Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ATTY. RICARDO M. A.C. No. 7820

SALOMON, JR.,
Complainant, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JOSELITO C. FRIAL,
Respondent. September 12, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn complaint[1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on December 22, 2006, complainant Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. charged
respondent Atty. Joselito C. Frial with violating his Lawyers Oath and/or gross
misconduct arising from his actuations with respect to two attached
vehicles. Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question, asked that Atty. Frial be
disbarred.

The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v. Ricardo Salomon et
al., docketed as Civil Case No. 05-111825 before the Regional Trial Court
in Manila, in which a writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favor of Lucy Lo,
Atty. Frial’s client. The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of complainants black
1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra.
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing
the attached cars in the court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Los counsel.
Atty. Salomon claimed that on several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted
being used by unauthorized individuals. For instance, on December 26,
2005, barangay captain Andrew Abundo saw the Nissan Sentra in front of a battery
shop on Anonas St., Quezon City. On February 18, 2006, Architect Roberto S. Perez
and three others saw and took video and photo shots of the same car while in the
Manresa Shell station at P. Tuazon Blvd. corner 20th Avenue, Quezon City. Also
sometime in June 2006, Robert M. Perez, complainants driver, saw the said car in
another Shell station near Kamias Street. On December 16, 2006, Arlene Carmela
M. Salomon spotted it driven by bondsman Ferdinand Liquigan allegedly with Atty.
Frials consent. As Atty. Salomon further alleged, when the misuse of the car was
reported, paving for Liquigans apprehension, Atty. Frial, in a letter, acknowledged
having authorized Liquigan to bring the car in custodia legis to a mechanic.

As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial
deliberately withheld information as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the
Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but the court was not immediately put on notice
of this development.

In his Answer,[2] Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own
undertaking, without authority and knowledge of the court. The subject vehicles,
according to him, were first parked near the YMCA building in front of
the Manila City Hall where they remained for four months. He said that when he
went to check on the vehicles condition sometime in December 2005, he found them
to have been infested and the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats. He
denied personally using or allowing others the use of the cars, stating in this regard
that if indeed the Nissan Sentra was spotted on Anonas St., Quezon
City on December 26, 2005, it could have been the time when the car was being
transferred from the YMCA. The February 18, 2006 and June 2006 sightings, so
Atty. Frial claimed, possibly occurred when the Nissan Sentra was brought to the
gas station to be filled up. He said that the car could not have plausibly been spotted
in Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in front of Liquigans house
for mechanical check-up.

During the mandatory conference/hearing before the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline, the parties agreed on the following key issues to be resolved: (1) whether
or not Atty. Frial used the cars for his personal benefit; and (2) whether or not Atty.
Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached properties.

Thereafter and after the submission by the parties of their respective position papers,
the Commission submitted a Report dated October 9, 2007 which the IBP Board of
Governors forthwith adopted and then transmitted to this Court. In the Report, the
following were deduced from the affidavits of Andrew Abundo, Roberto Perez,
Robert Perez, and Dante Batingan: (1) at no time was Atty. Frial seen driving the
Sentra; (2) Abundo learned that at that time the car was spotted at the battery shop,
the unnamed driver bought a new battery for the car which was not inappropriate
since a battery was for the preservation of the car; (3) Atty. Frial admitted that the
Nissan Sentra was seen gassed up on February 18, 2006 and in June 2006 and there
was no reason to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those times unless it was being used;
(4) Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was used to buy goats meat; and (5) photos
of the Nissan Sentra in different places obviously showed it was being used by
others.

In the same Report, the Commission observed that while there is perhaps no direct
evidence tying up Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact
remains that it was being used by other persons during the time he was supposed to
have custody of it. In addition, whoever drove the Nissan Sentra on those occasions
must have received the car key from Atty. Frial. When Atty. Frial took custody of
the Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars, he was duty bound to keep and preserve these in
the same condition he received them so as to fetch a good price should the vehicles
be auctioned.

As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in excellent condition and
that there was no court order authorizing him to remove the car from the YMCA
premises. Admitted too was the fact that he secured the release of the Volvo on the
strength alone of his own written undertaking;[3] and that the car was almost totally
destroyed by fire on February 4, 2006 at 1:45 a.m.[4] while parked in his residence.
He could not, however, explain the circumstances behind the destruction, but
admitted not reporting the burning to the court or the sheriff. While the burning of
the car happened before the mediation hearing, Atty. Frial, upon inquiry of Atty.
Salomon, did not give information as to the whereabouts of the cars.
The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frials residence was not an ordinary
occurrence; it was an event that could have not easily escaped his
attention. Accordingly, there is a strong reason to believe that Atty. Frial deliberately
concealed the destruction of said vehicle from the court during the hearings in Civil
Case No. 05-111828, which were the opportune times to reveal the condition of the
Volvo car.

On the basis of the foregoing premises, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial
committed acts clearly bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to
observe the diligence required of him as custodian of the cars. The Commission thus
recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

The findings and the recommendation of the Commission are well-taken.

A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached
property, thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by
the plaintiff or any proper party.[5] When the objects of the attachment are destroyed,
then the attached properties would necessarily be of no value and the attachment
would be for naught.

From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that Atty.
Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics that states:

11. Dealing with trust property

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain
he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or
be used by him. (Emphasis ours.)
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to
respect the courts order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties
as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.

Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of
the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who
had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the
destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without
so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.

