Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy

Author(s): Philip H. Gordon

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 74-100
Published by: The MIT Press
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 Europe's Uncommon PhilipH. Gordon
ForeignPolicy
in earlyFebruary1996,
aftertheUnitedStateshad engineered a peace agreement forformer Yugosla-
via thattheEuropeanshad failedto bringaboutafterfouryearsofinterven-
concludedoutloud whatmanyotherobservershad
tion,a seniorU.S. official
alreadybeguntothink:"UnlesstheUnitedStatesis preparedtoputitspolitical
and militarymusclebehindthe quest forsolutionsto Europeaninstability,
nothingreallygets done."' Only a few days later,aftera successfulU.S.
diplomaticintervention betweenGreeceand Turkeyover
to preventa conflict
an Aegeanisland, thatsame commented
official thatEuropeanswere"literally
sleepingthroughthenight"as PresidentBillClintonmediatedthedisputeon
the phone.2Five yearsafterthe EuropeanUnion (EU) had signeda treaty
announcingthecreationofa commonforeignand security policy(CFSP),the
perceptionhad begun to emerge-not only among Americansbut among
manyEuropeansas well-thattheEU's efforts had failed,and thattheUnited
Stateswas morethaneverthediplomaticand military leaderof theWestern
world.3
ComparingtheEU's foreign and security policyto thatoftheUnitedStates
is, ofcourse,unfair.The CFSP projectis farmorelimitedthanthecreationof

Studiesand EditorofSurvivalat the

Theauthoris CarolDeane SeniorFellowforU.S. Strategic
International
Institute Studies.
forStrategic

Thisarticlewas first
presentedas partofa Councilon ForeignRelationsStudyGroupon Europe
and TransatlanticRelationsin the 1990s.A differentversionof the paper,focusingmoreon
EuropeanUnioninstitutional thanthisarticle,will be publishedin
issues and less on security
AndrewMoravcsik, ed.,TheProspectsforEuropean Integration:
Deepening,Diversity,Democratization
(Washington,D.C.: Brookings and Councilon ForeignRelations,
Institution forthcoming 1998).I
would liketo thankRosa Alonso,AmayaBloch-Laine, FraserCameron,JohnChipman,Charles
Grant,CharlesKupchan,AndrewMoravcsik, JohnRoper,GideonRose,and theparticipants inthe
CouncilStudyGroupfortheircomments and suggestions; forthearguments
responsibility is of
courseminealone.

1. Then-U.S. AssistantSecretaryofStateforEuropeanandCanadianAffairs RichardC. Holbrooke,

citedin WilliamDrozdiak,"Europe'sDallyingAmidCrisesScaresItsCritics," International
Herald
Tribune,February 8, 1996.
2. Citedin LionelBarberand BruceClark,"US PolicesAegean'WhileEU Sleeps,"'Financial Times,
February 9, 1996.
3. Thisalso seemsto be theview of U.S. DefenseSecretary WilliamCohen,who has said that
Bosnia"was principally a Europeanproblemtobe solved.TheEuropeansdid notmove.Itpointed
out thattheEuropeansdo notact in theabsenceofAmericanleadership." Remarksreported by
BarbaraStarr, "CohenEstablishing His Doctrineas Clintonand CongressLookOn,"Jane'sDefence
Weekly,February 5, 1997,p. 19.

International
Security,Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter1997/98),pp. 74-100
? 1997 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.

74
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 75

a political-military
capabilitylikethatoftheUnitedStates;CFSP mechanisms
and procedureshave been in place foronlya shorttime;and theobstaclesto
foreignpolicycooperationamong longstanding sovereignstateswiththeir
own histories, perspectives,interests,
and bureaucracies are obvious.Yetthe
comparison-andthedisparaging remarksfromabroad-do servetohighlight
justhow fartheEuropeanUnionis frompossessingthesortofunity, credibil-
ity,and militarypowernecessarytobe an influential actorin globaldiplomatic
and security affairs.
Thosewho had hoped in 1991thattheEU's CFSP would
be worthyof sucha name-and therewereplentyofthemat thetime-have
been largelydisappointed.4
Whetheror not theEuropeanUnionis able to developintoa unifiedand
effectiveforeignand securitypolicyactoris important, not only forthose
Europeansseekingto enhancetheirown influence on theworldstagebutfor
thestructure ofworldpoliticsitself.An EU of nearly400 millionpeople and
a combinedgrossdomesticproduct(GDP) of morethan$8 trillionthatwas
able to uniteits diplomaticand military potentialcould easilychallengethe
UnitedStates'currentstatusas "lone superpower";exertinfluenceover the
Middle East peace processand securityin the PersianGulf;gain increased
economicand commercial leveragefromitsinternationalsecuritypolicy;begin
to play moreof a role in Asian diplomacyand security; and, perhapsmost
important, createa new balance withina NATO alliancethatis currently
dominatedby theUnitedStates.An EU thatremainsweak and fragmented in
foreignpolicy,however,will continueto be thesubordinate partnerthatit is
today-dependenton U.S. leadershipwithintheAtlanticAlliance,a relatively
minordiplomaticactorin thewiderworld,and unableto deal withsecurity
criseseven on itsown periphery.
Fordecades,and in particular sincethe1991Treatyon EuropeanUnion(the
Maastricht Treaty),theEU has been tryingto enhanceitsabilityto act diplo-
maticallyand militarilyabroad.Thisarticleexaminestherecentrecordofthe
EU's effortsto do so and prospectsfordoingso in thefuture. My argument is
thatcontrary to theambitiousrhetoric ofEU officials
and treaties,
theanalyses
(orhopes)ofa numberofscholars,and sometheoriesofEuropeanintegration,
the prospectsfora unifiedand effective EU foreignand securitypolicyare

4. The mostfamousexampleof exaggerated aspirationsforan autonomousEuropeanforeign

policywere the commentsby the Luxembourg ForeignMinisterJacquesPoos thatthe EU's
intervention in Yugoslaviawas "thehourofEurope,notthehouroftheUnitedStates."See Joel
Haveman,"EC UrgesEnd to YugoslavViolence,Threatens Aid Cut,"LosAngeles
Times,
June29,
1991,p. All.
 International
Security22:3 | 76

poor,and likelyto remainso. For reasonsexplainedbelow,the European

Unionis highlyeffective in determining and implementing commonexternal
aid and tradepolicies,butitis nota veryunifiedor crediblediplomaticactor,
is poorlyequippedto deal quicklyand effectivelywithexternalcrises,and has
a vastlyunderdeveloped military capabilitygivenitssize and
forceprojection
economicstrength. As I demonstrate by examining theoriesofEuropeaninte-
grationand the recordof CFSP so far,thissituationis unlikelyto change
significantlyevenoverthelongerterm.So longas theUnitedStatesis willing
to remainengaged in Europeansecurityand in NATO, and unless some
unforeseen and overwhelming commonexternal challengeweretoemerge,the
EU is likelyto remaina fragmented and incompleteinternationalactor,de-
pendenton theUnitedStatesfordiplomaticleadershipand military support.
Thenextsectionofthisarticlelooksat alternativetheoriesforthinkingabout
Europeanintegration and examinestheconditionsunderwhichforeignand
security policyintegrationwouldbe likely.Thoseconditions havenotyetbeen
met.The followingsectionconsiderstherecordof CFSP sinceits creationin
1991and arguesthat-evenafterefforts to improveit in the1997Amsterdam
Treaty-itsachievements have notbeen muchmoresignificant thanthoseof
theinformal EuropeanPoliticalCooperation(EPC) thatprecededit.Thefourth
sectionconsidersEuropeanattemptsto develop a military either
capability,
throughtheEU's fledgling defensearm,theWestern EuropeanUnion(WEU),
oras an "identity"withinNATO,and arguesthatneither oftheseefforts
comes
close to freeingEuropefromitsmilitary dependenceon theUnitedStates.In
thefinalsectionI ask ifthelonger-term prospectsforan effective
and unified
Europeanforeignand securitypolicyare betterthanthe prospectsforthe
shorterterm,and show that-barringunforeseen and unlikelycircumstances
such as the rise of a new commonthreator a U.S. disengagement from
Europe-theyprobablyare not.

Theories
ofEuropean and CFSP
Integration
To assesstheprospects forintegration
intheareaofforeignand security
policy,
it is usefulto reflecton past patternsof Europeanintegration,and on the
theoriesthatbestexplaintheconditionsunderwhichintegration proceedsin
differentfunctionalareas.It is alwayspossiblethatthecomingyearswill see
a sharpdeparturefrompreviouspatternsofEuropeanintegration, butthisis
unlikely;in theabsenceof compellingreasonsto believethatthesepast pat-
ternswillnothold,thebestway to knowwhatto expectin thefutureis to try
to understandwhathas happenedin thepast,and why.
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 77

