PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL.

1 3 , 3 7 4 8 (1993)

Introducing administrative reform through the application of

computer-based information systems: a case study in India
SHIRIN MADON
London Schoofof Economics

SUMMARY
Administrative reform in a number of developing countries has recently been directed at
achieving decentralization through the diffusion of information technology to local areas.
However, despite these efforts, the main objective of improving the effectiveness of development
planning and monitoring systems remains unfulfilled because of poor integration between
the process of technology adoption and the context within which the technology is imple-
mented. There is a paucity of literature that aims to make explicit the nature of this integration.
This paper aims to offer a contribution in this direction by describing the case of the computer-
ized rural information systems project (CRISP) in India. The results show that during the
first few years of implementation information technology served to reinforce existing inefficien-
cies within the bureaucracy. Information technology was later used as a vehicle for promoting
change within the administration as local administrators acquired the flexibility to direct
the technology towards their own requirements.

INTRODUCTION

The environment facing developing countries has become increasingly more turbu-
lent, dynamic and complex. As a result, increasing demands have been placed on
public administration in these countries to regulate socioeconomic development
(Conyers and Hills, 1984). With the declining cost of microcomputers and rapid
improvements in hardware and software technology, a number of developing coun-
tries have recently been prompted to direct administrative reform towards achieving
decentralized development planning through the diffusion of technology to a relati-
vely small area of administration known as the district. A central goal of all these
initiatives has been to improve access to information, thereby producing more
informed, better-reasoned decision making. In India, district planning was introduced
to the states, with the National Informatics Centre placing microcomputers in each
of the 439 districts (Sanwal, 1987). In Kenya, the resource management for rural
development project was engaged in the introduction of microcomputers in the dis-
tricts (MPND, 1987). In South-East Asia, Malaysia extended its integrated develop-
ment project information system to the districts (Han and Render, 1989).
With all these initiatives, however, the main objective of improving development
planning and monitoring systems remains unfulfilled (Sanwal, 1990). The main reason
for this stems from the fact that these efforts have been designed and developed
at the level of central government without due consideration of the inherent character-

Dr Madon is at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Information
Systems, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.

10037-12$11 .oo
027 1-207 5/93/0
0 1993 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
38 S. Madon

istics of development administration at the local level (Sirivedhin et al., 1987; Wal-
sham et al., 1990). Avgerou (1990) argues that while all planning involves some
elements of rational decision making, in developing countries it is heavily shaped
by political influences, which stem from the local social and cultural environment.
She notes that strict adherence to formal, rule-based procedures has imposed a parti-
cular rationality of using numerical analysis and quantitative data in information
processing, which is at odds with the dynamics of planning in developing countries.
Admittedly, the problems of information technology implementation apply to both
developed and developing countries. Indeed, information systems for government
policy making have been extensively researched in industrialized countries during
the 1970s and 1980s (Kraemer and King, 1986; King and Kraemer, 1991). However,
it is often argued that the national and organizational context in most developing
countries is substantially different from that in industrialized countries (Felts, 1987;
Bell and Sheppard, 1988). There is a small amount of literature that focuses on
the socio-organizational difficulties of adopting information technology in developing
countries (Adkins, 1988; Waema and Walsham, 1990; Lind, 1991). Although these
studies do not pertain specifically to the planning environment, they elucidate the
value of analysing the process of information technology transfer from a social per-
spective.
However, most studies on information technology for development planning tend
to focus on problems relating to infrastructure and human resource development
(Deboeck and Kinsey, 1985; Nabarro et al., 1989), with little explicit mention of
the social, political, cultural and organizational factors that prevail in the planning
environment and the way in which these factors interact with the process of techno-
logy adoption. This point can be illustrated by reference to a book of published
case studies, which describes 13 information technology applications in various
government departments and agencies in South and South-East Asian countries
(APDC, 1987). One of the case studies is concerned with the introduction of a com-
puter system to assist in the resettlement programme at the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform in the Philippines. This is a highly sensitive political subject in that country
and the introduction of such a system would have political implications, as powerful
groups with vested interests might block land reforms and thereby resist the use
of information technology for this purpose. Although the role of an information
system clearly occupies a key area of political action within such a highly politicized
environment, little attention is given to this dimension in the case study and the
poor impact of the system is attributed simply to the lack of government funding.
In view of the paucity of empirical research, which aims to investigate the interac-
tion between the context of development administration and the process of technology
adoption, this paper offers a contribution by describing the introduction of the com-
puterized rural information systems project (CRISP) in India.

