was docketed as RAB-IV-5-10039-
98-L. The Union members alleged that the closure of the high school
was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless
any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
These two cases were then consolidated. On January 8, 1999, Labor
Arbiter Antonio R. Macam rendered a Decision7 dismissing the Union’s
complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while granting SJCI’s petition to
declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of
employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.
Meanwhile, in the proceedings before the SOLE, the Union filed a
manifestation8 to maintain the status quo on March 30, 1998 praying
that SJCI be enjoined from closing the high school. It claimed that the
decision of SJCI to close the high school violated the SOLE’s
assumption order and the agreement of the parties not to take any
retaliatory action against the other. For its part, SJCI filed a motion to
dismiss with entry of appearance9 on October 14, 1998 claiming that the
closure of the high school rendered the CBA deadlocked issues moot.
Upon receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision in the aforesaid
consolidated cases, SJCI filed a second motion to dismiss10 on February
1, 1999 arguing that the case had already been resolved.
Moreover, after the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI
resolved to reopen the high school for school year 1999-2000. However,
it did not restore the high school teaching and non-teaching employees
it earlier terminated. That same school year SJCI opened an elementary
and college department.
On July 23, 1999, the SOLE denied SJCI’s motions to dismiss and
certified the CBA deadlock case to the NLRC. It ordered the
consolidation of the CBA deadlock case with the ULP, illegal dismissal,
and illegal strike cases which were then pending appeal before the
NLRC.
On June 28, 2002, the NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal and
ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and with full backwages. It
also required SJCI to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, and two (2) months summer/vacation pay. Moreover, it ruled that
the mass actions conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 could
not be considered as a strike since, by then, the employer-employee
relationship had already been terminated due to the closure of the high
school. Finally, it dismissed, without prejudice, the certified case on the
CBA deadlocked issues for failure of the parties to substantiate their
respective positions.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated April 22, 2004,
affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, in light of the preceding discussions, the
decision subject of the instant petition is hereby affirmed with a
modification that in the computation of backwages, the two
month unworked summer vacation should excluded.
SO ORDERED.11
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, SJCI interposed the
instant petition essentially raising two issues: (1) whether it is liable for
ULP and illegal dismissal when it closed down the high school on March
31, 1998 and (2) whether the Union is liable for illegal strike due to the
protest actions which its 25 members undertook within the high school’s
perimeter on May 4, 1998.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following requisites must
concur for a valid closure of the business: (1) serving a written notice on
the workers at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof; (2)
serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect of the
closure; (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at
least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as a
whole year; and (4) cessation of the operation must be bona fide.12 It is
not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. The third
requisite would have been satisfied were it not for the refusal of the
herein private respondents to accept the separation compensation
package. The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth
requisite, i.e., whether SJCI closed the high school in good faith.
Whether or not the closure of the high school was done in good faith is a
question of fact and is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari save for exceptional circumstances. In fine, the
finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
SJCI closed the high school in bad faith is supported by substantial
evidence and is, thus, binding on this Court. Consequently, SJCI is
liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
The determination of whether SJCI acted in bad faith depends on the
particular facts as established by the evidence on record. Bad faith is,
after all, an inference which must be drawn from the peculiar
circumstances of a case. The two decisive factors in determining
whether SJCI acted in bad faith are (1) the timing of, and reasons for the
closure of the high school, and (2) the timing of, and the reasons for the
subsequent opening of a college and elementary department, and,
ultimately, the reopening of the high school department by SJCI after
only one year from its closure.
Prior to the closure of the high school by SJCI, the parties agreed to
refer the 1997 CBA deadlock to the SOLE for assumption of jurisdiction
under Article 263 of the Labor Code. As a result, the strike ended and
classes resumed. After the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, it required the
parties to submit their respective position papers. However, instead of
filing its position paper, SJCI closed its high school, allegedly because
of the "irreconcilable differences between the school management and
the Academy’s Union particularly the safety of our students and the
financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations." Thereafter, SJCI
moved to dismiss the pending labor dispute with the SOLE contending
that it had become moot because of the closure. Nevertheless, a year
after said closure, SJCI reopened its high school and did not rehire the
previously terminated employees.
Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern that the closure
was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute to
the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock; to render
nugatory any decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Union’s right
to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. By
admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable differences between
the Union and school management, specifically, the financial aspect of
the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to
end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with
the demands of the Union. This is precisely what the Labor Code
abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is
to defeat the Union’s right to collective bargaining.
However, SJCI contends that these circumstances do not establish its
bad faith in closing down the high school. Rather, it claims that it was
forced to close down the high school due to alleged difficult labor
problems that it encountered while dealing with the Union since 1995,
specifically, the Union’s illegal demands in violation of R.A. 6728 or the
"Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education
Act." Under R.A. 6728, the income from tuition fee increase is to be
used as follows: (a) 70% of the tuition fee shall go to the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances, and other benefits of teaching and non-
teaching personnel, and (b) 20% of the tuition fee increase shall go to
the improvement or modernization of the buildings, equipment, and
other facilities as well as payment of the cost of operations. However,
sometime in 1995, SJCI claims that it was forced to give-in to the
demands of the Union by allocating 100% of the tuition fee increase for
teachers’ benefits even though the same was in violation of R.A. 6728 in
order to end the on-going strike of the Union and avoid prolonged
disturbances of classes. Subsequently or during the school year 1996-
1997, SJCI claims that it obtained an approval from the DECS for a 30%
tuition fee increase, however, only 10% was implemented. Despite this,
the Union persisted in making illegal demands by filing a complaint
before the DOLE claiming that they were entitled to the unimplemented
20% tuition fee increase. Finally, during the collective bargaining
negotiations in 1997, the Union again made economic demands in
excess of the 70% of the tuition fee increase under R.A. 6728. As a
result, SJCI claims it had no choice but to refuse the Union’s demands
which thereafter led to the holding of a strike on November 10, 1998. It
argues that the Union’s alleged illegal demands was a valid justification
for the closure of the high school considering that it was financially
incapable of meeting said demands and that it would violate R.A. 6728 if
it gave in to said demands which carried corresponding penalties to be
imposed by the DECS.
We are not persuaded.
These alleged difficult labor problems merely show that SJCI and the
Union had disagreements regarding workers’ benefits which is normal in
any business establishment. That SJCI agreed to appropriate 100% of
the tuition fee increase to the workers’ benefits sometime in 1995 does
not mean that it was helpless in the face of the Union’s demands
because neither party is obligated to precipitately give in to the proposal
of the other party during collective bargaining.13 If SJCI found the
Union’s demands excessive, its remedy under the law is to refer the
matter for voluntary or compulsory dispute resolution. Besides, this
incident which occurred in 1995, could hardly establish the good faith of
SJCI or justify the high school’s closure in 1998.
Anent the Union’s claim for the unimplemented 20% tuition fee increase
in 1996, suffice it to say that it is erroneous to rule on said issue since
the same was submitted before the Voluntary Arbitrator14 and is not on
appeal before this Court.15 Besides, by referring the labor dispute to the
Voluntary Arbitrator, the parties themselves acknowledged that there is
a sufficient mechanism to resolve the said dispute. Again, we fail to see
how this alleged labor problem in 1996 shows the good faith of SJCI in
closing the high school in 1998.
With respect to SJCI’s claim that during the 1997 CBA negotiations the
Union made illegal demands because they exceeded the 70% limitation
set by R.A. No. 6728, it is important to note that the alleged illegality or
excessiveness of the Union’s demands were the issues to be resolved
by the SOLE after the parties agreed to refer the said labor dispute to
the latter for assumption of jurisdiction. As previously mentioned, the
SOLE certified the case to the NLRC, which on June 28, 2002, rendered
a decision finding that there was insufficient evidence to determine the
reasonableness of the Union’s proposals. The NLRC found that SJCI
failed to establish that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive. A
review of the records clearly shows that the Union submitted a position
paper detailing its demands in actual monetary terms. However, SJCI
failed to establish how and why these demands were in excess of the
limitation set by R.A. 6728. Up to this point in the proceedings, it has
merely relied on its self-serving statements that the Union’s demands
were illegal and excessive. There is no basis, therefore, to hold that the
Union ever made illegal or excessive demands.
