Torts and Damages

Atty. Hazel D. Espina

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

PART I

I. Introduction

a. Tort Defined
– common law: unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and
which gives rise to an action for damages.
– An act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous legal
relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth
or incident.
– Private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract.
– Can be based on all 5 sources of obligation as enumerated in Art. 1157, NCC
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.

b. Kinds of Tort Liabilities

1. Intentional Torts
– conduct where the actor desires to cause the consequences of
his acts or believes that consequences are substantially certain to
result from it.
◦ Battery, assault, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of
privacy, interference of property

2. Negligence
- voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to another
without intending to cause the same. The actor fails to
exercise due care in performing such acts or omissions

3. Strict Liability
– the person is made liable independent of fault or negligence
upon submission of proofs of certain facts

Cases:

1. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals

 The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.
 Article. 21 of the Civil Code designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
in this jurisdiction grants adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
 wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books
 Damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not because of promise to marry
but because of fraud and deceit behind it-
ln the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
 Case at bar;
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit
and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress.
As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin
before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem
not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage
and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy.
As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage
of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary
will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

2. Exxon vs. Baker

 Punitive damage awards in maritime cases shall be capped at a 1:1 ratio measured
against compensatory damage awards.

c. Sources of Obligations under Philippine Law

i. Civil Code – Articles 1156 to 1162, and 2176

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
Article 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in
this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which
establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Article 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter
1, Title XVII, of this Book.
Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary
Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter
2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
 II. Quasi-delict (NCC: Article 2176)
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Cases:
1. Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
 Elements of quasi-delict.-
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.

 Case at bar.-
Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes
fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
The recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act
or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence and
the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no preexisting contractual
obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.-
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact ramains that
petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

 A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted provided that the
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores.- Article 2176,
whenever it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not only acts “not punishable
by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.

 The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code.-
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime—
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrele- vant in the
civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared
that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

2. Child Learning vs. Tagorio

3. Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers Inc

4. Lucas vs, Tuaño

a. Quasi-delict distinguished from other sources of obligations

 Quasi-delict vs. Breach of contract/culpa contractual

(NCC: Articles 1172-1173)

Cases:
1. Air France vs. Carrasco, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
2. Philippine School of Business Administration vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
 3. Manila Railroad Co. Vs. La Compnaia Trasatlantica, G.R. No.
11318, October 26, 1918

4. Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75

(2003)

 Quasi-delict vs. Delicts/culpa criminal

(RPC: Articles 100 and 365)

Cases:
1. Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, G.R. No. 48006, July 8, 1942
2. Elcano vs. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977

 Proscription Against Double Recovery

(NCC: Articles 2177)

Cases:

1. Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, et al., G.R.
No. 143360, Sept. 5, 2002

2. Lim vs. Ping, G.R. 175256, August 23, 2012

III. Negligence

A. Concept
(NCC: Article 1172 to 1174)

Cases:
1. Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809 (1918)

2. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. L-21291, March 28,
1969

3. Gaid vs. People, G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009

4. Pacis vs. Morales, G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010

5. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA and Ernest E.Simke,
G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988

6. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper, G.R. No.
189998, August 29, 2012

7. Dyteban vs. Jose Ching, G.R. No. 161803, February 4, 2008

8. Associated Bank vs. Tan, G.R. No. 156940, December 14, 2004
9. Francisco vs. Chemical Bulk Carriers, Incorporated, G.R. No.
193577, September 7, 2011

10. Phil Hawk Corp vs. Vivian Tan Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February
16, 2010

11. Li vs.Soliman, G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011

12. Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 148496,
March 19, 2002
 13. Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126074, February 24, 1998

14. The Heirs of Redentor Completo and elpidio Abiad vs Sgt.

Amando C. Albayda, Jr., G.R. No. 172200, July 6, 2010

15. Hidalgo Enterprises, inc. vs. Balandan, G.R. No. L-3422, June
13, 1952

B. Negligence as Proximate Cause/ Doctrine of Proximate Cause

- Proof of causation/causal relation between negligence/act or

omission and damage is an indispensable element of
liability

Cases:

1. Honoria Delgado Vda de Gregorio, et al vs. Go Chong Bing, 102

Phil. 556 (1957)

2. Batacan vs. Medina, 102 Phil 181

3. Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 714

4. Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 1 (1988)

5. Mercury Drug vs. Baking, G.R. No. 156037, May 25, 2007

6. Umali vs. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, January 30, 1976

7. S.D. Martinez vs. Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910

8. BPI vs. Suarez, G.R. No. 167750, March 15, 2010

 Immediate Cause; Intervening Cause

Cases:

1. St. Joseph’s College, Sr., et al., vs. Jayson Miranda, rep. by his
father, Rodolfo S.Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, June 29,
2010

C. Proof of Negligence

- Rules of Court (Rule 131, Sections 1, 2 and 3(d)

Case:

1. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958)