BACKGROUND TO CRISP

The responsibilities for planning, implementation and monitoring of the integrated

rural development programme (IRDP) are shared by the central and state govern-
 Computer-based information systems 39

ments, as well as official machinery at the district and block levels (GOI, 1988).
The central and state governments share the resource burden, frame policy plans
and broad guidelines, and monitor the programme on the basis of certain key indi-
cators. Detailed planning, implementation and monitoring are the shared responsibi-
lities of the district rural development agencies (DRDAs) at the district and block
offices. The primary reporting agency is the block office, which maintains the basic
details regarding the projects being implemented within the block’s jurisdiction. The
reports from the block office are consolidated at the DRDA office. The DRDA
reports are in turn consolidated at the state offices from which progress reports
of India are prepared.
In the mid-l980s, the Government of India realized that a massive amount of
data had been collected for managing the IRDP but that not much of it had been
used effectively. The very large dimensions of the programme meant that data compi-
lation was often delayed because of shortages in skilled manpower. Moreover, the
vast amount of data maintained in the records of local level offices was not easily
retrievable and could not therefore be used for further analysis for micro-level plan-
ning. Consequently, there was little interface between progress as reported upwards
and progress as witnessed in reality (Das Gupta, 1989). It was recognized that com-
puter-based information systems offered the possibility of providing a local level
of decision support for IRDP management. This led to the genesis of the computerized
rural information systems project (CRISP).
CRISP was based on the experience of an enterprising experiment in the Karwar
district of Karnataka in South India in which the project director of the DRDA
introduced a microcomputer-based information system to improve the local level
of decision support. Systems design and development involved the active participation
of the staff at the DRDA. All the clerks were made aware of the practical benefits
to be gained through computerizing operations at the district and were given adequate
training to enable them to become acquainted with operating procedures. The intro-
duction of technology was accompanied by an effort to modify inefficient procedures
and administrative arrangements at the local level (Banerji and Ghosh, 1989).
The Kanvar experiment resulted in a marked increase in the district’s performance
in terms of improved efficiency of report generation, thereby enabling officers to
devote more time for vital extension duties. The project also resulted in improved
access to accurate data for decision making and monitoring (Patel, 1987). Based
on the success at Kanvar, the Department of Rural Development extended the project
throughout the country. In October 1987, sanction was given to all DRDAs to
purchase a PC/AT microcomputer and the requisite peripherals. The software that
was provided by the central government to all districts consisted of a menu-driven
application called CRISP, which was developed by the National Informatics Centre.
The next section of this paper is devoted to describing the interaction between
the contextual factors inherent in development administration and the process of
CRISP implementation. The description relates to selected districts in the state of
Gujarat in Western India where the author spent several months of fieldwork during
1988 to 1991. The main means of data collection was via semi-structured interviews,
to enable respondents to introduce variations in their choice of answer. A longitudinal
research design was adopted to explore patterns in the coevolution of information
systems and social settings. The author returned to the research site at intervals
of about 9 months to see how the situation had altered.
40 S. Madon

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT

ADMINISTRATION AND THE PROCESS OF CRISP IMPLEMENTATION

The scope of this section is to highlight how the process of CRISP implementation
was influenced by its prevailing context and the extent to which CRISP served as
a vehicle for changing this context. The process of implementation is broken down
into three stages, which represent natural breaks in the course of events over time.

Phase 1: the pre-CRISP phase (before 1987)