In thetheoretical literatureon theEuropeanUnion,thereare two broadly

competing explanations, whichmightbe called"functionalist" and "intergov-
ernmentalist,"ofhow and whytheprocessofintegration proceeds.5 The first
setoftheories-"functionalist" or "neofunctionalist"-emphasizes theprocess
by whichpoweris graduallytransferred to a "new center"as integration in
some areas makesit morenecessaryin others;institutions, once setup, push
to expandtheirpower;leadersand peoplecall forintegration in new domains
as theysee its successin others;and transnational elitesand interest groups
tendto "socialize"and developcommonviews and interests. Ultimately, as
poweris transferred to thenew,centralinstitutions, people cometo transfer
theirexpectations and loyaltyto thenew bodies.Such functionalist theories
dominatedexplanations ofEuropeanintegration duringthe1960s,as thethen-
EuropeanEconomicCommunity was firstmovingforward, but largelywent
out offashionduringthe1970sas Europeanintegration stalled.6
The second set of theories-"intergovernmentalist"-emphasizes national
interests,
bargaining, lowest-common-denominator deals, and theunwilling-
ness of states (or at least large states)to compromisetheircore national
interests.
The intergovernmental paradigmhas been predominant since the
1980s,whenthelimitsoffunctionalism becameclearand alternative explana-
tionsfortheEuropeanCommunity's unexpectedrevivalin themid-1980s were
required.Althoughthesuccessofthe1987SingleEuropeanAct(SEA) and the
decisionat Maastrichtin 1991 to proceedwithmonetaryunion stimulated
renewedscholarly interestin newversionsoftheold functionalist theories,the
dominantexplanationof theCommunity's 1980srevivalemphasizedtheim-
portanceofstates.7
Functionalism and intergovernmentalism are not onlycompetingdescrip-
tionsof integration processes;theycarrypolicyimplications as well,particu-

5. Here"integration"is definedas eitherthedelegationofsovereignty to newcentralinstitutions

or thesharing,or "pooling,"ofsovereignty in commoninstitutions.
6. Fora conciseexplanationand discussionoftheliterature on functionalism,
see AndrewMorav-
csik,"Preferencesand Powerin theEuropeanCommunity: A LiberalIntergovermmentalistAp-
proach,"JournalofCommon Market Vol.31,No. 4 (December1993),pp. 473-482.TheEEC,
Studies,
EuropeanCoal and SteelCommunity, and Euratom-the"EuropeanCommunities" (EC)-for-
mallybecamethe"EuropeanUnion"withtheratification oftheMaastricht Treatyin 1993.I use
"Union"exceptwhenreferring to a specifichistorical
point.
7. TheSEA strengthened community institutions
andlaunchedthe"1992"program forcompleting
theEC's singleeconomicmarket. Fortherenewedinterest infunctionalism-butalsotheemphasis
on statesand governments-see Robert0. Keohaneand StanleyHoffmnann, Change
"Institutional
in Europein the1980s,"in Robert0. Keohaneand StanleyHoffmann, TheNewEuropean Commu-
nity:DecisionmakingandInstitutional
Change(Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1991),pp. 1-40;and
AndrewMoravcsik, "Negotiating theSingleEuropeanAct,"in Keohaneand Hoffmnann, TheNew
European Community, pp. 41-84.
 International
Security
22:3 | 78

larlywhereinstitution buildingis concerned.Confidencein functionalist ex-

planationsforintegration leads to thebeliefthatthesettingup ofinstitutions
itselfshouldbe a goal,because thoseinstitutions will be used, confidence in
themwillgrow,theirlegitimacy willbecomeestablished, and theideologyand
momentum ofintegration willbe maintained. In responseto theintergovern-
mentalists'viewthatinstitutions cannotworkunlesscommongoalsareshared,
functionalistshave faiththattheinstitutions themselves can have an effecton
the perceptionof commongoals. Intergovernmentalists thustendto take a
"pragmatic"view of what is possibleand seek to keep institution building
withinthoselimits,whereasfunctionalists believethattheEuropeanintegra-
tionprocessis aboutchanging whatis possible,and stretching thoselimits.This
debateabout"vision"and momentum on one hand,and "pragmatism" on the
other,has oftenmarkedthedifference betweenFrenchand British viewsabout
theEuropeanintegration process.8
Which set of theoriesexplainsmore?Despite the recentpreference for
intergovernmental approaches(which,as arguedbelow,are morerelevantto
CFSP),itmustbe admittedthatfunctionalism stillhas a certainlogic,and that
functionalistpressuresdo exist,eveniftheyare notalwaysstrongenoughto
provokedeeperintegration. Functionalism has beenbadlyservedby theulti-
mateexpectation of a "transfer of loyalties"to a new center,whichhas not
happened,but thelack of whichshouldnotdiscredittheexplanatory power
of the theory.The processhas hardlybeen rapid or complete,but it does
appear,as functionalistsexpected,thattheformation of a customsunionled
to pressuresfora completedsinglemarket; thatthecreationofa singlemarket
resultedin increasedpressureformonetary union;thatmonetary unionand
otherformsofintegration have led to callsforfurther democratization ofthe
Union;and thatthecommoninterests and perspectives resultingfromall this
integration increasespressurefora commonforeignand securitypolicyto
representand pursue the interestsof the Union. All along,EU elitesand
institutionshave pushedto expandtheirpower,and theperceivedsuccesses
in some areas (like the singlemarketand commoncommercialpolicy)and
perceivedfailuresin others(likemonetary and foreign policy)haveled tocalls

8. Frenchleaders(includingJeanMonnet,ValeryGiscardd'Estaing,FrancoisMitterrand, and
JacquesDelors)have oftenexplicitly
supportedthesetting
up ofinstitutions-like
theEuropean
Coal and SteelCommunity, theEuropeanMonetary System,or theEurocorps-onthegrounds
thattheirveryexistencewouldpropeltheprocessofintegrationforwardand keepthenotionof
"Europe"alive,whereasBritish all ofthe
leadershave tendedto opposeinstitutions-including
above-unless theirimmediateutilitycouldbe demonstrated.
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 79

forintegration in new domains.Thesepressureshave notalwaysresultedin

further integration,butit is worthnotingthattheyexist.9
It is also clearfromthepastforty years,however,thatthememberstatesof
theEuropeanUnionhave proveneminently capableofresisting thepressures
and incentives ofintegration as wellas thelobbyingofinstitutions and interest
groups,and thatintegration movesforwardonlywhenmemberstateshave
sufficiently similarperceivedinterests(government-preference convergence)
thatthepotentialgainsofintegration (through increasedscaleand theabsence
ofinterstate friction)
aregreaterthanthecostsoflostsovereignty. As a general
rule,onlywhenitis in themutualinterests ofthelargestatesoftheUnionare
commonarrangements setup, and onlywhenit is in thosestates'interest are
those arrangements abided by in timesof difficulty. In the mid-1960s,for
example,the Frenchgovernment concludedthatit was not in its interest to
allow thestrengthening of theEuropeanCommissionor theincreaseduse of
majority voting;it therefore instigated the"LuxembourgCompromise," a de
factonationalvetoon legislation thatnearlyall memberstatesfoundusefulin
thefollowing decades.'0In theearly1970s,despitethepressures forand setting
up ofan instrument to coordinatemonetary policy(the"snake")and callsfor
a fullmonetary union,the oil crisisand theMiddle East war of 1973drove
apartEC economicpoliciesand forcedthe dismantling of the monetaryar-
rangements. Europeanintegration moved forwardagain the1980swiththe
in
SEA, butonly,as AndrewMoravcsikhas shown,becausethepreferences and
perceivedinterests of themainEC governments convergedat thattimeand
on thatissue,and integration proceededin sucha wayas tomeettheminimum
requirements ofthemajorEC states.11 In theearly1990s,justas scholarshad
begunonceagainto pay closeattention to regionalintegrationtheory, diverg-
ingnationalinterests ofthemainEC statesled someofthemto abandontheir
revivedattemptsto harmonizemonetarypolicyand exchangerates(theex-
changerate mechanismof the EuropeanMonetarySystem),and votersin

9. On the pressurestowardintegration and the processof "spillover,"see ErnstB. Haas, The

Uniting ofEurope:Political,
Social,andEconomic Forces,
1950-1957(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniver-
sityPress),pp. 243,283-317;and Keohaneand Hoffmann, "InstitutionalChangein Europein the
1980s,"in Keohaneand Hoffmann, TheNewEuropean Community, pp. 18-22.
10. For details,see WilliamNicoll,"The Luxembourg Compromise," JournalofCommon Market
Studies,Vol.23,No. 3 (September 1984),pp. 35-43.
11. See Moravcsik, "NegotiatingtheSingleEuropeanAct."See also David R. Cameron, "The 1992
Initiative:
Causes and Consequences,"in AlbertaM. Sbragia,ed., Europolitics: Institutions
and
Policymaking in the"New"European Community (Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1992),
pp. 23-74.
 22:3 | 80
Security
International

Franceand Denmarkshowedin referenda thatthepopularityofevenlimited

integrationwas notwidespread.The fledgling CFSP showeditslimitsas soon
as itwas announcedwhenmemberstatesweredividedoverhow to deal with
theconflictin formerYugoslavia.
The conclusionfromeventhisbriefsketchoftheapparentprocessesofand
prerequisitesforEuropeanintegration thusseemsclear,and it is relevantto
any assessmentof theprospectsforfurther in thearea of foreign
integration
and securitypolicy.The conclusionis thatstatesonlysharetheirsovereignty,
letalonesurrendersovereignty whenthefollowing
to a new institution, condi-
tionshold.
1. The perceivedgains of commonactionthroughthe advantagesof scale
outweighthepotentialcostsoflostsovereignty or nationalprestige.12
2. Government preferences or perceivednationalinterestshave converged
so thatthe firstconditionholds (because lost sovereignty
sufficiently is
likelyto matterless whenEC membergovernments have similarinterests
and ideologies).
3. Particularinterestsof largestatesremainprotectedeitherthroughtheap-
plicationofstrictlimitsor conditionsto thetermsofintegrationor through
the"opting-out" ofthestatewiththeparticular interests.
Theseconditionshave held in thearea ofcommercial policy,wherethegains
of scale in internalfreetrade and througha commonexternalbargaining
positionoutweighedthecostsofgivingup nationalcommercial policies(con-
dition1), and theparticular interest
ofFrenchagriculturewas protected (con-
dition3). Theyhave heldforthecompletion oftheinternalmarketwherethe
abandonmentof the nationalveto was seen as necessaryto pass important
single-market legislation(condition1); and since by the mid-1980sall EC
governments had acceptedthevirtuesof economicliberalismand deregula-
tion,therisksof sacrificed sovereigntywereperceivedas small,evenby the
Britishgovernment at the time(condition2). And morerecently, all three
conditions playedimportant rolesintheareaofmonetary policy:theperceived