At any rate, even assuming that the Union’s demands were illegal or
excessive, the important and crucial point is that these alleged illegal or
excessive demands did not justify the closure of the high school and do
not, in any way, establish SJCI’s good faith. The employer cannot
unilaterally close its establishment on the pretext that the demands of its
employees are excessive. As already discussed, neither party is obliged
to give-in to the other’s excessive or unreasonable demands during
collective bargaining, and the remedy in such case is to refer the dispute
to the proper tribunal for resolution. This was what SJCI and the Union
did when they referred the 1997 CBA bargaining deadlock to the SOLE;
however, SJCI pre-empted the resolution of the dispute by closing the
high school. SJCI disregarded the whole dispute resolution mechanism
and undermined the Union’s right to collective bargaining when it closed
down the high school while the dispute was still pending with the SOLE.
The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the
establishment on the ground of illegal or excessive demands of the
Union. Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the dispute for
voluntary or compulsory arbitration, the employer may file a complaint
for ULP against the Union for bargaining in bad faith. If found guilty, this
gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities and allows the employer to
implement a lock out, but not the closure of the establishment resulting
to the permanent loss of employment of the whole workforce.
In fine, SJCI undermined the Labor Code’s system of dispute resolution
by closing down the high school while the 1997 CBA negotiations
deadlock issues were pending resolution before the SOLE. The closure
was done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the Union’s right to
collective bargaining. Besides, as found by the NLRC, the alleged
illegality and excessiveness of the Union’s demands were not
sufficiently proved by SJCI. Even on the assumption that the Union’s
demands were illegal or excessive, SJCI’s remedy was to await the
resolution by the SOLE and to file a ULP case against the Union.
However, SJCI did not have the power to take matters into its own
hands by closing down the school in order to get rid of the Union.
SJCI next argues that the Union unduly endangered the safety and well-
being of the students who joined the valid strike held on November 10,
1997, thus it closed down the high school on March 31, 1998. It claims
that the Union coerced the students to join the protest actions to
pressure SJCI to give-in to the demands of the Union.
However, SJCI provided no evidence to substantiate these claims
except for its self-serving statements in its position paper before the
Labor Arbiter and pictures belatedly attached to the instant petition
before this Court. However, the pictures were never authenticated and,
on its face, only show that some students watched the Union members
while they conducted their protest actions. More importantly, it is not
true, as SJCI claims, that the Union admitted that it coerced the
students to join the protest actions and recklessly placed the students in
harm’s way. In its Reply16 to SJCI’s position paper before the Labor
Arbiter, the Union categorically denied that it put the students in harm’s
way or pressured them to join the protest actions. Given this denial by
the Union, it was incumbent upon SJCI to prove that the students were
actually harmed or put in harm’s way and that the Union coerced them
to join the protest actions. The reason for this is that the employer
carries the burden of proof to establish that the closure of the business
was done in good faith. In the instant case, SJCI had the burden of
proving that, indeed, the closure of the school was necessary to uphold
the safety and well-being of the students.
SJCI presented no evidence to show that the protest actions turned
violent; that the parents did not give their consent to their children who
allegedly joined the protest actions; that the Union did not take the
necessary steps to protect some of the students who allegedly joined
the same; or that the Union forced or pressured the said students to join
the protest actions. Moreover, if the problem was the endangerment of
the students’ well-being due to the protest actions by the Union, then the
natural response would have been to immediately go after the Union
members who allegedly coerced the students to join the protest actions
and thereby endangered the students’ safety. But no such action
appears to have been undertaken by SJCI. There is even no showing
that it prohibited its students from joining the protest actions or informed
the parents of the activities of the students who allegedly joined the
protest actions. This raises serious doubts as to whether SJCI was
really looking after the welfare of its students or merely using them as a
scapegoat to justify the closure of the school and thereby get rid of the
Union.
