SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED),
Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action

for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A
of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent
Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not
be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,
[1]
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705
as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a
subsequent order of July 12, 1989.[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in
case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal
to the Secretary.[3] Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case
4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, [5] which issued a writ ordering the return
of the truck to private respondents.[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion
to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order
dated December 28, 1989.[7] Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial
courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. [8] Hence, this present petition,
[9]
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue
of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, [10] the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could
not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand,
would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not
given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that
the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not
used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are
of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
[11]
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action.[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons
of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity
to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual
and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,
[13]
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, [14] (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, [15] (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned,[16] (5) when there is irreparable injury, [17] (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,[19] (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, [20] (9) when the subject matter is
a private land in land case proceedings,[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR
when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration
of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989,[23] private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they
seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be
considered as an appeal to the Secretary.[24]

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and
disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain
remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now,
without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. [25] In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary,[26] which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, [27] this
Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale
of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases
heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule
out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was
violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of
petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. [28] One may be heard , not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings.[29] In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, [31] as in the instant case, when
private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a
letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of
Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,[32] we ruled that :

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because
the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law.
They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting
illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,
implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents thinking not only
because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be
the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents
interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably
reduces the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below:

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To
Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either
by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives
are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of
forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it
must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. [33] Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
benefits intended.[34] In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and
realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the
government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally
separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the
inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of
EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit
and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to
present situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court
in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power
on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A
would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the
problem perceived in EO 277, supra.[35]

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves
admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private
respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and
received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. :

xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we
uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be
filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx [36]

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated
that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of
the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation
of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the
truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as
amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:

xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No.277
specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not
covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering
of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
liable. xxx[37]

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section
68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private
respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime
under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment
by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are
reproduced herein, thus:

SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person
who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before
its amendment by E.O.277 )

SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as

follows:

Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as
amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty
of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and
inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[38]

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of
action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by
the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. [39] To detain is defined as to mean to hold or keep in
custody,[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right;
this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. [41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable
in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.
[42]
Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject
truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because
it was transporting forest products with out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably
warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the
continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as
amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or
upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and
executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision,
unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October
16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining
Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is
directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999]

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE
A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO
T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO
UY, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated March 30, 1990 and May 18, 1990, respectively, dismissing petitioners charge that Honorable
Benigno T. Dayaw, Presiding Judge of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering them to deliver to private respondents the six-wheeler
truck and its cargo, some 4,000 board feet of narra lumber which were confiscated by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and forfeited in favor of the government. [1]

The antecedent facts:

On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-
wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along
the Marcos Highway.They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the
truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division
(PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID
investigated them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra
lumber:[2]

a. What were declared in the documents (Certificate of Timber Origin, Auxiliary Invoices and various
Certifications) were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber;

b. As appearing in the documents, the Plate Numbers of the truck supposed to carry the forest products
bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the Plate Number of the truck apprehended is
NVT-881;

c. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of
Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin, which merely covers
only transport of logs and flitches;

d. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the seller
and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware, [3]

which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD Circular
requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents: (1)
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence,
the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets. [4] Such omission
is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code.[5] Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for
the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. [6]
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary) issued an order for the confiscation of the
narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. [7]

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office of the
President. Consequently, the confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of
the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on March 20, 1989. [8]

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of writs of
replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the
confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra
lumber, respectively.[9] Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2045 and raffled to Branch 80
of the RTC of Quezon City.

On the same day, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to desist from proceeding with the
planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on
March 27, 1989.[10]

On March 20, 1989, the scheduled date of the auction sale, private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion
for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of
Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. [11] The
trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners to deliver the xxx
[n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT
881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representative x x x.[12]

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply
therewith.[13] David G. Brodett, Sheriff of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City (hereinafter referred to as
the Sheriff) reported that petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the
DENR Compound and transferring them to the Mobil Unit Compound of the Quezon City Police Force. To
avoid any unwarranted confrontation between them, he just agreed to a constructive possession of the
properties in question.[14] In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their
intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of
seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. But the trial court did not oblige
petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on private respondents. Petitioners then
immediately made the required service and tendered the cash counterbond in the amount of
P180,000.00, but it was refused, petitioners Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March
30, 1989. [15]

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond which was, however,
denied for the same reason. [16]

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying
the writ of seizure.[17] The trial court gave petitioners twenty-four (24) hours to answer the motion.
Hearing thereon was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

However, on March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March
27, 1989.[18]
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary
restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction
upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00. [19]

However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed
the petition. It declared that as the complaint for replevin filed by private respondents complied with the
requirements of an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of court,
issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory. [20]

As for the contempt charges against petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed the same were
sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the report submitted by the Sheriff. [21]

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision. However, that
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990. [22]

Hence this petition.

