Scribd Logo
Importer

Bienvenue sur Scribd !

  • Armon-Jones - The Social Construction of Emotions

    Transféré par

    Milan Damjanac
    33 vues12 pages
    Social construction of emotions in constructivism

    Titre original

    Armon-Jones_The Social Construction of Emotions

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Formats disponibles

    PDF ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd

    Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

    Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

    Signaler ce document
    Social construction of emotions in constructivism

    Droits d'auteur :

    © All Rights Reserved
    Téléchargez comme PDF ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
    Signaler comme contenu inapproprié
    33 vues12 pages

    Armon-Jones - The Social Construction of Emotions

    Transféré par

    Milan Damjanac
    Social construction of emotions in constructivism

    Droits d'auteur :

    © All Rights Reserved
    Téléchargez comme PDF ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
    Signaler comme contenu inapproprié
    sur 12
    3 7 The Thesis of Constructionism Claire Armon-Jones resented Tar example in philosophy by Coulter, social theory by Sabini and Silva, 1982; in psychology by, and in anthropology by Lutz, 1982) retain the standard use a term to cover phenomena suclt as fear, , envy, jealousy, guil up of which the: Soe inderstod only i terms of te behaviour of a member, since his get, social acts which go beyondl him ier members of that group" (Mead, 193: heory was influ frameworks and ( experience certain ind appraise mat- idged desirable _naturalism.in_regacding _ natural Jeatutes which a Claire An ionale for (3),according (0 constructi JJoural functions. «be nieat example, according to (Gan be held res ‘THE IMPLICATIONS ( # CONSTRUCTIONISM Constructionist theories of emotion, are I think, impor jing not only because they 30 beyond trad emotion as natural phenomena but bezouse they have th philosophical and practical e _ The ethical theories of, for example: Stevenson, 1937) are opposed in thei” views of the ions and_moral discourse. According to Kant expressive o fey in Fal rng moral eaters uted natural disposi involved in, such judgements. According to Emotivis essentially functions n being 10 express thé Fspeakerandinete emat ory Be a -yrewrrhar avoral framing can educa natural emotional dis as phenomena which ate 0 “Gctidn. Whiereas Tor Kant emo MHOTEA in moral judgement ry conditions of mor ye nature of 35 disputes not only the grounds for this the theories itaddresses. According to constructionism, uch as “guilt” and ‘pity”are not onidogically. pr in moral rules is a precon iments. Thus far, constructionism ssuch sentiments not as prior understanding oF 1g to constructionism, itis ides such as the evalua- nis can “Of the capacity 16 reverses the Em causal conditions mn, Such sent ial appraisal and icism of Kant’s ‘ems, then a moral issue arises in thot such organizations only are socially based, b also can be evaluated as desirable 2 ‘or example, during the ¢ War recruitment of British soldiers stages of increased by prof ‘enhance the mot 1 of young men to qualifies as an emotion because it was clear! eyes and heart swelling with pric ‘was not clearly separable from sm" was at th ee ed Fesuppos ‘consider Various versions of constrictiGnism sppear to require a theory of. which emotions, as instances of psychological states, are. def been acquired, then the agent's further a will depend cru judgement and be “Second, and fol seu a hear of ing features. Emotions, they argue, are iden by behaviour, and in part by those external ‘Semantics via its inl "influence on our under. ‘ (eriis But also in. order to oppose the ism also requires a validation of these further sphy in psychology that emotions are non serve to disrupt rationality. gard ig individuals is can be understood as having a CONSTRUCTIONISM VERSUS NATURALISM 38 Claire Arn 30 extend the term beyond its scope of view gains support from two equally r: yy Between urian and ton-h ‘Erence (or The lata Mai emotions Evolve cog +e ascribed to members of non-huma 1: pecies. Second, philosophical shes. First an behaviour. curs ctbe used.as. cultural influences ven’ (1980), Averil cultural influences’ appears to responses as featuring prior to, of emotion Muonces, ‘One advantage of the weaker thesis is, xistence of natural emotions, it escapes some of ig view. For .,on the strong view it remains wexplained why, . emotions such she_humans.sho- and judgemet behaviour to mental slate should be confined to human features can be ascribed to non-human species, the fact that we often regard non-verbal behai tion of emotions such as ‘fear’ to other pers them of the concept fear’ is nota necessary cont . These points support our in some objects oF ferents of ematicns such as fea i, virtue oftheir The Thesis of Con 39 instance of that type whict ~ for example, instances of ‘compassion’ as generated by natural hic distressat the suffering’ of another being. So the second option seems preferable. enables the constructioni primary and non of the natural response and in determining the ‘outwardly displayed. A proponent of this approach is natural response constrained by norms which perm the griever is close to the deceased. that the natur ited