PGDD Kpe 1400 00 Eps Re 001 Hazop Hazid Study Report Rev.A

PT.
PERTAMINA GAS- PT PERUSAHAAN GAS NEGARA
KONSORSIUM
PT. PATRA DRILLING CONTRACTOR - PT. ELNUSA
PEMBANGUNAN PIPA GAS DURI-DUMAI (PGDD)

DIAMETER 24”
HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT

DOC. NO. : PGDD-KPE-1400-00-EPS-RE-001
A 27/12/2017 Issued for Review MAR PGH/YM

PREP’D CHK’D APP’D CHK’D APP’D
REV DATE DESCRIPTION PT. PERTAMINA
PT. PDC - PT ELNUSA GAS
PT. PGN
Date : 27/12/2017 HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT
Rev : A DOK.NO.: PGDD-KPE-1400-00-EPS-RE-001 Page : 2 of 31
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ATTACHMENT
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RECORD OF REVISION
Rev. Implemented
Page Subject Client’s Comment Explanation
Code (Y/N)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABULATION OF REVISION......................................................................................................... 2
RECORD OF REVISION ................................................................................................................ 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. 4
1. GENERAL ................................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Definition ....................................................................................................................... 7
2. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Codes and Standards ................................................................................................... 7
3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................... 8
4. ORGANIZATION ...................................................................................................................... 9
4.1 Study Team Composition ............................................................................................. 9
4.2 Chairman’s Responsibilities ........................................................................................ 9
4.3 Team Member’s Responsibilities............................................................................... 10
4.4 Scribber Responsibilities ........................................................................................... 10
5. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 10
5.1 HAZID Methodology.................................................................................................... 10
5.1.1 Guidewords ......................................................................................................... 10
5.1.2 Threats/Hazards and Consequences ................................................................ 11
5.1.3 Safeguards .......................................................................................................... 11
5.1.4 Risk Ranking ....................................................................................................... 11
5.1.5 Mitigation Required ............................................................................................ 12
5.2 HAZOP Methodology .................................................................................................. 12
5.2.1 HAZOP Technique .............................................................................................. 12
5.2.2 Causes & Consequences ................................................................................... 14
5.2.3 Safeguards .......................................................................................................... 14
5.2.4 Risk Ranking ....................................................................................................... 15
5.2.5 Action Required .................................................................................................. 15
6. HAZID REVIEW SESSION ..................................................................................................... 16
6.1 HAZID Workshop ........................................................................................................ 16
6.2 Reviewed Drawing ...................................................................................................... 16
6.3 Document Studied in HAZID ...................................................................................... 16
6.4 Nodes Consideration in HAZID .................................................................................. 17
7. HAZOP REVIEW SESSION ................................................................................................... 18
7.1 HAZOP Workshop ....................................................................................................... 18

7.2 Reviewed Drawing ...................................................................................................... 18
7.3 Document Studied in HAZOP ..................................................................................... 18
7.4 Nodes Consideration in HAZOP ................................................................................ 19
8. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................ 20
ATTACHMENT A - ATTENDANCE LIST .................................................................................... 26
ATTACHMENT B - HAZID WORKSHEET .................................................................................. 27
ATTACHMENT C - HAZOP WORKSHEET ................................................................................. 28
ATTACHMENT D - HAZID DRAWING REVIEWED .................................................................... 29
ATTACHMENT E - HAZOP DRAWING REVIEWED ................................................................... 30
ATTACHMENT F - RISK MATRIX............................................................................................... 31
1. GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
PT Pertamina Gas-PGN plans to build pipeline to support PT Pertamina Refinery Unit II

Program. RU II plans to convert the fuel for its power plant from oil to natural gas, so that the
oil production from the refinery can be increased to support national demand. In the future,
this gas infrastructure will also trigger industrial growth in Dumai.
The gas pipeline length will be 67 km from Trans Gas Indonesia (TGI) at Duri to PT
Pertamina Refinery Unit II at Dumai. This project also includes the construction of Four Line
Break Control Valve stations and Gas Metering Station at Dumai.
1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this HAZID study are as follows:
1. Generate a comprehensive list of hazards related to an activity/operation;

