I believe that Cook is mistaken to connect OC 478 with

OC 144 where Wittgenstein says, ‘The child learns to believe a

host of things. i.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs’.
Wittgenstein is not saying that the child learned to believe and act in
accord with the propositional belief that his milk exists any more
than the cat learned similar propositions about the mouse. What
Wittgenstein does say, in OC 475 is ‘I want to regard man here as
an animal: as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not
ratiocination

When its temperature rises above T c , this alignment disappears.

In the resulting paramagnetic state the overall magnetic moment is zero.
Moreover the mean value of the spin of any small set of neighboring
atoms within the piece of nickel also becomes zero, whereas it had some
positive value s in the ferromagnetic state. It would seem that the macro-
scopic property of being at a temperature T above T c at t is the cause of
the microscopic effect that the mean value of the spin of atom i and its
nearest neighbors is 0 at t’. Downward causation seems to be common
also in other sciences. In biology, the stimulation of a neuron influences
the state of ionic channels in its membrane. The former characterizes a
change in a property lying at a higher level (that of the neuron) than the
latter (the channels are constitutive parts of the neuron). In psychother-
apy, changing a patient’s beliefs can alleviate depression (Cuijpers et al.
(2008)), and modify its neural basis: It can modify abnormal regional
cerebral blood flow and glucose metabolism (Kalia (2005)). A change in
belief is a change in a property characterizing the whole person whereas
the effect is a change at a lower level concerning a property of a part of
the person’s brain.

The question of the relationship between God and morality has always been one of the
most important topics of discussion in theological ethics. This discussion was raised by
Socrates in Plato’s Euthyphro: ‘Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?’ (Plato 2002, 12). It can be stated in modern
terms as: ‘Does God command actions because they are morally good, or are actions
morally good because God commands them?’ The first horn of this dilemma has been
affirmed by natural law (guided will, non-voluntarist) theory, whose main claim is that
God commands certain actions because of their intrinsic moral value. In this case, God
would command or prohibit actions because they are morally good or evil in themselves.