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(Medina) vs CAMARCH 20, 2001

1.Respondent Tarbunal was hired by the petitioner
corporation as security guard on Sept 1996 and was
assigned to one of its clients.

2. However, the client requested that Tarbunal be relieved

from work because of several violations – being late for
duty, below standard performance and exceeding six
months duty in the company.

3. Tarbunal filed a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming

for separation pay,non-payment of legal/special holiday
and overtime pay, underpayment of13th month pay and
cash bond and tax refund.

4. On April 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment

ordering reinstatement of Tarbunal without loss of seniority
rights and the payment of full backwages and salary

5. Medina appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the same

for lack of jurisdiction. MR was also denied.

6. Medina filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which

dismissed the petition outright for having been filed beyond
the 60-day reglementary period or on them 67th day per
its resolution on June 2, 2000. - CA ruled in this manner
since Medina received on Nov 10, 1999 theOrder dated
August 26, 1999 of the NLRC and the MR was filed on Nov
19, 1999. - Copy of the said order was received by Medina
on April 3, 200 while the petition was filed with the CA
on May 31, 2000. - CA did not discuss the merits of the
petition.Hence, this petition.

1.Petitioner’s contention:
The petition for certiorari filed with CA was within the
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
reglementary period pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
on Civ Pro.They further claimed that when the assailed
Order was received on April 3,2000, the petition was filed
on May 31, 2000 which was only the 58th day.

2. Respondent’s contention:
Tarbunal said that he is aware that Sec 4, Rule65 of the
1997 Rules on Civ Pro was later amended and took effect on
September 1, 2000, hence, when the petition was filed with
CA on June 2,2000 was not yet covered by said

WON the petition for certiorari was filed beyond the
reglementary period.(technically, beyond naman talaga.
Nagfile kasi sa 67th day imbis na dapat within 60 days lang.
Tama ba na hindi tinanggap ng CA yung petiton kahitmedyo
lampas ng 60 days yung pagkakafile)

HELD:NO.The above conclusion is consonant with

the provision in Section 6, Rule 1of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that "(T)hese Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding."

Contrary to the position of respondents that such

amendment should not apply in this case, the Court ruled
that the amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC wherein
the sixty day period to file a petition for certiorari is
reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration should be deemed applicable.

Remedial statutes or statues relating to remedies or modes

of procedure,which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing do not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law, but, will be
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
of their passage like in the case at bar.

The resolutions dated June 2, 2000 which dismissed the

petition for certiorari isset aside and the case is remanded
back to CAfor further proceedings.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests


This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed
by petitioners seeking to reverse and set aside the
resolution of the CA which dismissed their petition for
review of the decision of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan
on the ground that the petition was filed out of time and the
Resolution denying their MR.Sometime in 1987, private
respondents’ predecessor Florentino Quintos, Sr.,
filed an application for the judicial registration of a certain
land which included petitioners’ land; that the land
registration court grants Quintos application and decreed
the land in Florencion Quinto’s name and OCT No.
227 75 was subsequently issued. Respondents
subsequently filed a complaint for illegal detainer against
petitioners for the latter’s refusal to vacate the subject
land which resulted in petitioners’ ejectment from the
subject property.

So in 1996, petitioners filed with the MTC of Lingayen,

Pangasinan an action for reconveyance with damages
againstrespondents alleging that they are the real owners
of the land.Respondents filed their answer with
counterclaim, alleging that the subject land had always
belonged to respondents’ later father Florentino
Quintos Sr.On June 29, 1999, a decision was rendered by
the MTC declaring petitioners as thelegal owners of the land
and ordering respondents to convey to petitioners
thesubject land and to pay damages to
petitioners.Respondents filed their appeal before the RTC,
Lingayen, Pangasinan which reversed the decision of the
MTC dismissing the complaint, declaring respondents as
the absolute owners of the subject land.Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied
in a Resolution. On April 18, 2000, petitioners, through
counsel, filed with the CA amotion for extension of time to
file a petition for review which she subsequentlyfiled on
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
May 2, 2000. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for reviewfor being filed out of time.

On May 29, 2001, the CA issued the assailed

Resolution dismissing petitioners’ petition for review
for being filed out of time. It found the explanation given by
petitioners’ counsel unconvincing since she failed to
give the reason why theenvelope was opened only on
April 3, 2000; that counsel’s secretary did not even
admit that she actually received the said Resolution;
that it is the counsel’s duty to adopt and strictly
maintain a system that efficiently takes into account all
courtnotices sent to her and she failed to instruct and
remind her secretary on whatshould be done with respect
to such notices and processes.

Petitioners’ motion forreconsideration was denied in a

resolution dated August 9. 2011.

ISSUE(S): WON the CA validly dismissed the petitioners’

petition for review for being filed out of time.

Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
provides that the petition shall be filed and served within 15
days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of
the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. In the
instant case, it has been established that the resolution
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s decision was received by the secretary
of petitioners’ former counsel on March 16, 2000, thus
the last day of the 15-day period within which to file the
petition for review with the respondent court was March 31,
2000. Considering that counsel filed a motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review with the respondent
court only on April 18, 2000, the judgment of the RTC
subject of the petition for review had already become final
and executory.
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
Consequently, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition
for being filed out of time since it has no more jurisdiction to
entertain the petition much less to alter a judgment.This
Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period laid down by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to
perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of
defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to availof the
same must comply with the requirement of the
rules. Failing to do so, theright to appeal is lost
We agree with the CA when it found that the reason
advanced by petitioners’ former counsel, which is that
she received the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration only on April 3, 2000 as she found it on her
table on the same date,unacceptable. The negligence of her
secretary in failing to immediately give the trial court’s
resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration upon receipt to
the counsel and the negligence of counsel to adopt and
arrange matters in order to ensure that official or judicial
communications sent by mail would reach her promptly
cannot be considered excusable. The Court has also often
repeated that the negligence of the clerks which adversely
affect the cases handled by lawyers, isbinding upon the

The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds

the client because otherwise, "there would never be an end
to a suit so long as newcounsel could be employed who
could allege and show that prior counsel had notbe
sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
Spouses Decena vs. Spouses Piquero [G.R. No.
155736. March 31, 2005]

Facts: On September 7, 1997, Spouses Danilo and Cristina

Decena executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero for the sale of their
titled property in Paranaque, costing P6,900,000.00, for
the price of P940,250.00 only, payable in six
(6) installmentsvia postdated checks. The MOA stipulated
that the that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer
the property to the respondents upon the execution of the
MOA with the condition that if two of the
postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank,
the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the
petitioners. The vendees forthwith took possession of the

The first two checks issued by the respondents were

dishonored by the drawee bank and were not replaced with
cash despite demands by the petitioners who on May 17,
1999 filed a complaint, before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
where they reside, against the respondents for
the annulmentof the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and
damages, alleging that they did not transfer the property to
and in the names of the respondents as a result of the
dishonored checks.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Malolos Bulacan gained

jurisdiction over the case and should be the venue of

Held: NO.The action of the petitioners for the rescission of

the MOA on account of the respondents' breach thereof and
the latter's failure to return the premises subject of the
complaint to the petitioners, and the
respondents' evictiontherefrom is a real action. As such,
the action should have been filed in the proper court where
the property is located, namely, in Pararaque City,
conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA
on account of the respondents' breach thereof and the
latter's failure to return the premises subject of the
complaint to the petitioners, and the
respondents' eviction therefrom is a real action. As such,
the action should have been filed in the proper court where
the property is located, namely, in Pararaque City,
conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court which reads:

SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. ' Actions affecting title to

or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos,

Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue was
improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably
with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

G.R. No. 147417 July 8, 2005 SPS. VICTOR &
AVISO, Petitioners, vs. ANTONIO HERMANO,


NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed after the CA

dismissed the petitioners’ original action for certiorari for
being filed out of time. The original action filed with the CA
questions the decision of the RTC ruling that there was a
misjoinder in the causes of action in the civil case filed by
the petitioners, and consequently dropping respondent
Hermano from the said case.

FACTS: Petioner spouses and Aviso filed three causes of

action based on the following allegations. Sometime in
November 1997, the spouses Perez and Aviso entered into
a Contract to Sell with Zecson Land Inc. as the buyer
through its president Zenie Sales-Contreras. The subject
properties were five parcels of land valued at P19, 104, 000.
In the agreement entered into by the parties, Zecson Land
Inc. shall pay a down payment to the spouses and Aviso,
another portion of the purchase price will be given as cash
advance upon the execution of the contract, while the rest
shall be used by Zecson as payment for loans earlier
contracted by the three from the company. This is the first
cause of action.

In the second cause of action, the spouses Perez

and Aviso contend that they were tricked to sign other
documents simultaneous with the execution of the Contract
to Sell. Two of the said documents were mortgage deeds
over the same 5 properties in favour of respondent
Hermano, whom they have never met. Sales-Contreras
allegedly explained to them that “the mortgage contracts
would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price
agreed upon in their Contract to Sell.” However, the

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

spouses and Aviso assert that it was never their intention to
mortgage their properties to Hermano and that they have
never received a single centavo from mortgaging their
properties to him. They now then seek a TRO against
Hermano who informed them that he would be foreclosing
the subject properties.

In their third cause of action, the spouses and

Aviso pray for damages against Zecson Land, Inc. and/or
Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and Antonio
Hermano. They claim that they are entitled to damages
from the aforementioned defendants for Zecson and
Contreras’ failure to comply with their obligations under
their Contract to Sell and in misleading and
misrepresenting them into mortgaging their properties to
Hermano, who in turn, had not paid them the proceeds

Thus, the first cause of action was for enforcement

of contract to sell entered into between the spouses and
Aviso and Zecson, the second was for annulment or
rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into
between the spouses and Aviso and Hermano, while the
last one was for damages against all the mentioned
defendants. A joinder was made on these causes of action
and a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon
Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty.
Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio
Hermano was filed before the RTC.

