Kant's Just War Theory

Orend, Brian, 1971-

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 37, Number 2, April

1999, pp. 323-353 (Article)

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 Kant's Just War Theory
BRIAN OREND

KANT IS OFTEN CITED as o n e o f the first truly i n t e r n a t i o n a l political p h i l o s o p h e r s .

Unlike the vast majority o f his predecessors, K a n t views a p u r e l y d o m e s t i c or
national c o n c e p t i o n o f justice as radically i n c o m p l e t e ; we must, he insists, also
turn o u r faculties o f critical j u d g m e n t towards the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane. W h e n he
does so, w h a t results is o n e o f the m o s t p o w e r f u l a n d p r i n c i p l e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f
international justice ever c o n s t r u c t e d . Kant's central concept, that it is a d e m a n d
o f o u r own practical reason that we f o r g e a c o s m o p o l i t a n f e d e r a t i o n o f free
republics, based on the rule o f law, h u m a n rights, a n d cultural a n d c o m m e r c i a l
d e v e l o p m e n t , still r e s o n a t e s t o d a y as a plausible a n d h o p e f u l p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r
h u m a n i t y ' s future.
M u c h o f K a n t ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory has recently received s e a r c h i n g analy-
sis a n d evaluation. But the bulk o f this c o n s i d e r a t i o n has focused on K a n t ' s
descriptive, as o p p o s e d to prescriptive, claims. Lavish a t t e n t i o n , for e x a m p l e ,
has b e e n showered on his assertion that p e r p e t u a l p e a c e is i n e v i t a b l e - - t h a t
o u r natural a n t a g o n i s m will irresistibly incline us, a f t e r m a n y failures, to estab-
lish an international juridical condition. C o m p a r a t i v e l y little has b e e n d o n e on
t h o r o u g h l y evaluating Kant's n o r m a t i v e claims o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l justice, p a r t i c u -
larly with r e g a r d to his ideal c o r p u s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d his c o n c r e t e
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for m o v i n g f r o m a global state o f n a t u r e to a c o s m o p o l i t a n
civil society?
In this p a p e r , I would like to c o n t r i b u t e to the latter task by f o c u s i n g o n the
m o r a l p r o b l e m t h a t war poses as, arguably, the m o s t f r e q u e n t a n d severe cause

' F o r a survey of the massive literature on Kant's descriptive/predictive claims about the
inevitability of perpetual peace see both C. Lynch, "Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral
Guidance in International Law," Ethics and International Affairs 8 (1994): 39-58; and W. L. Huntley,
"Kant's Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace," International Studies Quarterly 4 ~
(a996): 45-76. One of the most influential scholars on this issue has been M. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal
Legacies and Foreign Affairs," Parts I and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 2o4-35 and
323-53, respectively.

[323]
324 JOURNAL or THE HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL 1999
o f r u p t u r e s in t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . '~ I n p a r t i c u l a r , I
w o u l d like to a r g u e in f a v o u r o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l , a n d o r i g i n a l , t h e s i s t h a t
K a n t has a j u s t w a r t h e o r y . ~ I w o u l d t h e n like to d e v e l o p t h a t t h e o r y in s o m e
d e t a i l a n d to e x p l a i n its s t r e n g t h a n d s u g g e s t i v e n e s s . T h e f o c u s o n w a r s e e m s
b o t h h e l p f u l a n d t i m e l y . I t is h e l p f u l in t h a t it p r o v i d e s a s p e c i f i c , g r a p h i c
example with which one can apprehend more clearly the abstract architecture
o f K a n t ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l vision. I t is t i m e l y in t h a t , in t h e w a k e o f t h e v e r y r e c e n t
c o n f l i c t s in B o s n i a a n d R w a n d a , a n d in l i g h t o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t f o r m a t i o n o f
the International War Crimes Tribunals at The Hague, renewed attention has
b e e n p a i d to c o n s i d e r i n g w h a t , i f a n y t h i n g , c o n s t i t u t e s a j u s t w a r a n d w h a t is
p e r m i t t e d , a n d w h a t p u n i s h a b l e , in t e r m s o f c o n d u c t in w a r . A r i g o r o u s c o n s i d -
eration of what one of the true giants of moral philosophy thought about these
i s s u e s c a n o n l y s e r v e to i l l u m i n a t e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e c u r r e n t e v e n t s .