2. Identify mitigation measure in place to prevent the hazard from being realized and
control systems provided to help prevent escalation;
3. Identify areas where hazard may be prevented or mitigated against by implementing
procedures, additional control systems or safety barriers or modifications to existing
system/process.
4. Identify consequences of the hazards related to an activity/operation
5. Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate
hazards
The main objectives of HAZOP Study are:
1. To identify possible operational hazards that has the potential to impact the unit
operation, operator injury and environment for the new facility.
2. To record the identified threats and hazards associated with the operational activities
that have the potential to impact the facilities.
3. To identify and determine adequacy of critical safeguards (hardware systems and/or
procedures) associated with the identified risks and propose recommendations to
improve the safety systems of the facilities.
4. Highlighted those hazards for which risk level need to be managed during normal
operation and identify any opportunities for risk reduction.
5. Provide the basis for CLIENT Facilities Development hazard register.
It should be underlined that HAZOP Study is not a design review meeting and, therefore the
team should be reminded to avoid spending too much time for “Design Solutions”.
1.3 Definition
PROJECT Pembangunan Pipa Gas Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter

24”
CLIENT Kerjasama Operasional (KSO) between PT Pertamina Gas
and PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (PGN) as the Owner of
the Project.
CONTRACTOR Consortium of PT PDC (Patra Drilling Contractor) and PT
Elnusa Tbk, which is responsible to execute the Project as
specified in contract.
VENDOR / SUPPLIER The party which provides / manufactures equipment and
material specified and ordered by Contractor
MIGAS Representative from Indonesian Government which is
responsible for issuing licenses and permits for Oil & Gas
facilities.
Shall/must/will Indicate requirement strictly to be followed in order to
conform to this specification and from which no deviation
is permitted.
Should Indicates that among several possibilities, one is
recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning
or excluded others, or that certain course of action is
preferred but not necessarily required. Other possibilities
may be applied subject to approval.
May/Can Verbal form is used to indicate a course of action
permissible within the limit of specification.
2. REFERENCES
2.1 Codes and Standards
The references utilized during the workshop are presented below,
1. OHSAS 18001: 2007 Klausul 4.3.1 Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment, and
Determining Control
2. SNI ISO 14001 - 2005 Klausul 4.3.1 Aspek Lingkungan
3. Oil and Gas Producer, Evaluation and Risk Management
3. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Gas from tie-in at TGI plant is connected with new metering station that will be provided by
TGI. The new metering station will be located tie-in point near existing TGI gas plant. In
metering station, regulator is close with metering located in downstream of metering.
Regulator is provided to adjust required supply pressure to achieve respected destination
pressure of 410 psig at Dumai receiving facility. The gas from Duri Station will be sent to
Dumai Receiving Facility via onshore gas pipeline. Arround 61 Km from inlet pipeline, a 24”
future connection will be provided for future user / gas costumer.
Dumai Receiving Facility is located in Pertamina RU II Dumai. At receiving facility, gas from
pipeline is routed to slug catcher for separate condensation liquid from gas during normal
operation and receive liquid during pigging operation. Gas from slug catcher is controlled by
pressure control valve to meet with sales gas pressure based on costumer requirement at
363 psig (25 barg) as minimum. The sales gas is metered using gas costudy metering before
sent to customer.
The condensate vessel will store liquid from slug catcher during normal operation and
pigging operation with capacity 5000 liters. Condensate from Condensate Vessel will be
pump to costumer in intermittent using Condensate Pump. At downstream of Condensate
Pump is installed condensate metering to account condensate sales.
Flash gas from Condensate Vessel will be routed to Pertamina RU II venting line.
Figure 3-1 Block Diagram Duri-Dumai Gas Transmission

4. ORGANIZATION
4.1 Study Team Composition
Figure 4-1 HAZID/HAZOP Study Team Composition
The core of the HAZID & HAZOP Study team shall consist of a Chairman and Scribber. The
Chairman or HAZOP Leader shall be come from Legal Institution (not personal). The
process engineers of CONTRACTOR project team will attend the Study Meeting and give
explanation about process, instrumentation philosophy, operation and maintenance for the
facilities.
CLIENT also will attend the HAZOP Meeting. Therefore, CONTRACTOR will request
CLIENT to assign adequate personnel of engineer including Employer’s operating personnel.
Other engineers, such as electrical, piping, and civil of CONTRACTOR team will attend as
required (on call basis) by the Chairman.
4.2 Chairman’s Responsibilities
The chairman is responsible for:
 Facilitate HAZID & HAZOP meetings

 Ensure that procedures were followed and result were recorded and distributed
 Resolving any conflict that arose during the study
 Ensure all HAZID & HAZOP Reports prepared completely and accurately
 Maintain the meeting is always conducted consistently and timely
 The Chairman shall be qualified as PHA Leader from authorized institute.
4.3 Team Member’s Responsibilities
Team members are responsible for:
a. Attend at each meeting scheduled

b. Actively participate in any team activity such as:
 Develop node and deviation
 Identify safeguards
 Identify recommendations
 Participate in defining risk level
4.4 Scribber Responsibilities
The scribber is responsible for:
 Assist Chairman in preparing the discussion material