Over the years, the lack of an integrated policy for the IRDP had resulted in the
creation of a multitude of programmes aimed at alleviating poverty, but which lacked
strategic focus. In an attempt to co-ordinate these disparate efforts, a number of
centrally sponsored programmes emerged. However, these programmes aimed to
rationalize planning at subnational levels, without understanding the functioning,
dynamics and causes of inefficiency at the local level. Centrally sponsored schemes
also had the effect of undermining the planning role of the state government. Over
time, the centre started to do much of the state’s work and the state subsumed
much of the district’s work. This upward shifting of functions meant that planning
lost touch with reality, resulting in power conflicts between the centre and the state
that exist to this day. In parallel with efforts to rationalize planning at the local
level, several attempts were made by the central government during this period to
develop computer application for planning. However, these efforts were fragmented
and were neither matched with the adequate provision of skilled manpower, nor
with the development of indigenous capacity in terms of infrastructure and support.
At the local level, the lack of strategic focus to rural development and the reluctance
to devolve power meant that the planning and service roles of the DRDAs were
downgraded. Planning for the DRDA was reduced to the ritualistic observance of
targets, set by higher authorities, to be achieved for each district. This target orien-
tation resulted in IRDP performance being measured in terms of financial expenditure
and the number of households assisted, rather than in terms of alleviating poverty.
The hidden costs of imposing administrability through target setting by higher
levels have been to shape the values of administrators at the local level. The task
of IRDP implementation is viewed by them as an impersonal and mechanical exercise
of little value, as they are not given any opportunity to interact with superiors or
become involved in planning. This has led to feelings of neglect and apathy among
local administrators towards their duties. It has also had the effect of promoting
vested interests in terms of political and social status. There is a general consensus
amongst administrators about the kinds of demands that can legitimately be enter-
tained and a reluctance to undertake any activity that is conceived in the wider
interests of the programme, but which does not make the business of reaching targets
any easier.
Over the years, the system described above has generated a particular work culture,
which has shaped the attitudes of officials and set the pace of work. This has had
the effect of creating an iron frame within which to manage the IRDP. Any attempts
made to introduce new structures via administrative reform have eventually
had to be abandoned as it has proved difficult to modify attitudes and ways
 Computer-based information systems 41

of functioning within the administration. It was in this context that the CRISP
initiative was born.

Phase 2 (1 987-1 990)

Perhaps the strongest enabling factor for CRISP was the change in attitude of India’s
political leadership in the mid-1 980s. This triggered a drive towards computer appli-
cations which aimed to promote development planning. However, once the impetus
for change was under way, various historical and contextual aspects influenced the
process of systems design.
First, the inherent rigidity of the administration, which had hampered previous
attempts at reform to modify structures, influenced the process of systems design.
This rigidity manifested itself in the deliberate design decision taken by the central
government to develop CRISP as an overlay of the existing IRDP manual monitoring
system, to increase its chances of acceptability. However, by doing so, the data
sets were not derived from a model that reflected the reality of the local environment.
As a result, CRISP served to perpetuate the practice of reducing the complex task
of rural development to simple administrative procedures.
Second, historic tensions that had existed between the centre and the state were
further aggravated by the launching of CRISP. While the cornerstone of the CRISP
project was supposed to be decentralization of the technology diffusion process,
in practice the system was designed and developed without any consultation with
state governments concerning their requirements. The state government consequently
believed that the CRISP initiative was an unconstitutional move made by the centre
to bypass its authority and to establish a direct channel of communication with
the districts. The initiative therefore served to rekindle a context of hostility between
the centre and state administrations, which caused the state government to act as
an opposition group to the CRISP project soon after it was launched.
Third, efforts to computerize during the initial few months of launching CRISP
were hampered by the inadequacy of training and education in terms of course
content, duration and frequency. Most of the trainees were novice users who found
that training did not enable them to grasp even the basic concepts of computing
nor to retain the knowledge that they had gained. The problem was further com-
pounded because the CRISP user interface was in English, while the main language
of communication at the local level was Gujarati. The development of human
resources has also been hampered by the transfer structure inherent in the adminis-
tration. DRDA directors felt little incentive to release their staff for computer training
as all their staff were on deputation and could be transferred at short notice. This
meant that efforts to computerize at the district level were staggered and reliant
on the training received by incoming staff. In some cases, districts had no trained
personnel for long periods of time and were unable to use the computer system.
The importance of the concept of the ‘leader’ in Indian administrative culture
meant that the attitude of the director was a crucial determinant for the success
of computerization at the DRDA. In districts where leadership messages were strong,
positive and consistent, acceptance of the computer was established more easily.
In most cases, however, the computer represented an alien object to the directors,
who were themselves unaware of the advantages to be gained from CRISP. Leader-
ship messages have therefore tended to be inconsistent and nebulous. In many cases,
42 S. Madon

