MALAGA vs PENACHOS

This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court from
issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government.

The facts are not disputed.

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro Laboratory
Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements (PRE C-1) ** was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened
on December 12, 1988, 3 o’clock in the afternoon. 1

Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the name of
the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two
o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña submitted his own PRE-C1 on
December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o’clock in the
morning of December 2, 1988.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against
the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed
that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to
accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure
the needed plans and other documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.

In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of
their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the
defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding the project. 2

On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that
the Court was prohibited from issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary
mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.

The decree reads pertinently as follows:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource
development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including
among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility,
or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

The movants also contended that the question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction had become
moot and academic because the restraining order was received late, at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of
December 12, 1988, after the bidding had been conducted and closed at eleven thirty in the morning
of that date.

In their opposition of the motion, the plaintiffs argued against the applicability of P.D. 1818, pointing
out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not
part of the national government or of any local political subdivision. Even if P.D. 1818 were applicable,
the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the
project at bar.

They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. v. IAC, 3 where the Court allowed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite a similar prohibition found in P.D. 385. The Court therein stated that:

The government, however, is bound by basic principles of fairness and decency under the due
process clauses of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of government-
lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation, lead that corporation to
bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who, after ruining it, use the
mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of their misleads (p. 188, Emphasis
supplied).

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be construed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government falling within the coverage of P.D. 1818. Even if it were not, the petition for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would still fail because the sheriff’s return showed that
PBAC was served a copy of the restraining order after the bidding sought to be restrained had already
been held. Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could not be restrained from awarding the project
because the authority to do so was lodged in the President of the ISCOF, who was not a party to the
case. 4

In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the ISCOF because of its
separate and distinct corporate personality. It is also stressed again that the prohibition under P.D.
1818 could not apply to the present controversy because the project was vitiated with irregularities, to
wit:chanrobles.com :

1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of submission of pre-qualification document on
December 2, 1988 without indicating any time, yet after 10:00 o’clock of the given late, the PBAC
already refused to accept petitioners’ documents.

2. The time and date of bidding was published as December 12, 1988 at 3:00 p.m. yet it was held at
10:00 o’clock in the morning.

3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders to participate, issued a mimeographed
"Invitation to Bid" form, which by law (P.D. 1594 and Implementing Rules, Exh. B-1) is to contain the
particulars of the project subject of bidding for the purpose of.

(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate bids;

(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the bids;

(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC, by opening to all the particulars of a project.

Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the respondents and the Itemized Bill of Quantities
therein were left blank. 5 And although the project in question was a "Construction," the private
respondents used an Invitation to Bid form for "Materials." 6

The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction had not yet become
moot and academic because even if the bids had been opened before the restraining order was
issued, the project itself had not yet been awarded. The ISCOF president was not an indispensable
party because the signing of the award was merely a ministerial function which he could perform only
upon the recommendation of the Award Committee. At any rate, the complaint had already been duly
amended to include him as a party defendant.

In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since the members of the board of trustees of
the ISCOF are all government officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and since the operations and
maintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General Appropriations Law, it is should be
considered a government institution whose infrastructure project is covered by P.D. 1818.

Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private respondents insist that PBAC posted on the
ISCOF bulletin board an announcement that the deadline for the submission of pre-qualifications
documents was at 10 o’clock of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids would be held at 1 o’clock
in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. As of ten o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, B.E.
construction and Best Built construction had filed only their letters of intent. At two o’clock in the
afternoon, B.E., and Best Built filed through their common representative, Nenette Garuello, their pre-
qualification documents which were admitted but stamped "submitted late." The petitioners were
informed of their disqualification on the same date, and the disqualification became final on December
6, 1988. Having failed to take immediate action to compel PBAC to pre-qualify them despite their
notice of disqualification, they cannot now come to this Court to question the binding proper in which
they had not participated.

In the petitioners’ Reply, they raise as an additional irregularity the violation of the rule that where the
estimate project cost is from P1M to P5M, the issuance of plans, specifications and proposal book
forms should made thirty days before the date of bidding. 7 They point out that these forms were
issued only on December 2, 1988, and not at the latest on November 12, 1988, the beginning of the
30-day period prior to the scheduled bidding.

In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the documents of B.E. and Best Built were
received although filed late and were reviewed by the Award Committee, which discovered that the
contractors had expired licenses. B.E.’s temporary certificate of Renewal of Contractor’s License was
valid only until September 30, 1988, while Best Built’s license was valid only up to June 30, 1988.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in light of their testimonial and documentary
evidence and the applicable laws and jurisprudence. It finds for the petitioners.

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution — refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes
the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by
P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of
the government of effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic
of the Philippines also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses
to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of
bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request
of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of
such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be
included in the General Appropriations Law. 8

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said
decree.