D. Presumpti

on of Negligence
 ii. Res Ipsa Loquitor

Cases:
1. Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
2. Maao Central Co. vs.CA, G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990
4. Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448, G.R. No. L-12986, March 31,
1966

5. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William

Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762 (1999)

6. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. vs. Spouses Sarangaya, G.R>

No. 147746, October 25, 2005

7. Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers Inc., G.R. No. 180440, Dec. 5,

2012

8. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 341 SCRA 760 (2000)

 For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following
conditions must concur:

(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.-

Test to determine the existence of negligence.-

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be

stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation
would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself”;

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such character as
to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured

in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily P.A.P.M. 50 required to
show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no
other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him

iii. Violation of rules and statutes

a. Traffic rules (NCC: Articles 2184 and 2185)

b. Republic Act No. 10586, Sec. 13, and IRR

Cases:
1. Mallari vs. CA, 324 SCRA 147 (2000)

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.-
 In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari, Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery
van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark
at 5:00 o’clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of
it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel
Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner
Alfredo Mallari, Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not
allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory
evidence to overcome this legal presumption

2. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General Insurance Co.,
Inc., 557 SCRA 141 (2008)
The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible,
to the prejudice of innocent victims.—

The rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with
the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents,
for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of
ownership. A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of
law, which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought
to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being
able to identify a guilty party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register
a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of
innocent victims.

3. Añonuevo vs. CA, 441 SCRA 24 (2004) c.

The fact that there has long existed a higher degree

of diligence and care imposed on motorized
vehicles, arising from the special nature of a motor
vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to
recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the
standards applica
In order to prove negligence per se, the plaintiff must prove that:
 The defendant violated a statute.
 The statute in question is a safety statute.
 The defendant's acts caused the type of harm that the statute was intended to prevent.
 The plaintiff was a member of the class that the statute protected.

Statutes and ordinance/administrative rules

Cases:
1. FF Cruz and Co., Inc., vs CA, G.R. No. 52732, August 29, 1988

; Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct a firewall between
its shop and the residence of private respondents, in accordance with city ordinances, supports a findings
of negligence.- Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct a
firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to Support a finding of negligence
2. Cipriano vs. CA, 263 SCRA 711
Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.- —We have already held that violation of a statutory duty
is negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a furniture shop
liable for the destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his
failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez,
we stated that where the very injury P.A.P.M. 56 which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has
happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the proximate
cause of the death.

3. Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. CA, 300 SCRA 20 (1998)

; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses, hence, it behooves employers to exert extra care in
the selection and supervision of their employees; They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed
by law.-

iv. Dangerous weapons and substances

- NCC, Article 2188

Case:

1. Araneta vs. Arreglado, 104 Phil. 529 (1958)

IV. Defenses

a. Complete defenses

i. Plaintiff’s negligence is the proximate cause of injury

- NCC Article 2179

Cases:
1. Paulan vs. Sarabia, 104 Phil 1050

The law ordinarily provides that the period during which an action may be brought shall be computed from
the time the right of action accrues (Articles 1144 & 1149, New Civil Code), but nothing is provided in this
respect with regard to an action based on a quasi-delict, Article 1146 (New Civil Code) simply provides
that the action shall be instituted within four years. There being no provision as to when shall the period of
four years commence to run, the provision of Article 1150 shall apply, which reads: “The time for
prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
counted from the day they may be brought.” Evidently, the day therein referred to is that of the collision,
for an action based on a quasi-delict can be brought now independently of the criminal action and even
regardless of the outcome of the latter (Article 31, New Civil Code). There can therefore be no dispute that
the action of appellants against the appellee should have been brought within the period of four years
counted from July 25, 1951

2. American Express International, Inc., vs. Cordero, G.R. No.

138550, Oct. 14, 2005
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the
damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate
cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent

3. Fernando vs. CA, 208 SCRA 714 (1992)

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish
the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil
Code that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause
has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de
Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous
one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the
resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which
acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident.

4. PLDT vs. CA, G.R. No. 57079, Sept. 12, 1989

The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences
of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
 5. Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No.
174269, August 25, 2010

; A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting
injury.- —In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 (2005), we ruled that a person who
knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury: “The
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to
selfinflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.” This doctrine,
in our view, is wholly applicable to this case. Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when
travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any delay because the schedule is very strict.
When Pantaleon made up his mind to push through with his purchase, he must have known that the group
would become annoyed and irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable consequence of his
decision to make them all wait.

Exc: Doctrine of Attractove Nuisance

Cases: 1. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 16 Phil 8

When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed
to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he can not recover damages forthe injury.

2. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. vs. Balandan, 91 Phil 488

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically
a trespasser in the premises.