1. THE TRADITIONAL READING OF KANT: NO J U S T WAR

Nearly every commentator on Kant's international theory of justice who dis-
cusses t h e p r o b l e m o f w a r in a n y d e t a i l b e l i e v e s t h a t K a n t n o t o n l y h a s n o j u s t
w a r t h e o r y , b u t t h a t h e is, m o r e o v e r , a v i c i o u s c r i t i c o f t h e c o r e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f
classical j u s t w a r t h e o r i s t s , s u c h as A u g u s t i n e , A q u i n a s , a n d G r o t i u s . H o w a r d
W i l l i a m s , f o r e x a m p l e , says t h a t " K a n t h a s n o t h e o r y o f j u s t w a r . . . (j)ustice
a n d w a r a r e in c o n f l i c t w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d it is o u r d u t y as h u m a n b e i n g s to
try to o v e r c o m e w a r . " F e r n a n d o T e s o n c o n t e n d s t h a t " K a n t d i s m i s s e s t h e i d e a
that there could be a just war" and Georg Geismann asserts that, for Kant,
" t h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as a j u s t w a r . " S i m i l a r l y , W. B. G a l l i e a s s e r t s t h a t " K a n t
agreed.., that nothing but confusion and harm resulted from regarding any
w a r s as j u s t . . . " T h e r e is a b e v y o f q u o t e s in t h e K a n t i a n c o r p u s to s u p p o r t t h i s
reading.4
O n e p r o m i n e n t a n t i - j u s t w a r q u o t e o c c u r s in Perpetual Peace, w h e n K a n t

Other such ruptures would include the severing of diplomatic ties (for instance, by withdraw-
ing ambassadors) and the levelling of economic sanctions.
3There have been other scholars who have already anticipated, at least to some extent, the
cogency of this claim. See: L. Mulholland, "Kant on War and International Justice," Kant-Studien
7~ (1987): 25-41; G. Cavallar, "Kant's Society of Nations: Free Federation or World Republic?"
Journal of the Histo~. of Philosophy 32 (a 994): 461 -82; and T. Mertens, "War and International Order
in Kant's Legal Thought," RatioJuris 5 (1995): 296-314-
4H. Williams, '~udgements on War: A Response," in H. Robinson, ed., Proceedings of the Eighth
International Kant Congress, Vol. l, Part 3 (Milwaukee, WN: Marquette University Press, 1995) ,
t 393; F. Teson, "The Kantian Theory of International Law," Columbia Law Review 92 (1992) : 9o;
G. Geismann, "'World Peace' Rational Idea and Reality. On the Principles of Kant's Political
Philosophy," in H. Oberer, ed., Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik (Germany: Konigshausen und Neu-
mann, 1996), 286; and W. B. Gallie, Philosophersof war and peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), 19-2o.
 K A N T ' S J U S T WAR T H E O R Y 3z5

reflects on the contributions of traditional just war theorists and arrives at the
following judgment:

It is therefore to be w o n d e r e d at that the word right has not been completely b a n i s h e d

from military politics as superfluous pedantry, and that no state has been bold e n o u g h
to declare itself publicly in favour of doing so. F o r H u g o Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and
the rest (sorry comforters as they are) are still dutifully q u o t e d in justification o f military
aggression, although their philosophically or diplomatically f o r m u l a t e d codes do not
and cannot have the slightest legal force, since states as such are n o t subject to a
c o m m o n external constraint [all his italics] 5