On the one hand, petitioners contend, thus:

(1) Confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin. [23]

(2) Petitioners not compelled to criminally prosecute private respondents but may opt only to confiscate
lumber".[24]

(3) Private respondent charged criminally in court. [25] and

(4) Writ of Replevin issued in contravention of PD #605. [26]

On the other hand, private respondents argue that:

(1) The respondent Judge had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the

complaint for recovery of personal property and, therefore, had
jurisdiction to issue the necessary orders in connection therewith.[27]

(2) The issuance of the order for the delivery of personal property
upon application, affidavit and filing of replevin bond by the plaintiff is mandatory and not discretionary,
hence, no abuse of discretion can be committed by the trial court in the issuance thereof. [28]

(3) The Order of March 20, 1989 was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court and is,
therefore, valid.[29]

(4) The private respondents have not been proven to have violated Section 68 of the Revised Forestry
Code.[30]

(5) The petitioners do not have the authority to keep private respondents property for an indefinite
period, more so, to dispose of the same without notice and hearing or without due process. [31]

(6) Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, no formal investigation was conducted by the PIC with
respect to the subject lumber in this case. [32]
(7) The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitioner Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. of the
DENR is not valid and does not make the issuance of the order of replevin illegal. [33] and

(8) The subject properties were not in custody of the law and may be replevied. [34]

At the outset we observe that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner
Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705 which reads:

All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse
of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President x
x x. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct
their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. [35] As to the application of this
doctrine in cases involving violations of P.D. No. 705, our ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos:

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court
held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. [36]

However, petitioners did not file a motion to dismiss based on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.[37]

Nonetheless, the petition is impressed with merit.

First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicants filing of a bond and
affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations
therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the
issuance of a writ of replevin. Said provision reads:
Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts:

(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or entitled to the
possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention thereof to
his best knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an execution,
or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure;
and

(d) The actual value of the property.

xxxxxxxxx.

Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be
issued.

In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner
Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, to wit:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. - In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either
by land, water, or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. [38]

As the petitioner Secretarys administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of
the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for
by private respondents.

Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power
under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private
respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin.

Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. [39] When a thing is in
official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will
not lie to recover it.[40]Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of
law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. [41] So basic is this
doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, Sec. 2(c), Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts:

x x x x x x x x x;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or
seized under a writ of execution, or preliminary attachment or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or
if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; x x x

x x x x x x x x x.[42]

Third. Petitioner Secretarys authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is
distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, in Paat, we held that:

x x x precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and
realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the
government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally
separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. x x x. The preamble of EO 277 that added Section 68-A
to PD 705- is most revealing:

WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit
and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the Penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to
present situations and realities;

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
conveyances but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court
in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power
of confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A
would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the
problem perceived in EO 277, x x x. [43]

Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement criminal enforcement of
forestry laws.

Fourth. Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours
from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative
confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 provides:

SEC. 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest
even without a warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools
and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the
offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting officer or employee shall thereafter
deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest
products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated
by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.

x x x x x x x x x.

The title of Sec. 80 - Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions - bespeaks this intendment of the law. The
fact, too, that Secs. 68 and 80 were co-existing prior to the introduction of Sec. 68-A, proves that Sec. 80
applies to the criminal prosecutions subject of Sec. 68 and not to the administrative confiscation subject
of Sec. 68-A. Sec. 68-A, therefore, should not be interpreted in relation to Sec. 80 as to require that
criminal charges be filed with and seized forest products be immediately delivered to, the fiscal in case of
administrative confiscation, for this renders nugatory the purpose sought to be achieved thereby.
Statutes should always be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed, and they should be given such interpretation as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended. [44]

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents allegation that their right to due process was
violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their properties.