 Record and filing all meeting results
 Prepare meeting invitation, minutes of meeting and meeting report
 Prepare and distribute study results of Study Team
5. METHODOLOGY
5.1 HAZID Methodology
5.1.1 Guidewords
The guidewords in the HAZID review were used as examples to prompt the workshop group
into considering the possible causes of each hazard. The guidewords should carefully be
chosen to promote creative thought about all possible hazards. The guidewords used in the
HAZID review are listed below.
1. Loss of Containment: Leaks or rupture that may cause fluid inside piping/equipment
release to atmosphere.
2. Non Hydrocarbon Fires: Any fire not modeled as a hydrocarbon event, including
electrical fires, combustible material fires, static electricity, and lightning fires.
3. Transport Accidents: Collision between the installation (building, tank, or piping) and
vehicles.
4. Personal Accidents: Accidents with no potential to cause fatalities out of the immediate
area of the incident and no more than 5 fatalities (the majority cause only a single
fatality). They include a variety of events such as falls, and burns.
5. Constructability: Construction of the platform that may cause injury when someone is
working at the area.
6. Evacuations: Procedure/method/instrument to escape from hazardous area when facility
in damage (emergency case).
7. Design Considerations: Inappropriate consideration during design phase may cause
hazards to environment/ personnel during operation.
8. Structural: Any structural failure, i.e. structural/support fatigue, earthquake that cause
building collapse.
9. Miscellaneous: Any other issues that have not defined on the above guidewords.
5.1.2 Threats/Hazards and Consequences
The HAZID will identify the hazards or threats that may occur on specific area based on the
guidewords shown above. The hazards or threats will be identified assuming no
safeguarding or protective system is in place. Of each hazards/threats, the consequences
that may happen are considered as the worst case, where no safeguarding are
implemented.
5.1.3 Safeguards
Safeguards are inherent safety systems provided in the design facilities under HAZID to
prevent the escalation of a “threats/hazards” leading to “consequence” for a given keyword.
The safeguards could include:
 Systems or procedures which may prevent or reduce the potential for the deviation to
arise
 Systems or procedures which are intended to mitigate the impact of an incident
 Hazard prevention systems include design standards, operating procedures, fire
protection, etc. Mitigation systems include emergency systems such as gas detectors,
evacuation plans, emergency plans, etc.
During the HAZID the effectiveness of the installed or planned Safeguards are assessed
and, if deemed necessary, additional safeguards are decided upon in the form of Actions.
5.1.4 Risk Ranking
Hazard scenarios shall be risk ranked using the risk matrix, as shown on Attachment F. The
consequence severity of the hazard scenario is determined based on team’s experience /
judgment or consequence analysis results available to the study team. The consequence
severity shall be determined without considering available safeguards.
The likelihood of the hazard scenario shall be determined considering available safeguards.
When estimating the likelihoods, care should be taken to verify that listed safeguards
genuinely reduce likelihoods.
5.1.5 Mitigation Required
Brainstorming session is used with detail discussion on the mitigation or recommendation.

Each hazard discussed in the review is recorded. An identification sequence number are
used to every discussed item. HAZID record will be made in the worksheet in the event that
not sufficient protection systems are found to reduce and mitigate potential hazard
occurrence.
5.2 HAZOP Methodology
The HAZOP Study will be carried out by a team of individuals with expertise in different
areas such as process, operation, and safety. Other engineers may be involved by on-call
basis.
A HAZOP is a systematic method of identifying hazards and operability problems that could
arise during the operation of a potentially hazardous process or system. The HAZOP
conducted with the participants from each phase of the lifecycle of the project, from the
designer, engineering, construction, operations with a facilitator to provide an independent
review of the system.
The HAZOP will be completed with the following concepts:
 Effectiveness : Maximize the likelihood of identifying potential deficiencies
 Efficiency : Run session timely and follow up all recommendations
 Consistency : Repeatable standard in line with industry practices
5.2.1 HAZOP Technique
HAZOP technique applies a combination of a Parameter and Guide Word to generate a

Deviation from design intent. The Causes and Consequences of the deviation are then
identified, with associated Safeguards assessed. Actions are then identified for elimination or
mitigation of the identified hazard.
The technique is systematically applied to each node such that safety and operability
problems on the complete scope of study are eventually identified.
The HAZOP study is carried out in a group session involving a number of experts with
knowledge and experience of the process, equipment and operations, with brainstorming
each node by applying a number of basic Process Variable (parameter) and Guide Words,
as listed in Table 6.1.
Table 5-1 Process Variable and Guiderwords for HAZOP
Guidewords More Less