E l s e w h e r e , K a n t says t h a t " i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i g h t . . , b e c o m e s m e a n i n g l e s s i f
i n t e r p r e t e d as a r i g h t to g o to w a r . ,,6 F u r t h e r m o r e , his i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e d e s t r u c -
t i v e n e s s o f w a r in g e n e r a l , a n d h i s c o r e n o t i o n t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t e o f
n a t u r e (qua state o f war) is i n t r i n s i c a l l y u n j u s t a n d t h u s m u s t b e e x i t e d , b o t h
a d d c r e d e n c e to t h e a n t i - j u s t w a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f K a n t . K a n t d o e s , a f t e r all,
a s s e r t t h a t w a r is " t h e s c o u r g e o f h u m a n k i n d " ; " t h e g r e a t e s t evil o p p r e s s i n g
m a n " ; " t h e s o u r c e o f all evils a n d m o r a l c o r r u p t i o n " ; a n d " t h e d e s t r o y e r o f
e v e r y t h i n g g o o d . " 7 W e m i g h t a l s o m e n t i o n t h e p a s s a g e w h e r e K a n t s e e m s to
c l a i m t h a t w a r is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h u m a n r i g h t s ; n a m e l y , w h e n h e says t h a t
" h i r i n g m e n to kill a n d b e k i l l e d s e e m s to m e a n u s i n g t h e m as m e r e m a c h i n e s
a n d i n s t r u m e n t s in t h e h a n d o f s o m e o n e else (the s t a t e ) , w h i c h c a n n o t e a s i l y b e
r e c o n c i l e d w i t h t h e r i g h t s o f m a n in o n e ' s o w n p e r s o n . " 8 F i n a l l y , w e m i g h t cite
t h e c l e a r e s t s u c h p a s s a g e in K a n t , w h e n h e i n t o n e s t h a t " m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l r e a -
s o n w i t h i n us p r o n o u n c e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i r r e s i s t i b l e v e t o : There shall be no war
[his italics]." A n d this is t h e case b e c a u s e " w a r is n o t t h e w a y in w h i c h a n y o n e
s h o u l d p u r s u e his rights.".~

5I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans, by H. B. Nisbet, in H. Reiss, ed., Kant:
Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pg. lO 3 and paragraph (P) 355.
Here, for ease of location, I follow the practice of Kant scholars in also quoting the standard page
number (P) from the Prussian academy edition of Kant's works. Unless otherwise stated, the
majority of the translations of Kant quotes I will employ in this paper will come from the Nisbet/
Reiss collection.
6Kant, Perpetual, lo 5 (P 356).
7War as "scourge" is in I. Kant, Religion within the limits of reason alone, trans, by T. Greene and
H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 196o), 29 in the note. War as "the greatest evil" is in I. Kant,
Speculative Beginning of Hnman History, trans, by T. H u m p h r e y in his ed. lmmanael Kant: Perpetual
Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis, I N: Hackett, 1983), 58 (P 121 ). War as "the source o f all evils"
is in I. Kan t, On the Common Saying." "This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice," trans.
by H. Nisbet in H. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 91 (P 312). The last citation is from 1. Kant, The Contest of Faculties, trans, by H. Nisbet in H.
Reiss, ed. Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, x995), a83, x87 and
189 .
8Kant, Perpetual, 95 (P 345).
9][. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Part One: The Doctrine of Right, trans. H. Nisbet in H. Reiss,
ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 174 (P 354).
3~6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:~ APRIL 1999
O n e o f the main p u r p o s e s o f this p a p e r is to prove that the above quotes
can, by a n d large, be reconciled with the claim that K a n t has a just war theory.
In fact, it will be to show that the weight o f the textual evidence points clearly
in favour o f a pro-just war r e a d i n g o f Kant, a n d that any view to the c o n t r a r y
can only be sustained by a partial a n d selective r e a d i n g o f the relevant texts.
T h e c o m m o n t e n d e n c y to read only Perpetual Peace (something which b o t h
T e s o n a n d Gallie seem guilty of), in particular, is a p r i m e source o f this
confusion. It leads scholars like T e s o n to say that K ant advocates a f o r m o f
"extreme pacifism. "1~ We shall see that this claim is d e m o n s t r a b l y false. T h e
related t e n d e n c y to p u t d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e emphasis on Perpetual Peace, even
w he n drawing on such o t h e r crucial texts as the Doctrine of Right (something
which bot h Williams a n d G e i s m a n n seem guilty of), leads to the same error.
So, the aim here is to show that K a n t has a just war t h e o r y a n d to explain o f
what it consists.