In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in
P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition
pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that
to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative
machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this
dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818.

There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and the
award of the project.

First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed
these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.

Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government
infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the Notice of Pre-qualification
and other relevant information regarding the proposed work. Prospective contractors shall be required
to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2
Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was
referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid, after which
date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be advertised for at least
three times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two newspapers
of general circulations. 10

PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof,
and announced that the opening of bids would be at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988.
This schedule was changed and a notice of such change was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin
board. The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of pre-qualification documents to 10
o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o’clock in the afternoon of
December 12, 1988.

The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the
PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true that there were fourteen contractors
who were pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the defect of the irregular
notice. Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new deadline and
not because of their expired licenses. ***

We have held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before government contracts can
be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a general rule, render the same void and of
no effect 11 The facts that an invitation for bids has been communicated to a number of possible
bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the requirements of the law if it is
shown that other public bidders have not been similarly notified. 12

Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal
book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost
was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on December
2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest,
PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.

It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-
compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. The purpose of the
rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and
fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the
irregularities committed by PBAC.

It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for
competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any
of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts and purpose of its
adoption. 13

In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the
bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because of their
expired licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover, the plans and specifications which are
the contractors’ guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty that
contractors be placed on equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of competitive
bidding is negated if some contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and
specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not
improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
denied. We note from Annex Q of the private respondent’s memorandum, however, that the subject
project has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has
made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.

We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.

It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding
required by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. 14 It has not been
shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any of the
contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice sustained by
the petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.

As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage may not
be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either. Even so, the Court cannot close
its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private respondents, including
the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF
president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they
moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in
accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states:

"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

These damages are to assessed against the private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each,
to be paid separately for each of petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction. The other
petitioner, Occeña Builders, is not entitled to relief because it admittedly submitted its pre-qualification
documents on December 5, 1988, or three days after the deadline.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated December 12,
1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the chairman and the members of
the PBAC board of trustees, namely Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and
Teresita Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro
nominal damages P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the said chairman and members from the PBAC
board of trustees, or whoever among them is still incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office.
Costs against PBAC.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the Ombudsman.

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,

ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners, vs.MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or
legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never
more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly
collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power
to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3
For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit
of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory
Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to
enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and
respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination
of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and
scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid
justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the
power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of
good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of
any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a
Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in
which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7
and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal
aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views
being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la
Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People
v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the
court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There
is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10
"Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a
public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public
right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential
constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural
sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in
their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a
retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by
the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently
now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute
and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is
to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren
clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has
definitely been lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have
exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open
to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive
Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within
seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but
excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization
has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the
opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing
less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that
call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of
no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the
people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater
efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much
more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive
manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members
of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their
functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted
could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the
Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as
training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need
for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the
Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that
the last two decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity
and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate,
primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting
grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus
become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are
likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national
leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both
acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which
comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and
rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as
simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained
increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its
implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social
justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of
activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and
the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and
protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is
likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be
challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed
concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining
orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition.
Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That
is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital
concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity.
Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of
both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the
time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more
and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the
judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to
be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act,
before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be
duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report
as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major
reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901,
23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the
creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate
Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two
divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at
the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the
Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular
inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at
present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and
Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. 28
Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-
four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was
the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then
in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently
followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967,
Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank,
compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its
Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has
been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of
justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary
leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of
the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate
adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to
enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was
sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the
Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech
of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial
Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the options
presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon
consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover,
some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December
of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the
bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the
invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by
the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more
efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by
the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the
structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision
of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume
containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were
devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment
is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be
without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity
of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known
rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of
course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine
having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the
judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes
even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot
be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known
as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch.
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the
new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly
disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the
Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on
the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate
concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the
standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due
recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and
establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid
and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may
abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is
admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all
the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must
be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)"
44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may
abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of
tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on
the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the
application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity
of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that
cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is
palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the
hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here
discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the
legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect
adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for
sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was
greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than
at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and
although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by
the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by
its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First
Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including
the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new
courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact
of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of
the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the
mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion
flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating
new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other
metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and
municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior
courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts
was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly,
there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears mentioning
that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing
Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de
Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado
extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs.
State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the
situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former
justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido
abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The
present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute
was not within the bounds of legislative authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions
affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned,
with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and
understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the
section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out
in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the
Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts
shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the
office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into
the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from
extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution
adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the
1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist,
President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept,
categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the
Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm
and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy
alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice
Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again
the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president,
under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65
Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935
Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." 66
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of
President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as
the head of government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly,
a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this
Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain
aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the
Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as
Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the
Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus
of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with
the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is
a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present,
where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section
7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as
far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover,
this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded
the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the
basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the
two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what
is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that
in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus
be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed
to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied
Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other
Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of
now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity,
they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in
this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for
approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting
Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry
out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It
is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the
Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand
the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with
the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of
such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is
now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been
well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited
Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is
well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of
such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The
classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of
Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative
theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence
and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot
lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only
because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white
but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with
force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system,
and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of
governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in
constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where,
without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against
power. That we should avoid.

