Republic of the Philippines of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
SUPREME COURT Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,
substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL,
ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial
hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor
General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and
the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on
November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of
Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive
portion of the challenged Decision reads:4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of
dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a
new one entered confirming the registration and title
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann,
all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt,
Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land
covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and private oppositor are hereby
dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the
corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for
the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro
Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application
was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86
and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during
the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence,
his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by
their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June
13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of
jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants
through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession
of the subject land since 1938.
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed
to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice
of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only
published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and
"G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well
considered view that it has not legally acquired
jurisdiction over the instant application for want of
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion
No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement
under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold
purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the
provision of the aforequoted provision refers to
publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned
in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers
to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also
in a newspaper of general circulation, and is
procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable.
As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court
would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a
particular land registration case. As to the second,
publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due
process; otherwise, any decision that the court may
promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
1
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to
Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier
explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared
November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor
General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court
notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his
petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy
should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a
final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we
shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule
45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals
committed "grave abuse of discretion"10 in holding —
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of
title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such
publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD
1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
"published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation." According to
petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is
"necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court,
and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to
comply with the notice requirement of due
process."11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that
failure to comply with the requirement of publication
in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
"procedural defect." They add that publication in the
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12
In reversing the decision of the trial court,
Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot
be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal
force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors
were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters
fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its
disposition in this wise:14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with
the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in
the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places,
were complied with and these are sufficient to notify
any party who is minded to make any objection of
the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice
of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. —
The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the
date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of
the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the
time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to
be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may
concern." Said notice shall also require all persons
concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and
categorical terms that publication in the Official
Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down
to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents.
2
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is
impelled by the demands of statutory construction
and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work
to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration
upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting
the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal
mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon
its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its
normal mandatory meaning. In Republic
16
vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529
requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1)
publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which
must be complied with. "If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed
in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of
the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties,
and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of
notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly
be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be
interested or whose rights may be adversely affected
would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled,
a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty
in the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his
ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for
he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title
against the whole world. This task, which rests upon
the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons
concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have
rights to or interests in the subject property are
notified and effectively invited to come to court and
show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process
require that before the claimed property is taken
from concerned parties and registered in the name of
the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of
general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication
in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and
posting, all of which have already been complied
with in the case at hand. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the
notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties,
and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default
orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the
explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they
had, it would not have mattered because the statute
itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no
authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application.19 There is no alternative.
Thus, the application for land registration filed by
private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the
legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for
land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 146527 January 31, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
3
 MANNA PROPERTIES, INC., Represented by its
President, JOSE TANYAO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals’ Decision2 dated 20 December 2000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La
Union ("trial court") dated 21 February 1996 in Land
Registration Case No. N-2352 ("LRC No. N-2352")
approving the application of respondent Manna
Properties, Inc. ("Manna Properties") for the
registration in its name of a parcel of land located in
Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union.
Antecedent Facts
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence,
the facts of the case are as follows:
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an
Application for the registration of title of two (2)
parcels of land, specifically:
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434;
and
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434,
located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La
Union measuring around 1,480 square meters.
Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the
court a quo.
Copies of the application, postal money orders for
publication purposes and record were forwarded to
the Land Registration Authority by the Court a
quo on October 7, 1994.
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of
the Land Registration Authority, the full names and
complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot owners
were not stated for notification purposes. As a result
thereto, per Order dated December 5, 1994, the
applicant was directed to submit the names and
complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of
Lots 9514 and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the
applicant filed its compliance, which was forwarded
to the Land Registration Authority on December 22,
1994 together with the notice of the Initial Hearing,
which was reset to April 13, 1995.
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority
requested for the resetting of the initial hearing since
April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a non-working
day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or
ninety (90) days from date of the Order to allow
reasonable time for possible mail delays and to
enable them to cause the timely publication of the
notice in the Official Gazette.
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20,
1995 by the court a quo.
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter
dated March 6, 1995 from the LRA with the
information that the notice can no longer be
published in the Official Gazette for lack of material
time since the National Printing Office required
submission of the printing materials 75 days before
the date of the hearing. It was again requested that
the initial hearing be moved to a date consistent with
LRC Circular No. 353.
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing
was reset to July 18, 1995.
The Opposition to the application stated, among
others, that the applicant is a private corporation
disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to
hold alienable lands of public domain.
Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and
the National Printing Office, the Notice of Initial
Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue of
the Official Gazette officially released on June 19,
1995. The same notice was published in the July 12,
1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.
Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose
[Tanyao], who testified on the acquisition of the
subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepeña, co-
owner of the subject property, who testified on the
possession of the applicant-appellee’s predecessors-
in-interest.
The [documentary] evidence presented were:
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and
1006;
2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate;
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing by the LRA;
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing by the National Printing Office;
4
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing by the Circulation Manager of the Ilocos
Herald;
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12,
1995;
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995;
13. Sheriff’s Return of Posting;
14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners
of the Notice of Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision
dated February 21, 1996 granting the application.
(sic)3
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on
behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
("petitioner"), promptly appealed the trial court’s
decision to the Court of Appeals. On 20 December
2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s
appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found that Manna Properties has
substantiated by clear and competent evidence all its
allegations in the application for original land
registration. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA")
did not present any evidence in opposition to the
application. The trial court ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
approves the application, and orders that the parcels
of land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad.
5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of
One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square
meters, situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San
Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-
1331434 (Exh. "A" and the technical description
described in Exhibit "B" and "B-1") shall be registered
in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
in the name of the applicant Manna Properties, Inc.,
represented by its President Jose [Tanyao], Filipino
citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with
residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises,
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529.4
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling
and dismissed petitioner’s argument that the
applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of Presidential Decree No. 15295 ("PD
1529"). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-
day period for setting the initial hearing under
Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it
is the publication of the notice of hearing itself that
confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that
the records of the case reveal that the testimony of
Manuel Sobrepeña was not the sole basis for the trial
court’s finding that Manna Properties’s predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land in
question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals
added that while tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of ownership, they are "the best indicia" of
possession.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; and
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY
PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE
REQUISITE PERIOD.
The Ruling of the Court
On Whether Manna Properties Failed to Comply with
the Jurisdictional Requirements for Original
Registration
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day
maximum period between the court order setting the
initial hearing date and the hearing itself. Petitioner
points out that in this case, the trial court issued the
order setting the date of the initial hearing on 15
March 1995, but the trial court set the hearing date
itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125
days in between the two dates, petitioner argues
that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by
PD 1529. Thus, petitioner concludes "the applicant
[Manna Properties] failed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for original registration."
The petitioner is mistaken.
The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. –
The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour
of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-
five days nor later than ninety days from the date of
the order.
xxx
5
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies
with the land registration court. After an applicant
has filed his application, the law requires the
issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing
date. The notice of initial hearing is a court
document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by
the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the
clerk of court to the LRA. This involves a process to
which the party applicant absolutely has no
participation.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases,
the applicant must strictly comply with the
jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant
complied with the jurisdictional requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at
fault why the hearing date was set beyond the 90-
day maximum period. The records show that the
Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the
trial court to reset the initial hearing date because of
printing problems with the National Printing Office,
which could affect the timely publication of the
notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed,
nothing in the records indicates that Manna
Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by
law.
We have held that "a party to an action has no
control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court
acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle
unduly with the business of such official in the
performance of his duties."6 A party cannot intervene
in matters within the exclusive power of the trial
court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial
court errs on matters within its sole power. It is
unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission
over which the applicant has neither responsibility
nor control, especially if the applicant has complied
with all the requirements of the law.
Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time
between the issuance of the order setting the date of
initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing
itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with
respect to the sufficiency of the application.
Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of
the publication of the required notice of hearing.
Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real
jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases
— compliance with the publication requirement
under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of
hearing was published both in the Official Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation well ahead of
the date of hearing. This complies with the legal
requirement of serving the entire world with
sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.
On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently
Established Possession of the Land For the Period
Required by Law
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to
prove its possession of the land for the period of time
required by law. Petitioner alleges that the trial court
and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely
on their evaluation of the tax declarations presented
by Manna Properties.
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the review
and revision of errors of law.7 This Court is not bound
to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in
prior proceedings. Absent any of the established
grounds for exception, this Court is bound by the
findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
The issue of whether Manna Properties has
presented sufficient proof of the required
possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
raises a question of fact.8 It invites an evaluation of
the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re-
evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment
for that of the trial and appellate courts. Generally,
Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof and
evidence are beyond the power of this Court to
review under a Rule 45 petition, except in the
presence of some meritorious circumstances.9 We
find one such circumstance in this case. The evidence
on record does not support the conclusions of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application
of Manna Properties that, as a private corporation,
Manna Properties is disqualified from holding
alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease.
Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in
Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still
part of the public domain.
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it
has established that the land in question has been in
the open and exclusive possession of its
predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the
land was already private land when Manna
Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-
interest.
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141
("CA 141") otherwise known as the "Public Land Act."
Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
6
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are
effectively segregated from the public domain by
virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA
141 ipso jure converts such land into private
land.10 Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a
formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion
of the land into private land, the conversion having
occurred in law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete.11
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If
the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties
have been in possession of the land in question since
this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully
apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following
our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC,12 Manna
Properties, a private corporation, may apply for
judicial confirmation of the land without need of a
separate confirmation proceeding for its
predecessors-in-interest first.
We rule, however, that the land in question has not
become private land and remains part of the public
domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is
premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.13 Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect
title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified
to have the land titled in his name.14 Although
Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only
subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent
upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous
and adverse possession for the requisite period of
time.15 It is only when the applicant complies with
this condition that he may invoke the rights given by
CA 141.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to
prove the required length of possession consists of
the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest,
Manuel Sobrepeña ("Manuel"),16 transferee’s
affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the
land in question.
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is
not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.17 However,
the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties
do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna
Properties claimed during trial that they were
presenting the tax declaration proving possession
since 12 June 1945,18 a scrutiny of the tax declaration
reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna
Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a
substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28
November 1950. The annotation at the back of this
tax declaration indicates that it was issued to replace
the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in
question. A substitute is not enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented
considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material
to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12
June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating
that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in
1945 does not meet this standard. It is
unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration
was issued on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax
declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax
declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in
December 1945. Unless the date and month of
issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.
There is another reason why the application for
registration of Manna Properties must fail. The tax
declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as
Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small
annotation found at the bottom of the back page of
Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax
declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax
declaration was issued in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not
provide any of the required information that will
enable this Court or any interested party to check
whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever
existed.19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any
attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile.
Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any
indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted
tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to pass
off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked
as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was "FILED UNDER
SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No. 7160 is
the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn
undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly
prepared the tax declaration reads, "Subscribed and
7
sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov.
1950…" This means that the tax declaration was
issued more than forty (40) years before the form
used came into existence. Manna Properties gave no
explanation why its tax declaration used a form that
did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance of
the tax declaration. The totality of these
circumstances leads this Court to conclude that
Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of
making it appear that Manna Properties’
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the land in question since 12 June 1945.
The earliest of the "un-cancelled" tax declarations
presented by Manna Properties is dated 1950. This is
clearly insufficient to prove possession of the land
since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the
transferee’s affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna
Properties’ reliance on Manuel’s testimony is
similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence
insufficient and self-serving on its own but, Manuel
did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents
or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier.l^vvphi1.net The
only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel
was that his family used to plant rice on that piece of
land.20
Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna
Properties did not present sufficient proof that its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and adverse possession of the land in
question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna
Properties can only prove possession since 1952.
Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary
evidence like the testimony of Manuel and substitute
tax declarations. We have previously cautioned
against the reliance on such secondary evidence in
cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title
over public land.21 Manna Properties’ evidence
hardly constitutes the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse
occupation under CA 141.22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We
REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The
Application for Registration filed by Manna
Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad.
539-D, with a total area of One Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in
Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union,
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5720 August 20, 1910
MARIANO ESCUETA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellant.
M. Escueta, in his own behalf.
TORRES, J.:
On the 17th of August, 1908, Mariano Escueta filed
an application in the Court of Land Registration,
soliciting the registration, in conformity with the
Land Registration Act, of a property or parcel of land
of which he was alleged to be the absolute owner,
situated at No. 173 Calle Ilaya, of the district of
Tondo, Manila, bounded on the northeast by Calle
Ilaya; on the southeast by property of Susana
Marquez, Macaria Villareal, and Donato Miguel; and
on the southwest by property of Macario Cui-Malay
and Timoteo Lanuza. The application states that this
land contains 798'34,16 square meters, the
description and boundaries of which are given in the
detailed plan inclosed therewith; that there is no
encumbrance of any kind on the said land, nor any
person who may consider that he has a right to or a
share in the same, according to the applicant's best
knowledge and belief, and that the latter acquired
the said property, through purchase, from Ildefonso
Ramirez y Apostol, according to the deed ratified by
the vendee, on May 8, 1908, before the notary
public, Fermin Mariano. Among other particulars, the
applicant states that he is the present occupant of
the land. The application is accompanied by a plan of
the land, a deed of sale executed by the said
Ildefonso Ramirez in favor of the applicant, and
another instrument executed by Telesfora Apostol in
favor of the said Ramirez, on August 25, 2905, before
the notary Fernando de la Cantera, recorded on folio
73 under No.. 1045, fourth inscription; and by
another instrument executed by the spouses
Francisco Rojo and Susana Modesto, in favor of the
aforementioned Telesfora Apostol, on July 7, 1903,
before the notary public Calixto Reyes y Cruz,
recorded on folio 72, back, of the registry, under No.
1045, third inscription.
After the conclusion of the regular legal procedure
and the receipt of the report from the register of
deeds, this case came up for hearing on the 15th of
February, 1909, and at the trial the petitioner
8
presented in evidence several documents which
were admitted by the court. In view of the proofs so
presented the judge, on the same date, issued an
order decreeing the adjudication and registration of
the said property in accordance with the petition of
Mariano Escueta y Bernabe.
On the 23rd of the same month, the petitioner stated
in writing to the court that, after the hearing, he had
learned that the true boundaries of his land on its
southeastern side were the properties of Susan
Marquez, Macaria Villareal, Protasio Cabrera, and of
the deceased Gregorio Pineda, these two latter
instead of Donato Miguel Castro; that the said
Protasio Cabrera was then residing at Boac
Marinduque and was presented in this city by his
sister, Placida Cabrera, domiciled at No. 152 Calle
Ilaya, Tondo, and that the deceased Gregorio Pinda
was represented by his judicial administratrix, Ignacia
Lopez, residing at No. 105 Calle Folgueras, Tondo;
that both representative of the said adjacent
property owners agreed to the amendment which he
petitioned to have made in the description of the
said southeastern side were those given in the
writing, and that in view of the amendments
specified the area of the land should be 806'40,17
square meters instead of 798'34,16 square meters, as
appeared on the plan attached and which was
annexed to the application. The petitioner therefore
asked the court to admit the amendments
aforestated.
The court, on March 18, ordered that the honorable
Attorney-General should be granted a hearing on the
aforesaid petition, so that he might make such
opposition thereto as he deemed proper, and in
order that the case might be forwarded to the
Supreme Court.
The Attorney-General, by a writing of March 27,
1909, and for the reasons therein expressed,
opposed the amendments solicited by the petitioner,
except upon a new description of the land, other due
notifications and previous publication.
By another writing of the same date, the Attorney-
General excepted to the judgment rendered in the
case, announced his intention to file a bill of
exceptions, and asked for a new trial, on the grounds
that the court's findings of fact were manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and further
stating that the latter did not sufficiently justify the
said judgment, which, he declared, was also contrary
to law. A date was set for the hearing of the motion
for a new trial.
After a red line had been drawn on the plan, Exhibit
A, by the surveyor of the court, as provided by order
of August 23, 1909, on the 28th of the same month a
decision was rendered by the court granting the
proposed amendment solicited, without new
advertisement or notifications, and disallowing the
claim made by the Director of Lands. The Attorney-
General, in the name of the said Director, took
exception to the decision mentioned and announced
his intention to file the proper bill of exceptions,
which, on being filed, was forwarded to the clerk of
this court with the appeal submitted.
It is a mere question of law that is raised in this case,
through the appeal filed by the Attorney-General, in
representation of the Director of Lands, against two
decisions of the Court of Land Registration, and is,
whether or not new notifications and publications
are necessary in cases of the realty has been
decreed, the applicant requests an amendment of
the description of the land and of its plan, with an
increase in area and the statement of the name of a
new adjacent property owner not mentioned in the
previous notifications and publications, or
substituting the same by other names.
The judge of the Court of Land Registration decided
that in the present case it was not necessary to issue
new notifications and to republish, and, for the
reasons set forth in his order of August 28, 1909,
aforementioned, decreed that the amendment
solicited was proper, without new advertisements or
notices.
From the whole of the provision contained in Act No.
496, it appears that the procedure required in the
case of an application for registration is that
denominated in law in rem, that is, one against all
persons who may allege any right to the property
that is the subject of the application for registration,
and the decree of the court granting it constitutes a
valid and effective title, not only against all the
owners of the adjacent properties who appeared at
the trial, but also against all the parties who may
have an interest in the land.
In order that the registration decreed by the Court of
Land Registration and the titles in consequence
thereof issued might be vested with the greater
guarantee of security the said Act No. 496 provided
for an assurance fund wherewith to pay the claims
filed against the property registered in accordance
with the provisions thereof, and prescribed the due
procedure to be followed and observed on the basis
of publication. For this reason, it is provided that the
applicant shall attach to his application for the
registration of the land a plan and a description
thereof; that all the owners of the adjacent
properties and all other persons who may have any
interest in the said land shall be notified, and that the
notifications shall be published in the Official Gazette
9
and in the newspapers, together with a description of
the property to which the application refers, which
description, with the plan, must be the basis of the
record, and the decree, in case the applicant's
petition is granted, must contain an exact and
detailed description of the land, in accordance with
the final decision of the court.
If amendments or alterations were permitted in the
description of land sought to be registered, after the
publication of the application in the newspapers and
the issuance of the decree for the registration of the
property, on the petition of the interested party,
without new notifications and advertisement
whereby to make known to all persons the said
alterations and amendments concerning the
situation, boundaries, and area of the land, the
mandate of the law would be violated relative to the
publicity of the proceedings prescribed for the
registration of real estate, a publicity which
permeates the whole system of special trial
established for the registration of landed properties.
Moreover, third parties who have not had an
opportunity to present their claims, might be
seriously affected in their rights by not being notified,
it being natural and just that they be not injured in
consequence of the rectification that is sought.
The alteration or amendment of the plan of the land
in question and of its description may affect other
persons besides the adjacent property owners
Protasio Cabrera and the heirs of Gregorio Pineda:
wherefore the agreement of these owners or of their
representatives is not sufficient in order to comply
with the Land Registration Act, for there might other
persons who have a right in rem in the properties of
the said adjacent owners who would be injured by
the diminution of the area of the property
encumbered by such a right in rem. This possible
injury to them should be avoided by means of new
notification and publications concerning the
rectification or amendment desired. Moreover, a
third party, who did not appear to allege his right in
consequence of the previous publication of the
description of the land, in accordance with the
original plan, in the belief that the property
concerned is one in which he had no interest
whatever, would afterwards finds that the said land,
but a subsequent decree of the court, has a different
situation and different boundaries which affect his
right, of which differences he was not duly informed,
on account of the omission of the indispensable
notification and publication ordered by law.
This omission might give rise to possibility of claims
being filed against the Government for losses and
damages on the grounds that the claimant, without
negligence on his part and through the lack of
notification and publication of the rectification and
amendment of the boundaries and situation of the
land, was unable to appear at the trial and was
prevented from defending his rights and presenting
the proper claim. Such a case should be guarded
against as should also a decree of registration of a
parcel of tract of land which does not conform
exactly to the parcel which is the subject of the
proceedings or that the description of the same
should not coincide with that set forth in the decree
ordering the registration.
For the reasons, above expressed, it is proper, in our
opinion that, with a reversal of the decree of
February 15, providing for the registration of the said
land, and the decree of August 28, 1909, the case be
returned to the Court of Land Registration in order
that, by due notifications and new publications of the
amendment or rectification of the description of the
land, as expressed in the applicant's petition, the
judge may proceed in accordance with law and
render in due course of time such decree as justice
demands. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland and Trent,
JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112905 February 3, 2000
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE
LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON, ANTONIO GUICO
LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO
LOPEZ, ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE
LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE
LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE
LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ
VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS
LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON,
RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ
DE LEON,petitioners,
vs.
HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE
CASTRO married to ANTONIO PERIGRINA,
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO,
EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and their successors-
in- interest,respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this case, the two applications for registration of
the same parcel of land were filed twelve years apart
in different branches of the same Court of First
Instance, but a certificate of title was issued in one
case while the other is still pending appeal.
10
The applicants in the earlier case are now before this
Court on a petition for review on certiorari. They
assert that the decision ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration in their favor, while
promulgated subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title in the names of the second
applicants, should be "executed" and that the
certificate of title issued to the latter should be
nullified.1âwphi1.nêt
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez, et al. filed an
application for the registration of a 69-hectare parcel
of land in Tagaytay City with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, Branch III under Land Registration
Case No. 299 and LRC Record No. 11617. On January
29, 1957, the court issued an order of general
default, excepting only the Director of Lands.
On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi,
representing the Municipality of Silang, Cavite, filed a
motion to lift the order of general default and
submitted an opposition on behalf of the
municipality. The opposition was later amended on
September 16, 1966 alleging that a portion of the
land applied for which the municipality had leased to
private persons had been its patrimonial property
since 1930 or earlier. The municipality further alleged
that in a registration case entitled "Mariano Lopez de
Leon v. Municipality of Silang" (CA-G.R. No. 8161-R),
the Court of Appeals found that the applicants had
never been in possession of the land sought to be
registered.
In its answer to the amended opposition, the
applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of
land they sought to register was their inheritance,
which includes Lot No. 2 of plan PSU-51901 with an
area of 119 hectares. However, it had to be excluded
in the application for registration of the 69-hectare
land in Cavite upon the recommendation of the Chief
Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office
because it is located in the province of Laguna.
Similarly, Lot No. 1 of PSU-51901 that lies within
Tagaytay City had been excluded from the
registration proceedings under G.L.RO. Rec. No.
53498 or Land Registration Case No. 2201 in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna.1
Nevertheless, the municipality filed a motion to
dismiss the application for original registration of Lot
No. 1 on the ground of res judicata. The applicants,
on the other hand, contended that the principle
of res jucidata is not applicable because the subject
matter of CA-G.R. No. 8161-R (Mariano Lopez de
Leon v. Municipality of Silang) was Lot No. 2 or the
portion of the land in Laguna.
On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit on
the ground that the oppositor municipality had no
personality to intervene considering that Lot No. 1
was outside of its territorial limits. The lower court
held:
. . . . Even if said land was communal property of the
Municipality of Silang, by virtue of its incorporation
into (the) city of Tagaytay it became the property of
the latter. Hence, the Municipality of Silang has no
personality to appear in this (sic) proceedings. If any
right of action exists, it accrues in favor of the City of
Tagaytay and the same should be pursued by the said
city.2
The oppositor municipality filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order. On July 23, 1970,
the court issued an order stating that "in order not to
impede whatever action the movant" might take
against the order of February 7, 1969, said motion
should be denied. On January 12, 1971, the
applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of
court be commissioned to receive evidence for them
it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had
become final and executory "by virtue of which the
Municipality of Silang no longer ha(d) any personality
to appear in these proceedings."3 The court granted
said motion and directed the clerk of court to submit
a report on the matter.
In his report dated April 15, 1971, Clerk of Court
Rolando D. Diaz stated that since time immemorial,
Micaela, Fernando, Ciriaco and Catalino, all
surnamed De los Reyes, owned and possessed the
parcel of land in question. On November 3, 1870,
they sold the land to Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad and
Francisco Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the
property passed in ownership to Pedro Lopez de
Leon, Sr. and Maxima Carrillo Trinidad, the daughter
and sole heir of Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad. Pedro
and Maxima remained in possession of the property
until their death when their children, applicants
Pedro Lopez, Mariano Lopez de Leon, Pastor Lopez
de Leon, Eulogio Lopez, Clara Lopez, Ricarda Lopez
and Rosario Lopez took over ownership and
possession thereof. Upon their death, their
respective heirs succeeded over the property and, on
February 25, 1971, they partitioned it. The
agricultural property was under the supervision of
Domingo Opeña who planted portions thereof to rice
and other agricultural products.
The clerk of court thus recommended that the court
confirm its order of general default, approve his
report, and register the property in the names of the
11
applicants in accordance with the extrajudicial
partition of the property.4
On April 19, 1971, the court5 accordingly rendered a
decision approving the report of the clerk of court
and ordering that once the decision becomes final,
the corresponding decree of registration of title be
issued in favor of the applicants.6
The oppositor Municipality of Silang interposed an
appeal from the said decision of the land registration
court to the Court of Appeals. On May 2, 1979, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision7 dismissing the
appeal "for lack of personality of the oppositor-
appellant Municipality of Silang to interfere in the
registration proceedings below."8Undaunted, the
oppositor municipality filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 51054
(Municipality of Silang v. Court of Appeals) which was
denied on September 19, 1979. The municipality's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with
finality for lack of merit on October 24, 1979.9 On
November 9, 1979, judgment was entered in the said
case.10
Meanwhile, in the course of examining the records
for the purpose of issuing the decree of registration
in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration
Commission discovered that Lot No. 1, plan Psu-
51901 had been decreed in favor of private
respondents Honesto de Castro, et al.11
Further investigation revealed that sometime in
1967,12 Honesto de Castro, et al. filed before the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV in
Tagaytay City, an application for the registration of
the same parcel of land under Land Registration Case
No. TG-95 and LRC Rec. No. N-33292. The case was
called for hearing on March 18, 1968. Eight (8) days
later or on March 26, 1968, the court13 promulgated
a decision adjudicating the land located at Barrio
Iruhin, Tagaytay City, more particularly described as
Plan Psu-51901-Amd., in favor of said applicants and
directing that upon the finality of the decision, the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.14 The
ruling of the court was based on its finding that one
Hermogenes Orte, who originally owned the land
sought to be registered, sold it in 1932 to Marciano
de Castro. The deed evidencing said sale was
destroyed during the Japanese occupation. De Castro
continued possession of the land until his death on
April 26, 1940. His wife Epifania and their children
named Maria Socorro, Francisco, Honesto,
Romualdo, Felicitacion, Faustino and Felixberto
continued possession of the property who declared
the land for assessment and taxation purposes in
Cabuyao, Laguna. However, upon learning that the
property lies in Tagaytay City, the applicants declared
it in their names in said city.
The cause of the conflicting claims over the same
land was never explained because the head of the
geodetic engineers of the Land Registration
Commission did not appear in court in Land
Registration Case No. 299. Hence, on August 19,
1981, the CFI of Cavite, Branch III15 issued an order
declaring that the court had lost jurisdiction to hear
the case, without, however, dismissing the case.
Seven (7) years later, or on June 28, 1988, the heirs
of Pedro Lopez, et al. filed a complaint "for execution
of judgment and cancellation of land titles of the
defendants and their successors-in-interest" before
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, at
Tagaytay City. Docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1028,
the complaint named as defendants Honesto C. de
Castro, Maria Socorro de Castro married to Antonio
Perigrina, Francisco de Castro "widow", Faustino de
Castro, Felixberto de Castro, Epifania C. Vda. de
Castro and their successors-in-interest.
The complaint alleged the facts pertinent to enforce
the judgment of April 19, 1971. The plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, alleged further that, upon the
filing of their application for registration with the CFI
of Cavite, Branch III at Cavite City, said court acquired
jurisdiction over the res because land registration
proceedings are in rem and therefore, the CFI of
Cavite, Branch IV at Tagaytay City could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the same res by virtue of
De Castros' application for registration. They claimed
that no less than this Court had recognized the
jurisdiction of Branch III in Cavite City when it passed
upon the correctness of the lower court's ruling in
favor of Pedro Lopez, et al. Contending that the
decision of Branch III on April 19, 1971 declaring that
title to the land belonged to Pedro Lopez, et al. had
become final and executory on June 18, 1980, they
asserted that they were the lawful owners of the
land. However, they had been unduly deprived
ownership and possession thereof on account of its
"wrongful registration" in the name of the
defendants "by means of fraud and
misrepresentation." As a result of their undue
deprivation of ownership, possession and enjoyment
of the property notwithstanding that the question of
ownership had been settled in their favor, plaintiffs
claimed that they suffered actual and moral
damages. Claiming that the judgment sought to be
executed had not been barred by the statute of
limitations, they prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the judgment to
effect:
12
1. Execution of judgment of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) Branch III, Cavite, dated
April 19, 1971 by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico
which became final on June 18, 1980;
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration and the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the titles of the land
in question under the names of the defendants and
their successors in interest and that new title to the
same parcel of land be issued to plaintiffs;
3. Ordering all the occupants of the questioned land
to vacate the premises and deliver possession
thereof to the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in
interest to pay plaintiffs or its (sic) heirs and/or
successors in interest actual damages (in) the
amount of P200,000.00 or the amount that may be
proven during the hearing and trial of this case;
5. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in
interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 for
and as attorney's fees;
6. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 or the sum that may be proven
during the trial;
7. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs just and
proper under the premises.16
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the
defendants interposed the defenses of prescription,
laches and/or estoppel and failure to state a cause of
action. They averred that they were no longer the
owners of the property as it had been sold
"absolutely and unconditionally to innocent third
parties for valuable consideration and in good faith."
They contended that in view of the indefeasibility of
their title to the property, even the title of their
successors-in-interest can not be subject to collateral
attack. They claimed that Branch III of the CFI in
Cavite should have "remanded" the records of LRC
Case No. 299 or LRC Record No. 11617 to the same
CFI branch in Tagaytay City to which the "legal and
proper jurisdiction to hear and decide that particular
case belonged." They asserted that the complaint
should have been directed by the plaintiffs against
the Assurance Fund under the provisions of P.D. No.
1529. Alleging that the "very precipitate and
wrongful suit" caused them mental anguish, serious
anxiety, social humiliation and similar injury, they
claimed moral damages of P500,000.00, nominal
damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of
P300,000.00.
On May 21, 1990, the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18 in
Tagaytay City17 rendered the decision in Civil Case
No. TG-1028 dismissing the complaint for being
"improper and premature". The court likewise
dismissed the defendants' counterclaims for "their
dearth of sufficient legal, factual and evidentiary
support."18
The lower court held that the decision of Branch III
that became final on June 18, 1980, could not be
enforced against defendants considering that they
were not parties in LRC Record No. 11617. Neither
could it order the cancellation of the titles issued to
defendants because the LRC and/or the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City had not been impleaded as
parties to the case and therefore the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over them.
The lower court held further that because the case
was covered by Act No. 496 and/or P.D. No. 1529
which are special laws, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court on execution of judgment by independent
action cannot be invoked. The court also ruled that:
Treating the second issue raised by plaintiffs, the
then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, or
this Court, validly acquired jurisdiction over the case
filed by defendants Honesto de Castro, et al., in LRC
Case No. TG — 95. The records show that herein
defendants as petitioner(s) in that case, complied
with all the jurisdictional requirements of law,
conferring jurisdiction upon this Court to try that
case and lent validly (sic) upon its proceedings. As
admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, this Court was
not aware of the existence of LRC Record No. 11617,
pending before the other Branch of this Court, in the
same manner that they, or the plaintiffs themselves,
did not also know the existence of LRC Case No. TG
— 95 before this Court. This Court is assured that
good faith pervaded among the parties concerned, in
the conduct of its proceedings, all procedural
requirements having been punctiliously complied
with and no irregularity or breach of law having been
committed. So that the decision rendered by this
Court in that case is valid and subsisting, for all
intents and purposes and can be nullified only under
circumstances and through procedures mandated by
law. Hence, the corresponding decree of registration
issued in TG-95 and the original certificates of titles
issued to defendants in consequence thereof, are all
valid and binding until declared otherwise, in a case
directly assailing their validity, and of course, by a
competent court. And by express provision of law,
the same are insulated from any collateral attack.19
13
The court concluded that the complaint was in the
nature of a collateral attack on the validity of the
certificate of title issued in favor of the defendants
and their successors-in-interest because, "(b)y its
caption and averments, the validity of the title in
question, is not directly assailed."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision, which was denied on May 29, 1991. It
reiterated that the plaintiffs' failure to implead the
Administrator of the NLRDRA, the Register of Deeds
of Tagaytay City and the possessors of the property
in question was a fatal procedural error because they
were indispensable parties over which the court
should acquire jurisdiction. Their inclusion as
defendants in the case was necessary in order that
their title to the property could be directly attacked.
Petitioners should have availed of the remedy
provided by Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529 and their
failure to observe that law was a "colossal error"
because once issued, a certificate of title becomes
indefeasible, "completely insulated from any form of
collateral attack assailing its validity."20
Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of
Appeals, dismissed the appeal on November 29,
1993.21 Stressing the indefeasibility of title under the
Torrens System of land registration, the Court of
Appeals echoed the lower court's ruling that the
decree of registration in favor of respondents cannot
be reopened or set aside in a "collateral proceeding
such as the one in the case at bar which has for its
objective the execution of a judgment which
apparently has become dormant, thus appellants'
insistence that it be revived." Citing Article 1544 of
the Civil Code on sale of property to different
vendees which it opined had a "persuasive influence"
in the resolution of the appeal, it held that "in case
land has been registered in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date (of registration) shall
prevail." Nonetheless, emphasizing that the land in
question has been transferred to a third person, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the title issued in favor of
respondents should be "maintained in their status
quo, until the proper court shall have determined
their priorities, and the equities resulting
therefrom."22
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, raising the following assignment of errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO RULE ON THE VITAL AND PIVOTAL ISSUE
THAT THE TRIAL COURT (CFI TAGAYTAY CITY,
BRANCH IV), HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBSEQUENT LAND REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY
THE APPLICANTS BELOW, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HEREIN, AND IN DECREEING THE REGISTRATION OF
TITLE OVER THE SAID LOTS WHICH WERE ALREADY
PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS BY ANOTHER COURT (CFI CAVITE,
BRANCH III) IN A PREVIOUS LAND REGISTRATION
CASE IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH
WAS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
EVEN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
LIKEWISE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE
PROPRIETY OF THE INSTANT ACTION FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF CFI
BRANCH III, WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A REVIVAL OF
THE JUDGMENT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN MERELY
RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF
TITLE, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE RESPONDENTS'
TITLES, AND PRIORITY IN THE REGISTRATION AND
ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENTS, WHICH RELIANCE ARE MISPLACED
AND UNAVAILING IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE
FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND TO ISSUE
THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS CANNOT
DIVEST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF THE DISPUTED
LOTS BY FILING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS' TITLES.
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE
RIGHTFULLY AND LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE LOTS IN
QUESTION.
In all cases where the authority to proceed is
conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly
compiled with, or the proceedings will be utterly
void.23
When petitioners applied for the registration of Lot
No. 1 before the CFI in Cavite City in 1956, the
governing law then as regards the matter of
jurisdiction was the Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic
Act No. 296. Section 52 of that law providing for the
permanent stations of district judges or judges of
Courts of First Instance stated that for the Seventh
Judicial District that included the province of Cavite,
14
there would be two judges in Cavite City.24 The law
did not create other branches of the CFI in the
province of Cavite outside of the City of Cavite.
It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No. 3749
took effect that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City was set
up.25That amendment to Republic Act No. 296
provided that four judges would preside "over the
Courts of First Instance of the Province of Cavite and
the Cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Martires"
who would be "judges of the first, second, third and
fourth branches" of that court. Because the rule has
always been that court having territorial jurisdiction
over the property should take cognizance of its
registration,26 upon the creation of the Tagaytay City
branch, petitioners' application for registration
should have been transferred to that court inasmuch
as the property involved is located in that city.
It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch
remained the venue of petitioners' application for
registration, apparently on account of the following
provision of Rep. Act No. 3749:
Sec. 6. Wherever an additional branch or branches of
the Court of First Instance is or are established in this
Act in the same place where there is an existing court
or courts of first instance, all cases already filed in the
latter court or courts shall be heard, tried and
decided by such latter court or courts.
Notably, the law is not clear on whether or not the
phrase "in the same place" refers to the judicial
district/province or the place where a branch of the
court is stationed. Hence, considering the general
rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction over a
case it remains with that court until its full
termination,27 the phrase "in the same place" should
be interpreted as referring to the province of Cavite.
The Cavite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus
correctly retained jurisdiction over the application for
registration because there was no jurisdictional
question involved in the proceedings in Land
Registration Case No. 299. What was in question was
whether the Cavite City branch of the Cavite CFI was
the proper venue for said case upon the creation of
the Tagaytay City branch. As this Court said:
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters.
Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or
waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but
the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the parties and an
objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the
wrong county may be waived by the failure of the
defendant to make a timely objection. In either case,
the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or
agreement of the parties, whether or not a
prohibition exists against their alteration.28
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence
may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to
the parties, rather than restrict their access to the
courts as it relates to the place of trial.29 Thus, the
last paragraph of Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296
provided that in land registration cases, the Secretary
of Justice, who was then tasked with the
administration and supervision of all courts, may
transfer land registration courts "to any other place
more convenient to the parties." This implied that
Land Registration Case No. 299 could be retained in
the Cavite City branch of the CFI if it would be
convenient to the applicants who had been used to
transacting business with that branch; the case did
not have to be transferred to be transferred to
Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46 dated
July 3, 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R.
Liwag addressed to all CFI judges and clerks of court
in line with the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947,
merely quotes Section 6 thereof. Said circular does
not elucidate on whether cases should be transferred
to the branches that had territorial jurisdiction over
them.
Petitioners' claim that this Court had "sustained" the
jurisdiction of the Cavite City branch of the CFI over
Land Registration Case No. 299 in G.R. No. 51054 is
incorrect. To be sure, the principal issue raised in the
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054
was the personality of the Municipality of Silang to
file an opposition to the application for land
registration. While this Court upheld the lower
court's ruling on that issue, such affirmance in no
way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was likewise
resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought
to light for resolution.
As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City
branch over the land registration proceedings
instituted by private respondents, the order of
general default issued in Land Registration Case No.
299 is of relevance. When the Cavite City branch of
the CFI issued an order of default, it is presumed to
have regularly performed its task in accordance with
law especially with regard to notice requirements.
Act No. 496 provided that after the court shall have
set the application for initial hearing the following
procedure should be observed:
Sec. 31. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting
the time for initial hearing of the application from the
clerk of the Court of First Instance, the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office shall cause a notice
thereof to be published twice, in successive issues of
15
the Official Gazette, in the English language. The
notice shall be issued by order of the court, attested
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
and shall be in form substantially as follows: . . . .30
The general order of default of January 29, 1957
stated as follows:
It appearing from the certificate of the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office and the return of
the Sheriff, attached to the record of this case, that
the time notice relative to the application in said case
was duly published, posted, and served in
accordance with law; and that the time allowed for
entering appearance and filing answers expired at
9:30 A.M. on the 29th day of January, 1957, for which
date said case was duly set for hearing by the Court;
And it further appearing from said record that no
person has appeared as respondent in the case filed
an answer within the time for that purpose allowed,
with the exception of the Director of Lands
represented by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi;
All persons, except those herein above named, are
hereby declared to be in default in the above-entitled
case, and it is ordered that a general default be
recorded in said case, and that the application
therein be taken as confessed by all the world,
except the persons hereinabove named.
It is so ordered.31
On January 24, 1957, the Municipality of Silang filed a
motion to lift said general order of default and to
admit its opposition to the registration.32 This fact
supports the presumption that the officials
concerned performed their duties regularly because
it implies notice, whether actual or constructive, on
the part of said municipality that a land registration
proceedings had been filed with respect to Lot No. 1.
Compliance with the requirement of notice and
publication had the effect of notifying all persons
interested in the proceedings including the herein
private respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar
v. Caoagdan:
. . . it is true that appellants were not personally
notified of the pendency of the present registration
case even if they were actually occupying, as they
claim, portions of the land, but such procedural
defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court
because registration proceedings have the nature of
actions in rem. . . . .33
A proceeding in rem, such as land registration
proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land
as against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to or interests in the property.34 Constructive
seizure of the land for registration is effected through
publication of the application for registration and
service of notice to affected parties.35 Consequently,
when private respondents filed their own application
for registration of the same parcel of land, strictly
speaking, the Tagaytay City branch could no longer
entertain the application for registration as
the res involved had been constructively seized by
the Cavite City branch of the same court. In
hindsight, this complication of two applications for
registration having been filed for one and the same
tract of land could have been avoided had Land
Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to the
Tagaytay City branch of the same court where it
rightfully belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep. Act
No. 3947.
Be that as it may, the Court is not persuaded that the
registration proceedings instituted by private
respondents should be nullified by reason of the fact
that the Cavite City branch of the same court was
already proceeding with another registration case for
the same piece of land.
In land registration proceedings, all interested parties
are obliged to take care of their interests and to
zealously pursue their objective of registration on
account of the rule that whoever first acquires title
to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where
more than one certificate of title is issued over the
land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against a person who relies on a
subsequent certificate.36 It should be stressed that
said rule refers to the date of the certificate of title
and not to the date of filing of the application for
registration of title. Hence, even though an applicant
precedes another, he may not be deemed to have
priority of right to register title. As such, while his
application is being processed, an applicant is duty-
bound to observe vigilance and to take care that his
right or interest is duly protected.
Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence
required of them as applicants for land registration.
In the same way that publication of their application
for registration was supposed to have rendered
private respondents on constructive notice of such
application, the publication of notice in the land
registration proceedings initiated by private
respondents had the same effect of notice upon
petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have
been notified of the land registration proceedings
filed by private respondents in the Tagaytay City
branch of the Cavite CFI thereby providing them with
the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.
16
The fact that an interlocutory matter in Land
Registration Case No. 299 had to be resolved by both
the Court of Appeals and this Court did not in any
way mean that petitioners should no longer exercise
due diligence to protect their right or interest in the
said proceedings. On the contrary, they were bound
to exercise such diligence with vigor especially
because as early as April 19, 1971, they already had a
judgment in their favor. The record does not show
why petitioners did not have actual knowledge of the
registration proceedings instituted by private
respondents. However, the lack of such knowledge in
fact raises a doubt as to the veracity of their claim
that they were in possession of the land. If indeed
they possessed the property, even if through an
administrator, as diligent owners, the threat to their
ownership could not have escaped them considering
that the property is in a rural community where news
travels fast.
Even granting that petitioners did not really have
actual knowledge of private respondents' application
for registration, yet after discovering that the land
was already registered in the name of private
respondents, petitioners should have immediately
sought recourse in law to protect their rights. As it
turned out, they let almost seven (7) years to pass
from such discovery before they acted to revive what
already was a dormant judgment. Hence, they filed
the separate action "for execution of judgment and
cancellation of titles" of private respondents because
more than five (5) years had elapsed since the
promulgation of the decision directing the issuance
of a decree of registration.37 Under these
circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that
petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, they could or should have
done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that they either had abandoned or
declined to assert it.38 In short, they were guilty of
laches.
The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on
grounds of policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.39 Land registration proceedings entails a
race against time and non-observance of time
constraints imposed by law exposes an applicant to
the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious
effects of the application of the doctrine of laches.
An applicant for registration has but a one-year
period from the issuance of the decree of registration
in favor of another applicant, within which to
question the validity of the certificate of title issued
pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period
has lapsed, the title to the land becomes
indefeasible. While the law grants the aggrieved
applicant certain remedial measures, these are
designed to make up for his failure to register his title
to the property and not necessarily to restore
ownership and/or title that he had allowed by
inaction to be vested in another person. In Javier
v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court set out these
remedies as follows:
. . . . The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1)
year, a decree of registration is no longer open to
review or attack although its issuance is attended
with actual fraud. This does not mean however that
the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser
for value, an action for reconveyance is still available.