Even assuming arguendo that the safety and well-being of some of the
students who allegedly joined the protest actions were compromised,
still, the closure was done in bad faith because it was done long after
the strike had ended. Thus, there is no more danger to the students’
well-being posed by the strike to speak of. It bears stressing that the
closure was implemented on March 31, 1998 but the risk to the safety of
the students had long ceased to exist as early as November 28,
1997 when the parties agreed to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE,
thus, betraying SJCI’s claim that it wanted to safeguard the interest of
the students.
Furthermore, if SJCI was after the interests of the students, then it
should not have closed the school because the parents and the
students were vehemently opposed to the same, as shown by the letter
dated March 9, 1998 written by Mr. Teofilo G. Mamplata, President of
the Parents’ Association, and addressed to the Secretary of DECS, to
wit:
As per letters sent recently by the school Management to the
teachers and parents, notifying of its closure on March 31, 1998,
as decided upon by its Board of Trustees and Stockholders on
February 22, 1998 no reasons were stated to justify said
decision and action which will definitely affect adversely and to
the detriment of the plight of parents, teachers, students and
other personnel of the school.
In this connection and due to the urgency of the matter, we
hereby reiterate our appeal with our prayer that the management
and Board of Trustees of St. John Academy of Calamba,
Laguna, be stopped from pursuing their most sudden, unfair,
unfavorable and detrimental decision and action, and if
warranted, sanctions be imposed against the erring
party.17 (Italics supplied)
Along the same vein, the parents voiced out their strong objections to
the proposed closure of the school, to wit:
PAHAYAG NG PAGTUTOL
Kami, mga magulang, mag-aaral, guro, propesyonal,
manggagawa at iba pang sector ng pamayanan sa bayan ng
Calamba, Laguna ay nagpapahayag ng pagtutol sa hindi
makatarungang pagsasara ng paaralang SAINT JOHN
 ACADEMY. Ang kagyat na pagsasara nito ay nagdulot ng
malaking suliranin sa 2,300 estudyante (incoming 2nd year –
4th year), kagaya ng mga sumusunod:
1. Kakaunti ang bilang ng paaralan sa Calamba;
2. Walang paaralan na basta tatanggap sa 700 incoming third
year at 800 incoming fourth year;
3. Ang lahat ng "HONOR STUDENTS" ay mababaliwala ang
kanilang pinagsikapan;
4. Negatibo ang epekto sa moral ng mga batang estudyante ang
pagkakaroon ng physical and moral displacement dahil sa
biglaang pagsasara nito;
5. Hindi lahat ng magulang ay kakayaning bumayad ng mataas
na tuition fee sa ibang paaralan;
6. Ang mataas na kalidad ng turo ng mga guro sa paaralang ito
ay mahirap pantayan; at
7. HIGIT NA LIGTAS SA SAKUNA ANG AMING MGA ANAK sa
nasabing paaralan.
Bilang pagtutol sa pagsasara ng SAINT JOHN ACADEMY ay
inilalagda namin ang aming pangalan sa libis nito. (56
signatures follow)18 [Italics supplied]
Worth noting is the belief of the parents that the safety of their children
was properly secured in said high school. This was obviously in
response to the claim of SJCI that the school was being closed, inter
alia, for the safety and well-being of the students. As correctly observed
by the CA:
The petitioner urges this Court to believe that they closed down
the school out of their sheer concern for the students, some of
whom have started to sympathize and participate in the union’s
cause.
As intimated by the private respondent, however, the petitioner
itself said that the closing down of the school was, inter alia,
"because of irreconcilable differences between the school
management and the Academy’s Union." Indeed, this translates
into an admission that the cessation of business was neither due
to any patrician nor noble objective of protecting the studentry
but because the administration no longer wished to deal with
respondent Union.