On the contrary, by private respondents own admission, private respondent Sy who drove the six-
wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the
DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the
deficiencies in the documents.[45] Private respondents categorically stated that they made a continuous
and almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for the return of the truck and lumber x x x.
[46]
Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy requested petitioner
Secretary for immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn lumber. [47]

Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order of
confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all instances,
essential in administrative proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to
move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [48]

Moreover, respondents claim that the order of confiscation was antedated and not the product of the
investigation supposedly conducted by the PIC of the DENR. However, they proffer no proof to support
that allegation. On the other hand, there is the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is even particularly strong
with respect to administrative agencies like the DENR which are vested with quasi-judicial powers in
enforcing the laws affecting their respective fields of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of
them such technical mastery of all relevant conditions obtaining in the nation. [49]

Finally. The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its
discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes
that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order having been issued, no
contempt of court could be committed.[50]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17194 are hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED.Respondent Presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, is
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989 in Civil
Case No. Q-89-2045, or if said orders have already been enforced, the said respondent Judge is directed
to render judgment of forfeiture on the replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said
respondent Judge is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by
private respondents against the petitioners.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS
FLORES, respondents.

Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo, Arrozal, Luis Flares
and twenty other John Does," dismissing the information filed therein.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, in an information which read:

That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality
of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John
Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta
Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of
one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom,
without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease
license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total
value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including
government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.

Contrary to Law.

Lucena City, 7 January 1977. (p.17, Rollo).

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to
wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form.

On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo),
The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977 (p.42, Rollo).

On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with this Court, raising the following questions of
law: (1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and (2) whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction over the case.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the
opinion of the trial court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified
theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not
precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state,"
nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and
carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state
can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including
timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was "without any
authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking
of the logs was without the consent of the state.

We agree with the petitioner.

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.— Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined
in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA
57).

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or
removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered,
collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or
permit granted by the state.

The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because:

. . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying away of the logs were
done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the prosecution admits that timber is a forest
product that belongs to the state, the information, however, fails to allege that the taking was without
the consent of the latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective. (p. 39, Rollo)

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should
be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private
woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only
the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the
logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.
The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 349, clarified the
matter on ownership of timber in private lands. This Court held therein:
The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff because the timber
which it cut and gathered on the land in question belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff, the
latter having failed to comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.

The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, which reads;

"Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land containing timber,
firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry.
A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said
Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as
occasion may require.

Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies shall
render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of
Forestry."

In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that non-compliance with the
requirement would divest the owner of the land of his rights thereof and that said rights of ownership
would be transferred to the government. Of course, the land which had been registered and titled in the
name of the plaintiff under that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object of a forester license
issued by the Director of Forestry because ownership of said land includes also ownership of everything
found on its surface (Art. 437, New Civil Code).

Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to
exempt the title owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section
266 of the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:

"Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered private lands. — The
charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removed from any
private land the title to which is not registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest
Law; Provided, however, That in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather
and remove timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of
Forestry Law and Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing of timber and the other forest
products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and
removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such
cases in this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land as a
private woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he
still retained his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) — the very rights
violated by the defendant Basilan Lumber Company.

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest
products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private
ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that
ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the
failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient
that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools
and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the
offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or employee shall
thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the
confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate
official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.

If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall be done
within a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery.
The seized products, materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in accordance with
forestry administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.

The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police agency,
barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the power or
authority provided for in the preceding paragraph.

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials,
shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall
file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.

The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a
prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest
officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has
committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second
covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the
forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In
both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint
with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the
necessary informations in court.
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D.
705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the
alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the
complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.

The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in
Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that:

. . ., the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the
commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of Section 80
may be considered as covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer
assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any
of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. Such
interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80 deals precisely with the
authority of forest officers or employees to make arrests and institute criminal actions involving offenses
defined in the Decree. (p. 26, Rollo).

Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons
charged with the commission of the crime.

Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. — A provincial fiscal shall have
authority, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor.
To this end, he may summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear and testify upon oath
before him. . . .

With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in Courts of
First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary
investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the
said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec. 80
namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after
conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree (for violations not
committed in his presence) — he is still required to file the proper complaint with the appropriate official
designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted
to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in
the decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority to
arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those
upon whom it is vested by general law.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases No. 1591 is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.