The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no
longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date
of the decree so that the only remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is to bring
an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is
an action in personam and is always available as long
as the property has not passed to an innocent third
party for value. If the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the
remedy is an action for damages. . . . .
In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court
also said:
. . . it has been held that the proper recourse of the
true owner of the property who was prejudiced and
fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused or
employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent,
an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines
may be filed for recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund.
In filing the action for execution of judgment and
cancellation of titles, petitioners must have realized
that only the remedy of filing an action for damages
was available to them. Otherwise, they could have
filed an action for reconveyance of the property. Of
course, petitioners cleverly clothed their complaint
as one for execution of judgment under the
provisions of the Rules of Court. Clearly, such
procedural strategy was a bid to revive the decision
of the lower court ordering the issuance of a decree
of registration in their names. In other words,
petitioners availed of procedural remedies provided
for by the Rules of Court as it appeared that because
of the lapse of time, they would not benefit from
remedies prescribed by land registration laws.
17
The wrong appellation of petitioners' complaint shall
not mislead this Court as, in the determination of the
nature of a complaint, its averments rather than its
title, are the proper gauges.42 A reading of the
allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028
betrays petitioners' true intention in filing the case.
In paragraph 15 of the complaint, petitioners alleged
that they were '"unduly deprived of their ownership
and lawful possession of the land . . . due to the
wrongful registration of the subject land in the name
of the defendants by means of fraud and
misrepresentations." Except for this general
statement, the issue of fraud or misrepresentation is
not alleged with particularity in the complaint.43 This
is unfortunate because, if filed within the time set by
law, a complaint with the proper allegation of fraud
coupled with proof thereof could cause the loss of
the indefeasibility of private respondents' title to the
property. It is established that if fraud attended the
acquisition of title under the Torrens System, such
title cannot be used as a means to perpetuate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property.44
We take note of petitioners' allegation in their reply
memorandum that in the registration proceedings
filed by private respondents, "what was published in
the Official Gazette was the description of a bigger
tract of land that includes the smaller lot actually
applied for by respondents."45 That factual allegation
could have had its impact before the trial court in an
action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud in
the acquisition of title but not before this Court
where factual issues may no longer be raised.
The inevitable conclusion therefore is that petitioners
were cognizant all the while of the futility of their
attempt to cancel the title of private respondents
under the law. Hence, they indirectly and collaterally
attacked the land title duly issued to private
respondents on the theory that the revival of the
dormant judgment in their favor could result in the
realization of their objective of nullifying such title,
However, aggrieved applicants for land registration
cannot seek protection under the provisions of the
Rules of Court which are merely suppletory to special
laws governing land registration proceedings.
The resolution of the instant petition cannot be
complete without a word on the manner by which
officials of the then Land Registration Commission
ignored the lower court's order to explain the
conflicting claims of ownership over the same
property. Particularly, there is a need for an
explanation why they caused the publication of the
notice of hearing in private respondents' application
for registration notwithstanding that the same office
had already published the notice of hearing as
regards petitioners' application for registration of the
same parcel of land. It is within the power of these
officials to determine whether or not the same parcel
of land is the subject of two applications for
registration. The indefeasibility of private
respondents' title over the property should not get in
the way of an administrative investigation of possible
omission or neglect of official duty. This Court cannot
let such malfeasance or misfeasance in office pass
unnoticed lest the integrity of the Torrens System of
land registration be undermined.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
DENIED, and the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-1028
is AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Department of Justice so that an investigation
against officials who were responsible for the
publication of two notices of hearing of an
application for registration of the same parcel of land
may be conducted and the guilty officials duly
sanctioned.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997
HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE
LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of original
petitioner), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her
heirs,1 instituted this petition for review of the Court
of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in
"Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation," (CA
G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court when it
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or
not private respondent Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of
18
registration over two unregistered parcels of land in
Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to
reopen or review a decree of registration.
The facts of the case are narrated below:
On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation
(Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for
Registration of two parcels of unregistered land
located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos.
7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an
area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively.
The original registration case was docketed as Case
No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In
support of its application for registration, Maguesun
Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor
and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00.
Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from
the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda.
de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March
26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated
March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario
Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration.
Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named
as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant,
she was not sent a notice of the proceedings.
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the
Record Newsweekly.2 After an Order of general
default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear
the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the
Land Registration Authority reported, among other
things, that the subject parcels of land had previously
been applied for registration in Land Registration
Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of
First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and
Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered
thereon.3 Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the
Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's
application for registration (Land Registration Case
No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the
following dispositive portion:4
WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the
application for registration of said lands described in
plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with
an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674
square meters, as supported and shown by the
corresponding technical descriptions now forming
part of the records, in the name of Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation, with
office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all
liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse
claims of any kind and nature.
Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso
facto becomes executory, upon which eventuality
the corresponding decree of registration may thus be
issued.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the
Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991,
after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-
373 became final5 but not before it ordered, on
February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500
(GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A.
Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was
being asked to vacate the land that petitioner
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale
and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition
for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed
as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of
registration on the ground that Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that
the lots were among the properties she inherited
from her husband, former President Manuel A.
Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family
had been in open, continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property in
the concept of owner for more than thirty years
before they applied for its registration under the
Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further
denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza
whom she had never met before and that her
signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her
claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in
the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and
perhaps more significantly, she claimed that
Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her
name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining
owner in the application for registration submitted to
the Land Registration Authority such that the latter
could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a
result, an order of general default was issued and
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration
was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation's
with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to
the fact that the Maguesun Corporation's president,
Manolita Guevarra Sunatay after whom the
corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita
19
Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a
deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who
used to help with the lather's business affairs.
Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration
and insurance of the latter' s cars.6
The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial
court after the pre-trial, was whether or not Vda. de
Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida
Melliza were forged.7 Petitioner, who was then
already 92 years of age, testified in open court on
February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida
Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that
her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication were forged.8 A document
examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP)
concluded that there was no forgery.9 Upon
petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined
by another expert from National Bureau of
Investigation. The latter testified that the signatures
on the questioned and sample documents
were not written by the same person. 10 Despite the
foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial
court dismissed the petition for review of decree of
registration April 15, 1992. 11 Placing greater weight
on the findings and testimony of the PNP document
examiner, it concluded that the questioned
documents were not forged and if they were, it was
Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation,
who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun
Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court
further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had
not been paying taxes for several years, which fact
"exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs
of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that
her application for registration was "previously
dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that
"petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost .
. interest, if not actually her rights, over the property
in question. 12
In a decision dated December 8, 1994, 13 respondent
court denied the petition for review and affirmed the
findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held
that petitioner failed to and demonstrate that there
was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive
or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of
annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of
registration. Additionally, respondent court stated
that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of
Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by
petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters
that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the
intricacies of the law and are "not necessarily and
exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith
— especially when considered in the light of
circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records
also show, according to the appellate court, that
Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the
court either the existence of petitioner or any
interest she may have had in the registration
proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that
publication of the initial hearing in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. 14
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is
alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Maguesun Corporation had not commit actual fraud
warranting the setting aside of the registration
decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of
Maguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray
that the registration of the subject lots in the name
of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said
property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and
that respondent corporation pay moral damages not
less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less
than P36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.
We find the petition for review impressed with merit.
1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens
System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1529, the Property Registration Decree which
amended and codified laws relative to registration of
property. 15 Adjudication of land in a registration (or
cadastral) case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the
decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may set aside the decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another
party. 16 Absence, minority or other disability of any
person affected, or any proceeding in court for
reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to
reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law
(Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a
valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a
decree of registration. 17 It is further required that a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration be filed within one year from the date of
entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real
and dominical right and the property has not yet
been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 18
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual
or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud
20
because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even
though the act is not done or committed with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon
other persons. 20
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud
is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or
where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein, and is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. 21 Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but
collateral to the transaction sued upon. 22
The distinctions are significant because only actual
fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds
for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a
decree of registration reopened and reviewed. 23 In
the oft-citedMacabingkil v. People's Homesite
Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from
American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been
granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced
directly upon the party seeking relief against the
judgment or decree, (and) that party has been
prevented from presenting all of his case to the
court." 24The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this
case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic,
which includes an intentional omission of fact
required by law. 25 For fraud to justify a review of a
decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the
facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. 26 Persons who were fraudulently deprived
of their opportunity to be heard in the original
registration case are entitled to a review of a decree
of registration.
In Ramirez v. CA, 27 this Court adopted the Court of
Appeals' ruling that the suppression of the fact that
the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield
merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent
concealment and misrepresentation in the
application that no other persons had any claim or
interest in the said land, constitute specific
allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by
competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of
applicants to disclose the facts of actual physical
possession by another person constitutes an
allegation of actual fraud. 28Likewise, it is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit
is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 29
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the
decree of registration sought to be reviewed by
petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun
Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that
of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an
occupant of the subject property. In the
corporation's application for registration filed with
the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following
declaration appears:
6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as
known to the undersigned, of the owners of all
adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in
paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and
occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as
claimants are as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road
all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30
The highlighted words are typed in with a different
typewriter, with the first five letters of the word
"provincial" typed over correction fluid. Maguesun
Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded
application for the petition to review case (Civil Case
No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v.
Maguesun Management and Development
Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the
trial court, the answer to the same number is as
follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas. 31
The discrepancy which is unexplained appears
intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed erased
and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay
City (no house No.)" in the original application
submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the
word "Roxas" was submitted to the trial court in Civil
Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the
reason is to mislead the court into thinking that
"Roxas" was placed in the original application as an
adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or
claimant, the same application which formed the
basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending
out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the
applicant for registration to state the full names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and those of
adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the
extent of the search made to find them. Respondent
corporation likewise failed to comply with this
requirement of law.
21
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in
possession of the property uninterruptedly through
their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. 32 Respondent
Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of
the same application that the subject land was
unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas
family caretaker resided in the subject property.
Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the
knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its
President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the
property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is
reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have
inspected the property prior to the sale such that the
ascertainment of the current possessors or
occupants could have been made facilely.
Respondent corporation's intentional concealment
and representation of petitioner's interest in the
subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant
constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and
review of the decree of registration. Through such
misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of
the registration proceedings involving their property,
thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun
Corporation had not concealed from the court either
the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or
any interest she may have in the registration
proceedings for the records are replete with
references by Maguesun Corporation itself to
petitioner. 33 Mention of the late President's name as
well as that of petitioner was made principally in the
Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation,
in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax
declarations and as predecessor-in-interest.
However, this is not sufficient compliance with what
the law requires to be stated in the application for
registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse
interest, occupation and possession should be made
at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the
application for registration, otherwise, the persons
concerned will not be sent notices of the initial
hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to
present their opposition or claims.
3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was
made in the Official Gazette and in the Record
Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general
circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant
to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly
states that "the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to
be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation
remains an indispensable procedural requirement.
Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of
procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide
publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
adverse interest in the land subject of the
registration proceedings may be notified
34
thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not
affected, the fact that publication was not made in a
newspaper of general circulation is material and
relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to
the land.
4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in
the documentary, as well as in the testimonial
evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to
this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful
review of the facts of the case. 35 A close scrutiny of
the evidence on record leads the Court to the
irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed
attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no
proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct
participation in the execution and preparation of the
forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which
proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the
"innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
In response to the questions fielded by the trial court
and by counsel for petitioner, PNP Document
Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the
differences pointed out in the questioned signatures
and in the sample signatures as having been caused
merely by "natural variation." 36 He concluded that
the questioned signatures were not forged. In
contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio
Ramos, testified with more specificity as befits an
expert that the questioned and sample signatures
were not written by one and the same person
because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes; the
personalized proportional characteristics of letters;
the linking/connecting between letters; the structural
pattern of letters and other minute details . .
. 37 Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas categorically declared that she has never met
Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject
property. 38 Petitioner, then over ninety years old,
has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and
her family also own several other pieces of property,
some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g.
22
Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. 39 This
is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the
value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that
indication that she would sell over thirteen thousand
square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a
stranger for a measly P200,000.00 Finally, even to a
layman's eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged
photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal
forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the
Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are
starkly different from the sample signatures in
several documents executed by petitioner. The
questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and
have none of the jagged and shaky character of
petitioner's signatures characteristic of the
penmanship of elderly persons.
There are also added considerations reflective of the
dubious character of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. 40 In
it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2
Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states
that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De
Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at
Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A.
Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de
Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by
petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas
and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner).
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was
known to the general public, as well as the demise of
the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a
speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The
aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have
been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said
Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state
facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning
herself and her family.
Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises
doubt as to her existence. Her given address was
Matina, Davao City. How was she related to
petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject?
Respondent corporation could very well have
presented her to prove the legitimacy of their
transaction. If petitioner were selling said property,
would she not have offered them first to interested
relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an
ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand
square meters of prime property for P170,000.00
when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00?
These questions highlight several implausibilities in
the alleged sale of the subject property by herein
petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President
who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay
should have verified the sale of the subject property
by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to
petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered
the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with the late
petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that
she took advantage of such knowledge.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent
corporation cannot tack its possession to that of
petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza
conveyed not title over the subject parcels of land to
Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner
thereof. 41 Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled
to the registration decree which the trial court
granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not
been interrupted in her more than thirty years of
open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious
possession in the concept of an owner over the
subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida
Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and
sufficient for original registration over the two
parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. 42
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de
Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development
Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8,
1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, registration of title over the subject
parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot
Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and
10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and
supported by the corresponding technical
descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC
No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein
substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this
Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby
directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the
corresponding decree of registration and certificate
of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
23
 FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent
The Solicitor General for petitioner
J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August
19881 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
151632 and its Resolution of 18 October 19883 which,
respectively, affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth
Judicial Region, of 17 June 19874 granting the
petition of private respondent for the reconstitution
of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of a
transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of
notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants
of the land, and denied petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of the Decision.5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to
adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the
land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial
reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to
be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered
owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of
33,294 square meters, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of
Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition
for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate
copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on
the basis of the owner's duplicate copy.6 She alleged
therein that she is in possession "of the title subject
matter of" the petition but she, however, did not
allege the reason why she asked for the
reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set
the petition for hearing and required its publication
in the Official Gazette, which was done. Required
notices, except to the adjoining owners and the
actual occupants of the land,were given.
Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of
private respondent's evidence was made by the OIC-
Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987,
the trial court handed down an Order7 which made
the following findings of facts:
From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it
appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain
parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square
meters, embraced in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the
name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a
document of sale executed by the registered owner
(Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title which was
usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
this province was destroyed by reason of the fire
which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building
then housing said office on August 12, 1977 (Exh.
"C"). It appears further that there are no co-owner's,
mortgagee's, lessee's duplicate copy of said
certificate of title which had been previously issued
by the Register of Deeds of this province; that the
petitioner is in actual possession of the area of
16,647 square meters which was sold to her and that
she is benefiting from the produce of the
improvements existing on the area belonging to her.
and disquisition:
Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-
founded and there being no opposition to its
approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of
Deeds of this province is hereby directed to
reconstitute the original and the owner's duplicate
copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in
the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days
after receipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of
this province and the Commissioner of the Land
Registration Commission, on the basis of the existing
owner's duplicate copy thereof.
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed from said Order to the Court of
Appeals and made the following assignment of
errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE
OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062
WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF
HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL
OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY SECTION
13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION.8
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner
maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as
held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394.
24
In its Decision of 29 August 19889 respondent Court
of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner
and held that:
1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the
sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and
actual occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to
have been "at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529" because it is
inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which
provides that in original registration cases publication
of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section
110 of said Decree provides:
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original
of Torrens Title. –– Original copies of certificates of
title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds
as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such
titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No.
26 insofar as not inconsistent with this
Decree. (emphasis supplied)
2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with
the instant case for in the former both the original
and the owner's duplicate copies of the certificate of
title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant
case where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not
shown that the original copy in the custody of the
Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the
titles alleged to have been lost were later found
intact in the names of other persons; and, more
importantly, the Petition was not published in the
Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin,
unlike in the instant case.
3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and
actual occupants is imposed upon the court, not the
party filing the petition for reconstitution (herein
private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto
should not prejudice or injure the latter.
4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent
cannot be blamed for the loss of the original copy of
the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason
of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not,
therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having
been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the instant
petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:
a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted
contrary to law when it did not consider that the trial
court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition
for reconstitution of the original owners (sic)
duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no
requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining
owners and actual occupants of the land as required
by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;
b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted
contrary to law in granting the petition for
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of
TCT No. 66062.
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989,10 We required
the respondents to comment on the petition. Private
respondent filed her comment on 10 February
1989.11 She practically copied therein the questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda,
which petitioner complied with on 3 July 198912 and
private respondent on 10 June 1989.13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the
Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court
of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June
1987, must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered,
modified or amended.1âwphi1 Since the
requirement therein of service of notice of the initial
hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual
occupants of the land was not complied with in this
case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly,
the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in
affirming the Order of the trial court granting the
petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been
"at least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in
relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took
effect on 11 June 1978.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,14 We
ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources
enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3
(e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered
owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest
in the property. The petition shall state or contain,
among other things, the following: (a) that the
owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been
lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's
or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had
been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c)
the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d)
25
the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the names and addresses of
the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)
the names and addresses of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, of the owners
of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed
description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other
instruments affecting the property have been
presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as
yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies
thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of
the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in
case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively
from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of
this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied
with a plan and technical description of the property
duly approved by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition,
filed under the preceding section, to be published, at
the expense of the petition, twice in successive issues
of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which
the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy
of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein whose address is known, at
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of
the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known,
the name of the registered owner, the name of the
occupants or person in possession of the property,
the owner of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries
of the property, and the date on which all persons
having any interest therein must appear and file their
claim or objection to the petition. The petitioner
shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication,
posting and service of the notice as directed by the
court.
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance
therewith would render all proceedings utterly null
and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan
Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.15 where, in respect particularly to the required
notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically
declared:
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the
owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent
to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having interest, title
or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares
more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or
omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on
the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which
the land is situated, at the provincial building and at
the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the
acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court.
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-
affirmed the foregoing doctrine:
The publication of the petition in two successive
issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the
notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual
occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the
notices in the main entrance of the provincial and
municipal buildings where the property lies at least
30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as
prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory
and jurisdictional requisites.
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no
room for any convoluted logic to support a sophistic
distinction between said case and the instant case
and an implausible interpretation of the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of
the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26
"appears to have been at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely
nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests,
indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend
said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either
misapprehended or read out of context that portion
of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:
. . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used
this clause to support its proposition of implied
amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of
Section 110 of the Decree.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial
hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter
alia, that:
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of
the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
26
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the
time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to
be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court . . .
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the
requirement of notice by mailing and
by posting.1âwphi1 What it simply means is that in
so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official
Gazette, although the law mandates that it be
published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
However, publication in the latter alone would not
suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official
publication.
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with
the other modes of giving notice, which remain
mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section
23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise,
said section would not have stressed in detail the
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the
Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one
of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is
clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to
strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to
prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens
wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land
registration proceedings and in proceedings for the
reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that only very few have
access to or could read the Official Gazette, which
comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication
in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both
proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court, owners of both unregistered and
registered lands may someday painfully find out that
others have certificates of title to their land because
scheming parties had caused their registration, or
secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and
sold the property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of
Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the
private respondent the duty to comply with the
requirement of service of notice because it was not
through her fault that the original copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable
since the law does not make any exception or
exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous
proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of
said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to
serve the required notices and private respondent
should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It
suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong
impression that mandatory requirements of notices
may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with
them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates
the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency which the Constitution directs public
officials and employees to faithfully observe. We
should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or
their personnel cannot be made a reason or
justification for non-observance of laws. By the very
nature of their functions, they should be the first to
obey the laws.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and
SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29 August 1988 and
the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the
Order of Branch No. 39 of the Regional Trial Court of
Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition
No. 11,456.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y
CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.
Southworth and Faison for appellants.
D. R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of
January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
27
purpose of having registered, under the Torrens
system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A,
Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were
located in the city of Manila. The only one of said
parcels to which attention need be given in the
present appeal is Parcel A.
From an examination of said petition we find that
parcel A was described generally and technically.
I. General description. — It is a parcel of land with the
buildings erected thereon, located in the district of
Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and
96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig
River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for
31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig River for
25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P.
Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the
estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10
meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as
set forth in the attached plan.
II. Technical description. — The undersigned on the
26th of the present month proceeded to survey and
fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical
plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials
one and two stories high belonging to Maria del
Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of
Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and
96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig
River. The point marked on the plan with the letter
"X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the
northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of
the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point,
whence S. 49º 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point
A, chosen as the point of beginning for the
topographical operations, the result whereof is as
follows:1awphil.net
————————————————————————
—————————— | Points or | Directions in |
Distances | Boundaries | 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called
| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |
————————————————————————
——————————
| A to B | S. 44º 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |
| B to C | S. 46º 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42º 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |
| D to E | S. 40º 50' E | 13.20 | |
| E to F | N. 49º 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
| F to G | N. 52º 00' E | 10.94 | |
| G to H | N. 37º 10' W | 24.90 | |
| H to I | N. 35º 45' W | 6.56 | |
| I to J | N. 50º 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
| J to K | N. 35º 00' W | 7.60 | |
| K to A | N. 42º 05' W | 25.50 | |
————————————————————————
——————————
The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square
meters; all the points specified are marked on the
attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its
boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the
south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of
Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the
heirs of Antonio Enriquez.
The plan to which reference is made in the above
technical description and which accompanied the
petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."
{bmc 029035a.bmp}
By comparing the above technical description with
the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that
the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44º,
30' W., and that the distance between A and B was
31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46º,
to this difference between the technical description
and the plan at this time, but its importance to the
questions presented will be discussed below.
Attached to said petition was a number of
documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain
of title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the
names of the adjoining owners of the land in
question. The petition gives the names of said
persons, as follows:
The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of
the owners of the parcels of land conterminous with
this estate are, according to my information:
The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives
are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple, Solignac &
Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P.
Roxas, 154 Malacañang, San Miguel.
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and
the documents showing the chain of title of the
petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner
of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who made
a very careful examination of the title of the
petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day
of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared
report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the
petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other
parcels, the recommends the registration of said
Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the
petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d
28
day of March, 1906, in accordance with the
provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the
following notice:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the
Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos.
84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler
and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon
Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; Rosendo
Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano
Cordoba, No. 28; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and
Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36;
and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs;
these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226,
and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario;
Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido
Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these of the district
of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez,
attorneys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle
Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of
Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and
Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, these two No.
330, the three on Calle Malacañang, district of San
Miguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso
Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and Gervasio Rosario
Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of
the district of Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle
Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the city of
Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:
Whereas an application has been presented to said
court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian,
through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle
Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of
Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the
following described land: Four parcels of land with
the improvements of strong materials thereon,
situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more
particularly bounded and described as follows:
Parcel A. — Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96,
beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan, being S. 49º
40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at
the S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez;
thence S. 46º 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of
the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46º 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt.
"C"; S. 42º E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40º 50' E., 13.20
m. to pt. "E"; N. 49º 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52º
E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36º 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt.
"H"; N. 38º 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52º 35' E.,
2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38º 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N.
53º 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40º 05' W., 14 m. to
pt. "M"; N. 44º W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow
the NW. bank of the Pasig River.
Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de
Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by property of the
heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.
Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land
Registration to be held at the City Hall, Calzada de las
Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April,
A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the
forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted; and
unless you appear at such court at the time and place
aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said
application will be taken as confessed, and you will
be forever barred from contesting said application or
any decree entered thereon.
Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court,
this 23d day of March in the year nineteen hundred
and six.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.
In accordance with said order of publication, the
clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th
day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each
of the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail.
The record shows that each of said persons received
a copy of said notice, including the representative of
the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the
certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of
Manila, that said notice was posted upon the land in
question. The record further shows that said notice
had been published in two daily newspapers of the
city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.
On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of
the Court of Land Registration, made the following
certificate relating to the notice and to the
publication of the notices required by section 31 of
Act No. 496.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian,
Applicant.
I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration
of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in compliance
with the order issued by said court, a notice referring
to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by
29
Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once
only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila
Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the
31st of the same month and year, in English and
Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the
Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the
Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A.
Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon
Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao
Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez;
Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler;
Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng;
Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen
Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa,
Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario
Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in
Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28,
1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of the
necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on
the 17th day of April, 1906.
A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that
Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila (p.
131, record) presented a written statement to the
court calling its attention to the fact that there
existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel
A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said
attorney also called the attention of the other plans
of the other parcels of land, included in the original
petition. Our attention has not been called to any
order made by the lower court, relating to said
request of the attorney of the city of Manila.
In accordance with said notice to all of the interested
parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought
on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock
a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At the
hearing the petitioner was represented. No one
appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio
Enriquez."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the
cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for
trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner
and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of
Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes
called the attention of the court again to the fact that
there existed certain errors in the measurement of
some of the sides of the plan presented by the
petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of
errors) the court ordered that said errors be
corrected. So far as the record shows no correction
whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been
brought on for hearing, the honorable Simplicio del
Rosario, judge, distated the following order or
judgment in default against all persons:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
No. 1895.
Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian for registration of the real estate described
herein,
vs.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the
Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A.
Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon
Geneto; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao
Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez;
Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler;
Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; And Seng Queng;
Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen
Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa;
Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario
Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may
concern, defendants.
The present case having been duly tried, and
Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be
published once only a notice in due from referring to
the application mentioned, in two newspapers of
general circulation, one printed in the English
language and another in the Spanish language, to
wit, The Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia
of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since
publication of said notice was effected;
Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered
mail, within seven days after the publication of the
said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to
each one of the persons named in the application or
who appeared to be concerned therein;
Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a
conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land
included in the application a certified copy of the
notice in Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in
the principal municipal building of the city of Manila,
before the fourteen days preceding that set for the
termination of the period fixed;
Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have
failed to appear to impugn the application, within the
period fixed by the law;
This court orders a declaration of default against all
the defendants and other persons who may be
30
concerned in opposing the application, which is
granted.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the
said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this 21st
day of July, 1906.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated
the following order, decreeing that said parcel of
land, A, be registered as the absolute property of
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said
decree was as follows:
Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of
Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the
absolute owner of the real property, which is
adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the
description whereof is hereinafter set forth:
A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle
Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the NE. by
the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by
the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the
heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle
Escolta.
Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which
point is 27.75 m. S., 49º 40' W. from the extreme W.
of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle
Escolta and Passage de Perez; and from said point A.,
S., 46º 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46º 15'
E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42º E., 32.75 m. to
point D; thence S., 40º 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.;
thence N., 49º 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N.,
52º E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence N., 36º 20' W.,
14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38º 40' W., 17.16 m.
to point I; thence N., 52º 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J;
thence N., 38º 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N.,
53º 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40º 05' W.,
14 m. to point M; thence N., 44º W., 15.35 m. to
point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square
meters.
All the points named are marked on the plan; the
bearings are magnetic; date of survey, December 26,
1905.
Wherefore this court orders that the said real
property be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of
the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, subject however to any of the
encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act that
may be in force and effect.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the
said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this
twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at
eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian.
Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.
A copy of this decree was sent to the register of
deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the
certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to
the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the
property became registered under the Torrens
system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of
the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906, nothing
further seems to have been done in the Court of
Land Registration until on or about the 19th day of
December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after
said land had been registered, when we find that the
assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the
following petition:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.
MOTION.
The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney,
comes now into the court and respectfully
represents;
I. That the plan of the property with which the
present case deals is affected by an error of closure
greater than 1/1500;
II. That the city of Manila is interested in the
correction of said error as it has to expropriate a
portion of said land for use as a public street;
Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a
new survey of said property described in the plan
filed in this case.
Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.
It is not clear whether said petition refers to the
incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the
incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land
(B, C, and D), which were included in the petition of
the petitioner.
31
On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable
Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, referred the petition of the city of
Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the
27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor
reported to the court that there existed "errors of
closure in said plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the
Court of Land Registration ordered the chief surveyor
to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of
Act No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to
the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original
petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of
the certificate issued to her on the 21st day of July,
1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands
included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian,
applicant.
Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of
Land Registration and represents:
1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in
the name and representation of the applicant, sought
the legalization of property title to four estates,
among them the following:
(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected
thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta,
district of Binondo.
(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected
thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district
of Binondo.
(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected
thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva, corner of
Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.
2. That the other estate mentioned in the said
application refers to a parcel of land, with the
buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230
Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings
were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on
the 2d of November of the year just past, and it
cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the
present application.
3. That in the said application it is stated that the
land of the estate designated by the letter (a) was
assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States
currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United
States currency; that the land of the estate
designated by the letter (b) was assessed at 55,020
dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the
buildings at 15,000 dollars, United States currency;
and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c)
was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency,
and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States
currency.
4. That both in the property titles to the said estates
and in the plans and technical descriptions thereof
which accompany said application and are annexed
to the above-entitled case, it appears that on the
parcels of land which form part of the estates under
consideration there are erected buildings, consisting
of two houses of strong materials, one behind the
other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a
house of stone and masonry in that designated by
the letter (b); and another house of stone and
masonry in that designated by the letter (c).
5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the
registration entries referring to the said estates, it
appears that they consist of the parcels of land and
the buildings stated.
6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the
Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners
conterminous with the estates referred to therein,
the buildings erected on them are likewise
mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and
registration of the estates were ordered in
applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the
application; but in the certificate of the decree or
resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of
the court, the description of the parcel of land
corresponding to each estate was given, but the
respective building on each was omitted, and in this
form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472,
764, and 743, which accompany this application.
8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and
22, 1906, the legal representative of the applicant
guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights
of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the
assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine
currency, the receipts and vouchers wherefore do
not accompany this application because the applicant
destroyed them in the belief that there was no need
to exhibit them, but averring that the amounts paid
for those purposes are credited in the accounting
32
division of the Court of Land Registration and the
office of the register of deeds, as has been
ascertained by a person delegated therefor by the
applicant.
9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of
the estates mentioned she observed the omission in
the corresponding certificate of title of the building
existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of
title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it
is to be supposed that said omission is due solely to a
simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly
affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your
honorable court with the request that you order the
correction of said omission, especially as there at
present exist on the said parcels of land, without
modification or alteration, the same buildings that
existed when legalization of title thereto was applied
for and which appear in the titles of acquisition
annexed to the above-entitled case, reference
whereto has been made in the third paragraph.
10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of
proving that the said estates consist not only in the
parcel of land or lot but also in the building erected
on each, the applicant attaches hereto the
assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the
said estates, wherein are stated the two points
mentioned.
11. That in view of what has been set forth and
explained, the applicant prays the honorable court to
decree, after the necessary legal proceedings,
correction of the omission referred to by ordering the
free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of
the said estates, wherein record be made of the
building erected on each, consisting of those
enumerated in the third paragraph of this
application.
Manila, February 28, 1912.
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.
On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple
Association of Manila sent a communication to
Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of
Land Registration, accompanied by a contract,
showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria
del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her
rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including
the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple
Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple
Association of Manila requested the judge of the
Land Court to attach said contract to the record in
the case and issue a new certificate to it.
On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said
Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of the
Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with
the order of the court of the 23d of December, 1911.
Said new plan was made for the purpose of
correcting the errors in closure in the original plan
presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of
January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see page
48):
After the presentation of said new or corrected plan,
the motions:
(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the
error of closure in the original plan;
(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title
the buildings located upon the lands registered in
accordance with her original petition; and
(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of
Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in
accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands
from Maria del Consuelo
{bmc 029048.bmp}
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian — after notice had been
given to all the interested parties, were set down for
hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on
said motion were transferred from one date to
another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of
August, 1912. During said various hearings, in
addition to the appointment of a commission to view
the premises, certain proof was taken upon the
question of the correctness of the original plan
presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During
said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez
appeared and apparently made some objection to
the granting of said motions. They presented no
written statement in which their specific objections
appear. The nearest approach to a definite and
specific statement of their objections appears in the
argument of their counsel at the close of said several
hearings, in which it appears that their objections to
the correction of the original plan and certificate and
the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic
Temple Association of Manila was based upon the
ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in
the land in the question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles
H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, and
his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and
the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges
of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of
August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted the
33
motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple
Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys
for the objectors presented a motion for new trial,
basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the
lower court were manifestly contrary to the proof.
After a due consideration of said motion for a new
trial and after hearing the respective parties, the
Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed
of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto
Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was
appealed to this court. In this court the respondents
presented the following assignments of error:
1. That the court below erred in holding that the
proceedings of the Court of Land Registration were
valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in
controversy in this suit.
2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to
law.
3. That the judgment of the court below is against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
After a careful examination of the argument of the
appellants in support of each of said assignments of
error, we are of the opinion that they may be
discussed together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their
assignments of error, there is but little argument
against the decision of the court rendered on the
24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole argument
of the appellants is based upon the ground that the
original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is
absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants
had no notice of the pendency of the original action
to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now
admit that a notice of the pendency of the original
action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde &
(Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now allege that it
affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of
its members represented the defendants and
appellants in that action. The record shows, as we
have pointed out above, that the original petition
showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were
the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio
Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We
have searched the record now in vain to find the
slightest denial of the fact that they were the
representatives of said heirs, even though one of said
attorneys represented them, or at least some of
them, in the present proceedings. So far as the
record shows there is not even a suggestion found in
the various hearings and proceedings taken and had
under the above motions, that said attorneys were
not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio
Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings.
Neither does the record show any attempt on their
part to deny the fact that they received the notices
given in the original action. The appellants assert in
their argument that "personal notice was absolutely
necessary in order to justify the court below in
rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, in the first instance" (the original
proceeding). The appellants, by that argument,
attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th
of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original
certificate (No. 742) was void, because they had not
been served with personal notice. This brings us to
the question whether or not personal notice to all of
the persons interested in an action for the
registration of real property under the Torrens
system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of
said registration. It will be remembered that we
noted above that personal notice of the pendency of
the original petition had been given and that a
publication of the same had been made in
accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32
of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period
during which notice must be given, the original cause
was set down for hearing. The record also shows that
the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate
showing that that notice had been issued and
published in accordance with the law. Section 32
provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk
that he had served the notice as directed by the
court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the
case before the return day, and shall be conclusive
proof of such service."
On the day set for the hearing of said original
petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of
the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No.
496 provides: "If no person appears and answer
within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded
and the application ( petition) be taken for confessed.
By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may
concern," all the world are made parties defendant
and shall be concluded by the default and order. The
court shall not be bound by the report of the
examiner of titles, but may require other and further
proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly
contrary to the contention of the appellants. It seems
to directly contradict the requirements of personal
notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of
a valid title under the Torrens system.
34
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions
of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38
provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind
the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to
the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the Insular Government, and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citations, or included in the
general description 'To all whom it may concern.'"
There is a further and very strong intimation in the
law that personal notice is not absolutely a
prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens
system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The
court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require
proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and
to all persons who appear to have an interest in or
claim to the land included in the application." It will
be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases
is not by law required to give any notice to any
person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give
the notices. (Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is
true that "the court may also cause other or further
notice of the application to be given in such a
manner and to such persons as it may deem proper."
Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express
provision of law relieved from any obligation
whatsoever to give motive to any person of the
pendency of his application to have his land
registered under the Torrens system. That being true,
upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to
harassment or delay or additional expense, because
some person claims that he did not receive actual
personal notice? Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496)
seem to contain a remedy for persons who have
suffered damages for the failure on the part of court
officials to comply with the law. (Noble State
Bank vs.Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to
have the registration and certificate annulled, unless
he comes within the provisions of section 38, and
even then he is without a remedy against the
applicant unless he can show, within a period of one
year after the decree of registration and the granting
of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or
any estate or interest therein," by fraud, and not
even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value
has acquired and interest." In the present case five
years and a half had transpired and negotiations for
the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had
been terminated. There is not intimation that the
petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightes degree.
While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times,
is has been adopted in many States and its provisions
have been attacked at almost every point. The
requirements relating to notices has been a fruitful
source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law
has been attacked many times, because of the
provision of said law relating to notices. This is not
the first time that the question has been presented
to this court. The same question was presented to
this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17
Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was
attacked upon the ground that fraud existed, simply
because personal notice had not been given. The
existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure of
actual personal notice. In passing upon that question,
this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said
(quoting from the syllabus):
In original proceedings for the registration of land
under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a
party- defendant by publication, but was not
personally served with notice: Held, That the decree
of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against
his as well as all the world.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under
Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A
proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may
be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon the claimants within the state
or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction
is secured by the power of the court over the res.
Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not
so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who
were known and those who were not known to the
plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
In the present case there is not the slightest
intimation that the original applicant (Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud.
The record shows that she named all the persons
who might have an interest in the registration of her
land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged
even with negligence. The record shows that she did
all the law required her to do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in
mind that its primary purpose is the registration of
the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to
relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or
unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land
registration is a system for the registration of title to
land only, and not a system established for the
acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may
be acquired by said system of registration. It is
intended only that the title, which the petitioner has,
shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens
and burdens of whatsoever character, except those
35
which shall be noted in the order of registration and
in the certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title
of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his
registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent
transfer of his title. The registration either relieves
the land of all known as well as unknown claims,
absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into
court and to make there a record, so that thereafter
there may be no uncertainly concerning either the
character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a
prerequisite to the validity of registration would
absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown
claims, for the reason that personal notice could
never be given to "unknown claimants." The great
difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of
possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be
dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact,
to the transfer of titles.
Courts have held that in actions in rem personal
notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the
courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the
res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land
Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first
established in admiralty proceedings. It was
established out of the very necessities of the case.
The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His
ship was found in the most distant ports of the earth.
Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as
men, coal, and food. The very nature of its business
necessitated the making of contracts. The
continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity
to make contracts and to get credit. It might also,
perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like
conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities,
to satisfy all possible obligations, to continue its
voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants
and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person,
with whom or with which they were dealing, and not
its real owner. Consequently there came into
existence this action in rem. For the purpose of
carrying into effect the broader purposes of the
Torrens land law, it has been universally considered
that the action should be considered as one in rem.
Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the
State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the
Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of
Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this
question, said:
Looked at either from the point of view of history or
of the necessary requirements of justice, a
proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may
be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or
notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution (of the
State of Massachusetts or the United States).
Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be
impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to
make a distinction between the constitutional rights
of claimants who were known and those who were
not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to
bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727; The
Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be
deprived of their property and of their rights, without
personal notice of the proceedings in which that may
occur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or
service upon the defendant may be had by
publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727.) So
also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of
claimants against estates of deceased persons,
personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by
publication may be had. Also unknown claimants or
owners may be brought into court without personal
notice in an action for the condemnation of private
property for public use. There exists a multitude of
cases in which personal service is not necessary and
service by publication is sufficient.
The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided
means by which title to land might be quited "by
notice by publication to all persons."
(Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274;
Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564;
Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American
Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47;
Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman,
86 Cal., 580.)
Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states
had the power and right to provide a procedure for
the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had
control over real property within its limits. The
conditions of ownership of real estate in a state,
whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are
subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer,
liability to obligations, private or public, and the
models of establishing title thereto; and for the
purpose of determining these question, it (the state)
may provide any reasonable rules or procedure.
(Clark vs.Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey,
181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402;
Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238;
Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs,
134 U.S., 316; American Land Company vs.Zeiss, 219
U.S., 47.)
36
The state possesses not only the power to determine
how title to real estate may be acquired and proved,
but it is also within its legislative competency to
establish the method of procedure. (American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill.,
235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150
Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs.Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated
within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceeding in rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in
rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known
and unknown. (State vs.McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81
Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21
Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs.McCrory, 55 Ark., 442;
29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National
Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon,
176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett,
102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662;
Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343;
Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep.,
381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571;
57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24;
Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76,
79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the
purpose of quieting title to real estate against an
unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable
method for securing substituted services against
residents. The power of the state to provide methods
of quieting title should not be limited to known
persons. In order to make such a law valuable and
effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be
made to operate on all interest and persons known
or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges
(175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said: "If it
(the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a
judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world
hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a
proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known
claims — indeed certainly against the unknown may
be said to be its chief end — and unknown claims
cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the
claimant."
Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of the American Land
Company vs.Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that
the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the
due process clause (of the Constitution) because a
case may be conceived where rights in and to
property would be adversely affected without notice
being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in
effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the
subject. The criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable
character of the requirements, having reference to
the subject with which the statute deals."
The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the
case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199, 215) in
speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in
suitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various
prudential regulations are made with respect to
these remedies by it may possibly happen,
notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen
who owes nothing, and has done none of the acts
mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his
estate without any actual knowledge of the process
by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as
we must, in order to sustain this legislation, that the
Constitution does not positively require personal
notice in order to constitute a legal proceedings due
process of law, it then belongs to the legislature to
determine in the particular instance whether the
case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and
what manner of constructive notice shall be
sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded
against of the Legal steps which are taken against
him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47;
Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal.,
289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of
their argument, is the case of the American Land
Company vs.Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts
and the decisions of the different courts which are
cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is
authority in support of the contention of the
appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows:
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an
action in the superior court of the country San
Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and
19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the public
records contained in the office of the county
recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was
destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906,
and at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was
the owner and in the actual and peaceable
possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that
his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land,
and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple,
absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect,
claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever.
Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the
be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the
possession of said parcels of land, and each of them,
was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from
all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of
any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the
plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be the
37
owner of and entitled to the possession of said
described parcels of land in fee simple, and that no
one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim
in or to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or
equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a
summons was issued and notice of the pendency of
the action was published in certain newspaper, as
was required by law. Notice was also posted upon
the property, as required by the statute. No one
having appeared and opposed the granting of the
petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in
or lien upon the property described in the
complaint, a default was ordered against all persons,
and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a decree
was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was
the owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the
possession of the land described in the complaint
and that no other person had any right title, interest,
or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof,
either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or
contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said
decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th day
of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the
entry of the decree of the superior court, in the city
and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th
of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United
States Circuit Court for the Northern District of
California, in which the plaintiffs claimed title to the
parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute,
which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The
plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the
superior court of the city and county of San Francisco
was void and of no force and effect and was made
and maintained without due process of law, and that
said superior court, in said action and
proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the
persons holding the title during such proceedings,
and that said court did not have or obtain jurisdiction
to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff .
The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right
whatever in said parcels of land, other than his rights
of possession and occupation." The bill further
alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times
citizens and residents of California, not seeking to
evade, but ready to accept service of summons and
easily reached for that purpose; that,
notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon
them nor did they in any way receive notice of the
pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming
any interest in or lien upon the real property herein
described); nor did they gain any knowledge of
existence of the decree until more than a year after
its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss,
demurred.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth District certified the question
involved to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States, after a
careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very
lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47),
decided each of the question submitted by the
Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention of the
plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the
title to two parcels of land for the purpose of
registrating his title to the same under an act of the
legislature of the State of California, entitled "An act
to provide for the establishment and quieting of title
to real property in case of loss or destruction of
public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney
Law. It was intended by said act to provide a method
whereby owners in possession of real estate, where
records had been destroyed to such an extent as to
make it impossible to trace a record title, might
secure a degree in the court which would furnish
public, authenticated evidence of title. The special
occasion for the law was the fact that practically all
of the public records of title in several counties in the
State of California had recently theretofore been
destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire.
Said law provided that whenever the public records
in the office of the county recorded had been, or
shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in
any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any
person who claims an estate of inheritance or have
title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or
other persons holding under him, in actual and
peaceable possession any real property in said
county, may bring and maintain an action in rem,
against all the world, in the superior court for the
county in which said real property is situate, to
establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims
thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be
commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in
which he shall name the defendants as "all persons
claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property
herein described, or any part thereof." He was
required to give in his complaint a particular
description of the property. The law provided that
upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or
notice was required to be issued, containing the
names of the court and the country in which the
action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a
particular description of the property involved, which
notice was directed to "all persons claiming any
38
interest in or lien upon the real property herein
described, or any part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or
notice should be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where the action was
brought, at least once a week for a period of two
months.
