Class 6.
Registerable Properties The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of
Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION)
AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43190 August 31, 1984
AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE
LA CRUZ, ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BANDA, BENITO
SANTAYANA, FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO,
GREGORIO DATOY, FELIMON GUTIERREZ, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL
RIO, respondents.
Bonifacio, Perez & Concepcion for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
Eduardo Cagandahan for respondent Santos del Rio.
CUEVAS, J.:
These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same
decision of the defunct Court of Appeals 2 have been
consolidated in this single decision, having arisen
from one and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC
Case No. N-283, Laguna), and presenting as they do
issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
oppositors constructed residential houses on the
aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the land in favor of applicant, now
private respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner
Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that the
land sought to be registered is part of the public
domain and therefore not registerable. Petitioners
private oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other
hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by
dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have
been in possession of the same for more than twenty
(20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case,
with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated
near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20)
meters therefrom (Exh. D), 3 in Barrio Pinagbayanan,
Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio
from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed of Sale
evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the
Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was
declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918,
and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since
1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs
extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject
parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the
latter's share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent,
filed his application for registration of said parcel on
May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by the
Director of Lands and by private oppositors,
petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained
permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck
houses on the land in question. Although there was
no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them
had made voluntary payments to private respondent.
In violation of the original agreement, private
land which prompted private respondent to file an
ejectment suit against the former in
4
1966. Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and
in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed
their respective sales applications with the Bureau of
Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration. The Court of First
Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for
registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a
favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed
their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
The two consolidated petitions raise substantially the
same issues, to wit :
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is
public land; and
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has
registerable title to the land.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in
Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of
private ownership. 5 Public lands, or those of public
dominion, have been described as those which,
under existing legislation are not the subject of
private ownership, and are reserved for public
purposes. 6 The New Civil Code enumerates
properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502
thereof. Article 420 provides:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth.
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the
following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
brooks running in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public
lands and their beds;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that
since a portion of the land sought to be registered is
covered with water four to five months a year, the
same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at
least, a foreshore land, which brings it within the
enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code
quoted above and therefore it cannot be the subject
of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the
Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is
the ground covered by their waters when at
their highest ordinary depth. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above
definition has been interpreted in the case of
Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during
the dry season, such depth being the "regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year." The foregoing interpretation
was the focal point in the Court of Appeals decision
sought to be reviewed. We see no reason to disturb
the same.
Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake
are also subject to the same gravitational forces that
cause the formation of tides 9 in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the
case of lakes. 10Thus, the alternation of high tides
and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could
hardly account for the rise in the water level of the
Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year
during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which
bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in
question. Since the rise in the water level which
causes the submersion of the land occurs during a
shorter period (four to five months a year) than the
level of the water at which the is completely dry, the
latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary
depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought
to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as
foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director
of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore
land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides... 11
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water mark and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in
water of a portion of the land in question is due to
the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de
Bay from different sources. 13 Since the inundation
of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux
of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land
within the meaning of the authorities cited by
petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be
registered not being part of the bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by
the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and
therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title. This brings us to the second issue,
which is whether or not applicant private respondent
has registerable title to the land.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens
System is not the acquisition of lands but only the
registration of title which applicant already possesses
over the land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law
was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership
over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces
the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale
(Exh. G) in favor of his father from whom he
inherited said land. In addition to this muniment of
title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I)
covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts
(Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back
to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, 15 they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 16 The then Court of Appeals found
applicant by himself and through his father before
him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,
exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed
land for more than thirty (30) years, counted from
April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a
third person by purchase. 17 The record does not
show any circumstance of note sufficient enough to
overthrow said findings of facts which is binding
upon us. Since applicant has possessed the subject
parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in
good faith, his possession need only last for ten years
in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set
in. 18 Applicant has more than satisfied this legal
requirement. And even if the land sought to be
registered is public land as claimed by the petitioners
still, applicant would be entitled to a judicial
confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also
satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of said Act
enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, the following:
(a) ...
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under bona fide c of ownership, for at least tirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title ...
The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R.
No. L43190, that they have reclaimed the land from
the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have
possessed the same for more than twenty (20) years
does not improve their position. In the first place,
private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land
from water bodies belonging to the public domain
without proper permission from government
authorities. 19 And even if such reclamation had
been authorized, the reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to the party reclaiming the
same as they may still be subject to the terms of the
authority earlier granted. 20 Private oppositors-
petitioners failed to show proper authority for the
alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to
the litigated parcel must fall. In the second place,
their alleged possession can never ripen into
ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in
the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title
acquired by prescription. 21 As correctly found by the
appellate court, the private oppositors-petitioners
entered into possession of the land with the
permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del
Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or
another did not pay rent cannot be considered in
their favor. Their use of the land and their non-
payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by
applicant and these could not have affected the
character of the latter's possession 22 which has
already ripened into ownership at the time of the
filing of this application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having
satisfactorily established his registerable title over
the parcel of land described in his application, he is
clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said
land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED and the registration in
favor of applicant private-respondent of the land
described in his application is hereby ordered.
Costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin,
JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman), is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD
AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO ALAGAD,
CARLOS ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND
EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO
ALAGAD, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil
Cases Division), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private
respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court
of Appeals 1 affirming two orders of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Laguna 2 dismissing its
petition for "annulment of title and reversion. 3 The
facts appear in the decision appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an
application for registration of their title over a parcel
of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of
8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971,
which was amended after the land was divided into
two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476
hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares,
reflected in survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-
typed ground that applicants and their predecessors
have not been in possession of the land openly,
continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the public
domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the
application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
4922 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case,
promulgated January 16, 1956, supplemented by
orders issued on March 21, 1956 and August 13,
1956, defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and
the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public
land. Decree No. N-51479 was entered and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated October 18,
1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal
Court of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict
the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On
August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the
eviction case ordering the defendants therein to
return possession of the premises to herein
defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The defendants
therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the
filing of the instant case. On October 6, 1970, as
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff
of Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and the
defendants from selling, mortgaging, disposing or
otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the
area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite
notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada,
Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands, representing
plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971,
the court a quodismissed the complaint. The
Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, was set
for hearing, and finally denied by the court a
quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972.
It appears that the appeal was dismissed by this
Court for failure to show in the record on appeal that
the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the
action of this Court. On November 19, 1982, the
Supreme Court set aside the dismissal resolution of
this Court and ordered Us to reinstate and give due
course to plaintiffs appeal.4
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic
claims that the decree and title [rendered and issued
in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] insofar
as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of
Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab
initio, 5 for the following reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or
end of Lot l, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining
Lot 2 of the same survey plan containing 2.8421
hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore
land reached and covered by the waters of the
Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950,
May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G.
Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30, 1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is
actually now the site of Barrio Aplaya, formerly a
sitio of Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been occupied by
the barrio people since the American occupation of
the country in the early 1900's where they
established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years
since the early 1900's have filled up and elevated the
land to its present condition of being some feet
above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-
116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan
so much so that this barrio site of Aplaya where
there are now sixty-eight (68) houses occupied by
more than one hundred (100) families is no longer
reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de
Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio
people, the land in question would not have been fit
for human habitation, so much so that defendants
and their predecessors-in-interest could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the property which
could be judicially confirmed in a registration case, as
in fact said defendants and their predecessors-in-
interest have never been in actual possession of the
land in question, the actual occupants thereof being
the barrio people of Aplaya; 6
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals
held that under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules
of Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of the
Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that
the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said
LRC No. 189 has long become final, titles to the
properties had been issued (in favor of the private
respondents), and that res judicata, consequently,
was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision
insofar as it sustained the lower court: (1) in
dismissing the petition for failure of the Republic to
appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res
judicata is an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the
Court of Appeals has been guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. It is well-established that the State cannot
be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its official or agents, 7 much more,
non-suited as a result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity,
which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land under the basic doctrine
embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the
present charter. It is charged moreover with the
conservation of such patrimony. There is need
therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private
claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought
to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such
primordial consideration, not the apparent
carelessness, much less the acquiescense of public
officials, is the controlling norm . . . 8
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the
Philippines 9 and Nilo v. Romero, 10 cited by the Court
of Appeals in support of its decision, are not
applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon
finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the
Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the
defendant had been "erroneously' represented in the
complaint by the City Attorney when it should have
been the City Mayor, on a holding that the City
Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended the
City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the
acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and
intentional in character, in which cases, it could not
be said that the Government had been prejudiced by
some negligent act or omission.
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is
an impediment to reversion of property. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 11 this Court stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled
(Republic v Animas, et al., . supra), and the
cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary
action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the
prior judgment of the land registration court, since
the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then
the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a
well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet
vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91
SCRA 113)...12
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the
names of the private respondents were foreshore
land, the land registration court could not have
validly awarded title thereto. It would have been
without the authority to do so. The fact that the
Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the decree
of registration could not have validated the court's
decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of
public dominion or of private
13
ownership ." Property is of public dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar
character; 14 or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth. 15
All other property of the State, it is provided further,
which is not of the character mentioned in ... article
[4201, is patrimonial property,16 meaning to say,
property 'open to disposition 17 by the Government,
or otherwise, property pertaining to the national
domain, or public lands. 18 Property of the public
dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by
the State by regalian right. They are things res
publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private
appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution,
[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated.' 19
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
brooks running in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public
lands, and their beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds,
which are also of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of
public works, even if constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to a
province, or to a city or municipality from the
moment they leave such lands;
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public
establishments.20
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public
lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public
domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of
private individuals, or the State or provinces, belong
to the respective owners of such lands, and those
situated upon lands of communal use belong to their
respective pueblos.21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition,
that the lands subject of the Republic's reversion
efforts are foreshore in nature, the Republic has
legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that
case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense.22
Of course, whether or not the properties in question
are, indeed, foreshore lands is the core of
controversy. According to the trial court, the
aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, 23 and hence, available disposition and
registration. As we have pointed out, the
Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore
laud, it is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the
parcel foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public
domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake .
24
Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in
depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water
coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is
connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River.
According to the definition just quoted, Laguna de
Bay is a lake. 25
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so
Colegio de San Jose further tells us, "we must resort
to the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the
parcels of land in question. 26 The recourse to legal
provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the
Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes ...
is the ground covered by their waters when at their
highest ordinary depth. 27 and in which case, it forms
part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's
waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been
defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay
during the dry season, such depth being the regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year . . . 28
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the
extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance,
the portions inundated thereby are not considered
part of the bed or basin of the body of water in
question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore
land but land outside of the public dominion, and
land capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been
defined as follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides... 29
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.30
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite
its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these
principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a
ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of
facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no
evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive
disposition 31 We therefore remand the case to the
court a quo to determine whether or not the
property subject of controversy is foreshore. We,
consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and
the trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO
VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee
Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his
application for the registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for
the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove),
situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area
of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his
application by alleging among others that he owned
the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the
application, the Director of Lands, Laureano
Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions.
Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The Director
of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion
of the public domain, for the reason that neither the
applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed
sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either
by composition title from the Spanish government or
by possessory information title under the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not
possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since
July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was
holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by
the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947,
and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a
parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired
from the Government by virtue of a free patent title
in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel
in question was formed by accretion and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay
which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant
Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since
1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his
possession thereof had been continuous, adverse
and public for a period of twenty years until said
possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to
prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by
the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed
part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the
application, holding that the parcel formed part of
the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the
following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in
question, altho an accretion to the land of the
applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but
forms part of the public domain.
II. Granting that the land in question forms part of
the public domain, the lower court nevertheless
erred in not declaring the same to be the necessary
for any public use or purpose and in not ordering in
the present registration proceedings.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land
in question now belongs to the applicant-appellant
by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land
having ceased to be of the public domain and
became the private or patrimonial property of the
State.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the
oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel from
claiming the land in question as a land of the public
domain.
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by
the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual
deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old
Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it
refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers,
while the accretion in the present case was caused
by action of the Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of
the Law of Waters are not applicable because they
refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that
Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find
said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea,
being a mere indentation of the same:
Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is
shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of
the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a
bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a
lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine
Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the
Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See
the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732,
involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by
Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed
by the action of the sea is property of the State;
Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505,
involving a land claimed by a private person and
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila
Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land
in question formed part of the public domain, having
been gained from the sea, the trial court should have
declared the same no longer necessary for any public
use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable
and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the
Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in
the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37
Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that
when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by
the waters of the sea and is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for coastguard service, the
government shall declare it to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an
increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments
have the authority and the power to make the
declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, on for coast-
guard service. If no such declaration has been made
by said departments, the lot in question forms part
of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of
Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this
Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde
vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's
Digest, VI. I, p. 52).
. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither
primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used for
the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of
Waters.
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part
of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the
land in question is no longer needed for coast guard
service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the
parcel in question through acquisitive prescription,
having possessed the same for over ten years. In
answer, suffice it to say that land of the public
domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the
case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19
Phil., 505 this Court said:
The occupation or material possession of any land
formed upon the shore by accretion, without
previous permission from the proper authorities,
although the occupant may have held the same as
owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf
on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer,
inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of
commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is
intended for public uses and for the benefit of those
who live nearby.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points
raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65334 December 26, 1984
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, petitioner,
vs.
AQUILINA ZAPANTA, ISIDRO DELA CRUZ, ELIAS DELA
CRUZ, MARIA DELA CRUZ, MODESTA LEYVA, FERMIN
LEYVA, SUSANA LEYVA, MARCIAL LEYVA, FELISA
LEYVA, ISIDORA LEYVA, HONORIO LEYVA,
CONCORDIA GALICIA, APOLONIA AVENDANO,
AMPARO AVENDANO, FIDELA SARTE, BEATRIZ
SARTE, VICTORIO SARTE, VIRGINIA SARTE, JULIANA
SARTE, RODOLFO SARTE, BENITA SARTE, ANTONINA
SUAREZ, DANIEL SUAREZ, BEATA SUAREZ, ENRIQUE
AVENDANO, PAULINO AVENDANO, SAMSON
LAVILLA, SR., AURELIA LAPAR, VIRGILIO HILARIO,
NATIVIDAD MARQUEZ, LUISITO LOPEZ, REMEDIOS
LOPEZ, ROMEO LOPEZ, NATIVIDAD LOPEZ and the
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT,respondents.
Mariano A.G. Cervo for petitioner.
Leonardo C. Rodriguez for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this appeal by Certiorari, we called upon to review
the Resolution of respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court, dated August 23, 1983. Dismissing petitioner's
appeal for failure to file its brief within the
reglementary period, and the subsequent Resolution
of the same Court, dated September 27, 1983,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for
being without any legal and factual basis.
The facts may be briefly stated as follows: On August
8, 1977, a single application for the registration of
two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct
applicants before the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court, for
short). One of the two applicants was Conrado
Eniceo. He had applied for registration under the
Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258
square meters. The other applicant was "Heirs of
Joaquin Avendaño", and the land they were applying
for registration was a parcel (hereinafter called the
DISPUTED PROPERTY) containing 9,826 square
meters surveyed in the name of the Municipality of
Antipolo (ANTIPOLO, for short). Both parcels were
situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The
applications were approved by the Registration Court
on February 26, 1980. ANTIPOLO took steps to
interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend
the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.
On May 22, 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a complaint in Civil
Case No. 41353, also of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig (the CASE BELOW, for short)
against named "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño", and
their assignees (hereinafter called the AVENDAÑO
HEIRS) praying for nullification of the judgment
rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants,
in their Answer, pleaded a special defense of res
judicata, After a preliminary hearing on the
mentioned special defense, the CASE BELOW was
dismissed. ANTIPOLO perfected an appeal to the
then Court of Appeals.
A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate
Court, which ANTIPOLO claimed it had not received.
Upon motion of the defendants-appellees to dismiss
on the ground that ANTIPOLO had not filed its Brief
within the reglementary period, the appeal was
dismissed despite the fact that before the dismissal,
ANTIPOLO had submitted its Appellant's Brief.
We gave due course to the Petition for Review on
certiorari filed with this Court by ANTIPOLO, and the
latter had restated the issues as follow:
I appropriate relief. However, considering the three
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred in dismissing
petitioner's appeal on the alleged ground of failure
to file appellant's brief within the reglementary
period the fact being that counsel had not been duly
served with the notice to file brief.
II
At any rate, the Appellate Court should have given
due course to the appeal since the appellant's brief
was filed within the 90-day period which is uniformly
granted as a matter of course to all litigants before
the Appellate Court, instead of dismissing the appeal
on a technicality.
III
With more reason should petitioner's appeal have
been given due course on the important and
substantial allegation that the registration court did
not have jurisdiction over the land subject of
registration, it being property of the Municipality of
Antipolo, used long before the war as a public market
and other public purposes, and hence actually
devoted to public use and service.
Only a short resolution need be made to sustain the
first and second issues of error. Although failure to
file Brief within the time provided by the Rules is,
indeed, a ground for dismissal of an appeal, this
Court had held that rules of technicality must yield to
the broader interests of substantial justice 1 specially
where, as in this case, the important issue of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Land
Registration Court has been raised.
With the foregoing conclusion, a remand to
respondent Court, for the entertainment of the
appeal on the merits, would ordinarily be the
Motions for Early Decision filed by private
respondents, we shall resolve the substantive merits
of the appeal to the appellate tribunal from the
judgment rendered in the CASE BELOW.
From the record, we have gathered that ANTIPOLO,
for more than 50 years now, has considered the
DISPUTED PROPERTY to be public land subject to
ANTI POLO's use and permission to use within the
prerogatives and purposes of a municipal
corporation. There is indication to the effect that it
had been the site of the public market as far back as
1908, 2 or at the latest, since 1920 "up to
today." 3 Gradually, additional public structures were
built thereon, like the Puericulture and Family
Planning Center, the Integrated National Police
Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and
the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy
almost the entire area of the land. At the time the
application for registration was filed on August 8,
1977, the DISPUTED PROPERTY was already devoted
to public use and public service. Therefore, it was
outside the commerce of man and could no longer
be subject to private registration.
The claim of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS that they merely
tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had
borrowed the DISPUTED PROPERTY from them, since
they had been in possession, since as far back as
1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof
since that time. They forget that all lands are
presumed to be public lands until the contrary is
established. 4 The fact that the DISPUTED PROPERTY
may have been declared for taxation purposes in
their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as
early as 1918 5 does not necessarily prove ownership.
They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership. 6 ANTIPOLO had also declared the
DISPUTED PROPERTY as its own in Tax Declarations
Nos. 909, 993 and 454.
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the application for registration of public
property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the
DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is null
and void. It never attained finality, and can be
attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action
brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason
of res judicata.
* * * the want of jurisdiction by a court over the
subject-matter renders the judgment void and a
mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is
in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are
divested, from which no rights can be obtained,
which neither binds nor bars any one, and under
which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of
are void, and considering, further, that the decision,
for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision
in contemplation of law, and hence, can never
become executory, it follows that such a void
judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by
reason of res judicata. 7
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the
AVENDAÑO HEIRS must also be held to be null and
void. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Perforce, they must be
ordered cancelled.
...It follows that "if a person obtains a title under the
Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens
System, or when the Director of Lands did not have
jurisdiction over the same because it is a public
forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said
certificate of title alone, become the owner of the
land illegally included" (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499, 503; Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
769).
xxx xxx xxx
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title
may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et
al., supra), and the cancellation may be pursued
through an ordinary action therefor. This action
cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land
registration court, since the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was
no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata
does not apply. * * *. Certainly, one of the essential
requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter is
absent in this case. 8 (Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
(1) The Resolutions of respondent Court, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, dated August 23, 1983
and September 27, 1983, are hereby set aside, with
this Court acting directly on the appeal of the
Municipality of Antipolo from the judgment rendered
by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XIII, in its Civil Case No. 41353;
(2) The aforesaid judgment of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII, in Civil Case No. 41353
is set aside; and, instead, the judgment and decree
rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XV, in Land Registration Case No. N-9995, LRC
Rec. No. N-52176, is hereby declared null and void in
respect of the "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño";
(3) The Register of Deeds of Rizal is hereby ordered
to cancel all certificates of title issued/transferred by
virtue of the said judgment and decree issued in the
mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-9995; LRC
Rec. No. N-52176 in respect of the "Heirs of Isabela
Avendaño";
(4) The certificate of title issued in the name of
Conrado Eniceo and transfers therefrom, by virtue of
the judgment and decree in the mentioned Land
Registration Case No. N-9995; LRC Rec. No. N-52176,
for practical purposes, shall continue to be valid.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS
PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T.
GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et
al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING
COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION
PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
IN JAPAN, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to
enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the
3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-
Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a
temporary restraining order effective February 20,
1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047)
likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel
the respondents to fully disclose to the public the
basis of their decision to push through with the sale
of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public
opposition and to explain the proceedings which
effectively prevent the participation of Filipino
citizens and entities in the bidding process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v.
Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on March 13,
1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary
Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were
required to file a comment by the Court's resolution
dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were
consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the
memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were
deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately
because the respondents filed a motion for an
extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R.
No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an
extension of another thirty (30) days which we
granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension
of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth
motion for extension of time which we granted on
June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the
respondents to the length of time the petitions have
been pending. After the comment was filed, the
petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days
to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved to
decide the two (2) cases.
I National Economic Council shall determine. Those
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4)
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other
lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-
machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of
approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at
present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho,
Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square meters
and categorized as a commercial lot now being used
as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate
staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2
Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services
procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification
to the Filipino people for their losses in life and
property and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that
reparations valued at $550 million would be payable
in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual
schedules of procurements to be fixed by the
Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and
development loans. The procurements are divided
into those for use by the government sector and
those for private parties in projects as the then
intended for the private sector shall be made
available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in
national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the
Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading "Government
Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated
June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the
land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of
the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the
failure of our government to provide necessary
funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C.
Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of
a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima
Corporation — which shall construct two (2)
buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in
Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine
Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the
construction would be the lease to the foreign
corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be
constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in
Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then
be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the
end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings
shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. No change of ownership or title shall
occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The
Philippine government retains the title all throughout
the lease period and thereafter. However, the
government has not acted favorably on this proposal
which is pending approval and ratification between
the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President
Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through
Administrative Order No. 3, followed by
Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive
Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The
four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive
branch of the government has been pushing, with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations
properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The
property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding
was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The
second one, after postponements, has not yet
materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February
21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules
on bidding were changed such that the $225 million
floor price became merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions
raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No.
92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi
property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No.
92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged
unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor
of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and
entities. These petitions have been consolidated and
are resolved at the same time for the objective is the
same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following
issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind
be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents,
have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart
from questioning the authority of the government to
alienate the Roppongi property assails the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in
making the property available for sale to non-Filipino
citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding
procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or
Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in
Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino
citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them
the right to be informed about the bidding
requirements.
II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the
Roppongi property and the related lots were
acquired as part of the reparations from the
Japanese government for diplomatic and consular
use by the Philippine government. Vice-President
Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified
as one of public dominion, and not of private
ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See
infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property
comes under "property intended for public service"
in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that
being one of public dominion, no ownership by any
one can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were acquired for
"sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular
quarters, buildings and other improvements"
(Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner
states that they continue to be intended for a
necessary service. They are held by the State in
anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa
65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside
the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple
terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v.
Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the
Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner
avers that the same remains property of public
dominion so long as the government has not used it
for other purposes nor adopted any measure
constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the
petitioner's contention by saying that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the
laws of Japan where the property is located. They
rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a
property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of
1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of
Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the
inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property
situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake
of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the
Roppongi property has ceased to become property of
public dominion. It has become patrimonial property
because it has not been used for public service or for
diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now
(Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because
the intention by the Executive Department and the
Congress to convert it to private use has been
manifested by overt acts, such as, among others: (1)
the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai
(2) the issuance of administrative orders for the
possibility of alienating the four government
properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive
Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by the Congress of
Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a
provision stating that funds may be taken from the
sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5)
the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi
property but which failed; (6) the deferment by the
Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future
date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the
government's intention to remove the Roppongi
property from the public service purpose; and (7) the
resolution of this Court dismissing the petition
in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478
which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the
Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks
this Court to rule on the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a
petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed
on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive
order contravenes the constitutional mandate to
conserve and develop the national patrimony stated
in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also
allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition
of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution;
Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-
aüsl
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article
VI, Constitution);
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises
against unfair competition and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to
information on all matters of public concern (Section
7, Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino
citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino
citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines
under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep.
Act No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Section 28, Article III, Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in
the execution of an unconstitutional executive order
is a misapplication of public funds He states that
since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi
property were never publicly disclosed until February
15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled
bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in
Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements and
the selection of qualified bidders should be done in
Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities owned
by them did not have the chance to comply with
Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi.
Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum
price of $225 million from which price capital gains
tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the
floor price would still be deducted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not
dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the three
related properties were through reparations
agreements, that these were assigned to the
government sector and that the Roppongi property
itself was specifically designated under the
Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine
Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public
service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the
terms of the Reparations Agreement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind
both the Philippine government and the Japanese
government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion
unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have
failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs,
and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to
serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens;
it is intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3
Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II,
p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of
private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not
of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the
use of the property been changed because the lot
has been Idle for some years? Has it become
patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for
a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio
v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various
pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize,
however, that an abandonment of the intention to
use the Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definiteAbandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-
use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property
(See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368
[1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive
act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
failure by the government to repair the building in
Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated,
there simply was a shortage of government funds.
The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study
of the status and conditions of government
properties in Japan were merely directives for
investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an
"authority to sell", does not have a provision in its
text expressly authorizing the sale of the four
properties procured from Japan for the government
sector. The executive order does not declare that the
properties lost their public character. It merely
intends to make the properties available to
foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale,
lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the
restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations
goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The
text of Executive Order No. 296 provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as
amended, and of other laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties
can be made available for sale, lease or any other
manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to
entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong
premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the
three other properties were earlier converted into
alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act
No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the
government sector and the private sector (Sections 2
and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector
properties can be sold to end-users who must be
Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this
nationality provision which was amended by
Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law)
which provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of
the properties of the Government in foreign
countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property
from being classified as one of public dominion when
it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63
(c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to
those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No.
6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive
Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
enumerates possible sources of future funding to
augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform
Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.
Obviously any property outside of the commerce of
man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public
dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code
should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government
officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist
that in the sale of extremely valuable government
property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should
prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and effects,
when enacted, and exceptions to its provision — is
not presented to the Court It is simply asserted that
the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply
without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on
faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should
apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is
a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance,
the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined (See Salonga, Private International Law,
1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land
ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the
need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements
exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of
ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex
situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle
the alienability of the real properties procured
through reparations nor the existence in what body
of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are
capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely
explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the
constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of
the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no
point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is
correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the
Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be
sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by
President Aquino of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi
property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public character
of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval
does not have the force and effect of law since the
President already lost her legislative powers. The
Congress had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that
the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which
the Government is a party. — In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying the
title to real estate or to any other property the value
of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos,
the respective Department Secretary shall prepare
the necessary papers which, together with the
proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the
Congress of the Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines
unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by
law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
— Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency
or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989,
asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi
property does not withdraw the property from public
domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere
resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning
the public character of the Roppongi property. In
fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is
conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734
which raises serious policy considerations and calls
for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances
behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296.
Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not
uphold the authority of the President to sell the
Roppongi property. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive order was not the
real issue and that resolving the constitutional
question was "neither necessary nor finally
determinative of the case." The Court noted that
"[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of
the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi
property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the
Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to
finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not
acknowledge the fact that the property became
alienable nor did it indicate that the President was
authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The
resolution should be read to mean that in case the
Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial
and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a
sale may be used for national economic development
projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The
petitions before us question the proposed 1990 sale
of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the
issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised
in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from
public domain to make it alienable and a need for
legislative authority to allow the sale of the property,
we see no compelling reason to tackle the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon
constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their
resolution is necessary for the determination of the
case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court
will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground such as the
application of a statute or general law (Siler v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909],
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
[1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the
Roppongi property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of
property. It was given to the Filipino people in
reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who
died and suffered during the Japanese military
occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans
who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes
and other properties lost by countless Filipinos
during the war. The Tokyo properties are a
monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino
people in the face of an invader; like the monuments
of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do
not expect economic or financial benefits from them.
But who would think of selling these monuments?
Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we
keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the
countless Filipinos who died and suffered. Even if we
should become paupers we should not think of
selling them. For it would be as if we sold the lives
and blood and tears of our countrymen. (Rollo- G.R.
No. 92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by
the Japanese government in atonement for its past
belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb
and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic
devastation the whole Filipino people endured in
World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never
bring back to life, that its significance today remains
undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the
war ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years since
the property passed on to the Philippine
government.
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not —
be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is
valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so
because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos —
veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the
Roppongi and related properties will eventually be
sold is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur. Considering the
properties' importance and value, the laws on
conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued
enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the
sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The
February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
270 Phil. 392
FERNAN, C.J.:
The center of controversy in the instant petition for
review on certiorari is a limestone-rich 70-hectare
land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are,
according to petitioners, within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve.
Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC
for brevity), a duly registered corporation established
for the purpose of setting up a cement factory, claims
on the other hand, to be the owner in fee simple of
the whole 70-hectare area indicated in survey plans
PSU-217518, PSU-217519 and PSU-217520 with a
total assessed value of P6,724.48. Thus, on
September 23, 1965, it filed in the then Court of First
Instance of Abra an application for registration in its
name of said parcels of land under the Land
Registration Act or, in the alternative, under Sec. 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 [1] as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-
in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof
since July 26, 1894.[2]
The requisite publication and posting of notice
having been complied with, the application was set
for hearing. Except for the Director of Lands, nobody
appeared to oppose the application. Hence, the
court issued an order of default against the whole
world except the Director of Lands.
After the applicant had rested its case, the provincial
fiscal, appearing for the Director of Lands, submitted
evidence supporting the opposition filed by the
Solicitor General to the effect that AIC had
no registerable title and that the highly mineralized
parcels of land applied for were within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve which had not yet been
released as alienable and disposable land pursuant
to the Public Land Law.
On July 22, 1966, the lower court[3] favorably acted
on the application and ordered the registration of the
parcels of land under the Land Registration Act. It
ruled that although said land was within the forest
zone, the opposition of the Director of Lands was not
well-taken because the Bureau of Forestry, thru the
District Forester of Abra, "offered no objection to
exclude the same area from the forest reserve." [4] It
found that the parcels of land had been acquired by
purchase and AIC's possession thereof, including that
of its predecessors-in-interest, had been for forty-
nine (49) years.
The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
asserting that except for a 4-hectare area, the land
covered by PSU-217518, 217519 and 217520 fell
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; that
although it had been denuded, it was covered with
massive, corraline, tufaceous limestone estimated to
yield 200,000,000 metric tons about a fifth of which
was suitable for the manufacture of high
grade portland cement type and that the limestone,
being 250 meters thick, could yield 10,000 bags of
cement a day for 1,000 years. [5] He contended that,
while the land could be reclassified as mineral land
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, the
process of exclusion from the CordiIlera Forest
Reserve had not yet been undertaken pursuant to
Sec. 1826 of Republic Act No. 3092 and therefore it
was still part of the forest zone which was inalienable
under the 1935 Constitution.
AIC having filed its opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, the lower court denied it on
September 28, 1967 holding that the grounds raised
therein were relevant and proper only if the Bureau
of Forestry and the Bureau of Mines were parties to
the case. It added that the motion for intervention
filed by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Mines
was improper in land registration cases.[6]
The Director of Lands filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same
was dismissed for having been filed out of
time[7] Hence, on December 22, 1967, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees
Nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for the registration
of the subject parcels of land in the name of AIC.
Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or
on May 22, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, invoking Section 38 of
Act No. 496, filed in the Court of First Instance
of Abra a petition for review of the decrees of
registration and the lower court's decision of July 22,
1966. The Solicitor General alleged that although the
evidence presented by AIC showed that it had
purchased from individual owners only a total area of
24 hectares, the application included 46 hectares of
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and therefore
AIC "employed actual fraud" which misled the court
"to error in finding the applicant to have
a registerable title over the parcels of land subject
of the application."[8]
On November 27, 1969, the lower court [9] denied the
petition on the ground that if, as alleged by the
Solicitor General, then presiding
Judge Macario M. Ofilada was mistaken in
appreciating the evidence presented, judicial error
was "not synonymous with actual fraud."[10]
Without asking for a reconsideration of said order, on
February 25, 1970, the Solicitor General,
representing the Director of Lands, the Director of
Forestry and the Republic of the Philippines, filed the
present petition for review on certiorari under
Republic Act No. 5440.
The petition was forthwith given due course by the
Court[11] but inasmuch as no action was taken on
their prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, the petitioners filed a motion
reiterating said prayer. Finding the motion
meritorious, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the private respondent and its agents
and representatives "from further acts of possession
and disposition to innocent purchasers for value of
the parcels of land involved" in this case. [12]
AIC filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on
the grounds that it raises "unsubstantial" issues and
that it was filed out of time. The motion was denied
by the Court[13] but it bears pointing out
that AIC's second ground for dismissal, which is
premised on its perception that a motion for
reconsideration of the order of November 27, 1969 is
necessary before the filing of the instant petition, is
incorrect.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a
prerequisite to an appeal, petition for review or a
petition for review on certiorari.
[14]
The reglementary period for filing the petition for
review on certiorari in the instant case was thirty (30)
days from notice of the order or judgment subject of
review[15] which period, parenthetically, is now fifteen
(15) days pursuant to Section 39 of the Judiciary Act
of 1980.[16] Petitioners having been granted a total of
sixty (60) days[17] within which to file the petition, the
same was timely filed.
Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred
in granting the application for registration of the
parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they
are within the forest zone. The District Forester's
failure to object to the exclusion of the area sought
to be registered from the forest reserve was not
enough justification for registration because under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power to exclude
an area from the forest zone belongs to the President
of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
not the District Forester or even the Director of
Forestry.
Petitioners also contend that the lower court erred in
denying the petition for review based on actual fraud
because under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a decree of
registration may be reviewed not only by reason of
actual fraud but also for a fatal infirmity of the
decision upon which the decree is based, provided
no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced.
We find the petition to be meritorious. Once again,
we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court
in Director of Forestry vs. Munoz[18] and consistently
adhered to in a long line of cases [19] the more recent
of which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals, [20] that
forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of
private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private
properties. This ruling is premised on
the regalian doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987
Constitution Article XIII of which provides that:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal x x x, forests or timber, x x x and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated."
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land
must first be released from its classification as forest
land and reclassified as agricultural land in
accordance with the certification issued by the
Director of Forestry as provided for by Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code. [21] This is because
the classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not of the courts.[22] Moreover, a
positive act of the government is needed
to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.[23]
Being the interested party, an applicant for
registration of a parcel of land bears the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.[24] In this case, AIC asserts that the land in
dispute is no longer part of the Cordillera Forest
Reserve because the communal forest
in Bucay, Abra which had been established in 1909 by
virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-298,
had been "cancelled and de-established" by Forestry
Administrative Order No. 2-622 dated October 1,
1965 and issued by then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano.
[25]
AIC therefore tries to impress upon the Court the
fact that as there was no longer a forested area, the
same area had become alienable more so because its
actual occupants, who had been devoting it to
agriculture, had relinquished their rights over it in
favor of AIC "to give way for greater economic
benefits for the people in the locality." [26] It
should be emphasized, however, that the
classification of the land as forest land is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
[27]
Hence, the fact that the contested parcels of land
have long been denuded and actually contains rich
limestone deposits does pot in any way affect its
present classification as forest land.
While it is true that under Section 1839 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the Director of
Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head,
may change the location of a communal forest, such
executive action does not amount to a
declassification of a forest reserve into an alienable
or disposable land. Under Commonwealth Act No.
141,[28] it is no less than the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head,
who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.[29] The President shall also declare
from time to time what lands are open to disposition
or concession.[30] AIC therefore, should prove first
of all that the lands it claims for registration are
alienable or disposable lands. As it is, AIC has not
only failed to prove that it has a registerable title but
more importantly, it failed to show that the lands are
no longer a part of the public domain.
The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the
review of the decision ordering the issuance of the
decree of registration in view of its patent
infirmity. The lower court closed its eyes to a basic
doctrine in land registration cases that the
inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain
nullifies the title.[31] Its decision to order the
registration of an inalienable land in favor of AIC
under the misconception that it is imperative for the
Director of Forestry to object to its exclusion from
the forest reserve even in the face of its finding that
indeed a sizable portion of the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve is involved, cannot be allowed to
stay unreversed. It betrays an inherent infirmity
which must be corrected.
WHEREFORE, the order of November 27, 1969
denying the petition for review under Section 38 of
Act No. 496 and the decision of July 22, 1966 insofar
as it orders the registration of land within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve are hereby REVERSE AND
SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
issued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made
permanent. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50340 December 26, 1984
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE F. SALAZAR, JESUS F.
SALAZAR, PEDRO F. SALAZAR and AURORA F.
SALAZAR, respondents.
Zamora, Trinidad, Reverente, Ferrer, Carpio and
Associates for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This is an application for the registration of 291
hectares of land located on both sides of the
Sorsogon-Albay national highway at Barrios Salvacion
and Esperanza, Pilar, Sorsogon.
In its 1977 decision, the Court of Appeals denied the
application. However, in its 1979 resolution, it
reversed itself and granted the application. The
Director of Lands appealed to this Court.
The issue is whether that big tract of land is
registerable under section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
considering that it was declared alienable and
disposable by the Director of Forestry only on April
28, 1961 (Exh. D. and 1-A).
Applicant's evidence shows that on March 13, 1952
Tomas Cevallos, single, a Filipino citizen residing at
Barrio Salvacion, Pilar, Sorsogon and his sister,
Alberta Cevallos Vda. de Vasquez, a Spanish
citizen residing at Esguerra 18 Valladolid, Spain sold
for P50,000 to Soledad Fajardo Vda. de Salazar, a
resident of Legaspi City, five lots with a total area of
291.5 hectares assessed at P40,670 (Exh. M). The
deed of sale does not indicate how the Cevalloses
became the owners of that land. They had no
Spanish title.
Then, more than thirteen years later, or on July 30,
1965, Mrs. Salazar allegedly sold the five lots to her
four children named Jose, Jesus, Pedro and Aurora,
for P20,000 only (Exh. 0). The three Salazar brothers
and their sister secured tax declarations for their
respective lots. Their total assessed value was
P49,880 (Exh. H).
The 1965 tax declarations disclosed that out of the
total area of 291 hectares, only about 96 hectares
were supposed to be planted to coconuts, rice and
abaca and the rest, or 195 hectares were cogon or
uncultivated land(Exh. H-1 to H-5). It is noteworthy
that the 37-hectare Lot 2 allocated to Aurora F.
Salazar (single) had no permanent improvements in
1966. Five hectares of Lot 2 were planted to rice and
the rest of 32 hectares were cogon land (Exh. H-2).
On September 22, 1965, or barely two months after
their purchase of the five lots, the Salazars filed their
application for registration. They alleged that the
291-hectare land was occupied by their overseer,
Nicolas Millevo, a resident of Barrio
Esperanza. Millevo did not testify at the hearing. So,
his alleged possession of the land in behalf of the
Salazar applicants was never proven.
The application was opposed by the Director of
Lands and by twenty-five occupants of the land,
namely: Pedro Adamos, Fidel Ate, Blas Baldano,
Amando Bania, Delfin Bania, Silveriano Bania, Juan
Castuera, Benito Dorado, Felipa Gonzales, Juan
Jacob, Amado Legeño, Calixto Llanera, Felix Llantos,
Vivencia Losigro, Juan Lozada, Primo Maldo (barrio
captain), Higino Mansion, Alberto Marquez, Damian
Marquez, Simeon Militante, Francisco Millanes,
Gaudencio Misolas, Juan Moratillo, Monico Nuelan
and Santiago Obligar.
Land Inspector Baldomero Esperida in his report
dated May 21, 1968 recommended that the
application be opposed (Exh. 1). During his ocular
inspection of the lots, he ascertained the nature of
the improvements thereon and the persons who
effected them. He found that "the improvements
introduced on these five parcels of land were first
made by the ancestors of the present occupants
(meaning the private oppositors), which occupation
have (has) been open, continuous, peaceful and
exclusive, and in concept of owner" and that "due
perhaps to sheer ignorance, the present occupants
nor their predecessors-ancestors has (have) never
filed any public land applications for the respective
parcels that they have been occupying" (Exh. 1).
As indicated in Esperida's findings, quoted below, the
occupants refused to acknowledge the alleged
ownership of the applicants (p. 2, Exh. 1):
In the year 1966 one Aurora Salazar came to the
premises and informed the occupant-farmers that
the lands (that) they were cultivating for a long time
are the properties of the Salazar family.
The occupant-farmers were likewise informed that
from then on they must give 20% share of the
harvest of whatever crops that they may produce on
the land. They were also requested to sign contract
papers regarding their cultivation and stay on the
respective parcels.
These occupant-farmers refused to sign these
contract papers presented to them, on the belief that
they have a better right to the land against any other
persons due to the length of time that they have
occupied the land.
Almost all of these occupant-farmers were born on
the very parcels that they are presently cultivating.
(p. 2, Exh. 1).
Esperida found that Lot 1, with an area of 75.99
hectares, was fully cultivated by eleven occupant-
farmers, namely: (1) Fidel Ate, (2) Amando Baniya (3)
Felipe Bolaños, (4) Benito Burabud, (5) Juan Castuira,
(6) Felix Granadillos, (7) Calixto Llanera, (8) Primo
Maldo, (9) Crispin Maraño, (10) Gaudencio Misolas
and (1 1) Monico Noelan.
Each of them occupies an average of four hectares
planted to upland rice, coconuts, fruit trees and root
crops. They constructed houses near the areas
cultivated by them and the national road.
Ten other farmers have occupied and cultivated an
area of ten hectares and built their respective houses
thereon.
But the northern portion of Lot 1, where there are
300 fruit bearing coconut trees, is in the possession
of Rufino Balayo, Jr., the overseer of the Salazar
family, who has a house in that portion.
Nevertheless, Felix Llantos, who lives on the other
side of the road opposite the coconut trees, claims
that he and his decease father planted those
coconuts and that it was only in 1966 when the
possession thereof was taken from him against his
will (pp. 2-3, Exh. 1).
Land Inspector Esperida found that Lot 2, with an
area of 37.5 hectares planted to coconuts, fruit trees,
upland rice, bananas and root crops, was occupied
by fourteen farmers with houses on the said lot,
namely: (1) Pedro Adamos, (2) Rosario Bazar, (3)
Apolinar Bolaños, (4) Benito Burabud, (5) Felix
Granadillos, (6) Nelson Granadillos, (7) Juan Jacob,
(8) Calixto Llanera, (9) Felix Llantos, (10) Juan Losada,
(11) Leodegario Losigro, (12) Vivencio Losigro, (13)
Segundino Mallorca and (1 4) Ruben Nolong.
Felix Llantos informed Esperida that the Salazars also
deprived him of the possession of more than one
hundred coconut trees (some of which are more
than fifty years old) planted on Lot 2. His house is in
the said lot (p. 3, Exh. 1).