Hermano denied the spouses and Aviso’s

allegations through his Answer with Counterclaim.
Hermano also filed a “Motion with Leave to Dismiss the
Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" which
was granted by the trial court on the ground that there was
a misjoinder in the causes of action. As a consequence,
Hermano was dropped from the civil case. The spouses
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
Perez and Aviso moved for reconsideration but was also
denied by the trial court. So, they filed an original action for
certiorari before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition "for having been

filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended."
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was also denied. Hence this petition.


erred in dropping Hermano in the civil action and ruling
that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action.
HELD: Yes. The statutory intent behind the provisions on
joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions
which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights
and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in
giving a standard definition of the terms used or in
developing a rule of universal application. The dominant
idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or
equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many
separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless
be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the
restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

What the SC gathered from the trial court’s Orders

was that the trial court ruled that there was a misjoinder in
the civil case filed because it did not comply with the
conditions on joinder of parties. It is well to remember that
the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties
or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties,
as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law
common to both parties joined, arising out of the same
transaction or series of transaction.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

It can be deduced from the averments made in the
complaint that there are questions of fact and law common
to both Zecson Land, Inc. and Hermano arising from a
series of transaction over the same properties.

There is the question of fact, for example, of

whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners
to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano.
There is also the question of which of the four contracts
were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under
Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it
is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of
the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent Hermano will
definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that
what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc.,
was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean
that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners
were no longer the absolute owners of the properties
mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or
not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras,
and respondent Hermano committed fraud against
petitioners as to make them liable for damages.
Thus, the petition was granted, the Orders of the
RTC were annulled and set aside, and the RTC was ordered
to add respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the
defendants in Civil Case filed by spouses Perez and Aviso.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005
R O S E N D O A L B A , minor, represented by his mother
and naturalguardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A.
ALBA ,in h e r personal capacity, petitioners,
HERRERA, respondents.

On 21 October 1996, respondent filed a petition in
RTC Manilafor cancellation of entries in the birth
certificate of petitionerminor, to wit: (1) minor’s
surname ‘Herrera’; (2) his filiation
asf a t h e r ; a n d ( 3 ) m a r r i a g e t o m i n o r ’ s m o t h e r ,
Armi, allegingthey are false and that he
m a r r i e d o n l y o n c e w i t h E z p e r a n z a Santos.O n 1 3
January 1997, the RTC issued an Ame nded
O r d e r r e - scheduling the hearing of petition to 26
February 1997. Copyof which was published in
‘Today’ in its Jan 20, 27, and Feb 3,1997 issues, and
were also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza
St.,E r m i t a , M a n i l a ( a d d r e s s p e r m i n o r ’ s b i r t h
c e r t i f i c a t e ) , L o c a l Civil Registrar and Solicitor
General.During the hearing, only OSG appeared but filed
no opposition,while Armi was not present for she did
not receive the Order,t h e a d d r e s s p r o v i d e d b e i n g
w r o n g . O n 1 A p r i l 1 9 9 7 , t h e R T C granted the petition
which became final on 2 June 1997. On 24November
2000, petitioners filed a petition for annulment
of judgment with CA on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their perso
n.A r m i a v e r r e d t h a t : ( 1 ) r e s p o n d e n t k n e w a l l
along of her trueaddress where they cohabited
as husband of wife, result of which is the
minor; and (2) she knew of the decision only
on2 6 F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 8 ; h e n c e d u e p r o c e s
s was denied.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

NM Rothschild vs Lepanto Consolidated

Facts: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a Complaint
against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited
praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging
contracts between the parties void for being contrary to
Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for

Upon motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel

to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the
Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the
latter office to effect service of summons on NM
ROTHSCHILD. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With
Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the
Complaint on the ground, among others: the Complaint
failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not
have any against petitioner and the action is barred by
estoppel. Petitioner also filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for
Leave to take the deposition of Mr. Paul Murray(Director,
Risk Management of petitioner) before the Philippine
Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve
Interrogatories on respondent. The trial court dismissed
the motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR. The
petitioners filed petition for certiorari with CA,dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not there is a cause of action

Ruling: It is basic that "[a] cause of action is the act or

omission by which a party violates a right of another." Its
elements are the following: (1) a right existing in favor of
the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to
respect the plaintiff's right, and (3) an act or omission of
the defendant in violation of such right. We have held that
to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. The trial court held that
Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests
the Complaint in the case at bar contains all the three
elements of a cause of action.

Indeed, petitioner’s defense against the charge of nullity of the

Hedging Contracts is the purported intent of the parties
that actual deliveries of gold be made pursuant thereto.
Such a defense requires the presentation of evidence on
the merits of the case. An issue that "requires the
contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as
the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case,
should not be within the province of a mere Motion to
Dismiss." The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the
Motion to Dismiss on this ground.

Civil Procedure Rules 1 & 2 Digests

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