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO

SWIMMING POOL OR WATER TANK.- The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location.

ii. Assumption of Risk

- NCC Article 2179

Cases:
1. Afiliada vs. Hisole and Hisole, 85 Phil 67

Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its
caretaker.
2. Ilocos Norte Co. vs. CA, G.R. No. 53401, Nov. 6, 1989

“When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission

3. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259,
Feb. 28, 2005
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”)
refers to a selfinflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so.- Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,
they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.”

iii. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of Supervening

Negligence; Doctrine of Discovered Peril; or the
Humanitarian Doctrine

DEFINITIONS:

The last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts that is employed in contributory negligence
jurisdictions. Under this doctrine, a negligent plaintiff can nonetheless recover if he is able to
show that the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident.

The doctrine has five elements that must be proven in order to show that the defendant had the last
clear chance:

1. The plaintiff placed themselves in the situation of danger because of their own negligence
2. The plaintiff could not avoid the danger
3. The defendant recognized the dangerous situation and had a duty to avoid it
4. The defendant failed to avoid the danger despite having an opportunity to avoid it
5. As a result of the defendant not avoiding the danger, the plaintiff was injured

The most important elements of assumption of risk are that the person voluntarily and
knowingly assumed the risks inherent to the dangerous activity. Furthermore, it is necessary for
the defendant (the person the lawsuit was brought against) to demonstrate that the plaintiff knew
of all risks at the time of the injury.
Cases:
1. Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918)

That although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant
was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity
to avoid the accident af ter he realized the situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to
avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position of
greater safety.

2. Philippine National Railways Corporation vs. Vizcara, G.R.

No. 190022, Feb. 15, 2012
A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen” signage,
is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable
care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.-
—Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into
consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners
failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way
to an approaching train.

3. Echevara vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 175172, Sept. 29, 2009

The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, but the defendant—who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so—is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered.
4. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation vs.
Angala, G.R. No. 153076, June 21, 2007

Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The doctrine of last
clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the
loss.

5. Tiu vs. Arriesgado, 437 SCRA 426 (2004)

; Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case,
as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles.-

iv. Fortuitous Event

- NCC Article 1174

Cases:
1. Gotesco vs. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18 (1992)

Force majeure as cause of accident not necessarily exculpatory where negligence is also proved.- Besides,
even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse was
due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial
court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier’s definition of and Cockburn’s elucidation on force
majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should
not have been guilty of negligence

2. Servando vs. Philippne Steam Navigation Co., 117 SCRA 832

(1982)

Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the
obligor is exempt from liability for nonperformance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of
the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.'
In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Española says: "In a legal
sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential
characteristics:

(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
(2) it may be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor."
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event

3. Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines vs. UCPB General Insurance

Company, G.R. No. 146018, June 25, 2003

Broadly speaking, force majeure generally applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a
lightning, an earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy.- Having originated from an unchecked crack in
the fuel oil service tank, the fire could not have been caused by force majeure. Broadly speaking, force
majeure generally applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a lightning, an earthquake, a
tempest or a public enemy. Hence, fire is not considered a natural disaster or calamity.

v. Emergency Rule
Cases:

1. Gan vs. CA, G.R. No. L-44264, Sept. 19, 1988

Emergency Rule, Defined.- A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. “Under that
rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails
to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence

2. Valenzuela vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 115024 & 117944, Feb. 7, 1996

An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence
if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.- Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that
an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally
applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and
reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the
“emergency rule” adopted by this Court in P.A.P.M. 77 Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who
suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought
by his own negligence

3. Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation vs. Mangalinao,

G.R. Nos. 174089 & 174266, Jan. 25, 2012

vi. Prescription
 - NCC Article 1150
Cases:

1. Capuno vs. Pepsi, G.R.No. L-19331, April 30, 1965

2. De Guzman vs. Toyota Cubao, Inc., G.R. No. 141480,
November 29, 2006

b. Incomplete/Partial Defense

i. Doctrine of Contributory negligence

- NCC Article 2179

Cases:
1. Rakes vs. The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, 7 Phil 359
(1907)

2. NPC vs. Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008

3. Lambert vs. Heirs of Rey Castillon, 452 SCRA 285 (2005)
Estacion vs. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, Feb. 27, 2006

V. Vicarious Liability
(NCC: Articles 2180, 2181 & 2182)
a. Parents and Guardians

- Family Code (as amended by RA 6809) Articles 217, 219, 221,

236

Cases:

1. Libi vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70880, Sept. 18, 1992

2. Exconde vs Capuno, 101 Phil 843 (1957)
3. Cuadra vs. Monfort, G.R. No. L-24101, Sept. 30, 1970

4. Tamargo vs. CA, 209 SCRA 518

5. St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos, G.R. No.143363,
February 6, 2002

b. Owners and Managers of Establishment

Cases:

1. Phil. Bus Rabbit vs. Phil-Am Forwarders, G.R. No. L-25142,

March 25, 1975

2. Castilex Industries vs. Varquez, 321 SCRA 393 (1999)

c. Employer