The law further provided that personal notice should
be given to any person claiming an interest in the
property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the
publication and posting of the summons and its
service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon
whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the
court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over
the plaintiff and said property and of the person and
every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest
in or to or lien upon said property, or any part
thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the
possession and control of said property, for the
purpose of the action, and shall have full and
complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein,
which is provided for in the law.
In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss,
cited and relied upon by the appellants, the validity
of said law was attacked and the legality of the title
granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that
the law was unconstitutional and void, and because
the plaintiff had not received actual notice of the
application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under
said law. The Supreme Court of the United States
(219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that
the law was constitutional and that a compliance
with the requirements of the notice provided for in
said law was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction
over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems
to be but little in the decision in the case of the
American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the
contention of the appellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands had full power to adopt the procedure
provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the
title of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action
followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law;
and
Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or
constructive, upon the part of any of the parties
connected with said action, we are forced to the
conclusion that the appellants here are not now
entitled to have that judgment or decree of
registration and certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the
appellants have not discussed and which we deem of
importance. It is the question of the right of the Land
Court to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a
statement contained in a certificate. A plan is
prepared and is presented with the petition for the
registration of a parcel of land. No opponents
appear. No opposition is presented to the
registration. All the steps in the procedure required
by law have been taken. The land is registered. It is
then discovered for the first time that by reason of a
wrong direction given to one of the lines in the plan,
said plan will not close — that if a wall were built
upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corners of
the wall would not meter. We believe that an error of
the character may be corrected by the court,
provided that such correction does not include land
not included in the original petition. Upon the
question whether the amended plan (p.252, record)
included more or different lands than were included
in the original petition, we find the following
statements made by one of the judges who ordered
said plan amended. The statements is:
At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular
point nothing further is incumbent upon the court
than to determine the property as it was adjudicated
in this case.
Therein no new portion was either added or
subtracted, and this court finds that such should be
the holding on this particular point.
We have a further statement made by one of the
judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to
the same question, in an answer presented by him to
a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by
some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court.
That petition for a writ of prohibition involved
practically the same question presented by the
appellants here now. Upon the question whether or
not additional lands had been included in the new
plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering for
himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez)
said:
Respondents deny that a new dividing line between
the premises in question (premises of the plaintiff
and appellant) was determined and established by an
order of the court issued at the conclusion of said
proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents
charge the truth to be that the dividing line between
said properties was not changed but simply approved
and so indicated upon the record title. For instance,
the line between said properties beginning on the
south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point
indicated in the original description and approved by
39
the court; in other words, the premises in question of
the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian
have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof
have not been changed; the real descriptions of the
properties have been left undisturbed; the adjoining
land owned by the petitioners is undiminished,
except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to
have been created by the projection of some of the
roots of the petitioners' building over the aforesaid
registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is
settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph
of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the
petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property
ran S., 44º 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while
the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A,
page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46º 30' W., a
distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the
certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante)
also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W., for a
distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no
application why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page
35, ante) did not conform to the description of the
land given in the petition. That error, in our
judgment, seems to have constituted the real
difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said
conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court
is entirely justified in ordering the plan corrected for
the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case,
which the appellants have not discussed, and that is
the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian to have her original certificate of
registration corrected, for the purpose of showing
that she was the owner of the buildings located upon
the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered
that in her petition presented January 12, 1906, she
alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land
in question, together with the buildings thereon. No
opposition was presented. No objection was made to
the registration of the land as described in her
petition. The record shows no reason why the
buildings should have been omitted in the certificate
of registration. The omission must have been an
errors. on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No.
496 contains an express provision for the correction
of such errors. Section 112 provides that the
registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition
to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake
made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum
thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We think
the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the
correction of such original certificate was entirely
within her right under the law. It might be claimed,
and we believe that the proposition is sustained by
law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless
the record contains something to the contrary,
necessarily includes the buildings and edifices
located thereon, even though they are not
mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of
law, however, and in view of the petition of the
plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original
certificate be amended so as to include not only the
land described in the original petition, but the
buildings located thereon as well.
With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple
Association of Manila, the record contains no
sufficient reasons for not granting the same.
Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are
of the opinion that the judgment of the court below
should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100643 October 30, 1992
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal, PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUENDO
EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM :
In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner
Adez Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5)
days from notice why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the
judgment of the court a quo 1 thereby altering and
modifying its factual findings with the apparent
purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a
favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar.
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly prostrates himself
40
before the Honorable Court and throws himself at its
mercy," and explains that —
. . . whenever he prepares petitioners either for the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, he dictates
to his secretary and if portions of the decision or
order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he
simply instructs his said secretary to copy the
particular pages of the said decision or order.
In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to
copy the corresponding pages in the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words
were intercalated on a particular paragraph noted by
the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to
explain. He remembers, however, that at the time he
was preparing the petition at bar there were other
pleadings necessitating equal if not preferential
attention from him which could perhaps be the
reason why his secretary committed a very grievous
mistake, Such mistake though he does not condone
and he feel upset at the turn of events. 2
Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an
Affidavit 3 of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly his
Secretary, stating among others that —
3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review
on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, it was
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the
contents of said petition;
4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me,
as he is wont to do whenever he prepares a petition,
to copy the particular pages in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 entitled
"Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch
79 (not 89 as stated is the Affidavit), et al.,
respondents";
5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the
decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed by
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it
was only after our office received the copy of the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 . . .
that Atty. Dacanay confronted me and asked me
where I got that portion which was added to the
particular paragraph noted by the Supreme Court;
that it was only then that I realized the mistake I
committed;
xxx xxx xxx
7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to
the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so many cases
being handled by the law office that I presume I
could have copied or my intention was distracted by
other pleadings atop my table at the time.
Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the
First Division referred his case en consulta to the
Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance
of it in view of the possible sanction that may be
imposed on a member of the Bar.
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off
as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel's
explanation that it was his secretary who committed
the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance of
counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza
v. Barinaga, 4 where the Court observed thus —
Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger
the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in filing of
pleading, motion and other paper and for the
lawyer's dereliction of duty is a common alibi of
practicing lawyer. Like the alibi of the accused in
criminal cases, counsel's shifting of the blame to his
office employee is usually a concoction utilized to
cover up his own negligence, incompetence,
indolence and ineptitude.
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse.
For, how could the secretary have divined the phrase
"without notice to the actual occupants of the
property, Adez Realty," without counsel dictating it
word for word? Could it have been a providential
mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and
on which could have hinged the fate of a litigant's
cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel
cannot elude administrative responsibility which
borders on falsification of a judicial record to which,
by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his
secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade
responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he
admittedly dictated and signed the petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review
and recheck the allegation in their pleadings, more
particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the
statements therein are accurate and the
reproductions faithful, down to the last word and
even punctuation mark. The legal profession
demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings,
motions and other documents dictated or prepared
by them, type or transcribed by their secretaries or
clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is
bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason
should counsel be bound the acts of his secretary
who merely follow his orders. 5
The instant case originate from a petition for
reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section
13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same
statute, on which petitioner bases one of his causes
of action, provides among others that notice should
41
be given to the occupants or persons in possession of
the property. Compliance therewith is a material
requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution
of title. The inserted phase "without notice to the
actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was
just the right phrase intercalated at the right place,
making it highly improbable to be unintentionally,
much less innocently, committed; and by the
secretary a that. All circumstances herein simply but
strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it
appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that
no notice was given to the occupants of subject
property –– when in fact it did not make such a
finding –– is a clear indication not merely of
carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed
decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue
advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more
importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court,
which is the final arbiter of litigations.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that,
save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 6 The
distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the
willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense
and should not be treated lightly, not only because it
may set a dangerous precedent by, rather, because it
is a clear and serious violation of one's oath as
member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III,
of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved" (Emphasis supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a
court decision constitutes willful disregard of the
lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in manner
consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never
venture to mislead the court by false statements or
quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista
v. Gonzales, 7 We suspended respondent for six (6)
months for, among other submitting to the lower
court falsified documents, representing them to the
true copies. In Chavez v. Viola, 8 We suspend
respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed
an Amended Application for Original Registration of
Title which contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned
cases, has more serious and far-reaching
repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this
Court, the last forum for appeal, should be dealt with
more severely lest We be made unwilling
instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel
has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and
fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land.
Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief
by laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose
duty is was simply to obey him.
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety,
what We have already said —
. . . that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. On of those requirement is the
observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be
gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the
courts, is essential for the expeditious administration
of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation.
Otherwise, the administration of justice would
gravely suffer . . . It is essential that lawyers bear in
mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients
but rather to the courts, that they are above all . . .
sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all
and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates
of the exclusive interest of their clients. For this
reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court. 9
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN
M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision
elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering its
factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no
other, of misleading the Court in order to obtain a
favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live
up to the standards expected of him as a members of
the Philippines Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN
M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective
immediately from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given address at
Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road,
Quezon City, entered upon his personal records, and
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
the courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, JJ. concur.
Narvasa, C.J. is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
42
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150844 August 20, 2008
CEFERINO T. ADVIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MIGUEL ALVAREZ, namely: MARIA P.
ALVAREZ, DR. BEDA P. ALVAREZ, JR., MIGUEL
ALVAREZ, JR., DR. AGUSTINA A. BALUYOT,
SEVERINO P. ALVAREZ, ANICIA LEE, AZUCENA S.
HUSHEY, and ALEXANDER P. ALVAREZ; Heirs of Lilia
A. Ramos, namely: DANILO RAMOS, NOEL RAMOS,
ROY RAMOS, and LEO MIGUEL RAMOS; and LYDIA
GAYA,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 376411 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 of the Sixth Judicial
Region, Branch 20, Naga City in Civil Case No. R-12
(7205) entitled "Miguel Alvarez, plaintiff, versus Lydia
Gaya, defendant."
Civil Case No. R-12 (7205) was a case of
reconveyance involving a piece of land with an area
of 228 square meters, located in Naga City. It arose
when Miguel Alvarez, the original plaintiff and now
substituted by his heirs as respondents herein, filed a
complaint3 on October 22, 1971 against Lydia Gaya,
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, alleging that: (1)
he had been in continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession, and occupation of a parcel of land (Lot
No. 3153-Cad-7150) including its buildings; (2) the lot
was originally surveyed and numbered as part of Lot
No. 1696 of the Cadastral Survey of Naga, Cadastral
Case No. N-3, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. N-78; (3)
that Gaya initiated the subdivision of the said lot
(now Lot No. 3164) without the knowledge of Miguel
Alvarez; (4) that Gaya willfully failed to notify Miguel
Alvarez of the cadastral proceedings, as the lawful
occupant and owner; (5) that Gaya committed fraud
in obtaining Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 338
of the Register of Deeds of Naga City; and (6) that
because of such fraud, Alvarez sustained losses,
actual and moral damages including attorney’s fees.4
Lydia Gaya alleged in her Answer: (1) that Miguel
Alvarez had no right of ownership since he had not
been in continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the said land; (2) she had been in
peaceful and continuous possession as an owner
from 1936 up to the present; (3) that she acquired an
imperfect title thereto, which was confirmed on June
29, 1966 by the Cadastral Court in Camarines Sur in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 141; (4)
that the case was considered uncontested since she
was the only claimant; (5) that the Court of First
Instance ordered the registration of said property
along with the improvements thereon in her and her
husband’s name resulting in the issuance of Decree
No. 117760 on December 4, 1967 and OCT No. 338
on March 15, 1968; (6) that her title over the
property has become indefeasible and can no longer
be reviewed; (7) that the complaint was barred by
the statute of limitations; and (8) the complainant’s
action was pure harassment, hence, damages should
be awarded to her.5
On March 28, 1973, the parties agreed before the
trial court on two points: (1) that the land in question
is a part of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 338 in
the name of Lydia Gaya, with an area of 228 square
meters, and (2) the existence of a title in Lydia Gaya’s
name.
Miguel Alvarez died during the trial. After the Notice
of Death was submitted, he was substituted by his
heirs.6
On May 25, 1984, petitioner Ceferino Adviento filed
an Answer in Intervention With Urgent Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction alleging that he
acquired the controversial lot, or part thereof, by
purchase against the interest of Miguel Alvarez.
Ceferino Adviento traced his title to Fidel Cu who
bought the same property from Lydia Gaya.
Petitioner Adviento adopted the allegations of Lydia
Gaya insofar as they contested the ownership over
the controverted land. He further alleged that Miguel
Alvarez constructed a concrete building, which the
former discovered was encroaching on his property.
Petitioner alleged that the encroachment was illegal
and unlawful because he was dispossessed of his
right of entering and occupying the building.
Adviento claimed damages amounting to Php
50,000.00 representing reimbursement for expenses
incurred.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents-heirs of Miguel
Alvarez. The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby
rendered:
(a) ordering the annulment of Original Certificate of
Title No. 338 in the name of Lydia Gaya and its
subsequent titles, TCT 13200 in the name of Fidel Cu
and TCT 15201 in the name of Ceferino Adviento, in
so far as it covers the land adjacent to plaintiff’s land
covered by TCT 69 on the Southeast along the Naga
River consisting of more or less 228 square meters,
and further declaring plaintiff’s ownership thereon
[and] who [is] entitled to possession thereof;
43
(b) ordering defendant Lydia Gaya to indemnify
plaintiffs (sic) the amount of P5,000 as attorney’s
fees and the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the CA affirmed.
The petitioner raised the following issues against the
decision of the appellate court:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT WHENEVER THERE IS A ROAD BOARDERING
[SIC] A STREAM OR RIVER THERE IS CEASED [SIC] A
RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP ON AN ALLEGED ACCRETION
AND WHATEVER ACCRETION THERE MIGHT HAVE
BEEN DOES NOT BELONG TO THE OWNER.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT
MIGUEL ALVAREZ DURING THE PRE-TRIAL AS TO THE
FACT THAT PETITIONER HAD A TITLE OVER THE LAND
IN QUESTION CONTROLS THE SUBSEQUENT
PROCEEDING OF THE CASE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT INASMUCH AS THERE WAS REGULARITY,
VALIDITY AND CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DECISION IN
THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE (LRC) RESULTING IN A
DECREE OF REGISTRATION IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT
GAYA, THE SAID LRC DECISION PUTS TO REST
WHATEVER ISSUES THERE MAY BE.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT BY THE COMPLETENESS AND DETERMINATION
OF TITLE IN FAVOR OF LYDIA GAYA AND
SUBSEQUENTLY TO PETITIONER, THE CIVIL CASE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AND THAT THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AS WELL
AS THE COURT OF APPEALS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT HEIRS OF MIGUEL ALVAREZ SHOULD
HAVE BEEN LIKEWISE DISMISSED.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD; PLAINTIFF AND HIS
SUBSTITUTE HEIRS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES.8
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioner contends that title should not vest to a
riparian owner when there is a road bordering the
land and the adjunct waters. This is an issue raised
for the first time in this Court. We cannot entertain
the issue for it is unprocedural and would call for
determination of facts after presentation of
evidence. Settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts. 9
The records show that the claim of Alvarez is based
on possession. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found the claim sustained by the evidence.
They held that Miguel Alvarez acquired the lot by
purchase from ALATCO, on January 23, 1952, located
on Padian St., Naga City, covered by OCT No. 862
which was later cancelled by TCT No. 69 in the name
of Alvarez. The land was bound on the northeast by a
government property; on the southeast by the Naga
River; on the southwest by an unnamed street; and
on the northwest by Padian Street. The trial court
found that together with the area sold to Miguel
Alvarez covered by OCT No. 862, the land in question
was previously possessed "since time immemorial"
by ALATCO having previously declared it under its
name by Tax Declaration No. 9726 and in subsequent
tax declarations. Alvarez further proved his
possession when he applied for a building permit to
construct a building along the bank of the Naga River.
We find no reason to disturb these findings.
We also reject petitioner’s contention that
considering the admission by the respondents in the
trial court as to the existence of "title" in her name,
she does not need to prove her ownership of the
subject lot. We affirm the ruling of the appellate
court that a "[d]istinction should be drawn between
taking judicial notice of sources, documents and
materials without formal proof of the genuineness or
authenticity, and taking notice of facts related to
such admissions and materials."10 As the appellate
court explained: "[w]here the court finds that it is
while the source is genuine, the facts therein are not
clearly indisputable and should, therefore be subject
to proof."11 The totality of proof adduced by the
parties shows that the title of petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest is bereft of any legal basis.
We cannot also agree with petitioner that the
decision of the appellate court failed to recognize the
regularity, validity and conclusiveness of the order in
the Land Registration Case which culminated in the
decree of registration in favor of petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest. Further, petitioner argues
that it was enough that there was publication of
notice in the application for registration.12 Petitioner
contends that respondents had all the opportunity to
know of the application for registration made by
44
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest over the subject
lot.
The applicable law at that time is Section 21 of Act
No. 496, Land Registration Act,13 which requires that
applications for registration should contain a
notification to "all the occupants of the land and of
all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it
shall state what search has been made to find
them."14 So we held in Republic v. Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille:15
For an applicant to have this imperfect or incomplete
title or claim to a land to be originally registered
under Act 496, the several requisites should all be
satisfied; (1) Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or
a duly licensed private surveyor; (2) Filing an
application for registration by the applicant; (3)
Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the
application by the Court; (4) Transmittal of the
application and the date of the initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidences
attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Commission; (5) Publication of a notice
of the filing of the application and the date and place
of the hearing in the Official Gazette; (6) Service of
notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and
those known to have interests in the property by
the sheriff; (7) Filing of answer to the application by
any person whether named in the notice or not; (8)
Hearing of the case by the Court; (9) Promulgation of
judgment by the Court; (10) Issuance of the decree
by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue
a decree of confirmation and registration; (11) Entry
of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission; (12) Sending of copy of the decree of
registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds;
and (13) Transcription of the decree of registration in
the registration book and the issuance of the owner's
duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant
by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the
prescribed fees.16
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted the lack of the
notice to respondents. Lack of notice is a denial of
due process to respondents. It is elementary that no
person can be denied his property without due
process of law.17
We also reject petitioner’s argument that the
registration decree binds the RTC and the CA. The
argument goes against the very grain of judicial
review. The RTC and the CA are not bound by the
land registration decree especially when it is assailed
on the ground of fraud.
Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act,
provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the
applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and
registration shall be entered. Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the
following section. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description 'To all whom it
may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in
the competent Court of First Instance a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree,
provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said
term of one year, every decree or certificate of title
issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the
decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall
remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to
the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided,
however, That no decree or certificate of title issued
to persons not parties to the appeal shall be
cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by
such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other
person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever
the phrase 'innocent purchaser for value' or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value.18
In Salomon v. Bocauto,19 Justice Laurel had the
occasion to discuss the nature of this provision:
Under section 38 of Act No. 496, the petitioner must
show affirmatively that (1) he has an interest or
estate in the land, and (2) he has been deprived of
that interest through fraud in the procurement of
the decree of registration. The essential facts are to
be clearly alleged in the petition; otherwise, the
registration court is justified in dismissing the same.
(Guzman vs. Ortiz, 12 Phil., 701; Cusar Insular
Government, 13 Phil., 319; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26
Phil., 586; and Escudero & Marasigan vs. Esguerra, 48
Phil., 511.) In the present case, the appellants
Bocauto and Redon pretend to derive their claim
45
from llariano Redon, the original owner. The lower
court, however, in its decision dated January 26,
1939, appears to have rejected this claim and found
that Mariano Redon had sold the said land to
Bonifacio Redon, who, in turn, conveyed it to
Policarpio Tamoro. Moreover, both petitioners had
notice of the original registration proceedings, but
failed to put up any claim and to show title in
themselves.
In the case at bar, respondents pleaded their interest
in the land and the fraud used which defeated such
interest. No notice was given to the respondents. The
lack of notice was obviously intended by the
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest to prevent
contest on the application. Petitioner’s predecessor-
in-interest falsely attested to the absence of any
adverse claim, including the absence of any
possession of the land. By our rulings, this constitutes
extrinsic fraud. In Libundan v. Gil,20 we held that:
The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties,
deprived of land or any interest therein, through
fraud in the registration proceedings, the
opportunity to review the decree is to insure fair
and honest dealing in the registration of land. But
the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of
fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be
extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is
based have not been controverted or resolved in the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered, Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
'outside the trial of a case against the defeated
party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case.' But intrinsic
fraud takes the form of ‘acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments
or perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and
just determination of the case.’
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his
interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not
contested when in fact they are, or in applying for
and obtaining adjudication and registration in the
name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not
been allotted to him in the partition, or in
intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the
land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed
of a navigable stream, or in willfully misrepresenting
that there are no other claims, or in deliberately
failing to notify the party entitled to notice, or in
inducing him not to oppose an application, or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the
true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his opposition. In all these examples the
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his
case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court.21
The averments in the petition for review of the
decree of registration constitute specific and not
mere general allegations of actual and extrinsic
fraud.22 Competent proof to support these
allegations was adduced as found by the courts a
quo. We find no compelling reason to disturb their
findings.
It should be emphasized that petitioner is a
successor-in-interest—he merely bought the land
from Lydia Gaya, and hence, the petitioner stepped
into the shoes of the same predecessor-in-interest.
As the RTC found:
On cross, Ce[f]erino Adviento admitted the existence
of an annotation on the title of the pendency of Civil
Case No. 7205 filed as early as October 1971 before
he purchased the land in question, and therefore
knew the risk of buying it. He was likewise shown a
title by Fidel Cu and also knew of the existence of
a lis pendens in the latter’s title. He also examined
the records of this case, was aware that the plaintiff
was a boundary owner of the land in question, but
did not verify his title as to whether his land was
bounded on the Southeast by Naga River. Before he
filed his answer-in-intervention in May 1984, he
already knew of the records of this case and only
coordinated with his counsel. He came to know that
the property of Alvarez is bounded by the Naga River
on the southeast after the relocation made by the
Commissioner. Despite such knowledge, he did not
confront Lydia Gaya or Fidel Cu about it. In 1984 he
did not know that the heirs of Miguel Alvarez were in
possession of the construction work of Alvarez which
was going on at that time on the premises, but he did
not confront Alvarez about it. At the time of his
purchase of the land, there were no buildings on the
land but only small shanties at the corner of Elias
Angeles Street and a "Cafehan" at the road along the
river with nipa roofing and the walls were somewhat
nipa too, and which appeared to be quite old. He did
not however inquire who allowed the construction
thereof. At the time of his purchase in 1984, the area
owned by Alvarez which appears now to adjoin the
property he purchased was used as a bus terminal
which was put on much later, but not at the time of
his purchase.
46
Admittedly, the land in question consisting of 228
square meters, more or less, is a portion of Lot 3164
covered by OCT 338 in the name of Lydia Gaya.23
Thus, when the trial court decided against Lydia
Gaya’s interest, it followed that all the succeeding
titles which trace interest to her title were affected.
In the case at bar, the trial court found that the
issuance of title was illegal. Petitioner’s claimed right
cannot now have more coverage and extent than
that from which it originated. Indeed, petitioner’s
purchase of the said land despite the notice of lis
pendens and actual knowledge of the pending case
would not qualify him as an innocent purchaser for
value.24 It is a settled rule that a purchaser of real
estate with knowledge of any defect or lack of title of
the vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the
land or interest therein. The same rule applies to one
with knowledge of facts which should have put him
on inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his
vendor.25
IN VIEW WHEREOF, premises considered, the
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision, dated May 10, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 37641
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
the Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 20, Naga City in Civil
Case No. R-12 (7205) dated February 27, 1992
ordering the annulment of OCT No. 338,
is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-
appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3621)
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL.,
defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3622)
JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL.,
defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3623)
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL.,
defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-
appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge
Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622, and 3623.1
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three
separate complaints containing substantially the
same allegations.2
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they
were the owners and possessors of the three parcels
of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now
barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area
of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they
inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor
Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his
father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their
predecessors in interest had possessed these three
parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully,
cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on
March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey
by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose
in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownership over said parcels of land; that they
declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940
under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942
and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila
and other places, after having secured the
permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses
thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
47
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they
were the owners and possessors of two parcels of
agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now
Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan,
province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of
approximately 148,118 square meters; that these
parcels of land were inherited by them from their
deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn
inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara;
that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were
the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two
brothers inherited the land from their father, and
they and their predecessors in interest had been in
open, adverse and continuous possession of the
same, planting therein palay and other agricultural
products and exclusively enjoying said products; that
on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan
Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands
in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the
plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of
ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said
lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942
and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila
and other places, after having secured permission
from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses
on said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals
from them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are
the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural
land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose),
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an
area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that
this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from
their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the
same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his
predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied
and cultivated the said parcel of land from time
immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his
children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel
Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and
cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of
said land, had openly, adversely and continuously
cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other
agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the
products harvested therefrom; that during his
lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land
sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the
cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the
Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs
filed and registered their claim of ownership over the
said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942
and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila
and other places, after securing permission from
plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said
land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from
their lessees or tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly
alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime
in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the
peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants,
particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc.,
through their agents and representatives, with the
aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using
bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally
entered and started defacing, demolishing and
destroying the dwellings and constructions of
plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements
consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and
fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old
roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks
within and outside the lands in question, disregarding
the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs
were deprived of the rentals received from their
lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the
probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they
discovered for the first time that their lands, as
described in their respective complaint, had either
been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct
or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1
(known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province
of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for
registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la
Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de
la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also
alleged that the registered owners mentioned in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for
the registration of two parcels of land (known as the
Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in
the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del
Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square
meters; that the registration proceedings were
docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration; that the application for registration in
LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was
published in the Official Gazette; that before the
decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area,
48
boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1
were altered and amended; that the amendments
and alterations, which were made after the
publication of the original application, were never
published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was
rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended
plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914
a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914,
known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the
registration in the names of the applicants of the two
parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman
Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is null and void because the Land
Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No.
17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7,
1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from
the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a
void decision and because the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are
different and not identical with the boundaries,
technical descriptions and areas in the application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette; that
the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No.
17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1
appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1
(Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the
beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void
decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and
technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the
area, boundaries and technical description appearing
in the application for registration as published in the
Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been
notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although
the applicants knew, or could have known, by the
exercise of necessary diligence, the names and
addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest who were then, and up to the time the
complaints were filed, in possession and were
cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their
respective complaint; and that during, before, and
even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the
ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands
because said defendants had never disturbed the
possession and cultivation of the lands by the
plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer
certificates of title issued subsequently, based on
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and
void.3
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the
court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the
possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described
in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2)
to revoke the decision of the Court of Land
Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681,
and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914
null and void from the beginning with respect to
Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the
plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null
and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City
subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of
Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the
event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared
valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land
described in their respective complaint in favor of the
plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to
order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market
value of the lands in question in case of defendants'
inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the
defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendants, their lawyers, their agents and
representatives from disturbing the ownership and
possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of
these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the
trial court to litigate as paupers.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were
ordered summoned by publication in accordance
with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The
other defendants were all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases.
This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court
on July 20, 1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order
granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary
injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial
court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the
total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of
the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying
the motion to dismiss. This motion for
49
reconsideration was denied by order of the court of
September 26, 1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its
answer, this defendant, among others, specifically
denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands
involved in each case. The answer contains special
and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the
plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment
and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156
which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme
Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the
Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the
lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the
complaints failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants;
(3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their
complaints state sufficient cause of action, had
prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under
statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good
faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of
land involved in the three cases; (5) that the
registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681
instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest
was in accordance with law, and the requirements
for a valid registration of title were complied with. By
way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the
plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as therein
specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three
cases, by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and
the amended complaints were admitted by the trial
court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a
manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging
its answers to the original complaints as its answers
to the amended complaints in view of the fact that
the amendments to the complaints consist merely in
the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as
necessary parties-plaintiffs.4
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented
their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon
grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the
statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a
prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not
presented any evidence to prove their claim of
ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to
withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to
withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court,
in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted
defendant's motion to withdraw the third ground of
its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to
dismiss.5
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court
rendered a decision for the three cases, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs
and against the Defendants as follows:
A — Declaring that the decision, the decree and the
title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void, ab
initio, and of no effect whatsoever;
B — Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No.
735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration
Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning
(and) of no effect whatsoever;
C — Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title
emanating or allegedly derived from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal are
likewise null and void;
D — Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to
the possession of the parcels of land claimed and
described in paragraph V of their respective
complaints;
E — Ordering the defendants and all persons
claiming under them to vacate and restore to the
plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of land
described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and
Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
F — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming
under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the
possession of the parcels of land described in
paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623
and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187
(Exh. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");
G — Ordering the Defendants and all persons
claiming under them to vacate and restore to the
plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land
described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-
491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");
H — Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual
damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such
possession is restored to them;
I — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as
50
actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951
until such possession is restored to them;.
J — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as
actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951
until such possession is restored to them; .
K — Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .
L — The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared
dismissed for lack of merit."6
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However,
before the motion for new trial was resolved by the
court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a
notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond,
and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on
appeal.7 The record on appeal, after it had been
corrected and amended, as ordered and/or
authorized by the trial court, was approved on
September 29, 1965.8
Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal,
contends that the trial court committed the following
errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land
Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was
without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the
alleged reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not
published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not
identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied
for and as published in the Official Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1
as applied for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the
West of Parcel 1.
II. The trial court erred in finding that the
transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in
accordance with the law and that, therefore, said
OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains
unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these
cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and
decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases
on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in
denying the motions to dismiss filed on said grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases
on the ground of res judicata and in denying the
motion to dismiss filed on said ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all
certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for
value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of
the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to,
the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing
appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant
to pay the costs of these suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These
cases involve the validity of the decision and the
decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the
issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership and
possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the
plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among
others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the
decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio,
having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2)
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having
been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because
the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree
to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance
with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all
Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and
derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No.
735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in
these three civil are the owners and entitled to the
possession of the parcels of land described in their
respective complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the
voluminous records, and the numerous documentary
evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the
conclusions of the trial court are not supported by
the evidence and the applicable decisions of this
Court.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been
declared null and void ab initio by the trial court
covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title
as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square
meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa
Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246
square meters more or less, known as the Diliman
Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case
No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853
51
square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land
involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate
area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and
the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623,
having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or
less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1.9 The trial
court, in its decision, states that the identity of the
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not
disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the
defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are
found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa
Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.10 It is shown in the survey
plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the
defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved in
these three cases are located at the northwestern
portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the
evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la
Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de
la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an
application for the registration of their title over two
parcels of land, designated in the survey plans
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an
area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with
an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application
was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another
application covering three other parcels of land,
docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No.
7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh.
X). The application and the notice of hearing,
containing the technical descriptions of the two
parcels of land applied for, were published in the
issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh.
YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land
Registration issued an order of general default
against the whole world except the Insular
Government, the Director of Lands and the
municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte
(Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an
order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC
No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the
applicants and the Government entered into an
agreement whereby the Government agreed to
withdraw its opposition to the application for
registration of title over the portion known as
Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the
roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to
remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance,
of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all
the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496
as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On
December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration
rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680
and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that
during the registration proceedings the plans
accompanying the two applications were amended in
order to exclude certain areas that were the subject
of opposition, that the order of general default was
confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of
the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit
a report as to whether or not the new (amended)
plans had included lands which were not by the
original plans, and whether or not the new plans had
excluded the lands that had already been covered by
the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further
stated that in the event that the new plans did not
include new parcels of land and that the lands that
were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563
had been excluded, an additional decision would be
made decreeing the adjudication and registration of
the lands that were the subject of the registration
proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6)
undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la
Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion;
to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth
(1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the
decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on
January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the
court which, among others, stated that the new plan
of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land
that had not been previously included in the original
plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration
rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on
the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and
of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land
Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y
de la Paz and others were the owners of the land
applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the
proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering
that the land applied for be registered in the names
of the applicants and that a decree of registration be
issued in accordance with the decision and the
amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of the
Survey Division addressed a communication to the
registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681,
suggesting that the decision of the court of March 7,
1914 be modified such that the decree of registration
be based upon the original plan as published and not
upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land
Registration did not follow the recommendation of
the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914
Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the
52
Chief of the General Land Registration Office
pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land
Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The
decree contains the technical description of the two
parcels of land in accordance with the plan as
amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has
an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less,
or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area
of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the
application for registration and in the notice of
hearing which were published in the Official Gazette
of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of
15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a
decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of
16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the
application and in the notice of hearing that were
published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All
in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square
meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of
land sought to be registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds
of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y
de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio
Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).
1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by
the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 null and void ab initio because, according to
said court, that title was based on Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null
and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to
a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC
No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said
decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1,
known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known
as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these
two parcels of land had been subdivided into
numerous lots, and most of those lots had sold to
numerous parties — Parcel 1 having been converted
into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights
Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private
individual and entities, such that in that subdivision
now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital,
the station of Pangasinan Transportation Co.
(Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church
and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the
lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer
certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of
the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were
based upon transfer certificates of title that
emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The trial court declared null and void all transfer
certificates of title emanating, or derived, from
Original Certificate of No. 735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and
void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735
would invalidate the title over the entire area
included in Parcel 1 — which admittedly includes the
six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also
the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let
it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10
square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area
of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the
six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an
aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters,
more or less. In other words, the area of the six
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little
over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial
court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785,
without any qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land
Registration had no jurisdiction to render the
decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the
registration proceedings, after the original
application and notice of hearing had been duly
published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no
publication regarding the amended plan was made.
The trial court pointed out that the area and the
description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No.
17431 are not identical with the area and description
of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official
Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that
publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an
application for registration and to order the issuance
of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496
(Land Registration Act).
We believe that the lower court erred when it held
that the Land Registration Court was without
jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court
may allow, or order, an amendment of the
application for registration when it appears to the
court that the amendment is necessary and proper.
Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at
any time order an application to be amended by
striking out one or more parcels or by severance of
the application. The amendment may be made in the
application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the
application and the survey plan go together. If the
amendment consists in the inclusion in the
53
application for registration of an area or parcel of
land not previously included in the original
application, as published, a new publication of the
amended application must be made. The purpose of
the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application.
Without a new publication the registration court can
not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of
land that is added to the area covered by the original
application, and the decision of the registration court
would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns
the newly included land.11 The reason is because
without a new publication, the law is infringed with
respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the
opportunity to present their claim might be
prejudiced in their rights because of failure of
notice.12 But if the amendment consists in the
exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the
original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not
necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the
court over the remaining area is not affected by the
failure of a new publication.14
In the case at bar We find that the original plan
covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was
amended in order to exclude certain areas that were
the subject of opposition, or which were the subject
of another registration case; and the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was
ordered to determine whether the amended plan
included lands or areas not included in the original
plan. In compliance with the order of the registration
court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the
court that no new parcels were included in the new
(or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court
of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681,
dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the
following:
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos
solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmendaronlos
planos unidos a los mismos para excluir ciertas
porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.
xxx xxx xxx
POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se
ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de
este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido
en los planos originales ...."15
On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division
of the Court of Land Registration made a report to
the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We read
the following:.
Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1
de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de
Diciembre proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues
de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los
Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de
informar:
1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los
solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a,
del Expedients No. 7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No.
7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano
Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas
1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del
7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales.16
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of
Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7,
1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the
Survey Division was taken into consideration and the
court ordered the registration of the lands applied
for by the applicants as described in the amended
plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado").
It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No.
7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not
previously included in the original plan which
accompanied the application that had been
published in the Official Gazette. There was,
therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the
amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land
Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to
order the issuance of Decree of Registration No.
17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735
was based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on
the validity of the very same Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null
and void in the three cases now before this Court. In
the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Acuña (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants
(Pascual Acuña and others) precisely upon the
ground that during the registration proceedings,
which brought about the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the
applicants was ordered amended, and no new
publication was made of the amended plan and so it
was urged that the registration court did not have
jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of
54
registration in favor of the applicants. The action in
this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the
purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual
Acuña and others certain lands included in the Santa
Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of
Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal.
Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
declared that none of the defendants owned any part
of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court
observed that the character in which the plaintiff
sued was not open to question, and the material
facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate,
referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title
to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600
hectares located in the province of Rizal. This
property was then covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates
dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3792 emanated from Or Certificate of Title
No. 735.17The appellants precisely sought to nullify
the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which
emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in
the three cases at bar, that during the registration
proceedings the original plan of the lands known as
the Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no
publication was made of the amended plan.
Regarding the question of the non-publication of the
amended plan, this Court said:
Among the arguments made by the appellants of the
Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title
relied by the plaintiff is void, and in support of this
contention it stated that, during the course of the
registration proceedings, an order was made by the
court for the amendment of the applicants and that
this order was not followed by new publication,
wherefore, it is supposed the court was without
jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In
this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine
stated in the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs.
Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the
appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the
rule stated in the case cited has reference to an
amendment of the plan by which additional land,
different from that included in the original survey is
intended to be brought within the process of
registration. In the case before us, the order referred
to was for the exclusion of certain portions of the
land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine
of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does
not appear that the portion intended to be excluded
comprehended any part of the land which had been
usurped. 18
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña, supra, is
not applicable to the three cases now before this
Court because what was involved in said case was
Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and
not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases.
This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The
decision in that case states that the action was
instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among
others, of recovering from Pascual Acuña and others
"certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman
Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and
Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San
Juan del Monte."19 But what matters is the doctrine
that was laid down by this Court in that case that is:
that when the original survey plan is amended, after
the publication of the application in order to include
land not previously included in the original survey, a
new publication of the amended plan is necessary in
order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration
court to order the registration of the land that is
added to what was included in the original survey
plan. The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in
the three cases now before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that
publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should
have been made because it appears in the Decree of
Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said
parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the
application as published in the Official Gazette; and,
also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the
decree are not identical with the boundaries stated
in the application as published in the Official Gazette.
We paid particular attention on this point of the
lower court's decision, and our impression is that the
trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies
between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of
registration and its description in the original
application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to
render a decision on the amended plan, boundary
descriptions, and additional lands comprised within
Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such
amended plan, boundary description, technical
description and additional areas is necessary to
confer jurisdiction upon the Court."20
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the
area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration
is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application
as published, it did not mention the fact that the
difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We
believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is
too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the
55
determination of the validity of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower
court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a
basis for ruling that because in the amended plan
there is this increase in area as compared to the area
appearing in the application as published, the Land
Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render
the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in
LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the
Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court
of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new
plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land that was not
included in the original plan. That report was made
precisely in compliance with the order of the
registration court, in the decision of December 29,
1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los
nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya
sido comprendido en los planos originales". That
report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues
de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los
expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances,
our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters
was already included in the original plan, and that
the computation of the area in the original survey
must have been inaccurate; and the error was
corrected in the recomputation of the area when the
amended plan was prepared. We made a careful
study and comparison of the technical description of
Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published,
and the technical description appearing in Decree of
Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and
We accept the explanation of counsel for the
appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square
meters had been brought about "by the fact that
when the amendment of the plan was made, the
distances and bearings in a few points along the
southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were
brought to the nearest millimeter and to the nearest
second respectively; whereas, the computation of
the survey in the original plan was to the nearest
decimeter and to the nearest minute only".21 We
believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square
meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower
court that "the amended plan ... included additional
lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1
as published in the Official Gazette." It being
undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than
8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We
believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the
original plan was made and the computation of the
area when the amended plan was prepared, can not
be considered substantial as would affect the identity
of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this
area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location,
in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The
appellees did not even attempt to show that this
excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within
the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot,
therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters
as an area that was separate and distinct from, and
was added to, the land that was covered by the
original survey plan, such that the publication of the
amended plan would be necessary in order that the
registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that
area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10
square meters was simply the result of the
recomputation of the area when the original plan
was amended. There is no showing that the
recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a
showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters
belongs to any person and that person had been
deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that
particular area because of the non-publication of the
amended plan. On the other hand, there is the report
of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of
Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended
plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any
land which was not included in the original plan.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in
cases where the original survey plan is amended
during the registration proceedings by the addition of
lands not previously included in the original plan
should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of
the area that was added after the publication of the
original plan.22
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration
court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel,
or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in
virtue of the publication of the application, that
jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned
and described in the application. If it is later shown
that the decree of registration had included land or
lands not included in the original application as
published, then the registration proceedings and the
decree of registration must be declared null and void
in so far — but only in so far — as the land not
included in the publication is concerned. This is so,
because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the land not included in the publication-the
publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the
court. But the proceedings and the decree of
registration, relating to the lands that were included
in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a
certificate of title had been issued covering lands
where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the
certificate of title is null and void insofar as it
concerns the land or lands over which the registration
court had not acquired jurisdiction.23
56
And so in the three cases now before this Court, even
granting that the registration court had no
jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square
meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the
lower court could have done was to nullify the
decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area
of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can
be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could
not declare, and should not have declared, null and
void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and,
certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and
void ab initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which
covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10
square meters but also the remaining area of
8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire
area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The
trial court, in its decision, declared Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the
very beginning and of no effect whatsoever", without
any qualification. This declaration by the lower court,
if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would
nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land
(Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of
24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476
hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared
null and void all transfer certificates of title that are
derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer
certificates of title are the results of transactions
done in good faith and for value by the holder of
those transfer certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present
cases claim six parcels that have an area of some
495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares),
whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2
is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476
hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1
and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous
lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been
acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that
are now holding certificates of title which can be
traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The decision of the lower court, however, would
render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735
and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or
derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court
would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons,
both natural and juridical, who had acquired portions
of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of
the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the
lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of
persons who are not parties in the present cases.
And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision,
did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this
Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to
support its ruling that Decree of Registration No.
17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel
1 in the decree of registration is different from the
description of the same parcel in the notice of
hearing of the original application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette. The different
description that appears in the decree of registration,
according to the lower court, is an amendment to the
Original survey plan that accompanied the
application and the amended survey plan should
have been republished; and because there was no
such republication the registration court was without
jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The
lower court also committed an error in making this
ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid
stress on differences in the names of the owners, and
on differences in the designations, of the lands that
adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern boundary. We
find, however, that these differences are well
explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY
and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as
follows:
Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao
and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River;
SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda,
Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara
Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road,
Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic
Church.
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431
(Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:
PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario
Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E.
by San Juan River; on the SW. by properties of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito
Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W.
Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road,
Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman
Catholic Church ...
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1
on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they
appear in the notice of hearing that was published
and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the
same. It is in the southwestern boundary where
there appear some differences in the names of the
owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands.
Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears
that the names of the owners, or the designations, of
the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on
the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito
Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2,
57
Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the
decree of registration it appears that the lands that
bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest
are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de
Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful
examination of the records, We find that the lands
that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as
indicated in the notice of hearing that was published
in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are
indicated in the decree of registration as the lands
that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary.
There is simply a change in the names of the owners
or in the designations, of the lands. We find that
parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands
on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681,
as published, are in fact parcels of land that are
owned, and had been applied for registration, by
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No.
7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided
jointly with LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration
Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No.
7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason
y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the
decree of registration that those lands on the
southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the
properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et
al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2,
and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And so, what appears in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the
southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than
those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the
notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on
the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears
that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side
is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of
registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do
not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words
"C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that
during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel
1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who
prepared the amended plan must have found that
what used to be the property of the Santa Clara
Monastery at the time of the original Survey was
already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when
the amended plan was prepared. This can simply
mean that there was a change of ownership from
Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It
must be considered that the original survey took
place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits
18 and 19), while the registration case was decided
on March 7, 1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of
registration "shall contain a description of the land as
finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court
of Land Registration acted in consonance with this
provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681,
it took into consideration the actual description of
Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and
when it disregarded the recommendation of the
Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914,
that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be
based upon the original plans, as published, and not
upon the amended plan." It may well be said that
Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the
correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the
owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No.