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful
reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising
such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and
allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the
doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to
make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms
and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy,
therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly
more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means
as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo
of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent
factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of
the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a
"definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this
provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of
the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be
the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be
issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is
insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the
meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall
cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of
performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any
interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks
of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of
whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable.
Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the
Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the
generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as
earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the
unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to
have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there
that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is
entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in the
Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of
scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever
since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the
opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved.
Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then
Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101
consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not
inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth
century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of
conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has
been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the
Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level
and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed
with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has
to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own
benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A
public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The
law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and
fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision
to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then
are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their
conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of
which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right.
As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most
rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of
that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider.
independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by
former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of
judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The
judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff
as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one
litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty
Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior
courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office
made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a
judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary,
Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who
have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are
independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other
two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to
annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the
administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts
except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the
trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of
the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient
judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments
are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the
sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this
pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a
decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system,
this Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA
COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on
behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The
Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:

SEC. 14. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers,
Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers
Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to
intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was
necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to
file their Comment in Intervention.

The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as follows:

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among

others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical
attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales,
contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at
P450 Million annually in government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum
from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout
the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of
numerous moviehouses and theaters;

4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the

Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all business
industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only
alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and
500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for the
Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes
a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate
of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb
these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people
and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted
with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local
government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers
conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.

1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express
each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts
of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given
practical rather than technical construction. 5

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider
is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental
rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction
of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected
shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where
the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the
DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles
explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7

2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive,
confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in
the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 10

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by
the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an
end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is
similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners
pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting
the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all
videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to
impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the
state's police power.13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the
DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that
"whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."

In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause
sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency
measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President,
considering that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said
Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised
at the proper time.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of
legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the
direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited
period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the
Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion
as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with
the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the
grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE
as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate
remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among
other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's
position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after
the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to
engage in the videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms,
including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before
they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the
possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of
registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the
possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.

raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof of
registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto
law.

The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 15

... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that
the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such
presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that
when certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the
guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the
facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others
is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common
experience". 16

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection between
the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the
DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only
after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in
character.

6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being
eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its
regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund
movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the
unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic
films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in
theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually
untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in
business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video
industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places
notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the
DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative
concern.

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the
main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such
a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the
rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General,
with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and
making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the
consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

`(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities
referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.

(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual
may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.

(d) . . .

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the
production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to
corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the
meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.

SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and
decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than
five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the
 discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the manager
or administrator shall be criminally liable.

SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall
consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall
so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from
then on be temporarily suspended.

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act to
have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall
again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or
cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense
committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order
No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the
authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30,
1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law
was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on
the 20th of August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1
authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in
an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also
says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of
the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not
in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and
discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not
"an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and
the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold,
any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have
been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an
emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are
vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of
the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the
power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when
any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature
itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another,
and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate
legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the
Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact
any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature
itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act
within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187;
24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:

Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and,
under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates
of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for
the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void
as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a
public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This
was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a
railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality
of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive
opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn.,
281), in which the court held:

Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. — Under Laws 1887,

c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are
equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a
railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with
the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had
on that question.

Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority thus given to

the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are
equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —

That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property
shall be equal and reasonable.

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the
facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the
violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there
held —

That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to
require either argument or citation of authority.

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules
and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law
already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an
authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and
reasonable.

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law
shall be, — which would not be allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it an authority
and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it,
which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the
law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon
these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely
charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made."

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others,
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of
a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be
put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the
judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220
U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of
Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act
there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and
establish such service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the
provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or
in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of
the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an
exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate
refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person having no right in the land to use
it as they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different from governmental
authority.

The opinion says:

From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon
executive officers power to make rules and regulations, — not for the government of their
departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could
confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had
legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general
provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of administrative rules and
regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by
Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and
grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an
unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable
to the penalty imposed by Congress.