Inspector Esperida found that Lot 3, with an area of
121.3 hectares, planted also to coconuts, fruit trees,
upland rice, bananas and root crops, was occupied
by twenty farmers with portions of around two and a
half hectares each and with houses where their
families resided.
These farmers are (1) Bienvenido Abrera, (2) Rosaleo
L. Añonuevo, (3) Rosaleo M. Añonuevo, (4) Jose
Aringo, (5) Blas Baldano, (6) Juan Gonzales, (7)
Felicisimo Logronio, (8) Higino Mansion, (9) Dionisio
Mañago, (10) Damian Marquez, (11) Modesto Mijola,
(12) Francisco Millanes, (13) Antonio Militante, (14)
Simeon Militante, (15) Crispin Montalban, (16) Juan
Moratillo, (17) Catalino Obligar, (18) Santiago Obligar,
(19) Julian Oca and (20) Gregorio Papa.
According to Esperida, about fifty hectares of Lot 3
were enclosed by the Salazars in 1965 with a barbed
wire fence and used as a ranch for about 80 head of
cattle. The former occupants of that pasture land
planted it to abaca, bananas, upland rice and root
crops. They had to vacate that portion because the
cattle of the Salazars destroyed their plants. The
cattle also destroyed the crops of the farmers
cultivating portions of Lot 3 contiguous to the ranch
(Exh. 1).
The 1965 tax declaration in the name of Jesus F.
Salazar shows that ten hectares of Lot No. 4 were
planted to abaca, eight hectares were planted to
upland rice and thirty-eight hectares were
uncultivated or cogon land (Exh. H-4). Lot No. 5 with
an area of 4,592 square meters is devoted to upland
rice (Exh. H-5).
As already stated, the crucial legal issue raised by the
Director of Lands is that the Appellate Court erred in
holding that the courts may classify lands into
agricultural or forestal and in disregarding the
certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in
question became alienable or disposable only on
April 28,1961. That contention is meritorious.
The classification, delimitation and survey of lands of
the public domain are vested by sections 6, 7 and 8
of the Public Land Law in the President of the
Philippines upon the recommendation of the
Minister of Natural Resources. The assignment of
forest land for agricultural purposes is vested in the
Minister, formerly Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (Sec. 1827, Revised Administrative
Code. See Justice Esguerra's opinion in Gaspar
Vicente vs. Director of Forestry, CA-G.R. No. 26677-R,
July 30,1966).
Oppositors Felix Granadillos (whose father tilled the
land even during the Spanish regime), Apolinar
Bolaños, Santiago Obligar, Benito Burabud, Juan
Castuira, Julian Oca and Higino Mansion all testified
that they wanted to file homestead applications for
the portions occupied by them but the officials of the
Bureau of Lands apprised them that the land was
within the forest zone and, therefore, not disposable
(24- 25 tsn May 30, 1969; 15, 18, 27 and 36 tsn July
30, 1969; 22 and 33 tsn October 28, 1969 and 5 tsn
December 12, 1969). This point was omitted by the
trial court in its truncated summary of the evidence.
The Appellate Court held correctly through Justice
Mariano Serrano in its decision that whatever
possession of the land the Salazars and their
predecessors might have had prior to April 28,
1961 cannot be credited to the thirty-year
requirement under section 48)b).
Thus, forestal land, which was released for
agricultural purposes by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources in 1961, could not be
registered immediately thereafter (Santiago vs. De
los Santos, L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA
146).
Land that was a part of the forest zone was not
susceptible if of private ownership until November
28, 1923 when it was reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry
(Director of Lands vs. Heirs of T. Villongco, CA-G.R.
No. 31243-R, July 29, 1966. See Montoya vs. Ansojas,
CA-G.R. No. 35113-R, May 31, 1966).
Forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a
title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish
regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the
title. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594 and
Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November
28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Li Seng Giap vs.
Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Director of Forestry
vs. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183;
Dizon vs. Rodriguez, and Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 121 Phil. 681; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401).
Section 48(b) cannot apply to forestal land before it
is declassified to form part of disposable public
agricultural land (Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, L-27873, November 29, 1983,
126 SCRA 69, 75). A patent issued for forestal land is
void. The State may sue for its reversion to the public
domain (Republic vs. Animas, L-37682, March
29,1974, 56 SCRA 499). Possession of forestal lands
cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of
Forestry vs. Muñoz, supra).
The other contention of the Director of Lands is that
no competent evidence was offered by the Salazars
that they and their predecessors have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, exclusive and
notorious possession in the concept of owner of the
land for more than thirty years prior to 1965 when
they filed their application.
Tomas Cevallos originally claimed possession of 231
hectares located in Barrio Esperanza. When he
caused it to be surveyed in 1949, the area of the land
had been increased to 291 hectares or an increase of
60 hectares. The land extended to Barrio Salvacion, a
place not mentioned in his tax declarations. How he
came to have possessory right over 291 hectares is
not established in the record. His relationship to
Policarpia Cevallos who was mentioned in the early
tax declaration (Exh. H-10), was not shown.
It is noteworthy that while the two parcels with a
total area of 231 hectares have as natural boundaries
the Cagbacong River and a brook, on the other hand,
the five lots have as natural boundaries not only the
Cagbacong River but also the Kawilan Creek, Lonoy
Creek and a dried up creek (Exh. M). It was simply an
unwarranted appropriation of the public domain, a
notorious practice in land registration cases.
It is not clear whether the declarations and tax
receipts (Exh. H to H-20 and Exh. N to N-53) refer to
the land acquired by the Salazars. For example,
Exhibit N-8 was presented as receipt for payment of
the realty taxes for the period from April 12, 1950 to
April 12, 1951. Actually, it is a receipt for P 25 issued
by the municipal treasurer of Pilar "for annual
firearm fee" for the.45 caliber pistol of Cevallos.
Applicant's Exhibit N may also be cited. This is a
receipt dated May 21, 1946 issued by the municipal
treasurer of Pilar showing that Cevallos paid P29.58
as full payment of the 1946 realty tax of land located
at Barrio Cagbacong,covered by Tax Declaration No.
11833 with an assessed value of P3,380.
It is true that there is a tax declaration No. 11833 in
the name of Cevallos, Identified as Exhibit H-12. It is
dated September 12, 1928 but it refers to a parcel of
land with an area of 175.6 hectares located at Barrio
Esperanza (not Cagbacong) and with a total assessed
value of P26,900 (not merely P 3,380) consisting of
P12,340 for the land and P14,560 for the
improvements or plantings thereon. Exhibit N is
manifestly irrelevant to this case.
Exhibit N-2, a tax receipt dated May 30, 1946 issued
to Cevallos, is also irrelevant to this case because it
refers to his two parcels of land located in Barrio
Esperanza covered by Tax Declarations No. 13967
and 11832 which do not cover the land involved in
this case. The tax receipts Identified as Exhibits N-3,
N-4, N-5 and N-6 likewise do not refer to the land
sought to be registered.
Anyway, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by other evidence
(Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs.
Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562; Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring,
12 Phil.. 384; Province of Camarines Sur vs. Director
of Lands, 64 Phil.. 600; Bañez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
3035 1, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 30).
Such proofs are lacking in this case. The evidence
shows that numerous persons are in possession of
portions of the disputed land. It results that the
Salazars failed to prove that they are entitled to
register the 291-hectare land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Appellate Court's resolution dated
March 23, 1979 is reversed and set aside. Its decision
of August 31, 1977 is affirmed. The application for
registration is dismissed. Costs against respondents
Salazar.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos,
Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO
and TARCIANA MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES,
ROGELIO AQUINO, Minor represented by his father,
Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO,
MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all
surnamed CONSOLACION, respondents.
Silvestre Loreria, Jr. for respondent spouses
Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the validity of the registration of
885 hectares of public forestal land located in
Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of
First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon, Judge Vicente del
Rosario on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision,
ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly
located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in
the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and
Tarciana Morales, less 200 hectares which should be
registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo
Consolacion (72, Record on Appeal). The decision
became final and executory. A decree and an original
certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the
Republic of the Philippines filed with the Gumaca
court an amended petition to annul the decision,
decree and title on the ground that they are void
because the land in question was still a part of
the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the
possessory information title relied upon by the
Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land
and not 885 hectares. The petition was verified by
the Acting Director of Forestry.
The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing
on the merits, Judge Agana denied the petition in his
order of September 8, 1970. That order was served
upon the assistant provincial fiscal on September 16,
1970 and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the
Bureau of Forestry, on November 26, 1970.
A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to
the Solicitor General's Office only on September 2,
1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the
order. Twenty-two days thereafter or on September
24 the Solicitor General appealed from that order
and filed a motion for extension of time within which
to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was given
due course.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate
Court through Justices Asuncion, Porfirio V. Sison and
Sundiam dismissed the petition because the 1970
order had allegedly long become final and
unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this
Court.
That is the issue to be resolved first: whether the
appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970 order
of denial was seasonably made. The Appellate Court
held that the service of the order on Dispo, as special
attorney, was binding on the Solicitor General's
Office. Consequently, the record on appeal, which
was filed after thirty days from the service of the
order upon Dispo, was filed out of time.
We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for
appeal should be reckoned from the time the
Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970
order of denial and not from the time the special
counsel or the fiscal was served with that order.
These representatives of the Solicitor General had no
power to decide whether an appeal should be made.
They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor
General.
In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by
Solicitor General Barredo, approved by Secretary of
Justice Teehankee, it was specified that he should
consult the Solicitor General on all questions, legal
and factual, regarding the case. The question of
whether an appeal should be made could only be
decided by the Solicitor General's Office.
The 1969 petition to annul the decision, decree and
titles was filed by Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar,
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Alicia Sempio-Diy. Consequently, the
Solicitor General's Office should be served with the
final order disposing of the petition and should not
be bound by the service on his surrogates, the
special counsel and the fiscal (Republic vs. Polo, L-
49247, March 13, 1979, 89 SCRA 33; Republic vs.
Mendoza, L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539).
The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on
time, the Solicitor General's Office was late in filing
the amendments to it is of no moment. In
exceptional cases, like the instant case, the interest
of justice may warrant waiver of the rules (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83
SCRA 453).
In this case, where it is contended that the
registration is void allegedly because public forestal
land was registered and the State sought to declare
the decision void, the Government should not be
estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents
(Gov't. of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga,
50 Phil. 975, 980; Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Unson, 50
Phil. 981, 990; Go Tian An vs. Republic, 124 Phil. 472,
475; Republic vs. Aquino, L-33983, January 27, 1983,
120 SCRA 186, 191-192).
Now, as to the merits of the case. It is incontestable
that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the
Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable
and disposable nor susceptible of private
appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was
certified by Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis on
July 6, 1940, as per Land Classification Map No. 1386,
Tayabas Project No. 16-E of Mulanay, Exhibit C-
Annulment, and as shown in the report and
testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warden
(Exh. B-Annulment; 7, 10-15 tsn March 5, 1970). Tria
recommended that the title of the Maxino spouses
be annulled (Exh. B-Annulment).
The certification was reiterated by the Director of
Forestry on May 20, 1948 as per Land Classification
Map No. 1516, No. 16-E of Mulanay, Quezon, Exhibit
1-A-Director of Forestry, and as shown in paragraph 6
of the report of Forester Emerson B. Abraham who
recommended that the opposition to the registration
entered by the Director be sustained (Exh. 1-Director
of Forestry; Exh. Q, Report of Land Investigator
Serapion Bauzon).
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish
title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous composition title or
adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio
Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December
26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de
animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and
Campalacio Creeks. *
There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy
between the area of 29 hectares and the actual area
of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959
(Exh. D). We have no hesitation in saying that the
composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The
trial court grievously erred in applying to this case
the rule that the area comprised in the boundaries
should prevail over that stated in the moniments of
title.
Tria averred in his report and testimony that the
Yamay and Campalacio Creeks mentioned in the
composition title really refer to the Banguian and
Mamba creeks. This would mean that the actual area
claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares, not 970
(Exh. B-Annulment; 27-30 tsn March 5, 1970).
That would also explain why in the document, Exhibit
H, presented by the Maxinos, mention is made of
"paligawang 'Manba' ".
The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition
title is evident from the sale executed by the heirs of
Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-
Maxino (Exh. F).
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by
his two children Maria and Lucila. On September 24,
1935 the two heirs, without executing an
extrajudicial settlement of Prudencio's estate and
adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves,
executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of
Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. F), the wife of
applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son
and the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona.
That curious document is not a sale at all. It is
a "quit-claim". It is stated therein that in
consideration of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases
and forever quitclaim unto the said Vendee" the 29-
hectare land described in the composition title (Exh.
F).
As an indication that the Tesalona "vendors" were
not certain that their title was good, it was stipulated
as an "express condition" that the said vendors had
no obligation of warranty for "the premises hereby
sold by them, the Vendee hereby expressly releasing
the Vendor(s) from all duty of defending the Vendee
against all persons now claiming, or who may
hereafter claim, to have a better right and
title thereto, and assuming all the risk of eviction by
superior title" (Exh. F).
It was further stipulated "that in the event that any
third person shall succeed in establishing right or title
to said premises or to any portion thereof superior to
that of the grantor and in lawfully dispossessing the
Vendee therefrom the Vendee shall not be entitled
to reimbursement from the Vendor of the sum of
TWO HUNDRED PESOS which constitutes the
consideration for these presents, or of any part
thereof, or to damages" (Exh. F).
The Maxinos contend that
Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title
(as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title)
should prevail in determining the Identity of the
disputed land. This assertion is untenable in the light
of the notorious discrepancy between the area of 29
hectares stated in the title and the 970 hectares now
claimed as the real area (885 hectares for Lot 1 and
84 hectares for Lot 2 which is not involved in this
case).
The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his
gratuitous adjustment title granted him possessory
rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares
but not ownership over 970 hectares of grazing
land. As to the requirements for an adjustment
proceeding under the Royal Decree of December 26,
1884, where the area in hectares, not the
boundaries, is important, see Ventura, Land
Registration and Mortgages, pp. 1719.
The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the
title justified the considerable increase in area. They
have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a
valid title for 970 hectares. The boundaries and areas
stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that
a different land was covered thereby. The title states
that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio
Yamay. In his tax declarations it is stated that the
land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now Anonang.
His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land whose
boundaries are not the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks but it was bounded by the Yamay Creek and
the lands of Maximo Tesalona, Emiterio Tesalona and
Felix Aguilles, with an area of 120 hectares (Exh. I).
On the other hand, his 1919 and 1921 tax
declarations are for land with the same boundaries
but with an area of 36 hectares only (Exh. I-2 and I-
3).
The 1948, 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the
boundaries Campalacio and Yamay Creeks but the
area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only, a far cry
from the 970 hectares as surveyed (Exh. I-4, I-5 and I-
6).
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not
registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title
be issued during the Spanish regime or under the
Torrens system, nullifies the title (Director of Lands
vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Director of
Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177,
194-5; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, G. R. No. 50340,
December 26, 1984).
Possession of public forestal lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
1183, 1199; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, supra).
The oral evidence does not bolster the case at all for
the applicants. Applicant Prudencio Maxino testified
that the lot he was seeking to register has an area of
more than seventy hectares (8 tsn Jan. 11, 1961). He
purchased the lot from his aunt and mother, as
shown in the deed of September 24, 1935, Exhibit F
(9).
He testified that the Mamba Creek is also known as
Yamay Creek (13). The land was grazing or pasture
land (15). Thirty-one squatters occupied the land (5
tsn March 6, 1961). He did not know that the land
had an area of 29 hectares in 1935 when he bought it
(6). He came to know the area of the land when it
was surveyed. He was not present when it was
surveyed (6).
Another witness, Fortunato Nañadiego, 76, testified
that the land was possessed during the Spanish
regime by his stepfather, Pedro Tesalona, the owner,
not Prudencio Tesalona, the holder of the adjustment
title (11).
Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p. 1198). The instant case
bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez
vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an
adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void
because it was fraudulent and it covered public
forestal land not subject to registration. As to void
composition or patent issued in 1898, see Testagorda
vs. Commanding General, 6 Phil. 573.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential
Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Agana, the decision
of the Appellate Court and the decision of Judge Del
Rosario dated March 21, 1961 are reversed and set
aside. The application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-
175880 is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ.,
concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and
PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO
GALLO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which
seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the
respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming
the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court
of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case
No. N-506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled
"Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry,
Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries
Commission, oppositors. " The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of
Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the bigger portion of Lot
No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A
together with the improvements thereon in the
name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age, widower,
Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street,
Iloilo City, Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are
subject to the road right-of-way of 15 meters wide
which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal
Montpiller provincial Road and Buenavista-Daraga
provincial Road they being properties of the Province
of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said
province. The oppositions of the Director of Lands,
Director of Forestry and the Philippine Fisheries
Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of
2.6864 hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is
found inside Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit is hereby
declared public land. After the decision has become
final let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex
"A." p. 25, Rollo)
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside
respondent court's resolution dated December 14,
1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal
is —
Whether or not the classification of lands of the
public domain by the Executive Branch of the
Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can
be changed or varied by the court depending upon
the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief for the
Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in
Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu-150727,
containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares
were the subject of an application for registration by
Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she
herself occupied said parcels of land having bought
them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma.
Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in
turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The
Director of Lands opposed said application on the
ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the
lands applied for, which could be registered under
the Torrens systems, and that they have never been
in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of
the application. The Director of Forestry on the other
hand anchored his opposition principally on the
ground that certain specific portions of the lands
subject matter of the application, with an area of
approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove
swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C.
Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista,
Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having
purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes
Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in
place of the latter, attaching to his motion an
Amended Application for Registration of Title
substantially reproducing the allegations in the
application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine
Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30, 1965
to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of
Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land
sought to be registered, supervision and control of
said portion having been transferred from the
Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision
ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of
land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after
excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is
the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and
subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of
15 meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following
errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND WHICH
CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND AND
LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE
UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN PEACEFUL,
OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND
ADVERSE TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF
OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied
a motion for reconsideration of the same hence the
present petition with two (2) assigned errors,
basically the same issues raised with the respondent
court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND
IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS
EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
(NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE
SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE LAND IS PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS
NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE REMOTE
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN
QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20,
Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration
under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares are
coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain. These are more
particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and
"B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest,
consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as
parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-
A," is now the center of controversy of the present
appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court
completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the
controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C.
Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista,
Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18,
1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect
that the area in question is needed for forest
purposes. Respondent court in affirming the decision
of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the
controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are
mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block
"B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered
part of the public forest not susceptible of private
ownership since petitioners failed to submit
convincing proof that these lands are more valuable
for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the
presumption is that these are agricultural lands.
Respondent court based its conclusion upon the
premise that whether or not a controverted parcel of
land is forest land, is a question of fact which should
be settled by competent proofs, and if such a
question be an issue in a land registration
proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of
Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs
that the land in dispute is not more valuable for
agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position
of respondent that respondent court did "not
hesitate to apply this presumption with full force
particularly where, as in the case at bar, the lands
applied for have been possessed and cultivated by
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a
long number of years without the government taking
any positive step to dislodge the occupants from
their holdings which have passed from one to
another by inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief
for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our
impression that private respondents claim the rule of
prescription against the government.
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold
water. Admittedly the controversial area is within a
timberland block as classification of the municipality
and certified to by the Director of Forestry on
February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest
purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land
and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to
submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in
dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for
forest purposes, as there was no question of whether
the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that
said forest land had been declared and certified as
such by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on
February 18, 1956, several years before the original
applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes
Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49
Phil. 49, cited by private respondents themselves in
their brief, We held —
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), it is again held,
that whether a particular parcel of land is more
valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural
purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be
established during the trial of the case. Whether the
particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a
question to be settled in each particular case unless
the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of
private interest, set aside said land for forestry or
mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis)
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56
SCRA 499, 503 that-
... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not
alienable or disposable under either the Constitution
of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction
and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all
public forests and forest reservations and over the
granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816
of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in
question is a forest or timber land is clearly
established by the certification made by the Bureau
of Forest Development that it is within the portion of
the area which was reverted to the category of forest
land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is
now a prerogative of the Executive Department of
the government and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it
is not the court which determines the classification
of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or mineral but the Executive Branch of the
Government, through the Office of the President.
Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion
for the respondent court to ignore the
uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is
within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by
the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for
forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to
have obtained their title by prescription inasmuch as
the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of
the public domain which cannot be acquired by
prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is
a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one
is hereby rendered, declaring that:
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch
plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of 11.1863 hectares of
coconut land and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain are hereby ordered
registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno
Gallo and/or his successors-in-interest as provided
for by the Public Land Law; and
2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the
same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of 19.4080 hectares,
are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the
Republic of the Philippines and are therefore
inalienable.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
NOT ACQUIRED. — This Court ruled in the leading
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184)
DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF that possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents. the ground that the ares covered by the patent and
title was not disposable public land, it being a part of
the forest zone and any patent and title to said area
is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive
SYLLABUS act of Government is needed to declassify land which
is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND;
CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS
STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN
ON THE APPLICANT. — In confirmation of imperfect
AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS,
title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO
proving that he meets the requirements of Section
NOT APPLY. — A forested area classified as forest
48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
land of the public domain does not lose such
Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
classification simply because loggers or settlers may
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
the public domain but that he has an interest therein
classified as forest land may actually be covered with
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open,
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
and notorious possession and occupation of
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
classified as forest land. The classification is
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
application.
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation DECISION
of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us
question the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not
subject to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an
application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of
Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is
known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar,
Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and
Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and
Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed
that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar
Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs
of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal
of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application
for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest
land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his
opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885
containing 117,956 square meters was concerned
and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed
and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner
Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he
may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter
also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled
to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz
adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio
Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of
5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director
of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the
Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to
the private litigants that have been shown to have a
better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern
portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it
was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747
square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui;
but the last question that must have to be
considered is whether after all, the title that these
two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount
to a registerable one in view of the opposition and
evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from
1955 when the application was filed which would
place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted
that during that period, the land was a classified
forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that;
that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area; and
this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had
stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest
land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when
the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before
the filing of the application; but only after there had
been a previous warning by the District Forester that
that could not be done because it was classified as a
public forest; so that having these in mind and
remembering that even under Republic Act 1942
which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after
this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in
order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a
registerable title he must have shown.