12. The advantagesofscaleinclude(1) theadded leveragethatcomesfroma unifiedbargaining

thatderivefromavoidingEU statespursuingcompeting
position;(2) thebenefits and (3)
interests;
thepossibilityofusingCommunity prestige,
means,institutions,
andfinancing,whichcanenhance
leverageand possiblyfacilitate
moreefficient
implementation, forthepursuitofcertainobjectives.
For a discussionof whycommonactionmightenhanceleverage,see RoyH. Ginsberg, Foreign
PolicyActions oftheEuropean
Community: ThePolitics
ofScale(Boulder,
Colo.:LynneRienner, 1989),
pp. 3, 154.
 Europe'sUncommon Policy| 81
Foreign

gains of unitywere greaterthanthe lost sovereignty costof all thegovern-

mentsthatagreedto participate (condition1); thefirstconditionheldbecause
all thosegovernments had come to acceptthevirtuesofindependent central
banksand anti-inflationary currency policies(condition2); and Germanypro-
tecteditsparticular interestin a stablecurrency by requiringstrictcriteria for
joiningthe EuropeanMonetaryUnion (EMU), and Britainand Denmarkre-
servedtherightnotto participate, becauseforthem,thefirst conditiondid not
apply(condition 3). A similaranalysiscouldbe doneoftheagreement toallow
open bordersamongthesignatories oftheSchengenaccordsas well as ofthe
Social Chapterof theMaastricht Treaty(on workingconditions), but notyet
forforeignand securitypolicy,forwhichthestatesstillperceivethecostsof
integration to be greaterthanthepotentialbenefits.
It is also worthnotingwhatthepastrecordsayswhenintegration does not
happen:it does nothappen simplybecause stateswantto keep up the mo-
mentumtowardfunctional integration. Institutions are important in forming
commonperceptions, and thereis certainly a bias towardEU cooperation and
politicalsolidarity wheneverpossible.Buttherecordsuggeststhatstatestake
onlycosmeticstepstowardintegration whentheirperceivedinterests are not
servedby acceptingrealintegration. Europeanstatesmaywellone day accept
an integrated foreignpolicysimplyforthesake ofcreatinga trueunion,but
thatwould be breakingwith a patternof functionalcooperationthathas
evolvedoverdecades.
Fromthe precedinganalysis,it appears clearthatthe prerequisite forthe
development offoreign and securitypolicyintegration is a convergence ofthe
perceivedinterests ofthemainmemberstates,at leastto thepointwherethey
either(1) no longerfearthatthecommonpolicywould divergesignificantly
fromtheirnationalpolicy;or (2) are compelledby the developmentof an
importantcommoninterestto believe thata commonpolicyis worthsac-
rificing nationalautonomy. Stateswillonlytakethedifficult and self-denying
decisionto sharetheirforeign policysovereignty ifthegainsofcommonaction
are seen to be so greatthatsacrificing sovereignty is worthit, or if their
interests converge to the point thatlittleloss of sovereignty is entailed.
I argue below thatthese conditionshave not held in the past, do not
currently hold,and are notlikelyto holdin thefuture. In foreign and security
policy,theperceivedbenefits ofinstitutionalized cooperation seemso low that
governments stillfeeltheycanindulgecultural, historical,ordomesticpolitical
imperatives. Beforeshowingwhy,however,it is necessaryto makeclearjust
whatis understoodhereby commonforeignand security policy,becausethe
 Security22:3 | 82
International

discussionof CFSP is oftenplagued by ambiguityand confusionabout just

what is being discussed. Indeed, many apparent"disagreements"about
CFSP-both prescriptive and descriptive-arenotreallydisagreements at all,
but simplyreflections ofa failureto agreeon termsand statethemclearly.
The firstambiguity withCFSP is thatit potentially coversa wide rangeof
different things,fromlong-term economicaid to crisisreactionand potential
militaryinterventions. Thus if one analysthas in mindthe EU's long-term
approachto sub-SaharanAfricaor Ukraine,and anotheris thinking aboutthe
GulfWaror theYugoslavcrisis,itis notsurprising thattheycan cometo very
different conclusionsabouthow successful CFSP has been,whatitsprospects
are,and how bestto fix it.13As noted theEU is in facthighlyeffective
earlier,
at usingtradeand foreignaid in supportofitslong-term economicinterests,
but it is less good at crisisreactionor diplomaticand military intervention. I
define"foreign and security policy"broadly, and focuson thediplomaticand
security aspectsmorethantheeconomicones,forthesearetheareastheCFSP
was designedto improve.
The secondpotentialambiguity is aboutwhat"strengthening theCFSP"-a
goal ofall thememberstatesoftheEU-really means."ProgresstowardCFSP"
could conceivably be definedaccordingto how integrated itis (as opposedto
intergovernmental), how globalit is (as opposed to regional),how military it
is (as opposed to civilian),how well articulatedit is (as opposed to poorly
explained),or how well it can deal withimmediatecrises(as opposed to
pursuinglong-term goals). Thereis no "right"or "wrong"definition of pro-
gress,but it is important to be clearjust whichdefinition one has in mind.
Along any of theseaxes, I believethe notionof "makingprogress"toward
CFSP mustinvolvethecreationofinstitutional, legal,or politicalmechanisms
to promoteand implementcommonperspectivesor actions.For the word
"cooperation"to have meaning,itmustto somedegreeentailgettingstatesto
do whattheyotherwisewould nothave done,eitherthroughmechanisms to
promoteconvergence of views (throughcommonanalysisand consultation),

13. See,forexample,PhilipZelikow'ssharpcritiqueofCFSP,based on the(unstated) assumption

thatitis primarily aboutmilitarycrisisresponse(liketheGulfand Bosniawars,thetwocaseshe
considers).The critiqueis trenchantif crisisresponseis theissue at hand;iflong-term foreign
orientationis theissue,thecritiquemissesthemark.And contrast thiswiththeviewofEberhard
Rheinof the EuropeanCommission, who in listingthe meansavailableto a stateforforeign
policy-treatypolicy,economiccooperation, and diplomaticmeasures-doesnot even mention
militaryforce.Not surprisingly,Rhein'sjudgmentof CFSP is morepositivethanZelikow's.See
PhilipZelikow,"TheMasque ofInstitutions," Survival,
Vol.38,No. 1 (Spring1996),pp. 9-10;and
EberhardRhein,"Besserals ihrRuf:die EU Aussenpolitik," Internationale
Politik
(Summer1996),
p. 55.
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 83

throughdeals in theexpectationofmutualgain,or,mostsignificantly,
through
bindingdecision-making institutions.
Simplyhappeningto agreeon thesame
policy-say,to supportdemocracyin SouthAfrica-isveryimportant, but it
does notrequirea commonforeignand security policyto bringit about.14
Finally,CFSP can be ambiguousbecause any normativejudgmentof it
dependson theperspective ofthejudge.Dependingon thelevelofanalysis-
the EU itself,one or anotherEU memberstate,outsideactorssuch as the
UnitedStates,or worldorderin general-CFSP willhave different meritsand
drawbacks.Foreignpolicyintegration might,forexample,be in theinterest of
theEU as an organization,or ofsmallmemberstateswithlittleindependence
to lose,butit mightnotbe in theinterest
ofotherstates,or ofoutsideactors.
Ratherthan assertcategorically thatCFSP is or is not a good thing,it is
important to keep in mind the different
ways integration would affectthe
variousactorsin the process,and the way in whichthesedifferences could
affecttheoutcomeofnegotiations. Different
actorswill makedifferent assess-
mentsof whetherCFSP would be in theirinterest, and opposingviews will
notnecessarily be "wrong."

The RecordofCFSP

The CFSP createdin the1991Treatyon EuropeanUnionis butthelatestin a

long seriesof attemptsover the past fortyyearsto coordinatethe foreign
policiesof the membersof the EuropeanCommunity. The firstsuccessful
attempt to do so-afterthefailedEuropeanDefenseCommunity (EDC) ofthe
early1950sand theunsuccessful FouchetPlansoftheearly1960s-was "Euro-
pean PoliticalCooperation,"conceivedat the EC's Hague summitof 1969,
whichcame intobeing in 1970.15EPC was a networkof Europeanforeign