2. BACKGROUND I: CORE PRINCIPLES OF

MORALITY AND DOMESTIC JUSTICE

Before specifically refuting, a n d u h i m a t e l y t r a n s f o r m i n g , the traditional read-

ing of Kant's views o n the ethics o f war a n d peace, recourse m u s t be m a d e to
the general c o n c e p t i o n of morality a n d international justice to which K ant is
committed. T h e just war t h e o r y will not make m u c h sense unless we do so; we
must witness how it is f u n d a m e n t a l l y consistent with Kant's m ost c h e r i s h e d
principles. But, in o r d e r to arrive quickly at the central issue, such r e c o u r s e to
the general theory can only be d o n e in quite broad, abstract a n d p r o g r a m m a t i c
terms.
Kant's f o u n d a t i o n a l p r o p o s i t i o n is that h u m a n beings, while composites o f
both animal instinctuality and free rationality, nevertheless find their d e e p e s t
sense o f personal identity a n d interest in their rational natures. Reason is thus
the f o r e m o s t source of orientation a n d direction in o u r lives. T h e f u n c t i o n or
p u r p o s e o f reason is to seek a unified a n d c o h e r e n t web o f concepts which: 1)
provides us with orientation a n d direction in o u r lives (both in the theoretical
and practical spheres); and 2) does n o t overstep its b o u n d s a n d is t h e r e f o r e
self-limiting or critical. For Kant, reason itself actively provides us with ends or
goals p r o p e r to o u r n a t u r e as rational beings, a n d it provides us with an
o r d e r e d set of rules, directives, a n d imperatives which are to guide us towards
the realization of such ends. T h e m o s t g e n e r a l o f these goals or ends o f h u m a n
reason are: 1) formally, to e n h a n c e its own c o h e r e n c e a n d unity; a n d 2) materi-
ally, to p r o m o t e its own realization in the world. T h e m ost g e n e r a l o f the

'~ "Kantian," 9o.

 K A N T ' S J U S T WAR T H E O R Y 3Z7

means-providing, action-guiding directives towards t h e s e e n d s is, o f c o u r s e ,

the categorical imperative.'
As rational agents, human beings are negatively free from utter determina-
tion by instinctual inclinations. We can, if we desire, be moved by consider-
ations other than those of raw impulse. So, we are capable of making choices
between alternative principles, and courses, of action, and of being held re-
sponsible for the quality of these choices. Furthermore, human beings are
p o s i t i v e l y f r e e to a c t in a c c o r d w i t h t h e d i c t a t e s o f t h e i r o w n r e a s o n . I n s h o r t ,
we can employ our indigenous negative freedom (in t h e e x e c u t i v e a s p e c t o f
o u r will) so t h a t it a c c o r d s w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e s and principles of our own
practical reason (in t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a s p e c t o f o u r will). W h e n w e d o so, w e a c t
from a self-directing or autonomous will b e c a u s e w e act f r o m o u r o w n m o t i v a -
t i o n on o u r o w n p r i n c i p l e s . O u r r e a s o n m a n d a t e s that we undertake this move
f r o m n e g a t i v e to p o s i t i v e f r e e d o m - - t h a t we undertake this process of enlight-
enment and emancipation--in o r d e r to r e a l i z e itself, a n d t h e r e b y o u r d e e p e s t
selves, in t h e w o r l d . F r e e d o m is t h u s " t h e k e y s t o n e " o f t h e e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e o f
Kant's political philosophy.'~
The deepest practical aspect of our rational natures is c o m p o s e d of the
categorical imperative (or C I ) . T h e C I is a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l command of our
own practical reason and forms the foremost source of normative orientation
regarding the practical sphere o f o u r lives. It s p e c i f i e s w h a t , a b o v e all, w e
o u g h t to d o . E s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t in t h e v a r i o u s f o r m u l a t i o n s o f t h e CI':~ is t h e