The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest
reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses.
He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A
violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by
the Secretary, but by Congress."

The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It
will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public
corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the
power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could
delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable
rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance,"
and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative
authority.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out
and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
 That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be
provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like
manner, that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action to depend.

The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:

All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until
5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the president.

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:

We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary
power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust
and groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated; second, because the power
to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be
delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make
a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its
operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or
board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide
arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an
attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.

The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations
were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso
per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of
rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act
of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it
at any price was to a crime.

The Executive order2 provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as
follows:

In Manila —

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

 In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price
less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to
the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum
price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may
be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary handling
expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most
effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other
and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and
different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation
by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a
sub delegation of that power.

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General
to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the
price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local or
special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all
over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of
common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice
with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which
varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of
the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling
price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to
all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is
confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut,
chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn
from the numerous other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law.
If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by
proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other
product of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and
uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law,
must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion
and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in
excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other
words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what
was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice
should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced,
and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any
cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or
define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the
Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No.
53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the
Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the
sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation
a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked
a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here
presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an
argument for, or against, its constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and
property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or
any emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of
the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We make the broad
statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms and
conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix
the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of
government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with
government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under
the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the
Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the
Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other or different
price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution
should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full
force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution
could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the
United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should be
bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at the time was at
war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of
the same act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it,
either actual or constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and
fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private
property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and
did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the
personal, private property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the
public, but the members of this court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions.
Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law
authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would
sell his own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by
analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868
here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power
to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of
the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-
General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in
violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-
General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to
sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or
undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but
hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement
of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage
to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by
transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No.
626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary
to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos
and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
 (SGD.)
FERDINAND E.
MARCOS

Pre
side
nt

Republic of the
Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the
improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable
here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the
Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the
basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor
General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely
different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of
the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall
Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy
of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of
his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the
validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to
have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion
not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is
the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and
the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained
by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an
"iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the
import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process
— and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the
sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except
by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their
progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn
vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a
ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern
visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its
totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary
or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to
be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade
the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing,
to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances,
previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present
danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent
in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of
its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power,
which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to
beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a
ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some
relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.
And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of
the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending
the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases,
that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a
measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on
these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken
steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own
carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output,
which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and
the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more
effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the
questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
 To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of
the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by
their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or
by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where
they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it
could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of
the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that
there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty
is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck
at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process.
It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should
not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority
to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property
as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall
"be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it
is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they
be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President,
to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute
it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for
all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,
this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure
would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the
present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation
of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and
soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of
protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M.

ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of
National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

RESOLUTION

EN BANC:

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a
statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E.
Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1;
Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major
arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny
them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of
the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus,
petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary
travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee
M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin
respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr.
Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the
'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return
of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the
Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he
prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the
movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the
Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the
Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a
reconsideration of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the
factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown
to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused
by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return
when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the
"legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of
the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power
and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department
and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction
to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new.
This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of
governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as
mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton
stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional
language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31
ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the
definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted
in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the
federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long
as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms,
strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by
direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers
makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit;
rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves
exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive'
power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual
powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained
analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which
provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and
the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all,
Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6
refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath
of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that
she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court
will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos has
not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it
has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the
discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of
lightning to whip the blood.

This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund
that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been reduced to a non-
person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a
symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be
interred in this country.

This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse that
deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep
and let us be done with it forever.

PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:

I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.

Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to
say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance,
our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if
we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of
his widow and the other members of his family?

Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and
consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or political
and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not
allow the remains to come, more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted. To
refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against the well-intentioned aim of the
administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the
oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.

Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once
wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of government.
Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our
country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question
will no longer be what is right, but what is left.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after decision in this case had
been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original dissenting opinion. There I said that the
first cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled
to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add a few statements to that dissenting
opinion.

Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in
this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the
right to be buried in this country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying the
constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion,
includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should be in the negative
if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid the
completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his mortal remains with a few
square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth.

Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that can be accorded him
now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this country would apply to any
Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This is the most
irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the fundamental
assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply to all Filipinos, whether
dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is a Filipino.

It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose a serious threat to
national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my dissenting opinion, the second
cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that respondents have not presented any "hard
evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general conclusions of
national security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and enforceable
constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind, served to confirm the
validity of such dissenting statement.

If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national security, the situation
cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to be buried into
mother earth, where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that reigns, in
the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten national security, his
supporters would pose that threat to national security. This argument is untenable as it is without
merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived
of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the
country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled, Marcos' supporters
would be deprived of an otherwise potent argument—so conducive to mass protests and even
violence—that their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in his homeland.