1681 as of the time when the decision of the land
registration court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of
this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55
Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:
We may further observe that underlying the
contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in
the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is
erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is
registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875,
practically all plans for land registration were
defective especially in regard to errors of closures
and areas, but so far no such errors have been
permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the
boundaries of the land registered can be determined,
the technical description in the certificate of title may
be corrected without cancelling the decree. Such
corrections have been made in this case by approved
surveys which embrace all of the land here in
question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely
by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead
to chaos.
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of
land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three
cases now before this Court are on the northwestern
portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and
F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far
from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance,
therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of
the owners, or the designations, of the lands that
adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no
moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are
concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by
the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No.
1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of
said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the
lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring
Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original
58
Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no
effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in
the names of the owners, or in the designations, of
the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1,
because those dissimilarities are well explained in the
records of these cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it
made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1
on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then
declared that the lands situated west of the A.
Bonifacio road were never the subject of the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower
court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as
unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of
those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621
and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-
26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to
the evidence presented by the parties in these cases.
Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as
their evidence the notice of hearing of the
application as published in the Official Gazette
(Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the
decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh.
25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of
Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio
del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6,
UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court
considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only
boundary on the West, and ignored the two other
boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in
the notice of hearing as published and in the decree
of registration. The sketches and the survey plans,
forming part of the evidence on record, show that
the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside
the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1
and the Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a
point where it traverses the northwestern portion of
Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the
area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the
western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the
Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and
29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del
Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other
boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court
declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road,
which form part of the lands that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are
outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and
that those particular areas had remained as
unregistered lands and are not covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower
court is contrary to the very admission of the
appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six
parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area
of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in
the amended complaint, in each of these three cases,
the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim
"had either been fraudulently or erroneously
included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate)
of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the Province of Rizal."24 In their appeal
brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both
the appellees and the appellant admit that these
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three
(3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735".25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of
December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of
land litigated in these are portions of the lands
covered by OCT No. 735.26The lower court itself, at
the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the
plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels
of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623 are found within the boundaries of the present
Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735"27 The appellees in these
two cases had never asserted that part of the lands
that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel
1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they
claim have remained unregistered and not covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower
court had made a finding not only contrary to the
evidence of the appellees but even more than what
the appellees asked when it said in its decision that
the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A.
Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the
appellees west of this road had never been
registered. This Court certainly can not give its
approval to the findings and rulings of the lower
court that are patently erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void
upon the ground that the decree of registration was
not transcribed in the Registration Book in
accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act
496. In its decision, the lower court said:
During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of
Title was brought to the Court. The Court had
occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the
Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of
the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should
be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing
the technical description which should be page 2 is
Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have
been Page 1, contained the last portion of the
description of the land described in the decree. The
sheet containing the bulk of the description of the
lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-
called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on
Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
59
is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of
Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not
been complied with. Said Section requires that the
entry in the Registration Book must be a
transcription of the Decree and the paging should
consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... 28
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496
reads, as follows:
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court
directing the registration of any property, the clerk
shall send a certified copy of such decision to the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who
shall prepare the decree in accordance with section
forty of Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six,
and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree
to the register of deeds of the province or city in
which the property is situated. The register of deeds
shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the
"Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in
consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to
each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in
this book in each case shall be the original certificate
of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with
the seal of his office....
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496
reads, as follows:
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the
day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and
shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the
owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the
name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under
disability, it shall state the nature of the disability,
and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a
description of the land as finally determined by the
court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient
form for transcription upon the certificates of title
hereinafter mentioned.
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the
decree of title has been registered in the office of the
register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one,
the property included in said decree shall become
registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496
provides that the certificate shall take effect upon
the date of the transcription of the decree.
This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of
Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the
decree of registration made by the register of deeds
in the registry.29
The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the
Registration Book in the office of the register of
deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50).30 We have examined this
document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy
of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a
valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and
41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is
the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration
Office that the decree of registration was registered
in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the
certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the
decree was received for transcription in his office on
July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face
of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree
No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at
Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No.
7681 of said court. The names of the declared
owners, their civil status, their spouses if married,
and their respective interest or share in the lands
covered by the title are stated on the face of this
title. We have noted that the technical descriptions
of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are
copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have
compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and
2 as they appear on this photostat of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the
technical descriptions of these lands as they appear
in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the
plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We
find that the technical descriptions appearing on the
title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or
transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing
in the decree of registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin
on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a
technical description is ordinarily copied on the
certificate of title. What appears on the face of this
title is the last part of the technical description of
Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2
begin on the second page and end on the first page.
This circumstance, that is, that the technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the
face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of
the lower court in ruling that the decree of
registration was not transcribed in the registration
book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and
so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void.
We have noted, however, that in its decision the
lower court made no mention that in the
transcription of the decree in the registration book
any of the data that is required in Section 40 of Act
496 to be included had been omitted. We have also
noted — and this fact is undenied — that the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they
appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully
and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original
60
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no
showing that the manner of transcribing the decree,
as it appears on that photostat, was done for a
fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead.
Considering that the decree of registration is fully
transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as
copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the
circumstance that the beginning of the technical
descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first
page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a
ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree
with the lower court that the transcription of the
technical descriptions should begin, or should have
been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the
title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was
not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in
determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the
technical descriptions should be considered as a
formal, and not a substantial, defect. What matters is
that the original certificate of title contains the full
transcription of the decree of registration, and that
the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act
496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The
lower court made a literal construction of the
provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly
applied its construction in the determination of the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We
believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496
should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with
Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act
shall be construed liberally so far as may be
necessary for the purpose of effecting its general
intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the
provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by
the lower court, such that the defect in the manner
or form of transcribing the decree in the registration
book would render null and void the original
certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity
or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend
on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the
office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds,
or an employee in his office, can wittingly or
unwittingly render useless a decree of registration
regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a
registration court and thus nullify by the error that
he commits in the transcription of the decree in the
Registration Book an original certificate of title that
has been existing for years. This strict interpretation
or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would
certainly not promote the purpose of the Land
Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to
ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a
given landed property31; to make, so far as it is
possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to
the owner of the land absolute proof of such title32;
to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any
question of legality of title33; and to decree that land
title shall be final, irrevocable and
indisputable. 34
We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the
transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in
the Registration Book did not render null and void
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently,
We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1
which includes the lands claimed by the appellees,
and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens
System of registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the
present appeal is whether or not the lower court had
correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning
and of no effect whatsoever. 35
In the preceding discussions, We have held that the
lower court erred when it declared null and void
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found
that the registration proceedings that brought about
the decree of registration upon which was based the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were
in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as
amended. We have held that the Land Registration
Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of
registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the
application for registration filed by Mariano Severo,
Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and
Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz.
The records show that the notice of hearing of the
application, which embodied the technical
descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1,
known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known
as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as
required by law. The records show that the hearing
on the application was regularly held, and that the
registration court had seen to it that no land which
was not included in the original survey plan and not
covered by the original application was made the
subject of the registration proceedings. We have
found that the decree of registration was properly
issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to
the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that
said decree of registration was fully transcribed in
the Registration Book in the office of the Register of
Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also
that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the
appellees. in the three cases now before Us are all
included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.
61
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in accordance
with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six
parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in
the present cases are covered by said certificate of
title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether
or not the appellees still have any legal right over the
six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the
appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to
recover the ownership and possession of the six
parcels of land mentioned and described in their
complaints. The appellees would accomplish their
objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the
nullification of the decision of the Land Registration
Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree
of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in
their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered
valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to
them by the defendants named in their complaints,
including herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of
the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they
cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure
payment to them by the defendants named in their
complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of
land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of
their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in
asserting the rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the
reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had
been wrongly registered in the name of another
person must recognize the validity of the certificate
of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a
reconveyance may only take place if the land that is
claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in
the name of the person who procured the wrongful
registration. No action for reconveyance can take
place as against a third party who had acquired title
over the registered property in good faith and for
value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the
value of the property registered may be demanded
only from the person (or persons) who procured the
wrongful registration in his name.36
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the
assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in
LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were
null and void and that Original Certificate of Title No.
735 is null and void ab initioand of no effect. The trial
court even went to the extent of declaring that some
of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127
and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court
forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the
parcels of land claimed by them, as described in their
complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon
declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and
void, did not make any statement, or observation,
regarding the status or situation of the remaining
lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees
the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had
maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the
lower court was correct in annulling Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in
favor of the appellees the ownership and possession
of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court
erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735
void and of no effect. We have held that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of
the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which
was regular and that said certificate of title is valid
and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in
rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to
the decision rendered in said registration case bound
the lands covered by the decree and quieted title
thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice or citation, or included in the
general inscription "To whom it may concern", and
such decree will not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court
for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may
only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud would file in the
competent court of first instance a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree,
provided no innocent purchaser for value had
acquired an interest on the land, and upon the
expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or
the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree,
is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now
before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in
LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is
undisputed that no person had filed any petition for
review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681
within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That
decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title
62
No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been
incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired
interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735.37
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on
July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an applicants
for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason
y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz
and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those
who were registered as the original owners
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
When the original complaints were filed in these
three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the
parties named defendants in each of the three cases
were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa
Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la
Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta
Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of
these defendants (without naming them), and J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named in the
three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints.
All the other defendants did not appear, and so they
were all declared in default.38 It had to happen that
way because as of the time when the three
complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the
ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already
passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact
this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided
and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the
Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became
involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.39 During the pendency of the case the
properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were
administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as
the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case
No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to
execute, upon payment to it of the sum of
P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in
favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997,
which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13,
1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands
executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh.
13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the
name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and
36). The deed of transfer and assignment was
approved by the court in an order dated June 17,
1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
took place at a time when the Supreme Court had
already decided the case of Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court
upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of
title emanating therefrom.40
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 — which was
formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 — clearly indicate that said corporation
acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser
in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same
property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name
of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We
do not find any evidence in the record that would
sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason
given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact
that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
were practically the same persons belonging to the
same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if
some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are
also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
During these days when businesses are promoted,
operated, and managed, through corporate entities,
it is not surprising to see two or more corporations
organized by the same persons or group of persons
with different purposes, for different lines of
business and with distinct or separate assets and
interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of
the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized,
and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for
the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
had acquired the land originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 in a transaction that was
authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration,
thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a
purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it
transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold
same property to the latter was also a good title, and
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good
63
faith and for value — even if it appears that the
incorporators of the two corporations belong to the
same Tuason family. The records of these cases are
bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the
sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith
is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was
aware of the fact that the appellees or their
predecessors in interest were in possession of, and
were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now
claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower
court is too strained. It should be remembered that
the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could
happen that certain relatives or ancestors of
appellees had been squatting on some portions of
the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to
the extent of having the areas claimed by them
declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus
the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations
that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have
noted, however, that at the back of those tax
declarations are written the words "This parcel is a
duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-
Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-
Pili).41 These annotations simply reveal that when the
predecessors of the appellees had those tax
declarations made to cover the lands that they claim,
those lands were already included in the tax
declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been
exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over
the lands in question after it bought the same from
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.42This is borne by the
statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955,
issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was
presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal where these three were pending, as follows:
3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had
title covering the land in question which they are
subdividing into small lots for sale and in view of the
observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court
finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain
the writ of preliminary injunction that has been
issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622,
defendants having secured a final judgment against
plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for
ejectment before the Municipal court of Quezon City;
and such injunction would annul the order of the
execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should
be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning
pleaded to the Court that the area on which their
respective houses stand be not touched and their
possession thereof be respected by defendant J. M.
& Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking
for about 250 square meters each which represents
the land on which the house stands and their
immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by
these three or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the
Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of
P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to
answer for whatever damages he may suffer by
reason of the continuance during the action of the
acts complained
43
of.
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest,
if there was such possession at all, would be
unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate
of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question.
From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735
was issued, no possession by any person of any
portion of the lands covered by said original
certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent
transfer certificate of title derived from said original
certificate of title, could defeat the title of the
registered owner of the lands covered by the
certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted
that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the
registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only
on June 15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when
it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo
Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.)
when it bought the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial
receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court.
We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court
when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a
purchaser on bad faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six
parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and
numerous persons and entities had purchased the
subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were
issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots
that they bought, based on the transfer certificate of
title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The
buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in
64
the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because
they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in
good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots
have built thereon residential houses, office
buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the
lower court, disregarding these circumstances,
declared null and void all transfer certificates of title
that emanated, or that were derived, from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error
committed by the lower court. And the error is
compounded when the lower court ordered
appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those
claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore
to the appellees the possession of the parcels of
lands that are claimed by them in the present cases.
The possessors of the lots comprised within the six
parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates
of title covering the lots that they bought, are not
parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of
the lower court would annul their titles and compel
them to give up the possession of their properties. To
give effect to the decision of the lower court is to
deprive persons of their property without due
process of law.44 The decision of the lower court
would set at naught the settled doctrine that the
holder of a certificate of title who acquired the
property covered by the title in good faith and for
value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible.45
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that
the action of the appellees in the three cases now
before this Court must fail..
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which
includes the six parcels that are claimed by the
appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest
of the appellees — or any person, for that matter —
had not filed a petition for the review of the decree
of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one
year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
registration was issued, is a circumstance that had
forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of
said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of
registration had become incontrovertible. An action,
similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the
present cases, which attack collaterally the said
decree of registration cannot be
46
entertained. Neither may the action of the
appellees for reconveyance of the lands in question
be entertained because such action had already
prescribed, barred by laches, considering that
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued
way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present
cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a
lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time
when these complaints were filed the six parcels of
land claimed by the appellees are no longer covered
by the certificate of title in the names of the persons
who procured the original registration of those lands.
The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of
land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the
hands parties who were innocent purchase for value.
This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735, was subsequently covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown,
this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the
Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of
the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and
the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in
the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was
cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073
was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It
has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous
persons and entities bought those subdivision lots,
and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates
of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very
clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance
cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
much less against the registered owners of the lots
that form parts of the six parcels of land that are
claimed by the appellees.47
Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for
damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
considering that said appellant is not one of the
original registered owners that procured the
registration of the land. There is no evidence that J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the
registration proceedings which brought about the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 —
even supposing that the registration was procured
fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court,
dealing on questions regarding the validity and
ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The rulings of this Court in those cases are
necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the
resolution of the issues involved in the three cases
now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil., 183), where the
jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that
issued the decree which was the basis of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court
and categorically pronounced the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.
65
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus
Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998,
Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court
declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is
incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons
claiming, either by themselves or by their
predecessors in interest, rights over the lands
covered by said certificate of title.
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related
to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court
in that former case are of decisive application to
these three cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch)
by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro
de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and
Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz,
Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among
the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before
this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose
Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in
Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and
Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156
claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of
the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of
their complaint — Jose Alcantara claiming two
parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and
Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is
alleged in the complaint48 that each plaintiff, by
himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful
owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous
possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of
land from time immemorial until January 1950 when
the defendants by force and by the use of armed
men started to convert their lands into a subdivision;
that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of
land which included the lands possessed by them
(plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had
been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years
before the issuance of the title; that the silence and
inaction of the defendants since the date of their
original certificate of title showed that said certificate
of title did not express the status of the their claim to
the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal
notice by the defendants of the registration of the
lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No.
735 was not in accordance with law, and that
defendants did not have proper title for registration
to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as
described in the complaint; and that because the
certificate of title issued by the register of deeds was
still in the names of the defendants, successors in
interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not
passed to innocent parties for valuable
consideration, the conveyance of the same to the
plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that
therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance of the parcels of land described in their
complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the
defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the
corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the
names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
The material allegations of the complaint are: that
plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth
in their complaint, which parcels are situated along
Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and
that they have been in actual, open, and continuous
possession and enjoyment thereof without
molestation from defendants from time immemorial
to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants
obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel
of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and
which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as
owners more than 30 years before the issuance of
said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused
the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land;
and that defendants did not file any action against
plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their
title, in violation of the "due process of law" clause of
the Constitution. There are other allegations which
really are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that
defendants could not acquire title by the registration
proceedings against the lawful holder, especially
without formal notice, because registration is to
confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the
defendants since the issuance of their title shows
that this does not express the lawful status of their
claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it states no of action
and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute
of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the
second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with the same substantial
allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in
January, 1950, that they learned that their lands
were included in the registration proceedings which
culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that
defendants never claimed ownership to the lands,
but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to
continue exercising their rights of ownership over the
same. This amended complaint was denied
admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of
the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the
appeal.
66
In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing
the complaint, this Court held:
Without considering whether the trial court's refusal
to admit the amended complaint is erroneous or not
we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the
action, even with the amended complaint is a basis
thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the
original and amended complaints, it appears that the
defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued
on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration
proceedings. There is no allegation in both original
and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not
notified, or were not aware, of the registration
proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as
occupants proper notices thereof were served on
them and that they were aware of said proceedings.
If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose
predecessors in interest were, on the land during the
registration proceedings, were bound by said
proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the
whole world, whether served with notice personally
or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the
decree of registration, in pursuance of which
defendants' title was issued, binds the land and
quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the
plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The
supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged
continued possession for thirty years was, therefore,
destroyed fully and completely by the registration
proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the
inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the
effects of the registration proceedings, and the
supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs
to continue on the land after registration can not
serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because
acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an
owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942,
Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act).
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the
Philippine Island vs. Acuña case, supra, this Court
upheld the validity of the registration proceedings
which culminated in the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that
"the decree of registration, in pursuance of which
defendants' title was issued, binds the land and
quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the
plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision,
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them
Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their
successors-in-interest, could no longer question the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor
claim any right of ownership over any portion of the
land that is covered by said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again
came to court to claim ownership over portions of
the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his
brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed
Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his
brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and
Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil
Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which
originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) which are now before this
Court on appeal.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed
out that the complaints in these three cases had
been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all
the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the
owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs
in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No.
3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto
Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint and the common
predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to
include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged
owner of the two parcels of land described in the
complaint and the common predecessor in interest
of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil
Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs
of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel
of land described in the complaint and the common
predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein)
filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground
"that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is
barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of
limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of
the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower
court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its
answer to the complaint in each of these three cases,
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses
the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the
plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss
upon the ground that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and
that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to
prove their claim of ownership. This second motion
to dismiss was also denied by the lower court.49
67
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this
Court, the lower court held that the decision in
the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in
these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of
the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of
action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one
hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on
the other.
It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.
Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred
in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res
judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on
said ground."50
Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara
case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in
the three cases at bar?
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the
following requisites must be present: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and the second actions, identity of
parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San
Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156
(G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits
that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the parties. The only
requisite for res judicata which we have to determine
is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998),
on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and
3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the
other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action.
In our examination of the records and the evidence,
We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the
lower court's pretrial order dated December 18,
1957, which was based on the agreement of the
parties, it is stated
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-
156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of
land litigated in them cases Nos. 3621, 8622 and
3623. 51
We also find that there is identity of cause of action.
It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint
(Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the
Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of
action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged
fact that the defendants had dispossessed and
deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land
described in the complaint, which were claimed by
the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had
been in actual, open and continuous possession from
time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly
included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was
obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar,
plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having
been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants
of the parcels of land of which they were absolute
owners and possessors, by themselves and through
their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial
and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was
obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156,
on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar,
on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the
nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land
that they claim as theirs.52 It appears clear to Us that
in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar,
the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover
the ownership and possession of the same parcels of
land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We find that
there is no exact identity of parties between Civil
Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears
that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual
Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil
Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano
Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while
in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the
defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta,
Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all
surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing
as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title
No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
We find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason,
and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the
Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel
1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The
defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-
156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So,
the parties defendants in all these cases are
practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil
Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the
plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view
that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to
the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias
Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of
plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R.
68
No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case
No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res
adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view
that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve
to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine
of stare decisis.
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were
Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two
brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it
was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had
another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban
Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin
brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted
by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil
Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1)
the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta
Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of
Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan
Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died,
and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of
the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the
plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and
(2) Jose A. Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were
Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint,
it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two
brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili
and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their
heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her
heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was
decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego
Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa
Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a
plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still
living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623
Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was
a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantara case) is a
final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a
court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the parties, and that there is identity of
subject matter and cause of action between Civil
Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it
appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in
Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose
Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-
156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a
party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil
Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case
No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623 are practically the same persons and/or
entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a
previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies
to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in
interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and
his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No.
3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in
interest in Civil Case No. 3623.53
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint on their
being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin
who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs
base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of
land described in their complaint on their being the
heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara
who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs
base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of
land described in their complaint on their being the
heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who
died in 1931.
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili,
alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156
(which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners
of the parcels of land specified in their complaint,
having inherited the same from their ancestors and
had been in possession of the same from time
immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of
Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili,
respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the
plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili
and all the other plaintiffs were their respective
ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso
Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case
may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso
Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931,
it is obvious that during all the time when the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking
place before the Court of Land Registration, which
culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso
Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The records
show that no one of these three persons, or their
representative, had filed any opposition to the
application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did
69
any one of them, or their representative, file any
petition for review of the decree of registration No.
17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this
Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the
complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual
Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No.
Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias
Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual
Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623, respectively, but also against all the other
plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is
different from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil
Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that
claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156.
And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not
claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual
Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same
right, based on the alleged ownership of their
respective common predecessor in interest — in Civil
Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in interest
being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common
predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and
in Civil Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in
interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156
Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the
ownership of his predecessor in interest who
necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon
the ownership of his predecessor in interest who
necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual
Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in
interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It
follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in
G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held
untenable the cause of action of the successors in
interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of
Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and
possession of any land covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause
of action of all other persons who claim to be
successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso
Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered
by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to,
Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in
1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three
predecessors in interest of the appellees died long
after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, which took place on July 8, 1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in
these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs
Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil
Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 —
the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case,
still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the
effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in
interest were bound by the proceedings in the
registration court which culminated in the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and
applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases,
because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is
based on the same predecessors in interest of
plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili
in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be said that
the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127
(Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or
successors in interest of Sixto Benin were
represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156
(G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128
(Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or
successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were
represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156
(G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129
(Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or
successors in interest of Candido Pili were
represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156
(G.R. No. L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23,
1960) 55, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin
to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M.
Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their
ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a
parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to
their complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish
government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio
Santiago had since then been in possession of the
aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and
adversely until his death, when his two children,
Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own
and possess said land pro indiviso in the same
character as that of their predecessor that upon the
death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land
was inherited by his eleven children who, together
with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess
the land in the same character as that of their
predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came
to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously
filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil
Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of
possession" against five of the children of Isaias
Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they
were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by
its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the
70
judgment in Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they
(Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as
parties, had already become
57
final ; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the
judgment against them, excluding and rusting them
from the enjoyment and possession of the land.
Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No.
735 from which the former was derived, did not
include the parcel claimed by them; that even
granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of
that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor
their predecessors, were not actually notified of the
registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation
of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged
that the technical description in Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas
never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land
Registration Court, since they were areas not
included in the application and publication in the
registration proceedings; that long before the
predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for,
and secured, registration of the land which included
their parcel of land they had already acquired
ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex
A of their complaint, but also by acquisitive
prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs
prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to
desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against
them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine
whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
(37679) included the land described in their
complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered
of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may
be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No.
119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered
cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of
title embracing only those lands included in the
application, publication and/or decree in LRC No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed
the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the
grounds that there was no cause of action, that the
case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs,
if they had any, had prescribed.
This Court affirmed the order of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her
co-plaintiffs.58Regarding the contention of Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in
the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in
G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res
judicata against them because they were not parties
in that suit, and that they did not derive their title
from the defendants in the previous suit, this Court
held:
We agree with appellants that the decision in the
preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the
appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs of
Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11,
5727), can not constitute res judicata against these
appellants who were not parties to that suit and do
not derive their title from the defendants in the
previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is
authority for the proposition that a judgment may be
made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one
who, although not a formal party to a previous suit,
has actually conducted or controlled the action or
defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was
adequately represented in such previous litigation;
but no clear proof of the existence of such
exceptional circumstance is before us in the present
case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners
are not privies inter se in relation to the property
owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx
But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are
not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former
litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No.
L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made
in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish
document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio
Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither
a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title
by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested
no ownership over the land therein described in
favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to
herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect
of the document does not depend upon the person
who invoke it.
If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the
owner of the disputed property by virtue of the
document Annex A, then appellants herein, as heirs
of Ynocencio have not acquired such ownership
either. It follows that the first and second causes of
action of their complaint, predicated as they are on
the assumption that such ownership and its
consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must
necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain
of no invasion of dominical rights.
It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned
decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago
71
and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if
they were not parties in that previous case, this Court
nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No.
L-5079) in that previous case where it was
pronounced that the document, Annex A of the
complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither
a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title
by composision con el estado, and it did not establish
the right of ownership of their predecessor in
interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her
co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on
that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in that
previous case that the document was unavailing
against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of
Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision
in the Santiago case, in the three cases at bar We
hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621,
except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias
Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156;
even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except
Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and
were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual
Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not
parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the
pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that
previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the
plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in
interest were bound by the registration proceedings
which culminated in the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all
the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In
that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain,
the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of
herein appellees over the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees,
therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can
derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of
title that are derived from said original certificate of
title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the
contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs
that the registration proceedings which resulted in
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not
personally notified of the registration proceedings
that resulted in a decree of registration of title in
favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in
itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the
decree. The registration proceedings, as
proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole
world and the decree issued therein is conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who
appeared in such proceedings but also against parties
who were summoned by publication but did not
appear. The registration by the appellee's
predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims
and liens of whatever character that existed against
the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of
title, except those noted in the certificate and legal
encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and
Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In
addition, there being no allegation that the
registered owners procured the non-appearance of
appellants at the registration proceedings, and very
much more than one year having elapsed from the
issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither
revocation of such decree nor a decree of
reconveyance are obtainable any more.
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription
over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court
held:
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title
in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a
cause of action. If such prescription was
completed before the registration of the land in favor
of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut
off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If,
on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or
completed after the decree of registration, it
conferred no title because, by express provision of
law, prescription cannot operate against the
registered owner (Act 496, section 46).
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case,
this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued
as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C.
No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are
many other cases where this Court has made a
similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate
of Title No. 735.60
In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have
hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by
the appellant, the lower court also erred when it
declared the appellees the owners of the lands
claimed by them and in awarding damages to them,
in these three cases.61
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the
counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for
damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 62,
72
considering, as the records show, that the appellees
are persons who are not in a position to pay damages
in any form. 63 We believe that the appellees had
filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken,
belief that they have a good cause of action against
the appellant corporation and not because they
meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who
are identified or connected with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages
Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is
reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in
the three cases in the court below for the lifting of
the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered
cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168848 June 30, 2009
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE
LUZURIAGA,1 represented by JOSE DE LUZURIAGA,
JR., HEIRS OF MANUEL R. DE LUZURIAGA, HEIRS OF
THE LATE REMEDIOS DE LUZURIAGA-VALERO, and
THE LATE NORMA DE LUZURIAGA
DIANON, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169019 June 30, 2009
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA,
represented by JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, JR., and HEIRS
OF THE LATE REMEDIOS DE LUZURIAGA-VALERO
AND THE LATE NORMA DE LUZURIAGA-
DIANON, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us are two petitions under Rule 45 interposed
by the heirs of the late Jose De Luzuriaga, assailing
the November 26, 2004 Decision2 and May 25, 2005
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75321. The first is a Verified Petition for Review
on Certiorari under G.R. No. 169019, while the
second is styled Supplemental Petition and docketed
as G.R. No. 168848.
The assailed CA decision and resolution reversed and
set aside the Orders dated August 31, 20014 and
October 24, 20025 in Cadastral Case No. 97-583 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51 in Bacolod
City.
The Facts
Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1524 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1524 of the Cadastral Survey
of Bacolod), with the improvements thereon,
situated in the Municipality of Bacolod. Bounded on
the N. and NE., by the Lupit or Magsungay Pequeño
River; on the SE., by Calle Araneta and Lots Nos. 440,
442 and 441; on the SW., by the Sapa Mamlot; and
on the W. by Creeks x x x; containing an area of [TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY TWO (268,772) square meters], more
or less.6
On May 16, 1997, petitioners filed an Application for
the Registration of Title, docketed as Cad. Case No.
97-583 before the RTC. In it, the subject lot was
specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774,
Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City of
Bacolod, Island of Negros. The survey plan,
conducted by Geodetic Engineer Eluminado E.
Nessia, Jr. and duly approved on May 17, 1997 by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Regional Office, Iloilo City; and the technical
description of the subject lot, prepared by the Office
of the Regional Technical Director, Land
Management Services, DENR, Region VI, Iloilo City,
were submitted to the RTC.
On May 12, 1998, the application was amended to
state, thus: "x x x that the parcel of land in question
be ordered registered and that an original Certificate
of Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R. [De]
Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering
Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre."7
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general
default except as against respondent Republic of the
Philippines, which entered its due appearance
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which, in turn, designated Bacolod Assistant City
73
Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to represent the OSG at
the trial.
Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the
hearings was a copy of Decree No. 227528 dated
October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land
Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the decision in
the cadastral case confirming and granting unto the
late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership of Lot No.
1524.
RTC Decision Granting Application for Registration
of Lot 1524
By Decision9 dated May 24, 1999, the trial court
ratified its order of general default and judicially
confirmed the incomplete title of the late De
Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to Decree
No. 22752. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of
general default previously entered is ratified and
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered confirming the title of
the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 of
Bacolod Cadastre under Decree No. 22752 dated
October 7, 1916 (Exh. "K" & "L") identified in the
approved Survey Plan (Exh. "M") and technically
described in the Technical Description (Exh. "N").
As soon as this decision becomes final, let an Original
Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late
Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr., pursuant to Decree No.
22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the
Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to file an
appeal.
Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod Registry
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-58 in
the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr.
DAALCO Sues for Quieting of Title
Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A.
Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO) filed a Complaint10 against
petitioners before the RTC for Quieting of Title,
Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58 with
prayer for injunctive relief and damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-10924 and entitled Dr. Antonio A.
Lizares Co., Inc., (DAALCO) v. Jose R. De Luzuriaga, III,
et al.11 In gist, DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-
in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered,
lawful, and absolute owner of Lot No. 1524 as
evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
190-R (T-247 [T-19890]) issued by the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Bacolod City on February 8, 1939. Said
TCT served to replace OCT No. 2765 in the name of
Lizares and was issued pursuant to Decree No.
22752, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55 as early as November
14, 1916 and registered in the registration book of
the Office of the RD of Negros Occidental, at Vol. 10,
p. 283.
To buttress its case, DAALCO pointed to the fact that
the RD, after the finality of the May 24, 1999 RTC
Decision, did not issue an OCT in the name of De
Luzuriaga, Sr., as prayed for in the application of
petitioners and as ordered by the cadastral court.
What the RD instead issued––owing to the issuance
in 1916 of OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares––was
a reconstituted title, i.e., OCT No. RO-58. Finally,
DAALCO maintained having been in actual, open, and
continuous possession as registered owner of the
subject lot.
The Petition for Relief from Judgment by the
Republic
On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC
rendered its Decision, the Republic through the OSG,
however, sought the annulment thereof via an
unverified Petition for Relief from Judgment12 filed
before the same RTC which rendered the above
decision in Cad. Case No. 97-583.
To support its prayer for annulment, the Republic
alleged, first, that petitioners failed to indicate in
their application all the heirs of the late De Luzuriaga,
Sr. and their corresponding authorization for the
application in their behalf.
Second, the Republic asserted that petitioners cannot
use Decree No. 22752 as basis for the application of
land registration as said decree effectively barred
said application. It invited attention to Section 39 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, which requires
the simultaneous issuance of the decree of
registration and the corresponding certificate of title.
As argued, the policy of simultaneous issuance
prescribed in the decree has not been followed in the
instant case.
Third, the Republic, relying on Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals,13 contended that no new title over the
subject lot can be issued in favor of the applicant, the
same lot being already covered by a title, specifically
OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares.
Fourth, again citing jurisprudence,14 the Republic
maintained that the applicant, even if entitled to
registration by force of Decree No. 22752, is already
barred by laches, the same registration decree having
been issued 83 long years ago.
74
In the meantime, Judge Anita G. Chua replaced
retired Judge Ramon B. Posadas as presiding judge of
the RTC, Branch 51 in Bacolod City.
The Ruling of the RTC
By Order dated August 31, 2001, Judge Chua, on the
finding that the "petition for relief from judgment is
not sufficient in form and substance and having been
filed out of time,"15 denied the petition. Specifically,
the RTC found the Republic’s petition to be
unverified and filed beyond the 60th day from
receipt on June 22, 1999 of a copy of the May 24,
1999 RTC Decision.
Subsequently, the Republic moved for
16
reconsideration of the above denial order arguing
that its procedural lapses are not fatal to its case. It
cited Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,17 in which
the Court held that the merits of the substantive
aspects of the case are deemed a special
circumstance or compelling reason for the
reinstatement of its petition and prayed for the
relaxation of the Rules. Moreover, the OSG alleged
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
Cadastral Case No. 97-583 inasmuch as the
corresponding amended application for registration
dated May 5, 1998 was not published and a copy of
which the Republic was not served.
Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument on
the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as basis for
the application of land registration in view of the
implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.
The Republic later filed a Supplement (To Motion for
Reconsideration) reiterating the merits of its case.
The RTC denied the Republic’s motion for
reconsideration through an Order of October 24,
2002. In the same order, the trial court observed that
the Republic is actually asking the present presiding
judge to review the decision of her predecessor,
Judge Posadas, and to annul the same decision.
Pursuing the point, the RTC, citing Miranda v. Court
of Appeals18 and Nery v. Leyson,19 ratiocinated that a
judge who succeeds another has no reviewing and
appellate authority and jurisdiction over his
predecessor’s final judgment on the merits of a case,
such authority residing, as it does, in the ordinary
course of things, with the appellate court.
Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case before the
CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75321, the petition
raised the sole issue of whether the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying its petition for relief
from judgment.
The Ruling of the CA
On November 26, 2004, the appellate court rendered
the assailed decision granting certiorari and ordered
the remand of the instant case to the trial court for
reception of evidence to determine whether the
RTC’s Decision confirming the title of the late
Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot 1524 will result in a double
titling of the subject lot. The fallo of the CA’s decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
case is remanded to the court a quo for reception of
evidence in order to resolve the issue of whether or
not the Decision dated May 24, 1999 confirming the
title of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No.
1524 of Bacolod Cadastre really resulted to "double
titling" and thereafter, to rule on the merits of the
petition for relief from judgment.
SO ORDERED.20
The CA predicated its ruling on the following factors:
(1) the merits of the petition for relief from judgment
far outweigh the procedural technicalities that
obstruct it, i.e., not verified and filed out of time; and
(2) the Republic was able to make out a prima
facie case of "double titling," supported by a
Letter/Report21 issued by the Bacolod City RD on
December 7, 2001 showing that Lot No. 1524 was
already registered under, and an OCT already issued
in, another man’s name.
Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005
Resolution, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, we have these petitions, with the
supplemental petition filed on July 28, 2005; while
the main petition for review on certiorari was filed on
August 11, 2005, which explains the lower docket
number of the former.
The Issues
Petitioners raise as ground for review in G.R. No.
169019 the following issues and assignment of
errors:
A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE [CA]
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S OFFICE,
WITHOUT MAKING A DEFINITE FINDING OF ACTUAL
PRESENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT, VIOLATING THE
WELL-KNOWN PRINCIPLE THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT
PROPER WHERE THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AND WHEN THERE ARE UNSETTLED
FACTUAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE CASE;
75
B. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE [CA] IN
ITS HEREIN CONTESTED DECISION x x x DIRECTLY
VIOLATED THE LONG-HELD PRINCIPLE OF "JUDICIAL
STABILITY" THAT HOLDS THAT NO REVIEW CAN BE
HAD BY ONE COURT OF A DECISION OF ANOTHER
COURT OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION, AND THE
RULE THAT NO SUCCEEDING JUDGE CAN REVIEW A
DECISION OF THE PREVIOUS PRESIDING JUDGE, AS
HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT IN HACBANG V. LEYTE
AUTOBUS CO., INC. 62 O.G. 31, Aug. 1, 1966,
MIRANDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 71 SCRA 295, AND
NERY VS. LEYSON, 339 SCRA 23;
C. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SUBJECT DECISION
OF THE HONORABLE [CA] VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE
OF RES JUDICATA OR FINALITY OF JUDGMENT;
D. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE [CA]
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE OSG’S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, WHICH
WAS CLEARLY RESORTED TO FOR THE FAILURE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL TO SEASONABLY FILE A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NOTICE OF
APPEAL, OR PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
OF THE ORDER OR OF THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT, RTC BRANCH 51, IN THE CASE A
QUO, WHICH RESORT OR DEVISE IS THOROUGHLY
FROWNED UPON IN OUR JURISDICTION;
E. THE HONORABLE [CA], WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN
"EXCEPTIONAL CASE" IN THIS ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE
WHICH JUSTIFIES THE GRANT OF THE PETITION,
WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE IS NONE;
MOST IMPORTANTLY:
F. A POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS CONFLICT OF
DECISIONS HAS BEEN CREATED BY THE ORDER OF
THE HONORABLE [CA] WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IN
REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
TO THE COURT A QUO, WHEN THERE IS ALREADY A
SIMILAR CASE INVOLVING PRINCIPALLY THE SAME
ISSUE OF ALLEGED "DOUBLE TITLING" IN ANOTHER
BRANCH OF THE [RTC] OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
NAMELY, BRANCH 46, IN THE CASE ENTITLED
DAALCO VS. LUZURIAGA, ET AL. WITH CIVIL CASE
[NO.] 99-10924, FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.22
In G.R. No. 168848, petitioners raise the sole issue in
their Supplemental Petition of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED
NOVEMBER 26, 2004 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY
25, 2005 WERE CONTRARY TO LAW AND/OR
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT23
In the meantime, on September 12, 2005, DAALCO
filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene,24 apprising the
Court of, among other things, the pendency of its
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10924.
The Court’s Ruling
The core issue in these petitions is whether the
appellate court gravely abused its discretion in
granting the Republic’s petition for relief from
judgment despite: (1) the May 24, 1999 Decision in
Cadastral Case No. 97-583 having become final and
executory; and (2) the issue of double titling having
been raised in DAALCO’s complaint in Civil Case No.
99-10924 for quieting of title and cancellation of OCT
No. RO-58 before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
The CA acted within its sound discretion in giving,
under the factual premises and for reasons set out in
the assailed decision, due course to the Republic’s
petition for relief from judgment and remanding the
case to the trial court for reception of evidence.
Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, we agree with the appellate court’s holding
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for relief from the May 24,
1999 Decision.
Procedural Issue: Relaxation of the Rules to
Promote Substantial Justice
We can concede that the unverified petition for relief
from judgment of the OSG was filed out of time. Such
a petition must be filed within: (a) sixty (60) days
from knowledge of judgment, order, or other
proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months
from entry of such judgment, order, or other
proceedings.25 In the case at bar, the OSG admits
receiving the May 24, 1999 Decision on June 22,
1999. Thus, when it did not file a notice of appeal of
said decision within the 15-day reglementary period
for filing an appeal, the OSG was left with the
remaining remedy of relief from judgment subject to
the conditions provided under Secs. 1 and 3 of Rule
38 of the Rules of Court. But, as thing turned out, the
OSG, for the Republic, belatedly filed its petition only
on November 24, 1999, or more than five months
from receipt or knowledge of the May 24, 1999 RTC
Decision.
The Republic ascribes its failure to file a timely notice
of appeal or a petition for relief from judgment on
the negligence of the OSG person––in charge of
receiving all pleadings assigned to Asst. Solicitor
Josefina C. Castillo––who belatedly gave the copy of
the RTC Decision to the latter due to oversight. And
the Republic prays for the relaxation of the rigid
application of the Rules based on the merits of its
petition for relief from judgment.
76
While the reglementary periods fixed under the rules
for relief from judgment are mandatory in
character,26procedural rules of the most mandatory
character in terms of compliance may, in the interest
of substantial justice, be relaxed.27 Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, they are not to be applied with
severity and rigidity when such application would
clearly defeat the very rationale for their existence.
In line with this postulate, the Court can and will
relax or altogether suspend the application of the
rules, or except a particular case from the rules’
operation when their rigid application tends to
frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.28
The peculiarities of the instant case impel us to do so
now. Foremost of these is the fact that the Republic
had properly made out a prima facie case of double
titling over the subject lot, meriting a ventilation of
the factual and legal issues relative to that case.
Apropos the matter of verification which the OSG
failed to observe, it cannot be over-emphasized that
the requirement on verification is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings. Non-compliance with
it is not jurisdictional, and would not render the
pleading fatally defective.29 A pleading required by
the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due
course even without a verification if the
circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in
the interest of justice.30 So it must be here.
Substantive Issue: Prima Facie Case of Double Titling
Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no
other available or adequate remedy.31 And its
determination rests with the court. In the instant
case, certain attending facts and circumstances, as
shall be set forth below, make for an exceptional
case for allowing relief from judgment.
Register of Deeds report shows doubling titling
when another OCT is issued for subject lot
First. The Letter/Report32 issued by the Bacolod City
RD on December 7, 2001, ineluctably indicating the
registration of subject Lot No. 1524 and the
subsequent issuance of an OCT in the name of
another person, provides a reasonable ground to
believe that a case of double titling would result
should another title issue for the same lot in the
name of De Luzuriaga, Sr. Thus, there exists a
compelling need for another hard look at Cad. Case
No. 97-583 and for the trial court to address the
likelihood of duplication of titles or "double titling,"
an eventuality that will undermine the Torrens
system of land registration.
OCT already issued for subject lot
Second. The prior issuance on November 14, 1916 of
OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares over Lot No.
1524 persuasively buttresses a prima facie case on
the issue of double titling. Civil Case No. 99-10924 for
quieting of title filed by DAALCO before the RTC,
Branch 46 in Bacolod City tends to show that
DAALCO’s predecessor-in-interest, Lizares, was
issued OCT No. 2765 in 1916 ostensibly pursuant to
Decree No. 22752, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55. This is
confirmed by the adverted Letter/Report.
Decree No. 22752 is the same decree petitioners
relied upon in Cad. Case No. 97-583 for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over subject Lot No.
1524. Obviously, one and the same decree cannot
serve as basis for a valid grant of separate titles in fee
simple over the same lot to two different persons.
Ownership of subject lot best ventilated in civil case
Third. Since petitioners and DAALCO separately claim
owning Lot No. 1524, the ownership issue would be
best litigated in Civil Case No. 99-10924 filed by
DAALCO for quieting of title. Lest it be overlooked,
both parties anchor in a way their ownership claim
on Decree No. 22752. It ought to be stressed,
however, that an OCT was issued several months
after Decree No. 22752 was rendered, and the
certificate was issued to Lizares, not to De Luzuriaga,
Sr. De Luzuriaga, Sr., during his lifetime, never
contested or assailed the title issuance to Lizares,
suggesting the possibility of a lawful transfer of
ownership from one to the other during the period
material. In any case, for purposes of Cad. Case No.
97-583, the fact that an OCT was already issued for
the subject lot would, perforce, foreclose the
issuance of another OCT for the same lot.
As has been consistently held, neither prescription
nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a
land registration case. 33 In line with this doctrine of
the inapplicability of prescription and laches on
registration cases, the Court has ruled that "the
failure on the part of the administrative authorities
to do their part in the issuance of the decree of
registration cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land."34 Following these doctrinal
pronouncements, petitioners argue that they can
rightfully bank on Decree No. 22752 to defeat the
claim of DAALCO.