" I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ellington, in the collection Kant's
Ethical Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), passim; 2. Kant, Critique ~Pure Reason, trans.
Norman Kemp-Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), passim; I. Kant, Prolegomena to an~
Future Metaphysics, trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1977), passim; T. Pogge, "Kant's
Theory of Justice," Kant-Studien 71 0988): 4o7-33; and R. Velkley, "The Crisis of the End of
Reason in Kant's Philosophy and the Remarks of 1764-65," 76-94, and J. Rawls, "Themes in
Kant's Moral Philosophy," '.,9x-319, both in R. Beiner and W. J. Booth, eds., Kant and Political
PhilosoptW The Contemporary Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, ~993)-
"~Op. cit., note J I. The "keystone" comment is taken from I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason,
trans, by L. W. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 3 (P 3)"
'3The five formulations of the categorical imperative are:
1. The formula of universal law (FUL) : "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law."
2. The formula of the law of nature (FLN): "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become
through your will a universal law of nature."
3. The formula of the end-in-itself (FEI) : "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether
in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never
simply as a means."
4. The formula of autonomy (FOA): "Act under the idea of the will of every rational being as a
will that legislates universal law."
5- The formula of the kingdom of ends (FKE), building on the FEZ and FOA, refers to Kant's
postulate of an (ideal) ethical commonwealth wherein all beings legislate for themselves in hat-
328 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL 1999
f o r m a l e m p h a s i s o n t h e n e e d f o r u n i v e r s a l i t y , c o n s i s t e n c y a n d s y s t e m a t i c i t y in
a moral system, on the one hand, and the material emphasis on respecting
h u m a n i t y a n d d i g n i t y , o n t h e o t h e r . M o s t c e n t r a l l y , t h e C I m a n d a t e s t h a t all o f
us act in s u c h a w a y t h a t : 1) all r a t i o n a l a g e n t s c o u l d (also) a c t o n t h e e x a c t
s a m e p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n as o u r o w n ; a n d 2) w e p a y full r e s p e c t to t h e r a t i o n a l
a g e n c y w h i c h is t h e h a l l m a r k o f o u r h u m a n i t y . K a n t s t r e s s e s t h e i d e a t h a t
morality forms one rational, universal and coherent system of imperatives or
d u t i e s , as d e t a i l e d b y t h e CI. V i o l a t i o n o f t h e C I t h u s c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n in t h e s y s t e m o f p r a c t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . I t is o n l y w h e n a p e r s o n wills a
p r i n c i p l e o r m a x i m o f a c t i o n w h i c h is in a c c o r d w i t h t h e C I (i.e., it d o e s n o t
c o n f l i c t w i t h a n y o f t h e CI f o r m u l a t i o n s ) a n d w h e n t h a t p e r s o n p e r f o r m s t h e
c o r r e s p o n d i n g a c t i o n f o r t h e s a k e o f a d h e r i n g to t h e C I , t h a t t h e p e r s o n acts
m o r a l l y , w h i c h is to say f r o m a g o o d will.14
I t is c r u c i a l to n o t e t h a t , f o r K a n t , t h e o n l y t h i n g in t h e u n i v e r s e p o s s e s s e d
o f i n t r i n s i c v a l u e is a g o o d will; h e e v e n s u g g e s t s , in a f a m o u s a n d c h a r m i n g
m e t a p h o r , t h a t a g o o d will is like a j e w e l w h i c h s h i n e s b y its o w n l i g h t . I n d e e d ,
K a n t g o e s so f a r as to say t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d m a t u r a t i o n o f g o o d w i l l - -
acting from our own motivation on our own deepest principles--is whatjusti-
ties a n d g i v e s s e n s e a n d p u r p o s e n o t o n l y to o u r lives b u t to t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e
o f t h e w o r l d itself. " W i t h o u t m a n [ a n d his p o t e n t i a l f o r m o r a l p r o g r e s s ] , " h e
i n t o n e s , " t h e w h o l e o f c r e a t i o n w o u l d b e a m e r e w i l d e r n e s s , a t h i n g in v a i n ,
a n d h a v e n o f i n a l end."15
Many have contended, quite plausibly, that Kant's general moral outlook,
t h u s c h a r a c t e r i z e d , is d e o n t o l o g i c a l , as o p p o s e d to c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , in s t r u c -
t u r e . 16 I t is d e o n t o l o g i c a l , o r a n t i - c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , in a t l e a s t t h r e e s e n s e s : 1)
b e c a u s e d u t y is t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t in K a n t ' s m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y ; 2) b e c a u s e