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years,
preceding the filing of the application;’
the foregoing details cannot but justify the
conclusion that not one of the applicants or
oppositors had shown that during the required
period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act
1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable
title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before
filing of the application, he had been in
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain’,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted
on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30)
years and even before and applicants and their
predecessors had made implicit recognition of that;
the result must be to deny all these applications; this
Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the
conflicting positions of the private litigants among
themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a
better right to possess because this Court foresees
that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme
Court and it is always better that the findings be as
complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to
pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as
it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the
oppositions with the exception of that of the Director
of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed;
no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw
virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the
Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the
disputed lot had been in the possession of private
persons for over thirty years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person
in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition
for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the
deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by
them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The
complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of
Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the
public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon
the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot
when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a
part of the public domain classified as forest
land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition
depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is
public forest land, not capable of registration in the
names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No.
885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp."
Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is
included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no
big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the land
in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885,
even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had
been in actual possession of private persons for
many years, and therefore, said land was already
"private land" better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under
forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of
Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56
SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground
that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest
zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab
initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly
well-grounded in the instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of
the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No.
885 does not divest such land of its being classified
as forest land, much less as land of the public
domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the
land must have been a virgin forest as stated by
Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and
that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The
opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees
and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It
was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same
could not be done because it was classified as "public
forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he
has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title
such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that
he has had continuous, open, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based
merely on the presumptions implicit in
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The
records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be
classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890,
all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would
be any land that should have been in the possession SO ORDERED.
of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests
since time immemorial, for such possession would Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.
justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
private property even before the Spanish
Republic of the Philippines
conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
SUPREME COURT
Manila
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho
case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot THIRD DIVISION
No. 885 had always been public land classified as
forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we
G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER
". . . The possession of public land however long the COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
period thereof may have extended, never confers vs.
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
of limitations with regard to public land does not CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.
operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.
claim of ownership for the required number of years
to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of
Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw
library DAVIDE, JR., J.:
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed From an adverse decision of the then Court of First
property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a
classified as public forest land. There is no need for special civil action for declaratory relief with
us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled
Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose
lawlibrary Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and
favor of petitioner and against the respondents:
G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not
empower the University of the Philippines, in lieu of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by
the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in
said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges
prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code
therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971,
the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on
28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to
this Court as the "entire case hinges on the
interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990
as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed
by the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner
Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June
1966.2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that
respondent University of the Philippines (hereafter
referred to as UP) does not have the right to
supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of
timber and other forest products, to scale, measure
and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest
charges, reforestation fees and royalties from
petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden
upon the latter in that portion of its concession,
covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1
February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by
Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be
enjoined from committing the acts complained of
and prays that respondents be required to pay
petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and
costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and
pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August
1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13
September 1987,3 wherein they interpose the
affirmative defenses of, among others, improper
venue and that the petition states no cause of action;
they further set up a counterclaim for the payment
of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest
products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP
under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with
surcharges and interests as provided in the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case
for Judgment,5 which reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by
the undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the
following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT
SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without
prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either
party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the
manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood
and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25
years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect
and remove timber from that portion of timber land
located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the
Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and
Calauan, Province of Laguna under License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and
promulgated by the Government through the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
January 11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A
(Amendment) is a renewal of the Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the
Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to
February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the
present, has been in peaceful possession of said
timber concession and had been felling cutting and
removing timber therefrom pursuant to the
aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement
executed by the Government on June 4,1953
(License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11,
1960, has constructed roads and other
improvements and installations of the
aforementioned area subject to the grant and
purchased equipment in implementation of the
conditions contained in the aforementioned License
Agreement and has in connection therewith spent
more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the
effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of
the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No.
791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND
TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS
COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND
PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE
OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to
the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia,
President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw
from sale or settlement and reserve for the College
of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as
experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research
and production studies of this College, a certain
parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly in
the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of
Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants,
Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to the condition
that the disposition of timber and other forest
products found therein shall be subject to the
forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is
more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines
to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of
September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of
the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the
effectivity of the aforementioned License Agreement
No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act
No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines and approved by the President of the
Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central
experiment station for the use of the University of
the Philippines in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public
domain consisting of three thousand hectares, more
or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province
of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are
stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961,
is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to
the University of the Philippines, subject to any
existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the
central experiment station shall be exempt from
taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts
or income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3990, and prior to the institution of the
present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as
well as in writing to plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by
plaintiff under the License Agreement 27-A
(Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be
paid to the University of the Philippines, instead of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by
plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central
Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No.
3990 be performed by personnel of the University of
the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of
the defendants was fully discussed in the letter dated
April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the
President of the University of the Philippines, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in
paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to allow
entry to personnel of the University of the
Philippines to the Central Experiment Station area
assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the
felling cutting and removal of timber therein and
scaling any such timber cut and felled prior to
removal
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in
Relation to the implemetation of Republic Act No.
3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the
letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a
parcel of forest land approximately 3,500 hectares in
area was ceded in full ownership by the government
to the University of the Philippines. This area is
known as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is
presently issued in the name of the University of the
Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to
the University of the Philippines gives the university
full rights of dominion and ownership, subject to the
existing concession of International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms
of this law all forest charges due from the
concessionaire should now be paid to the University
of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land
grant to the University is to enable us to generate
income out of the land grant and establish a research
and experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and
Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure
your approval of the following matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District
Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present
should be remitted in favor of the University of the
Philippines pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood
shall hereafter be paid to the University of the
Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall private woodlands are not subject to forest charges,
receive all forest charges and royalties due from any but they must be invoiced when removed to another
logging concession at the land grant. municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete
May we request that proper instructions be issued by Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full
the district Forester of Laguna about this matter. private ownership and as the grant is manifestly to
Thank you. be considered registered, no forest charges are
Very truly yours, actually due and payable on the timber cut and
removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly
Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR. to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
Business Executive agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P.
are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant
contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code
Business Executive dated February 8, 1966, the
but as part of the royalties payable by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the
concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber
following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
resources of the land grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
March 11, 1966
1. The University may directly collect the supposed
forest charges payable by concessionaires of the land
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines grant.
Diliman, Quezon City
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Veneer Company of the Philippines may be
Business Executive refunded provided that a formal claim for the refund
thereof is made within two years from the date of
Gentlemen: payment. The proper claimant shall be International
Hardwood and not the University.
This has reference to your letter dated February 8,
1966 stating as follows: Very truly yours,
xxx xxx xxx (Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as
follows: 13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive
sent the letter quoted below to the District Forester
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as
of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:
amplified by Section 15(a) of Revenue Regulations
No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest April 18, 1966
products, cut, gathered and removed from registered
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue concerning the right of the
University of the Philippines to collect forest charges
from the existing logging concessionaire at the
Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This
tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares
was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in
June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the
Philippines requested that its authority over said
land be recognized and that the existing
concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest
charges directly to the University instead of to the
national government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the official
ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the
following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now
directly collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the
existing logging concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the
Bureau of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966
shall be refunded to the University of the Philippines.
In this manner, INTERWOOD is requested to file a
claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid
by it to be remitted to the University of the
Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, it is understood that forest charges
on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled
by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall
now be paid directly to the University of the
Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the
Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of
Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant
Business Executive dated April 18, 1966 was duly
endorsed by the District Forester of the province of
Laguna to the Director of Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant
Director of Forestry addressed to plaintiff the letter
dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office
to comment on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C.
Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated
that the University of the Philippines is claiming the
right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside
the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete,
Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges;
and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by
law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting,
removal and disposition of the timber from said area,
and the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs
and the collection of the corresponding forest
charges and other fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments
against the claim of the University of the Philippines
to have acquired the above rights. We believe that
the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of
number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment)
to utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding
and should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis
of this acknowledgment that we sent your client our
letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to
comment on the application of the State University
for a Special Timber License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in
paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau of Forestry
issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June
30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd
paragraph of your letter dated April 26, 1966,
designated as above, as to whether or not you shall
turn over the scaling work for logs cut from the area
of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of
the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of
the University of the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the Paete Land Grant, which embraces
the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer
Company of the Philippines, is considered a
registered private woodland of the University of the
Philippines and therefore no forest charges are
actually due and payable on the timber cut and
removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling
of said Commissioner that the forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under
any licensing agreement entered or to be entered
into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the
charged contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by
the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber
resources of the land grant, you may turn over the
scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such
licensing agreements entered or to be entered into
by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products
from the neighboring public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case, and whatever
additional evidence may be presented by the parties,
the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and
pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the
following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case
was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable
under its timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof', to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University
of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable
Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the
University of the Philippines, whether or not the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging,
telling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act
No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial
court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor
of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is
quoted at the beginning of this decision. In deciding
the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on
the petitioner has no legal basis. In the first place,
the cession in full ownership of the tract of land
referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to
any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of
the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber
concession over the tract of land was existing and
would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the
University of the Philippines will acquire full
ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after February 1, 1985.
The cession of the property to the University of the
Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land,
subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the
usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the
donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the
property donated. In the second place, the
respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the
provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National
Internal Revenue Code regarding the measuring of
timber cut from the forest and the collection of the
prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In
their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch the
scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in
order to include therein such amendment of the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and
Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to
convince the Court, not only because of the first
reason above stated, but also because it clearly
appears that such amendment is not intended in
Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even
a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general
amendatory provision at the end. In the third place,
under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the
Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded
to it for purposes other than those therein expressly
provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the
Philippines in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the
expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the
University of the Philippines cannot even legally
renew it or grant timber concession over the whole
tract of land or over portions thereof to other private
individuals and exercise the functions of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling
and measuring the timber cut within the area and
collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by
the National Internal Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court
erred:
I
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF
ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT
SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990
DOES NOT EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO
SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE
PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED
TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING
FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the
Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move
and pray that the trial court render
judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on
the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case
was filed, should pay forest charges due and payable
under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University
of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable
Court that said forest charges are to be paid to the
University of the Philippines, whether or not the
University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging,
felling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act
No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an
action for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the
appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs.
Caparas, et al.6 that declaratory relief cannot be
joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all
legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its
failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the
complaint and the answer), which is authorized by
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence.— When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to so amend does not affect the result of the
trial by these issues. ...
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the
issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be
ape for judicial determination.7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an
actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
exists between the parties, all of whom are sui
juris and before the court, and that the declaration
sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt
becomes a justiciable controversy when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually
contested.8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert
that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the
Philippines may effect collection of forest charges
through the University of the Philippines because the
License Agreement does not expressly provide that
the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific
contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency
in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic
may effect such collection through another agency.
(b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of
land in question, the UP acquired full control and
benefit of the timber and other resources within the
area. Timber areas within the ceded property but
outside the concession of petitioner can be fully
exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas
within the ceded property but covered by the
concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until
the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny it such
charges would render its "full ownership" empty and
futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income
derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section
3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central
experiment station shall be exempt from taxation,
local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of
the University of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied
for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty
bound to operate and maintain a central experiment
station; since this law does not provide for
appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly the
legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the
earnings or income from the area, which can only
come from the timber and the royalties or charges
payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the
general principle that a grant of authority or
jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in
connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is
exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement
in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No.
3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies
affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific rulings
recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or
charges and to supervise petitioner's logging
operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of
respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not
been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to
collect forest charges or the authority to supervise
the operation by the petitioner of the timber
concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be
construed strictly in favor of the public and most
strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be
included in the grant except that which is granted
expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262
of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to
the measuring of forest products and the collection
of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of
the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee
shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The
supervision and regulation of the use of forest
products and of the cutting and removal of forest
products are vested upon the Bureau of
Forestry.10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even
impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from
the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded
to it forest charges due and payable to the
Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its
provisions relating to charges on forest products or
to supervise the operations of the concessions by the
holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of
the land in question was expressly made "subject to
any concession, if any", and that petitioner's
concession would continue until 1 February 1985;
the UP then would acquire full ownership and
exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after 1 February 1985. The position of
UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land
subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently
incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the
power to interpret the law, which is primarily a
function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a
vested right to operate the timber concession under
the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September
1961, a parcel of land of the public domain described
therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the
very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was
withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved
for the College of Agriculture of the UP as
experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research
and Training Institute and for research and
production studies of said college, subject however
to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the
disposition of timber and other forest products found
thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and
regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by
petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which
establishes a central experiment station for the use
of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved"
area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to
the University of the Philippines subject to any
existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP,
the Republic of the Philippines completely removed
it from the public domain and, more specifically, in
respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public
forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto
and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP;
and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. That the law
intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is
unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full"
to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or
possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any
essential quality.11 The proviso regarding existing
concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner.
All that it means, however, is that the right of
petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected,
impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But,
insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is
concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership.
This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No.
3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines.
Having been effectively segregated and removed
from the public domain or from a public forest and,
in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated.
This is obvious from the fact that the condition in
Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the
disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws
and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990.
The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject
to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by
law.12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the
right to receive from the thing what it produces, and
the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by
its use.13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil
Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the
industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are,
however, exceptions to this rules, as where the
property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the
usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that
exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or
grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the
area ceded and transferred to UP until I February
1985.1âwphi1 However, it has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties,
to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
provided for in the Agreement. The charges should
not be paid anymore to the Republic of the
Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as
aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of
Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and
jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the
subject area and to collect forestry charges and other
fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of
petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP
the authority to collect forest charges and to
supervise the operations of its concession insofar as
the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its
argument that it has acquired vested rights to
operate its concession under the supervision and
control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous.
The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no
means bound under the License to perpetuate the
Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its
contention that legislative grants must be construed
strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is
transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which
leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in
favor of the private party pursuant to the license,
which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession
in favor of the petitioner which should, on the
contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June
1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from and
payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within
the area ceded and transferred to the University of
the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid
to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that
the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the
aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena &
Marcos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal
classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as
they are commonly known. If they are part of our
public forest lands, they are not alienable under the
Constitution. If they are considered public
agricultural lands, they may be acquired under
private ownership. The private respondent's claim to
the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After
trial, the application was approved by the Court of
First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry
then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be
reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the
petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this.
The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps
or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private respondent
insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue
before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go
back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier
American organic acts in the country. By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three grand divisions, to wit,
agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This
classification was maintained in the Constitution of
the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it
was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public
lands to include industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted
the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This
provision has been reproduced, but with substantial
modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was
the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be
5 'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.
alienated. Their disposition was provided for under
C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were
not subject to private ownership unless they were
first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released
for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular
Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove
swamps or manglareswere defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the
tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will
not live except when watered by the sea, extending
their roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute
the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist
naturally, but which are also, to some extent
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible
wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for
the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although
these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the
opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense
in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing
over them are not available for purpose of
navigation, and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory
condition of the law, the custom had grown of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries
which became a common feature of settlement along
the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which
would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural
lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically
declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of
this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of
1917, which became effective on October 1 of that
year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the
purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this
definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the
case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the
Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as
terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be
'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means
land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant
would never be called a tree in English but a bush,
and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic
plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in
a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the
general character of the land from manglare to
timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-
quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural
lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress
of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares
found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot
affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands,
the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then
the rights of appellants are fully established by Act
No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena
Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March
4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity
of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand
declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition
that the land covered by the application there are
mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1,
but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the
Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which
was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed
in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in
litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court
that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove
species grow, where the trees are small and sparse,
fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing
are not of commercial value as lumber do not
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not
forest in character. They do not form part of the
public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court,
citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the
ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are
not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens,
there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary
view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it
held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No.
885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.'
Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is
included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no
big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code
as first, second and third groups are found on the
land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to
land registration proceedings because the property
had been in actual possession of private persons for
many years, and therefore, said land was already
'private land' better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under
forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in
out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing
in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the
Solicitor General's submission that the land in
dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties and so not
registerable. This case was decided only twelve days
after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court
feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement
that should resolve once and for all the question of
whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or
forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function
initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision
classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now
even permitted to provide for more categories of
public lands). The legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may then, in
the discharge of their own role, administer our public
lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in
accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part,
the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid
down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming
they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being
correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the
three departments, coordinating with each other,
pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution
in the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to
the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands,
Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable
or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time make the classifications provided
for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
similar manner, transfer lands from one class to
another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised
Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves-
Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of
the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines
may set apart forest reserves from the public lands
and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries
thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not
be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner
by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of
any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any
such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
forest reserve shall be and become part of the public
lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural
purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest
reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to
be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following
conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public forests of
the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section
1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no
authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to date
and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly, the
said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or
unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must
be respected. We repeat our statement in the
Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no
duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as
pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which
ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such
lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest
lands because this would be violative of a duly
acquired property right protected by the due process
clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in
dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was
much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention
being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of
Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in
fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920
to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could
therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by
the private respondent in support of his application
for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as
forest land and reclassified as agricultural land
pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry
may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of
the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of
Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It
should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting
the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because
it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has
the authority to determine whether forest land is
more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry
uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land
and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition
of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable
neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads,
sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timber land
and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title
in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of
forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it
into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were
agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof
is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness.
The record contains no convincing evidence of the
existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly
obtained by the original transferor of the property,
let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring
title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has been
inscribed or registered in the registry of property and
that the land has been under the actual and adverse
possession of the private respondent for twenty
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage
Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in
this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private
respondent were practically the only basis used by
the appellate court in sustaining his claim of
possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove
possession and much less vest ownership in favor of
the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not
established his right to the registration of the subject
land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be
granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
PARAS, J.:
unamended up to now, mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the to annul and set aside; (a) the decision* of the Court
Constitution and may not be the subject of private
of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP
ownership until and unless they are first released as No. 13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge
forest land and classified as alienable agricultural
Ruben C. Ayson, et al." declaring that both the
land. petitioner and private respondent hold possessory
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is titles to the land in question, and (b) the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration.
SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title
of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against The facts of the case are as follows:
him. This decision is immediately executory.
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares
SO ORDERED. situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located
sometime between December 25, 1930 and
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I.
Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the Act
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the
Fernan, C.J., took no part. Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of
Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral
Republic of the Philippines claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining
SUPREME COURT
Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia
Manila mineral claim, together with other mineral claims,
was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining
SECOND DIVISION
Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991 Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein
petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on November
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY,
2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in
INC., petitioner,
continuous and exclusive ownership and possession
vs.
of said claim up to the present (Rollo, Annex "B", p.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN
21).
CONSI, respondents.
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for
Mario C.V. Jalandoni for petitioner.
the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim
Joy B. Labiaga for private respondent.
together with other mineral claims owned by Atok
has been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535
and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an
application for lease was filed by Atok covering the
Fredia mineral claim (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi
has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at
Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a
house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he
was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a
building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was
constructing a house thereon. It was only in January
1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the
said house that people came to take pictures and
told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private
respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said land
which his father before him had occupied
(Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok
informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok,
that a construction was being undertaken at the area
of the Fredia mineral claim by private respondent
Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to
go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano
Reyes himself and other security guards went to the
place of the construction to verify and then to the
police to report the matter (Rollo, Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible
entry and detainer against Liwan Consi (Rollo, Annex
"C", p. 32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the
Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by
Judge Irving rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby
ordered dismissed. (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet,
Branch VI, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson
(Rollo, Petition, p. 3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon dated January
29, 1987 appealed from is hereby reversed and set
aside and a new one entered in its place ordering the
defendant Liwan Consi and all those claiming under
him to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral
claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, and to
restore possession thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company.
The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to
remove and demolish his house constructed in the
premises of the land of Fredia mineral claim at
Tuding, Benguet, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, Petition, p. 4).
On March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the subject forcible entry action. Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "C" p. 48).
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
The determination of whether the subject lot is
mineral land or agricultural awaits the decision of the
Secretary of Natural Resources in a proceeding called
for that purpose. Thus, there is a chance that the
subject property may be classified as alienable
agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company
may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a
"squatter" he also has possessory rights over the
property. Such rights may mature into ownership on
the basis of long-term possession under the Public
Land Law,
Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are
of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot.
Both hold possessory titles to the land in question —
the petitioner through his long term occupancy of
the same; the respondent mining firm by virtue of its
being the claim locator and applicant for a lease on
the mineral claim within which the subject lot is
found. But it was established that the petitioner has
been in actual and beneficial possession of the
subject lot since before the Second World War in the
concept of owner and in good faith. (Rollo, Annex
"C", pp. 47-48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK
(Rollo, Annex "D", p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an
individual's long term occupation of land of the
public domain vests him with such rights over the
same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that
claim.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had
secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
Corporation case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of
the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured
by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed
that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with
all the requirements of the law regarding the
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. By such
act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of
any further act such as the purchase of the land or
the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the
lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale
executed between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is
not only to segregate the area from the public
domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid
location of mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public and the property of the
locator. When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the right of present and exclusive
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment
of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of
the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
right by virtue of his location made in compliance
with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues. (St. Louis Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 605,
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have
exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue
of their respective mining claims which they validly
acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not
and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and
the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent
contends that his predecessor-in-interest has been in
possession of said lot even before the war and has in
fact cultivated the same.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
288 1988, this Court held:
. . . even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-
interest of the de la Rosas had already been in
possession of the subject property, their possession
was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim
but of the property as agricultural land, which it was
not. The property was mineral land, and they are
claiming it as agricultural land. They were not
disputing the rights of the mining locators nor where
they seeking to oust them as such and to replace
them in the mining of the land. . . .