staff have taken this as a signal to disregard the CRISP initiative resulting in non-
utilization of the technology.
Fourth, a major reason for underutilization of CRISP has been the lack of human
resources available at the DRDA to operate the machines. In 1989, the central govern-
ment offered to provide each DRDA with additional personnel from its headquarters
to assist in clearing the backlog of data entry. However, because of the suspicion
and antagonism between the centre and the state governments that had built up
over the years, the Gujarat administration rejected the offer as it did not want any
further interference from the centre. Refusing help from the centre, yet faced with
a chronic shortage of manpower to operate the equipment, junior clerks at the DRDA
were put under increasing pressure to perform data entry in addition to their regular
administrative duties. This caused considerable stress for this group of workers.
Rather than computerization resulting in less ‘pen pushing’, they saw a rapid expan-
sion of their duties. As a result, there was a serious disincentive for junior clerks
to use the equipment, which manifested itself in non-reporting of faults if the computer
was out of action for any reason.
Fifth, when users returned to their offices after training, they were often unable
to practise what they had learnt because the machines were invariably out of action.
There was a lack of accountability on the part of maintenance companies, and on
the part of the CRISP monitoring cell established by the state government. Despite
several pleas for assistance, district offices were sometimes kept waiting for up to
6 months for help to arrive. The CRISP monitoring cell maintained a progress report
of CRISP usage in the district offices. However, progress was measured merely in
terms of whether hardware and software were installed. Such performance indicators
were input-oriented and reminiscent of the manner in which the IRDP and other
development programmes have historically been evaluated. The cell kept no record
about qualitative aspects of the CRISP initiative in terms of how the equipment
and personnel were functioning.
Sixth, the value attached to status and hierarchy by administrators was an import-
ant influence on the diffusion of technology at the local level. According to central
government guidelines, the computer was to be located in a cabin, adjacent to the
director’s cabin. In most cases, however, the popular choice of location was the
director’s cabin. This choice was driven by the importance attached to status among
senior administrators in the bureaucracy. The computer was seen by directors as
portraying power and authority. In many cases, the computer caused a distraction
to both the director and the user; the director himself was often too busy to use
the machine and the user felt intimidated to use it in his presence. As a result,
the computer was grossly underutilized.
Seventh, the closed and non-participative style of bureaucracy, which was part
of the administrative culture, had resulted in a kind of secrecy built around data
or knowledge. With the manual system, it had been possible for directors to manipu-
late figures on the hard copy. However, with the advent of the computer system,
it was feared that information would become more visible to many and the elasticity
of data would be reduced. Faced with the prospect of a possible realignment of
power, it was reported that some directors actively discouraged efforts to computerize
by preventing staff from attending training courses, or by insisting that the computer
be kept in their cabin.
A further aspect was that while a stated objective of CRISP was to promote
 Computer-based information systems 43

decentralization of IRDP management, the process of systems development did not

allow for any consultation with district administrators who play a leading role in
the decentralization process. This led to the establishment of centrally defined data
sets without regard to local conditions. Lack of user involvement in systems develop-
ment served to perpetuate feelings of neglect and apathy amongst local administrators
towards the task of rural development. However, another serious consequence was
the mismatch that resulted between the reporting requirements of the district offices
and the reporting capabilities of CRISP. As a consequence, local administrators
had no incentive to use the machines as the regular reports still had to be produced
manually.
Finally, an inherent characteristic of development administration is the one-way
communication from higher to lower echelons of the hierarchy, which has often
manifested itself in the form of target setting without any feedback loops. With
the implementation of CRISP, this characteristic found expression in the lack of
any channel of communication between systems developers and users, which pre-
vented users from being able to communicate their concerns about the system. Situa-
tions have arisen in which users have felt that a feature of the CRISP system was
dysfunctional, but there has been no channel available for them to communicate
that knowledge. This has tended to perpetuate the impersonality and anonymity
inherent in the administration. The only recourse has been for users to signal the
problem through resistance to change.

Phase 3 (since 1990)

The problems experienced during the first 3 years of the CRISP experiment meant
that by the end of 1989, there was a distinct possibility of the CRISP project stagnat-
ing. In most district offices, the computer was not being used and administrators
had reverted to the manual system of functioning. During the latter half of the
year, senior officers at the centre and state began to realize that a lot more than
technical inputs were required for the successful implementation of CRISP. Attention
began to focus on how technology could be harnessed in a more dynamic way and
some concrete strategic moves were taken by the centre, the state and the DRDAs
in terms of modifying structures within the administration.
The centre began to show concern about the efficacy of existing organizational
procedures at the DRDA and has recently initiated a study of the DRDA as a
key institution involved with poverty alleviation at the district level. While similar
studies have previously been undertaken by independent scholars, this is the first
time that the government has made a serious attempt to modify structures and pro-
cedures at the local level.
Given the problems of human resource development at district level, senior officers
from the central and state governments have recently convened a meeting to discuss
the possibility of having a permanent computer cadre established at each DRDA.
This cadre may consist of externally recruited computer programmers and support
staff, or may involve training staff from within the DRDA itself.
Concern over the lack of technical support offered to the DRDAs during the
initial few years has prompted the centre to consider placing CRISP completely
under the control of the National Informatics Centre rather than allowing states
44 S. Madon