mony with all others and in accordance with the ideal of treating all as ends and not as mere
means.
All of these formulations occur in Kant, Groundwork: FUL and FLN are both P 421; FEI is at P
429; and FOA and FKE are at P 431-32.
'4Kant, Groundwork, passim. T. Pogge, "The Categorical Imperative," in O. Hoffe, ed.,
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein hooperative Kommentar (Vittori Klostermann: Frankfurt/
Main, 1989), 172-93; L. W. Beck, "Kant's Two Conceptions of the Will in their Political Context,"
in R. Beiner and W.J. Booth, eds., Kant andPoliticalPhilosophy: The Contemporary Lega~ (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1993), 39-49; C. Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula of Humanity," Kant-Studien
69 (1986): 183-2o2; C. Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula of Universal Law," Pacific Philosophical Quar-
terly 66 (1985): 24-47; O. O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations in Kant's Practical Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, x989), esp. 125-44; andJ. B. Schneewind, "Autonomy,
obligation and virtue" in P. Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, x992), 3o9-41.
~5I. Kant, The End of All Things, trans, by T. Humphrey in his ed. Immanuel Kant: PerpetualPeace
and Other Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 96 (P 331).
'6Although recent writers such as D. Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996 ) have challenged this standard assumption.
 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 399
K a n t d e e m s it at least permissible (indeed, p e r h a p s e v e n obligatory) f o r an
a g e n t not to intend, a n d / o r to act so as, to m a x i m i z e overall best c o n s e q u e n c e s ;
a n d 3) b e c a u s e he stipulates firm side-constraints on the p r o m o t i o n o f ends,
such as m a x i m i z i n g overall best c o n s e q u e n c e s . ' 7 T h e s e p r o p e r t i e s o f his anti-
consequentialist c o n c e p t i o n shall b e c o m e , so to speak, o f c o n s e q u e n c e w h e n
we consider the substance o f his j u s t w a r theory. In the m e a n t i m e , o n e clear
a n d illustrative anfi-consequentialist q u o t e f r o m K a n t is his insistence t h a t
"(w)hat is essentially g o o d in the action consists in the m e n t a l disposition, let
the c o n s e q u e n c e s be w h a t they m a y . " 8 T h e actual c o n s e q u e n c e s o f an action
do n o t exhaust, or p e r h a p s even affect, its m o r a l calibre. W h a t m a t t e r s m o r a l l y
is h a v i n g a g o o d will, which is to say: 1) i n t e n d i n g to do o n e ' s d u t y (as disclosed
by the CI) for its own sake; a n d 2) conscientiously m a k i n g serious efforts to
realize that intention.19
T h e CI, as a p p l i e d to the s p h e r e o f "external," i n t e r p e r s o n a l interaction
b e t w e e n rational agents, is called the universal principle o f r i g h t or justice
(UPJ): "Act externally in such a way t h a t the free exercise o f y o u r will is
c o m p a t i b l e with the f r e e d o m o f e v e r y o n e , a c c o r d i n g to a universal law."'~~ T h e
UPJ, m o s t centrally, m a n d a t e s respecting, p r o t e c t i n g a n d e n h a n c i n g h u m a n
a g e n c y - - w h i c h is o u r p u r p o s i v e capacity to m a k e o u r own choices in l i f e - -
w h e r e v e r a n d w h e n e v e r we e n c o u n t e r it. In fact, this is a m a n d a t e which can,
a n d ought, to be b a c k e d by coercive force w h e r e necessary: the U P J specifies
rights a n d duties which can, a n d ought, to be e n f o r c e d . W h y m a y coercion be
e m p l o y e d in the "external" s p h e r e o f action? T h e answer, in K a n t ' s words, is
that it m a y be used if it "hinders a h i n d r a n c e to f r e e d o m . T M C o e r c i o n m a y be
e m p l o y e d because such is s o m e t i m e s r e q u i r e d to p r o t e c t o u r free r a t i o n a l
a g e n c y f r o m (coercive) i n t e r f e r e n c e by others. We have seen that the only
thing o f intrinsic value for K a n t - - t h e ultimate source o f v a l u e - - i s a g o o d will.
But only a free a n d rational will can b e c o m e good. T h u s , s h o u l d rational
a g e n c y n e e d coercive p r o t e c t i o n f r o m such s t a n d a r d threats to it as f o r c e a n d
f r a u d (which it does), t h e n such is m a n d a t e d by the s t r u c t u r e o f practical
r e a s o n itself. We m a y e m p l o y force in the s p h e r e o f justice in o r d e r , as it were,
to m a k e the world safe for the g r o w t h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f the s p h e r e o f
morality.

