PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003
No notice of motion for provisional dismissal,
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s
motion of reconsideration of the resolution
dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of
several factual issues relative to the application
of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the
cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the
respondent. The respondent was charged with
the shooting and killing of eleven male persons.
The court confirmed the express consent of the
respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial
determination. The court also ruled the need to
determine whether the other facts for its
application are attendant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the
applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure were complied with in the
Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the
subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the
victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case
since the conditions for its applicability, namely:
1) prosecution with the express consent of the
accused or both of them move for provisional
dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases
provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders
of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants
burden to prove, which in this case has not been
done
a. The defendant never filed and denied
unequivocally in his statements, through counsel
at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal
nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal
thereof.
b.
hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to
the heirs of the victims.
2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be
applied prospectively or retroactively.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively.
Though procedural rules may be applied
retroactively, it should not be if to do so would
work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process. Statutes should be
construed in light of the purposes to be achieved
and the evils to be remedied. This is because to
do so would be prejudicial to the State since,
given that the Judge dismissed the case on March
29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec
1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year
and three months to work instead of 2 years. At
that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule
and therefore they should not be penalized for
that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales
must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in
the new rule is for the benefit of both the State
and the accused. It should not be emasculated
and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided
merely to benefit the accused. To do so would
cause an injustice of hardship to the state and
adversely affect the administration of justice.
Held: Motion granted