3. Bautista vs.

Aparece

51 O.G. 805 (1995)

FACTS:

As owner of the lot subject of the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. In the same
year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani, In October 12,1935, Claudio Justiniani executed a
public instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was
assessed since 1935. While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of
the land and took possession thereof. Thus, Aparece file a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating
in the province of Bohol. When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla
officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good
will, and recognized Aparece’s lawful ownership over the land. Thus, possession of the land was restored
to Aparece.

However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the aid of armed men and
pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of the land. On appeal, Bautista raised as
defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence. He
argued that the document was executed under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla
officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before
an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.

RULING: This argument is beside the point.

The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is whether or not it is relevant, material
or competent.

The public document is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership
between the parties litigants.

Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac action.
And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules
of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular
case. With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed before
a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised
in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other evidence, documentary and oral,
satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aparece.

P.S. Had to copy this from Scribd. I couldn’t find the full case of the case in the net.
8. SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA

FACTS:

A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event.

***TRANSCRIPT*** (for reference)

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong

Good Afternoon M'am. binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung

ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
kung paano ka napunta rito, porke your own merit alam ko naman kung
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam
noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses
na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni
— Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo,
ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi
ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik
sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply
ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko
talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto
mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your
own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan
na kita).
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may
utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-
explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-
sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil
nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako
duty ko. ng mga taga Union.
 ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang
mong kalimutan na hindi ka na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi nilapastangan mo ako.
mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
tapos ka na. CHUCHI — Paano kita
nilapastanganan?
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na
loob. ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi
na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas
ka na. Magsumbong ka.

***In gist, Garcia felt betrayed because of Ramirez’s actions. Garcia reminds Ramirez that it is
through her help that the latter got her current job. Garcia left some hurtful remarks against
Ramirez.

Private respondent filed a criminal case on another RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping
Act) against Ramirez due to the recording made.

Upon arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

RTC granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication.

Private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with SC, which forthwith referred to CA.

CA declared the RTC’s decision as null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but CA denies
the same.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the provisions of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING: NO.

1.) The language of RA 4200 is clear.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator.
The Senate Congressional Records supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200
our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations
or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

2.) The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.

The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be professed."

3.) Definition of private communication.

In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)". These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written
or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter's office.

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." The instant case turns on
a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
13. JOSE TABUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

The case revolves around a 440 sqm parcel of land in Aklan. In 1973, the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla filed
an action for recovery against Jose Tabuena. The judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot.

Records show that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the
two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting
upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested
that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she
paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land
until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession
thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his
parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they
died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was
a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.

Tabuena appealed to CA, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio
took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally
submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it
considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.

In sustaining RTC, CA held that the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted as disclosed in the
Transcript Stenographic Notes.

ISSUE/S:

1.) W/N exhibits “A” and “B” and “C” were formally offered as evidence?

2.) W/N RTC committed a mistake in taking judicial notice of the evidence submitted without the consent
and knowledge of Tabuena?

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE:

Upon examination of the records, the exhibits submitted were Exhibits "X" and "T" and not Exhibits "A", "B"
and "C". In fact, the RTC categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among
those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix."

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the
pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not
by such marking formally offered as exhibits.

SC mentions the case of Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles: "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide
to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to
do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value."

As per CJ Moran: “The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial.”

SECOND ISSUE: YES.

GENERAL RULE: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have
been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge.

EXCEPTION: In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

Note that the exception applies "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"
or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of
the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the
case then pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was
completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the
case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was
"unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

Considering the scarcity of evidence for the private respondent, the complaint should have been dismissed
by the RTC for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations.

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously allowed
Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not
hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with the property, being a
bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is specious reasoning. At best,
it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the
property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if
he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in
the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were
paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in her own name.

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of
the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession thereof for more than
fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own
name.13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. He even mortgaged the land to the
Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner.
These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner
was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and even
to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The
exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no
valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of RTC were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally
offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court.
RTC also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice
thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated,
the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been
sustained by the respondent court.

The private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the
disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is
substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial
judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.