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private dated March 13, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
respondent's possession of the subject lot no matter and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
how long did not confer upon him possessory rights and Benguet dated June 16, 1989 is REINSTATED.
over the same.
SO ORDERED.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
provides:
Sarmiento, J., took no part
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
Republic of the Philippines
the same time in two different personalities except in
the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise SUPREME COURT
Manila
regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two SECOND DIVISION
possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates
of the possession are the same, the one who G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
determination of its possession or ownership
vs.
through proper proceedings.
MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO ALAGAD,
been in continuous and exclusive possession of CARLOS ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND
the Frediamineral claim while private respondent's EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO
possession started only sometime in 1964 when he ALAGAD, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the
constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil
superior possessory rights than private respondent, Cases Division), respondents.
Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer in
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
possession."
Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it
respondents.
was really petitioner who was in actual physical
possession of the property. Having been deprived of
this possession by the private respondent, petitioner
has every right to sue for ejFectment. SARMIENTO, J.:
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court
further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has of Appeals 1 affirming two orders of the defunct
the exclusive right to the property in question. Court of First Instance of Laguna 2 dismissing its
petition for "annulment of title and reversion. 3 The
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and facts appear in the decision appealed from:
the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an
application for registration of their title over a parcel
of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of
8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971,
which was amended after the land was divided into
two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476
hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares,
reflected in survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-
typed ground that applicants and their predecessors
have not been in possession of the land openly,
continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the public
domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the
application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
4922 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case,
promulgated January 16, 1956, supplemented by
orders issued on March 21, 1956 and August 13,
1956, defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and
the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public
land. Decree No. N-51479 was entered and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated October 18,
1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal
Court of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict
the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On
August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the
eviction case ordering the defendants therein to
return possession of the premises to herein
defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The defendants
therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the
filing of the instant case. On October 6, 1970, as
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff
of Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and the
defendants from selling, mortgaging, disposing or
otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the
area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite
notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada,
Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands, representing
plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971,
the court a quodismissed the complaint. The
Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, was set
for hearing, and finally denied by the court a
quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972.
It appears that the appeal was dismissed by this
Court for failure to show in the record on appeal that
the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the
action of this Court. On November 19, 1982, the
Supreme Court set aside the dismissal resolution of
this Court and ordered Us to reinstate and give due
course to plaintiffs appeal.4
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic
claims that the decree and title [rendered and issued
in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] insofar
as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of
Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab
initio, 5 for the following reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or
end of Lot l, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining
Lot 2 of the same survey plan containing 2.8421
hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore
land reached and covered by the waters of the
Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950,
May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G.
Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30, 1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is
actually now the site of Barrio Aplaya, formerly a
sitio of Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been occupied by
the barrio people since the American occupation of
the country in the early 1900's where they
established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years
since the early 1900's have filled up and elevated the
land to its present condition of being some feet
above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-
116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan
so much so that this barrio site of Aplaya where
there are now sixty-eight (68) houses occupied by
more than one hundred (100) families is no longer
reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de
Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio
people, the land in question would not have been fit
for human habitation, so much so that defendants
and their predecessors-in-interest could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the property which
could be judicially confirmed in a registration case, as
in fact said defendants and their predecessors-in-
interest have never been in actual possession of the
land in question, the actual occupants thereof being
the barrio people of Aplaya; 6
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals
held that under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules
of Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of the
Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that
the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said
LRC No. 189 has long become final, titles to the
properties had been issued (in favor of the private
respondents), and that res judicata, consequently,
was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision
insofar as it sustained the lower court: (1) in
dismissing the petition for failure of the Republic to
appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res
judicata is an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the
Court of Appeals has been guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. It is well-established that the State cannot
be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its official or agents, 7 much more,
non-suited as a result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity,
which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land under the basic doctrine
embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the
present charter. It is charged moreover with the
conservation of such patrimony. There is need
therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private
claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought
to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such
primordial consideration, not the apparent
carelessness, much less the acquiescense of public
officials, is the controlling norm . . . 8
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the
Philippines 9 and Nilo v. Romero, 10 cited by the Court
of Appeals in support of its decision, are not
applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon
finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the
Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the
defendant had been "erroneously' represented in the
complaint by the City Attorney when it should have
been the City Mayor, on a holding that the City
Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended the
City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the
acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and
intentional in character, in which cases, it could not
be said that the Government had been prejudiced by
some negligent act or omission.
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is
an impediment to reversion of property. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 11 this Court stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled
(Republic v Animas, et al., . supra), and the
cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary
action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the
prior judgment of the land registration court, since
the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then
the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a
well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet
vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91
SCRA 113)...12
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the
names of the private respondents were foreshore
land, the land registration court could not have
validly awarded title thereto. It would have been
without the authority to do so. The fact that the
Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the decree
of registration could not have validated the court's
decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of
public dominion or of private
ownership ." 13 Property is of public dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar
character; 14 or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth. 15
All other property of the State, it is provided further,
which is not of the character mentioned in ... article
[4201, is patrimonial property,16 meaning to say,
property 'open to disposition 17 by the Government,
or otherwise, property pertaining to the national
domain, or public lands. 18 Property of the public
dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by
the State by regalian right. They are things res
publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private
appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution,
[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated.' 19
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
brooks running in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public
lands, and their beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds,
which are also of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of
public works, even if constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to a
province, or to a city or municipality from the
moment they leave such lands;
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public
establishments.20
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public
lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public
domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of
private individuals, or the State or provinces, belong
to the respective owners of such lands, and those
situated upon lands of communal use belong to their
respective pueblos.21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition,
that the lands subject of the Republic's reversion
efforts are foreshore in nature, the Republic has
legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that
case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense.22
Of course, whether or not the properties in question
are, indeed, foreshore lands is the core of
controversy. According to the trial court, the
aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, 23 and hence, available disposition and
registration. As we have pointed out, the
Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore
laud, it is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the
parcel foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public
domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake .
24
Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in
depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water
coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is
connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River.
According to the definition just quoted, Laguna de
Bay is a lake. 25
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so
Colegio de San Jose further tells us, "we must resort
to the legal provisions governing the ownership and
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the
parcels of land in question. 26 The recourse to legal
provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the
Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes ...
is the ground covered by their waters when at their
highest ordinary depth. 27 and in which case, it forms
part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's
waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been
defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay
during the dry season, such depth being the regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year . . . 28
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the
extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance,
the portions inundated thereby are not considered
part of the bed or basin of the body of water in
question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore
land but land outside of the public dominion, and
land capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been
defined as follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides... 29
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.30
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite
its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these
principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a
ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of
facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no
evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive
disposition 31 We therefore remand the case to the
court a quo to determine whether or not the
property subject of controversy is foreshore. We,
consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and
the trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, FLORENCIO T.
CASTILLO, SOLEDAD LOTA CASTILLO, CARLOS L.
CASTILLO, NIEVES KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L.
CASTILLO, HIPOLITA DYTIAPCO CASTILLO, AIDA
CASTILLO HERRERA, HERMITO HERRERA, JOSE L.
CASTILLO, LILIA MACEDA CASTILLO, TERESITA L.
CASTILLO, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Castro, Nardo, Quintanilla, Gonzales & Macatangay
Law Office for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April
26, 1984 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court * reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of
the then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
VI, in Civil Case No. 2044.
The antecedental facts of this case, as found by the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied
for the registration of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and
2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, described
in Plan Psu-119166, with a total area of 39,755
square meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951,
the said Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat,
was declared the true and absolute owner of the
land with the improvements thereon, for which
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was, issued to
him by the Register of Deeds at Batangas, Batangas,
on February 7, 1952. By virtue of an instrument
dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665, together
with Lot No. 12374 covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3251-A, were
consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under
Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto Castillo, or on
August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al.,
executed a deed of partition and assumption of
mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a
result of which Original Certificate of Title No. D-665
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer
cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo,
et al., to wit: Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21703
(Lot 4) (and) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21704 to
Florencio Castillo (Lot 5); Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-21708 to Carlos L. Castillo (Lot 7); Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21712 to Mariano L. Castillo
(Lot 6); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21713 to
Jose L. Castillo (Lot 9); Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-21718 to Aida C. Herrera (Lot 2); and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21727 to Teresita L. Castillo
(Lot 8).
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No.
2044 with the lower court for the annulment of the
certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat
Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of
Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands
covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the
State. It was alleged that said lands had always
formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated
by the waters thereof, and being of public ownership,
it could not be the subject of registration as private
property. Appellants herein, defendants below,
alleged in their answer that the Government's action
was already barred by the decision of the registration
court; that the action has prescribed; and that the
government was estopped from questioning the
ownership and possession of appellants.
After trial, the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch VI, presided over by Honorable
Benjamin Relova, in a Decision dated February 6,
1976 (Record on Appeal, pp. 62-69), ruled in favor of
herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The
decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Batangas is
hereby ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto Castillo and the
subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title issued
over the property in the names of the defendants.
Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby
declared public lands belonging to the state. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, in a Decision
promulgated on April 26,1984, reversed and set aside
the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint
(Record, pp. 31-41). Herein petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration (Record, pp. 42-51), but the
same was denied in a Resolution promulgated on
October 12,1984 (Record, p. 52). Hence, the instant
petition.
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not
the decision of the Land Registration Court involving
shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
There is no question that one of the requisites of res
judicata is that the court rendering the final
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that
shores are properties of the public domain intended
for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore,
not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that
portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters
and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in
a certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title upon
the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259
[1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et
al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al.,
13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of
the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166
had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and
inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the
same were not subject to registration, being outside
the commerce of men; and that since the lots in
litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil
Code) the registration court (of 1951) did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private
property, hence, res judicatadoes not apply. (Rollo,
pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and
documentary evidence.
As summarized by the Intermediate Appelate Court
(now Court of Appeals), the testimonies of the
witnesses for the petitioner are as follows:
1. Rosendo Arcenas, a Geodetic Engineer connected
with the Bureau of Lands since 1961, testified to the
effect that Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166, which are the
lots in question, adjoin the cadastral survey of
Tanauan, Batangas (Cad. 168); that the original
boundary of the original cadastral survey was
foreshore land as indicated on the plan; that the
cadastral survey of Tanauan was executed sometime
in 1923; that the first survey executed of the land
after 1923 was the one executed in 1948 under Plan
Psu-119166 that in the relocation survey of the
disputed lots in 1962 under SWO-40601, said lots
were annotated on the plan as claimed by the
Republic of the Philippines in the same manner that
it was so annotated in Plan Psu-119166; thus
showing that the Government was the only claimant
of the land during the survey in 1948; that during the
relocation survey made in 1962, old points cannot be
Identified or located because they were under water
by about forty centimeters; that during the ocular
inspection of the premises on November 23, 1970,
he found that 2 monuments of the lots in question
were washed out by the waters of the Baloyboy
Creek; that he also found duck pens along the lots in
question; that there are houses in the premises as
well as some camotes and bananas; and that he
found also some shells ('suso') along the banks of the
Taal lake (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 13-21; Feb. 16,
1971, pp. 4-36).
2. Braulio Almendral testified to the effect that he is a
resident of Tanauan, Batangas, near the Taal lake;
that like himself there are other occupants of the
land among whom are Atanacio Tironas, Gavino
Mendoza, Juliano Tirones, Agapito Llarena, etc.; that
it was they who filled up the area to make it
habitable; that they filled up the area with shells and
sand; that their occupation is duck raising; and that
the Castillos never stayed in or occupied the
premises (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 32-50).
3. Arsenio Ibay, a Geodetic Engineer connected with
the Bureau of Lands since 1968, also testified to the
effect that in accordance with the cadastral plan of
Tanauan, the only private claim of Sixto Castillo
referred to Lots 1006 to 1008; that the Castillos
never asserted any private claim to the lots in
question during the cadastral survey;' that in the
preparation of plan Psu-119166, Lots 12374 and
12377 were made as reference to conform to
previously approved plans; that lot 12374 is a portion
of cadastral lot 10107, SWO-86738 while Lot 22377 is
a portion of Lot 10108 of the same plan (Tsn, Nov. 25,
1970, pp. 115-137).
4. Jose Isidro, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of
Lands, testified to the effect that pursuant to the
order of the Director of Lands, he, together with
Engineer Rufino Santiago and the barrio captain of
Tanauan, Batangas, conducted an investigation of the
land in question; that he submitted a report of
investigation, dated October 19, 1970 (Exh. H-1); that
portions of the lot in question were covered by
public land applications filed by the occupants
thereof; that Engineer Santiago also submitted a
report (Exh. H-8); that he had notified Dr. Mariano
Castillo before conducting the investigation (Tsn, Nov.
25,1970, pp. 137-162).
5. Rufino Santiago, another Geodetic Engineer
connected with the Bureau of Lands, testified to the
effect that on October 19,1970, he submitted a
report of investigation regarding the land in question;
that he noted on the plan Exhibit H-9 the areas on
which the houses of Severo Alcantara and others
were built; that he found that the land was planted
to coconuts which are about 15 years old; that the
land is likewise improved with rice paddies; that the
occupants thereof are duck raisers; that the area had
been elevated because of the waste matters and
duck feeds that have accumulated on the ground
through the years (Tsn, Nov. 26,1970, pp. 163-196).
6. Pablo Tapia, Barrio Captain of Tanauan, Batangas,
since 1957, testified to the effect that the actual
occupants of Lots I and 2 are Atanacio Tirones,tc.;
that during the war the water line reached up to a
point marked Exhibit A-9 and at present the water
has receded to a point up to Exhibit A-12; that the
reasons why the waters of Taal lake have receded to
the present level is because of the fillings made by
the people living in Lots 1 and 2; that there are
several duck pens all over the place; that the
composition of the soil is a mixture of mud and duck
feeds; that improvements consist of bananas,
bamboos and palay; that the shoreline is not even in
shape because of the Baloyboy Creek; that the
people in the area never came to know about the
registration case in which the lots in question were
registered; that the people living in the area, even
without any government aid, helped one another in
the construction of irrigated rice paddies; that he
helped them file their public land applications for the
portions occupied by them; that the Castillos have
never been in possession of the premises; that the
people depend upon duck raising as their means of
their livelihood; that Lots 1 and 2 were yet inexistent
during the Japanese occupation; and that the people
started improving the area only during liberation and
began to build their houses thereon. (Tsn, Nov.
26,1970, pp. 197-234).
Among the exhibits formally offered by the
Government are: the Original Plan of Tanauan,
Batangas, particularly the Banader Estate, the
Original Plan of PSU-119166, Relocation Verification
Survey Plan, maps, and reports of Geodetic
Engineers, all showing the original shoreline of the
disputed areas and the fact that the properties in
question were under water at the time and are still
under water especially during the rainy season
(Hearing, March 17,1971, TSN, pp. 46-47).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain
that Lots 1 and 2 have always been in the possession
of the Castillo family for more than 76 years and that
their possession was public, peaceful, continuous,
and adverse against the whole world and that said
lots were not titled during the cadastral survey of
Tanauan, because they were still under water as a
result of the eruption of Taal Volcano on May 5, 1911
and that the inundation of the land in question by
the waters of Taal Lake was merely accidental and
does not affect private respondents' ownership and
possession thereof pursuant to Article 778 of the Law
of Waters. They finally insisted that this issue of facts
had been squarely raised at the hearing of the land
registration case and, therefore, res judicata (Record
on Appeal, pp. 63-64). They submitted oral and
documentary evidence in support of their claim.
Also summarized by respondent Appellate Court, the
testimonies of the witnesses of private respondents
are as follows:
1. Silvano Reano, testified to the effect that he was
the overseer of the property of the late Modesto
Castillo located at Banadero,Tanauan, Batangas since
1944 to 1965; that he also knows Lots 1 and 2, the
parcels of land in question, since he was managing
said property; that the occupants of said Lots 1 and 2
were engaged in duck raising; that those occupants
were paying the Castillos certain amount of money
because their animals used to get inside the lots in
question; that he was present during the survey of
the land in 1948; and that aside from the duck pens
which are built in the premises, the land is planted to
rice (Tsn, April 14, 1971, pp. 62-88).
2. Dr. Mariano Castillo, testified to the effect that the
late Modesto Castillo was a government official who
held high positions in the Government; and that
upon his death the land was subdivided among his
legal heirs. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-9).
As above-stated, the trial court decided the case in
favor of the government but the decision was
reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
A careful study of the merits of their varied
contentions readily shows that the evidence for the
government has far outweighed the evidence for the
private respondents. Otherwise stated, it has been
satisfactorily established as found by the trial court,
that the properties in question were the shorelands
of Taal Lake during the cadastral survey of 1923.
Explaining the first survey of 1923, which showed
that Lots 1 and 2 are parts of the Taal Lake, Engineer
Rosendo Arcenas testified as follows:
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
Q Now, you mentioned Engineer that a subject
matter of that plan which appears to be Lots 1 and 2
are adjoining cadastral lots of the Tanauan Cadastre,
now, will you please state to the Court what is the
basis of that statement of yours?
A The basis of that statement is the plan itself,
because there is here an annotation that the
boundary on the northeastern side is Tanauan
Cadastre 168 which indicates that the boundary of
the original cadastral survey of Tanauan Cadastre
way back in the year 1923 adjoins a foreshore land
which is also indicated in this plan as foreshore lands
of Taal lake, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, on this plan Exhibit "A-2", there are two lots
indicated namely, Lots 12374 and 12377, what do
these lots represent?
A This is the cadastral lot executed in favor of a
certain Modesto Castillo that corresponds to Lots
12374 and another Lot 12377, sir.
Q At the time this survey plan Psu-119166 and
marked as Exhibit "A-2" was executed in 1948, were
these lots 1 and 2 already in existence as part of the
cadastral survey?
A No, sir, because there is already a foreshore
boundary.
Q Do I understand from you Mr. Witness at the time
of the survey of this land these two lots form part of
this portion?
A Yes, sir.
Q When again was the cadastral survey of Tanauan,
Batangas, executed if you know?
A In the year 1923, sir. (Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN
pp. 15-17).
Such fact was further verified in the Verification-
Relocation Survey of 1948 by Engineer Arcenas who
conducted said survey himself and reported the
following:
That as per original plan Psu-119166, it appears that
Lot 1 and Lot 2, Psu-119166 surveyed and approved
in the name of Modesto Castillo is a portion of Taal
Lake and as such it appears to be under water during
the survey of cadastral Lot No. 12374 and Lot No.
12377, which was surveyed and approved in the
name of Modesto Castillo under Cad. 168. To support
this theory is the annotation appearing and printed
along lines 2-3-4-5 of Lot 1, Psu-119166 and along
lines 4-5-6 of Lot 2, Psu-119166 which notations
clearly indicates that such boundary of property was
a former shorelines of Taal Lake, in other words, it
was the extent of cultivation being the shorelines
and the rest of the area going to the southwestern
direction are already covered by water level.
Another theory to bolster and support this Idea is the
actual location now in the verification-relocation
survey of a known geographic point were Barrio
Boundary Monument (BBM N. 22) is under water
level quite for sometimes as evidence by earthworks
(collection of mud) that amount over its surface by
eighty (80) centimeters below the ground, see
notation appearing on verification-relocation plan
previously submitted. (Re-Verification-Relocation
Survey Exhibits, pp. 64-65).
Said surveys were further confirmed by the
testimonies of witnesses to the effect that from 1950
to 1969, during rainy season, the water of Taal lake
even went beyond the questioned lots; and that the
water, which was about one (1) foot, stayed up to
more or less two (2) to three (3) months (Testimonies
of Braulio Almendral and Anastacio Tirones both
residents of Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas (Hearing
of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN, pp. 41-42 and Hearing of Nov.
23, 1970, TSN, pp. 93, 98-99, respectively). In the
Relocation Survey of 1962, there were no definite
boundary or area of Lots 1 and 2 because a certain
point is existing which was under water by 40
centimeters (Testimony of Engineer Arcena, Hearing
of Nov. 16,1970, TSN, p. 20).
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the
lands in question must be differentiated from
foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to
the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by
the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on
Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that
accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay,
belong to the owners of the estate to which they
have been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53
Phil. 423) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs
to the public domain, and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the government
to be no longer needed for public use (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents
because there is no accretion shown to exist in the
case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that
the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck
raising filled up the area with shells and sand to
make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not
available in this case because, as already ruled by this
Court, mere possession of land does not by itself
automatically divest the land of its public character
(Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26,1984 Decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6,1976
Decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Maristela vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 34901-R
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66575 September 30, 1986
ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA,
VICTOR, ANTONINA, LOURDES, TEODORO and
MYRNA, all surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO, SALOME
RODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO
ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES
CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE
PANLILIO, respondents.
Loreto Novisteros for petitioners.
Corleto R. Castro for respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a
certain fishpond located within the four [41 parcels
of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the
annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95 of the
Municipal Council of Bugallon Pangasinan. The trial
court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated
August 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of
water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is
a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River;
therefore public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. The lower court likewise held that
Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of
the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios
Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution
No. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all
municipal ferries and fisheries, including the
fishpond under consideration, were passed by
respondents herein as members of the Municipal
Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of
their legislative powers.
Petitioners appealed said decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the
same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Acting on the petition, the Court required the
respondents to comment thereon. However, before
respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that
for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo
Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the
fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the
case by submitting to the Court a Compromise
Agreement praying that judgment be rendered
recognizing the ownership of petitioners over the
land the body of water found within their titled
properties, stating therein, among other things, that
"to pursue the case, the same will not amount to any
benefit of the parties, on the other hand it is to the
advantage and benefit of the municipality if the
ownership of the land and the water found therein
belonging to petitioners be recognized in their favor
as it is now clear that after the National Irrigation
Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the
land, no water gets in or out of the land. 1
The stipulations contained in the Compromise
Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication
of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the
fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the
lower and appellate courts, was originally a creek
forming a tributary of the Agno River. Considering
that as held in the case of Mercado vs. Municipal
President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek,
defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a
property belonging to the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of
any individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil.