14. It mightbe worthnotingthatwhentheEU uses theword"common"in otherfunctional areas

("commonagricultural policy,""commoncurrency," "commonfisheries policy,"etc.),it normally
refers topoliciesthatareundertheauthorityofEU institutions
(suchas theEuropeanCommission
and Parliament or a EuropeanCentralBank),whichgo beyondsimpleintergovernmental coordi-
nationand genuinely implyjointimplementation and bindingcentraldecisions.The reasonthe
UnitedStates(or anyotherstate)has a true"CFSP" is notbecauseits"memberstates'havethe
sameinterests and alwaysagreeon whatto do, butbecauseit has legitimate,
centralized institu-
tionswiththeauthority to takebindingdecisions.
15. The EDC was a Frenchplan devisedin 1950to createan integrated Europeanarmy.It was
rejectedby France'sown NationalAssemblyin 1954.The FouchetPlans,namedafterFrench
PresidentCharlesde Gaulle'sadviserChristian Fouchet,werede Gaulle'sattempts to createa
Europeanpolitical-military groupingdistinct
fromtheUnitedStates.TheFrenchNationalAssem-
blyrejectedtheEDC largelybecauseit was too integrated and too Atlanticist,
and theFouchet
Planswererejectedby theBelgiansand Dutchin 1962becausetheywerenotintegrated and not
 22:3 84
Security
International

ministers, politicaldirectors, and otherdiplomatswho soughtto meetregu-

larlyto exchange information theirforeign
and to coordinate policiesas much
as possible.16It had no formalstatusin the EC treatiesand was entirely
intergovernmental. EPC was a recognition by Europeanleadersthatin the
absenceofa moreintegrated approach,regularmeetings and discussionsabout
foreignpolicywerebetterthannothing.
The 1987SingleEuropeanAct gave EPC a place in theEC treatiesforthe
firsttime.It gave the European Commissiona role in the "politicaland
economicaspectsof security"and called on EC governments not to block,
wherever possible,"theformation 30.1).Evenwiththese
ofa consensus"(Article
strengthened provisions, EPC playeda limitedrolein Europeanforeignpoli-
cymaking inthelate1980s.Itsoutcomesweremostlydeclaratory, alwaysbased
on consensus,and usuallyfocusedon relatively peripheralor uncontroversial
issues (such as the Conferenceon Securityand Cooperationin Europe,the
HornofAfrica, and theIran-IraqWar)ratherthancoreissues(suchas dealing
withthe SovietUnion,CentralEurope,the Mediterranean, or defense).At
timesEPC even seemedto getin theway ofrapidEC foreign policydecision
making,forexamplewhenEuropeanleaderstookweeksbeforeevenmaking
a statement on the1979SovietinvasionofAfghanistan, or whentheyfailedto
findanything at all to say abouttheU.S. invasionofGrenadain 1983.17 One
of the mostsuccessfulareas forEPC was its role in coordinating European
policytowardtheMiddleEast,beginningwiththeEuro-Arabdialogueofthe
late1970sand culminating withtheJune1980VeniceDeclarationon theArab-
Israelipeace process.18 Even in thisarea,however,althoughEC policieswere
fairlywell coordinated, theywereprimarily declaratoryand had littleactual
effect.When the Middle East peace processfinallygot offthe groundin

Atlanticist
enough.Thisintra-European debateoverintegration and Atlanticismwas one of the
mainreasonsfortheinability toagreeon foreign policycooperation forso long,and itstilldivides
Europeanstoday.
16. Foran excellentstudyofEPC written by an "insider,"see SimonJ.Nutall,European Political
Co-operation
(Oxford, U.K.: ClarendonPress,1992).
17. See Delegationde l'Assembl6eNationalepour les Communautes Europeennes, PierreLel-
louche,rapporteur,
L'Europe etsa securit6e:
bilanetavenir 6trangere
dela politique etdese'curite'
commune
de l'UnionEurop6enne(Paris:AssembleeNationale,May31,1994),p. 14.
18. The VeniceDeclaration distinguished EU policyfromU.S. policyby emphasizing the"legiti-
materightsofthePalestinian people"and callingforthePalestineLiberation Organization tohave
a rolein thepeace process.See ConseilEuropeen,"Declarationdu 17e ConseilEuropeensur le
dialogueeuro-arabe, et la situationau Proche-Orient," Venice,June12-13,1980;and Christin
Marschall,"TheEuropeanCommunity and theArabWorld,1972-1991: FromEconomicsto Poli-
tics,"HarvardMiddleEastern andIslamicReview, Vol.1,No. 2 (1994),pp. 56-80.
 ForeignPolicyj 85
Europe'sUncommon

October1991aftertheGulfWar,its officialsponsorsweretheUnitedStates
and themoribundSovietUnion,and theEC playedhardlyanyroleat all.
EPC was notwithoutpurposeor effect, and Europeandiplomatsnotedover
the yearsthatregularcontactsled to betterunderstanding of one another's
positionsand facilitated
a commonapproach.19 EPC also helpedharmonizeEC
memberstatepositionson a rangeofissuesin regionslikeLatinAmericaand
Asia,wherelocal actorswereunableto play one EC stateoffagainstanother,
because all memberswerefollowingthe same line.But ifa habitof seeking
commonpositionsexisted,itwas limited;and a commonforeign and security
policydid not result,whichbecamesorelyevidentin Europe'sresponsesto
theGulfWarand theYugoslavcrisis.EC memberstateshad nationalconstitu-
encies and interests,and EPC did not. Nor did the Communityhave the
institutionalmeansto imposea commonpositionor back up its diplomacy
withmilitary force.As the 1990sbegan,Europeanforeignpolicieswere still
nationally made,withEPC playinglittlemorethana consultative function.
CFSP was a responseto EPC's perceivedinadequacyin the face of the
momentous changethattookplacein Europein thelate1980sand early1990s.
Withthe end of theCold Warand Germanunification, Francebecamecon-
vincedthattheEC's foreignpolicyprocesshad to be strengthened, ifonlyto
"tie in" a now fullysovereignGermany;and Germany, longa strongpropo-
nentof all aspectsof Europeanintegration, readilyagreed.20The resultwas
the1990-91EuropeanIntergovernmental Conference (IGC) on politicalunion,
whichwas added to theIGC on monetary unionalreadyscheduledforthat
year,and whichconcludedat theMaastricht summitofDecember1991.
The Maastricht Treatycreateda new,three-pillarstructurefortheEuropean
Union,withthe EuropeanCommunityas the firstpillar,the CFSP as the
second,and Home and Justice as thethird.Onlythefirstpillarwould
Affairs
be governedbytheintegrated community (theEuropeanCommis-
institutions
sion, Parliament,and Court of Justice),while the othertwo-thus CFSP
wouldremainalmostexclusively intergovernmental. Thiswas a disappoint-
mentforthose statesthatsupportedforeignpolicyintegration withinthe

19. See ChristopherHill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model, or Flop?" in
ReinhardtRummel,ed., The Evolutionofan International Actor:WesternEurope'sNew Assertiveness
(Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 33.
20. On the developmentsleading up to the CFSP agreementat theMaastrichtsummitofDecember
1991, see Mathais Jopp, The StrategicImplicationsof EuropeanIntegration, Adelphi Paper No. 290
(London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies [IISS], 1994),pp. 6-12; and JamesB. Steinberg,
"An Ever Closer Union": EuropeanIntegrationand Its Implicationsfor the Futureof U.S.-European
Relations(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), pp. 50-60.
 Security22:3 | 86
International

EuropeanCommunity, butitreflected theunwillingness ofa numberofmem-

berstates(notonlyBritain, butalso othersincludingFrance)to abandontheir
rightofforeignpolicyinitiative to theCommission.
Like manypreviousstepson the road to Europeanintegration, the CFSP
createdat Maastrichtreflecteda lowest-common-denominator compromise
amongthecompeting visionsand interests oftheEC's memberstates.In this
case, the compromisewas betweenone groupof states,led by Franceand
Germany, thatsoughtsignificantly to strengthentheexistingEPC and to give
it moreofan integrated and bindingcharacter, and anothergroup,led by the
UnitedKingdom,thatwas morecautiousaboutgivingup itsnationalforeign
policyprerogatives and soughtto avoid anypossiblethreatto thecohesionof
theAtlanticAlliance.CFSP made no significant progresstowardtheadoption
ofmajority votingin foreignpolicy;and althoughit claimedto deal with"all
aspectsrelatedto thesecurity of theunion"and forthefirsttimereferred to
"theeventualframing ofa commondefensepolicy' (TitleV,ArticleJ.4),ittook
no practicalstepstowardtherealizationofthisgoal and gave no defenserole
at all to theintegrated institutions.
TheresultoftheMaastricht negotiationson CFSP is thusa good demonstra-
tionofthetheoryofEuropeanintegration describedearlier:thatintegration is
acceptedonlywhentheperceivedgainsofscale clearlyoutweighthecostsof
lostsovereignty, at leastforthelargememberstates.EC leaderscametogether
at Maastricht to negotiatea commonforeignand security policyin thewake
of momentousinternational change,but despitethe ostensibleFrenchand
Germanenthusiasmfortheproject(and theirmutualgoal of an evercloser
Europe),theyagreedonlyon limitedinstitutional change,nota qualitative leap
forward. The prerequisites forintegration had notbeen met.
At their1996-97intergovernmental conference(concludedin Amsterdam in
June1997),foreseen bytheMaastricht Treatypartlyto reassessand strengthen
CFSP,EU memberstatesconsidereda widerangeofinstitutional proposalsfor
improvingforeignpolicycooperation.The consensusamongobserversand
officials alikewas thatCFSP had notbeen effective, and somememberstates
wentintotheIGC determined to makebold movesin theforeign policyarea.
Spurredon bytheadmittedfailurein Bosnia,theneedto findsomefunctional
area in whichto pursueintegration lestmomentum be slowed,and ongoing
uncertainty about the Americanrole in Europe,manyEU leadersthought
foreignpolicymightbe themostpromisingarea forfurther EU integration,
especiallyas themonetary unionprojectappearedto be in trouble.
Yet,notsurprisingly ifone acceptstheanalysisoffered here,theoutcomeof
theIGC was extremely limited,plaguedby someofthesamedivisionsamong
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 87