No Reverse Different Others
Parameter /High / Low
Flow √ √ √ √
Temperature √ √
Pressure √ √
Level √ √ √
Composition Change √ √
Impurities √
Erosion/Corrosion √
Commissioning √
Start-up √
Shut down √
Maintenance √
Testing / Sampling √
Miscellaneous √
The following is potential cause for process variable,
 Flow: Pipe blockage, leakage/rupture, valve fail open, defective check valve, operation
trip, etc;
 Pressure: Fire case, low/high supply from source, etc;
 Temperature: Fire case, high pressure, etc;
 Level: Pipe blockage, valve fail open, etc;
 Composition Change: Raindrop penetration, occurrence of other component;
 Impurities: Scaling, etc;
 Erosion/corrosion: Sour material in composition, etc;
 Commissioning: Any incomplete procedure during commissioning, operator not
following SOP commissioning;
 Start Up: Any incomplete procedure during start up process, operator not following SOP
start up;
 Shut Down: Any incomplete procedure during shut down process, operator not following
SOP shut down;
 Maintenance: Any incomplete procedure during maintenance, operator not following
SOP maintenance;
 Testing/Sampling: Impurities, etc;
 Miscellaneous: Any other issues that have not defined on the above
guidewords/process variables.
5.2.2 Causes & Consequences
The HAZOP will identify the causes for the deviation based on the guidewords shown in
Table 6.1. The causes will be identified assuming no safeguarding or protective system is in
place.
The consequences describe the impact of causes for the deviation that may be occurred
during operation.
The HAZOP assumption as follows:
 The causes will be identified assuming no safeguarding or protective system is in place.

 For cases where process variables are considered unable be applied to a system/node,
e.g. liquid level in gas piping system, will be identified as “not applicable”.
 For cases where the process variables could be applied but deviation cannot occur nor
have no tendency/possibility to cause hazard operation, e.g. composition change during
normal operation, will be identified as “no issue”.
 Certain deviation may be due to the by the same cause and for the purpose of the
HAZOP, these will be defined as “no new issue”. This approach will eliminate repetition
in listing same deviation cause, and subsequently preventing repetitive close out action.
5.2.3 Safeguards
Safeguards are inherent system provided in the system under HAZOP to prevent the
escalation of a “cause” event leading to “consequence” for a given keyword.
The safeguards could include;
 Systems or procedures which may prevent or reduce the potential for the deviation to
arise;
 Systems or procedures which are intended to mitigate the impact of an incident.
 Prevention systems include design standards, operating procedures, plant alarm and
trip systems, fire protection, etc.
 Mitigation systems include emergency systems such as gas detectors, water spray
system, emergency shutdown system, alarm systems, evacuation plans, emergency
plans, etc.
During the HAZOP the effectiveness of the installed or planned Safeguards were assessed
and, if deemed necessary, additional safeguards were decided upon in the form of Actions.
5.2.4 Risk Ranking
Hazard scenarios shall be risk ranked using the risk matrix, as shown on Attachment F. The
consequence severity of the hazard scenario is determined based on team’s experience /
judgment or consequence analysis results available to the study team. The consequence
severity shall be determined without considering available safeguards.
The likelihood of the hazard scenario shall be determined considering available safeguards.
When estimating the likelihoods, care should be taken to verify that listed safeguards
genuinely reduce likelihoods.
5.2.5 Action Required
If the team judges that the engineering system and operating procedures are unlikely to cope
safely with the consequences of all deviations or that an operability feature requires
attention, and then a recommendation should be made. The Leader should have every
recommendation read out at the time it is raised in the session. The team members should
be obliged to reach consensus on it at the time. This is vital as many Leaders are in the habit
of rewording recommendations outside the review sessions without the input of the team
members at the time. This often results in a change of the essence of a recommendation.
The worksheets should be circulated to all team members for comments after the review
sessions.
The Leader should take particular care that the team does not fall into the trap of trying to
design the solution to all problems identified. If an obvious solution is apparent, it should be
recommended; otherwise the team should just identify the problem and recommend further
study to determine resolution.
For each guideword, the team considers whether there are realistic causes for that
guideword and whether the consequences are significant. The risks of each consequence
are assessed using a hazard ranking exercise to highlight the level of attention each hazard
requires. Each hazard is assigned a frequency of occurrence and a consequence severity.
The prioritization of HAZOP action items is of great value to Asset Management who may be
faced with addressing a large number of actions. As such, it is worth the Leader allowing the
team to take some time to reach consensus.
6. HAZID REVIEW SESSION
6.1 HAZID Workshop
The HAZID workshop was conducted at Meeting room in Hotel Grand Zuri Dumai, Jl. Jendral
Sudirman No.88, Bintan, Dumai Kota, Kota Dumai, Riau, Indonesia, 28812, on 22th
December 2017
The HAZID workshops were chaired and scribed by 3rd Party that appointed by KPE and
Approved by KSO. The workshop was attended by engineers and operation personnel from
Pembangunan Pipa Gas Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. Members of the HAZOP/
HAZID Study Team present are listed in Attendance Sheet in Attachment A.
6.2 Reviewed Drawing
Technical documents such as drawings have been provided. Layouts drawing are used as
basis for developing HAZID “Area NODES” based on actual condition on site.
The process flow and understanding of the platforms processes are mainly based on the
description provided by engineers and operation personnel from Pembangunan Pipa Gas
Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. The marked up drawings used during the review
are attached in Attachment D and E. The drawings reviewed during the HAZID Workshop
are presented in following section.
6.3 Document Studied in HAZID
The HAZID workshop was systematically considered all potential hazard scenarios
applicable for all phases/components of the design facility. Documents related are listed in
Table 6-1.
Table 6-1 Documents Reviewed at HAZID
Document Number Description
GDD-KPE-1403-09-EEL-DG-001 Layout Hazardous Area Duri
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EEL-DG-001 Layout Hazardous Area Dumai
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EPG-DG-001 General Plot Plan Duri
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPG-DG-001 General Plot Plan Dumai
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EPG-DG-002 Equipment Layout Plan Duri
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPG-DG-002 Equipment Layout Plan Dumai