For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, we find Atty. Frial
guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We
must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without
legal recourse in recovering the Volvos value from Atty. Frial should they desire to
do so.
The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate
penalty of disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.[6] With the view we take of the case, there
is no compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended to pervert the
administration of justice for some dishonest purpose.

Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any

punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish
the end desired.[7] This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment
on the economic life and honor of the erring person. In the case of Atty. Frial, the
Court finds that a years suspension from the practice of his legal profession will
provide him with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Frial is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and

infidelity in the custody of properties in custodia legis. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Let notice of this Decision be entered in his
personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the
same served on the IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all the courts concerned.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn
A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy
Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by
me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33
Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to
own real property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,

recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr.
Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment
case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against
Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy
Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for
taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land
in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six
months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated
that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his
pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and
his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the
IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the
laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning
real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the
transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition,
quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided
"some safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that
would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of
lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts
to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for
preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation
and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1

and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4545 February 5, 2014

CARLITO ANG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139-B, Section 12(c) of the Rules of Court assailing
Resolution Nos. XVII-2005-1411 and XVIII-2008-6982 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors found respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana
administratively liable and imposed on him the penalty of suspension for one year from the practice
of law and the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as
notary public for two years.

The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent.
Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely
Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and
Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066-B-2-B which had an area of 6,258 square meters and was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square
meters designated as Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon.5 However,
when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT No. (T-22409)-6433 had
already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs6 had been issued in the names of William
Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D.
Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in
the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who prepared and notarized
the Affidavit of Loss7 and Deed of Absolute Sale8 that led to the transfer and issuance of the new
TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria
Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as
clearly shown by the Certification9 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of
respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit.10 As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the
late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she
Died11 three years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss.

Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the attorney-in-fact of
William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and
Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of
Sale12 selling Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10, 1995. Ang
complained that the sale was made even though a civil case involving the said parcel of land was
pending before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely using the
present administrative complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case and their
counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes. Respondent averred that Ang had filed Civil
Case No. Man-2202 before Branch 55 of the Mandaue City RTC. He anchored his claim on the
Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed for
reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. During the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. Man-
2202, Ang admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo but insisted on his claim for
a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the common-law husband of
Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the four
certificates of title of the land in question were ordered cancelled and the land effectively became
available for disposition. Ang sought reconsideration of the order, but a compromise was reached
that only one TCT (TCT No. 34266) will be annotated with a notice of lis pendens. Respondent
surmised that these developments in Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that Ang would lose his case
so Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the case for being devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding
resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending resolution of Civil Case No. Man-2202 allegedly
because the issues in the present administrative case are similar to the issues or subject matters
involved in said civil case.

Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, to whom the
case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation, submitted her Report and
Recommendation15 finding respondent administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent committed an
unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property
through a deed of sale executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a pending litigation before
the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that respondent
"delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office before being brought to him for his
signature." This, according to the commissioner, "must have been the reason for the forged
signatures of the parties in the questioned document…as well as the erroneous entry in his notarial
register…."16 Nonetheless, the Investigating Commissioner merely reminded respondent to be more
cautious in the performance of his duties as regards his infraction of his notarial duties. She held,
Respondent should have been more cautious in his duty as notary public which requires that the
party subscribing to the authenticity of the document should personally appear and sign the same
before respondent’s actual presence. As such notary public respondent should not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.18

On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-
141,19 adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modifying the recommended
penalty. Instead of suspension for three months, the Board recommended the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one year and revocation of respondent’s notarial commission and
disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,20 arguing that it was neither illegal nor unethical for a
lawyer to accept appointment as attorney-in-fact of a client to sell a property involved in a pending
litigation and to act as such. He further contended that granting that his act was unethical, the
modified penalty was evidently too harsh and extremely excessive considering that the act
complained of was not unlawful and done without malice.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
69821 denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2005-141.
Hence, this petition for review.

Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own clients to sell a portion of a parcel of
land, part of which is involved in litigation, is not per se illegal or unethical. According to him, his
clients got his help to sell part of the land and because they were residing in different provinces, they
executed a Special Power of Attorney in his favor.22

We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively liable.

After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not act unethically when
he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney-in-fact because there was no more notice of
lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold. Likewise, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to
show that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989 was
antedated.

However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when
he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of
Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103,
otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:

Sec. 1. x x x

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of
the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is
done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or
any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.23 In the case at
bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before
respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March
26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. Indeed,
respondent averred in his position paper before the IBP that he did not in fact know Candelaria
personally before, during and after the notarization24 thus admitting that Candelaria was not present
when he notarized the documents.

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine.25 Thus,
in Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the significance of the act of notarization, to wit:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who xecuted and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed.

A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers
and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.27 It devolves upon
respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned documents.
Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in undermining the integrity of a
notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for his
infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred

duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
1âwphi 1

respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.28 As the Court has held in Flores v. Chua,29

Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of
his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of
Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing." Respondent averred
in his position paper that it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical staff
documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said clerical staff investigates whether the documents are
complete as to the fundamental requirements and inquires as to the identity of the individual
signatories thereto. If everything is in order, they ask the parties to sign the documents and forward
them to him and he again inquires about the identities of the parties before affixing his notarial
signature.30 It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his notarial report. As aforesaid,
respondent is mandated to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his duties as a notary and to ascertain that the persons who signed the documents are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of
documents brought to him for notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization process to
simply inquiring about the identities of the persons appearing before him, and in notarizing an
affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law
for one year are in order.31

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable for
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial
commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two years, with a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.