17For an astute characterization of "non-consequentialism," see F. M. Kamm, "Non-

consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status," Philosophy and
Public Affairs 20 (1991 ): 354- 89-
'8Kant, Groundwork, 96 (P 416).
tgSee note 11 and N. Latham, "Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Action Solely from the
Motive of Duty," The Journal of Philosophy 9 t 0994), 599 -6t8.
2~ Right, 132-34 (P 23o-31).
2l Kant, Right, 134 (P ~31-3'2).
33 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL 199 9
A careful analysis o f the u P J reveals, following the seminal w o r k o f
T h o m a s Pogge, that it actually contains t h r e e c o m p o n e n t principles: 1) the
f o r m a l principle o f justice (FPJ), which m a n d a t e s the c r e a t i o n a n d rule o f a
d e t e r m i n a t e system, or state, o f coercive positive law a n d o r d e r ; 2) the first
material principle o f justice (MPJ I), which stipulates the s e c u r i n g o f h u m a n
rights for all; a n d 3) the s e c o n d material p r i n c i p l e o f justice (MPJ 2), which in
g e n e r a l c o m m a n d s the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the political p r e - c o n d i t i o n s for a rise in
e n l i g h t e n m e n t , culture and, in the end, m o r a l a u t o n o m y a n d g o o d will. FPJ-
MPJ 2 thus i n f o r m us of o u r rights a n d duties o f justice, e n f o r c e a b l e with
coercion, with r e g a r d to the p r o t e c t i o n a n d a d v a n c e o f rational h u m a n a g e n c y
and freedom. ~
T h e u P J f o r m s Kant's m o s t i m p o r t a n t "test for legislation." J u s t as indi-
viduals are to evaluate their m a x i m s o f action vis-a-vis the CI, so we are also,
collectively, to evaluate p r o p o s e d legislation vis-a-vis the UPJ. O n l y t h a t legisla-
tion which is in accord with the UPJ is p e r m i t t e d by K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f justice.
F u r t h e r m o r e , because the U P J (qua CI as a p p l i e d "externally" to the r e a l m o f
politics) is a c o m m a n d o f practical reason, it follows t h a t all rational beings
m u s t c o n s e n t to its stipulations. So K a n t is, as f r e q u e n t l y noted, a kind o f social
contract theorist: we all, qua rational beings, c o n s e n t to the d e m a n d s o f the
u P J , a n d t h e r e b y collectively f o r m a " g e n e r a l will" d e d i c a t e d to the realization
o f its c o m p o n e n t principles. T h e d e e p e s t i m p o r t o f the UPJ is that, for K a n t ,
we are to o r d e r o u r c o n d u c t a n d to r e f o r m basic socio-economic a n d legal-
political institutions so that they c o n f o r m to the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the u P J . T h i s
means, notably, that: 1 ) we are to m o v e f r o m the "wild, lawless f r e e d o m " o f the
pre-political state o f n a t u r e (if we h a p p e n to find ourselves in that state) to a
lawful state o f o r d e r e d f r e e d o m w h e r e i n citizens are s i m u l t a n e o u s l y co-
legislators a n d subjects; a n d 2) we are to s t r u c t u r e civil society (once we have
established it) so that it respects h u m a n rights, which are those universal j u s t
claims, or entitlements, justified on the basis o f h u m a n i t y a n d dignity, t h a t we
all have r e g a r d i n g h o w we ought, a n d o u g h t not, to be t r e a t e d by each o t h e r
a n d by the state. H u m a n rights, in short, are high-priority, justified claims that
we all have on each o t h e r and, above all, on the way in which socio-political
institutions o u g h t to be shaped. K a n t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t h u m a n rights we
have is limited to traditional civil a n d political rights: to f r e e d o m , p r o p e r t y ,
equality, a n d various d u e process a n d p a r t i c i p a t o r y rights.~3