Petitioners’ above posture may be given cogency but
for the issuance, pursuant to the same decree, of
OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares. Nothing on the
records adequately explains, nor do petitioners
attempt to do so, how a registration decree
adjudicating Lot No. 1524 to De Luzuriaga, Sr.
77
became the very medium for the issuance of a
certificate of title in favor of Lizares. Consequently,
whatever rights petitioners might have over the
subject lot as heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. ought to be
litigated against the successors-in-interest of Lizares
to put a final rest to their clashing claims over Lot No.
1524.
Issuance of reconstituted title beyond the judgment
in the cadastral case
Fourth. OCT No. RO-58 was issued by the RD of
Bacolod City purportedly in execution of the final and
executory decision in Cad. Case No. 97-583. Yet the
Court notes that the title issuance went beyond the
scope of the judgment sought to be executed. The
second paragraph of the fallo of the May 24, 1999
RTC Decision granting and confirming ownership of
subject Lot No. 1524 unto the late Jose R. De
Luzuriaga clearly ordered, thus:
As soon as this decision becomes final, let an Original
Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late
Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr., pursuant to Decree No.
22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre in
accordance with law.35
But the RD of Bacolod City––in grave abuse of
discretion, instead of issuing an OCT in the name of
De Luzuriaga, Sr., as directed by the court––issued a
reconstituted title over Lot No. 1524 in the name of
the heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. Not lost on the Court is
the fact that a reconstituted title is ordered issued in
an ordinary civil case, not in a cadastral proceeding
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over
unregistered property, as in the instant case.
Basic is the rule that execution must conform to what
the decision dispositively decrees.36 Logically, an
execution is void if it does not strictly conform to
every essential particulars of the judgment
rendered.37 Be that as it may, the issuance of the
reconstituted title is rendered moot and ineffective
by the grant of relief from judgment.
Cadastral Case and Quieting of Title Case can
proceed independently
Fifth. Petitioners’ contention that a petition for relief
from judgment and the special civil action for
quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without
solid basis. Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for
quieting of title in Civil Case No. 99-10924 each
involves different concerns and can proceed
independently. The cause of action of the Republic’s
petition for relief from judgment of "double titling"
of the subject lot is different from DAALCO’s quest
for quieting of title. From another perspective,
DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT
No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs,
while the Republic’s petition assails the grant of
ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land
duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of
Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his
heirs or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed
independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases
would be ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.
The RTC Had Jurisdiction in Cadastral Case
The Republic, after participating in the proceedings
below, has raised the issue of jurisdiction, drawing
attention to the non-publication of the amended
application for registration during the trial of Cad.
Case No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way clear
to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the Republic.
As it were, the Republic entered its appearance in
Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by prosecutor
Bayona. The petitioners in that case appeared to
have complied with the essential jurisdictional
requirement of publication. The required survey plan,
technical description, and original tracing cloth have
been duly presented and submitted as evidence.
Prosecutor Bayona obviously found the cadastral
proceedings to have been in order, else, he would
have duly protested and assailed the same.
We hardly can subscribe to the Republic’s argument
that the publication of the amendment in petitioners’
application is a condition sine qua non for the RTC,
acting as cadastral court, to acquire jurisdiction. Sec.
738 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the
Cadastral Act, and Sec. 3539 of PD 1529, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for
the publication of the application for registration and
the schedule of the initial hearing. This is so since
judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary
administrative registration, are in rem, and are
governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure,
and evidence. Due publication is required to give
notice to all interested parties of the claim and
identity of the property that will be surveyed. And
any additional territory or change in the area of the
claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan
or application without new publication, otherwise
the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the additional or amended claim. But where the
identity and area of the claimed property are not the
subjects of amendment but other collateral matters,
a new publication is not needed.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due
publication was made for Lot No. 1524, its identity
and area. The amendment in petitioners’ application
in the relief portion neither altered the area and
identity of the subject lot nor added any territory.
78
Thus, no new publication is required. Besides, the
Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been duly
notified of such amendment. Consequently, the
Republic could not plausibly argue that it was
deprived of its day in court.1avvphi1
Anent DAALCO’s motion to intervene and interest
over the subject lot, it may address its motion to the
lower court, although intervention may no longer be
necessary in the light of Civil Case No. 99-10924
pending before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City,
where DAALCO can properly ventilate its ownership
claim as against that of petitioners, who, incidentally,
are impleaded in said case as
respondents/defendants.
A final consideration. A petition for relief is in effect a
second opportunity for an aggrieved party to ask for
a new trial.40 Once granted either by the trial court or
the appellate court, the final judgment whence relief
is sought is deemed set aside and the case shall stand
as if such judgment had never been rendered. In such
a case, "the court shall then proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration had been granted by it."41
Here, the presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 51 in
Bacolod City, by the remand to the court of Cad. Case
No. 97-583, is not asked to review and/or annul a
final judgment of his or her predecessor or of
another RTC, as there is nothing for the presiding
judge to nullify in the first place, the annulling act
having been taken by the CA. Hence, the trial court’s
invocation, as seconded by petitioners, of the
teachings of Nery,42 is off-tangent. Nery, it is true,
held that a trial court is without jurisdiction to annul
a final judgment of a co-equal court. Nery was,
however, cast against a different factual and legal
milieu. Suffice it to state for the nonce
that Nery involved a final judgment of the RTC
against which no petition for relief has been
interposed. In view of the first reason, the final
judgment was not effectively set aside, unlike here.
WHEREFORE, the Verified Petition for Review on
Certiorari and Supplemental Petition are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
CA’s November 26, 2004 Decision and May 25, 2005
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 75321 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94033 May 29, 1995
FELICIANO RAMOS, Substituted by his heirs through
VALERIANA VDA. DE RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO C. RODRIGUEZ, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal and LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Feliciano Ramos applied for the registration of a
parcel of land in San Jose, Rodriguez, Montalban,
Rizal, identified as Lot 125-B of subdivision plan Psd-
760 with a total area of 156,485 square meters. Upon
his death on April 6, 1982 and during the pendency
of said application, Feliciano was substituted by his
heirs, petitioners herein.
After issuing an order of general default, respondent
judge rendered a decision on July 28, 1988,
adjudicating the said lot to the petitioners.
On September 12, 1988, the court a quo issued an
Order for Issuance of Decree stating that the July 28,
1988 decision had become final and directing the
Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) 1 to comply
with Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that
is, to prepare the decree and certificate of
registration.
Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio submitted a
report dated September 26, 1988, which was earlier
required by the court, recommending that the July
28, 1988 decision be set aside after due hearing
because the subject lot was part of Lot 125, Psu-
32606 which is already covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8816 issued on October
29, 1924, in case No. 1037 in the name of the Payatas
Estate Improvement Company, and which was
assigned Decree No. 1131 on January 31, 1905.
Petitioners later claimed that TCT No. 8816 was
fraudulent but they failed to present any evidence in
support of such allegation.
Several settings for the hearing were made before
the court in an order dated February 2, 1990, merely
noted the said report. The court opined "that it
cannot set aside its (July 28, 1988) decision on the
basis of the report dated September 26, 1988, which
was received by this Court on October 10, 1988, after
the finality of its decision." It added that the proper
79
remedy of the government was an action for
annulment of judgment.
Bonifacio filed on March 9, 1990, through the Chief
Legal Officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
a motion for reconsideration of the February 2, 1990,
order.
On May 29, 1990, the court a quo issued an order
granting the motion for reconsideration, denying
petitioner's application for registration, setting aside
its decision dated July 28, 1988, as well as its order
for the issuance of decree dated September 12, 1988
and denying the petition to re-direct the LRA to issue
the decree of registration. The court noted that the
subject lot was already covered by an existing
certificate of title and that no final decree has yet
been issued by the LRA.
Petitioners are now asking the Court to set aside the
trial court's May 29, 1990, order on the strength of
the principle of finality of judgments.
This issue has already been settled in a similar
case, 2 where the Court declared that:
. . . Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of
land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility(,) until after the expiration of one
(1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held
that as long as a final decree has not been entered by
the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.
It is also argued by petitioners that the issuance of
the decree of registration and the certificate of title
by the LRA is a ministerial duty which follows as a
matter of course the order of the court directing it to
issue said decree. This, too, has been squarely met
in Gomez, thus:
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent
land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act
under the orders of the court and the decree must be
in conformity with the decision of the court and with
the data found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they are in
doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation
and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer
the matter to the court. They act, in this respect as
officials of the court and not as administrative
officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."
In the case at bench, Administrator Bonifacio filed his
report as an officer of the court precisely to inform
the latter that the NLTDRA cannot comply with the
order to issue a decree because the subject lot
sought to be registered was discovered to have been
already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas
Estate. Under these circumstances, the LRA is not
legally obligated to follow the court's order.
This is also one of the reasons why we have to reject
the claim of petitioners that the court's Order for
Issuance of Decree is the reckoning point in
determining the timeliness of a petition to re-open or
review the decree of registration in view of the
ministerial nature of the LRA's duty. The other reason
is that the one-year period stated in section 32 of
P.D. 1529 within which a petition to re-open and
review the decree of registration clearly refers to the
decree of registration described in Section 31 of the
said P.D., which decree is prepared and issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
Finally, petitioners aver that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside
the July 28, 1988, decision and the order for issuance
of decree dated September 12, 1988, upon the mere
motion for reconsideration filed by the LRA, not by
the Solicitor General, of the February 2, 1990 order.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Solicitor
General is bound to "[r]epresent the Government in
all land registration and related proceedings." 3 Add
to this the fact that P.D. 1529 itself, specifically
Section 6 thereof which enumerates the functions of
the Commissioner of Land Registration, is bereft of
any grant of power to the LRA or to the
Commissioner to make the same representation as
the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the
government in land registration proceedings.
The court a quo could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion because it was merely following
the earlier recommendation of the LRA which was
then acting as an agent of the court.
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses
have been committed in the proceedings below,
these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of
substantive justice. 4 This is especially true when, as
in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would
result in a situation where the LRA would be
compelled to issue a decree of registration over land
which has already been decreed to and titled in the
name of another.
80
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the
LRA report and only alleged that the title of the
Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any
proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816,
however, having been issued under the Torrens
system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of
validity. As we declared in an early case, 5 "[t]he very
purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if
the same land may be subsequently brought under a
second action for registration." The application for
registration of the petitioners in this case would,
under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral
attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under
Section 48 of P.D. 1529.
At this point, it may be stated that this controversy
could have been avoided had the proper procedure
in land registration cases been observed by both the
trial court, acting as a land registration court and by
the LRA, acting as an agent of the court. The court
should have rendered its decision only "after
considering the evidence and the reports of the
commissioner of Land Registration and the Director
of Lands," as mandated by Section 29 of P.D. 1529,
instead of precipitately adjudicating the land in
question to the applicant and directing the
Commissioner to issue a decree of registration and
certificate of title when the report of the LRA was still
forthcoming. On the other hand, if a faster
disposition of the proceedings were really desired,
the court could facilely wield the powers of its office
in order to compel the LRA to speed up its
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Finally, the Solicitor General is reminded to be more
vigilant in handling cases which his office should,
under the law, properly represent.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is
hereby DENIED, and the order of respondent court
dated May 29, 1990, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO
and TARCIANA MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES,
ROGELIO AQUINO, Minor represented by his father,
Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO,
MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all
surnamed CONSOLACION, respondents.
Silvestre Loreria, Jr. for respondent spouses Prudencio
Maxino and Tarciana Morales.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the validity of the registration of
885 hectares of public forestal land located in
Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of
First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon, Judge Vicente del
Rosario on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision,
ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly
located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in
the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and
Tarciana Morales, less 200 hectares which should be
registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo
Consolacion (72, Record on Appeal). The decision
became final and executory. A decree and an original
certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the
Republic of the Philippines filed with the Gumaca
court an amended petition to annul the decision,
decree and title on the ground that they are void
because the land in question was still a part of
the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the
possessory information title relied upon by the
Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and
not 885 hectares. The petition was verified by the
Acting Director of Forestry.
The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing on
the merits, Judge Agana denied the petition in his
order of September 8, 1970. That order was served
upon the assistant provincial fiscal on September 16,
1970 and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the
Bureau of Forestry, on November 26, 1970.
A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to
the Solicitor General's Office only on September 2,
1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the
order. Twenty-two days thereafter or on September
24 the Solicitor General appealed from that order
and filed a motion for extension of time within which
to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was given
due course.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate
Court through Justices Asuncion, Porfirio V. Sison and
Sundiam dismissed the petition because the 1970
order had allegedly long become final and
81
unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this
Court.
That is the issue to be resolved first: whether the
appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970 order
of denial was seasonably made. The Appellate Court
held that the service of the order on Dispo, as special
attorney, was binding on the Solicitor General's
Office. Consequently, the record on appeal, which
was filed after thirty days from the service of the
order upon Dispo, was filed out of time.
We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for
appeal should be reckoned from the time the
Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970
order of denial and not from the time the special
counsel or the fiscal was served with that order.
These representatives of the Solicitor General had no
power to decide whether an appeal should be made.
They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor
General.
In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by
Solicitor General Barredo, approved by Secretary of
Justice Teehankee, it was specified that he should
consult the Solicitor General on all questions, legal
and factual, regarding the case. The question of
whether an appeal should be made could only be
decided by the Solicitor General's Office.
The 1969 petition to annul the decision, decree and
titles was filed by Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar,
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Alicia Sempio-Diy. Consequently, the
Solicitor General's Office should be served with the
final order disposing of the petition and should not
be bound by the service on his surrogates, the special
counsel and the fiscal (Republic vs. Polo, L-49247,
March 13, 1979, 89 SCRA 33; Republic vs. Mendoza,
L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539).
The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on
time, the Solicitor General's Office was late in filing
the amendments to it is of no moment. In
exceptional cases, like the instant case, the interest
of justice may warrant waiver of the rules (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83
SCRA 453).
In this case, where it is contended that the
registration is void allegedly because public forestal
land was registered and the State sought to declare
the decision void, the Government should not be
estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents
(Gov't. of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga,
50 Phil. 975, 980; Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Unson, 50
Phil. 981, 990; Go Tian An vs. Republic, 124 Phil. 472,
475; Republic vs. Aquino, L-33983, January 27, 1983,
120 SCRA 186, 191-192).
Now, as to the merits of the case. It is incontestable
that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the
Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and
disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation.
Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by
Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis on July 6,
1940, as per Land Classification Map No. 1386,
Tayabas Project No. 16-E of Mulanay, Exhibit C-
Annulment, and as shown in the report and
testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warden
(Exh. B-Annulment; 7, 10-15 tsn March 5, 1970). Tria
recommended that the title of the Maxino spouses
be annulled (Exh. B-Annulment).
The certification was reiterated by the Director of
Forestry on May 20, 1948 as per Land Classification
Map No. 1516, No. 16-E of Mulanay, Quezon, Exhibit
1-A-Director of Forestry, and as shown in paragraph 6
of the report of Forester Emerson B. Abraham who
recommended that the opposition to the registration
entered by the Director be sustained (Exh. 1-Director
of Forestry; Exh. Q, Report of Land Investigator
Serapion Bauzon).
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish
title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous composition title or
adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio
Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December
26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de
animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and
Campalacio Creeks. *
There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy
between the area of 29 hectares and the actual area
of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959
(Exh. D). We have no hesitation in saying that the
composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The
trial court grievously erred in applying to this case
the rule that the area comprised in the boundaries
should prevail over that stated in the moniments of
title.
Tria averred in his report and testimony that the
Yamay and Campalacio Creeks mentioned in the
composition title really refer to the Banguian and
Mamba creeks. This would mean that the actual area
claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares, not 970
(Exh. B-Annulment; 27-30 tsn March 5, 1970).
That would also explain why in the document, Exhibit
H, presented by the Maxinos, mention is made of
"paligawang 'Manba' ".
The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition
title is evident from the sale executed by the heirs of
82
Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-
Maxino (Exh. F).
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by
his two children Maria and Lucila. On September 24,
1935 the two heirs, without executing an
extrajudicial settlement of Prudencio's estate and
adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves,
executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of
Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. F), the wife of
applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son
and the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona.
That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-
claim". It is stated therein that in consideration
of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever
quitclaim unto the said Vendee" the 29-hectare land
described in the composition title (Exh. F).
As an indication that the Tesalona "vendors" were
not certain that their title was good, it was stipulated
as an "express condition" that the said vendors had
no obligation of warranty for "the premises hereby
sold by them, the Vendee hereby expressly releasing
the Vendor(s) from all duty of defending the Vendee
against all persons now claiming, or who may
hereafter claim, to have a better right and
title thereto, and assuming all the risk of eviction by
superior title" (Exh. F).
It was further stipulated "that in the event that any
third person shall succeed in establishing right or title
to said premises or to any portion thereof superior to
that of the grantor and in lawfully dispossessing the
Vendee therefrom the Vendee shall not be entitled
to reimbursement from the Vendor of the sum of
TWO HUNDRED PESOS which constitutes the
consideration for these presents, or of any part
thereof, or to damages" (Exh. F).
The Maxinos contend that
Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title
(as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title)
should prevail in determining the Identity of the
disputed land. This assertion is untenable in the light
of the notorious discrepancy between the area of 29
hectares stated in the title and the 970 hectares now
claimed as the real area (885 hectares for Lot 1 and
84 hectares for Lot 2 which is not involved in this
case).
The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his
gratuitous adjustment title granted him possessory
rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares
but not ownership over 970 hectares of grazing
land. As to the requirements for an adjustment
proceeding under the Royal Decree of December 26,
1884, where the area in hectares, not the
boundaries, is important, see Ventura, Land
Registration and Mortgages, pp. 1719.
The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the title
justified the considerable increase in area. They have
not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid
title for 970 hectares. The boundaries and areas
stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that
a different land was covered thereby. The title states
that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio
Yamay. In his tax declarations it is stated that the
land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now Anonang.
His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land whose
boundaries are not the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks but it was bounded by the Yamay Creek and
the lands of Maximo Tesalona, Emiterio Tesalona and
Felix Aguilles, with an area of 120 hectares (Exh. I).
On the other hand, his 1919 and 1921 tax
declarations are for land with the same boundaries
but with an area of 36 hectares only (Exh. I-2 and I-3).
The 1948, 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the
boundaries Campalacio and Yamay Creeks but the
area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only, a far cry
from the 970 hectares as surveyed (Exh. I-4, I-5 and I-
6).
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not
registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title
be issued during the Spanish regime or under the
Torrens system, nullifies the title (Director of Lands
vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Director of
Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177,
194-5; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, G. R. No. 50340,
December 26, 1984).
Possession of public forestal lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
1183, 1199; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, supra).
The oral evidence does not bolster the case at all for
the applicants. Applicant Prudencio Maxino testified
that the lot he was seeking to register has an area of
more than seventy hectares (8 tsn Jan. 11, 1961). He
purchased the lot from his aunt and mother, as
shown in the deed of September 24, 1935, Exhibit F
(9).
He testified that the Mamba Creek is also known as
Yamay Creek (13). The land was grazing or pasture
land (15). Thirty-one squatters occupied the land (5
tsn March 6, 1961). He did not know that the land
had an area of 29 hectares in 1935 when he bought it
(6). He came to know the area of the land when it
was surveyed. He was not present when it was
surveyed (6).
Another witness, Fortunato Nañadiego, 76, testified
that the land was possessed during the Spanish
83
regime by his stepfather, Pedro Tesalona, the owner,
not Prudencio Tesalona, the holder of the adjustment
title (11).
Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p. 1198). The instant case
bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez
vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an
adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void
because it was fraudulent and it covered public
forestal land not subject to registration. As to void
composition or patent issued in 1898, see Testagorda
vs. Commanding General, 6 Phil. 573.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential
Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Agana, the decision
of the Appellate Court and the decision of Judge Del
Rosario dated March 21, 1961 are reversed and set
aside. The application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-
175880 is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ.,
concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26093 January 27, 1969
VIRGINIA L. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, and RUFITO
AKIA, respondents.
Rogelio A. Cortes for petitioner.
Moises P. Cating for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The corrective powers of this Court are invoked in
this, an original petition for certiorari, to strike down
the reopening proceedings before the cadastral court
below upon the jurisdictional ground of lack of
publication, or, in the alternative, to annul said
court's orders rejecting petitioner's intervention for
want of personality to sue.
The litigation below commenced from the petition
of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral court,
for the reopening of cadastral proceedings, pursuant
to Republic Act 931. 1Respondent Akia there sought
the registration in his name of 15,922 square meters
of land situated in the City of Baguio.
On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro
moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000
square meters allegedly included in the 15,922
square meters of land specified in respondent Akia's
petition below. 2
It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed
with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application
[TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square
meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill
Subdivision, Residential Section "K", Baguio City. It
was surveyed for which she paid a fee of P150.00 on
October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was
conducted at which petitioner de Castro was the
highest bidder. On December 17, 1955, the lot was
awarded in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square
meter, or a total of P4,300.00. Petitioner fully paid
the purchase price which, with interests, amounted
to P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed, had been
paying taxes on the lot.
On August 16, 1965, petitioner's motion for
intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted
by the court below.
At the trial on the merits, petitioner de Castro,
respondent Akia, and different government agencies
were duly represented. Petitioner de Castro there
presented documentary and testimonial evidence in
support of her opposition to the inclusion of said
1,000 square meters of land. The case was submitted
for decision.
Thereafter, on October 24, 1965, Akia lodged a
motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his
(Akia's) petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings.
Ground therefor, amongst others, was that petitioner
lacked personality to sue.
On December 4 1965, over the objection of herein
petitioner de Castro, respondent judge ruled out her
intervention and dismissed her opposition to the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings. He declared
that mere applicants of public land have no capacity
to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands. The
judge did not go into the merits of the case upon the
evidence presented.
But, on January 13, 1966, de Castro moved to
reconsider. She stressed the fact that she was not a
mere applicant of public land but an equitable owner
thereof. Because, she was an awardee who had paid
84
to the government, in full, the sales value of the land
she applied for.
On February 1, 1966, respondent judge refused
reconsideration, this time upon a different ground.
The judge based his action on a "Manifestation" of
counsel for the Director of Lands of January 21, 1966
stating that on October 15, 1965, the Director of
Lands had cancelled the award in favor of petitioner.
A second "motion for reconsideration dated
February 21, 1966 was registered by petitioner de
Castro. She there informed the court that, thru a
letter of December 3, 1965, she had urged from the
Director of Lands reconsideration of the revocation
of the award in her favor. She appended to her
motion the foregoing letter where she made it clear
that construction of her residential house on the lot
as required was an impossibility because, in the year
1955 and several years thereafter, there were no
lighting, water and road facilities within the
immediate vicinity of the land, and later on, the City
Engineer of Baguio refused to issue the required
building permit because of the pendency of
respondent Akia's petition for reopening heretofore
adverted to. She also acquainted the court with the
fact that because of her letter aforesaid, the Director
of Lands had asked its Baguio office to re-examine
the revocation. At any rate, the land in question, so
she continued to aver in her motion, could not be the
subject of petition for judicial reopening as it was
never in possession of respondent Akia.1awphil.ñêt
On March 2, 1966, the foregoing second motion for
reconsideration was perfunctorily denied by
respondent judge.
Then, on March 15, 1966, the Director of Lands
came out with an order reinstating petitioner de
Castro's award, for the reason that lack of water and
lighting facilities found to be true in the investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Lands caused delay in
the construction of petitioner's house. The Director,
however, held in abeyance further action thereon
until respondent Akia's petition for reopening is
finally decided by the Baguio court.
The next move of petitioner Virginia L. de Castro
was to start certiorari proceedings in this Court thru a
verified petition praying that the orders of
respondent judge, dismissing her opposition to the
reopening, be set aside and annulled.
Upon the return of respondents, and the
memoranda of the parties, the case is now before us
for decision.
1. First to merit attention is the question of
jurisdiction.
The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the
reopening of the cadastral case below is
jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.
Respondent Akia's petition for reopening was
instituted under Republic Act 931, effective June 20,
1953, which in its Section 1 reads:
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of
land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings, who at the time of the survey were
in actual possession of the same, but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim
in the proper court during the time limit established
by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act,
are hereby granted the right within five years 3 after
the date on which this Act shall take effect, to
petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings
under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two
hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with
respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted,
or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of
by the Government, and the competent Court of First
Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify
the Government, through the Solicitor General, and if
after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all
conditions herein established have been complied
with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties
thereof have been paid from the time when land tax
should have been collected until the day when the
motion is presented, it shall order said judicial
proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken
on such parcels. 4
The foregoing provision establishes the procedure
for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such procedure
does not include publication. Neither is publication
mentioned in any of the other provisions of Republic
Act 931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that
"the competent Court of First Instance, upon
receiving such petition, shall notify the Government,
through the Solicitor General." About two years back,
we held in a case, 5 that under Republic Act 931, it is
unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a
copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as said Act
[931] only required service thereof to the Solicitor
General."
Jurisprudence informs us that "[a]n order of court in
a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to
make it include land not previously included therein is
a nullity unless new publication is made as a
85
preliminary to such step" and that "additional
territory cannot be included by amendment of the
plan without new publication." 6 Upon the other
hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders
providing for exclusion of land included in the
original plan is not affected by failure to order a new
publication. 7
Here, it should be undisputed that the court already
acquired jurisdiction over the entire territory of the
Baguio Townsite in the original cadastral case sought
to be reopened. It was a reservation suit instituted by
the Director of Lands in 1912 (Civil Reservation Case
No. 1) to compel registration of lands in Baguio. 8 The
final decision therein was rendered on November 13,
1922. A petitioner who wishes to reopen that case
under Republic Act 931 is thus to be logically
considered a claimant in the original cadastral
proceedings. The view has been expressed that in a
sense, the government here is the plaintiff and all the
claimants are defendants, 9 who thus become
oppositors. 10Otherwise, the petition should not be
one for reopening but one that begins an entirely
new proceeding completely distinct and separate
from said case of the Director of Lands.
The view we take is not without foundation. If a
prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an
alleged right that has accrued prior to the institution
of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he
is, of course, to be deemed to have received notice
thru the publication therein made. If his rights are
derived from the government after the land has been
declared part of the public domain by the cadastral
court, then notice to the government of a reopening
petition as provided by law, should suffice. For the
government is supposed to take up the cudgels for a
public land grantee, or at the very least, notify the
latter. It must be remembered that a petition for
reopening under Republic Act 931 can successfully be
blocked if it is shown that the land involved therein
has already "been alienated, reserved, leased,
granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently
disposed of by the Government."
True, Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March
31, 1966, ruled that the petition to reopen filed in
that caseunder Republic Act 931, must be published
as required in Section I of the Cadastral Act (Act
2259) because such case is still governed by the
procedure laid down by the latter law.
The Benitez case, however, must be read in its factual
context. There, the petition of the Benitez spouses
for reopening the cadastral proceedings covering the
entire city of Tacloban, was based on the claim that
"through oversight, inadvertence and excusable
neglect a portion of" 1,805 square meters of Lot 2157
of the land originally registered in the name of
petitioners therein "has not been included in the
original survey." They prayed that after appropriate
proceedings, said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of
the subdivision plan) be adjudicated to them
pursuant to Republic Act 931. In fact, back of
the Benitez declaration that publication is necessary
is jurisprudence heretofore stated, 11 that such
publication is required when additional territory is
sought to be included in the original plan. Indeed, the
record of Benitez in this Court shows that the
opposition to the reopening petition is predicated on
the averment that the cadastral court did not include
the lots in controversy because those lots were "part
of the offshore land" and hence, of the public domain
which could not be the subject of cadastral survey or
of the cadastral case. 12
To hold without qualification that failure of
publication is jurisdictionally fatal in reopening cases
under Republic Act 931 is to inject into our statute
books something not required.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for
reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent
Akia — was already embraced in the cadastral
proceedings filed by the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already
acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The
petition, the wherefore, need not be published.
We hold that the authority of the cadastral court
over the reopening proceedings below is not
impaired by failure of publication.
2. This brings us to the next question: Does
petitioner Virginia L. de Castro have legal standing in
the proceedings below?
In an early case, 13 this Court declared that mere
citizens could have no interest in public land. At
about the same time, this Court also held that to give
a party standing in a court of land registration, he
must make some claim to the property. 14Then,
in Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Sto. Cristo, 15 this
Court pronounced that although an opponent in a
land registration proceeding could not show title in
himself, he was not discapacitated from opposing the
registration sought by another. Plain was the
statement there that "[a]ll that is necessary to enable
anyone to exert the faculty of opposition is that he
should appear to have an interest in the property."
And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial whether
this interest is in the character of legal owner or is of
a purely equitable nature as where he is the
beneficiary in a trust." Later, this Court described a
homesteader who had not yet been issued his title
86
but who had fulfilled all the conditions required by
law, as a person who should be regarded as
an equitable owner of the land. 16 Similarly, a
purchaser of friar land has an equitable title to the
land before the issuance of the patent.17Pitargue vs.
Sorilla,18 laid down the principle that a bona fide
applicant of public land may protect his right of
possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer or pursue any suitable remedy provided by
law. Indeed, an awardee in a sales application is
authorized to take possession of the land to enable
him to comply with the requirements of the award
before title can be issued. 19 We held in still another
case, 20 that a homestead entry segregates the
homestead from the public domain and divests the
Director of Lands of control and possession thereof
except if the homestead application is finally
disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.
Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be
in possession of a tract of public land and have
applied with the Bureau of Lands for its
purchase have the necessary personality to oppose
registration. 21 We have held, too, that an award
under a sales application has "the effect
of withdrawing the lands of the public domain that
were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands." 22
Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening
is narrowed down by the specific conditions therein
set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition
is possible "only with respect to such of said parcels
of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
granted or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government." 23 The
statute made it abundantly clear that judicial
proceedings shall be reopened only, if the cadastral
court "shall find that all conditions herein established
have been complied with." Thus it is, that the
alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any
provisional or permanent disposition by the
government of the land claimed should suffice to bar
reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be
recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding held
upon her own township sales application. Of course,
the award up to now has not been fully implemented
because she has not yet complied with one condition
imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent
disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to
prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land
disputed.
We, accordingly, rule that petitioner has legal
standing before the cadastral court below.
3. The plight of petitioner Virginia de Castro arrests
attention. She is an awardee in a sales application of
the lot she claims. She paid the government the full
price thereof. As such awardee, she was at first
allowed by respondent judge to intervene in the
present proceedings. She had presented all her
evidence. And so had respondent Akia. In truth, the
controversy between the two was already ripe for
decision. Then came the motion of Akia to throw out
petitioner's opposition for want of personality to sue.
Despite petitioner's objections thereto, respondent
judge granted said motion. Petitioner asked for
reconsideration. This was rejected by respondent
judge, not on the ground originally set forth, but on a
certain "Manifestation" of the Director of Lands that
petitioner's award had already been cancelled,
because she failed to make the necessary
improvements on the property, a condition tacked to
the award. That revocation was done without notice
to petitioner who came to know of the existence
thereof only after she had presented her evidence in
this case.
Worse, petitioner was not served a copy of that
manifestation. She was not given a chance to explain
— in the Bureau of Lands and in court — why she
failed to introduce improvements on the property.
When she was finally apprised of the action by the
court, she moved to reconsider. She told the court
that she had sought reconsideration from the Bureau
of Lands of the cancellation of her award because it
was an impossibility for her to make the necessary
improvements on her property as there were no
lighting, water and road facilities in the area, and that
when she was about to construct her house
afterwards, she was told by the City Engineer of
Baguio that she could not be issued the required
building permit for the reason that her lot was
included in respondent Akia's reopening petition. She
even made it of record in court that because of her
letter of reconsideration, the Director of Lands issued
a memorandum to the Office of the Bureau of Lands
in Baguio directing reexamination of the cancellation.
There was nothing more that petitioner could have
done at that time.
Respondent judge should have taken all these facts
into consideration. While petitioner's plea for
reconsideration before the Bureau of Lands was
pending, appeal by petitioner from respondent
judge's order would have been futile. For, there was
then nothing definite on which to base her appeal.
So, there was really nothing to do but to wait. Upon
the other hand, respondent judge should have taken
stock of the fact that petitioner was at an obvious
disadvantage.
It should be here stressed that the court
manifestation of counsel for the Director of Lands
87
heretofore adverted to was explicitly "without
prejudice" to the Director's right "to submit further
evidence within the period allowable by law, if future
circumstances so warrant." Respondent judge should
have waited. But he did not. Add to this the fact that
if the court in this case should grant Torrens title to
Akia, then all the rights of petitioner would be
foreclosed. Where else could petitioner go to
establish her claim? Thus, when respondent judge
finally shut out petitioner's opposition, we perceive a
grave abuse of discretion which calls for the
corrective powers of this Court.
The injustice suffered by petitioner becomes the
more accentuated by the fact that shortly after the
court order throwing petitioner's case out of court,
the Director of Lands did set aside the order of
revocation and reinstated petitioner's award. Well it
is to remember that "[c]ourts ordinarily do not deny
the writ [of certiorari] if the result would be to
deprive a party of his substantial rights and leave him
without remedy." 24
For the reasons given, the writ of certiorari is hereby
granted; the orders of December 4, 1965, February 1,
1966, and March 2, 1966 dismissing the opposition
filed by petitioner Virginia L. de Castro in the matter
of the petition for reopening of judicial proceedings
by respondent Rufito Akia (Civil Res. Case No. 1,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, Court of First Instance of
Baguio, Branch I), are hereby annulled; and the
respondent judge or whoever may take his place is
hereby directed to reinstate petitioner's opposition
aforesaid and to decide the case on the merits.
Costs against respondent Rufito Akia. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee
and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25313 December 28, 1970
ANA P. FERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIZA ABORATIGUE and RESTITUTO
BACNAN, defendants-appellants.
Roberto P. Reyes for plaintiff-appellee.
Salvador P. Socrates for defendants-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The plaintiff, claiming ownership of a parcel of land
situated in sitio Dipulao, barrio Central, township of
Coron, Palawan, filed suit1 in the Palawan Court of
First Instance to have the defendants vacate a
portion of said land and cease exercising acts of
ownership therein.
It was alleged in the complaint that Vicente
Aboratigue, father of defendant Feliza Aboratigue,
was during his lifetime employed as guard at one of
the gates to the property, and as such was allowed to
plant fruit trees in a small portion in the immediate
vicinity; and that after his death the said defendant,
together with her husband Restituto Bacnan, were
allowed to stay therein, but that later on they
claimed to be the owners of the said portion. In their
answer to the complaint the defendants alleged, as
basis of their claim of ownership, continuous
possession and cultivation of the disputed area, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest since the year 1901.
In the course of the trial, on November 4, 1958, upon
the court's suggestion the following stipulation of
facts was submitted by the respective counsel for the
parties:
1. Parties agreed that the plaintiff Ana P. Fernandez
is the owner of a parcel of land under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 306 in the name of Ana P.
Fernandez, formerly under Title No. 209 in the name
of Ana P. Fernandez and her late husband Guillermo
Fernandez located in sitio Dipulao, Coron, Palawan,
the technical description is stated in said title and the
Blue Print Map is found in the plan marked as Exhibit
"2" for the defendants, the Title is marked as Exhibit
"A" for the plaintiff.
2. Parties agreed that the following appears in the
Title of Ana P. Fernandez: "A parcel of land Plan No.
II-7482 with all the building and improvements,
except those herein expressly noted as belonging to
other persons situated in sitio Dipulao barrio of
Central township of Coron."
3. Parties agreed that in a photostatic copy of the
official survey plan of the land adjudicated to Ana P.
Fernandez which was submitted by the defendants,
there is an area enclosed by the dotted line on the
northwest corner of the said land with the following
annotation:
'Claimed by Vicente Aboratigue.'
88
4. That both parties also agreed that the area claimed
by the defendants is not approximately 16 hectares,
but the portion described by the dotted lines located
in the plan which is the exhibit of the defendants.
The case is submitted for the determination of the
Court on the following issues:
1. Does the entire area comprised in the official plan
belong to the plaintiff Ana P. Fernandez under her
Title?
2. Does the reservation contained in said Title under
the Phrase "except those herein expressly noted as
belonging to other persons situated in barrio
Dipulao" and confirmed by the annotation in the
Official Plan II-7482 remove said area from the entire
property in favor of the defendant claimants, Vicente
Aboratigue's successors in interest.
On November 25, 1958 the defendants moved for a
formal hearing on the case, alleging that the final
draft of the stipulation as dictated by the court was
not shown to them before it was signed by their
counsel; that it did not contain certain matters
relevant to the defense, particularly their continuous
possession and cultivation of the land in question
since 1901; and that there were portions in the
stipulation that were not agreeable to them.
The parties, through their counsel, were ordered to
argue the motion in writing, but only the plaintiff's
counsel did so by way of opposition; and on January
28, 1959 the Court denied the motion and on the
basis of the facts stipulated rendered judgment or
the plaintiff, declaring her to be the owner of the
disputed property and ordering the defendants to
vacate the same, with right to reimbursement of the
value of the improvements thereon, they being
builders in good faith.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals,
and the case was later certified to this Court on the
ground that the questions involved are purely legal.
The first issue is whether or not the trial court erred
in not setting aside the stipulation of facts and in not
granting a formal hearing with respect to matters not
covered thereby although raised in the pleadings.
These matters, as already observed, refer to the
appellants' allegation of possession under claim of
ownership since 1901. The second issue corollary to
the first, is whether or not the decision is correct and
justified on the basis of the stipulated facts alone.
1. The facts set forth in the stipulation are not
denied. They are a matter of record. Apropos, the
trial court found that the land (containing an area of
135.4016 hectares) was originally registered in 1918
under original certificate of title No. 354 in the name
of a certain Rufo Sandoval, then transferred to
Manuel Sandoval, from whom the appellee herein
subsequently acquired it.
The appellants' defense, as formulated in their
answer is as follows:
C. That the parcel of land in question is outside and
not included as part and parcel of the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 209 as shown on
the plan II-7482 of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 209 and the land in question is
situated on the NORTHWESTERN part of the land of
the plaintiff clearly shown by dotted lines with the
following notation — "CLAIMED BY VICENTE
ABORATIGUE" placed on the land in question as
Shown on plan II-7482 of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 209.
D. That the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 209
specifically and unequivocally excluded the land in
question as part of the land covered by it expressed
in the following words —
'..., except those herein expressly noted as belonging
to other person ...'
and the provisions in the said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 209 - '..., EXCEPT THOSE HEREIN EXPRESSLY
NOTED AS BELONGING TO OTHER PERSON ...' the
defendants allege and claim as to VICENTE
ABORATIGUE indicated on plan II-7482 of the land
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 209 on
the northwestern part of the said plan enclosed by
dotted lines wherein it is written "CLAIMED BY
VICENTE ABORATIGUE," a certificate copy of the said
plan will be presented during the hearing of this case.
E. That the defendants are of the full belief that the
provisions in the said Transfer Certificate of title No.
209 — '..., except those herein expressly noted as
belonging to other person ....'
refer to Vicente Aboratigue and his heirs as the said
plan II-7482 does not show any other persons
claiming any portions of the land inside the said plan
II-7482.
A reading of the foregoing allegations shows an
admission rather than a denial of the fact that the
portion of the land "claimed by Vicente Aboratigue,"
father of appellant Feliza Aboratigue, is part of the
area covered by the appellee's certificate of title.
Reference to the technical description therein on one
hand and to the survey plan on the other, confirms
the said fact unequivocally, and the trial court has so
89
stated in its resolution denying the appellants'
motion for reconsideration. The appellants' theory is
simply this: that because on the survey plan a certain
part of the land in its northwestern corner is
enclosed in dotted lines and carries the notation
"claimed by Vicente Aboratigue," that part is not
covered the appellee's title in view of the phrase".
except those herein expressly noted as belonging to
other persons." This theory accepts the truth of, and
indeed is premised upon, the facts stipulated; and
therefore the appellants' insistence that the
stipulation be disregarded is groundless. It is true
that their alleged occupation and cultivation of the
disputed area since 1901 was not included in the
stipulation, but the point is not material to the
resolution of the question of ownership. The said
area is part of the bigger parcel originally registered
in 1918 under the Land Registration Act, Section 46
of which provides that "no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession."
2. The appellants rely on the fact that on the survey
plan of the entire parcel covered by the appellee's
title a portion is enclosed in dotted lines with the
notation "claimed by Vicente Aboratigue," and, in
relation thereto, on the following words on the
certificate itself: "a parcel of land (plan II-7482) with
all buildings and improvements, except those herein
expressly noted as belonging to other persons ...."
(a) It is obvious that a mere claim cannot defeat a
registered title. Furthermore, the "claim" here is only
noted on the survey plan, and such notation cannot
prevail over the actual decree of registration as
reproduced in the certificate. All claims of third
persons to the property must be asserted in the
registration proceedings. If any claim to a portion
thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from the
property applied for, and is not included in the
decree of registration and certificate of title
subsequently issued to the applicant. If it is included,
the claim is deemed adversely resolved with finality,
subject only to a petition for review of the decree
within one year from its issuance on the ground of
fraud, under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
(b) No belabored exercise in legal hermeneutics is
necessary to arrive at the conclusion, as the trial
court did, that the exception in the appellee's title
relied upon by the appellants refers not to the land
but only to buildings and improvements thereon, and
then only to such as are noted on the certificate itself
and not on any extraneous document.
The rule is that the owner of buildings and
improvements should claim them during the
proceedings for registration and the fact of
ownership, if upheld by the court, must be noted on
the face of the certificate. There is no such notation
here in favor of the appellants. However, inasmuch
as the improvements in the disputed area have been
acknowledgment by plaintiff in her complaint as
belonging to the appellants' predecessor-in-interest,
and the lower court's decision allowing them to
recover the value of the improvements is not now in
question, this right of the appellants must be upheld.
The trial court has left the determination of such
value to mutual agreement between the parties. This
disposition should be modified in the sense that if
they fail to agree, the matter should be submitted to
the said court for hearing and adjudication.
With that modification above indicated, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16761 October 31, 1964
JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA,
JR., applicants-appellees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., oppositors,
ANSELMO IRENEA, ARTURO DE LA CRUZ,
DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS FRANCISCO,
CIPRIANO SEQUILLO, PEDRO TAGALOG, PONCIANO
GARCIA, RODOLFO DE DIOS, ET AL., private
oppositors-appellants.
A. P. Mayor & C. P. Mayor for private oppositors-
appellants.
E. Espinosa & J. Ma. Francisco for applicants-
appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate, which,
after survey, appeared to contain 411 hectares as per
plan PSU-143798 was applied for registration in the
Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956
by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held
on June 20, 1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau
of Public Highways filed written oppositions. Thirty-
90
five individuals appeared and expressed verbal
oppositions. All persons, ,except the
abovementioned oppositors, were declared in
default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting
evidence and the private oppositors were given five
days to file written opposition (Tsn., p. 5). Of the
oppositors 28 filed written but unverified opposition
on July 29, 1958. On August 20, 1958 applicants
finished adducing evidence and rested their case.
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented
their first witness. After his cross-examination,
counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to
the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the
private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their
opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the
court issued an order on January 13, 1959 dismissing
the unverified opposition, without pronouncement
as to costs (Rec. on Appeal, p. 26). Motion for
reconsideration was denied by order dated
November 18, 1959. The private oppositors have
appealed from both orders.
The requirement of verifying oppositors in land
registration proceedings is based on Sec. 34 of Act
496 —
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in
the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on
or before the return day, or within such further time
as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall
state all the objections to the application, and shall
set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the
same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be
signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his
behalf.
Applicants failed to invoke this provision seasonably.
Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they
proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and
rested their case. Only after the first witness of the
private oppositors had testified and applicants'
counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of
lack of verification brought up. By that time,
applicants had waived the defect —
An objection to a want of verification must be
reasonably made. ... The objection must be taken
before trial ... . The question cannot properly be
raised by an objection to the introduction of
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Lack of, or defect in the verification of a pleading may
be waived by the adverse party's failure to make a
proper and timely objection thereto ... . Where a
party proceeds with the case as though his
adversary's pleading were verified, he waives the lack
of verification of such pleading.
xxx xxx xxx
The act of ... proceeding to trial on the merits
without objection, is generally a waiver of all
uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal
defects, of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading
of the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
By ... going to trial without objection, ... a party may
waive the right to urge that his adversary's pleading
is not subscribed or verified ... . (46 C. J. S. 1120,
1129, 1133, 1137.)