6.4 Nodes Consideration in HAZID
This section describes the nodes considered in the HAZID study.
Table 6-2 Nodes Considered in HAZID
Node No Description
1 Duri Station
2 Pipeline Duri-Dumai
3 Dumai Station
7. HAZOP REVIEW SESSION
7.1 HAZOP Workshop
The HAZOP workshop was conducted at Meeting room in Hotel Grand Zuri Dumai, Jl.
Jendral Sudirman No.88, Bintan, Dumai Kota, Kota Dumai, Riau, Indonesia, 28812, on 21th -
22th December 2017
The HAZOP workshops were chaired and scribed by 3rd Party that appointed by KPE and
Approved by KSO. The workshop was attended by engineers and operation personnel from
Pembangunan Pipa Gas Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. Members of the HAZOP
Study Team present are listed in Attendance Sheet in Attachment A.
7.2 Reviewed Drawing
Technical documents such as drawings have been provided. The Piping and Instrumentation
drawings (P&ID) act as the basis for developing the HAZOP “NODES” and as the basis for
assessment of the potential undesirable hazardous situations and operational impacts
caused by the basic design and operational characteristics of the systems as designed.
The process flow and understanding of the platforms processes are mainly based on the
description provided by engineers and operation personnel from Pembangunan Pipa Gas
Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter 24” project. The marked up drawings used during the review
are attached in Attachment D and E. The drawings reviewed during the HAZOP Workshop
are presented in following section.
7.3 Document Studied in HAZOP
The HAZOP was carried out on the process based on Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
(PIDs), and Heat and Material Balance (HMB). The documents related are listed in Table 6-3
Table 7-1 Document Reviewed for HAZOP
PGDD-KPE-1400-00-EPS-DG-001 PFD & HMB Duri - Dumai
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-102 P&ID Fire Water System & Ring at Dumai

Receiving Facility
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-103 P&ID Metering Dumai at Dumai
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-104 P&ID SDV And Pressure Control Valve

Dumai at Dumai
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-105 P&ID Instrument Air Distribution at Dumai

Receiving Facility
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-108 P&ID Pig Launcher Duri
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-109 P&ID SDV And Pressure Control System

Duri
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-110 P&ID Air Instrument System Duri
PGDD-KPE-1403-09-EPS-DG-111 P&ID Water Tank Duri Station
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EPS-DG-101 P&ID LBCV Sectional Block Valve Duri -

Dumai (Typical)
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EPS-DG-102 P&ID Slug Catcher Dumai at Dumai

Receiving Facility
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EPS-DG-103 P&ID Pig Receiver Dumai at Dumai