494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 4551; and
considering further that neither the mere
construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water
from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor
its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the
nature of the creek as a property of the public
domain, the Court finds the Compromise
Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the
same being contrary to law and public policy.
The finding that the subject body of water is a creek
belonging to the public domain is a factual
determination binding upon this Court. The
Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-
constituted municipal council is clothed with
authority to pass, as it did the two resolutions
dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be
said that petitioners were deprived of their right to
due process as mere publication of the notice of the
public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the
whole world.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to
set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare
the same null and void for being contrary to law and
public policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS
the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, in his capacity as Judge,
Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, ALSON
CARANTES, BILL CARANTES and EDUARDO
CARANTES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio,
Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for petitioner.
Jesus M. Ponce for private respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
A perusal, even the most cursory, of this petition for
review on certiorari, would make evident its being
impressed with merit. Respondent Judge, under
color of a statutory provision 1 and at the instance of
private respondents, did re-open Civil Registration
Case No. 1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
establishing the Baguio Townsite Reservation,
promulgated as far back as November 13, 1922, thus
enabling private respondents to apply for the
registration of an area of 74,017 square meters
inside the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation
Center. In the decision now sought to be set aside in
this suit dated November 9, 1968, its registration
therefor was ordered in favor of the aforesaid private
respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
thus has a legitimate grievance. Republic v.
Marcos,2 a 1969 a decision, speaks authoritatively. It
does provide a firm, not to say rocklike foundation.
Respondent Judge was without power to re-open the
aforesaid Civil Reservation Case No. 1 which was not
a cadastral proceeding. What is more, it is
undeniable that the land in question, being a part of
a duly established military camp or reservation,
cannot be thus ordered registered in favor of private
respondents. We have to grant the petition.
It would appear from the facts that on November 12,
1966, respondents, the Carantes heirs, filed under
Civil Reservation Case No. 13 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-opening
of said proceeding to have them declared owners,
and for the registration in their favor of four lots with
a total area of 74,017 square meters therein
described. Then on December 14, 1966, respondent
Judge issued an order requiring the publication and
posting of notices thereof. The Director of Lands duly
opposed, as a report of an investigator of his office
was that the area sought to be registered is inside
Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This notwithstanding,
on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge
rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads: "[Wherefore], this Court hereby orders
the registration of this parcel of land, situated in Res.
Sec. "J", Baguio City, identified as Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4
as shown on survey plan PSU 223402, and described
in its Technical Descriptions and Surveyor's
Certificate, with a combined total area of 74,017
square meters, more or less, in the names of the
petitioners, pro-indiviso, namely, [Alson Carantes],
married to Monica Pedro, [Eduardo Carantes],
married to Jesusa Rosal, and [Bill Carantes], married
to Budaet Onias, all of legal ages, Filipino citizens,
with residence and postal addresses at Loakan,
Baguio City, Philippines."4 The efforts exerted by the
Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal
said decision, seasonably made, did not prosper,
respondent Judge being of the belief that "the
proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay."
Unfortunately, with the Solicitor-General not having
been informed of what did transpire, such denial
went unchallenged.5 It was not until August 22, 1969
that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance in
the case and filed a motion to annul the decision
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the proceedings as
the land in question is part of a duly established
military reservation. Such motion was denied by
respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be
noted that the location of the lot inside Camp John
Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the
respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision
was impressed by the claim that the private
respondents had been in possession "since the
Spanish regime," and thus came within the
protection of the words annotated on all survey
plans of Camp John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and
existing private rights."6
What is immediately apparent is that even if the
above decision were not flawed by a grave infirmity,
it could not survive after the decision of this Court
in Republic v. Marcos,7 as noted in the brief for
private respondents, an action against the very same
judge whose actuation over a matter not dissimilar
was challenged and — challenged successfully. For
the absence of jurisdiction under such statutory
provision from which he would derive his
competence as well as the location of the disputed
area inside a military reservation deprived the
decision now sought to be nullified of the slightest
claim to validity. Nor could private respondents
derive comfort from the doctrine of estoppel which
as they should be the first to realize cannot operate
against the state. Accordingly, as noted at the outset,
we grant the petition.
1. The question of jurisdiction was squarely raised
and passed upon in the aforesaid Republic v. Marcos.
Thus: "Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far
from ambiguous. It is quite explicit and categorical.
Only persons "claiming to parcels of land that have
been the object of cadastral proceedings' are granted
the right to petition for a re-opening thereof if the
other conditions named therein are successfully met.
It cannot admit of doubt, therefore, that if the
parcels of land were not the object of cadastral
proceedings, then this statute finds no application.
Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the
then President of the United States, William H. Taft,
issued an executive order reserving for naval
purposes the lots now disputed, they could not have
been the object of the cadastral proceedings
involving the Baguio townsite reservation, decided
only on November 13, 1922."8 It was then stated in
the opinion: "The Cadastral Act was enacted on
February 11, 1913, taking effect on its passage. As is
made clear in the first section thereof, when public
interest requires that titles to any land be settled and
adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the
Governor General, he could order the Director of
Lands, to make a survey and plan of such lands.
Clearly, it does not include the survey of lands
declared as reservations."9
Its historical background was next passed upon: "An
earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically
governs the subject matter of reservations. As
provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any
interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying
within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter
set apart and declared to be military reservations
shall be forthwith brought under the operations of
the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands,
buildings, and interests therein as shall not be
determined to be public lands shall become
registered land in accordance with the provisions of
said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances
hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was
sustained as against the allegation that there was a
violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine
Squadron." 10 Finally, an earlier case of decisive
significance was referred to: "What is even more
conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part
of the private respondents to seek a re-opening
under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling
in Government v. Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly held:
"The defendant's contention that the respondent
court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order
the registration portions of a legally established
military reservation cannot be sustained. The
establishment of military reservations is governed by
Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and
Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or
buildings, or any interest therein, within the
Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the
areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought
under the operations of the Land Registration
Act. ... ." ' " 11
This Court could conclude therefore that as
contended by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge
in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim of private respondents invoking the
benefits of Republic Act No. 931." 12 So it is in the
present case. The absence of jurisdiction is equally
clear.
2. That Republic v. Marcos is likewise an insuperable
bar to the re-opening sought by private respondents
is made clear by the latter portion of the opinion.
Thus: "This lack of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Judge is made more patent by another
specific restriction of the right of a person to seek re-
opening under this statute. For the power of the
Court to order such re-opening is limited 'to such of
said parcels of land as have not been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally
or permanently disposed of by the Government. ... .'
Included in the petition is an executive order of then
President Herbert Hoover of June 19, 1929 declaring
to be a naval reservation of the Government of the
United States 'that tract of land known as lot no. 141,
residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation,
heretofore reserved for naval
purposes ... .' If there were still any lingering doubt,
that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a
presidential determination, then binding and
conclusive as we were under American sovereignty,
that the lot in question should be a naval
reservation." 13
3. The state of the law could thus be summarized:
"The private respondents are thus bereft of any right
which they could assert under Republic Act No. 931.
Such an enactment is the basis of whatever standing
that would justify their reliance on the specific power
granted courts of first instance to re-open cadastral
proceedings. Such jurisdiction is thus limited and
specific. Unless a party can make it manifest by
express language or a clear implication from the
wording of the statute too strong to be resisted, he
may not set in motion the judicial machinery under
such specific grant of authority. This, private
respondents have failed to do as the statute in terms
that are crystal clear and free from ambiguity denies
them such a right. Petitioners have made out their
case for certiorari and prohibition." 14
Private respondents, however, would not give up
without an attempt to escape from the operation of
a decision that is controlling. Not that it did them any
good. Their counsel, with as show of diligence, would
cite authorities on estoppel. He ought to have known
better. He should have realized that resort to them
would be without avail. For, as Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
speaking for this Court, in Luciano
Estrella, 15 categorically declared, "it is a well known
and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic,
or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its officials or agents." 16 In an
earlier case, Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Lines,
Inc., 17 there was an enunciation of such a principle in
this wise: "Thus did the lower court, as pointed out
by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the
government was bound by the mistaken
interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer
and the auditor general. It would consider estoppel
as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not
lie. Such a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de
Romero v. Director of Lands, a 1919 decision." 18
Nor is this all. An indication that one's appreciation
of controlling doctrine leaves something to be
desired is bad enough. What is worse is the
impression yielded of a failure to discern the thought
that lies behind the 1969 decision of Republic v.
Marcos. 19 It is this: the state as a persona in law is
the juridical entity, which is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land under the basic
doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well
as the present charter. It is charged moreover with
the conservation of such patrimony. 20 There is need
therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private
claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought
to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such
primordial consideration, not the apparent
carelessness, much less the acquiescence of public
officials, is the controlling norm. Nor is there
anything unjust in such an approach as the alleged
deprivation of a private right without justification by
the government is not remediless, where there is
persuasive proof that such is the case. The point of
this decision as well as the earlier Republic v.
v. Marcos is that the procedure followed by private
respondents is not the road to such an objective
even on the assumption, purely hypothetical, that
there is basis in law for what is hoped for and aimed.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted
annulling and setting aside the decision of
respondent Judge, dated November 9, 1968, which is
declared to be without any force or effect as having
been issued without jurisdiction. Costs against
private respondents.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE
JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R,
raising the question of whether or not petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over
a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive
proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical
center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of
respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application
No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron,
Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The
property applied for was a portion of what was then
known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through
its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids
for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose
bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr.
Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The
Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale
for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de
Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-
service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on
October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus
was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously
submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of
P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at
P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued
to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the
dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the
proceedings had in connection with the Sales
Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law
and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is
herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de
jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for
thewhole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of
this office as Sales Application No. 3231, covering the
tract herein awarded, which is more particularly
described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SW—Public Land;
W—Municipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually
surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey
under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was
approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus
was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and
1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400
hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an
amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de
Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by
Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de
Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military
camp site purposes, the said application is amended
so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in
the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus
amended, it will continue to be given due course."
The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the
very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon
issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No.
1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the
same for military purposes, under the administration
of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid
P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales
Application was amended. This payment did not
include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as
the same had already been excluded from the Sales
Application at the time the payment was
made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then
Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance
of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales
Application for "a tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion,
City of Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano
Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de
Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated
in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao,
Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64
ares, and 00 centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay
revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of
the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the
following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked
this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot
No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under
the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens
registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with
the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical
Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the
strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area
for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and
successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de
Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that
his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested
right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of
Award issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition
to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare
portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2
belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
directing "the registration of the title to Lot No.
1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on
Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City
of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square
meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center,
Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio
Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court
and appealed the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.
£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant
Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard
the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus,
registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central,
Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square
meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to
relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-
2 which is occupied by the medical center and
nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable
appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership
over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the
Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied
the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has
registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and
not only on a portion thereof occupied by the
Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350,
dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay
legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical
Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of
Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which
governs the registration of grants or patents involving
public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in
the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government
of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act [Land Registration
Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." 9 It
would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis
of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has
registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its
nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable
appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the
reservation, when the proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares
to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal
infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized
competence of the president to reserve by executive
proclamation alienable lands of the public domain
for a specific public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of
the Revised Administrative Code empowers the
president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition
and for specific public uses for service, any land
belonging to the private domain of the Government
of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used for
the specific purposes directed by such executive
order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly,
Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes
the President to "designate by proclamation any tract
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations
for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines
or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when
the public interest requires it, including reservations
for ... other improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled
that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus, had
acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare
Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him
on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands
Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for,
including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any
reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to
draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales
Award describes the tract awarded as located in
Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22 hectares,
and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and
Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road
and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land;
and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of
22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares
upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands.
The same area was reckoned with by then Lands
Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance
of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for
his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a
tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares,
situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of
Davao." 12 In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to
Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to
Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public
land situated in the City of Davao, Island of
Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20
hectares 64, ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of
Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and
Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to
sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares,
it becomes imperative to conclude that what was
really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400
hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of
october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted a
bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of
only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the
purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare,
the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares,
10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33
hectares, the total purchase price would be
P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10%
deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was
actually deposited by sales applicant Eugenio de
Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded
33 hectares in that public bidding, he should have
made the required 10% deposit of P331.65. That he
merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that
what was bidden for and awarded to him was only 22
hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a
matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on
November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment
intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the
remaining area after the amendment of the Sales
Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the
military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares]
for the reason that the said site, at the time of last
installment was already excluded from Sale
Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as
ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if
the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws only 22
hectares and since two years thereafter the Director
of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the
military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10
hectares, then would have been left to applicant
Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would
have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate
Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption.
What was ordered amended was the Sales
Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22
hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states:
"Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so,
because the amendment was already reflected in the
Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares
was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales
Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the
conclusion that the area awarded to applicant
Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33
hectares. Such general description of "whole tract"
cannot prevail over the specific description
delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries.
Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded
as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and
bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa
Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a
provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on
the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a
municipal road. 16 Specific description is ordinarily
preferred to general description, or that which is
more certain to what which is less certain. 17More so,
when it is considered that the series of executive
proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350)
continuously maintained the intent of the
Government to reserve the subject land for a specific
purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed
favorably to the Governement, and most strongly
against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention
or extent of the grant, or the intention of the
Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In
general, the quantity of the land granted must be
ascertained from the description in the patent is
exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And
courts do not usually go beyond a description of a
tract in a patent and determine the tract and
quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate
Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged occupation,
cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land
(including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916
vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive
right in the acquisition of the land, which right was
controverted into "a special propriety right" when
the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only
for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only
for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares
upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares, the
privilege of occupying public lands a view to
preemption confers np contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President
to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the
divesting by the government of title threof stands,
even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them
can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have
settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public
land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by
law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and
warning all persons to depart therefrom, this
terminates any rights previously avquired in such
lands by a person who was settled thereon in order
to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And
patents for lands which have been previously
granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are
void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the
same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be,"
but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus
failed to prove any private rights over the property
reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the
applicant has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that a certain portion of the public domain
was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for
the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or
patents, the property must be held to be part of the
public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de
Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by
prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares,
inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof
(assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare
lot was included in the original sales application for
33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily
admits that the portions applied for are part of the
public domain, against which no acquisitive
prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section
48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained
Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the military "camp
site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the
Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of
the Department of National Defense, sometime in
1936 subject to the condition that it would be
returned to him when the Philippine Army would no
longer need it. As found by the trial court in 1936,
the Department of National Defense was not yet in
existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name
of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed of
donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2
consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of
National Defense was only organized in 1939.
Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would
prove by secondary evidence the existence of such
donation thru the testimony of persons who
supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides
that before the terms of a transaction in realty may
be established by secondary evidence, it is n that the
due execution and subsequent loss of the original
instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For
it is the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of such document.
And the due of the execution of the document would
be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or
persons who executed it; (2) the person before
whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any
who was present and saw it executed and delivered,
or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom
the parties to the instrument had previously
confessed the execution thereof. 28 None of these
modes of proof was ever followed by respondent
Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest,
Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement
that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with
Defense Secretary Marabut when at hat time the
Defense Department was not yet in existence. The
notary public who presumptively acknowledged the
donation or the witnesses to the instrument were
never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of
the party to present the notary Public and thore s
who must have seen the signing of the document as
witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the
admission of a secondary evidence of the terms of
the deed. 29 This is especially true in realty donations
where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the
accomplishment thereof in a public document in
order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo
Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of
Eugenio de Jesus showed him a copy of the "paper"
signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus;
of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao, that
in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de jesus went to
his office to register a document" executed by
Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former
Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus
showed him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de
Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy
the requisites of the Rules, as to which very strict
compliance is imposed because of the importance of
the document involved. 30 First none of these persons
was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them
saw the document after its execution and delivery
ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously
confessed the execution; second, the reference to a
"paper" or "document" ambigous as to be
synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third,
the persons who showed the deed, Sesinando de
Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to
the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's
narration of the existence and loss of the document
equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial
court, he testified that the copy of the deed which
his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his
uncle, Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his
father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his
copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the
Japanese occupation. The replies of the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Acting Executive Secretary that the property
was "still needed for military purposes" and may not
therefore be released from the reservation cannot
substitute the proof so required. These replies are
not confirmatory of the existence of such donation
much less official admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of
the military "camp site" was executed between
Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such
donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior
de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when
it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year,
proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withrew the area from sale or settlement and
reserved it for military purposes. Respondent
Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the
subject of the donation was not the land itself but
"the possessory and special proprietary rights" of
Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that
the gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a
thing or right. 31 But the term "right" must be
understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the
processor has the jus disponendi. 32 This is because,
in true donations, there results a consequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his
assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be
possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole
33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081
hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had
already been severed from the mass of disposable
public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in
the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets
as a consequence of such donation is therefore
farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in
gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was
included in the Sales Award, still the same may not
be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is
conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to
take possession of the land so that he could comply
with the requirements prescribed by law." 34In other
words, the right granted to the sales awardee is only
"possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary
right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the
issuance of the sales patent and registration thereof,
title to the land is retained by the
State. 35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be
considered "disposed of by the Government" upon
the issuance of the Sales Award, but this has the
singular effect of withdrawing the land from the
public domian that is "disposable" by the Director of
Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the
dsiposition is merely provisional because the
applicant has still to comply with the requirements of
the law before any patent is issued. It is only after
compliance with such requirements to the
satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the patent
is issued and the land applied for considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government." This
again is a circumstance that demeans the irrevocable
nature donation, because the mere desistance of the
sales applicant to pursue the requirements called for
would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its
resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and
set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514
of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081
hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the
petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl
buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious
diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c)
physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and
Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18867 April 30, 1966
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESARIO OCTOBRE, SHERWIN TAMANG, JAMES
OLILA, TERIO BAMBICO and ERNESTO
ROSIMO,defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio Torres, Solicitor C.
V. Bautista and Provincial Fiscal F. R. Belmonte for
plaintiff -appellant.
Bantas Suanding for defendants-appellees.
BARRERA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio an action for
recovery of possession of a portion of land with an
area of one and one-half hectares, allegedly acquired
by it by purchase from one Ramon Valles in 1925, for
the use of the Mountain National Agricultural School
with reserved lands in La Trinidad, Mountain
Province, and illegally occupied by defendants
Cesario Octobre, Sherwin Tamang, James Olila, Terio
Bambico, and Ernesto Rosimo, plaintiff also
demanding damages for such unlawful occupancy.
In their answer to this complaint, defendants set up
the defense of actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the respective portions of the land
occupied by them, on their own and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
Furthermore, they alleged that the land in question
no longer forms part of the reservation, the same
having been released by Presidential Proclamation
No. 209 dated October 20, 1955, for disposition
under the provisions of the Public Land Law.
After hearing on this point and upon the finding that
the areas disputed by the parties were actually
included in the portion of the government
reservation released by proclamation of President
Magsaysay, for disposition in accordance with law,
the court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the Mountain National Agricultural School has
no more claim over this land. Hence, this appeal by
the government on the ground that, (1) as the area
was already reserved for a specific public purpose,
i.e., for use of the students of the Mountain National
Agricultural School, the same could not have been
validly released from such reservation by a
presidential proclamation; and (2) even if
Proclamation No. 209 of the President has force and
effect, the court should have continued the hearing
of the case to determine who were the actual
occupants of the land, and entitled to acquire the
same from the government, in view of the claim of
plaintiff that it purchased the lot in question from
one Ramon Valles.1äwphï1.ñët
In support of its first contention, appellant cites
Section 64(e) of the Revised Administrative Code
which reads:
SEC. 64. Particular powers and duties of President of
the Philippines.—In addition to his general
supervisory authority, the President of the
Philippines shall have specific powers and duties as
are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law
and also, in particular, the powers and duties set
forth in this chapter.
Among such special powers and duties shall be:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To reserve from sale or other disposition and for
specific public uses or service, any land belonging to
the private domain of the Government of the
Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law; and thereafter such land shall be
used for the specific purposes directed by such
executive order until otherwise provided by law.
xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is not disputed that any disposable land belonging
to the government may, by presidential action alone,
be reserved for a specific public purpose or service.
Appellant's theory, however, seems to be that, once
such reservation is made, the President can no
longer, by his act alone, lift or release the said land
from the reservation, a legislative act being
necessary for the purpose. And, in the instant case, it
is admitted that the alleged release of the portion of
the Mountain National Agricultural School
reservation was effected merely by proclamation of
the President.
It may be pointed out, in this connection, that the
cited provision of the Revised Administrative Code
(Sec. 64-e) did not specifically provide that a
congressional act is necessary before a reserved land
may be released and opened for disposition. It
merely states that such reserved land shall be used
for the purposes directed in the reservation, until
"otherwise provided by law". The matter to be
considered then is whether there is any law that
directs or authorizes the President to release a
disposable land from a reservation previously made.
Precisely the Public Land Act (Com. Act 141) contains
such an authority. Section 9 of said act provides:
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable
or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural.
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes.
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes.
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time make the classifications provided for in
this section and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
(Emphasis supplied)
It may here be reiterated that pursuant to Section
64(e) of the Revised Administrative Code, alienable
lands of the public domain may be ordered reserved,
by the President, for a specific public use or service.
Then, under the provisions of the Public Land Law
abovequoted, the President has authority to re-
classify such lands from one class to another, e.g.,
from agricultural to reserved area and vice-versa.
And, this reclassification may be effected any time
and in a similar manner, that is, by presidential
action. It cannot be rightly claimed, therefore, that
the release from reservation of a certain portion of
the area originally intended for the use of the
Mountain National Agricultural School by a
subsequent proclamation of the President, is not in
accordance with law.