scope since the: responses form part of a ment attitudes of which largely reflect the agent's membership of his/her « to demonstrate the extent to which both“ a0 Claire Armon-Jones The Thesis of Consiructio mncbased, and. as _ idinal components should be understood as provi je Of emtotions” as socisculturally ig ERATE GOTT Theories of the role clement in ‘emotion fe suggest that ions upon the type of object to which an emotion can “Envy’ and ‘jeaiou their grammatical permit me to fee involving basis Tor the construct y responsible for, and able to take credit for, the event though n agent can ascribe to himsel ibe to himself the term 'se to his feelingsis his own faul ‘of someone else could he describe himself as generally restrictions upon the sort of object to ‘an emotion type ‘an be directed (see Bedford, chapter 2above). nally defined the emotions as ‘passions’. Pas were regarded as involuntary, non-cognitive phenomena which, | sensation and perception, are incor de named by simple concept he same fashion as the objects ofthe exterior ser to the soul in (Descartes, THE COGNITIVE ASPECT OF EMOTIONS. iat Iam responsible for the action. However, while beliefs may be the generaticn of emotions, they are i see Fa Tidlar emotioas tec tuve different emotions sam: belt For exarip &, the ‘belie that x is dang “ei WMT An ‘ex com only the evaluativ. and appetitive ‘or example private but access them depend upon objective criteria f and hence form a part of a shared public language: ‘an “inner process SG stands in need of outward criteria’ (Wittgenstei Second, Wi its out that emotions and sensations are fundamentally dissimilar in that emotions, unl about an external object or cal obje of x/grateful to x angry that of the passions world. meaning of em ee 42 Claire Armo.-Jones some respect. For example, while I .nay regard M's vthlessness as undesirable in so far as it Causes him 1c be selfish and incor towards others, may also regard M's rthle ole in so far as ives him determination and as decide that, all things considered, t's ruthless vious. But [ am not iripelled to resolve my apprais they focus on differ ‘compare. Also, if emotions are con: ot, as the his desires, say, to seek revenge on EMOTIONS AND INTE SIONAL OBJECTS ‘The attitudinal account also imposes es rictions upon the, object to which an emotion can be d.rected. If M's ‘ange is then x is the extension of M's emotion. However, given judes towards x which, generate his emotion, then », in ining M's emotion, has to be ckaractenzed it mn can be elucidated by using, Aristotle's accou ‘as ‘a desire for what -ppears to be a revengs for what example is not xs The Thesis of Cor of, it is x under the agent's dese in pa Ifan emotion depends upon the construal of an object under those intensional descriptions which warrant the emotion, then tt considerable | the range of token extensional obj which a particular emotion can be directed and in the range of this person evaluations concerning the warrantedness of the emotion. For token objects of M's “depression” can run the gamut from “the r ships’. These obj 43 ions that explains x as an object of E extensional properties in comm sion’ in so far as they share the etc. A fortiori, the third-person evaluation of an agent ‘warranted depends not only upon judgements concerning the extension of ch M is afraid) but also upon ‘agreement over the agent's construal as construal of the object (eg., that x can be construed as menacing or dangerous). ‘HE RELATION BETWEEN CONSTRUCTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY EMOTION THEORIES ‘What relevance do the accounts out! ‘The characterization of emotion as 1110 constructionism in the following respects. According to con- constituted emotion is an acquired response. This requires that the elements co ‘ones which are capable of being acquired by the agent. Consequer to constructionism that an account of emotion be given in which with, nor have the same ontological sn and perception. This is so because, also have yed above have for constructionism? fed phenome ‘contemporary accounts of em a 44 Claire Armon custom (eg, the desire to be polite; the evaluation of a Matisse as delica the belief that theft is a crime). Thus far, the contemporary accounts of emotion appear to provide an apposite framework upon tionists might build their explanation the various emotions are socioculturally con: fones ‘warranting certain emotions in virtue of the con- itudes which reflect the bel fs and values of the idinal account opposes of emotions as opposed to the faculty of reason. Ifemotions are cognition- based, then this allows that they can be subjected to rational persuasion and criticism. For example, agents can be reasoned out of their ‘anger’ just because the emotion is based on attitudes which can themselves be critically appraised in respect of whether they form an accurate or reasonable construal of the situation. If the agent misinterprets the tion as an insul ind consider him able to r ‘anger’. This px emotions can be endorsed or condemne EMOTIONS, SENSATIONS AND QUALIA The analysis given so far has characterized emotion in terms of the complexes to which the various emotion types are conceptually According to some attitudinal theorists emotion feeling is not reducible to. des, in which case the analysis is, as it stand! incorporate emotion ‘feeling’ itself. This alleged incompleteness of a purely attitudinal account has led to various compromise “fee The Thesis of Constructionis 45 evident in the expericnce of being moved" by an emotion, can only be ‘vaguely approximated’ via evocation and metaphor ly captured vi ings themselves land the means by which they are conceptually represented. ‘The introduction of emotion qualia t of emotion poses a difficulty for construct respects, The mist wants to argue that emotions are socioculturally consti nin language and behaviour, but also the experiential aspect of emotion via their determi thesis outlined above requires that lual emotion experience which is not redui ides and expression and therefore can remai tural factors which are alleg cexpia’n these Ia ig could be sociocul 5 (eg, Perkins, 1966) poses a diffic Virtue of its natural induced arousal and increased motor ac tood to be basic, nai wre necessary components ofa fe the scoze of the conistructionist’s argumer 1 which could be expl stan ¢ such physi 46 Claire Armon-tones The Thesis of Const outward criteria in the form oft a 47 characterized without appealing to qi necessary constituents of the total emot sensation feelings. The point here is that sens processes ly related theless ontologict tudes and behaviour to which they give is not to emotion feelings but to sen that Leventhal iction between representation and fe ‘THE CONSTITUTION OF EMOTION FEELING BY ATTITUE ES Here Lwant to examine ad enstein d-aws between faded aEBIT: semouon and sent ‘However, with reference to the emotion joy’, Wittgenstein remarks: construct agreement cation, the qualia thesis above im criteria are expressive of an inner quale or in the cast. Gr emotion. question of what the ‘feeling’ term in an eve wal such as stands for an emotion predicate) coul although the account above may apply to sensation, the residual qualia is not plausible in the case of emotion. Why ns in, as already noted, argues tha: the terms for both emotion elated to those verial and that? ... the words Lam. they give t deny the existence of ie case of the emot ‘behaviour né thoughts of happines: of joy. Hence, unlike the case of sen behaviour refer to an inner quale of which such factors are ontologically jons these factors are ontologically From Wittgenst “designate anything’ can be derived the fo above is not meant to imply that ‘joy’ lacks Green (1979) suggests, meant t0 © er inner feeling or outer behaviour, and to e no single item of verbal or physical behaviour ean pro conditions for the ascription of an emotion, would suggest that the reason why “reference to an inner process’ tosen refer to inner tue of the by, and rem: y distinct from, give rise and ing of a pain cannot be cor 1¢ nevertheless appears {0 focus on the expressi thoughts in the form of outward verbal and. physical beh: “feeling joyful’ need not-be overtly expressed. allowing it to show in my verbal and physica ith the possibility that ted in its outward expression, and also 50 Claire Armon jones Here it seems reasonable to suggest that the inner array of events described above constitutes a typical state of feeling ‘regretiul'o: ‘afraid’ and hence explains sufficie ie be moved by these erations in ‘a particular case. Consequently, in the case of ‘regret’ for exeruple, @ report such as I wish that x had not happacd’, although a refined expres sion of the agent's attitudes, is not an ‘approximation of the sutiective clement’ but is at most a summary of, and at least a selection itor attitudes. Hence the antagonist’ reference °o ‘vagueness’ as a des feature of the subject ected. IfT ean describe my ‘regret’ or ‘anger’, whether i properly be said to feel these emotions. Hence if ‘feeling’ 's sot easi conveyable via language and behaviour, this is because it 15 barely & feeling, not because it isa ‘bare fee vaguely ‘THE ROLE OF BODILY FEELING So far I have suggested that em priate attidues, whether such attitudes are covert or overtly ‘Against this account the antagonist might object that it fails (0 ‘we have the term feet’ in our emotion repertoire, Perkins, a proponent of the compromise view, argues that one role o. the term ‘feelin the case of emotionis to designate bodily feeling:“bodily feelingis indispensat le to Our practice of ... conceiving emotions is felt’ (Perkins, 1964). Th's view requires some consideration as an alternative to the attitudinal account of ‘emotion feeling advanced so far. Perkins wants toargue that an emotion is a double aspect ‘such that attitudinal and behavioural components can qualify as a emotion’ only if they give rise to some kind of bodily sensation. Sensation is understood by Perkins as a non-specific aspect of the totel emotional event and hence differs from the traditions, James-Langian account of ‘emotions as individuated by, and reducible to, specifie or unigue disjunc~ tions of sensation, On Perkins's view it isa necessary condition ot an event x's being a felt emott non-specific bodily feeling (S) fewtures, total emotional event. Perkins, in using the necessary condition. provide a criterion for placing psychological phenomena i "So far the eriterion remains uninformative about the nature of ‘emotions, Hlecan avoid this object’on by maintaini Im of sufficient conditions that the rature of particul n feeting is constituted oy the

    Vous aimerez peut-être aussi