Receiving Facility
PGDD-KPE-1472-00-EPS-DG-104 P&ID Condensate Drum
7.4 Nodes Consideration in HAZOP
This section describes the nodes considered in the HAZOP study.
Table 7-2 Nodes Considered in HAZOP
Node No Description
Tie-in from TGI Facility (TP-DR1) to SDV & Pressure Control System
1 Duri to Pig Launcher at Duri Station
2 LBCV Sectional Block Valve Duri - Dumai to Dumai Receiving Facility
3 From Pig Receiver at Dumai to inlet Slug Catcher
4 Slug Catcher at Dumai
5 SDV & Pressure Control Valve at Dumai
6 Condensate Drum
7 Instrument Air Distribution
8 Fire Water System & Ring
9 Potable Water Tank

8. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Fourty nine (49) HAZOP recommendation was generated during the HAZOP review.
Meanwhile, ten (10) HAZID recommendations arise from the workshop. The
recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the
process or improve the clarity of the process (P&ID’s) and layout drawings. Summary of the
number of recommendations raised for the HAZOP / HAZID reviews is presented in table
below,
Table 8-1 Number of PHA Recommendations
# HAZOP # HAZID
Risk Ranking
Recommendation Recommendation
Fatal 4 8
Berat 8 1
Moderate 12 1
Rendah 25 -
49 10
The recommendation is to be followed up by the nominated party and closed out as soon as
possible. Action plans need to be developed and distributed to the responsible parties to
ensure that all of these recommendations are closed out.
Several changes/ corrections were recommended on the drawings and are directly marked
on the soft copy of the respective drawings/ SAFE Charts during the workshops; this shall
also be considered as a drawing comment recommendations and shall be considered for
implementation accordingly. These were not separately listed as recommendations as
agreed by the team members.
Total of fourty nine (49) recommendations that has been proposed during workshop was
shown in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2 HAZOP Recommendation Summary
Rec. Risk Action

# ID Causes Recommendation
No. Ranking Party
1. To review set point 01-PAIHH-001 /
001A. actually maximum pressure in
1 TGI 1080 Psig (set point PAHH in TGI Rendah KPE
facility)
1-SDV-001 fails
1.1.1 2. To review the requirement bypass
closed
line for 01-SDV-001
2 Rendah KPE
3. Determine the maximum buffer gas

3 Rendah KPE
volume between 01-SDV-001 to 02-
Rec. Risk Action

No. Ranking Party
SDV-001 to ensure sufficient time for
repair SDV (Hand-Pump)
4. To review set point for Pressure

Alarm in upstream 01-SDV-002 A/B/C
01-SDV-002 A/B/C to give sufficient time for operator
1.1.2 4 Fatal KPE
fails closed intervention to open manual valve in
standby SDV 01-SDV-002 A/B/C
5. To review requirement 01-PT-006 to

trip upstream SDV in case of 01-PV-
5 Moderate KPE
001 A/B/C stuck open
01-SDV-003 fails
1.1.4
closed 6. Consider to calculate size of 01-
PSV-001 for scenario blocked
6 Moderate KPE
discharge
7. To review requirement equalizing

No equalizing line in
line for 01-SDV-001 & 01-SDV-003)
1.15.1 01-SDV-001 or 01- 7 Moderate KPE
during start up / maintenance activity
SDV-003
To consider for integration F&G system
and Fire Water system between TGI &
8 Fatal KSO & TGI
No DIBB valve for KSO related to PGDD facility
isolate during
1.17.1 Maintenance SDV Consider to replace manual valve with
01-SDV-002 A/B/C DIBB valve for upstream pressure
or 01-PV-001A/B/C 9 control system (Line 12"-PG-DU-A02A- Fatal KPE
004 & 006 & 008)
To review requirement equalizing line

for manual valve 8"-02-V-012 kicker
10 Moderate KPE
line during pigging activity
1.17.2 Pigging Activity
To ensure, manual valve which
location to be used for methane
11 Moderate KPE
detection during pigging activity
12. Consider to calculate size of 01-

01-PV-001A/B/C PSV-001 for scenario PV failure (stuck
1.5.2 12 Rendah KPE
stuck open open)
To conduct gas dispersion study for

depressurization scenario during
13 emergency / upset condition and Berat KPE
Deppresurization
determine vent position to safe location
2.16.1 gas to atmospheric
during emergency
Consider to replace globe valve with
14 RO to keep gas vent flowrate Berat KPE
Consider to conduct pipeline risk

assessment realated potential fire /
15 Moderate KPE
External 3rd party explosion impact to community
2.19.2
activity
16 Consider to calcucate dispersion study Moderate KPE
2.19.3 Instrument flanges 17 To review requirement instrument Moderate KPE