In view of the foregoing conclusion, appellant's
alternative contention must be sustained. The
complaint should not have been dismissed merely on
the ground that the disputed area was proved to be
part of the area released from the reservation.
Instead, the hearing should have been continued to
determine the persons entitled to acquire the land
thus released, the right, if any, of one Ramon Valles
from whom plaintiff alleges to have purchased the
lot in question, and the validity of the respective
claims of the defendants, facts all directly put in issue
by the pleadings of the parties.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set
aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings. No costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58822 April 8, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL G. SANGALANG, as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet,
Branch I; SPS MARIANO KIANG, and MIRANDA
SOBLE; Sps. WAGNIL KIANG and DALIN OSTEG; BEN
KIANG; OLMAN KIANG, Sps. BENIGNO LAGASCA and
CANDIDA A. LAGASCA; Sps. BIENVENIDO L. GARCIA
and DOLORES C. GARCIA; Sps. EUSEBIO LITILIT and
JOVITA LITILIT Sps. HIPOLITO DELLA and FILOMENA
DELLA; Sps. VILLAMOR A. NAVORRA and REBECCA
B. NAVORRA; Sps. RENATO DEMAIJA and ANITA
DEMAIJA REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY; and
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet, Branch
I, dated May 26, 1981, in Civil Case No. 3168,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses
Mariano Kiang, et al.," dismissing the complaint for
the nullification of the decision of Judge Pio R.
Marcos dated February 16, 1970, in Land Registration
Case No. N- 30, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-7307, which
granted the petition for Mariano Kiang, et al. for the
registration of two parcels of land, otherwise
designated as Lots A and B, in Survey Plan II-11747
(SWO-34633) with an area of 117,911 square meters,
situated in Residential Section of Baguio City.
The background and antecedent facts pertinent to
the case are as follows: The subject property was
inherited by the private respondents Kiangs from
their father, known as old man Kiang (one name)
who in turn inherited the same from his parents
Quebec and Cawane, who were in continuous
possession of the land since the Spanish times.
For the purpose of securing title over the property in
question, the old man Kiang had it surveyed by the
Bureau of Lands on October 11, 1916, and filed an
application for registration, docketed as Case No. 30,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 12073. The said application was
instituted by old man Kiang during the pendency of
the land registration proceedings in Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, filed on April 12,
1912 with the Court of First Instance of Banquet,
Mountain Province for the compulsory registration of
all lands, buildings and interests within the limits of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation in accordance with
Section 62 of Act No. 926 (Public Land Act), in
relation to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act No. 627 (an
act to bring immediately under the operation of the
Land Registration Act all land lying within military
reservations). The said petition (Civil Reservation
Case No. 1) involved the establishment of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, which included the lands of
old man Kiang.
On November 13, 1922, the Court of First Instance of
Benquet, Mountain Province, rendered a decision in
Civil Reservation Case No. L- declaring as public lands
all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, with the exception of lands reserved for
specific public purposes and those claimed and
adjudicated private property. Among those declared
public lands were the lands applied for by old man
Kiang under Case No. 30, G.L.R.O. Record No. 12073,
which was dismissed by the court in said decision.
About 31 years later, or on October 1, 1953, the
respondent Kiangs filed with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Banquet an application for
registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of the
parcels of land in question, which was docketed as
Land Registration Case No. N-30, G.L.R.O. Record No.
N-7307. On February 16, 1970, the respondent court
presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos rendered a
decision adjudicating the aforesaid parcels of land in
favor of the respondents. Accordingly, on April 17,
1975, the Land Registration Commission issued
Decree No. N-154937 over the said lands in favor of
applicant Kiangs and on June 5, 1975, the Register of
Deeds of Baguio City issued the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-280 to the
applicants. Subsequently, the Kiangs conveyed
portion of the lands covered by O.C.T. No. 0-280 to
the other respondents herein (except respondents
Register of Deeds of Baguio City and the Land
Registration Commissioner).
On June 24,1977, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General,
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Banquet, docketed as Civil Case No. 3168,
for the annulment of the decision of Judge Pio R.
Marcos dated February 16, 1970, in Land Registration
Case No. N-30, as well as the certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto. Petitioner alleged in the
petition that the claim of the respondent Kiangs was
barred by the decision of the court in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211,
dated November 13, 1922; that the respondent court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
nature of the action in Land Registration Case No. N-
30 on the ground of res judicata, and consequently,
all the proceedings held therein and the titles issued
pursuant 'thereto were null and void ab initio. On
May 26, 1981, the respondent court rendered its
decision, dismissing the complaint. Hence, this
appeal.
The issues raised in this petition are:
1. Whether or not the respondent court had
jurisdiction over Land Registration Case No. N-30
considering that the status and ownership of the
lands applied for had already been settled and
adjudicated in Civil Reservation Case No. 1.
2. Whether or not the decision of respondent court
in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 barred the application
in Land Registration Case No. N-30.
3. Whether or not the respondent court gravely
erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 3168 for annulment
of the decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-30 and the
certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
The basic issue in the instant case is whether or not
the court which awarded title to the Kiangs in Land
Registration Case No. N-30 had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action. It is well-settled that
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be
waived and can be raised at any time. 1 Jurisdiction of
the subject matter is conferred by law and does not
depend on the consent or objection or the acts or
omissions of the parties or any one of them. 2
The subject matter of Land Registration Case No. N-
30 was property already declared public land and
part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation by virtue of
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Banquet,
Mountain Province, dated November 13, 1922, in
Civil Reservation Case No. L-G.L.R.O. Record No.
12073. The latter case involved the compulsory
registration of land within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation pursuant to Section 62 of Act No. 926, in
relation to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act No. 627.
Section 62 of Act No. 926 provides:
Sec. 62. Whenever any lands in the Philippine Island
are set apart as town sites, under the provisions of
Chapter Five of this Act, it shall be lawful for the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to notify the
judge of the Court of Land Registration that such
lands have been reserved as a town site and that all
private lands or interests therein within the limits
described ought forthwith to be brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act, and to
become registered land within the meaning of said
Registration Act. It shall be the duty of the judge of
said court to issue a notice thereof, stating that
claims for all private lands or interests therein within
the limits described must be presented for
registration under the Land Registration Act in the
manner provided in Act Numbered Six hundred and
twenty-seven, entitled "An act to bring immediately
under the operation of the Land Registration Act all
lands lying within the boundaries lawfully set apart
for military reservations, and all lands desired to be
purchased by the Government of the United States
for military purposes." The procedure for the
purpose of this section and the legal effects thereof
shall thereupon be in all respects as provided in
sections three, four, five, and six of said Act
Numbered Six hundred and twenty- seven.
In accordance with the aforesaid provision, the
procedure for the purpose of this Section 62 and
"the legal effects thereof" shall be in all respects as
provided in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act No. 627.
Under the provisions of Sec. 5 of Act No. 627:
Sec. 5. Upon the filing of claims and application for
registration in the Court of Land Registration, the
same procedure shall be adopted as is by the Land
Registration Act provided for other claims and
applications; but in case of all claims and applications
which are finally dismissed, the judgment shall be
that the lands embraced therein are public lands,
unless the same shall be included within other claims
or applications which are favorably acted upon by
the court. It shall be the duty of the court to expedite
proceedings under this Act, and give to them
precedence over other claims for registration under
the Land Registration Act. All rights of appeal secured
by the Land Registration Act shall be applicable to
proceedings under this Act.
Hence, the decision of land registration court in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 declared all lands comprised
within the Baguio Townsite Reservation as public
lands, with the exception of lands "reserved for
specific public purposes and those claimed and
adjudicated private property." Outside of those lands
specifically excepted from the effects of the decision,
all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation were declared 'public lands' no longer
registrable under the Land Registration Act. It is clear,
therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Banquet, presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos,
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. N-30, and to render a decision
awarding title to the land in question to the
applicants Mariano Kiang et al. The decision of Judge
Marcos in Land Registration Case No. N-30 was null
and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
The reliance of respondent court on the exception
provided in Section 79 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 to justify the jurisdiction of the court to award
the title of the land in question to the Kiangs in Land
Registration Case No. N-30 is misplaced. Section 79
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides:
Sec. 79. All lots, except those claimed by or belonging
to private parties and those reserved for parks,
buildings, and other public uses, shall be sold, after
due notice, at public auction to the highest bidder,
after the approval and recording of the plat of
subdivision as above provided, but no bid shall be
accepted that does not equal at least two-thirds of
the appraised value, nor shall bids be accepted from
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships
not authorized to purchase public lands for
commercial, residential or industrial purposes under
the provisions of this Act. The provisions of sections
twenty-six and sixty-five of this Act shall be observed
in so far as they are applicable. Lots for which
satisfactory bids have not been received shall be
again offered for sale, under the same conditions as
the first time, and if they then remains unsold, the
Director of Lands shall be authorized to sell them at
private sale for not less than two- thirds of their
appraised value.
The exception provided for in the above-cited
provision refer to lands "claimed by or belonging to
private parties." This exception can not possibly
apply to the respondents Kiangs since the land which
was the subject of Land Registration Case No. N-30
can no longer be considered land "claimed by or
belonging to private parties." By virtue of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Banquet,
Mountain Province, in Civil Reservation Case No. L-
the Id land was declared public land and the claim of
the predecessor of respondents Kiangs over said land
was already barred by virtue of the provisions of
Section 5 of Act No. 627 in relation to Section 62 of
Act No. 926. Hence, the court which awarded the
title to the Kiangs in 1970 in Land Registration Case
No. N-30 had no jurisdiction over the land subject
matter of the case, and its decision therein is null and
void.
In Republic vs. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, et al., 52 SCRA
238, held that the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Banquet had no jurisdiction to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, on
the ground that said case did not par-take of the
nature of cadastral proceedings as contemplated in
Republic Act No. 931, as amended, and that lands
within Government reservations can not be
registered in favor of private individuals. Recognizing
that before the promulgation of said decision , large
portions of the public land within the Baguio Towns";
Reservation had been illegally decreed in favor of
private individuals, Presidential Decree No. 1271 was
issued on December 22, 1977, which was intended to
protect title holders who, before the promulgation of
the Supreme Court decision on July 31, 1973, had
acted in good faith and relied, although mistakenly,
on the indefeasibility of torrens certificates of titles
anal had introduced substantial improvements on
the land covered by said certificates. Said PD No.
1271 provides:
Section 1. All orders and decisions issued by the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet in
connection with the proceedings for the reopening
of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211,
covering lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, and decreeing such lands in favor of
private individuals or entities, are hereby declared
null and void and without force and effect;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that all certificates of titles
issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered
valid and the lands Covered by them shall be deemed
to have been conveyed in fee simple to the
registered owners upon a showing of, and
compliance with, the following conditions:
a. The lands covered by the titles are not within any
government, public or quasi-public reservation,
forest, military or otherwise, as certified by
appropriate agencies;
b. Payment by the present title holder to the
Republic of the Philippines of an amount equivalent
to fifteen per centum (1 5%) of the assessed value of
the land whose title is voided as of revision period
1973 (P.D. 76), the amount payable as follows: Within
ninety (90) days of the effectivity of this Decree, the
holders of the titles affected shall manifest their
desire to avail of the benefits of this provision and
shall pay ten per centum (10%) of the above amount
and the balance in two equal installments, the first
installment to be paid within the first year of the
effectivity of this Decree and the second installment
within a year thereafter.
Sec. 2. The provisions of the preceding section for
the validation of titles shall not apply to cases in
which the registration was obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation in the proceedings for the
reopening of Civil Registration Case No. L- GLRO
Record No, 211, nor shall the confirmation or
issuance of new title under this Decree have the
effect of validating titles otherwise invalid because
obtained through fraud or misrepresentation in the
aforesaid reopening proceedings.
Sec. 3. The holders of the titles falling under Section I
of this Decree that are not considered valid pursuant
to the proviso thereof shall, within ninety (90) days
from the effectivity of this Decree, surrender their
respective titles for cancellation and the owners and/
or possessors of the areas covered by such titles shall
vacate the premises and remove whatever
improvements or structures they may have
introduced thereon within six (6) months from
notice. If, by removal of the improvements, damage
to the lands would result, such improvements shall
be forfeited in favor of the government or shag be
demolished or removed at the title holder's expense.
All taxes and registration fees paid in connection with
the lands are deemed forfeited in favor of the
Government.
Sec. 4. Ninety (90) days after the effectivity of this
Decree, the Commission on Land Registration shall
cause the cancellation of original and transfer
certificates of titles not validated under Section 1
hereof, including those titles whose holders have
failed to avail of the benefits granted under the same
section within the period therein provided.
The proviso in favor of bona-fide holders of titles
issued on or before July 31, 1973 does not apply to
the case at bar, since the certificate of title of the
respondents Kiangs was issued only on June 5, 1975.
Neither is there any showing that respondents
complied with the requirements of Section 1 of PD
No. 1271 for the validation of their title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
decision of respondent court in Civil Case No. 3168 is
REVERSED and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-280
of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City and all
transfer certificates of title therefrom are hereby
nullified and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983
WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA,
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL
RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-
appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO
HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,
Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent Director.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l
Co.
Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.
Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao
Happick, Jr.
MAKASIAR, J:
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20,
1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which
dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does
not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the
respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural resources and the Director of Forestry)
motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry
issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding
a certain tract of public forest land situated in
Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received
on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This
public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is
located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the United States Government to the
Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form
after paying the necessary fees and posting tile
required bond therefor. Nine other applicants
submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29,
rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of
having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow
the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder.
On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia
issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry, which read as follows:
It is desired that the area formerly covered by the
Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for
watershed purposes. Prepare and submit
immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing
the said area as a watershed forest reserve for
Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids
received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance
of the timber license in the area during the public
bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in
order that the area may be reserved as above stated.
...
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
(pp. 98, CFI rec.).
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of
Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the
findings and re comendations of the Director of
Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial
to the public interest if the area is made available for
exploitation under certain conditions," and
We quote:
Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the
Executive Secretary Malacanang. Manila inviting
particular attention to the comment and
recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the
proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice fully
concurs.
The observations of responsible forest officials are
most revealing of their zeal to promote forest
conservation and watershed protection especially in
Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they
have demonstrated that to declare the forest area
involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for
timber exploitation under license and regulation
would do more harm than of to the public interest.
To convert the area into a forest reserve without an
adequate forest protection force, would make of it a
'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to the ever
'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open
target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other
forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the other
hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable
and responsible licensee who shall conduct logging
operations therein under the selective logging
method and who shall be obliged to employ a
sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and
protect the forest consecration and watershed
protection.
Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of
Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to
determine the most qualified bidder to whom the
area advertised should be awarded. Needless to
stress, the decision of the Director of Forestry to
dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much
thought and deliberation and after having been
convinced that to do so would not adversely affect
the watershed in that sector. The result of the
bidding only have to be announced. To be sure, some
of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual,
went to much expense in the hope of winning a
virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn
about of this decision without strong justifiable
grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this
Office no end of embarrassment.
In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the
Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the
announcement of the results of the bidding for the
subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement
dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio,
Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully returned to the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate
action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No.
2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry
for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed
the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the
Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this
award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and
Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration
which were denied by the Director of Forestry on
December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who
succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office —
issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of
1963, pertinent portions of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: ... ... ...
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry
to grant ordinary timber licenses.
1. ... ... ...
2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to
grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the
area covered thereby is not more than 3,000
hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary
timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000
hectares each;
3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267,
CFI rec.).
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting
secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon
assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on
December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No.
60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director
of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No.
46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which order
took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963.
Pertinent portions of the said Order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order
No 46 dated May 30, 1963 —
1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the
volume and Nature of the work of the Department,
the authority delegated to the Director of forestry
under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated
May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber
licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of
ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding
3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further
notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including
amendments thereto, shall be signed by the
secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all
other previous orders, directives, circulars,
memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with
this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.;
Emphasis supplied).
On the same date that the above-quoted
memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963,
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated
April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons
Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry
Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On
January 6, 1964, the license was released by the
Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p.
77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by
Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company
wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural
Resources praying that, pending resolution of the
appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and
Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of
Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration,
OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be
cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant
thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to
existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation
made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an
order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64
issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry
without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The
dispositive portion of said order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of
the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64
in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as
hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force
and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop
the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if
there be any, in the area in question and shall see to
it that the appellee shall not introduce any further
improvements thereon pending the disposition of
the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company
and Jorge lao Happick in this case" (pp. 30-31, CFI
rec.).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of
the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order
dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph
appears:
In this connection, it has been observed by the
Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of
February 12, 1964, that the area in question
composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo,
including the proposed Olongapo watershed
Reservation; and that the United States as well as the
Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire
watershed for a watershed pilot forest for
experiment treatment Concerning erosion and water
conservation and flood control in relation to wise
utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting
cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of
agricultural areas influenced by the watershed,
etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals
filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial
Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry
dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons
Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting
the proposals of the other applicants covering the
same area, promulgated an order commenting that
in view of the observations of the Director of
Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question
to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly
adversely affect public interest which is paramount
to private interests," and concluding that, "for this
reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that
without the necessity of discussing the appeals of
the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as
hereby they are, dismissed and this case is
considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is
concerned" (p. 78, rec.).
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-
appellant filed the instant case before tile court a
quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil
Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-
appellant claims that the respondents-appellees
"unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and
arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by
revoking a valid and existing timber license without
just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the
equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his
constitutional right to property without due process
of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of
contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed
for judgment making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents-
appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9,
March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts
and those of the Director of Forestry implementing
said orders, and all the proceedings in connection
therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force
and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew
OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the
respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the
petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary
damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary
damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as
attorney's fees and costs. The respondents-appellees
separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial
Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio Mallari,
presented petitions for intervention which were
granted, and they too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss
dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds:
(1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the
respondents may not be sued without their consent;
(3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available
administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does
not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely
administrative and discretionary functions of
administrative officials may not be interfered with by
the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his
answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following
special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the
petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is
improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from
suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no
power to interfere in purely administrative functions;
and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license
was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.).
Intervenors also filed their respective answers in
intervention with special and affirmative defenses
(pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition
for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction,
wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties
including the intervenors, and extensive discussion
was held both orally and in writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the
court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved
not only the question on the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss,
declared that the petition did not state a sufficient
cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly.
To justify such action, the trial court, in its order
dismissing the petition, stated that "the court feels
that the evidence presented and the extensive
discussion on the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be
taken into consideration in resolving not only this
question but also the motion to dismiss, because
there is no reason to believe that the parties will
change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p.
478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having
been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this
Court.
I
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court,
claiming that the trial court erred in:
(1) holding that the petition does not state a
sufficient cause of action: and
(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is,
whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a
sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-
appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion
on the definition of the term cause of action wherein
he contended that the three essential elements
thereon, — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the
correlative obligation of the defendants and the act
or omission of the defendant in violation of that right
— are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp.
31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the
ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no
cause of action, such fact can be determined only
from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no
other, and the court cannot consider other
matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that in a
motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of
action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the
motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).
A perusal of the records of the case shows that
petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As
already observed, this case was presented to the trial
court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the
petition to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the
ground that the timber license relied upon by the
petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by the
Director of Forestry without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the
general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule
admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which
are well pleaded however while the court must
accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does
not admit allegations of which the court will take
judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply
to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible
in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or
document included in the pleadings to be unfounded
(Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the
instant case wherein answers were interposed and
evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing,
petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to
introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his
petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently,
he is estopped from invoking the rule that to
determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a
motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the
complaint must be considered. If there were no
hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA
Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was
presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss
because of alleged failure of complaint to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and no
answer was interposed and no evidence introduced,
the only facts which the court could properly
consider in passing upon the motion were those facts
appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such
facts as the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March
31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly
dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to
lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by
taking into consideration the discussion in said
motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion
of said decision is hereby quoted:
Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is
lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the
motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to
reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
1. The threshold questions are these: Was the
dismissal order issued without any hearing on the
motion to dismiss? Is it void?
WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed
on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February
10 following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's
counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest
postponement motion dismissal till written
opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled
hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his
wire, with his written opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss
and the 6-page opposition thereto, We find that the
arguments pro and con on the question of the
board's power to abolish petitioner's position to
discussed the problem said profusely cited
authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order
recited at length the said arguments and concluded
that petitioner made no case.
One good reason for the statutory requirement of
hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to
adduce evidence in support of their opposing claims.
But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of
cause of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack
of it is determined be a reference to the facts averred
in the challenged pleading. The question raised in the
motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully
discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto.
In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are
reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be
overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other
intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a
motion, i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite
party and to give to the latter time to study and meet
the arguments of the motion,' has been sufficiently
met. And then, courts do not exalt form over
substance (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid
cause of action, a motion to dismiss for- insufficiency
of cause of action will be granted if documentary
evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts
sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go
beyond disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No.
1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International
Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern Pacific Co.,
6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605).
Thus, although the evidence of the parties were
presented on the question of granting or denying
petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly
applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion
to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the
resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in
its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that,
"there is no reason to believe that the parties will
change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p.
478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose
any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments
in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI
rec.). This omission means conformity to said
observation, and a waiver of his right to object,
estopping him from raising this question for the first
time on appeal. " I question not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal"
(Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA
276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the
rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is
that the complaint states no cause of action, its
sufficiency must be determined only from the
allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice;
the technical rules had been misapplied to the
prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid
application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1,
Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing
cases).
What more can be of greater importance than the
interest of the public at large, more particularly the
welfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and
Zambales province, whose lives and properties are
directly and immediately imperilled by forest
denudation.