memberstatesand unwillingness to giveup sovereigntythathad beenpresent

at Maastricht and before.The changesmade werelimitedto thesettingup of
a foreignpolicyplanningand analysisunitat theEU CouncilofMinisters; the
appointment as High Representative forforeignpolicyof an EU bureaucrat
(theSecretary-General of theCouncilof Ministers), ratherthana prominent
politician,as some memberstateswanted;and closercooperation-butno
merger-betweenthe EU and its defensearm,theWEU. Majorityvoting,it
was agreed,would be used onlyin the "implementation" phases of foreign
policy,whereasthe strategicchoiceswould stillhave to be agreed unani-
mously.2'
How effective has theCFSP been underthe provisionsdevelopedsinceit
was firstnegotiatedin 1991?Eventhemostenthusiastic supporters ofa CFSP
would accepttheEU Commission'sown assessmentthat"theaim of a sub-
stantialimprovement has notbeen achieved."22The EU has, it is true,estab-
lishedmorethantwenty-five so-calledcommonpositions,includingthoseon
economicrelations withLibya,Sudan,Haiti,and former Yugoslavia;on general
policyobjectivesor a commonapproachtowardUkraine,Rwanda,Burundi,
Angola,and EastTimor;and on functional subjectssuchas blindinglasers,the
biologicaland chemicalweaponsconvention, and thecolocationofdiplomatic
missions.It has made an unprecedentednumberof joint declarationson
foreign policy(roughlytwoperweek),and takenmorethanthreedozen"joint
actions,"includingsupervising electionsin SouthAfricaand Russia;delivering
aid to the Palestinianauthority; organizinghumanitarian aid in Bosniaand
administering theBosniancityofMostar;supporting theindefinite extension
oftheNuclearNonproliferation Treaty;and negotiating and implementing the
StabilityPact (or BalladurPlan) to ensurestability
in CentralEurope.23

21. The treatydoes allow fora formof "constructiveabstention,"wherebya state could abstain
froma vote,allowing the decision to go ahead but withouthaving to implementit.For the specifics
of what was agreed at Amsterdam,see IntergovernmentalConference,Amsterdam European
Council, An Effectiveand CoherentExternalPolicy,chapter12, "The Common Foreignand Security
Policy,"available fromthe European Union website.
22. See EuropeanCommission,
Intergovernmental
Conference
1996:Commission
Report
fortheReflec-
tionGroup(Brussels: EC, May 1995), p. 63. A recentFrenchanalysis has also admittedthatCFSP
"has not been able to play a determiningrole." See "Quelle identit6politique ext6rieure?"in
InstitutFrancais des RelationsInternationales,Ramses:1996 (Paris: Dunod, 1996), p. 320.
23. On the common positions and joint actions,see European Commission,"List of JointActions
Adopted by the Council since the Entryinto Force of the Treatyon European Union (November
1993-September1996)," and "List of Common Positions Adopted by the Council since the Entry
into Force of the Treatyon European Union (November 1993-September1996)," EuropeanDialogue
(Brussels: European Commission, 1997), pp. 18-20; and Barbara-ChristineRyba, "La politique
6trangereet de s6curit6commune: Mode d'emploi et bilan d'une ann6e d'application,"Revuedu
marchecommunde l'unioneuropeenne, No. 384 (January1995), pp. 15-35.
 International
Security22:3 | 88

ButCFSP has been absentfromother,moreimportant (or morecontrover-

sial)aspectsofEuropeanforeign and security policy.Intelligence and
collection
and commonEU representation
analysisis stilla nationalresponsibility, in
internationalbodies suchas theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilis noteven
considered, althoughtheAmsterdam Treatydoes call for"coordinated action
in internationalorganizations"(ArticleJ.9).In the Middle East,the EU has
continuedto seeka greaterdiplomaticroleand in October1996appointedits
own specialrepresentative there;but analystsagreethatEurope'sdiplomatic
roleremainsextremely limitedrelativeto itseconomicpresencein and assis-
tanceto theregion,and thatEU memberstatescannotagreeon how theEU
shouldinteract withtheUnitedStatesin thepeace process.24 Eventhosestates
supposedlymostenthusiastic about developinga unitedEU capacityforac-
tion,such as France,have been unwillingto abandontheirown freedomof
maneuverin areas ofnationalimportance. The unilateralFrenchintervention
in Rwanda in June1994,thedecisionlaterthatyearto conducta finalseries
ofnucleartests(condemnedat theUnitedNationsbyelevenofthesixteenEU
memberstates),and theimmediatedispatchoftheFrenchforeign ministerto
Lebanonin theApril1996crisisin theMiddleEastarejustsomeoftherecent
examplesof CFSP's inabilityeitherto constraincontinuednationalforeign
policybehavioror to offeran acceptablealternative to it. Greece's1994-95
economicembargoof the formerYugoslavrepublicof Macedonia,Britain's
isolatedsupportforU.S. airstrikeson Iraq in September 1996,and Franceand
Germany'sunwillingness to agree to an April1997EU resolutioncriticalof
China's human rightsrecord(lest it imperiltheireconomiccontractswith
Beijing)were all further examplesof cases in whichcertainEU stateshad
distinctperceivednationalinterestsand pursuednationalforeign and security
policiesto protectthoseinterests.
Mostrecently, Italy'sApril1997decisionto
organizea peace enforcement missionto Albaniaoutsidethecontextofeither
theEU or WEU,becauseofa lackofconsensusorabilitytocompeljointaction
in thoseorganizations, demonstrated theenduringlimitsofCFSP.
Close consultations amongmemberstateshave been pursuedthroughthe
CFSP,and the generalbias toward"systematic cooperationamongmember
states,"althoughdifficultto measure,does seemto exist.Butin theareasthat

24. See Rosemary Holfis,"Europeand theMiddleEast:Powerby Stealth?"International Affairs,

Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997),pp. 15-29;IISS, "Europeand the Middle East Peace Process,"Strategic
Comments, Vol.2, No. 10 (December1996);and KennethStein,"Transatlantische im
Partnerschaft
Nahen Osten?" Internationale
Politik(9/1996), pp. 33-39.
 Europe'sUncommon Policyj 89
Foreign

theMaastricht Treatywas supposedto strengthen-the areasin whichtheEU

was not alreadycompetentthroughits effective firstpillar-CFSP has been
ineffective.
Judgedby any of the possiblecriteriafor"progress"discussed
earlier-degreeof unityof memberstates,abilityto act globally,abilityto
intervenemilitarily,
crisisreaction,or even presentationofpolicy-CFSP has
not been significantly
betterthanEPC. Unless and untilEU memberstates
agreethatthereis moreto be gainedthanlostfrommoresuccessfulbinding
institutional theseweaknessesare unlikelyto disappear.
integration,

TheEU as a Military
Actor

Creatinga trulyeffective commonEuropeanforeign and securitypolicywould

meanendowingtheEU withthemilitary powerto backup itsdiplomaticand
economicinitiatives. It is preciselyin thisarea,however,thattheEU has been
mostlacking,and whereprospectsforfurther integrationare mostdoubtful.
Whereassome memberstates,mostnotablyFrance,have longsoughtto give
Europea moreindependent strategic others-ledby Britain-have
capability,
always resisteddoing anythingthatmightseem to threateneitherNATO's
primary rolein thedefenseand military fieldorcloserelationswiththeUnited
States.Even France,whichfromthe 1960sto the 1980surgedits European
partnersto join it in thecreationof an independentEuropeanmilitary capa-
bility,was always reluctantto embed thiscapabilityin the EU lest its own
nationalindependencebe constrained.25 As a result,and despiterepeated
demonstrations that Europeanforeignpolicy cooperationunsupportedby
military strength could not reachits fullpotential(a consequentialexample
was theGulfWar,whenSaddamHusseinrefusedevento meetan EU delega-
tion),an integrated or effectiveEU military policyremainedan elusivegoal.26

25. See PhilipH. Gordon,A Certain

Idea ofFrance:FrenchSecurity
Policyand theGaullistLegacy
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993).
26. Saddam Hussein refusedto meet the "Troika" of current,past, and upcoming holders of the
rotatingEU presidency (who are supposed to representthe Union's foreignpolicy), and Iraqi
ForeignMinisterTariq Aziz only agreed to do so if theycame to Baghdad. The Soviets gave the
EU littlemore respect,failingto tell the Troikaabout theirown peace offerwhen the EU leaders
were in Moscow. This episode was a demonstrationnot only of the EU's lack of credibilityin a
militarycrisis,but also of the shortcomingsof the way EU foreignpolicywas represented,because
theTroikaat thattimehappened to consistof Ireland,Italy,and Luxembourg-not exactlyEurope's
major militarypowers. On the EU and the Gulf crisis,see Nicole Gnesottoand JohnRoper,eds.,
WesternEuropeand theGulf(Paris: InstituteforSecurityStudies of WesternEuropean Union, 1992),
p. 131.
 International
Security22:3 | 90