We are further tempted to doubt the verity of the petitioner’s
claim that in deciding to shut down the school, it only had the
welfare of its students in mind. There is evidence on record
which hints otherwise. Apparently, the parents of the students
were vehemently against the idea of closing down the academy
as this would be, as it later did prove, more detrimental to the
studentry. No less than Mr. Teofilo Mamplata, President of St.
John Academy Parents Association of Calamba expressed the
groups’ aversion against such move and even wrote a letter to
the then Secretary of the Department of Education seeking
immediate intervention to enjoin the school from closing. This is
an indication that the parents were unanimous in their sentiment
that the shutdown would result in inconvenience and
displacement of the students who had already been halfway
through elementary school and high school. It turned out some
were even forced to pay higher tuition fees just so they would be
admitted in other academies.19 (Italics supplied)
To recapitulate, there is insufficient evidence to hold that the safety and
well-being of the students were endangered and/or compromised, and
that the Union was responsible therefor. Even assuming arguendo that
the students’ safety and well-being were jeopardized by the said protest
actions, the alleged threat to the students’ safety and well-being had
long ceased by the time the high school was closed. Moreover, the
parents were vehemently opposed to the closure of the school because
there was no basis to claim that the students’ safety was at risk. Taken
together, these circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that
SJCI merely used the alleged safety and well-being of the students as a
subterfuge to justify its actions.
SJCI next contends that the subsequent reopening of the high school
after only one year from its closure did not show that the previous
decision to close the high school was tainted with bad faith because the
reopening was done due to the clamor of the high school’s former
students and their parents. It claims that its former students complained
about the cramped classrooms in the schools where they transferred.
The contention is untenable.
First, the fact that after one year from the time it closed its high school,
SJCI opened a college and elementary department, and reopened its
high school department showed that it never intended to cease
operating as an educational institution. Second, there is evidence on
record contesting the alleged reason of SJCI for reopening the high
school, i.e., that its former students and their parents allegedly clamored
for the reopening of the high school. In a letter20 dated December 15,
2000 addressed to the NLRC, which has never been rebutted by SJCI,
Mr. Mamplata, stated that –
Para po sa inyong kabatiran xxx isinara nila ang paaralang ito
dahil sa mga nag-alsang guro.
Sa ganitong kalagayan kaming pamunuan at kasapi ng PTA ay
nakipag-usap sa pamunuan ng paaralang ito na huwag naming
isara dahil malaking epekto ito sa aming mga anak dahil noon
ay kalagitnaan pa lamang ng pasukan. Sa kabila ng pakiusap
naming ito ay hindi kami pinakinggan at sa halip ay tuluyang
isinara. Sa kanilang ginawang ito marami sa mga bata ang hindi
nakapasok sa ibang paaralan at ang iba naman ay nadoble ang
pinagbayaran sa matrikula. Sa kabuuan nito ay malaking
paghirap ang ginawa nila sa aming mga magulang at anak na
nag-aaral sa paaralang ito dahil lamang sa panggigipit sa mga
gurong walang tanging hangarin kundi bayaran sila ng naaayon
sa itinakda ng batas.
Lastly, SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on
May 4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and
give a notice of strike. However, we agree with the findings of the NLRC
and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a
strike because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long
ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on
March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school
and its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down,
show that the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of
circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’
right to security of tenure. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and
illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 22, 2004 Decision and
April 15, 2005 Resolution of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74519 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Sa taong 1999-2000 ay muling binuksan ang paaralang ito na

sabi nila ay sa kahilingan ng PTA. Alin kayang PTA ang
tinutukoy nila. Paanong magkakaroon ng PTA samantalang ito
ay nakasara at kami ang PTA bago ito isinara.

Kaya po pinaabot naming sa inyong kaalaman na kaming PTA

ng paaralang (St. John Academy) ito ay hindi kailanman
humiling sa kanila na pamuling buksan ito.21 (Italics supplied)

Finally, when SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union
members. Evidently, the closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get
rid of the Union members.

Clearly, these pieces of evidence regarding the subsequent reopening

of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that
the high school’s closure was done in bad faith.