The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber
license practically comprises the entire Olongapo
watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge
that watersheds serves as a defense against soil
erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water.
As a matter of general policy, the Philippine
Constitution expressly mandated the conservation
and proper utilization of natural resources, which
includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the
Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive
treatment due to various unscientific and destructive
land use practices. Once lush watersheds were
wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber
cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal
loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of
the rules and regulations included in the ordinary
timber license it is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject
to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire
at an earlier date, when public interests so require
(Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).
Considering the overriding public interest involved in
the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of
the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by
petitioner-appellant's timber license has been
established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest
Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238
by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in
parts read as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, 1,
Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines do
hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and
establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for
watershed, soil protection, and timber production
purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be,
under the administration and control of the Director
of Forestry, xx the following parcels of land of the
public domain situated in the municipality of
Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the
Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60
O.G. No. 23, 3198).
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over
the timber concession in question. He argues thus:
"The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal
right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by
his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding
obligation on the part of the respondents to give
effect, recognize and respect the very timber license
they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the
respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license
of the petitioner without giving him his day in court
and in preventing him from using and enjoying the
timber license issued to him in the regular course of
official business" (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is
readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on
the validity or invalidity of his timber license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court
that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed
and released without authority by then Acting
Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is
therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such
findings:
In the first place, in general memorandum order No.
46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was
authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license
only where the area covered thereby was not more
than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest
awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares
(Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex B;
Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756
hectares of the said area contain commercial and
operable forest; the authority given to the Director of
Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of
not more than 3,000 hectares does not state that the
whole area should be commercial and operable
forest. It should be taken into consideration that the
1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable
forest must have been distributed in the whole area
of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please
see attached sketch and technical description,' gives
an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is
the area covered of commmercial and operable
forest (Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition,
which was marked as Exhibit B, states:
Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest
containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo,
Zambales was declared available for timber
utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice,
there were received bid proposals from the following
persons: ...
Wherefore, confirming the findings of said
Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087
shall be awarded, as it is hereby awarded to
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following
conditions: ... ...
In the second place, at the time it was released to
the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no
more authority to grant any license. The license was
signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner
on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license was contained in general
memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This
was revoked by general memorandum order No. 60,
which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In
view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer
any authority to release the license on January 6,
1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio (pp.
479480, CFI rec.).
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives
rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to
December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of
the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of
greatest importance is the date of the release or
issuance, and not the date of the signing of the
license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license
might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out
by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no
longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had
not acquired any legal right under such void license.
This is evident on the face of his petition as
supplemented by its annexes which includes
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in
the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959),
this Court held that if from the face of the complaint,
as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the
owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have
been levied upon and sold at public auction by the
defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity,
the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of
action against the defendants. In the same case, this
Court further held that, in acting on a motion to
dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint
from its annexes where it clearly appears that the
claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the
properties in question is predicated on said annexes.
Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be
dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he
has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no
avail as respondents-appellees have failed,
neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow
petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the
area covered by his timber license. He further alleged
that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except thru this special civil
action, as the last official act of the respondent-
appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in declaring void the timber license
referred to above after denying petitioner-appellant's
motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative
act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of
Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil.
237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that the
failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse
decision of the Secretary to the President cannot
preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view
of the theory that the Secretary of a department is
merely an alter-ego of the President. The
presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears
the implied sanction of the President unless the
same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. the
Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not
appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of
the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation
No. 238 withdrawing the area from private
exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo
Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the
orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal
is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs.
Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the
alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions
are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from
the decision or opinion of the former to the latter,
and that, such being the case, after he had appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands
he had exhausted the administrative remedies, is
untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President
of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all
thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal
to the President is the last step he should take in an
administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-
92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is
afforded by and within the executive department of
the government the courts will not interfere until at
least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs.
Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651;
U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198
U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs. U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The
administrative remedies afforded by law must first be
exhausted before resort can be had to the courts,
especially when the administrative remedies are by
law exclusive and final. Some matters and some
questions are by law delegated entirely and
absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of
the executive department of the government. When
the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon
the executive department of the government to
dispose of particular questions, their judgments or
the judgments of that particular department are no
more reviewable by the courts than the final
judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be
reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis
supplied).
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-
appellant must allege and prove that he has no other
speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at
bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and adequate
remedy is an appeal to the President of the
Philippines.
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being
elementary that the only question involved n
certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction or
excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant
the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari when the same is so grave as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-
Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191
[April .1, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption
that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in
the acts or omissions of the respondents-appellees.
certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time
and again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110
SCRA 465), "it being a time honored and well known
principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party
must first exhaust the administrative remedies
available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April
18, 1969).
Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of,
petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In
other words, before filing the present action for
certiorari in the court below, they should have
availed of this administrative remedy and their
failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case
[Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June
29,1962]. To place petitioners' case beyond the pale
of this rule, they must show that their case falls —
which it does not — within the cases where, in
accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party
need not exhaust administrative remedies within his
reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs.
The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P.,
G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs.
Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs.
Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G. R. No. L-11078, May 27,
1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959,
Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs.
Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31,
1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29,
1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA
1178, April 28, 1969).
III
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, but also failed to note that
his action is a suit against the State which, under the
doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper
unless the State gives its consent to be sued
Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs.
U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the
petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting
within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-
appellant contends that "this case is not a suit
against the State but an application of a sound
principle of law whereby administrative decisions or
actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a
protection afforded the citizens against oppression"
(p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his
contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action
is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing
State exemption from suits. He cannot use that
principle of law to profit at the expense and
prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion
of public welfare and the protection of the
inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights
and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule
establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be
circumvented by directing the action against the
officers of the State instead of against the State itself.
In such cases the State's immunity may be validly
invoked against the action as long as it can be shown
that the suit really affects the property, rights, or
interests of the State and not merely those of the
officer nominally made party defendant" (SINCO,
Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos,
64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation System
vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44,
Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs.
Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125;
Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees'
Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their
capacity as officers of the State, representatives of
the sovereign authority discharging governmental
powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber
license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the
petitioner-appellant would result in the government
losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This
being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot
prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
IV
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber
license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly
revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier,
paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in
the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and
conditions of this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this
license may be made to expire at an earlier date,
when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI
rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this ceise
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In
the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56
Phil. 123), it was held that:
A license authorizing the operation and exploitation
of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may
not be deprived without due process of law, but a
mere privilege which may be revoked when public
interests so require.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus,
no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co.,
Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug.
30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it
to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and
welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct.
24,1970).
V
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber
licenses are subject to the authority of the Director
of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest
resources is directly under the control and
supervision of the Director of Forestry. However,
"while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that forest products shall be cut,
gathered and removed from any forest only upon
license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true
that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry
is subject to the control of the Department Head or
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may
impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the
powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of
Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981).
The power of control of the Department Head over
bureaus and offices includes the power to modify,
reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials
(Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969;
Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148).
Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority
to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by
the Director of Forestry. There being supporting
evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's
timber license was a wise exercise of the power of
the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.
Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the
principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary
to which the alleged right to them of private
individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into
and more often than not rejected. We do so again"
(Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE
reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving
the national patrimony as ordained by the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE
ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SO ORDERED,
Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin,
JJ., concur.
Aquino, J, concurs in the result.
De Castro, JJ., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
LOPE GUZMAN RIVAS, PACIFICO V. VIJANDRE,
FERNANDO A. PASCUA, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
AQUINO, C.J.:
This is a land registration case involving what the
Republic of the Philippines claims to be grazing land,
a part of the forest reserve.
The evidence shows that on March 14, 1873
the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First
Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted
to Domingo Bunagan a possessory information title
for a tract of land, called Nottab, "3,500 brazas de
largo y 3,000 brazas de ancho", "destinado al pasto
de sus ganados" y bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio
del derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera
tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. I and K).
The Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885
mentions Bunagan as having obtained a
"composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile,
Cagayan (Exh. J-1) or a gratuitous adjustment title as
distinguished from an onerous adjustment title. **
What happened to the Nottab land? The conflicting
evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural
Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre
shows that two persons, the brothers Luis Guzman
Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of Pablo Guzman,
played decisive roles in its disposition.
The evidence is conflicting because, according to
Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis
Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco, whereas,
according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion was
sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope
Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to Vijandre
and Fernando A. Pascua.
The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab
land, whatever its area, is forestal and grazing land,
and consequently, was inalienable land and,
therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land
were void.
According to Cavaco's evidence, after Bunagan's
death, his son-in-law, Ceferino Saddul,
as apoderado of Bunagan's heirs, sold the land to
one Manuel Guzman sometime in 1904 or 1905 or
1908.
The administratrix of Manuel Guzman's estate, with
the approval of the probate court, sold the land in
1934 to Luis Guzman Rivas who died in 1944. The
land passed to his widow, Dolores Enriquez, who sold
the northern portion of the land to Saturnino
Moldero in 1944 and the southern portion to Rafael
Gonzales in 1951.
Moldero in 1948 sold his northern portion to the
spouses Antonio and Josefa Estrada. In 1951 the
Estrada spouses and (Gonzales sold the land to
Cavaco (Exh. 12-A to 15—Pascua, 242 Joint Record
on Appeal).
The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land
registration case adjudicated to Cavaco 1,222
hectares of the Nottab land. It is the registered
owner of the land. Right or wrong that decision is the
law of the case. (Cagayan Valley Agricultural
Corporation vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No, 24931-
32, December 9, 1960).
The trial court correctly held that the said
adjudication means that the respondent herein
cannot use anymore in this case the supposed
1873 informacion posesoria and the
1885 composicion gratuita as bases of their
application for registration. The reason is that said
Spanish titles were already used in the Cavaco case.
Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not
exceed 1,000 hectares (Director of Lands vs, Reves, L-
27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191 and
other cases). It may be repeated that Cavaco
obtained more than 1,000 hectares by virtue of the
said Spanish titles. Parenthetically, it may be stated
that Presidential Decree No. 892 since 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.
It is the supposed remainder of Bunagan's land that is
now involved in this case, the portion transferred to
Lope Guzman Rivas as differentiated from the Cavaco
land which came from Lope's brother Luis. It should
be stressed that according to the Cavaco case
the whole land was sold to Luis and, therefore, no
remainder could have been transferred to Lope.
On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence
in this case, on July 26, 1915, Manuela Bunagan, the
sole heir of Domingo, sold to Pablo Guzman for
Pl,000 the remainder of the land in Nottab, Enrile,
Cagayan, "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia",
covered by Tax Declaration No. 626 (Exh. H).
Pablo Guzman died in 1927. The Nottab land was
inherited by his son, petitioner Lope Guzman Rivas,
who leased the land for grazing purposes to other
persons. Lope has been residing in Makati, Metro
Manila since 1961 because he has a heart ailment.
In 1958 about 800 hectares of the said land were
sold by Lope to Ignacio Pascua who in 1962 sold the
same portion to his son, Fernando.
Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968
an application for the registration of two parcels of
land located at Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land
previously applied for by Cavaco. It is covered by Plan
Psu-178846, embracing thirteen lots with an area of
1,033 hectares, and Plan Psu-179101 covering fifteen
lots with an area of 890 hectares, or a total of 1,92.7
hectares.
Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas
sold to his co-petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire
land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre undertook to finance
the registration of the land. Should the registration of
the land not materialize for causes not imputable to
Vijandre, then Lope would return to mall
scashadvances(9-16, Joint Record on Appeal).
The learned trial court declared the disputed land
public land and dismissed the applications of Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua
and Cavaco.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's
decision. It granted the application of Lope and
Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13, which
was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The Directors
of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this
Court. Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file
any appellees' brief.
The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate
Court erred (1) in not declaring that the disputed
land is part of a forest reservation; (2) in not finding
that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their
predecessors have not been in the open, continuous,
uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession of
the disputed land and that their possession was not
in the concept of owner: (3) in not finding that
Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic
and (4) in not finding that the 1960 decision in favor
of Cavaco is not res judicata.
On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the
disputed land was already private in the hands of
Domingo Bunagans (2) that portions of said land,
1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the
names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V.
Pascua) respectively; (3) that the pasture lease
agreements did not convert private land into public
land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles were
authentic and valid.
We hold that the disputed land is inalienable public
grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It is
part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile,
Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry Map
L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan
Land Classification, containing an area of 8,249
hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong,
Cagayan. It is non-registerable (Exh. 2-Rep.). It cannot
be appropriated by private persons. It is not
disposable public agricultural land.
Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under
Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February
13, 1967. It is intended for "wood production
watershed soil protection and other forest uses" (Exh.
1-B and 7, Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was
made prior to the instant 1968 application for
registration.
Applicant Lope Guzman Rivas and oppositor Pascua
and their predecessors have always treated the 1,923
hectares as pasture land. Portions of the land had
been the object of pasture lease agreements with
the Bureau of Forestry. Among the lessees were
oppositor Fernando A. Pascua himself, Eliseo Lasam
and J.T.Torres, Jr. (Exh. 3 and 4, Rep.).
The 1960 and 1968 tax declarations of applicant Lope
Guzmian Rivas describe the 2,000 hectares of land in
question as for "pasture exclusively", meaning it
is grazing land (Exh. R and S). Similarly, the 1960 and
1962 tax declarations submitted in evidence by
oppositor Pascua describe 790 or 767 hectares of the
land as "pasture land" (Exh. 27 and 28—Pascua).
We have stated that the supposed possessory
information title issued in 1873 to the original
claimant, Domingo Bunagan, describes the land as
"una estancia de ganado al terreno" (grazing land),
or "un terreno destinado al pasto de sus ganados" or
la estancia para ganados denominada Nottab".
The application for the possessory information title
was approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio
determination derecho que el Estado o otro tercero
pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. 1).
(Note that Exhibit J, the 1885 resolution published in
Gaceta de Manila, is not a composition title at all).
Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo
Bunagan, sold in 1915 the 2,000 hectares in question
to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare as "una
parcela de pasto de ganaderia (Exh. H). Similarly,
Ignacio A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas
the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a parcel of pasture
land" (Exh. I Pascua).
Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable
under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly
agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
(inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation
cannot be the object of private ownership (Republic
vs. Animas, L- 37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499;
Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 132 Phil. 637;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077,
February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156 and other cases).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is
reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V.
Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer
Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., (Chairman), Abad Santos, Escolin and
Alampay, JJ., concur.
Cuevas, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO LAHORA and TORIBIA
MORALIZON, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
EMILIO DAYANGHIRANG, JR., and THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, oppositors-appellees.
Occena and Ocampo Law Offices for petitioners-
appellants.
Jose C. Mañgune for oppositor-appellee Emilio
Dayanghirang, Jr.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The spouses Francisco Lahora and Toribia Moralizon
brought the present appeal to this Court from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Davao (in Land
Reg. Case No. N-86), dismissing their petition with
respect to Lot No. 2228 on the ground of previous
registration, said appellants claiming that the
question of the validity of a certificate of title based
on a patent allegedly obtained by fraud can be raised
by them in a land registration proceeding, contrary to
the ruling of the court a quo.
The records show that on 26 November 1965 herein
appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Davao for registration of nine (9) parcels of land
located in barrio Zaragosa, municipality of Manay,
province of Davao, one-half of which having been
acquired by appellant Toribia Moralizon allegedly by
inheritance, and the other half by purchase and by
continuous, open, public and adverse possession in
the concept of owner. One of the said parcels of land
is identified as lot No. 2228, plan SWO-36856, Manay
Cadastre.
The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang,
Jr., who alleged that lands belonging to him and his
wife were included in the application for registration,
mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228 which was said
to be already covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-6055 in the name of oppositor's wife. The
Director of Lands also filed an opposition to the
petition, contending that the applicants or their
predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title
over the parcels of land sought to be registered, nor
have they been in open, continuous, and notorious
possession thereof for at least 30 years.
On 14 June 1967, counsel for the private oppositor
filed a motion for correction of the number of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously
referred to as OCT No. P-6055, when it should
properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is likewise prayed in
the same motion that the petition be dismissed
insofar as it includes Lot No. 2228, for the reason
that said lot was already registered and titled in the
name of oppositor's wife as of 21 June 1956. In its
order of 18 June 1967, which was amended on 29
June 1967, the court granted the oppositor's motion
and directed the dismissal of the petition as regards
Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it having been
previously registered and titled, said parcel of land
can no longer be the subject of adjudication in
another proceeding. Hence, this appeal by the
petitioners.
It may be recalled that the action filed by petitioners-
appellants in the lower court on 26 November 1965
was for original registration of certain parcels of land,
including Lot No. 2228 of the Manay Cadastre. It is
not here denied by appellants that said Lot No. 2228
was the subject of a public land grant in favor of the
oppositor's wife, and by virtue of which grant or
patent Original Certificate of Title No. P-6053 was
issued in her name on 21 June 1956. Appellants,
however, try to make a case against the dismissal-
order of the lower court by contending that the
patent issued to oppositor's wife was procured by
fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual
occupants of the land, were not notified of the
application for patent therefor and of its
adjudication. Thus, according to appellants, since
they were the actual occupants of the property, the
government could not have awarded it to oppositor's
wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as
the original certificate of title subsequently obtained
by her, were null and void.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land
patents and the character of the certificate of title
that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where
land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Land Registration Act 1,
the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to
all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said
Act.2 In other words, upon expiration of one year
from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued
in a registration proceeding.3
In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and
titled in the name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June
1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants'
petition for registration of the same parcel of land on
26 November 1965, on the ground that the first
certificate of title (OCT No. P-6053) covering the said
property is a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly
administration of justice precludes that Lot 2228, of
the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two
registration proceedings. Having become registered
land under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the
issuance of the public land patent and the recording
thereof, further registration of the same would lead
to the obviously undesirable result of two certificates
of title being issued for the same piece of land, even
if both certificates should be in the name of the same
person. And if they were to be issued to different
persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is
the most valued characteristic of Torrens titles,
would be torn away. For this reason, this Court has
ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, that
in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already decreed
in an earlier case; and that a second decree for the
same land would be null and void.4 Of course, if the
patent had been issued during the pendency of the
registration proceedings, the situation would be
different.5
Even assuming arguendo, that there indeed exists a
proper case for cancellation of the patent for intrinsic
fraud, the action for review of the decree should
have been filed before the one year period had
elapsed.6 Thereafter, the proper party to bring the
action would only be the person prejudiced by the
alleged fraudulent act — the owner and grantor, 7 and
not another applicant or claimant. Furthermore, the
relief provided by the law in such instance may be
secured by the aggrieved party, not in another
registration, for land already registered in the name
of a person can not be the subject of another
registration8, but in an appropriate action such as
one for reconveyance or reversion 9, or for damages
in case the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. 10
As regards the complaint against the alleged
correction of the number of the certificate of title
covering Lot No. 2228 which was erroneously stated
in the oppositor's motion as OCT No. P-6055, when it
should properly be OCT No. P-6053, it appearing that
the motion was intended to rectify a clearly
typographical mistake, there is nothing irregular in
the lower court's order granting the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF
LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN
TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA
TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C.
TANCINCO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial
District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of
Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered
their registration in the names of the private
respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco
Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial
and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent
to their fishpond property and particularly described
as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892),
situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the
NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on
the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on
the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on
the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina
Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-
12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-
111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY THREE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (33,937)
SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-
131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.
Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property of
Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by
Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot
3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1,
by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877).
... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-
131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line
2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line
3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5,
by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877),
and on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of
Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985)
SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando
C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands
filed a written opposition to the application for
registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a
partial withdrawal of the application for registration
with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with
the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed
by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn
from the application and trial proceeded only with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a
decision granting the application on the finding that
the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-
131892 (Exh. H) are accretions to the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of
said property. The Court, therefore, orders the
registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio of
Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan Psu-
131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical
descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin
Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and residing at
3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.;
Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes, Jr.,
residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina
Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan Imperial, residing
at Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal; and
Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor,
residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to
the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered
a decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower
court. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan
at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang walang
bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court
admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina
Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA
734) we held that this Court retains the power to
review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts
when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave
abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the
court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record
which render untenable the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question
are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to
speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and
thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-
made and artificial and not the result of the gradual
and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of
the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on
the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect
that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 &
2, they were already dry almost at the level of the
Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from
the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms
length the land was still dry up to the edge of the
river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil
from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil
and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new
lots were then converted into fishpond, and water in
this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of
the Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing
evidence establishes the fact of accretion without
human intervention because the transfer of the dike
occurred after the accretion was complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of
three requisites before an accretion covered by this
particular provision is said to have taken place. They
are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to
the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant
case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that
the addition to the said property was made gradually
through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe
that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being
because of the effects of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private
respondents who happens to be their overseer and
whose husband was first cousin of their father
noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve
hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already
taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to
testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to
their land in the years before 1939. However, the
witness testified that in that year, she observed an
increase in the area of the original fishpond which is
now the land in question. If she was telling the truth,
the accretion was sudden. However, there is
evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result
of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not
because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers
but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the
river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be
registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly
and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond
adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The
private respondents' own evidence shows that the
water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side
of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter
deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner
the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river
is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he
suffers because of the location of his land. If estates
bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other
evils produced by the destructive force of the waters
and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are
subject to incumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which
may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City
of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner
does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring
about accretion. When the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the
dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not
to protect their property from the destructive force
of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor
General that the testimony of the private
respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early
as 1939 there already existed such alleged alluvial
deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that
the lots in question were not included in the survey
of their adjacent property conducted on May 10,
1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire
Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the
years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was
declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33
years after it had supposedly permanently formed.
The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said
areas could not have been there in 1939. They
existed only after the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river
in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion
is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration
of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of
the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as
property of the public domain under Article 420
paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private
property in the names of the private respondents is
null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move
back the dikes of their fishponds to their original
location and return the disputed property to the river
to which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.