It should be noted that respondent bank filed a motion to expunge the

complaint based on Section 3(c) of Rule

29 w hich states:

SEC. 3. Other consequences. – If any party or an officer or managing

agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under section 112 of
this Rule requiring him to answ er designated questions, or an order
under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection,
copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry
upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may
make such orders in regard to
the refusal as are just, and among others the follow ing:

xxxx

(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further

proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party; and

x x x x.13

As w e have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of

Sorsogon,14 the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of
Rule 29 w ould only apply w here the party upon w hom the w
ritten interrogatories is served, refuses to answ er a particular
question in the set of w ritten interrogatories and despite an
order compelling him to answ er the particular question, still
refuses to obey the order.

In the instant case, petitioners refused to answ er the w hole

set of w ritten interrogatories, not just a particular question.
Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion
based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of

Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:

SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. – If a party or

an officer or managing agent of a party w illfully fails to appear before
the officer w ho is to take his deposition, after being served w ith a
proper notice, or fails to serve answ ers to interrogatories submitted
under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on
motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of
that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion,
order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including
attorney’s fees.

Due to respondent bank’s filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court

cannot be faulted for ruling that the motion to expunge w as premature
for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on Section 3.

This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various modes or
instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Rules of
Court.15 In the case of Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v.
Ley
Construction and Development Corporation,16 w e declared:

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is w ell

recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on
July 13, 2004 w hich provided for the guidelines to be observed
by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-
trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring
parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and
request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at
their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other
measures under Rule 27 and 28 w ithin 5 days from the filing
of the answ er. The parties are likew ise required to submit, at
least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing
among others a manifestation of the parties of their having
availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners.

The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is w ithin the sound

discretion of the trial court. Thus, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals,17 w e held:

The matter of how , and w hen, the above sanctions should be applied
is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the court w here
the case pends, having alw ays in mind the paramount and overriding
interest of justice. For w hile the modes of discovery are intended to
attain the resolution of litigations w ith great expediency, they are not
contemplated, how ever, to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves
trial courts to examine w ell the circumstances of each case and to
make their considered determination
thereafter. x x x