Applicant's contend that the defect could not be
waived because it resulted in the private oppositors'
lack of standing in the case from the start.
This court has already held unverified oppositions
sufficient to confer standing in court on oppositors.
In Malagum vs. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19, a written
opposition not made under oath was dismissed by
the lower court. When oppositors sought from this
Court mandamus to have their opposition reinstated,
this Court denied the same for the reason that
petitioners "had appeared in the case, had therefore
a standing in court, and the order excluding their
answer was in effect a final determination of their
rights" so that appeal and not mandamus was their
proper remedy.
In Nicolas vs. Director of Lands and Camungao, L-
191478, December 28, 1963, the lower court
dismissed a petition for review of its judgment
adjudicating the land to an applicant, filed by an
oppositor who was not notified of the hearing, for
the reason that —
In the first place, the opposition filed by him was not
a valid opposition because it was not sworn to as
required by the Land Registration Act. It was simply a
written appearance. In other words, he failed to file
the answer in due form.
On appeal this Court held —
The written appearance with opposition presented
by petitioner herein, on November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was
a valid one, and sufficient to give him legal standing
in court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter
of right. The lower court erred in choosing to ignore
91
the written appearance with opposition, which was a
substantial compliance with the law, that requires a
formal answer.
For purposes of record, the private oppositors should
be allowed, as they had requested, to verify their
opposition because, in any event, the supposed
defect is deemed waived.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside
and the case is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings, without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41278 April 15, 1988
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, MARIA O.
GARCIA, and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Filoteo T. Banzon for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
On September 8, 1973, an application for land
registration was filed by respondent Maria O. Garcia
in the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan; 1 a copy of the application was forwarded to
the Solicitor General thru the Director of Lands. On
February 19, 1974, the Director of Lands filed an
opposition to this application, and at the same time
the Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his
behalf at the hearings of the same. Subsequently,
respondent Inperial Development Corporation, with
the conformity of respondent Garcia, filed a Motion
to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria O. Garcia to
Imperial Development Corporation without
amending the boundaries and the area of the parcels
of land stated in the original application, which
motion was granted by the respondent Judge. A
Notice of Initial Hearing was sent by the respondent
Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that
a party who failed to appear would be declared in
default. The same notice was likewise published in
the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as
required by law. On January 23, 1975, the date of the
initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was
present; an order of general default was issued by
the respondent Judge on the same date. After the
reception of evidence for the applicant before the
clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the
questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in
favor of the respondent corporation.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Motion for New
Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to
appear at the initial hearing was excusable, and that
the decision was contrary to the facts and to law. The
motion was, however, denied.
The instant petition is for certiorari, to nullify and set
aside the following orders and decision of the
respondent Judge:
a) Order of the respondent Judge dated September
30, 1974, admitting the Amended Application for
Registration;
b) Order of the respondent Judge dated January 23,
1975 declaring, in effect, the Director of Lands in
default;
c) Decision of the respondent Judge dated February
17, 1975, adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of
the respondent corporation; and
d) Order of the respondent Judge dated August 7,
1976, denying the petitioner's Motion for New Trial;
and for mandamus, to order the respondent Judge to
give due course to the petitioner's Motion for New
Trial; alternatively, the petitioner prays for the
dismissal of the respondent corporation's application
for registration. 2
According to Sec. 34 of the Land Registration Act, and
as adopted in Sec. 151 of the Public Land Act:
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in
the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on
or before the return day, or within such further time
as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall
state all the objections to the application, and shall
set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the
same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be
signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his
behalf. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3621.)
It is undisputed that on February 19, 1974, or prior to
the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, an
opposition was filed by the petitioner Director of
Lands to the original application for land registration
of respondent Garcia. 3 That verified opposition was
precisely the answer referred to in the above-quoted
92
section, for, as therein alleged by the Director of
Lands, neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership
in fee simple of the parcels of land applied for;
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the present application; that
the said parcels of land are a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
and that, therefore, the same should be declared
part of the public domain. 4 As a matter of fact, under
the Property Registration Decree, issued on June 11,
1978, which supersedes all other laws relative to
registration of property, the word used is
"opposition" and not "answer." 5
Thus, the opposition or answer, which is based on
substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it
was improper for the respondent Judge taking
cognizance of such registration case to declare the
oppositor in default simply because he failed to
appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The
pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person
appears and answers within the time allowed, the
court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no
reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded ...," 6 cannot be interpreted to
mean that the court can just disregard the answer
before it, which has long been filed, for such an
interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,
unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that
failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the
initial hearing would be a ground for default despite
his having filed an answer, it would have been so
stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious
consequences of an order of default. Especially in this
case where the greater public interest is involved as
the land sought to be registered is alleged to be
public land, the respondent Judge should have
received the applicant's evidence and set another
date for the reception of the oppositor's evidence.
The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner
herein should have been accorded ample
opportunity to establish the government's claim.
True, an amended application was submitted but it is
admitted by the respondents themselves that no
significant alterations were made therein, hence, the
opposition already filed should have been considered
as the answer to the amended application as well.
Parenthetically, since the amendment in the
application consisted merely in the substitution of
the name of the applicant, it was not absolutely
necessary to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy
of the amended application, and it sufficed that the
substitution was stated in the Notice of Initial
Hearing. 7
The respondent corporation maintains that the
appropriate remedy in this instance is appeal, which
is expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, and not certiorari. We do not agree.
The declaration of default against the petitioner was
patently invalid because when the same was made,
he had already entered an appearance and filed his
opposition or answer. In Omico Mining and Industrial
Corporation vs. Vallejos we laid down the doctrine
that appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party
is illegally declared in default. Thus, we stated:
The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule
(i.e. Sec. 2, Rule 41) is properly, though not
exclusively, available to a defendant who has been
validly declared in default. It does not preclude a
defendant who has been illegally declared in default
from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious
remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the
judgment by default set aside as a nullity. 8
Indeed, for the above reason, we gave due course to
this petition. 9
Additionally, the respondent Judge, in denying the
petitioner's Motion for New Trial, ignored the
established rule that courts should be liberal in
setting aside a default judgment. "The Court, in the
exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their
standing in court and given them an even chance to
face their opponents." 10
Further, we hold that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion when it granted the respondent
corporation's application for registration, without
sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an
imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable
under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act. Verily, we said in Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court that: "No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in
truth, be little more than formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already
vested." 11 But precisely we are not convinced with
the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the
arguments of the respondent corporation that the
latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.
93
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin,
from whom the respondent corporation purchased
the subject lots, have pending sales applications as
evidenced in the plans submitted to the land
registration court by Maria Garcia herself which
contain the following footnotes: "This survey is
covered by S.A. (x-5) 582" ... "This is covered by S.A.
No. (x-5) 583," S.A. being the short form for Sales
Application. As such sales applicants, they manifestly
acknowledge that they do not own the land and that
the same is a public land under the administration of
the Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were
submitted. 12 Therefore, their possession was not
that of an owner, as required by law. We note that
the private respondents were conspicuously silent on
this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital
fact.
Secondly, if it is true that the original owner and
possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands
declared for taxation purposes for the first time only
in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For
although tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof
that the holder had a claim of title over the
property. 13
More than anything else, however, registration in
this instance can not be granted on the basis of
Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to
wit:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
as the above provision applies exclusively to
agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears
from Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157,
dated April 28, 1971, 14 that the subject lands, with
an approximate area of 56,598 square meters and
situated at Sitio Babuyan, Cabcaben, Mariveles,
Bataan, under Project No. 4-A, were forest lands and
only later, declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus,
even on the assumption that the applicant herein,
through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession for at least thirty years, such possession
never ripened into private ownership. The
respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have
applied for sales patents precisely because they
wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands.
An examination of the dates will show that the filing
of the sales applications, apparently on October 24,
1971, was done after the lands had been declared as
alienable and disposable.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of
whatever clasification belong to the State, courts
must scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. But this the respondent
Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and
plans submitted by the private respondents were not
carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the
petitioner's opposition to the application were so
casually ignored.
We no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial
of this case which would only prolong the litigation
unnecessarily, for as we said in a recent case, the
remand of a case to the lower court for Lither
reception of evidence is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on
the records before on the records before it. 15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED; the Order of general default, dated
January 23, 1975, as against the petitioner, and the
Order dated August 7, 1975 denying the Motion For
New Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975, as
well as the decree of registration issued pursuant
thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET ASIDE.
The respondent corporation's subject application for
land registration is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and
Padilla, JJ., concur.
94
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D.
VALISNO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second
Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer
for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders
issued by respondent judge in Land Registration Case
No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Second Branch,
entitled, "Application for Registration of Title,
Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs. Flordeliza Valisno
and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated
July 2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by
petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the
order dated September 19, 1980, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza
and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs
of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo,
Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two
parcels of land, particularly described as follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay
Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of
Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000)
square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the
Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long;
bounded on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the
South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the
Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del
Estado, now Matias del Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of
Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters
or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred
twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South;
bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the
south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita
Blanco and on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road
and Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-
42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described
parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes
and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the
concept of owners by installing as caretaker one
Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q.
Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in
question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his
and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30,
1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted
Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He
subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said
land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before
the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint
against private respondent for recovery of possession
of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in
favor of petitioners who were declared owners
thereof. On appeal, however, by private respondent
to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court
in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978,
reversed the decision of the lower court and
dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding
that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the
complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr.
Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from the
land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appelles
appellant, their respective area and boundaries being
completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the
appellees showing that their property encroaches,
much less covers that of the property presently
occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving
sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr.
Blanco. We refuse to give any weight to this piece of
evidence because it was prepared by someone who'
has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to
his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or
to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona Harvester
Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has
not been successfully Identified with that described
in the complaint, the instant action should have been
95
dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article
434 of the New Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must
be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine enunciated
in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Lim vs.
Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the
present occupant of the land since he purchased the
same from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967,
having constructed a six-door apartment in the
premises which he lets to both transients and
residents of the locality. Being the actual possessor of
the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just
title and he need not show or prove why he is
possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New
Civil Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and
that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the
latter in the matter of Identifying the property in
question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"]
showing the position of the land in relation not only
to the properties adjoining the same but also with
known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the
other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly the
description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is
unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the
property are mere estimations, reached thru pure
guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands,
50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one
noted authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece
of land its boundaries and not the area are the main
factors to be considered holds true only when the
boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the
Identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly
indicates that an erroneous statement concerning
the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial
Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth
Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit.
Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 19631.
(Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision
filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due
course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private
respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of
Isabela an application for registration in his name of
the title of the lands in question, basing his
entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of
sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in
CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40,
Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to
the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo]
Private respondent, however, moved for the
dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the
same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate
court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the
opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss,
the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders
dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground
of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo]
When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as
grounds therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING
PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS
HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS.
FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A
LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING
THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN
THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A
MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A
LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES
JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO
DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING
PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT,
SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS,
ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT
CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO
WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY
2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980
[ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their briefs.
Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private
respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief
within the given period which expired on October 9,
1981. Thus, the case was consider submitted for
decision without the brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the
motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G.
Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-
96
204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to
the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence,
We observe that the situation obtaining in the case
at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having
been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed
unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is
not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize
it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not
provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a
motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
however, allows the application of the rules
contained therein in land registration proceedings in
a suppletory character or whenever practicable and
convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of
the land registration case, this Court in Duran v.
Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the
application for registration of therein appellants
upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors,
it having been indubitably shown that the court a
quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands
sought to be registered in appellants' name had
previously been registered in the names of the
oppositors. To have allowed the registration
proceeding to run its usual course would have been a
mere exercise in futility. The same consideration
applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the
nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary
civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a
complaint, this time with the original defendant
becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who
becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either
then answer the counterclaim or be declared in
default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The
latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for.
Although as We have earlier said, such situation
rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the
irregularity that petitioners complain of stems
basically from the infrequent use of a motion to
dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it
being unauthorize.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily
relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In
said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court,
ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicata is
available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged
rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior
judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss. "
Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice
Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr.
Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule
132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower
court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to
entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res
judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of
petitioner's claim will not necessarily or
automatically mean adjudication of title to the
individual respondents but it will certainly facilitate
the consideration of their claims which cease to be
contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is
the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no
retrogression in the application of sound rules and
doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his
opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v.
Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil.
425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the
Court invariably ruled that a "final judgment in an
ordinary civil case determining the ownership of
certain land is res judicata in a registration case when
the parties and the property are the same as in the
former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res
judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle
to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it
must have been' rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties,
[c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there
must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The
decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment
on the merits rendered by a court which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
There is, between the registration case under
consideration and the previous civil action for
recovery of property, identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega,
Sr., in the application for registration does not result
in a difference in parties between the two cases. One
right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests
of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258]
Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his
ownership over the land in question, he was doing so
in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from
the fact that one of the evidence he presented to
prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by
the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and
Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no
question that the land sought to be recovered by
petitioners are the very same parcels of land being
sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's
names.
97
While the complaint in the first action is captioned
for recovery of possession, the allegations and the
prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership.
In effect, it is in the nature of an accion
reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of
title. Consequently, between the two cases there is
identity of causes of action because in accion
reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of
ownership and the same is true in registration cases.
Registration of title in one's name is based on
ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the
applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only
difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is
directed against particular persons, while in the latter
proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the
whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action
remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v.
Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the
answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an
action to recover title, as real rights are involved
therein. It is only the form of action which is
different. "But the employment of two different
forms of action, does not enable one to escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same
cause of action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco
v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v.
Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA
411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21
SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824;
Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de
Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v.
Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].
It does not matter that the first case was decided by
a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case
is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as
a registration court. It is enough that the court which
decided the first case on the merits had validly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. That both courts should have equal
jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res
judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the
alleged right of another claimant, what useful
purpose would be served by allowing a party to
present evidence of ownership over the land sought
to be registered when the final result would
necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set
up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the
land registration court finds that the party against
whom the principle of res judicata operates does
have a better right or title to the land, what happens
to the principle of res judicata? Can a court sitting as
a land registration court in effect, annul a final
judgment of another court of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for
practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal
of either the application for registration or the
opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably
shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is
barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera
case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their
opposition, respondent court had denied them their
day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they
had their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895
as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim
over the land in question was fully aired and
ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent
Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect
to the land under consideration had been put to rest
in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained
finality, the same remains the law of the case
between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by
respondent judge in dismissing petitioners'
opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
Pedro M. Surdilla for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In a land registration case, does the bare statement
of the applicant that the land applied for has been in
the possession of her predecessors-in- interest for
more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh
98
incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required
in proceedings of this nature? This is the issue to be
resolved in the instant petition for review.
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed
before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Pangasinan, an application1 for
registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting
of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at
Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
The Director of Lands, in representation of the
Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition,
alleging that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land
under any of the Spanish titles or any other
recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that
neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in concept of owner at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
the application; and that the land is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.2
After trial, the Court of First Instance3 rendered
judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law,
Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942
and 6236, the Court hereby confirms the title of the
applicants over the parcel of land described in Plan
Psu-251940 and hereby adjudicates the same in the
name of the herein applicants, spouses Stephen Lee
and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age, Filipino citizens
and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their
conjugal property.
Once this decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree and title issue therefor.
SO ORDERED.4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals),
which however affirmed the lower court's decision in
toto on July 29, 1983.5
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:6
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P.
LEE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR IMPERFECT
TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION
EITHER UNDER ACT NO. 496, AS AMENDED (LAND
REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B), C. A. NO.
141, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC LAND ACT);
B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELF-SERVING AND
UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT THAT
THE SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA
VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS LEADING TO
REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE STATE OF
ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE
PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE, WHICH, HOWEVER,
STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM
OF PROOF—WHICH MUST BE CONCLUSIVE—
REQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;
D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS
MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESCRIPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND
BELONGING TO THE STATE.
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that
she was able to prove her title to the land in question
through documentary evidence consisting of Deeds
of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as
her testimony that her predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land in question for more
than 20 years; that said testimony, which petitioner
characterizes as superfluous and uncalled for,
deserves weight and credence considering its
spontaneity; that in any event, the attending fiscal
should have cross-examined her on that point to test
her credibility; and that, the reason said fiscal failed
to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts
showing that the land being applied for is a private
land.7
We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that
the land in question was owned by the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan, who on August
11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to Mrs.
Laureana Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March
18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively, Mrs.
Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their half portions to
private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent
had the property recorded for taxation purposes in
her name and that of her husband Stephen Lee,
paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March
9, 1976 for the same years.
At the time of the filing of the application for
registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent
had been in possession of the subject area for about
thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to
her possession that of her predecessors-in-interest in
99
order to comply with the requirement of Section 48
(b) of commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, to
wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain.
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,"
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter.
Private respondent's testimony on her predecessors-
in-interest's possession is contained in a one-page
declaration given before a commissioner on
December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows:8
Commissioner: Atty. Surdilla, you can now present
your evidence.
Atty. Surdilla: I am presenting the applicant, your
Honor.
Commissioner: Swearing under oath the applicant.
Atty. Surdilla:
Q Please state your name and other personal
circumstances.
A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married
to Stephen Lee, proprietor, and resident of Dagupan
City.
Q Are you the applicant in this case now?
A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.
Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject
of registration now?
A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T.
Mataban, sir.
Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours
over said property?
A Yes, sir.
Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 30, 1963, what can you say
to them?
A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the
conveyance to us by Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over
the 1/2 portion of the property and the deed of sale
dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2
portion of the property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said
Deeds of Absolute Sale adverted to above be marked
as Exhibits "I" and "J", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and
Mrs. Laureana Mataban (your vendors) acquired
likewise the property sought by you to be registered?
A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan who possessed
the same for more than 20 years.
Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated August 11, 1970, is this the sale
adverted or referred by you?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said
deed be marked as Exhibit "H", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark it.
Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is
the nature thereof?
A I and my husband are in possession of the
property, which possession tacked to that of our
predecessors-in-interest is adverse, continuous,
open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your
Honor.
Q Whose name/names is the property declared for
taxation purposes?
A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that
Tax Declaration Nos. 22253 and 24126, be marked
as Exhibits "K" and "K-1", respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?
A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that Official
Receipts Nos. H-6048922 and G-9581024, dated
March 9, 1976 and March 25, 1975 be marked
as Exhibits "L" and 'L-1",' respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in
the bank or private person/persons?
A No sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.
100
That's all, your Honor.
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that
"no person is entitled to have land registered under
the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the
owner in fee simple of the same, even though there
is no opposition presented against such registration
by third persons. . . . In order that the petitioner for
the registration of his land shag be permitted to have
the same registered, and to have the benefit
resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued,
the burden is upon him to show that he is the real
and absolute owner, in fee simple."9
Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has
occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and under a claim of title since July 26, 189410 or
prior thereto.11
The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that
all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. As enunciated in the case
of Santiago vs. de los Santos:12
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present
Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There
would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they
must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would
be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing
such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our
polity that lands of whatever classification belong to
the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it
retains its rights over the same as dominus . . .
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private
respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or
more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of
the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the
application, was open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and in concept of owners. This burden,
private respondent failed to discharge to the
satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the
spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been
in possession of the property for more than twenty
(20) years found in private respondent's declaration
is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
required in cases of this nature. Private respondent
should have presented specific facts that would have
shown the nature of such possession. The phrase
"adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in
concept of owner" by which she described her own
possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-
interest are mere conclusions of law which require
factual support and substantiation.
That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine
her on this point does not help her cause because the
burden is upon her to prove by clear, positive and
absolute evidence that her predecessors' possession
was indeed adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner.1âwphi1 Her bare
allegation, without more, did not constitute such
preponderant evidence that would shift the burden
of proof to the oppositor.
Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had
knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for
is private land helpful to private respondent. Suffice
it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court which
should be convinced, by competent proof, of private
respondent's registerable right over the subject
parcel of land.
Private respondent having failed to prove by
convincing, positive proof that she has complied with
the requirements of the law for confirmation of her
title to the land applied for, it was grave error on the
part of the lower court to have granted her
application.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987
FELIPA S. LARAGAN, INDEPENDENCIO SIBBALUCA,
AURORA C. SIBBALUCA, and ZENAIDA S.
VALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORO LEAÑO,
TOMAS LEAÑO, FRANCISCO LEAÑO, and
CONSOLACION LEAÑO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
101
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
judgment * of the respondent appellate court in CA-
G.R. No. 48353-R which affirmed, with modifications,
the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela in Land Reg. Case No. N-275 Land Rec. No. N-
36094,ordering the registration of the parcel of land
described in Plan HS-48806 in the names of the
petitioners.
The facts of the case are as follows: On 14 October
1968, the herein petitioners, Felipa Laragan,
Independencio Sibbaluca, Aurora Sibbaluca, and
Zenaida Valdez filed an application with the Court of
First Instance of Isabela for the registration of their
title over a parcel of land with an area of 221,667 sq.
m., more or less, situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas,
Ilagan, Isabela, and described in Plan HS-48806. The
applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of
land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the
spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that
they have been in possession thereof for more than
34 years. 1
The application was set for hearing on 20 May 1969.
The Land Registration Commission issued a notice of
initial hearing, copies of which were furnished all the
parties concerned. The notice was published in the
Official Gazette and also posted in the municipal
building of Ilagan, Isabela as weLL as in conspicuous
places where the land is situated.
On the date set for the initial hearing of the
application that is, 20 May 1969, Teodoro Leano,
Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano, and
Consolacion Leano appeared and served notice that
they were opposing the application for registration
and they asked the court that they be granted a
period of thirty (30) days within which to submit their
opposition. 2
Thereafter, the court issued an order of general
default. 3
On 7 July 1969, the Solicitor General filed a written
opposition, on behalf of the Director of Lands,
alleging, among others, that the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to
the parcel of land sought to be registered, the same
not having been acquired by composition title from
the Spanish Government or by a possessory
information title under the Royal Decree of 13
February 1894, nor by acquisitive prescription. He
prayed that the land be declared public land. 4
On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano,
Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion
Leano filed their opposition to the application for
registration. They claimed that they are the
owners, pro indiviso, of the southern part of the land
applied for, with an area of 16 hectares, which is
covered by Homestead Application No. 58202 of
their deceased parents, the spouses Eleuterio Leano
and Victoria Sabido, and which has been in their
possession for more than 30 years. 5
Hearings were then conducted, after which, the trial
court rendered judgment confirming the title of the
applicants over the parcel of land applied for and
ordering its registration in the names of the
applicants. 6
From said judgment, only the oppositors Teodoro
Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano,
and Consolacion Leano appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On 9 November 1977, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but
excluded the southern portion of the land applied
for, which is the portion covered by Homestead
Application No. 58202 (E-34962), the appellate court
declaring such excluded portion to be public land,
and part of the public domain, in view of the failure
of the applicants and oppositors to prove registrable
title over the same. 7
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision 8 but their motion was denied. 9
Hence, the present petition.
The application for registration, filed with the lower
court, was for the confirmation of an imperfect title.
The law applicable is Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act which provides as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by way or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
102
(c) xxx xxx xxx
This Court has ruled that an applicant for
confirmation of imperfect title must first comply with
all the requisites prescribed before he can acquire a
vested right over the land applied for. 10
In the instant case, the appellate court found that,
while it may be true that the petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Sibbaluca, have
been in continuous and adverse possession of the
land in dispute for more than 30 years, they were
not bona fide occupants thereof. Said the appellate
court:
The evidence on record indicates the facts to be as
follows: Sometime in 1920, Eleuterio Leano, the
father of the oppositors-appellants applied for a
homestead patent for a parcel of land located in
barrio Guinatan. (now Sto. Tomas) municipality of
Ilagan Isabela, with boundaries: North — Domingo
Ancheta; East — Felipa Jamias; South — Guinatan
Creek; and West — Juan Salvador and others; with an
area of sixteen (16) hectares. The application was
covered by Homestead Application No. 5802 (E-
34962). On August 20, 1920, the application was
approved subject to the conditions set forth in law.
(Annex "2" of the Opposition). The applicant, then
started to cultivate the land planting corn and
tobacco with the help of some tenants. On May 27,
1928, Eleuterio Leano died, survived by his wife
Victoria S. de Leano and his children, the oppositors-
appellants. On December 28, 1935, the widow,
Victoria S. de Leano executed a deed of sale of the
homestead in favor of Hilario T. Maagay and his wife,
Batolomea Adduro de Maggay. Hilario Maggay gave
the property as a "reward" to his nephew Sibbaluca,
who from then on, took possession of the parcel of
land. However, upon investigation conducted by the
Director of Lands, regarding the proposed transfer of
the rights over the said parcel of land, to Anastacio
Sibbaluca, it was found out that "the intention of the
parties was merely to constitute a mortgage on the
homestead as a security for the widow's
indebtedness to Hilario T. Maggay and not a real
transfer of his rights thereto." Thus, in the order,
dated December 16, 1940, the Director of Lands said:
"... the proposed transfer of the homestead under
consideration should be, as hereby it is, dropped; and
Homestead Application No. 58202 (E-34962) of
Eleuterio (deceased) now his heirs, shall be given due
course." (Exhibit 2)
On February 10, 1941, Anastacio Sibbaluca filed a
motion for reconsideration regarding the foregoing
order, questioning among other things, the fact that
there was no mention whatsoever regarding
reimbursement of his expenses over improvements
introduced by him. On June 6, 1946, the Director of
Lands in an Order regarding the matter said that
under the Public Land Law, the Bureau of lands could
not enforce his right to reimbursement.
Nevertheless, he had ample remedy under
substantive law. In short, he could enforce his right in
the court's of justice. (Exhibit 3) Despite this order,
Anastacio Sibbaluca did not vacate the premises, so
that on June 10, 1947, the heirs of Leano filed a
Motion for Ejectment. On February 2, 1949, the
Director of Lands thru a certain Clodualdo Garcia,
referred the matter to the district Land Officer
District No. 4, Bureau of Lands, Ilagan, Isabela for
proper action. A portion of the letter says:
"... in order that proper action could be taken on the
"Motion" you are hereby directed to immediately
take steps for the reconstitution of the records
relative to the above-noted application." (Exhibit 4)
Pursuant to this order, Alejandro Ramos, Junior
Public Lands Inspector was ordered to make an
investigation regarding the said parcel of land. In a
letter, dated May 11, 1950, addresses to the Director
of Lands thru the District Lands, District No. 4, Bureau
of Lands, Ilagan, Isabela, Alejandro Ramos
recommended the cancellation of the homestead
application of applicant Leano stating his personal
findings 6f the improvements introduced by
Anastacio Sibbaluca on the land in question. (Exhibit
V) However, despite this recommendation, The Chief
Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands, in a
Memorandum, dated July 8, 1968, "In the matter of:
HA No. 58202 (E-34962) Eleuterio Leano (deceased)
now his heirs, represented by Victoria Sabido de
Leano (widow) (Proposed Transferor) Anastacio
Sibbaluca (Proposed Transferee), Guinatan, Ilagan,
Isabela addressed to the Chief, Land Management
Division of the same office, stated:
"We are referring to you herewith the folder of
Homestead Application No. 58202 (E-34962) of
Eleuterio Leano (deceased) now his heirs,
represented by Victoria Sabido de Leano, for further
action thereon, informing that the Order of this
Office in the above-noted case, dated June 9, 1941,
had long been final and executory." (Exh. 7)
Because of the Memorandum, Clemente Dizon, Land
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, was ordered by the
Director Land Officer (the original order coming from
the Director of Lands) to conduct an ocular
inspection on the land. Thus, on October 25, 1968,
after proper notice was given to both parties,
Clemente Dizon conducted an ocular inspection of
said land. In the course of his investigation, he found
out that the said land was fully cultivated, planted
with manggo trees, coconut trees, oranges, etc.
103
Furthermore, a house was built inside the lot. By
virtue of these findings, Dizon, in his report
recommended that HA application No. 58202 (Entry
No. 34962) of Eleuterio Leano be cancelled for having
been alienated and conveyed to a second party
without previous knowledge and consent of the
Director of Lands. However, the record does not
show, whether this recommendation was acted upon
or not. What appears on record is that on August 27,
1968, a Homestead Application for Reconstitution
Purposes, was filed by the heirs of Eleuterio Leano,
represented by Tomas Leano, oppositor-appellant,
herein, covering the parcel of land in issue. Also, on
October 3, 1968, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by spouses Anastacio Sibbaluca and
Lucrecia Sibbaluca in favor of the applicants-
appellees, of the parcel of land, now in controversy.
(Exhibit F)
From the evidence adduced, we find the applicants-
appellees lacking the prerequisite pursuant to
Section 48 (b) CA 141. of bona fide acquisition of the
said parcel of land ...
The petitioners now seek the reversal of the
respondent appellate court's decision. They claim
that the respondent appellate court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land
in question as public land, because the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the
registration of said parcel of land in their favor, had
already become final and executory for failure of the
Director of Lands to appeal therefrom.
The argument is untenable. While it may be true that
the Director of Lands did not appeal from the
decision of the trial court, his failure to so appeal did
not make the decision of the trial court final and
executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the
other oppositors, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano,
Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano, who also
seek the confirmation of their imperfect title over the
land in question.
Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to
appeal foreclose the appellate court from declaring
the land in question to be public land, since the
oppositors and the herein petitioners are both
seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the
provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law
where the presumption always is that the land
pertains to the state, and the occupants and
possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation under
a bona fide claim of ownership for the required
number of years. Thus, in their application for
registration, the petitioners alleged that they "hereby
apply to have the land hereinafter described brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and
to have the title thereto registered and
confirmed." 11 The petitioners are deemed to
thereby admit that, until such confirmation, the land
remains public.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for
registration is not necessarily entitled to have the
land registered in his name simply because no one
appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of the land. He must show, even in the
absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the
court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple.
Courts are not justified in registering property under
the Torrens system, simply because there is no
opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence
of any opposition, deny registration of the land under
the Torrens system, if the facts presented do not
show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple,
of the land which he seeks to register. 12
The petitioners also contend that the bad faith of
their predecessor-in-interest is of no legal
consequence to their application for registration as
such alleged bad faith is not imputable to them, and
what matters is that they occupied and possessed
the disputed parcel of land in 1934 by virtue of a
deed of absolute sale, executed in their favor by the
spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca, in utmost
good faith and in concept of owners under a bona
fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, and that they
have been in open, peaceful, continuous possession
and occupation in the concept of owner for more
than 34 years.
Petitioners' claim is devoid of merit. The evidence
shows that the petitioners acquired the land from
Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca only on 3 October
1968, or 11 days prior to the filing of their application
for registration, 13 and it was Anastacio and Lucrecia
Sibbaluca who had allegedly possessed the land for
about 34 years. Thus, in their application for
registration, the petitioners alleged the following:
4. That the applicants have acquired said land in the
following manner: The parcel of land and its
improvements thereon have been acquired by the
herein applicants by way of ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE
from their vendors, namely, the Spouses Anastacio B.
Sibbaluca and Lucrecia Sibbaluca, the latter having
been in possession, occupation, and cultivation of
said parcel of land for more than 34 solid years,
open, peaceful, continuous, public, notorious, and
against third persons and in concept of owner for
that length of time. 14
104
It would appear, however, that the possession and
occupation of the land by the spouses Anastacio and
Lucresia Sibbaluca are tainted with bad faith so that
the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the
provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.
Finally, the petitioners claim that the respondent
appellate court grossly erred in not dismissing the
appeal of the private respondents therein on the
grounds that: (1) the record on appeal does not state
that an appeal bond was timely filed; (2) the record
on appeal does not contain sufficient data to show
that the appeal was perfected within the
reglementary period in that it does not state when
the appellants received a copy of the trial court's
decision; (3) the appellants failed to file their brief
since the brief filed for them by Atty. Teofilo Leonin
was unauthorized as their counsel of record was Atty.
Dominador P. Nuesa of Ilagan, Isabela and not Atty.
Leonin and there has been no substitution of
counsel; (4) the appellants' brief is deficient in that
(a) it does not contain a subject index of the
arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged; (b) the "Statement of Facts"
does not contain a clear and concise statement in a
narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties
and those in controversy, together with the
substance of the proof relating to the facts in
controversy in sufficient detail to make it clearly
intelligible; and (c) there is no clear and concise
statement of the issues of fact and/or law to be
submitted to the court for its judgment.
The contention is likewise without merit. We find
that there has been substantial compliance with the
Rules as to the filing of the appellants' brief. The
appellants cannot be rigidly tasked to adhere to the
provisions of Section 16, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court
as to what an appellant's brief should contain, for the
reason that the rules contained in the Rules of Court
are applicable to land registration cases only in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient; 14-a and that said rules of procedure are
to be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding. 15
As to the appeal bond and record on appeal, suffice it
to state that an appeal bond and a record on appeal
are no longer required for an appeal. The filing of a
record on appeal is required only in appeals under
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
where multiple appeals are allowed. The present
proceeding is not one of such cases. 16
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR,
HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Cases
Division), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
respondent court which affirmed the adjudication by
the land registration court of a parcel of land in
Mulanay, Quezon in favor of the private respondents.
In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and
the Heirs of Felipe Rocete applied for the registration
of a parcel of land described in PSU-215779, with an
area of 226,773 square meters.
Unrebutted testimonial evidence established that the
land was part of the property originally belonging to
one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and
possession began sometime during her lifetime and
extended until 1936 when she died. (Tsn., August 6,
1976, Testimony of Florencio Marquez, Exhibit "U").
The present applicants are the grandchildren of
Candida Fernandez. In 1936, after the death of
Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in
the name of the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under
Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty (30)
hectares.
Subsequently, sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel
of land was forfeited in favor of the government for
failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same
was redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of
the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was
then the administrator of the property. A final deed
of sale (Exhibit "N") was executed by the Provincial
Treasurer of Tayabas in 1944 in favor of Vitaliano
Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs that the
property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for
the others until such time that partition among them
105
was effected. The evidence shows Vitaliano's public
and continuous possession.
The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the
property among themselves. The particular lot now
disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor of
the applicants-respondents. Shortly after the
partition, in 1948, the new owners declared their
share for taxation purposes. Tax Declaration 91 for
that year indicated the land as 12 hectares. This
declaration was followed by another one, Tax
Declaration No. 2021, in 1958.
In 1965, the private respondents caused a survey of
their property to be made. The property was found
to actually contain an area of 22.6773 hectares. This
corrected area was reflected in subsequent tax
declarations. The last one submitted in evidence is
dated 1974.
An ocular inspection conducted by the trial court
found more than one hundred (100) coconut trees
with ages over thirty (30) years old, out of a total of
more or less one thousand four hundred (1,400)
coconut trees on the land.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forest
Development filed an opposition alleging that neither
applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the land, not having
acquired the same under any of the recognized
Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land for
at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the application; and that the land is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an
opposition alleging that they have registrable title on
account of their possession since time immemorial.
Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition,
alleging that there was no actual survey of the land
applied for; and that he is entitled to registration on
account of his occupation and that of his
predecessor.
The spouses Dominador Lacson and Esperanza
Lacson likewise filed their opposition with respect to
"the portion of land embraced by points 22 to 24 to
25 to 26 to 27 and by a straight line drawn between
point 27 to point 23 of Plan Psu-215779" in answer to
which the applicants-respondents agreed to
relinquish or quitclaim whatever right, title, and
interest they might have over the above specified
portion in favor of oppositors Lacson. In view
thereof, the oppositor spouses withdrew their
opposition in the land registration case.
On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its
decision adjudicating the land to applicants as
follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the
applicants, namely MARIANO FUNTILAR,
MAGDALENA FUNTILAR and the HEIRS OF FELIPE
ROCETE are hereby declared owners proindiviso of
the parcel of land described according to Plan Psu-
215779, with an area of 22.6773 square meters,
subject to the claim of oppositors Dominador Lacson
and Esperanza Lacson as per agreement with the
applicants and when the decision becomes final and
executory, let a final decree be issued for the
issuance of title as provided by Act 496.
The Government alone, represented by the Director
of Lands and Director of Forest Development, filed its
appeal with the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court. The decision now under review dated August
24, 1984 states:
xxx xxx xxx
According to the government oppositors, the land in
question was certified as alienable and disposable
only on September 3, 1953, They, therefore,
conclude that herein applicants could not have been
in possession of said land for more than 30 years.
There is no evidence presented by the government,
however, that said land in question was part of the
forest zone. For that matter, during the hearing, the
Director of Forestry and the Director of Lands
manifested in writing that they have no evidence in
support of their opposition. They have not presented
plans or sketches to show that the land in question is
part of the communal forest.
Under the foregoing circumstances, We do not find
any merit in the appeal of the Government. It has
been ruled on this issue that the Director of Forestry
has the burden of proving that a piece of land
belongs to the forest zone (Ramos vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175; de Villa vs. Director of Lands, CA-
G.R. No. 5847-R, June 13, 1952).
... It has been ruled that the inclusion of portions of
said lands within the reservations declared by the
Director of Forestry in 1928 cannot affect the vested
rights of applicants and her predecessors who have
been continuously occupying and profiting from the
land since time immemorial (Ankron vs. Government
of the Phil., 40 Phil. 15; Llana vs. Director of Forestry,
CA-G.R. No. 4887-R, Sept. 23, 1950). Applicants have
established by preponderance of evidence that they
106
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of the
land in question for over 30 years introducing
improvements thereon.
As we have stated in previous decisions, the
registration of public lands for private titles after
satisfying the requirements of open, adverse and
public possession will be more beneficial to the
country as it will promote development of Idle lands.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof,
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Hence, this petition
The petitioners contend that in affirming the decision
of the lower court, the Intermediate Appellate Court
committed the following errors:
I the contrary finding. Survey Plan Psu-215779 of the
1. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE IdENTITY OF THE LAND
SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.
2. IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS.
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS
OF POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30) YEARS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF THEIR
APPLICATION IN 1972 AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO
REGISTRATION.
3. IN NOT DECLARING APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION.
4. IN NOT FINDING THAT APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS
HAVE FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND
The petitioners have come to us for a review on
questions of fact property within the province of the
trial courts to resolve. (Santos vs.Aranzanso 116 SCRA
1). This case furnishes occasion for us to reiterate the
general principle that only legal questions, not
factual issues, Should be raised in the Supreme Court
(Magpantay vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 236) and
that findings of fact of the Intermediate Appellate
Court should not be disturbed absent any showing of
grave error or abuse of discretion. Since the factual
findings of the respondent court are fully
substantiated by evidence on record ( Regalano vs.
Northwest Finance Corporation, 117 SCRA 45), we
decide not to disturb them.
The first issue raised refers to identity.
Petitioners allege that the identity of the land sought
to be registered has not been established. We sustain
property, showing its boundaries and total area,
clearly Identifies and delineates the extent of the
land. The petitioners cite the insufficiency of such a
survey to identify the land. The petitioners overlook
the fact that no survey would at all be possible where
the Identity of the land is not first properly
established. More importantly, without such
Identification, no opposition, even its own, to the
application for registration could be interposed.
Encroachment on or adverse possession of property
could not be justly claimed.
The petitioners cite differences in the description of
the land boundaries, as well as in the land area
stated in the tax declarations submitted in evidence
by applicants-respondents. They allege that these do
not refer to one and the same property.
A careful examination of the record shows a
misinterpretation of the evidence as to the
Identification of the land. Tax Declaration Nos. 91
and 2021 in 1948 describe a twelve-hectare property
bounded as follows: "N-Mocboc Brook; E-Campacat
Mt. ; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Mocboc Brook and Briccio
Morales. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 in 1964
and 1974 speak of a 22.6773-hectare land bounded"
N-Mariano Funtilar, et al.; "E-Heirs of Donaciano
Pumarada; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Emilio Aguirre and
Bagopaye Creek." However, the applicants-
respondents have satisfactorily explained the
discrepancy. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021
followed in tax payments from 1948 to 1958 and
beyond were made prior to the survey of the
property in 1965. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and
2662 were made subsequent thereto and, hence,
account for the difference in area stated. Such
differences are not uncommon as early tax
declarations are, more often than not, based on
approximation or estimation rather than on
computation. More so, if the land as in this case was
merely inherited from a predecessor and was still
held in common. Differences in boundaries described
in required municipal forms may also occur with
changes in boundary owners, changes of names of
certain places, a certain natural boundary being
known by more than one name or by plain error.
Neither was it uncommon then to designate the
nearest, most visible natural landmarks such as
mountains, creeks, rivers, etc. to describe the
location or situation of the boundaries of properties
in the absence of knowledge of technical methods of
measuring or determining boundaries with accuracy,
especially where as in this case, the same were made
merely by humble farm people. Certain
discrepancies, if logically explained later, do not
make doubtful, the Identification of the property as
107
made, understood and accepted by the parties to the
case.
It is respondents' contention that the land in
question was originally owned by Candida Fernandez;
forfeited in favor of the government for non-
payment of taxes; subsequently repurchased by
Vitaliano Aguirre in a tax delinquency sale and finally
adjudicated in favor of applicants in 1948.
Petitioners, however, allege that the relationship of
the land sold at auction with the land subject of
registration has not been established, since the final
deed of sale in favor of Aguirre and the survey plan
Psu-215779 refer to two different parcels of land.
The difference in boundary descriptions has already
been explained. Anent the disparity in land area, it
must be noted that the property mentioned in the
final deed of sale issued by the provincial treasurer at
the delinquency auction sale was the property
originally owned by Candida Fernandez. The parcel of
land sought to be registered and Identified by Survey
Plan Psu-215779 is a part of that property. The
surveyed land resulted from the partition of
Candida's property among her heirs. Adjudicated in
favor of herein respondents was 22.6773 hectares
thereof, the rest having gone to Emilio Aguirre, a son
of Candida whose property bounds the parcel of land
in dispute on the south. Such fact is revealed by the
testimony of Mariano Funtilar on direct examination,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Your counsel has presented a certain Exhibit 1,
which is a certification from the Municipal Treasurer
of Mulanay. It clearly states that a certain parcel of
land is declared in the name of the heirs of Candida
Fernandez, the administrator of which is Petronila
Aguirre which clearly shows that the tax declaration
was only made in the name of the heirs Candida
Fernandez, but in her name, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do we understand also that you are trying to
register only the portion that you personally, your
brother and sister are occupying?
A. Yes, sir and we are applying for that.
Q. In other words, it is clear that this land supposedly
originally owned by Candida Fernandez is a bigger
portion, is that correct, a bigger parcel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And only a portion of the land is allotted to your
brothers and sisters?
A. Yes, sir.
(Tsn-March 13, 1975, Land Reg. Case No. 192-G, p. 7)
xxx xxx xxx
And on cross-examination
ATTY. LAUREL:
Q. Would you like to enlighten this Court that you
and your brother and sister who are children of
Antonia Resales received this property, this entire
property were the only ones who received this entire
property?
A. That was the property pointed to uses our own,
sir.
Q. I am asking you whether this entire property was
given- was inherited by the children of Antonia
Rosales only?
A. That is a big parcel but it is only a portion which
was given to us which we are causing for registration,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(Tsn-March 4, 1976, Land Reg. No. 192-G, p. 7)
ATTY. LAUREL:
Q. When you said portions were adjudicated to the
heirs in order to avoid conflict in the repurchase do I
get from you Mr. Funtilar, that the property
repurchased that this property you are claiming in
your application is only a portion of the property
repurchased from the Government?
A. Yes, sir.
(Tsn-April 27, 1976, Land Reg. Case No. 1921-G, p.
18)
The petitioners contend that the private respondents
have failed to establish possession for at least thirty
years to entitle them to confirmation of imperfect
title and registration under the law. The petitioners
also fault the respondents reliance on the 1944 tax
delinquency sale, forgetting that possession must still
be proved.