At the December1991 Maastrichtsummit,despitethe sense of urgency

createdby theoutbreakofwar in Yugoslaviathreemonthsbefore,EU leaders
could notagreeon theextentto whichdefenseand military policyshouldbe
broughtintotheUnion;evenFrance,despiteitssupportforEuropeanstrategic
autonomy, was stillreluctant to take stepsthatwould constrainits military
sovereignty.The compromise reachedwas to declarethattheWEU was both
the"EuropeanpillaroftheAtlantic Alfiance"and the"defensearmoftheEU,"
and,as notedearlier, to createa nonbinding linkagebetweentheEU and WEU.
At the Amsterdamsummitof June1997,designedin part to improvethe
functioning of thesemechanisms, Franceand Germany(withsupportfrom
Italy,Spain,Belgium,Luxembourg, and Greece)putforward a proposalcalling
fora specifictimetableforthe gradualmergerof the EU and WEU.27This
projectwas once again stoppedby Britainand theneutralstates,determined
to keep defenseand military affairsout of the EU. All thatcould be agreed
insteadwas an unspecified commitment to"enhancecooperation" betweenthe
two organizations, thatEU membersthatare notmembersoftheWEU could
participatein some WEU activities, and thatan EU-WEUmergercould take
place "should the EuropeanCouncilso decide."In otherwords,therightof
memberstatesto continueto blocka WEU-EUmergerhas been preserved.28
In theabsenceofa consensusto turntheEU itselfintoa defenseorganiza-
tion,Europeanefforts to enhancemilitary cooperationhave revolvedaround
of
thestrengtheningan independent WEU. Althoughin existencesince1948,
theWEU has alwaysbeen subordinate to NATO (createdthefollowing year)
as WesternEurope'sprimarydefenseorganization, and only over the past
decade has it playedany operationalrole.The WEU's firstmilitary operation
ever,in 1988,was thedispatchofminesweepers to thePersianGulfduringthe
Iran-IraqWar.Sincethenithas participated in a navalblockadeofIraq during
the 1990-91Gulf War,helped enforcesanctionson Yugoslaviaalong the
Danube Riverand in the AdriaticSea, and provideda police forceforthe
BosniancityofMostarfrom1994to 1996.Thesewereall verylimitedopera-
tions,however,and were arguablyundertaken moreas a way of givingthe
WEU some sortofa role-in thenameofEuropean"identity"-than because
theWEU was bestequippedforthejob.29

27. See the proposaloutlinedby FrenchForeignMinisterHerve de Charetteand his Italian

counterpartLambertoDini in "Innoverpourprogresser,"
Le Monde,March25,1997.
28. See Intergovernmental
Conference,Amsterdam and Coherent
EuropeanCouncil,An Effective
ExternalPolicy.
29. Indeed,in somecases,suchas theenforcement oftheYugoslavarmsembargoin theAdriatic
during1992-93,theWEU's efforts to stakeout a roleforitselfactuallydiminished
theefficiency
oftheoperationby causingconfusion betweentheWEU and NATO as to theirrespective roles,
 Europe'sUncommon Policyj 91
Foreign

Over thepast decade,and particularly sincetheGulfand Yugoslaviawars,

Europeanleadershave attemptedto give the WEU moreof an operational
capabilityand role.At theirJune19, 1992,meetingin the Petersberg castle
outsideBonn,WEU leadersagreedto strengthen theWEU's operationalrole,
in accordancewiththedecisionstakenat Maastricht theyearbeforeto develop
theWEU intothedefensecomponentof the EU. The Petersberg Declaration
listedpossibleoperations(now commonlyreferred to as "Petersbergtasks")
thatwould includehumanitarian and rescuetasks,peacekeeping, and combat
tasksin crisismanagement.30 SinceMaastricht, theWEU has takena number
ofstepsto fulfill
thismandate.It has moveditsheadquarters to an impressive
new sitein Brussels;setup a DefensePlanningCell ofmorethanforty officers;
developed a catalogueof militaryunitsanswerableto the WEU; set up a
satelliteinterpretation
centerin Torrejon, Spain (whereit is alreadytraining
staffand receivingdata fromtheHellos I satellite);arrangedfortheregular
meetingof armedforceschiefsof staffand othermilitary officers;
developed
a political-military
decision-making process;initiateda comprehensive mili-
taryexercisepolicy;setup itsown Institute forSecurityStudiesin Paris;and
establisheda situationcenter(capableoftwenty-four-hours perdayoperation)
to bettermonitorand deal withcrisissituations.31Even thoughitsroleis still
limited,and althoughitis stillseparatefromtheEU, theWEU has moreactual
military and organizationalcapabilitythanit everhad in thepast.
In additionto strengthening the WEU and bringingit closerto the EU,
Europeanleaders have also soughtto enhancetheirmilitaryleverageand

untiltheenforcement operationswerecombinedin November1993.Thefaultherewas notall the

WEU's,ofcourse,becauseit was actuallyfirst to declareitsmissionin theAdriatic,withNATO
followingon immediately afterward.Interviews withWEU officials. Also see Jopp,TheStrategic
Implications
ofEuropean Integration,
pp. 30-31;and Gregory L. Schulte,
"Former Yugoslaviaand the
New NATO,"Survival, Vol.39,No. 1 (Spring1997),pp. 19-42.On "identity" as a primaryWEU
mission,see PhilipH. Gordon,"Does Western EuropeanUnionHave a Role?"in AnneDeighton,
ed., WesternEuropeanUnion,1954-1997: Defence,Security,Integration(Oxford,U.K.: St. Antony's
College,1997),pp. 103-117.Some ofthefollowing sectiondrawson and updatesmychapterin
theDeightonbook.
30. Participation
in suchmissionswouldstillbe voluntary,butnow therewas an explicitagree-
mentthattheWEU would plan for,and possiblyundertake, missionsthatwentwellbeyondits
originalcommondefensecommitment. See thePetersberg Declarationof theWEU Councilof
Ministers,Bonn,19 June1992;and thediscussionin AssemblyofWestern EuropeanUnion,Sir
Russell Johnson,rapporteur,WesternEuropeanUnion:Information
Report(Brussels:March 14, 1995),
pp. 33-36.
31. See Brigadier
GrahamMesservy-Whiting, "WEUOperational
Development,"
Joint
ForcesQuar-
terly,
No. 15 (Spring1997),pp. 70-74;and Assembly
ofWestern
EuropeanUnion,Western
European
Union,pp. 47-55.On thesatelliteCenter,see Assemblyof Western
EuropeanUnion,WEUand
Helios2 (Brussels,
WEU: May 14,1996).
 Security22:3 j 92
International

capabilityby pursuingthecreationof a distinctEuropeanrole-a European

Securityand DefenseIdentity(ESDI)-within NATO.Announcedas a goal at
NATO's November1991summitin Rome,thepursuitof an ESDI was given
furtherimpetusby theJanuary 1994agreement at NATO'sBrusselssummitto
create"combinedjointtaskforces"(CJTFs),flexiblenew commandstructures
thatwould allow for "coalitionsof the willing"-potentially all-European
ones-to undertakepotentialmilitary actionswithouttheparticipation ofthe
restof the AtlanticAlfiance.32 Prospectsforan ESDI withinNATO seemed
particularly promisingafterlate1995,whenFranceannounceditsintention to
pursuea Europeanstrategic rolefromwithinNATO ratherthanoutsideit,a
goal welcomedby a Clintonadministration allegedlyfavorableto givingthe
Europeansa greaterrolewithintheAlliance.33
At itsJune3, 1996,ministerial meetingin Berlin,NATO agreed-aftermore
thantwo yearsof debate-on thebasic principlesof CJTF.34 Most important
whereESDI was concerned, theAllianceexplicitly acceptedthepossibilityof
creating CJTFsled bytheWEU,in whichtheWEU wouldcommanda military
missionbut would be able to draw on NATO and even Americanassets,
withoutnecessarilytheparticipation of U.S. troops.The Berlindecisionwas
hailedbyEuropeansand Americansalike(and describedbythemedia)as one
thatwould allow Europeto takeon moreresponsibility forits own security,
and one thatpromiseda muchmoreimportant futurefortheWEU.35While
theWEU-ledCJTFinnovationis indeeduseful,however,as are the changes
takingplace withinthe WEU, thereare numerousreasonsto believe that
Europe'sabilityto backitsdiplomacywithforcewillremainlimited,and that
the enhancedrolefortheWEU pronouncedaftertheBerlinmeetingwill be
hypothetical ratherthanreal.
First,it is necessaryto remember thatforall therecentefforts to strengthen
theWEU's operationalrole,Europeansare stillmilitarily dependenton NATO

32. See CharlesBarry,

"CombinedJoint TaskForcesin Theoryand Practice," Vol.37,No.
Survival,
1 (Spring1995),pp. 81-97.Also see variouscontributions
in PhilipH. Gordon,ed., NATO's
Transformation:
The ChangingShapeoftheAtlanticAlliance(Boulder,Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield,
1997).
33. On France'sdecisionto pursueESDI withinNATO ratherthanindependently,see RobertP.
Grant,"France'sNew Relationship Vol.38,No. 1 (Spring1996),pp. 58-80.
withNATO,"Survival,
34. See the Final Communiqueof the June3, 1996,NorthAtlanticCouncilBerlinMinisterial
Meeting.
35. See,forexample,"NATOAcquiresa EuropeanIdentity,"
TheEconomist,June8,1996,pp. 43-44;
BruceClark,"US Agreesto GiveEuropeMoreSay in NATOOperations," Financial
Times,June4,
1996;and RickAtkinson, "NATO GivesMembersResponseFlexibility," WashingtonPost,June4,
1996.
 Europe'sUncommon Policyj 93
Foreign

and theUnitedStatesforall but smalland nearbymilitary operations.Euro-

pean countries havelargeand capablearmedforces(nearly2 millionmenand
womenunderarms forthe membersof the WEU), and withoutdoubt the
economicpotentialto developrobustcapabilitiesforintelligence, forceprojec-
tion,and high-technology combat.36At present,however,mostof thisforce
remains devoted to and organized for territorial defense,with Britain
and Francethe onlytwo WEU memberspossessingthe capabilityforeven
medium-scale (10,000soldiers)or sustaineddeployments abroad(thetypeof
missionmostlikelyfortheWEU).As theGulfWar,conflict in formerYugosla-
via,and even interventions suchas Rwandamadeclear,onlytheUnitedStates
has thetypesof military forcesnecessaryto conductoperationsthatinvolve
gettinglargenumbersofcombat-ready troopsto a distantlocationin a short
amountoftime.37
Thereis no sign,moreover, thatEuropeansare preparedto do verymuch
abouttheirmilitary dependenceon theUnitedStates.Europeanmilitary budg-
ets have been fallingrapidlyformorethansix yearsand are likelyto be cut
even further in an effortto meetthe deficitcriteriaforEuropeanmonetary
union.WhereastheUnitedStates,whosemilitary budgetsare also falling,
still
spends$266billion-3.6 percentof itsGDP-on defenseannually,themem-
bersof theWEU spend only$173 billion,or 2.3 percentof theirGDP.38It is
truethatsomecountries, mostimportant France,are reorganizingtheirarmed
forcesto be betterable to projectforcesand participate
in peacekeepingand
peace enforcement missionsabroad. The professionalization of the French
forces,and plans to buildup an interventionforceofup to 60,000troops,are
important and relevantcontributions to Europe'smilitarycapabilities.39
But
even while Francetalksof buildingup Europeanmilitarycapabilities,it is
cuttingdefensespendingby FFr100 billion($20 billion)overthecomingsix