It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human rights, to speak of.
This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr.
Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It
was vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be
buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is
finally laid to rest in his country.

This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the right to lay down
conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these conditions must, as a
fundamental postulate, recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.

The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now. Without in any way
affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority, I am deeply concerned
and greatly disturbed that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they
have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment, threatens
to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional dimension of the
problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to the dead.
What predictably follows will be a continuing strife, among our people, of unending hatred,
recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!

My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return and burial in the
Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such conditions as
the Philippine government may impose in the interest of peace and order.

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila,
petitioners,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA

IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor
General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human
Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order
issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may
the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a
particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency
or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These
facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they
had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS
premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The
"mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in
the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those
directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
the days that followed. 3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents
herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-
political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer
the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of
P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named
respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later
also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17,
1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the
MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on
the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed
as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . .
docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated"
or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September
27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10

6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS),"
all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In
connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño)
received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the
case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process
and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with
which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order
13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and
resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of
their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en
banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to
file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging
as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction
over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
"striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-
082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners
may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that
it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges
against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion
to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten
(10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits
with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due
process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative
charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was
empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the
facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference
being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of
petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this
Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to
hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in
other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following
general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers,
(and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this
Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the
Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it
has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine,
certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the
Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at
the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect
for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . .
an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,

determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially,
to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact,
and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot
and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or
not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c)
what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues
and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved
parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said
issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process;
and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a
motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an
adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme
Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business
intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its
own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the
complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in
the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If
its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would
have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by
the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government
agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate
unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof
are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits."

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City
Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons
of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of
the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are
dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992,
this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of
the leachate3that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams
could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at
the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992
among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and
LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle
the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA
issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its
Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate,
Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the
LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action
for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan
sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance
the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the
time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the
pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that
under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not
by the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-
15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the
trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from
dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further
orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the
aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan
City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to
the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the
petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of
Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1)
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to
cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and
desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12,
1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an
urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise
if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is
therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the
respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately
set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted
or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference
was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the
Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and
review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a
rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days
from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.15Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease
and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its
enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in
the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the
temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said
area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal
attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby
adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining
and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal
proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now
docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of
Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper
interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until
otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open
dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains
highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of
the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained.
On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of
Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program
within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers
and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series
of 1983 which provides, thus:
 Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice
and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying
the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of
sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify
any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or
abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or

instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above
provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial
functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold
question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws,
have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in
the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive
Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers
and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized
in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy,
the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of
the LLDA for the development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the
open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken
without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850,
as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the
said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was
recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as
intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue:
Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop
dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation
of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as
an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the
LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant
to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would
be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need
not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order when there isprima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the
allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
 Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as
the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is
a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the
1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."28 It is to be borne in mind
that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under
its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been
complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps
would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute
"necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private
sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases
which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad
powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to
issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related
issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July
19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping
their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and
ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Guillermo H. Pulia for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 14, 1985 Decision of Labor Arbiter Teodorico L.
Ruiz which held that herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was illegally dismissed; and of the
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission which dismissed petitioner's appeal on the
ground that the same was filed out of time.

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal
Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he
was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of
P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General
Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in
his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased
to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was
increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire
Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly
salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the
grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor
Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal
with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985
(Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
Hence, the instant petition (Ibid, pp. 2-22).

In compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated April 30, 1986 (Ibid., p.
94), private respondent filed his Comment on May 23, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 97-101) and public respondent
on July 2, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 120-124).

On June 6, 1986, petitioners filed their Reply to private respondent's Comment (Ibid, pp. 102-105) and
on July 25, 1986, their Reply to public respondent's Comment (Ibid., pp. 126-131).

In a Resolution dated August 18, 1986, the Second Division of this Court resolved to give due course
to the petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., P. 132).

In compliance with the above mentioned Resolution, petitioners filed the,.r memorandum on
November 10, 1986; while private respondent filed his Memorandum on October 17, 1986 (Ibid, pp.
139-144), and public respondent on November 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 160-166).

Before going however, into the merits of the case, an important point to consider is whether or not it is
still within the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which
to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April
11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension
policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was
denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed
out of time (Rollo, pp. 31-32).

Petitioners claim, among other things, that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality
(Rollo, p. 9). It invokes the Rules of Court provision on liberal construction of the Rules in the interest
of substantial justice.

It will be noted however, that the foregoing provision refers to the Rules of Court. On the other hand,
the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no
room for interpretation.

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137
SCRA 314 [1985]).

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this
case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in
rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who
should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all
be demanded.