We are satisfied from the evidence that long before
her death in 1936, Candida Fernandez already
possessed the disputed property. This possession
must be tacked to the possession of her heirs,
through administrator Vitaliano Aguirre, and later to
the possession of the private respondents
themselves, who are Candida's grandchildren.
108
The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture
in 1940 of the land in favor of the government. It
would be rather absurd under the circumstances of
this case to rule that the government would order
the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real
estate taxes if the property is forest land. It is also
reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida
Fernandez redeemed the property because they
wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the
possession of their family, thus continuing prior
possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more
than the required period. As a matter of fact, the
applicants' witnesses testified to their personal
knowledge of more than 50 years possession.
More important is the petitioners' allegation that the
property sought to be registered was unclassified
public forest until September 15, 1953 when L C
Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it
alienable and disposable.
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule
that after an applicant files his application for
registration, the burden shifts totally to the
government to prove that the land forms part of the
unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69)
governs applications for confirmation of imperfect
title. The applicant shoulders the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain.
The private respondents tried their best to present
the necessary evidence. A certification issued by then
District Forester Fernando Roy on September 27,
1972 reads:
xxxxxxxxx
... said parcel of land falls within the Alienable and
Disposable LC Project No. 16-D, LCMap No. 1634
certified" (not classified) "on September 15, 1953, by
the Director of Forestry. In view thereof, this office
interposes no objection in behalf of the Director of
Forestry for the registration and/or confirmation of
title on the property mentioned therein without
prejudice to such action, the Director of Lands and
other government entities may deem proper to take
on the premises.
to which, the then District Land Officer of the Bureau
of Lands, Land District No. IV-2 in Lucena City, in a
communication dated March 16, 1973 responded:
1. the parcel of land subject of this registration was
originally claimed by Emilio Aguirre and A. Fernandez
and the herein applicants have acquired the rights
and interest therein thru predecessors-in-interest;
and
2. that said parcel of land has not been disposed of,
reserved, leased, applied for or granted as
homestead or otherwise be alienated by the
government.
In view of the above findings, and basing from the
report of the investigation submitted thereon by a
representative of this office, and considering that this
Agency has no evidence to support the opposition of
the Government, it is further informed that this
office interposes no opposition in the confirmation of
the rights to and interest on the parcel of land
particularly described under Plan Psu-215779 in favor
of the herein applicants.
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our
land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural
resources is a revered and long standing principle. It
must, however, be applied together with the
constitutional provisions on social justice and land
reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid
manifest unfairness and injustice.
Every application for a concession of public land has
to be viewed in the light of its peculiar
circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs
of Amunategui us. Director of Forestry (supra) ruling
is warranted whenever a portion of the public
domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation,
fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices.
But when an application appears to enhance the very
reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act, and
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public
Land Act, then their provisions should not be made
to stand in the way of their own implementation.
The land sought to be registered was declared
alienable and disposable 33 years ago. It is not forest
land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the
applicants and their predecessors for at least three
generations. The attempts of humble people to have
disposable lands they have been tilling for
generations titled in their names should not only be
viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as
a matter of policy, be encouraged. We see no strong
reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and
the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The decision of the respondent
appellate court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
109
 SECOND DIVISION
June 18, 1987
G.R. No. L-66866
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MINDA DE PORKAN, SADIN MARAUG, GORGONIO
BERMUDEZ, LOLITA MACATINDOG, MEDORI DE
PORKAN, JUAN ARANGALI, ANTONINA ESTARES,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO DEL NORTE and the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [Fourth Civil
Cases Division], respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for private respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, seeks
the reversal of the decision 1 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated
February 29, 1984, which affirmed the joint
decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch I [Tagum] dismissing petitioner's
complaint in Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248 for
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of private
respondent Minda de Porkan and her successors-in-
interest and the Free Patent of private respondent
Lolita Macatindog and her successors-in-interest,
respectively.
The undisputed facts appearing on the records are as
follows:
The family of Sadin de Porkan, father of Medori and
Macampon de Porkan, both native Muslims of La Paz,
Carmen, [formerly Panabo] Davao del Norte, had
been in actual possession as owner since the Spanish
colonial period of a tract of land planted with
coconuts situated in said municipality. 3 During the
Tagum Cadastral Survey of July 22, 1937, this tract of
land, Identified as Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 were
respectively allocated to Medori and Macampon de
Porkan, the predecessors-in-interest of herein private
respondents.4
On April 30, 1953, or sixteen [16] years after the
Tagum Cadastral Survey, Medori de Porkan filed her
Free Patent Application No. V-27162 5 over Lot No.
1099 containing an area of 16.2983 hectares. The
following day, or on May 1, 1953, Vicente J. Villena,
Junior Public Lands Inspector, submitted a final
investigation report 6 recommending that the patent
be granted to Medori de Porkan. The report was
subsequently endorsed for approval to the Director
of Lands on May 30, 1953 by, Juan Tapales, Head,
Special Investigation Party, Davao, who
recommended that the entry of applicant be
favorably confirmed and a free patent be issued to
Medori de Porkan, thus:
9. That the said land has been surveyed, and the
survey records are known as Tagum Cad Survey No.
25-B. It corresponds to Lots 1099, B.L. Case No. 4,
Cadastral Record No. 276 which was allocated to the
herein applicant, Medori de Porkan during the
cadastral survey of Tagum.
10. FURTHER REMARKS: Due to the long possession
and occupation by Medori de Porkan of the land,
who also introduced considerable improvements
thereon the undersigned believed beyond reasonable
doubt that she is entitled to a free patent.
Information gathered from other persons, settlers
and homesteaders in the vicinity reveals that no
other persons had been allowed to have any
interests in, rights to, the improvements now existing
therein. Records show that the land applied for was
allocated to the herein application (sic) during the
cadastral survey of Tagum but the said applicant has
not filed any application for the land.
Fifteen [15] years after, or on November 12, 1968,
Medori de Porkan relinquished her rights and
interests over Lot No. 1099 7 to her daughter, Lolita
Macatindog, who thereafter filed her own free
patent application 8 on November 14, 1968. The Free
Patent Application No. V-271162 of Medori de
Porkan covering Lot No. 1099 was thereafter ordered
transferred to, recorded and given due course in the
name of Lolita Macatindog in an order dated
February 8, 1971.9 On May 27, 1971, the Director of
Lands approved the Free Patent Application of Lolita
Macatindog and ordered that the said application be
entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands as Free
Patent Entry No. 431343 and that the corresponding
Free Patent be issued in her favor over Lot No.
1099. 10 Free Patent No. 488112 was issued to Lolita
Macatindog on June 7, 1971, and on July 13, 1971,
she was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-
9742 11 over said Lot No. 1099.
On June 6, 1978, or after seven [7] years from the
issuance of the Free Patent, Lolita Macatindog
conveyed 60,000 sq. meters of said Lot No. 1099 to
Juan Arangali who secured Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-25142 12 over said area. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25143 13 was issued for the
remaining 102,983 sq. meters in the name of Lolita
Macatindog.
110
On the other hand, Macampon de Porkan died
before he could file any application and improve Lot
No. 1546 containing an area of 15.2406 hectares
allocated to him. In his stead, the Homestead
Application No. V-76456 14 of Sadin Maraug, who
showed much interest in acquiring said tract of land,
was accepted on May 1, 1953 on the basis of the
investigation report 15 of Vicente J. Villena, Junior
Public Lands Inspector, dated May 1, 1953, which
was favorably endorsed by Juan Tapales, Head,
Special Investigation Party, Davao, on May 31, 1953.
Sadin Maraug's homestead application was
subsequently approved and recorded as Homestead
Entry No. V-68302 16 in an order dated January 13,
1954 issued by Zoilo Castrillo, Director of Lands.
On June 1, 1971, or seventeen [17] years after the
approval of his homestead application, Sadin Maraug
sought authority from the Director of Lands to
transfer his rights over Lot No. 1546, and on June 8,
1971, he executed a transfer of homestead rights in
favor of Minda de Porkan. This was approved by
Vicente A. Valdellon, Director of Lands, in an order
dated December 3, 1971, which likewise ordered that
the Homestead Application No. V-76456 of Sadin
Maraug be recorded in the name of the transferee,
Minda de Porkan. 17
Minda de Porkan thereafter filed her Homestead
Application No. V-76456.18 After she made a final
proof on July 8, 1971, she was issued Homestead
Patent No. 135029 approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 8,
197I. On March 17, 1972 she was issued original
Certificate of Title. No. P-10095 19over Lot No 1546.
In 1977, or after six [6] years from the issuance of the
homestead patent, Minda de Porkan conveyed
80,000 sq. meters of Lot No. 1546 to Gorgonio S.
Bermudez who secured his Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-23598 20 on September 26, 1977. Transfer
Certificate No. T-23599 21 was issued in the name of
Minda de Porkan for the remaining 72,406 sq.
meters.
Meanwhile, Mrs. Viola C. Azurin, a resident of 629
Sta. Ana Avenue, Davao City, obtained from the then
Philippine Fisheries Commission on March 4, 1966,
Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V 22 Covering
an area of 20 hectares situated at La Paz, Panabo
[now Carmen], Davao del Norte, described and
indicated in the sketch on the sheet 23 attached to
permit, subject to the additional rules on the next
page 24 and, among others, to the following terms
and conditions:
4. Upon the expiration of the permit or upon its
cancellation, all permanent improvements on the
area shall pass to the ownership of the Government
without any obligation on the part of said
Government to indemnify or reimburse the holder of
the permit therefor.
5. The decision of the Commissioner of Fisheries as to
the exact location of the boundary lines of the area
shall be accepted as final.
This permit will expire on December 31, 1966 or at an
earlier date under the conditions stated in Rules 10,
11 and 12 hereof.
Thereafter, Viola C. Azurin had the area surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Roman F. Joaquin, a private
surveyor, who found out that her fishpond permit
actually covered 33.6586 hectares, and not 20.0
hectares. 25 On November 29, 1967, Geodetic
Engineer R.F. Joaquin prepared and submitted for
approval by the Director of Lands the allegedly
corrected plan of the land [fishpond] 26 but the same
was not approved by the Director of Lands.
On January 17, 1968, the spouses Condi Mama and
Cadingaga Mora, both native Muslims of La Paz,
Panabo [Carmen], Davao del Norte, sold to Viola C.
Azurin, their rights and interests over all the nipa
plants and improvements in the parcel of land
covered by Viola C. Azurin's Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V for and in consideration of P3,500.00. 27
On March 1, 1968, Viola C. Azurin filed with the
Bureau of Lands a sales application 28 over an
agricultural land to be used solely for agricultural
purposes, containing an area of 33.6586 hectares,
bounded on the northeast by Tagum River and on the
southwest by public land, situated at La Paz, Panabo
[now Carmen], Davao del Norte, for which purpose
she stated that she would invest the sum of
P20,000.00. Prior to the said sales application, she
asked the Director of Lands, in a survey request
dated February 12, 1968, to have a private surveyor,
Geodetic Engineer Roman F. Joaquin, survey the
33.6586 hectares allegedly covered by her sales
application, but she agreed that she would take only
such title as may be issued to her by the Director of
Lands irrespective of the result of the survey of the
area which was allegedly occupied by her under
Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
The sales application of Viola C. Azurin over the
alleged 33.6586 hectares was not approved by the
Director of Lands. 29
On April 24, 1969, Viola C. Azurin filed Fishpond
Application No. 27257 over 13.6586 hectares
allegedly representing the excess area over the 20
hectares under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V
which, as found by Geodetic Engineer Roman F.
111
Joaquin, actually covered 33.6586 hectares. Before
her application over the said 13.6586 hectares was
filed, a certain Moonyeen Rodriguez-Beleno filed on
April 20, 1969 a protest with the Philippine Fisheries
Commission against Viola Azurin's fishpond permit
claiming that the latter had not improved the area
under her permit; that it was she [Beleno] who was
in actual possession and occupation of the area and
who had introduced improvements thereon, and that
she entered the area in good faith since the area was
heavily forested with mangroves. 30
The Philippine Fisheries Commission directed an
investigation to verify the allegations of Moonyeen
Rodriguez-Beleno.
On September 29, 1969, Moonyeen R. Beleno filed
Fishpond Application No. 27649 over 35.5 hectares
stated to represent the 20 hectares under Viola C.
Azurin's Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V and the 13.5
hectares excess of said permit. 31
On November 26, 1969, the Philippine Fisheries
Commissioner ordered the Regional Director at
Davao City to investigate the conflict of fishpond
applications between Viola C. Azurin and Moonyeen
R. Beleno over an area reportedly containing 13.6586
hectares, entitled "Fishpond Application No. 27649,
Beleno, Moonyeen Rodriguez, applicant-Complainant
versus Fishpond Application No. 27257, Azurin, Viola
C. Permittee." 32
On May 26, 1972, while the fishpond conflict case
was pending investigation by the Philippine Fisheries
Commission [Davao City], Viola C. Azurin filed with
the Bureau of Lands a complaint 33 for the correction,
amendment or cancellation of Homestead Patent No.
135029 of Minda de Porkan over Lot No. 1546 and
Free Patent No. 488112 of Lolita Macatindog over Lot
No. 1099 situated at La Paz, Panabo [now Carmen],
Davao del Norte, alleging, among others, that the
patentees secured their patents and titles through
fraud, misrepresentation and illegal machinations,
after which a relocation survey of their lots was
made, and on April 24, 1972, Minda de Porkan
forcibly entered the northeastern portion of her
[Azurin] landholding while Lolita Macatindog likewise
forcibly entered the southeastern portion of the
same landholding. 34
After an investigation, Acting Assistant District Land
Officer Lazaro G. Berania recommended in his
findings dated July 9, 1973 35 that a petition be filed
in the proper court for the amendment of
Homestead Patent No. 135029 of Minda de Porkan
over Lot No. 1546, Cad 276 and Free Patent No.
488112 of Lolita Macatindog over Lot No. 1099, Cad
276 in order to exclude therefrom the portion of
around seven [7] hectares of Viola C. Azurin and that
the Land Inspector, Mr. Amer Yusop, be charged
administratively for gross negligence and grave
misconduct for submitting false report.
Meanwhile, on January 10, 1978, the Director of
Fisheries issued an order resolving the conflict of the
fishpond applications between Viola C. Azurin [FPA
No. 27257] and Moonyeen R. Beleno [FPA No. 27649]
over 13.6586 hectares which, for the purpose of
Identifying the disputed land involved in the instant
case, We quote, thus:
Considering the actuations of both parties in this case
and of the fact that there is considerable difficulty in
distinguishing the excess area from the area of 20.0
hectares granted under Permit No. F-5551-V owing
to the absence of hearings in the technical
descriptions of the area as released by the Bureau of
Forestry, it is only proper, for the sake of justice and
equity, that the claims of the parties herein be
resolved by taking into consideration the actual
conditions existing at the time the controversy arose
and also to consider the principle that no one shall
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
Moreover, in a more recent ocular inspection and/or
relocation of the area involved in the above-entitled
case conducted by representatives of this Office
based on the sketch plan prepared by Fortunato I.
Javellana, Jr., Geodetic Engineer of Fisheries Regional
Office No. XI, Davao City, the three [3] parcels of
areas appears thereon, thus
Parcel I — consisting of 6.1010 hectares and is
bounded on the North by Parcel II and a portion of
Parcel III on the East by Tagum River; on the South by
the junction of Tagum and Taganay rivers; and on the
West by portion of Parcel III along the irrigation
canal;
Parcel II — consisting of 11.7869 hectares and is
bounded on the North by Tagum River; on the East
by Tagum River; on the South by Parcel I; and on the
West by portion of Parcel III; and
Parcel III — consisting of 16.5655 hectares and is
bounded on the North by Tagum River; on the East
by Parcels I and II; on the South by Mangrove area;
and on the West by Agricultural land.
Said verification further disclose that Parcel I is a
developed portion of the fishpond area and is
outside of the present conflicts. Parcel II was also
found to be developed and is the portion that Beleno
claimed to have introduced her
improvements. Parcel III was found to be
undeveloped and is the subject of the land title claim
of the De Porkans. Records also show that the
112
representatives of Viola C. Azurin also informed the
investigators that 60 to 70% of the area in Parcel III is
presently involved in the land title conflict with the De
Porkans and that there is a pending case with the
Bureau of Lands on this matter. However, with
respect to Parcel II, the representatives of Mrs.
Azurin assured them that it is outside of the land title
conflict with the De Porkans, hence, resolution on
the instant controversy is believed well-taken.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, FPA No. 27649 of
Moonyeen R. Beleno be given due course to cover
Parcel II as indicated in the sketch plan prepared by
Engineer Fortunato P. Javellana covering 11.7869
hectares and wherein her improvements are
indicated; and that the area of Mrs. Viola C. Azurin
under OFP No. F-5551-V shall be confined to Parcel
Nos. I and III of said sketch, after the adverse claims
of the Muslim claimants shall have been finally
resolved by competent authority. 36
The aforequoted order of the Director of Fisheries
giving due course to the Fishpond Application No.
27649 of Moonyeen R. Beleno over Parcel II covering
11.7869 hectares was appealed by Viola C. Azurin to
the Minister of Natural Resources.
On April 11, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands, thru the
Solicitor General, filed two [2] separate
complaints 37 with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao del Norte, seeking the cancellation in Civil
Case No. 1247 of Homestead Patent No. 135029 of
Minda de Porkan and its derivative titles, TCT No. T-
23598 and T-23599, in the names of Minda de Porkan
and spouses Gorgonio S. Bermudez and Benecita
Duluan Bermudez insofar as the portion covered by
the Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola
C. Azurin, with an area of 3.9 hectares, more or less
[subject to the result of a final survey] was
concerned; and the cancellation in Civil Case No.
1248 of Free Patent No. V-488112 and OCT No. P-
8742 in the name of Lolita Macatindog and its
derivative titles, TCT Nos. T-25143 and T-25142 in the
names of Lolita Macatindog and the spouses Juan
Arangali and Antonina Estares, respectively, insofar
as the portion covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V of Viola C. Azurin, with an area of seven [7]
hectares, more or less [subject to the result of a final
survey] was concerned.
The Solicitor General claimed that the disputed
portions of land in Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and 1248
were actually claimed, occupied and developed by
Viola C. Azurin, a holder of Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V, which portion the Director of Lands could
not dispose of under the Public Land Act 38 hence, the
patents and titles issued to Minda de Porkan and
Lolita Macatindog and all derivative titles issued to
their successors-in-interest are null and void insofar
as that portion occupied and covered by the fishpond
permit of Viola C. Azurin.
Minda de Porkan, et al. in Civil Case No. 1247 and
Lolita Macatindog in Civil Case No. 1248 similarly
claimed in their separate answers 39 that they were
the ones who first protested, along with their Muslim
relatives, the intrusion of the families of the Azurins,
Rodriguezes, and Belenos into their "ancestral lands,"
now the site of Barrio La Paz, Carmen [formerly
Panabo], Davao del Norte, which from time
immemorial had been occupied and cultivated by
their ancestors and predecessors-in-interest.
Upon motion of the Solicitor General for
consolidation of cases, Civil Cases Nos. 1247 and
1248 were ordered consolidated in an order 40 dated
August 19, 1980 issued by the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Davao del Norte for joint hearing
in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte,
Branch I.
After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Norte, Branch [Tagum] rendered its
decision 41 on November 18, 1980 dismissing the
complaints for cancellation of titles and upholding
the validity of the patents/titles of Lolita Macatindog
and Minda de Porkan, as well as the titles of their
transferees co-defendants Juan Arangali and
Gorgonio Bermudez, who were adjudged to be
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
The Solicitor General appealed the decision of the
lower court to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1981, the Minister of
Natural Resources, thru his Acting Assistant
Secretary, Jose A. Janolo, rendered a
42
decision setting aside the order of the Director of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources dated January 10,
1978, thereby rejecting the Fishpond Application No.
27649 of Moonyeen R. Beleno, and declaring, among
others, that the Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V of Viola C. Azurin should cover Parcels I, II and
III subject to the final resolution by competent
authorities of the adverse claims of certain Muslim
occupants over Parcel III. [Emphasis supplied]
On February 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
The Solicitor General thus elevated the case to this
Court by way of petition for review on certiorari
raising eleven [11] errors which, in its entirety, seeks
to cancel and declare as null and void the titles of
113
private respondents over Lot No. 1099, Cad 276 and
Lot No. 1546, Cad. 276, and their eventual reversion
to the State without prejudice to the claim of Viola C.
Azurin to a portion of seven [7] hectares of Lot No.
1099 and a portion of 3.9 hectares of Lot No. 1546
under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. 43 In other
words, the Solicitor General seeks to cancel and
declare as null and void the titles of private
respondents over Lot Nos. 1099 and 1546, but he
takes exception to the eventual reversion of the
entire area of the two [2] disputed lots to the State
insofar as 10.9 hectares, more or less, in favor of the
claim of Viola C. Azurin under Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V.
In the main, the cancellation of titles of private
respondents over the disputed two [2] lots and their
eventual reversion to the State primarily rests on the
contentions of the Solicitor General that Lot Nos.
1099 and 1546 could not be the subject of
disposition under the Homestead [Chapter IV] and
Free Patent [Chapter VII] provisions of the Public
Land Act 44 since they are marshy and swampy,
certified as such as more suitable for fishpond
development, disposable only thru lease under
Chapter IX of the Public Land, and private
respondents' non-compliance with certain statutory
requirements of possession and cultivation, and the
disqualification of applicant Minda de Porkan to
apply for a homestead patent, she being a married
woman. On the other hand, the argument on
retention of 10.9 hectares in favor of the fishpond
claim of Viola C. Azurin in the event that the titles of
private respondents are declared null and void is
predicated on the assumption that Viola C. Azurin's
Fishpond Application No. 27257 filed on April 24,
1969 over the alleged excess area of 13.6586
hectares over her 20-hectare fishpond under her
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V was, in fact, granted
by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of
the Ministry of Natural Resources. And on the basis
of said assumption, the Solicitor General then
contended that despite the presence of other
claimants in the area, Amer Yusop, a public land
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, misled the Director
of Lands into erroneously approving private
respondents' application and causing the fraudulent
issuance of patents in their favor by stating in his
report that "there are no claimants" to the land
applied for by Minda de Porkan and that the land
applied for by Lolita Macatindog "is claimed by
nobody."
At the outset, it is significant to note that the tract of
public land then possessed, occupied, developed and
planted to coconuts by the family of Sadin de Porkan
and his predecessors-in-interest, all native Muslims
of La Paz, Carmen [formerly Panabo], Davao del
Norte, which, by virtue of its being part of the
unregistered lands, was included in the Tagum
Cadastral Survey of July 22, 1937 and formed part of
the disposable or alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain referred to under Section 6, par. [a] in
relation to Section 9, par. [a] of the Public Land Act
[C.A. 141, as amended]. The nature and character of
said tract of public land, more particularly Lot No.
1099, as one found inside an "agricultural zone", and
that of Lot No. 1546, as one suitable for rice
cultivation, which were categorically stated in the
separate investigation reports in 1953 of Vicente J.
Villena, junior public land inspector of the Bureau of
Lands [Davao] is binding on the courts inasmuch as it
is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government to classify public
lands . 45 The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like.46 This Court,
speaking thru Justice Moir, in the case of Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, 39 Phil. 560 [1919], traced the
meaning of public agricultural lands, and the same
was restated 29 years later in Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461 [1948] thus:
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.
175, this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral. Whatever may have been the meaning of
the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands
in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or
agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural
public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Since the disputed tract of public land is neither
timber nor mineral lands, the same is alienable or
open to disposition as public agricultural lands, under
Section 11, C.A. 141 thru homestead settlement or
free patent.
The basic preliminary issue in resolving the
overlapping claims over the 10.9 hectares is whether
or not the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents Minda de Porkan, et al. in Civil Case No.
1247 and Lolita Macatindog, et al. in Civil Case No.
1248 had acquired valid and registrable titles over
Lot No. 1099 and 1546, respectively, by virtue of a
grant by the State under the Public Land Act. 47 We
rule in the affirmative.
The doctrine established in the 1909 case of Carino
vs. Insular Government, 42 Phil. 935, 944, affirmed
114
in Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424, and re-affirmed in a
number of cases48 the most recent of which are the
cases of Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 437 and Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme
Plywood and Veneer Co., Inc.,G.R. No. 73002 [Dec.
29, 1986] sustains on all fours the ruling of the trial
court that the herein private respondent Lolita de
Porkan Macatindog and her predecessors-in-interest,
as early as 1953, had already acquired by operation
of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099,
but a grant of the Government over the same
alienable land by virtue of their proven, open,
exclusive and undisputed possession for more than
30 years since the Spanish colonial period.
The case of Susi vs. Razon, supra, in particular, puts
the doctrine in a clearer and more precise language
which militates against the belated theory of the
Solicitor General after a period of 19 years since 1953
that in view of its being swampy and marshy in
nature, Lot No. 1099 is still public land which the
Director of Lands could not dispose of under the
Public Land Act, thus:
... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et dejure established in paragraph
[b] of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has
been in actual and physical possession, personally
and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for a grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void
and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. [Emphasis supplied]
Where, as in the instant case, the possession of a
public land later Identified as Lot No. 1099 by Sadin
de Porkan, father of Medori de Porkan, and their
predecessors-in-interest who were native Muslims of
la Paz, Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del Norte, dates
back to the time of the Spanish colonial period, such
possession of the said tract of public land has
attained the character and duration prescribed by
law as the equivalent of an express grant from the
Government. The mandate of the law itself is that
the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title" and by legal fiction, the land
ceases to be public and thus becomes private land. In
the language of Herico vs. Dar, supra, title over the
land has vested on the possessor so as to segregate
the land from the mass of the public domain. And as
stressed in Susi vs. Razon, supra, it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sustained by the courts, an
application therefor being sufficient.
On the other hand, as regards the homestead patent
over Lot No. 1546, Cad 276, the ruling in the case
of Balboa vs. Fartales, 51 Phil. 498 [1928], that when
a homesteader has complied with all the terms and
conditions which entitle him to a patent for a
particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested
interest therein, and is to be regarded as the
equitable owner thereof, and once the right to a
patent has become vested in a purchaser of public
lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually issued,
sustains, the conclusion of the trial court that a tract
of public land later Identified as Lot No. 1546 ceased
to be part of the public domain and became private
land over which the Director of Lands is divested of
control and possession when the homestead
application of Sadin Maraug was approved and
recorded as Homestead Entry No. V-68362 on
January 13, 1954 which was later confirmed by the
approval of the transfer of homestead rights in favor
of Minda de Porkan. The Court stated in Balboa vs.
Farrales, supra, thus:
A party who has complied with all the terms and
conditions which entitle him to a patent for a
particular tract of public land acquires a vested
interest therein, and is to be regarded, as the
equitable owner thereof [Wirth vs. Branson, 98 U.S.
118]. Where the right to a patent has once become
vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent
so far as the Government is concerned, to a patent
actually issued. The execution and delivery of the
patent after the right to it has become complete are
mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with
that duty [Simmons vs. Wagner, 101 U.S. 260]. ... A
perfected valid appropriation of public lands
operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body
of the public domain and, so long as such
appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land
115
covered thereby is deemed private property. A
perfected homestead under the law, is property in the
highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and
will pass by descent. ... Even without a patent a
perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest
sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title
to the land is in the Government. Such land may be
conveyed or inherited. [Emphasis supplied]
Corollary to the ruling in Balboa vs. Farrales, it was
held in Diaz and Reyes vs. Macalinao, et al, 102 Phil.
999, a 1958 case, that a homestead entry having
been permitted by the Director of Lands, the
homestead is segregated from the public domain and
the Director Lands is divested of the control and
possession thereof except if the application is finally
disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.
In Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 19 SCRA 223, involving a dispute as to
whether a pre-war homestead application was
approved by the Director of Lands, the Court held
that where the person had all the qualifications to
apply for a homestead and he was in actual
possession of the homestead at the time he
transferred his rights thereto, the presumption is
that his application for said homestead was approved
by the Director of Lands.
In that sense, there is then no legal obstacle for Lolita
de Porkan Macatindog, successor-in-interest of
Medori de Porkan, to complete the imperfect or
incomplete title of her predecessor-in-interest over
Lot No. 1099 by means of confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title by administrative legalization
[free patent] under Section 11 and Section 44 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 3872 [June 18,
1964]49 which she did when she filed her free patent
application on November 14, 1968; and for Minda de
Porkan to confirm her title over Lot No. 1546 which
was deemed vested on her predecessor-in-interest,
Sadin Maraug, as early as 1954, by filing her
homestead application on June 8, 1971. In both
parcels of land, the application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens Title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent.50
There is therefore no equitable justification for the
Director of Lands to divest private respondents of
their titles by claiming, after 19 years, that the lots in
question remain public lands because the same are
swampy and marshy in nature subject to lease only
under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, and on a
mere technical objection that Minda de Porkan is
disqualified to apply for a homestead patent because
she is married. As clearly found by the trial court,
Viola C. Azurin entered the 20-hectare fishpond in
1966 and, admittedly, she excavated and constructed
dikes in the disputed portion she assertively believed
to be within her 20-hectare fishpond permit. The
conversion of the disputed portion into a fishpond
will not change the agricultural nature of the land
subject to disposition by the Bureau of Lands as
alienable lands of the public domain in accordance
with the State policy of "land for the landless"; and
more importantly in line with the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 3872 [June 18, 1964]
to the Public Land Act intended to benefit the
members of the national cultural minorities. In fact,
the original registered owners of Lot No. 1099 and
Lot No. 1546 were issued their respective patents
pursuant to the 1971 land Patent Drive for Cultural
Minorities signed by Vicente A. Valdellon. 51
Inasmuch as Lot No. 1099 and Lot No. 1546 ceased to
be part of the public domain as early as 1953 and
1954, respectively, We need not dwell further on the
allegations of fraud advanced by the Solicitor General
in the issuance of the patents of Lolita Macatindog
and Minda de Porkan who were the successors-in-
interest of Medori de Porkan and Sadin Maraug
whose titles to the lots in question become vested by
operation of law and by the equitable application of
doctrinal jurisprudence on the land dispute in the
instant case.
The next issue then is whether or not the fishpond
claim of Viola C. Azurin over the 13.6586 hectares
allegedly representing the excess area over her 20-
hectare fishpond under her Fishpond Permit No. F-
5551-V has attained the character of a final grant
from the Government as would warrant the
exclusion of the same from Lot No. 1099 of Lolita
Macatindog and Lot No. 1546 of Minda de Porkan.
We rule in the negative.
A review of the records of the case show that Viola C.
Azurin has not sufficiently established her right to a
grant by the Government under any of the modes of
dispossession or concession of public lands
authorized under the Public Land Act or any special
law governing her alleged fishpond claim over the
disputed lots. The inaction, if not disapproval, of her
land claims over the disputed lots, thru applications
separate and distinct from each other, by the
concerned administrative agencies of the
Government renders untenable the Solicitor
General's contention that in the event Lot No. 1099
and Lot No, 1546 are finally reverted to the State, the
said 13.6586 hectares should be excluded from the
reversion in favor of the fishpond claim of Viola C.
Azurin under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V.
116
First, it must be noted that on January 17, 1968, Viola
C. Azurin obtained by purchase and sale from Condi
Mama and Cadingaga Mora, both native Muslims of
La Paz, Panabo [now Carmen], Davao del Norte, all
the rights and interests over all the nipa plants and
other improvements in the parcel of land covered by
her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. 52 Thereafter, on
March 1, 1968, she filed with the Bureau of Lands a
sales application 53 over an agricultural land with an
area of 33.6586 hectares allegedly covered by her 20-
hectare fishpond permit. But the sales application
was not approved by the Director of Lands.
Second, after Viola C. Azurin was granted on March
4, 1966 her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V by the
Philippine Fisheries Commission, she had the area
surveyed by a private land surveyor, Roman F.
Joaquin, who allegedly found out that her fishpond
permit actually covered 33.6586 hectares, resulting
in an excess of 13.6586 hectares. On November 29,
1967, Roman F. Joaquin submitted a plan of the land
[fishpond], allegedly the correct plan of the survey,
but the Director of Lands did not approve the same.
So Viola C. Azurin opted to file a fishpond application
[FPA No. 27257] on April 24, 1969 ver the excess area
of 13.6586 hectares over her 20-hectare fishpond
under her Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V. A protest
over Azurin's application was filed earlier or on April
20, 1969 by a certain Moonyeen Rodriguez-Beleno
which was decided by the Director of Fisheries on
January 10, 1978 by giving due course to the
fishpond application of Moonyeen R. Beleno over
Parcel II. However, on March 31, 1981, the Minister
of Natural Resources, thru his Acting Secretary, Jose
A. Janolo set aside the order by declaring that the
Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C. Azurin
covers Parcel I, II, and III subject to the final
resolution by competent authorities of the adverse
claim of certain Muslim occupants over Parcel III. In
other words, Viola C. Azurin's claim over Parcel III has
not attained the status of finality unless and until the
conflict of land claims, now subject of the instant
case, is finally resolved by the courts.
Third, the instant case now before this Court for
review is an offshoot of Viola C. Azurin's complaint
for correction, amendment or cancellation of the
Homestead Patent of Minda de Porkan and Free
Patent of Lolita Macatindog filed with the Bureau of
Lands on May 26, 1972 involving the same portion of
land subject of the sales application filed on March 1,
1968 and fishpond application filed on April 24, 1969
by Viola C. Azurin.
Fourth, the Fishpond Permit No. F-5551-V of Viola C.
Azurin had technically expired on December 31,
1966. Obviously, recognizing the extent and limits of
her occupation, use and possession of the fishpond
area, she filed the said sales application over the
same area on March 1, 1968, but said application
was not approved.
Considering that Viola C. Azurin was not able to
legitimize her claim over the disputed portion, there
is then no justifiable reason for the Director of Lands
to divest Lolita Macatindog and Minda de Porkan and
their successors-in-interest of their titles, which had
long been vested on their predecessors-in-interest.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals on
February 29, 1984 is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena &
Marcos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal
classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as
they are commonly known. If they are part of our
public forest lands, they are not alienable under the
Constitution. If they are considered public
agricultural lands, they may be acquired under
private ownership. The private respondent's claim to
the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After
trial, the application was approved by the Court of
First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry
117
then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be
reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the
petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this.
The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps
or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private respondent
insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue
before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go
back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier
American organic acts in the country. By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three grand divisions, to wit,
agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This
classification was maintained in the Constitution of
the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it
was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public
lands to include industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted
the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This
provision has been reproduced, but with substantial
modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was
the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be
5
alienated. Their disposition was provided for under
C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were
not subject to private ownership unless they were
first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released
for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular
Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove
swamps or manglareswere defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the
tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will
not live except when watered by the sea, extending
their roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute
the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist
naturally, but which are also, to some extent
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible
wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for
the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although
these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the
opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense
in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing
over them are not available for purpose of
navigation, and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory
condition of the law, the custom had grown of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries
which became a common feature of settlement along
the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which
would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural
lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically
declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of
this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of
1917, which became effective on October 1 of that
year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the
purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this
definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the
case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the
Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as
terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be
'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means
land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant
would never be called a tree in English but a bush,
and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic
plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in
a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the
general character of the land from manglare to
timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-
quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
118
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.
Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural
lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress
of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares
found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot
affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands,
the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then
the rights of appellants are fully established by Act
No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena
Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March
4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity
of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand
declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition
that the land covered by the application there are
mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1,
but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the
Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which
was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed
in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in
litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court
that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove
species grow, where the trees are small and sparse,
fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing
are not of commercial value as lumber do not
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not
forest in character. They do not form part of the
public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court,
citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the
ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are
not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens,
there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary
view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it
held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No.
885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.'
Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is
included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no
big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land
in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885,
even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had
been in actual possession of private persons for
many years, and therefore, said land was already
'private land' better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required
by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in
out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing
in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
119
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the
Solicitor General's submission that the land in
dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties and so not
registerable. This case was decided only twelve days
after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court
feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement
that should resolve once and for all the question of
whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or
forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function
initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision
classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now
even permitted to provide for more categories of
public lands). The legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may then, in
the discharge of their own role, administer our public
lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in
accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part,
the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid
down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming
they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being
correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the
three departments, coordinating with each other,
pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution
in the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to
the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands,
Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable
or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
the use or purposes to which such lands are destined,
as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time make the classifications provided
for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
similar manner, transfer lands from one class to
another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised
Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves-
Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of
the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines
may set apart forest reserves from the public lands
and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries
thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not
be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner
by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of
any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any
such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
forest reserve shall be and become part of the public
lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural
purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest
reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more
120
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to
be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following
conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public forests of
the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section
1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no
authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to date
and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly, the
said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or
unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must
be respected. We repeat our statement in the
Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no
duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as
pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which
ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such
lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest
lands because this would be violative of a duly
acquired property right protected by the due process
clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in
dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was
much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention
being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of
Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in
fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920
to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could
therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by
the private respondent in support of his application
for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as
forest land and reclassified as agricultural land
pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry
may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of
the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of
Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It
should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting
the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because
it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has
the authority to determine whether forest land is
more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry
uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land
and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition
of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable
neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads,
sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timber land
and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of
forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it
into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were
agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof
is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness.
The record contains no convincing evidence of the
existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly
obtained by the original transferor of the property,
let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring
title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has been
inscribed or registered in the registry of property and
that the land has been under the actual and adverse
possession of the private respondent for twenty
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage
121
Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in
this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the
private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of
possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove
possession and much less vest ownership in favor of
the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not
established his right to the registration of the subject
land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be
granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
unamended up to now, mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the
Constitution and may not be the subject of private
ownership until and unless they are first released as
forest land and classified as alienable agricultural
land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title
of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against
him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 73261 August 11, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO BACUS, respondent.
Jesus S. Anonat for respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
What at first blush appears to be a simple
registration case assumes on closer examination the
proportions of a constitutional question involving the
doctrine of separation of powers. That is why the
Court has seen fit to render a full-blown decision on
this petition rather than dispose of it by simple
resolution, as might otherwise have sufficed.
The subject of this litigation is a parcel of land
consisting of 496 square meters and situated in
Manga, Tinago, Ozamis City. Claiming to be its owner,
Francisco Bacus, the private respondent herein, filed
on September 14, 1981, an application for its
registration in his name with the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental.1 The application was
opposed by the Republic of the Philippines through
the Director of Lands. The grounds were that the
applicant did not have title to the property nor was it
available for private appropriation since it was still
part of the public domain.
The registration court ruled in favor of the
applicant. 2 The Republic appealed, reiterating its
original objections. The appealed decision was
affirmed in toto, prompting this petitions.3
The position of the petitioner is that the disputed
property is still part of the public forests and so is not
subject to alienation.
It is for the claimant to show that it has been
released for private appropriation, but this he has
failed to do. No evidence has been offered to prove
that the lot had earlier been declassified as forest
land by the proper authority, to wit, the President of
the Philippines. On the other hand, the Republic
submitted two important pieces of evidence showing
that the land was still part of the public forests.
The first was the letter 4 of District Forester Elpidio D.
Aspiras sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Oroquieta City
on April 19, 1980, stating that:
. . . Per investigation/verification conducted by
personnel of this office, it was found out that the said
lot (Lot No. 5939) containing an area of 496 square
meters has been found to be still inside the
Timberland Project No. 20, Block G, certified as such
on August 29, 1925 per BF L.C. Map No. 560.
and requesting that an opposition to Bacus's
application for registration of filed on behalf of the
Bureau of Forest Development.
The second was the 1st Indorsement dated April 21,
1982, 5 of the same District Forester conveying the
following information to the Director of Forest
Development:
The area covered by aforecited Land Registration
Case Number LRC No. N-10, LRC Rec. No. N-56666
has been investigated by a competent personnel of
this office and found to be still inside the timberland
122
block. Hence, a letter request has been sent to the
Provincial Fiscal, Oroquieta City to file an opposition
in behalf of the Bureau of Forest Development during
the cadastral hearing on 22 April 1982.
There should be no more question at this time that
forest lands are not alienable as such and can be the
subject of private appropriation only when they are
declassified and declared as alienable. As long as they
remain forest lands, no court has jurisdiction to order
their registration in the name of a private person.
It is essential that at the time of the commencement
of the requisite period of continuous possession and
occupation, the land must have been previously
classified as agricultural (or commercial/ residential)
land; otherwise, it is not subject of registration under
Section 48 (b) of CA 141. 6
xxx
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it 'may form part of the disposable agricultural
(or commercial/residential) lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.7
xxx
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over
lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.
Declassification of forest land is an express and
positive act of government. It cannot be presumed,
neither should it be ignored or deemed waived. 8
xxx
. . . It is already a settled rule that forest lands or
forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert them into private property (Vano v.
Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 11;
Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401;
Director of Forestry v. Muñ;oz, 23 SCRA 11 82;
Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands
v. Reyes and Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68
SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648;
and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701) unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable by the Director
of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land
prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable
and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-
year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
supra).lâwphî1.ñèt In this case, there is no showing
that the land in question is disposable or alienable.
This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.9
The law is equally clear on who may declassify forest
lands and declare them alienable and disposable. Act
No. 141 provides in no uncertain terms that:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c)
Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
And according to the Revised Administrative Code:
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural
purposes. — Lands in public forests, not including
forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director
of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to
be kept under forest, shall be declared by the
Department Head to be agricultural lands.
The respondent court could not have been unaware
of the above-quoted cases or of the cited laws which
were in force at the time it rendered its decision.
There was therefore no valid reason for it to
conclude that the subject land was no longer forest
land and could be the subject of private
appropriation. This ruling had no firmer basis than
the certifications made by minor functionaries who
had no authority whatever in the classification of
public lands. Curiously, they were not even
connected with the Bureau of Forest Development.
The first officer was the City Development
Coordinator of Ozamis City, who certified that the
subject land was within the commercial-residential
zone of Ozamis City. 10 The second was the Register
of Deeds of Ozamis City, who certified that the lots
123
near and surrounding the subject land had already
been registered in favor of private persons. 11 The
respondent court considered their certifications
sufficient to change the nature of the property.
Accordingly, it summarily dispensed with the needed
proclamation from the President of the Philippines
making the land alienable to private persons.
The respondent court said:
The applicant has his house of strong materials on
the area, and has introduced various improvements
(Annex E, Appellee's Brief).
In the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction, We cannot
just pull the wool over Our eyes to the above facts
considering the decision of the lower court which
had the vantage position of knowing the true
situation and state of affairs more than anyone of Us.
For Us to still insist on the letter of cited
jurisprudence which We believe are not anymore
applicable to the circumstances of this case, would
be sheer doggedness and obduracy which We would
disdain to be identified with. Since Occidental
Misamis has surged forth and broke down timber
and forest land to prove itself equal to this era of
population growth, development and modernization,
We too must march in Our judicial rule making along
parallel lines so as not to be infidel to Our sworn
advocacy of justice. 12
But what has caused this Court not a little concern is
the following incredible statement in the same
decision:
The basis of this appeal for the Republic is the
verification report of Forester Rolando S. Dingal Land
Use Officer, Bureau of Forest Development, Ozamis
City, dated April 19,1982 to the effect that the land
applied for is within the Timberland Block of Misamis
Occidental, Project No. 20, certified on August
29,1925 per B.F. LC Map No. 560.
Well, if this is so, it is high time that We update BF LC
Map No. 560. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
This is rank effrontery that we will not permit. It is
bad enough that the respondent court has summarily
dismissed as no longer applicable the clearly still
controlling jurisprudence laid down by this Court.
What is worse is that the Court of Appeals has also
encroached upon executive prerogatives, and with
such a brash justification as: "When, if this is so, it is
high time that we update BF LC Map No. 560.
To support its action, it cited its own decision in
another case 14 which is not really in point as what
was involved there was the authenticity of an old
map that had not even been introduced in evidence.