36. Full WEU member troop-strength, not including reserves,is 1.79 million.The total forall of
NATO's European members,includingTurkey,is 2.46 million.See IISS, TheMilitaryBalance1997-98
(Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversityPress, 1997), pp. 46-73.
37. For a good analysis of European NATO members'logisticaldeficiencies,see Michael O'Hanlon,
"TransformingNATO: The Role of European Forces," Survival,Vol. 39, No. 3(Autumn 1997),
pp. 5-15.
38. For figureson defense spending and comparisons with earlier years, see IISS, The Military
Balance,1997-98,293. See also RickAtkinsonand BradleyGraham,"As Europe Seeks WiderNATO
Role, Its Armies Shrink,"Washington Post,July29, 1996,p. Al.
39. Frenchdefense reformplans are discussed in Jacques Isnard, "Le budget militairesera r6duit
de 100 milliardsde francsen cinq ans," Le Monde,February24, 1996,pp. 6-9. Also see StanleyR.
Sloan, "French Defense Policy: Gaullism Meets the Post-Cold War World," Arms ControlToday
(April 1997), pp. 3-8.
 Security22:3 | 94
International

years,withdrawing itssupportforjointEuropeanprojectscritical totheWEU's

autonomyliketheFutureLargeAircraft transport
(a military plane)tobe built
by a Europeanconsortium, and sharplycuttingits ordersof transport and
attackhelicoptersmeantto be coproducedwithGermany.Germandefense
budgetsare also undergreatpressure;and althoughBonnwill probablygo
alongwith(and helppay for)Frenchplanstobuilda newseriesofopticaland
thescopeforsignificant
radarsatellites, development in thisarea,as in others,
is verylimited.40EstimatesvaryofwhatitwouldtakeforEuropeto createthe
military capabilityto conductmedium-scale "out-of-area"militaryoperations
withoutthe UnitedStates,but the costsof doing so (includingintelligence
floatingcommunications
satellites, headquarters, mobilelogistics,and trans-
portcraft)would be at least $30 billion,a figureunlikelyto be added to
Europeandefensebudgetsanytimesoon.41
The new NATO arrangements, of course,are designedto help Europeans
circumvent thiscapabilitiesconstraintby makingNATO and U.S. assetsavail-
able to theWEU. ThustheWEU shouldnotneed itsown independent assets,
but can borrowNATO's.One mustnotforget, however,thatNATO has very
fewassetsof its own to lend theWEU. Most of theforcesthatmakeup the
Alliancearenationally ownedand nationally controlled-simply "earmarked"
forNATO use if the nationalcapital gives the go-ahead.The only assets
actuallyowned by NATO itselfare an air defensesystem;some command,
control, and communications assets(whichare mostlyfixed,and therefore of
littleuse foroutsideinterventions); oil pipelines;a systemof bunkersand
shelters;and aboutthreedozen airbornewarningand controlsystems.What
the Europeanswould need to conductanything but small-scaleand nearby
interventions are not NATO assets but Americanones-long-rangeheavy
transport air-refueling
aircraft, and satelliteintelligence
capabilities, systems.
The verycapabilitiesthe Europeansneed but do not have,NATO, as such,
does not"have" either.

40. Despite many past agreements,uncertaintyremains as to whetherthe Germans will be able

to go ahead with the satellitecooperationwith France because of cuts in the defense budget. See
Giovanni de Briganti,"Germans May Drop Hellos," DefenseNews,June24-30, 1996,pp. 1, 76.
41. Accordingto a 1993 study done at the RAND corporation,equipping a European intervention
forceof around 50,000troopswould requireextraequipmentcosting$18-$49 billion over twenty-
five years (depending on the amount of capabilitydeemed necessary) as well as satelliteintelli-
gence systemsthatwould cost between $9 billion and $25 billion over the same period. See M.B.
Bermanand G.M. Carter,TheIndependent EuropeanForce:CostsofIndependence (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 1993). BrookingsInstitutiondefenseanalystMichael O'Hanlon calculates thatit would cost
around $50 billion for NATO's European members to develop about one-halfthe strategiclift
capabilityof the United States. See O'Hanlon, "TransformingNATO," pp. 10-11.
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy 95

Even theborrowingof strictly NATO assetsdependson theagreement of

all sixteenmembersoftheAlliance,including(mostimportant forthecase of
WEU-ledCJTFs)the agreementof the UnitedStates.While one can easily
imaginecertainsituations in whichtheUnitedStatesmightbe glad to lendits
support-whenmissionsare small,withgoals supportedby Washington and
littleriskof escalation-theUnitedStatesmayin manycases be reluctant to
authorizea WEU-ledCJTF,and therebyturnover politicalcontrolfromthe
NorthAtlanticCouncilto theWEU Council,whereit is not present.If U.S.
assetsare involved(as theywould mostlikelybe), or ifthereis anyriskofthe
WEU (withor withoutU.S. assets)gettingboggeddown in an operationand
requiringtheUnitedStatesto help getthemout (as was nearlythecase with
European forcesin Bosnia in 1994),it is difficult to imagineWashington
authorizing a WEU-ledCJTF.
evenwhenU.S. supportforWEU missionsexists,theaccompanying
Finally,
prerequisite forsuchmissionstotakeplaceis thatEuropeansagreetodo them,
whichis also farfromguaranteed.Havingfocusedtheirsecuritypolicieson
defenseformorethanforty
territorial years,mostEuropeanshave developed
a cultureof securitydependence,and theyseem reluctantto use forceor
undertakecollectivemissionswithouttheparticipation and leadershipof the
UnitedStates.An exclusively Europeanintervention forcein Bosnia,forexam-
ple, has fromthestartof theconflict been consistently and vigorouslyruled
outby Europeanleadersas too ambitiousand too difficult withouttheUnited
States.42And thereis no signyetthattheEuropeanattitudewillchangewhen
the mandateof NATO's stabilizationforceexpiresin July1998. European
concernsaboutAmerican"interference" in a WEU missioneveniftheUnited
Stateswas notparticipating in themissionare legitimate,butthoseconcerns
themselves ofa political-military
area reflection imbalancewithintheAlliance.
IfU.S. participationin Europeansecurity provesin comingyearsto be erratic
and undependable,and if Washington consistentlyrefusesto supportWEU
missions,perhapstheEuropeanswillrespondbydevelopingboththepolitical
willand themeansto conductsuchmissionson theirown.Butsucha devel-
opmentseemsunlikely, and itis worthnotingthatevenafterthegreattensions

42. The repeated themeof nearlyall European leaders since NATO intervenedmilitarilyin Bosnia
in late 1995 has been "in together(with the Americans),out together."When EU Commissioner
Hans van den Broek suggested in early May 1996 thatperhaps European troops could stay on in
Bosnia withoutthe United States,he was quickly repudiated by FrenchForeign MinisterHerv6
de Charette.See Agence France-Presse,"EU CommissionerSlammed forBosnia Comments,"May
7, 1996.
 Security22:3 | 96
International

over formerYugoslaviafrom1991to 1995,theEuropeanresponsehas been

moreto ensurethatEuropeansecurityremainsin thehands of theAtlantic
Affianceas a whole than to pursue theirstrategicindependencefromthe
UnitedStates.43
The prospectsfora coherent EU military policy-orevena functioning ESDI
withinNATO-seem uncertainat best.ManyEuropeansresenttheirmilitary
dependenceon theUnitedStatesand consequently regrettheirlimitedability
to influencedevelopments in Asia, Africa,theMiddle East,and even south-
easternEuropethatresultsfromthisdependence.Theydo not,however, seem
resentful-orin agreement
sufficiently on whatto do aboutit-to be willing
to endowtheEU witha genuinemilitary capabilityofitsown.Untileitherof
theserealitieschanges,theEU is unlikelytobecomea foreign policyactorable
tobackitsdiplomacywithforce,or evensignificantly toinfluencetransatlantic
and regionalsecurity If on
developments. theYugoslavcrisis Europe'speriph-
ery-combinedwitha U.S. policythatwas erratic, uncertain,and domineering
at the same time-was not enoughto motivatethe EU genuinelyto adopt
commonsecurity policiesand military whatwill?
integration,

CFSP in theComingDecades
Prospects:
Longer-Term
If the conditionsare not yetin place fora genuineintegration of European
foreignand security policies,will theyeverbe? Is thecreationofan effective
CFSP only a matterof time,or has foreignand securitypolicyintegration
reacheditslimits?Goingbackto thetheorieswithwhichthisanalysisbegan,
is foreign and securitypolicyjusta "function"thatis takinglongerthansome
to
others be pulled into of
the dynamic Europeanintegration, or is there
something particularaboutit thatmakesit less susceptibleto theforcesand
processesthathave led to integration in so manyotherareas?
This articlehas argued thatstatespool or delegatetheirsovereignty in
particular functionalareasonlyiftheperceivedbenefits ofdoingso outweigh
thecosts.In thearea offoreign policy,becausethegainsofcommonactionare