Rec. Risk Action

No. Ranking Party
connection leak connection flanges to replace with
welded type or install detection system
around LBCV area
Consider to locate LBCV at safe

distance to ignition source and
18 Moderate KPE
community
Consider to schedule safety patrol for

LBCV area more than one per day
19 Moderate KSO
complete portable gas detector
To consider to design pipeline

underground or special design fence or
20 Fatal KPE
others to protect from crash accidents
Traffic accident /
2.19.4 crash to above To check design pipeline to comply
ground pipeline with national regulation related
21 (KEPMENTAMBEN Fatal KPE
No.300.K/38/M.PE/1997)
Update all tag number valve and

instrumentation based on consignering
22 Rendah KPE
Duri-Dumai
3.19.1 Drawing Issue
To indicate 16" manual valve to be LO

23 Rendah KPE
Consider to calculate size 02-PSV-002
24 A/B set at blocked discharge Berat KPE
16" Manual valve To indicate 16" manual valve LO
gas outlet slug 25 Berat KPE
4.1.1
catcher 01-SC-01
Consider to calculate size of flare
inadvertetnly closed
header and tail pipe 02-PSV-002A/B
26 Berat KPE
based on rated flowrate PSV
To review 02-LV-001 control

philosophy related with throttling
27 Rendah KPE
function and on/off function
02-LV-001 stuck
4.10.1
open
Consider to install SDV at upstream
28 02-LV-001 Rendah KPE
To review requirement of dike/bund for

29 secondary containment Rendah KPE
Consider conduct fire risk assessment

Drain valve
4.10.2 related to fire impingement to adjacent
inadvertently open 30 Rendah KPE
equipment
To install LC at drain valve

31 Rendah KPE
To show differentiate between high
alarm and high alarm trip for all
4.19 Drawing Issue 32 Rendah KPE
instrumentation
Rec. Risk Action

No. Ranking Party
Consider to provide temporary
containment for 1-SC-01 drain outlet
33 Rendah KPE
liquid
Consider to conduct flare network

02-BDV-001 stuck study related to hydrocarbon release
4.4.1 34 Rendah KPE
open from BDV & PSV
Any manual valve

inadvertently Consider to describe SOP for manual
partially / full closed valve (10"-02-BV & 16"-02-BV)
5.1.3 35 Rendah KPE
at upstream and operation around regulator included at
downstream of operation manual document
regulator
Consider to provide Fire radiation &
36 gas dispersion study in accordance Rendah KPE
with fire & gas detector mapping
5.1.4 Natural gas leakage
Consider to use 2ooN logic voting for
37 Fire & Gas detection system to avoid Rendah KPE
false alarm which is trigger ESD-0
02-PV-001/002
stuck open or open
To confirm with vendor PV at gas
morethan required
5.2.1 38 metering package will keep flowrate to Rendah Pertagas
when on demand
customer
(02-PV-003 on
standy position)
Consider to provide malfunction alarm

of BDV to alert operator at control room
39 Rendah KPE
02-BDV-002 stuck (General Recommendation)
5.4.1 open or patially
open Consider to provide manual override of
40 opening BDV Rendah KPE
Consider to install check valve

02-PV-007 stuck upstream of 8"-01-BV at line 8"-FL-DM-
6.2.1 open or open than 43 A01A-024 and all supply lines Berat KPE
required upstream 8"-FL-DM-A01A-024
Consider to provide temporary

containment for 1-V-01 drain outlet
41 Rendah KPE
liquid
To install LO at manual valve for liquid
42 outlet 1-V-01 Rendah KPE
Any manual valve at Consider to add PIALL at 02-PT-008A

KPE &
instrument air interlock to start existing lag
7.1.1 44 Moderate Instrument
distribution line compressor
air supplier
inadvertently closed
To indicate LO manual valve at battery
45 limit for instrument air distribution line Rendah KPE
To relocate tie-in point for instrument
46 air at manual valve upstream flange Rendah KPE
Rec. Risk Action

No. Ranking Party
6"-FW-DM-A01A-
Consider to install redundant fire water
040 line blocked or
8.1.1 47 supply connection Berat KPE
isolated during
maintenance
Piping material is To ensure fire water piping material

not suitable for fire selection is appropriate with fire water
8.13.1 48 Berat KPE
water source (e.g. source
sea water)
Consider to install local level switch for
Pump 02-P-05-A/B
9.2.1 49 tank 02-T-05 interlock to 02-P-05 A/B Moderate KPE
continous running
Ten (10) recommendation recommendations have been proposed by the HAZID team as
shown in Table 7-3.
Table 8-3 HAZID Recommendation Summary
Rec. Risk Action