And significantly, it also does not appear that the
decision of the Court of Appeals has been affirmed by
this Court.
It is our finding from the evidence of record that the
subject property has not yet been declassified as
forest land and is not therefore, nor was it ever
before, susceptible of private ownership. The
certifications cited by the respondent court, and its
own ruling updating BF LC Map No. 560, did not have
the effect of making the land alienable and
disposable.
Having come to this conclusion, we find it no longer
necessary to dwell on the private respondent's claim
of title to the disputed property. Suffice it to observe
that the right conveyed to the private respondent
from the previous possessors of the land was the
right of the original transfer or, Concordio Juntilla,
only to lease the property. Juntilla had no right
to sell the land as he was a mere lessee thereof
under Miscellaneous Lease Application No. V-1662 as
approved by the Bureau of Lands. 15 Additionally,
there is no satisfactory showing either that Bacus had
acquired prescriptive ownership over the property
through long, continued and adverse possession. 16
The Court is not unaware of the difficulties this
decision will cause the private respondent (and other
persons similarly situated) in light of the finding that
the area in which the lot is located has become highly
developed residential-commercial land and actually
no longer forest land. That is indeed a reality we
cannot ignore. But while we do feel sympathy for him
over his plight, it is still not for us to correct the
situation, not even with what the respondent court
called its equity jurisdiction.
The fact is that from the legal standpoint, the area is
still considered forest land, not having been
declassified as such by the proper authorities. We are
bound by this fact and cannot change it. The solution
to the private respondent's problem may be effected
by administrative action or by an enactment of the
legislature, but not by this Court.
Even with the best of motives, the courts of justice
have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of the
legislative and executive officials as long as it has not
been shown that they have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Judicial intervention, and much less
usurpation, cannot be the panacea for every legal
problem hopefully brought to us for resolution.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
courts can only apply the law and have no authority
to enact or execute them. The last two functions
belong to the political departments of the
124
government and cannot be arrogated by the
judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. As
the subject land is still part of the public domain and
not susceptible of private appropriation, its
registration in the name of the private respondent is
hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griñ;o-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
LOPE GUZMAN RIVAS, PACIFICO V. VIJANDRE,
FERNANDO A. PASCUA, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
AQUINO, C.J.:
This is a land registration case involving what the
Republic of the Philippines claims to be grazing land,
a part of the forest reserve.
The evidence shows that on March 14, 1873
the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First
Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted
to Domingo Bunagan a possessory information title
for a tract of land, called Nottab, "3,500 brazas de
largo y 3,000 brazas de ancho", "destinado al pasto
de sus ganados" y bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio
del derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera
tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. I and K).
The Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885
mentions Bunagan as having obtained a
"composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile,
Cagayan (Exh. J-1) or a gratuitous adjustment title as
distinguished from an onerous adjustment title. **
What happened to the Nottab land? The conflicting
evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural
Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre
shows that two persons, the brothers Luis Guzman
Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of Pablo Guzman,
played decisive roles in its disposition.
The evidence is conflicting because, according to
Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis
Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco, whereas,
according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion was
sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope
Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to Vijandre
and Fernando A. Pascua.
The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab
land, whatever its area, is forestal and grazing land,
and consequently, was inalienable land and,
therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land
were void.
According to Cavaco's evidence, after Bunagan's
death, his son-in-law, Ceferino Saddul,
as apoderado of Bunagan's heirs, sold the land to
one Manuel Guzman sometime in 1904 or 1905 or
1908.
The administratrix of Manuel Guzman's estate, with
the approval of the probate court, sold the land in
1934 to Luis Guzman Rivas who died in 1944. The
land passed to his widow, Dolores Enriquez, who sold
the northern portion of the land to Saturnino
Moldero in 1944 and the southern portion to Rafael
Gonzales in 1951.
Moldero in 1948 sold his northern portion to the
spouses Antonio and Josefa Estrada. In 1951 the
Estrada spouses and (Gonzales sold the land to
Cavaco (Exh. 12-A to 15—Pascua, 242 Joint Record
on Appeal).
The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land
registration case adjudicated to Cavaco 1,222
hectares of the Nottab land. It is the registered
owner of the land. Right or wrong that decision is the
law of the case. (Cagayan Valley Agricultural
Corporation vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No, 24931-
32, December 9, 1960).
The trial court correctly held that the said
adjudication means that the respondent herein
cannot use anymore in this case the supposed
1873 informacion posesoria and the
1885 composicion gratuita as bases of their
application for registration. The reason is that said
Spanish titles were already used in the Cavaco case.
Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not
exceed 1,000 hectares (Director of Lands vs, Reves, L-
27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191 and
other cases). It may be repeated that Cavaco
obtained more than 1,000 hectares by virtue of the
said Spanish titles. Parenthetically, it may be stated
that Presidential Decree No. 892 since 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.
125
It is the supposed remainder of Bunagan's land that is
now involved in this case, the portion transferred to
Lope Guzman Rivas as differentiated from the Cavaco
land which came from Lope's brother Luis. It should
be stressed that according to the Cavaco case
the whole land was sold to Luis and, therefore, no
remainder could have been transferred to Lope.
On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence
in this case, on July 26, 1915, Manuela Bunagan, the
sole heir of Domingo, sold to Pablo Guzman for
Pl,000 the remainder of the land in Nottab, Enrile,
Cagayan, "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia",
covered by Tax Declaration No. 626 (Exh. H).
Pablo Guzman died in 1927. The Nottab land was
inherited by his son, petitioner Lope Guzman Rivas,
who leased the land for grazing purposes to other
persons. Lope has been residing in Makati, Metro
Manila since 1961 because he has a heart ailment.
In 1958 about 800 hectares of the said land were sold
by Lope to Ignacio Pascua who in 1962 sold the same
portion to his son, Fernando.
Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968
an application for the registration of two parcels of
land located at Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land
previously applied for by Cavaco. It is covered by Plan
Psu-178846, embracing thirteen lots with an area of
1,033 hectares, and Plan Psu-179101 covering fifteen
lots with an area of 890 hectares, or a total of 1,92.7
hectares.
Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas
sold to his co-petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire
land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre undertook to finance
the registration of the land. Should the registration of
the land not materialize for causes not imputable to
Vijandre, then Lope would return to mall
scashadvances(9-16, Joint Record on Appeal).
The learned trial court declared the disputed land
public land and dismissed the applications of Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua
and Cavaco.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's
decision. It granted the application of Lope and
Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13, which
was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The Directors
of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this
Court. Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file
any appellees' brief.
The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate
Court erred (1) in not declaring that the disputed
land is part of a forest reservation; (2) in not finding
that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their
predecessors have not been in the open, continuous,
uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession of
the disputed land and that their possession was not
in the concept of owner: (3) in not finding that
Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic
and (4) in not finding that the 1960 decision in favor
of Cavaco is not res judicata.
On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the
disputed land was already private in the hands of
Domingo Bunagans (2) that portions of said land,
1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the
names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V.
Pascua) respectively; (3) that the pasture lease
agreements did not convert private land into public
land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles were
authentic and valid.
We hold that the disputed land is inalienable public
grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It is
part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile,
Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry Map
L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan
Land Classification, containing an area of 8,249
hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong,
Cagayan. It is non-registerable (Exh. 2-Rep.). It cannot
be appropriated by private persons. It is not
disposable public agricultural land.
Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under
Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February 13,
1967. It is intended for "wood production watershed
soil protection and other forest uses" (Exh. 1-B and 7,
Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was made prior
to the instant 1968 application for registration.
Applicant Lope Guzman Rivas and oppositor Pascua
and their predecessors have always treated the 1,923
hectares as pasture land. Portions of the land had
been the object of pasture lease agreements with the
Bureau of Forestry. Among the lessees were
oppositor Fernando A. Pascua himself, Eliseo Lasam
and J.T.Torres, Jr. (Exh. 3 and 4, Rep.).
The 1960 and 1968 tax declarations of applicant Lope
Guzmian Rivas describe the 2,000 hectares of land in
question as for "pasture exclusively", meaning it
is grazing land (Exh. R and S). Similarly, the 1960 and
1962 tax declarations submitted in evidence by
oppositor Pascua describe 790 or 767 hectares of the
land as "pasture land" (Exh. 27 and 28—Pascua).
We have stated that the supposed possessory
information title issued in 1873 to the original
claimant, Domingo Bunagan, describes the land as
"una estancia de ganado al terreno" (grazing land),
126
or "un terreno destinado al pasto de sus ganados" or
la estancia para ganados denominada Nottab".
The application for the possessory information title
was approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio
determination derecho que el Estado o otro tercero
pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. 1).
(Note that Exhibit J, the 1885 resolution published in
Gaceta de Manila, is not a composition title at all).
Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo
Bunagan, sold in 1915 the 2,000 hectares in question
to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare as "una
parcela de pasto de ganaderia (Exh. H). Similarly,
Ignacio A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas
the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a parcel of pasture land"
(Exh. I Pascua).
Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable
under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly
agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
(inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation
cannot be the object of private ownership (Republic
vs. Animas, L- 37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499;
Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 132 Phil. 637;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077,
February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156 and other cases).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is
reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V.
Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer
Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., (Chairman), Abad Santos, Escolin and
Alampay, JJ., concur.
Cuevas, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 65663. October 16, 1992.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND LINO ANIT, Respondents.
Manalo, Puno & Gozos for Lino Anit.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LAND REGISTRATION
CASES; REQUIREMENT FOR SUBMISSION OF
ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN, MANDATORY. — It
is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for was not submitted in evidence
by respondent, which omission is fatal to his
application. The submission of the original tracing
cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character. (Aguillon v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 506;
Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.) Given the
mandatory character of the requirement for the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the
land applied for, said requirement cannot be waived
either expressly or impliedly.
2. ID.; ID.; OPEN, CONTINUOUS, AND EXCLUSIVE
POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS OF SUBJECT
LAND; REQUIRES FACTUAL SUPPORT AND
SUBSTANTIATION. — Clearly, respondent’s evidence
does not establish the nature of his predecessors-in-
interest’s possession. No evidence was offered to
show that his predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes
on the subject land or that they had introduced any
improvements thereon. In fact, respondent could
only show that property taxes were fully paid
beginning 1966. As this Court had said in Republic v.
Lee: Private respondent should have presented
specific facts that would have shown the nature of
such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous,
open, public peaceful and in concept of owner" by
which she described her own possession in relation
to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere
conclusions of law which require factual support and
substantiation. Inasmuch as respondent had failed to
prove having been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, for at least thirty years,
then his application must necessarily fail.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ALIENABLE PUBLIC LAND MAY
BE CONVERTED TO PRIVATE PROPERTY; RULE; CASE
AT BAR. — It is well-settled that open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least 30 years of
alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property. It therefore follows that an heir of a
person who had occupied a piece of alienable public
land in open, continuous and exclusive possession for
more than 30 years, may validly file an application for
said parcel of land since the same had already been
converted to private land. In the case at bar, had
respondent proved open, exclusive and continuous
possession for more than 30 years by his
predecessors-in-interest, there would have been no
127
bar to his application. However, since he had not
shown the duration and nature of his predecessors-
in-interest’s possession of the subject land, his
application would necessarily fail.
4. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529;
REQUISITE WHERE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED
IS OWNED IN COMMON. — Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 provides that where the land sought
to be registered is owned in common, all the co-
owners should file the application jointly. Therefore,
the application should have been filed in the names
of all the heirs of Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez,
and not just in the name of Respondent. Though
Victoria Anit Manalo testified that the subject
property was given to respondent as his share of
their parents’ estate by virtue of the extrajudicial
partition executed by the heirs of Servando Anit and
Natalia Benitez, the deed evidencing said
extrajudicial partition was never presented in
evidence before the trial court. This Court has held
that where the applicants own merely an undivided
share less than fee simple in the land described in the
application, the application should be dismissed
without prejudice to the right of the various owners
of the undivided interest in the land jointly to present
a new application for registration. (Santiago v. Cruz,
Et Al., 19 Phil. 145).
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul
and set aside the decision 1 dated September 28,
1983 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-
G.R. No. 66095 which affirmed in toto the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I,
granting the application of Lino Anit for the
registration of land title, but ordering that the title be
issued in the name of Lino Anit’s heirs, assigns or
successors-in-interest.
The facts of this case are as follows: On October 20,
1975, respondent Lino Anit, a Filipino who became
an American citizen by virtue of his service with the
U.S. Navy, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite an application for registration of a parcel of
land with an area of 42,567 square meters situated at
Ternate, Cavite, which case was docketed as Land
Registration Case No. TM-101, LRC Record No. N-
47776.cralawnad
After the required notices were published, the court
heard the application on March 29, 1976, during
which time only one Florante Malimban, through his
counsel Vicente Forteza, informally registered his
opposition to the application. However, Malimban
did not file any formal pleading with the court.
Respondent claims that the subject parcel of land
was originally owned by Felix Garay, who sold the
same to Jose Andra in 1943. In 1961, Andra sold the
land to his parents, the spouses Servando Anit and
Natalia Benitez. Respondent allegedly entered into
possession of the land sometime in 1966, planting
thereon bamboo, mango, and banana trees, and
camote. His parents died in 1967. Thereafter, the
heirs, which include respondent’s brothers and
sisters Teodoro, Librada, Domingo, Pascuala, and
Victoria, allegedly executed a deed of partition
wherein, among others, the subject property was
given to Respondent. The deed of partition was never
presented in evidence before the trial court.
To identify the subject land, respondent presented a
blue-print copy of Plan Psu-04-003805. 2 Respondent
failed to show the exact date when he became an
American citizen.
On March 3, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision
3 granting respondent’s application, the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
WHEREFORE, considering the complete records
under our present lights, judgment is hereby
rendered and the application is hereby granted in
favor of the applicant LINO ANIT married to Pelagia
Lupisan of Ternate, Cavite, with postal address at 486
Higante Drive, Daly City, State of California, United
States of America, his heirs, assigns and successors-
in-interest, who are hereby declared possessors and
owners in fee simple of one parcel of land containing
forty-two thousand five hundred sixty seven (42,567)
square meters found at Sitio Batalay, Barrio Sapang,
Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, and
bearing the technical descriptions (Exhibit CC-4)
under Psu-04-003805 as set forth by Geodetic
Engineer Leonardo C. Santos and approved by the
Regional Director Narciso V. Villapando on
September 12, 1972 for the Director of Lands;
Once this decision shall have become final, let the
corresponding decree be therefore produced
completely and absolutely subject to Presidential
128
Proclamation No. 1520 (dated November 28, 1975)
for the tourism areas of concern of the Republic of
the Philippines and its future expropriation causes of
actions for such field of governmental endeavor and
program areas.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Provided further that the parcel of land described
herein shall however, be fully registered in the name
(not of the applicant LINO ANIT) but in the names of
his wife Pelagia Lupisan of Ternate, Cavite and his
other heirs, assignees and successors-in-interest who
are Filipino citizens, should there be any and if they
are not American but Filipino Citizens.
SO ORDERED. 4 Respondent argues the fact that the Commissioner of
Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. After
his motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
filed the instant petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the decision of the trial court on the
grounds that (1) it acted contrary to law when it
confirmed respondent’s title on the basis of a mere
blue print copy of the survey plan; (2) it
misapprehended the facts when it ruled that
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had
been for at least thirty years in continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject land; (3) it
erred in confirming respondent’s title to the
exclusion of his co-heirs; and (4) it erred in not
holding that respondent’s title is not valid as against
the state.
We find the petition meritorious.
It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for was not submitted in evidence
by respondent, which omission is fatal to his
application. The submission of the original tracing
cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character. 5 provide:chanrob1es
Respondent’s counsel on the other hand contends
that he submitted the original tracing cloth plan,
together with other documents, to the Clerk of Court
when he filed the application. The application and
supporting documents were then elevated to the
land Registration Commission (now the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration) for
approval of the survey plan by the Director of Lands.
Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing
would indicate that respondent had submitted all the
pertinent documents relative to his
application.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
This argument had already been disposed of in
Director of Lands v. Reyes, 6 wherein this Court held
— of the requirement for the submission of the original
Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-
submission of the original tracing cloth plan by
claiming that the same must be with the Land
Registration Commission which checked or verified
the survey plan and the technical description thereof.
It is not the function of the LRC to check the original
survey plan as it had no authority to approve original
survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing
cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may
easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the
same in evidence. This was not done. 7
Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to
object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when
the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving
the objection to said evidence.
We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court
virtual 1aw library
These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and elections cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
This Court had applied the aforementioned rule in a
naturalization proceeding, and held that —
By reason of this provision, literal adherence to the
Rules of Court, which include rules of evidence, is not
obligatory in a proceeding like that under
consideration. 8
We see no reason for not applying Rule 143 to the
case at bar. Besides, given the mandatory character
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, said
requirement cannot be waived either expressly or
impliedly.
We likewise find merit in petitioner’s argument that
respondent had not shown that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land. Respondent made no mention of how his
parents came to possess the subject property, or the
manner their predecessors-in-interest possessed the
same, in his deposition 9 taken before Vice Consul
Romulo Villamil at the Philippine Consulate in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.chanrobles law library
129

Similarly, the testimony of respondent’s sister
Victoria Anit Manalo, merely narrated who were her
brother’s predecessors-in-interest and the manner
he acquired the subject property.
Clearly, respondent’s evidence does not establish the
nature of his predecessors-in-interest’s possession.
No evidence was offered to show that his
predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the
subject land 10 or that they had introduced any
improvements thereon. In fact, respondent could
only show that property taxes were fully paid
beginning 1966. 11 As this Court had said in Republic
v. Lee: 12
Private respondent should have presented specific
facts that would have shown the nature of such
possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open,
public peaceful and in concept of owner" by which
she described her own possession in relation to that
of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions
of law which require factual support and
substantiation. 13
Inasmuch as respondent had failed to prove having
been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, for at least thirty years, then his application
must necessarily fail.
Equally damaging to respondent’s application is the
fact that the subject land was owned by his parents,
Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez. When they died in
1967, the land passed by intestate succession to their
heirs, respondent and his brothers and sisters.
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides
that where the land sought to be registered is owned land ipso jure converts the same to private property.
in common, all the co-owners should file the 15 It therefore follows that an heir of a person who
application jointly. Therefore, the application should had occupied a piece of alienable public land in open,
have been filed in the names of all the heirs of continuous and exclusive possession for more than
Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez, and not just in the 30 years, may validly file an application for said
name of Respondent. Though Victoria Anit Manalo parcel of land since the same had already been
testified that the subject property was given to converted to private land.
respondent as his share of their parents’ estate by
virtue of the extrajudicial partition executed by the In the case at bar, had respondent proved open,
heirs of Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez, the deed exclusive and continuous possession for more than
evidencing said extrajudicial partition was never 30 years by his predecessors-in-interest, there would
presented in evidence before the trial court. This have been no bar to his application. However, since
Court has held that where the applicants own merely he had not shown the duration and nature of his
an undivided share less than fee simple in the land predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the subject
described in the application, the application should land, his application would necessarily fail.
be dismissed without prejudice to the right of the
various owners of the undivided interest in the land WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
jointly to present a new application for registration. REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the instant application
14 of Lino Anit is hereby dismissed.
We however do not find merit in petitioner ‘s last SO ORDERED.
contention that respondent’s title to the subject land
is not valid against the state because he is an Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ.,
American citizen. The appellate court did not err in concur.
applying Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution to respondent’s case. Said provision Republic of the Philippines
provides:cralawnad SUPREME COURT
Manila
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private SECOND DIVISION
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to G.R. No. L-61462 July 31, 1984
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of
Lands), petitioner,
Petitioner argues that said provision has no
vs.
application to the case at bar since the subject land is
COURT OF APPEALS and TEDITA INFANTE
still part of the public domain. We do not agree. It is
TAYAG, respondents.
well-settled that open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least 30 years of alienable public
130
 The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luis General Jr. for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This is an application for registration of land with an
area of more than 11 hectares located at Barrio
Tambo, Buhi, Camarines Sur which was opposed by
the Director of Lands.
Tedita Infante-Tayag (40 in 1977), the applicant, a
resident of Quezon City, testified that the land was
first possessed by her father, Froilan Infante, who
died in 1937. He was succeeded by his three children
and widow, Gertrudis M. Vda. de Infante. The four
heirs settled in 1969 his estate consisting of twenty-
two (22) parcels of agricultural and residential lands
(Exh. G).
That 11-hectare land was adjudicated to Soledad
Infante-Yago who exchanged it in 1975 for another
parcel of coconut land (Lot No. 6652) with an area of
23 hectares belonging to her sister, Mrs. Tayag, the
applicant (Exh. H).
Mrs. Tayag filed the instant application in 1976. She
possessed the land in question for barely a year. She
knows that the land is coconut land but she does not
know the number of coconut trees planted therein
nor the person who planted the same. Of the
boundary owners, she knows only one, her aunt,
Severa Peñoso. She does not know the actual area of
the land(17-18 tsn, June 9,1977).
The only other witness, Abraham Morandarte (56 in
1977), testified that he came to know the land in
1935 because his father was the overseer of Froilan
Infante, Mrs. Tayag's father. He lived in the land and
planted coconuts thereon some of which are 80
years old. The land has been administered by Mrs.
Tayag's brother, Antonio. He and the overseer,
Solomon Buenaflor, did not testify in this case.
Morandarte became the overseer only in 1973.
The land was declared for tax purposes in 1973 by
Pablo Yago, applicant's brother-in-law (Exh. I). The
realty taxes for 1946 to 1976 were paid only on April
23, 1976 by Mrs. Tayag (Exh. J) or five months before
the application for registration was filed.
The application is in the form prescribed in section 21
of Act No. 496 but it does not contain the paragraph
included in Judicial Form No. 20 of the Land
Registration Commission which reads:
(8) Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not
applicable to the case, he hereby applies for the
benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141
as he has been in possession of the land since ___ ...
(See Torrens System by Ponce, p. 158; 1 Tanada and
Rodrigo, Legal Forms, p. 542).
The instant application, like similar applications, is for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under
section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942.
Under that law, the applicant must prove that he, by
himself and through his predecessors in interest,
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of public
agricultural land, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by force majeure.
The trial court and the Appellate Court granted the
application. The Director of Lands appealed to this
Court. The Solicitor General's first contention, that
the application should be denied because Mrs. Tayag
failed to present the original tracing cloth plan,
cannot be sustained.
It is indubitably indicated that the "cloth plan of Psu-
112106" was attached to the application (p. 3,
Record on Appeal). It was detached and kept by the
Land Registration Commission. It could not be
marked as an exhibit.
The second contention is that Mrs. Tayag "miserably
failed to prove ownership or possession in the
concept of owner for thirty years" prior to September
7, 1976 when the application was filed.
After a study of the records, we find that contention
to be meritorious. The testimonies of Mrs. Tayag
(who does not know the boundary owners and the
area of the land) and Morandarte, her overseer since
1973, are not sufficient to prove the alleged thirty
years' possession in the concept of owner by the
applicant, her sister, mother and father.
The taxes for 31 years, 1946 to 1976, were paid only
in 1976, a few months prior to the filing of the
application.
It is true that the plan (Exh. A) shows that the said
land, Psu-112106 (an abaca and coconut land) was
surveyed in 1940 by Rafael Tayag for the heirs of
Froilan Infants. Mentioned in that plan as one of the
boundary owners are the heirs of Froilan Infante,
owner of the 31-hectare parcel of land, Lot 1-B, Psd-
16074 which was adjudicated in 1969 to Mrs. Infante,
the widow of Froilan Infante. It is item A in the deed
of partition, Exhibit G. Curiously enough, item A does
131
not mention at all the Infante heirs as boundary
owners.
The applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for
judicial confirmation of her alleged title (Maloles vs.
Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548). The said land must
be presumed to be still a part of the public domain
(Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside and the application for
registration is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY
FARMS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third
Civil Cases Division), HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO
VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY
DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION,
and COMMISSIONER OF LAND
REGISTRATION, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of
land which are the subject of this petition started in
1927 when an application for their registration under
the Torrens System was first filed. In the present
petition for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
(hereafter referred to as Realty)
and Macondray Farms, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
Macondray) seek a reversal of the Resolution of May
2, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and an
affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision of
December 29, 1982.
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of
373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala
Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are
covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to
wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the
name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was
derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958,
pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos.
657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-
33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the
name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from
OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant
to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-
6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27,
1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and
Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931
which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC
Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court),
for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and
TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty
Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the
Commissioner of Land Registration. Subsequently,
however, Carpo withdrew his complaint as against
the last named defendant, and the answer filed on
behalf of said government official was ordered
stricken off the record. The complaint alleged that
TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it
was derived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI,
then presided over by Judge Andres Reyes (hereafter
referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued the
order dated May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a
decree of registration, was not sitting as a land
registration court, but as a court of ordinary
jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the original
records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882
which was the basis for the issuance of said order of
May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during
World War II and were still pending reconstitution;
hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the
issuance of a certificate of title.
Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that
the Reyes Court was acting as a court of land
registration and in issuing the order of May 21, 1958,
was actually performing a purely ministerial duty for
the registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO Record
No. 29882 (and the two other cases, Cases Nos. 758
and 976, with which said case had been jointly tried
and decided) which on August 19, 1935 had rendered
a decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to
Estanislao Mayuga (father of Dominador Mayuga,
predecessor-in-interest of Realty and Macondray),
132
which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. It
was alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is null
and void, having been issued over a parcel of land
previously registered under the Torrens System in
favor of another.
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a
third-party complaint against the Quezon City
Development and Financing Corporation (hereafter
referred to as QCDFC) and the Commissioner of Land
Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982 and
333985 in the name of QCDFC also covered the same
parcels of land subject of the dispute between Carpo
and the two corporations, Realty and Macondray.
They thus prayed that Decree No. N-135938 issued
on July 22, 1971, OCT No. 8931 issued on July 27,
1971, as well as TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985
derived from OCT No. 8931 be declared null and void.
In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC
asserted the validity of its own title alleging that it is
the title in the name of Realty which is null and void.
QCDFC also filed a fourth-party complaint against
Carmelino Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia, Felicisimo
Alvendia, Josefina Alvendia, Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa
G. Miranda, Isabel G. Miranda, and Feliciano G.
Miranda, alleging that it bought said parcels of land
from them. It prayed that in the event of an
unfavorable judgment against it, fourth-party
defendants be ordered to reimburse the purchase
price which the corporation paid to them. However,
QCDFC failed to prosecute its case, and the fourth-
party complaint was dismissed for lack of interest.
After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on
January 20, 1981, sustaining the title of Morris G.
Carpo to the two (2) lots in question and declaring
the titles of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC
null and void.
On March 20, 1981, Realty filed a Petition for
certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-
56471 questioning the decision of the lower court. It
also asked that it be allowed to appear directly to this
Court as it was raising only questions of law. After
respondents filed their comments to said petition,
this Court passed a resolution dated October 19,
1981 referring the case to the Court of Appeals "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal."
In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of
Appeals, through its Ninth Division, with Justice
Patajo asponente, concurred in by Justices Gopengco
and Kapunan, set aside the decision of the trial court
and rendered a new one upholding the validity of the
title in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and
declaring null and void the titles in the name of Carpo
and QCDFC.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the
appellate court. In the meantime, by virtue and
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129, or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of
Appeals was reorganized into the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC). As a consequence, there was a
re-raffling of cases and the case was assigned to the
Second Special Cases Division which, however,
returned the records of the case for another re-
raffling to the Civil Cases Divisions as it deemed itself
without authority to act on a civil case in view of the
allocation of cases to the different divisions of the
IAC under Section 8 of BP 129. The case was then
assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division, composed
of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia, Zosa and Bartolome.
Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves,
and Justices Camilon and Bidin were assigned to the
Third Civil Cases Division.
On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third
Civil Cases Division, with Justice Zosa
as ponente; concurred in by Justices Camilon and
Bidin, promulgated its Resolution granting Carpo's
motion for reconsideration, reversing and setting
aside the decision of December 29, 1982, and
affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition docketed as G.R. No. 67451.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I
The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (for brevity, referred to
herein as SPECIAL DIVISION) which promulgated the
disputed RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 had no legal
standing under the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bldg. 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction
and adjudicatory power to pronounce any decision of
final resolution for the Court.
II
On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is
legally vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory
powers under the provisions of BP 129, it decided
questions of substance contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court because:
(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION'S Resolution of May 2, 1984
amounted to a denial to the Petitioners of their right
to appeal and judicial review over fundamental issues
of law duly raised by them in their Petition for
Review on certiorari (G.R. No. 56471), as authorized
by the Constitution (Art. X, sec. 5 (2) (e), the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Rule 42,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court; and
133
(b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984, it ruled that
the decision of the Court of Appeals could not have
gained the nature of a proper and valid judgment as
the latter had no power to pass upon the appealed
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the
Vera Court), as appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy;
Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly
departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings by giving a perverted and
obviously unjustified and illogical interpretation of
the RESOLUTION of July 25, 1983, of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, holding and
declaring that "it has in effect erased or cancelled the
validity of (the DECISION of December 29, 1982),
when the said RESOLUTION merely "RESOLVED to
return the records of the case ... for re-raffling and
reassignment ... in view of the allocation of cases to
the different Divisions of the Intermediate Appellate
Court under Section 8 of BP 129.
III
The SPECIAL DIVISION by confirming the appealed
judgment of the lower court in effect sanctioned the
contemptible disregard of law and jurisprudence
committed by Judge Vera, which call for an exercise
of the power of supervision;
IV
The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its RESOLUTION of
May 2, 1984 a deliberate falsehood, namely, that
Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in good faith and for
value when there is absolutely no evidence, whether
written or testimonial, that was presented by Carpo,
or by anyone else that he was, in fact, a purchaser for
value and in good faith — a material matter which
was neither alleged nor referred to in the complaint
and in all the pleadings, nor covered by any of the
exhibits presented by all of the parties herein and
solely on the bases of which the case at bar was
submitted by the parties for consideration and
decision.
1. To support their contention that the Special Third
Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court which promulgated the Resolution of May 2,
1984 had no legal standing under the provisions of
BP 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction and
adjudicatory power, petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8
of BP 129, to wit:
Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions.—The
Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise its
powers, functions and duties, through ten (10)
divisions, each composed of five members. The Court
may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercise
administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory
functions.
Sec. 8. Grouping of Divisions.—Of the ten (10)
divisions, of the Court, four (4) divisions, to be known
as Civil case Divisions, shall take cognizance of
appeals in civil cases originating from the Regional
Trial Court; two (2) divisions, to be known as Criminal
Cases Divisions, of appeals in cases originating from
the Regional Trial Courts; and four (4) divisions, to be
known as Special Cases Divisions, of original actions
or petitions, petitions for review, and appeals in all
other cases, including those from administrative
agencies, except as provided in Section 9 hereof.
Except with respect to the Presiding Appellate
Justice, the appointment of a member of the court
should specifically indicate whether it is for the Civil
Cases Divisions, the Criminal Cases Divisions, or the
Special Cases Divisions of the Court. No member of
the Court appointed to any of the three classes of
conclusions shall be assigned to any of the other
classes of division except when authorized by the
Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the
Intermediate Appellate Court en banc, if the
exigencies of the service so require. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
As officially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division
was composed of Justice B.S. de la Fuente, as
Chairman, Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa, and
Flores Bartolome, as Members. In view, however, of
the voluntary inhibition of Justices Coquia and
Bartolome from taking part in the case, Justices Bidin
and Camilon were reassigned to the Third Civil Cases
Division to form the Special Third Civil Cases Division.
Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil
Cases Division, not being one of the ten (10) Divisions
of the Court duly vested with jurisdiction, had no
adjudicatory powers. It is also alleged that the
reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon is
violative of the injunction against appointment of an
appellate Justice to a class of divisions other than
that to which he is appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law
will readily show that what BP 129 prohibits is
appointment from one class of divisions to another
class. For instance, a Justice appointed to the
Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the
Civil Cases Divisions.
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the
Fourth Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was
reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. The
two therefore come from the same class of divisions
to which they were appointed.
134
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon
to form the Special Third Civil Cases Division in view
of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular"
members, is still within legal bounds. Otherwise, a
situation would have arisen where a regular division
could not decide a particular case because some
members thereof inhibited themselves from
participating in said case.
2. The second assigned error involves a
determination of the correctness of the ruling of the
IAC that the CA Decision of December 29, 1982 could
not have gained the nature of a proper and valid
judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy) and that the Resolution of July 25,
1983 had in effect erased or cancelled the validity of
said Decision.
The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2,1984:
Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was
effectively an acknowledgment by the Division that
promulgated it that the earlier Decision dated
December 29, 1983 rendered in a Special Civil Action
case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-13530, was not
appropriate and beyond the authority of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals to promulgate. The
said Resolution was actually a statement that the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals had over-
stepped its bounds by reviewing in certiorari
proceedings a decision in a purely civil case that
should have passed through the processes of an
ordinary appeal. We are not aware of any legal
doctrine that permits an appellate court to treat a
petition for review on certiorari upon purely
questions of law, such as that filed by petitioners
herein, as an ordinary appeal. Neither can we find
any legal basis or justification for the election by the
appellate court of the essential requisites then
prescribed for the validity of an appeal, such as the
submission of a formal notice of appeal, an appeal
bond and approved record on appeal. Without any of
these mandatory requisites, the appeal could not
have been deemed perfected and ought to have
been dismissed outright.
The Court does not agree.
There are two modes by which cases decided by the
then Courts of First Instance in their original
jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal
either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the
Supreme Court. To the latter category belong cases
in which only errors or questions of law are involved.
Each of these modes have different procedural
requirements.
As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for
certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-
56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court,
and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this
Court as it was raising only questions of law.
However, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated
the petition first filed as an appeal, and not as a
special civil action for certiorari. After as, a petition
for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal.
(People v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69
SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and
procedure outlined in Rule 45 which, unlike ordinary
appeals, does not require a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and a record on appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision
of the Vera Court "cannot be passed upon anymore
in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and
not certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely,
petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal,
albeit by way of certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that
certiorari is not a substitute for appeal. Those cases
are not in point. They refer to the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, and not to appeal by way
of certiorari under Rule 45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in
interpreting the Resolution dated July 25, 1983 of the
Second Special Cases Division (to which the case was
assigned after the reorganization under BP 129) as
having "erased or cancellation" the validity of the
Decision of the Ninth Division. A perusal of said
Resolution shows that it merely made clarification
about the nature of the case and why it should be
reassigned to the Civil Cases Division of the IAC.
There was not the slightest implication that it "erased
or cancelled" the validity of the Decision of the Ninth
Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division
impliedly admitted the validity of the Decision of the
Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's motion for
reconsideration. It would have been incongruous to
grant a motion to reconsider a decision, reverse and
set it aside, if in the first place it did not have any
validity. It would have been necessary only to decide
its invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend
that the Vera Court, and the IAC Special Third Civil
Cases Division, erred in upholding the validity of the
135
title in the name of Carpo and declaring null and void
the titles in the names of Realty and of QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was
the same basis for the of the Vera Court and the IAC
Special Division, is that the Reyes Court had no
authority to issue the order of May 21, 1958 directing
the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of
Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was
not sitting as a land registration court and also
because the original records of LRC Case No. 657,
Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed
during World War II and were still pending
reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as
amended by Act No. 2347 (1914), jurisdiction over all
applications for registration of title to and was
conferred upon the Courts of First Instance of the
respective provinces in which the land sought to be
registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in
ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in court
of the application for registration, and is retained up
to the end of the litigation. The issuance of a decree
of registration is but a step in the entire land
registration process; and as such, does not constitute
a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao
Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-
in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24,
1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case
No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels
of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035.
(Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant litigation
among Carpo, RRealty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was
jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976,
GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and
LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by
Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved
Identical parcels of land, and Identical
applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land
registration court issued a consolidated decision on
the three cases, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
En meritos de to do lo expuesto, se ordena el registro
de los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 del plans PSU-47035 a nombre
de Estanislao Mayuga, desist oposicion de Florentino
Baltazar y Eduardo Guico con respects a dichos
lotes....
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
November 17, 1939. the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Por todas last consideraciones expuestas
confirmamos la decision apelada en cuanto adjudica
a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de such piano y
que equivalent a lost lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del plano de
Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico.
xxx xxx xxx
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before
this Court, but the petition was dismissed and the
Court of Appeals decision was affirmed (See Guico v.
San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his
name, Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of
Estanislao, filed a petition with the Reyes Court
docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the
only heir of the deceased Estanislao Mayuga and
praying for the issuance of a decree of registration
over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao.
At this point, it cannot be overemphasized that the
petition filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct and
separate proceeding from, but a continuation of, the
original land registration proceedings initiated by
Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo
Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes Court, as Branch
VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, was
continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the
case, which jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal
upon filing of the original applications.
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order
granting the petition of Dominador Mayuga and
directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to
issue a decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of
Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as registered
owner Dominador Mayuga in liue of Estanislao.
Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since
the records of LRC Case No. 657 were not properly
reconstituted, then there was no pending land
registration case. And since the Reyes Court was
acting without a pending case, it was acting without
jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's Memorandum, pp,
2-8.)
He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347,
April 29, 1969, 27 SCRA 1119) where this Court said
that upon failure to reconstitute pursuant to law,
"the parties are deemed to have waived the effects
of the decision rendered in their favor and their only
alternative is to file an action anew for the
registration in their names of the lots in question,"
136
citing the case of Ambat v. Director of Lands, (92)
Phil. 567 [1953]) and other cases. The basis of said
ruling is Section 29 of Act No. 3110, an Act to provide
an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of the
records of pending judicial proceedings and books,
documents, and files of the office of the register of
deeds, destroyed by fire or other public calamities,
and for other purposes.
However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the
effect of failure to reconstitute records on the status
of the case in its entirety, was modified in the case
of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93) Phil. 595 [1953]). where
this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat
case) in the sense that Section 29 of Act No. 3110
should be applied only where the records in the
Court of First Instance as well as in the appellate
court were destroyed or lost and were not
reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court
of First Instance are intact and complete, and only
the records in the appellate court were lost or
destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason
for this view is that section 29 of Act 3110 is found
among the sections and provisions dealing with the
reconstitution of records in the Court of First
Instance in pending civil cases, special proceedings,
cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act
(No.) 3110 ... who show that there are separate
procedures for the reconstitution of records in the
Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53;
for the reconstitution of records in the Supreme
Court, now including the Court of Appeals, from Sec.
54 to Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records in the
office of the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec.
90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed records in
the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47,
under which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously
comprehended.
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or
replace records lost or destroyed so that said records
may be complete and court proceedings may
continue from the point or stage where said
proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.
The law contemplates different stages for purposes
of reconstitution. . . .
. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was
pending trial in the Court of First Instance at the time
the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently
refers to the stage where the case had been tried and
decided but was still pending in the Court of First
Instance at the time the record was destroyed or
lost; section 6 covers the stage where the case was
pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals)
at the time the record was destroyed or lost. *
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost
and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the
court should go back to the next preceding age
where records are available, but not beyond that;
otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next
preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily
ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and
documented, to the great prejudice not only of the
parties and their witnesses, but also of the court
which must again perforce admit pleadings, rule
upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,-
all of these, when the records up to said point or
stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew
and incur the expenses and (suffer) the annoyance
and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and
the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility
that some of the witnesses may have died or left the
jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again
rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and
then decide the case, when an along and all the time
the record of the former pleadings of the trial and
evidence and decision are there and are not
disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly
logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties,
including the trial court which has not committed any
negligence or fault at all.
The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit
and intention of the reconstitution law. As stated
therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated to penalize
people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions.
It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather
to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court
records are destroyed at any stage of judicial
proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and
starting all over again, they may reconstitute the
records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask
for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to
them is that they lose the advantages provided by
the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at the
stage when the records were destroyed).
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC
Case No. 657, the parties thereto did not have to
commence a new action but only had to go back to
the preceding stage where records are available. The
land registration case itself re. mained pending and
the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have
jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case
when an that remained to be done was the
ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to
137
issue a decree of registration (which would be the
basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of
Title) to implement a judgment which had become
final (See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919]
at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1
SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar,
134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are
however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI
and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3
of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover,
there is an official report of the decision of this Court
affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final
order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance
of a decree of registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the
exercise of its jurisdiction as a land registration court
when it issued the order directing the issuance of a
decree of registration, "substituting therein as
registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in hue of the
original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the
affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the
provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,"
which order is in consonance with the ruling of this
Court in the Guico decision, and the decisions of the
CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and
November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the
validity of said order and rule that Judge Vera was
without jurisdiction to set it aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of
Realty and QCDFC, the Special Division also relied on
Carpo's being an innocent purchaser for value.
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for
value was never raised as an issue in the trial court. A
perusal of the records of the case reveals that no
factual basis exists to support such a conclusion. Even
Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an
innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the
presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the
Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent
purchaser for value only if, relying on the certificate
of title, he bought the property from the registered
owner, "without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property." (Cui
v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117
Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its
face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare supra.)
Carpo bought the disputed property from the
Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of
a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary
Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it
was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree
of registration in favor of the Baltazars was
transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province
of Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was
issued. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970,
that the deed evidencing the sale between the
Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of
Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was
cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961
in the name of Carpo was issued. (Exhibit 12, Rollo
pp. 270-273.)
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens
title which Carpo could have relied upon so that he
may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not
being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in
no better position than his predecessors-in-interest.
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are
heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the
original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in
1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the
title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035
"desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . .
con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of
Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the
land registration proceedings over the disputed
parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico,
Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when
as the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name
of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its
title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the
issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in
1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule
is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails . . . . In successive registrations, where
more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or
whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA,
Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA
380.)
TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore
superior to TCT No. 303961 derived from OCT 8629.
138
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development
and Financing Corporation (QCDFC) alleges that it has
been improperly impleaded as thirty-party defendant
inasmuch as Realty's alleged cause of action against it
is neither for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief in respect of Carpo's claim against
Realty. It likewise alleges that Realty had no cause of
action against it since the third party complaint did
not allege that QCDFC violated any legal right of
Realty, QCDFC also assails the Vera Court decision in
that it declares QCDFC directly liable to Carpo and
not to Realty.
In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the
decision of the Vera Court, nor from the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1982, nor
from the resolution of the IAC Special Third Civil
Cases Division dated May 2, 1984 — all of which
voided QCDFCs title to the disputed property. Hence,
said decisions/resolution have become final and
executory as regards QCDFC.
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that
the third-party complaint filed against it by Realty
was procedurally defective in that the relief being
sought by the latter from the former is not in respect
of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the
factual circumstances of the case compel this Court
now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed
property. ** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these
conflicting claims over the property. After an, QCDFC
was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised its right,
to prove its claim over the land. It presented
documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was
even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint
which, however, was dismissed since it failed to
prosecute its case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only
al., the original registered owners. Original Certificate between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421
of Title No. 8931 in the name of Spouses Carmelino [1948]).
Alvendia, et. al. was issued on July 27, 1971, or
The ruling in this case is therefore without any
thirteen (13) years after the issuance of Mayuga's
title in 1958. prejudice to this Court's final determination of G.R.
No. L-46953.
Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which
was issued earlier than OCT No. 8931 from which WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court and the Decision of
QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title must prevail
January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal Branch XXIII, are SET
over that of QCDFC.
ASIDE and the Decision of December 29, 1982 of the
6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
a manifestation alleging that the case at bar is closely
connected with G.R. No. L-469953, Jose N. Mayuga SO ORDERED.
et. al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray Farms, Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et. al. and moved
for consolidation of the two cases involving as they Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., took no part.
do the same property. By Resolution of August 29,
1984, this Court denied the motion for consolidation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the
action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of
an action to remove clouds from title to real
property. By asserting its own title to the property in
question and asking that Carpo's title be declared
null and void instead, and by filing the third-party
complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking
the court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions
of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481,
Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386),
and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies,
Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor
are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being
against the person in respect of the res, these
proceedings are characterized as quasi in
rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The
139