43. DuringtheYugoslaviawars,theclosesttheUnitedStatescameto drivingtheEuropeansto

considera trulyindependent military was in November1994,whenCongressforced
capability
theadministrationto cease itsimplementationoftheUN armsembargoon Bosnia,leadingeven
someBritish officials
to questionwhether theycouldstillrelyon theUnitedStatesorwhether the
Europeandefenseoptionwouldhaveto be pursued.WhenU.S.-European cooperation
improved
duringthecourseof1995,however, theBritish Europeanswereall to happy
and otherAtlanticist
to stickwithNATO.Interviews withBritishand Germanofficials,1994-95.
 Europe'sUncommon Policy| 97
Foreign

notalwaysobviousand do notaccrueevenlyto all membersofthegroup,this

conditionis likelyto be met only when nationalinterestsor government
preferences have convergedto thepointwherethepotentialcostsand risksof
bindingcommonactionare low.The mostcriticalquestionaboutthefutureof
foreignand security policyintegration, then,is whetherthisis happening.If
EU members'interests are moresimilarin thecomingdecades thantheyare
today,integration willbe morelikely;iftheyare not,integration is less likely.
This is nottheonlyvariablein thelong-term development CFSP,but it is
of
themostimportant one.
In favoroftheview thatEuropeanstates'foreigninterests willconverge,it
mightbe notedthattheyhavebeenconverging forthepastforty years.44 Some
of theissuesthatmostdividedEuropeansin thepast-colonial relationships
(and wars),memoriesofWorldWarII, divergent economicphilosophies, and
different roles in the Cold War-have lost significance, and even ancient
culturaldifferences, while stillstrong,have becomeless strongthroughthe
open communications, travel,and ideal oftheEuropeanUnion.The existence,
in some cases formorethanthirty years,of a commoncommercialpolicy,
growingmonetary coordination, jointindustrialprojects,and a singleinternal
markethave all madedifferent Europeanstates'interests farmoresimilarthan
theywerein the1950sand 1960s.
A certain"spilloverprocess"resulting fromintegration in otherdomainsis
also likelyto lead to a relativeconvergence of Europeaninterests. Open EU
internalbordersstemming fromtheSchengenaccords,forexample,makeall
statessusceptibleto thesameimmigration worries,and increasetheirstakein
stabilizingtheentireperiphery ofEurope,notjusttheregionsnearthem.And
monetaryunion,if it happens,will not only further harmonizeEuropean
economicinterests, but it will constrainstates'abilityto financeindependent
foreignpolicyadventuresand perhapscontribute to thefeelingof unityand
commonality thata trueCFSP requires.45 All ofthesefactorssuggestthatEU
memberstates'interests will convergeand thatthe pressuresforCFSP will
continue well intothefuture.
Whethertheywill lead to enoughconvergence of intereststo make those
stateswillingto acceptforeignand securitypolicyintegration, however,is

44. For a good recentargumentto this effect,see Charles Grant,Strengthin Numbers:Europe's

Foreignand DefencePolicy(London: CentreforEuropean Reform,1996), pp. 19-20.
45. For an argumentthatmonetaryunion will increase pressuresformore common foreignand
securitypolicy,see PierreJacquet,"European Integrationat a Crossroads," Survival,Vol. 38, No. 4
(Winter1996-97), p. 92.
 International
Security22:3 | 98

anothermatter;indeedthereare threegood reasonsto believetheywill not.

First,the end of the Cold Warhas takenaway one of the mostcompelling
forcesbehindthe need fora commonsecuritypolicy.Withouta common
enemyand the simplicity of the two-blocsystemof the Cold War,security
interestsare potentially moredifferentiated thanin thepast. The divisionof
Europeand theCold WarharmonizedEC foreign policyinterests to an extent
thatis unlikelyto be repeated.
Second,theexpectedenlargement of EU membership to as manyas thirty
countrieswill mean a significant expansionof theUnion'sgeographicaland
culturaldiversity.Ifa Community ofsixwas unwillingtoacceptforeign policy
integration duringtheCold War(whentherewas a commonthreat),a Com-
munityoftwelvewas unwillingto do so at Maastricht (whentheFrenchand
Germanleaderswere devotedto the idea of Europeanunityand concerns
aboutthefutureU.S. rolein Europeweregreat),and a Unionof fifteen was
unwillingto do so at Amsterdam(in the wake of the Bosnianwar), it is
legitimate to ask whytheyshouldbe expectedto acceptintegration sometime
in thefuturewhentheUnion'smembership willbe morethantwiceas large.
Indeed, the European Union of the year 2020 will probablystretchfrom
Portugalin theWestto Estoniain thenortheast, and fromSwedenand Finland
in thenorthto Bulgariaand Greecein thesouth.It will includea fargreater
diversitynot onlyof material(economicand security)interests, but also of
foreignpolicytraditions, relationships, cultures, and attitudestowardtheuse
of forceand intervention. It is truethatforeign policytraditions and cultures
changewithtimeand politicalevolution, and thatinteraction withintheUnion
will help lead to morecommonthinking aboutinternational affairs.Butit is
also truethatthesethingschangeextremely slowly,and thediversity in the
"strategiccultures"evenofcurrent EU
membersofthe has hardlydisappeared
despitedecadesofinteraction withintheEC/EU.
It can be argued,of course,thatthe wideningof the Union will require
integration ratherthanpreventit,becauseEU institutions will notbe able to
function withtwenty-five separatestateshavingveto power.46 Thereis cer-
tainlysomething to thisargument, and theuse ofqualifiedmajority votingis
likelyto be extendedincrementally intoeverydomainin whichthestateswill
accept it, whichtheywill do when the benefitsof unityseem worththis

46. As Alain Lamassoure, formerFrenchMinisterforEuropean Affairs,has put it, "doing things

intergoverrmentallywith 30 members is like reinventingthe CSCE or the League of Nations."
AgenceEurope,March 30, 1995, p. 3.
 Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
PolicyI 99

concession.But will wideningto includenew and diversestatesprovokea

willingness to integrate foreign and security policiesto ensuretheadvantages
of commonaction?Or will it provoketheopposite-largestatesinsisting on
maintaining theirfreedomofmaneuverand refusing to submitto thewill of
a centralizedinstitution, or a majority,
thatmightnothave thesameinterests?
If therewere an absolutelycompellingneed forintegration-anew security
threatin theabsenceofAmericanprotection, forexample- integration would
be the morelikelyresponse.Giventhatthereis not such a need-even the
performance of the EU in Bosnia,recognizedas a failure,does not seem to
have led to a willingnessto integrate foreignpolicyat therecentIGC-inte-
grationis unlikely.
Third,thefunctionalist arguments forlonger-term convergence-that forms
of integration such as open bordersand monetary unionnecessarily spreads
tootherareas-can easilybe exaggerated. Open borders, itis true,theoretically
make all statesequallysusceptibleto regionalinstabilities, but in factstates
remainunequallysusceptibleto suchproblemsbecauseofgeography, history,
language,and culture.Schengenor no Schengen,refugeesfromCentraland
EasternEuropewouldmostlygo to Germany-thebiggest,richest, and closest
country to them-and refugeesfromNorthAfricawould mostlygo to France,
wheretheymighthave familyor othercontactsand would understandthe
language.Similarly, monetaryunion mightenhancethe internaleconomic
cohesionoftheUnionand preventintra-EUexchangerateproblems, butit is
hard to see how and why it would lead to the harmonization of foreign
Ifit did,theseofcoursewould onlyapplyto thoseEU statespartici-
interests.
patingin themonetary union-presumablynotall membersfora verylong
time-thusseparatingratherthanharmonizing theirinterests. Europeanin-
dustrialcollaboration also cutsbothways:thedesireto sell Airbusaircraft to
China may well help unitethemembersof theAirbusconsortium's foreign
(and perhapseven security) policiestowardthatrisingpower,butit does not
have thesame effect on thoseEU statesleftout.
The interests of EU members,then,do not seem likelyto convergeto the
pointwheretrueintegration offoreign and securitypoliciesbecomesprobable.
Thedesiretopreservethenotionofan EU identity and moreefficiently pursue
thoseinterests thatare sharedamongEuropeanswill probablylead to even
moreinteraction and discussionamongmemberstates,continuedinstitutional
tinkering,thespreadoflimitedqualifiedmajority votingto areas thatdo not
involvethepotentialuse ofdeadlyforce,and symbolic pronouncements about
politicalsolidarity. These developmentsshould not be underestimated, and
 International
Security22:3 | 100

any comparisonof EU foreignpolicysolidarity todaywiththesituationten,

twenty,or thirtyyearsago is a reminderofhow farcooperationhas usefully
come.Buttheend oftheCold War,thewideningoftheUnion,thecontinued
in EU members'strategic
differences values,and historical
culture,ambitions,
relationships,
and thelack-even afterforty yearsof integration-ofa Euro-
pean identitysufficientto permitdelegationof sovereignty to centralized
mean thatEU foreignpolicycooperationwill probablyremain
institutions
limited,fragmented,and intergovernmental.Havingeliminatedwars and se-
curitycompetitionsamongWestEuropeanstatesis an enormousachievement;
eliminating nationalforeignand securitypoliciesand preferences
distinctive
will remainan elusiveone. The UnitedStates'currentstatusas theworld's
"lonesuperpower"maywellbe challengedin thetwenty-first century,
butnot
by theEuropeanUnion.