# ID Event Description Recommendation
No. Ranking Party
Consider to install one pair OPGD between KPE &
1 Fatal
metering shelter and office area KSO
Consider to install gas detector at control room KPE &

2 Fatal
door KSO
Leak or rupture at Consider to use electrical and instrument KPE &

1.1.1.1. 3 Fatal
TGI metering facility equipment based on specification of HAC KSO
Consider to install HVAC or move control room
KPE &
4 door to plant north side with panic door and gas Fatal
KSO
tight type
Consider to install flame detector with fire & gas KPE &
5 Fatal
mapping study to avoid blind spot area KSO
Electrical short
Consider to provide fire suppression system KPE &
1.2.1.1. circuit at control 6 Fatal
electrical cabinet (general) KSO
room / Panel room
Combustible
Consider to install fire alarm control panel for KPE &
1.2.2.1. material from office 7 Berat
building (general) KSO
work
Battery room Consider to provide sufficient portable fire KPE &

1.2.1.2. 8 Fatal
electrical fire extinguisher (general) KSO
Leak or rupture at Consider to install one pair OPGD between KPE &
1.1.1.2. 9 Fatal
Duri regulator area regulator and EDG & IA package KSO
Leak or rupture at Consider to conduct Quantitative Risk

2.1.1.1. 10 Moderate KPE
LBCV facility Assessment complete with risk contour
All HAZOP/HAZID Nodes have been assessed successfully. The HAZOP/HAZID has found
total of 59 action items to be closed out by the KPE and KSO. This will need to be closed out
prior to commissioning the system.
As part of HAZOP/HAZID, a close out report completed with close out register, shall be
generated to ensure all items are duly closed out.
ATTACHMENT A -
ATTENDANCE LIST
ATTACHMENT B -
HAZID WORKSHEET
ATTACHMENT C -
HAZOP WORKSHEET
ATTACHMENT D -
HAZID DRAWING REVIEWED
ATTACHMENT E -
HAZOP DRAWING REVIEWED
ATTACHMENT F -
RISK MATRIX

PGDD Kpe 1400 00 Eps Re 001 Hazop Hazid Study Report Rev.A

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PT.

PERTAMINA GAS- PT PERUSAHAAN GAS NEGARA

PEMBANGUNAN PIPA GAS DURI-DUMAI (PGDD)

HAZOP / HAZID STUDY REPORT

A 27/12/2017 Issued for Review MAR PGH/YM

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7.1 HAZOP Workshop ....................................................................................................... 18

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PT Pertamina Gas-PGN plans to build pipeline to support PT Pertamina Refinery Unit II

The main objectives of this HAZID study are as follows:

1. Generate a comprehensive list of hazards related to an activity/operation;

The main objectives of HAZOP Study are:

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PROJECT Pembangunan Pipa Gas Duri-Dumai (PGDD) Diameter

2.1 Codes and Standards

The references utilized during the workshop are presented below,

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Figure 3-1 Block Diagram Duri-Dumai Gas Transmission

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4.1 Study Team Composition

Figure 4-1 HAZID/HAZOP Study Team Composition

4.2 Chairman’s Responsibilities

The chairman is responsible for:

 Facilitate HAZID & HAZOP meetings

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4.3 Team Member’s Responsibilities

Team members are responsible for:

a. Attend at each meeting scheduled

4.4 Scribber Responsibilities

The scribber is responsible for:

 Assist Chairman in preparing the discussion material

5.1 HAZID Methodology

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5.1.2 Threats/Hazards and Consequences

The safeguards could include:

5.1.4 Risk Ranking

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5.1.5 Mitigation Required

Brainstorming session is used with detail discussion on the mitigation or recommendation.

5.2 HAZOP Methodology

The HAZOP will be completed with the following concepts:

 Effectiveness : Maximize the likelihood of identifying potential deficiencies

 Efficiency : Run session timely and follow up all recommendations

 Consistency : Repeatable standard in line with industry practices

5.2.1 HAZOP Technique

HAZOP technique applies a combination of a Parameter and Guide Word to generate a

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Table 5-1 Process Variable and Guiderwords for HAZOP

Guidewords More Less

The following is potential cause for process variable,

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5.2.2 Causes & Consequences

The HAZOP assumption as follows:

 The causes will be identified assuming no safeguarding or protective system is in place.

The safeguards could include;

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5.2.4 Risk Ranking

5.2.5 Action Required

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6. HAZID REVIEW SESSION