to decide on training and support. However, this issue has opened up debate about
the future of computerization at DRDAs. On the one hand, the central government
working through the National Informatics Centre believes that it is better to have
a menu-driven system designed by the centre for district level computerization. On
the other hand, the state administration believes that the future of computerization
lies in local initiative building with appropriate technical support. In one sense,
this debate draws on the prevailing contextual factors concerning the reluctance
of the centre to devolve power to the states.
While the debate concerning the future direction of computerization at district
level continues, the state-level training institute has had a more practical and pivotal
role to play in steering the way towards end-user computing. By virtue of its experience
in human resource development, the training institute in Gujarat has been given
almost a free hand by the government in how it plans and conducts its training.
By directing its training towards the use of high-level languages, the training institute
has not only altered the course of DRDA computerization in Gujarat but has also
taken a new stance of devolving power to substate levels.
With all the initial frustrations encountered with the CRISP initiative, the sheer
existence of the microcomputer at the DRDA has prompted some degree of curiosity
and self-learning among administrators at the local level. State-level support towards
end-user applications has triggered initiatives from many DRDAs towards the provi-
sion of local infrastructure. Most DRDAs have started to employ persons on a
daily wage basis for data processing at the DRDA. In addition, some DRDAs have
recently taken the initiative to engage local consultants to conduct training to their
staff on general computer awareness and on the use of high-level languages. Some
districts are training as many as eight members of staff. In these districts, additional
computers have been purchased by the directors using the DRDAs’ annual interest
income. Most DRDAs in Gujarat report that the computer has reduced the time
required for preparing routine monthly reports by half. It appears, therefore, that
the stated objective of improving the efficiency of report generation has been achieved.
There is also growing realization among DRDA directors that the current use
of computers does not afford any real decision support for IRDP planning at the
district level. Some districts have realized that the plethora of information generated
should be put to some managerial use rather than just looked at as a requirement
from the government. As a result, some districts are beginning to identify useful
categories of information for planning and monitoring purposes and are contemplat-
ing approaching independent marketing agencies for the collection of ongoing data
on productivity and income generation of rural poor households. The willingness
of DRDAs to allocate a portion of their annual budget for such activity reflects
the seriousness of their intentions towards developing more useful indicators of deve-
lopment.
The trend towards end-user computing applications has also triggered changes
in the normal functioning of IRDP administration. In a few districts, the director
has decided to generate more accountability and involvement in IRDP implemen-
tation amongst extension workers. Until now, the performance of these workers
was measured on the achievement of targets for the whole area under their jurisdic-
tion. This often meant that targets would be set and achieved for more progressive
villages, preventing uplift of the most backward areas. Under the new system, com-
puter formats have been produced for each village. The performance of each village-
 Computer-basedinformation systems 45

level worker will be monitored based on the extent to which each village in his
area has been uplifted.
The use of the computer has also brought about a change in working-group rela-
tionships within the DRDA. Errors are immediately detected within the processing
system and responsibilities for errors are easily traced. Each individual is therefore
made more aware of his and other people’s contribution and unsuccessful workers
appear to be put more in the spotlight than before.
Local initiatives toward computerization have also brought about a change in
working-group relationships between the director and his staff. Until now, a formal
relationship existed between juniors and seniors with seldom any contact between
the two. As junior officers are starting to perceive the value of computers for their
daily functioning, they are brought into direct contact with the director to discuss
potential computer applications for the DRDA. To accelerate this trend further
towards more involvement of junior staff in administrative functions, some directors
have taken the initiative to purchase a bilingual card to provide a Gujarati language
interface.

DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDY

The case study findings provide insights into the difficulties and challenges encoun-
tered in implementing technological change in the context of development adminis-
tration. Table 1 summarizes the findings. What is apparent from the Table is the
fact that the adoption of CRISP was influenced by a web of social and political
factors in the focal and wider context. This context served to reinforce existing ideas,
structures and power relations within the administration between the period from
1987 to 1990. For example, the case study findings revealed that during this period,
the CRISP initiative was not accepted by users for a variety of reasons. While the
success of the Karwar experiment was attributed to the fact that systems development
had involved the active participation and feedback of the administrators, CRISP
was introduced in a top-down manner with no consultation with administrators
at state or substate levels. Users had been locked into a rigid system, inherited from
asymmetrical colonial structures, in which they had no control to change the way
that the system behaved and no sense of ownership of the data that they were generat-
ing.
Failure of the system during this period was a product not only of non-implemen-
tation of the system, but also of the reinforcement of hostility and antagonism between
various levels of the administration. Coalitions formed according to the perceived
implications of the interactions between the proposed technological change and the
existing distribution of power, social and organizational arrangements. For example,
directors of the DRDA coalesced to resist the introduction of information technology
because of the power loss implications perceived to accompany the implementation
of the technology. During this period, the notion of information as a form of social
power further entrenched social and political biases. The existence of certain infor-
mation in the system ascribed a privileged position to certain types of data relating
to physical and financial targets, thereby excluding vital qualitative data concerning
the uplift of rural poor households.
46 S. Madon

Table I . Dynamics of the interaction between the process of CRISP implementation and
the context of develoDment administration
Pre-CRISP context* Effect of context on Effect of CRISP implementation on context3
CRISP
implementationt Pre-t990 Post- 1990
Technology drive of Impetus for CRISP Technological Governments began to
mid- 1980s initiative deterministic attitude recognize that
prevailed towards technical imputs were
information insufficient
technology for
development planning
Bureaucratic Systems design Replication of existing Trend towards
inflexibility replicated manual inefficiencies in the promoting changes in
system bureaucracy administration
Power struggles State acted as System design and Shift in balance of
between centre and opposition group to development power as state takes
state CRISP reinforced centrelstate dominant role in
conflict promoting end-user
computing
Inadequate human Lack of skilled DRDAs had poor Discussion about
resource information human resource creation of a separate
development/ technology capacity computer cadre within
transfer structure operators at DRDA the administration
to operate CRISP
Importance attached Computer regarded Computer system had Changes noticed in
to power/status/caste as status symbol, the effect of working relationships
fear of sharing perpetuating distance among DRDA staff
information between seniors and
juniors
Non-participative Lack of user System diffusion Local initiative and
style of involvement in tended to reinforce involvement of local
administration systems development apathy amongst local administrators noticed
administrators towards in training, support
central government and design
initiatives
Target orientation CRISP monitoring CRISP monitoring not Gradual change in
based on targets based on its value as a perception of
tool for IRDP information
management technology as a tool for
IRDP management by
administrators of all
levels
*Factors prevailing in the wider and focal context of CRSIP.
t How the contextual factors influenced CRISP implementation.
$How CRISP implementation in turn influenced the context before 1990 and after 1990.

Since 1990, the findings reveal that social choice has played a part in determining
the degree t o which the dominance of particular interest groups within the adminis-
tration has increased o r reduced. For example, the case study reveals emergent uses
o f information technology at the district level, quite apart from the intentions of
the original designer. Information technology has acted as a probe to reveal inefficien-
cies in basic administrative tasks and procedures and has begun to be used as a
 Computer-based information systems 47

vehicle for promoting change within the administration on issues such as centraliza-
tion and decentralization and in work procedures and relationships between workers.
This realignment of power and control has led local administrators to recognize
how information can be harnessed in a more useful way as an instrument of develop-
ment. The administrative culture built up over the years had reinforced a particular
rationality of using numerical analysis and quantitative data relating to physical
and financial targets. By doing so, social and political biases tended to persist behind
a screen of ‘rational planning’ and attention was diverted away from evaluating
the quality of service to the rural poor. With the advent of end-user applications,
the findings reveal that many district officers are beginning to identify useful categories
of information to expose the causes of differences in people’s well-being.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that organizational and human factors play a critical role
in the effective deployment of information technology in developing countries. On
the one hand, the complex sociopolitical and cultural context of development adminis-
tration has resulted in such systems being used as a means of increasingly centralized
dominance and control. On the other hand, computerized information systems have
been used as an enabling mechanism for the development of decentralized localities
to carry out planning and implementation of projects.
The parallel existence of both opportunities and threats in the application of infor-
mation technology for development planning suggests that the process of change
needs sensitive management, which should take into account the complex web of
sociopoiitical and cultural factors in development administration.

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