~ Kant, Right, 132-4o (P 218-3~); Pogge, "Kant's Theory," 4o7-33; Mulholland, System, 14o-
54; A. Rosen, Kant's Theory ofJustice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) , 8o-115; R. Pippin,
"On the Moral Foundations of Kant's Rechtslehre," in R. Kennington, ed., The Philosophy of Immanuel
Kant (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1985), lo7-4~; and E. Weinrib,
"Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason," Columbia Law Review 87 (1987): 47~-5o8.
~ Op. cit., note 2~, See also B. Ludwig, "'The Right of a State' in Immanuel Kant's Doctrine of
 K A N T ' S J U S T WAR T H E O R Y 331

From these schematic remarks, we can discern in broad outlines Kant's

conception of the just state or republic. Kant's quite austere and minimalistic
p o l i t i c a l i d e a l s e e m s to b e a k i n d o f p r o - r i g h t s proto-libertarianism, calling
only for that exact amount of government n e c e s s a r y to p r o v i d e f o r t h e r u l e o f
l a w a n d o r d e r , a n d to s e c u r e all o u r h u m a n rights. The watchwords of Kantian
governance are: law and order; equal human r i g h t s to f r e e d o m and property;
socio-economic opportunity; trade, development and commerce; and self-
driven effort, industry, and enlightenment.~4

3- B A C K G R O U N D I I : T H E A R C H I T E C T U R E OF T H E
INTERNATIONAL T H E O R Y OF J U S T I C E
The first p r e m i s e of Kant's international theory of justice, as a d i r e c t o u t -
growth from his d o m e s t i c c o n c e p t i o n , is t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s o f t h i s t h e o r y a r e
s t a t e s , a n d t h a t s t a t e s e x i s t as m o r a l p e r s o n s . B y t h i s K a n t m e a n s two things.
T h e first is t h a t t h e s t a t e is w o r t h y of our moral attention a n d r e s p e c t to t h e
e x t e n t to w h i c h it p r o t e c t s a n d s e r v e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l s , m o r a l p e r s o n s proper,
w h o live u n d e r its a u s p i c e s . T h e s e c o n d is t h a t w e a r e , via t h e d o m e s t i c a n a l -
ogy,'~5 t o c o n c e i v e o f s t a t e s as n e g a t i v e l y f r e e r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , u n d e t e r m i n e d by
raw inclination or mechanism, w h o a r e f r e e to m a k e c h o i c e s b e t w e e n alterna-
tive c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n a n d c a n , as a r e s u l t , b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u b s t a n c e
of those choices.
As rational agents, states also find their deepest sense of identity and inter-
est in a d h e r i n g to t h e n o r m s of reason. It follows from previous argumenta-

Right," Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 099o): 4o3 - 15. For Kant on rights, see M. Gregor,
"Kant on 'Natural Rights," in R. Beiner and W.J. Booth, eds., Kant and Political Philosophy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 5o-75; S. Shell, The Rights Of Reason (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, x98o ), passim; and Mulholland, System, passim.
24Op. cit., notes z2 and 23. See also W. Kersting, "Politics, Freedom and Order: Kant's
Political Philosophy," in P. Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 342-67. This minimalist conception of Kant's notion of the just state is in
contrast to that of the so-called Kantian socialists, such as H. Van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and
Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 ) .
'~5The "domestic analogy" asserts that we are, in general terms, to refer to the behavior of
states, vis-{t-viseach other, in analogy with the way in which we speak of individual agents behaving
vis-d-vis each other. It is important to note that such need not involve any kind of metaphysical or
mystical conception of the nation-state; rather, the domestic analogy draws its life and vitality
from the sheer difficulty of speaking meaningfully and insightfully about the behavior of entities
as complex as states without employing simplifying assumptions, such as that they have a discern-
ible identity, have intentions, face choices between alternatives, etc. See M. Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1991 ,`,nd ed.; 1st ed., 1977), 51-74 . Another discussion of Kant's
doctrine of the moral personhood of states is S. Byrd, "The State as a 'Moral Person,' " in
H. Robinson, ed., Proceedings of the Eighth Intenmtional Kant Congress (Milwaukee, WN: Marquette
University Press, 1995), Volume 1, 171-9o. It should be noted that this analogy is only that: it is
only generally persuasive and does not preclude the existence of important particular disanalogies
(see, for example, note "9).
332 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:2 A P R I L 1 9 9 9
fion that, politically, states m u s t be subject to a p r i n c i p l e o f practical r e a s o n
a n a l o g o u s to the UPJ, call it SUPJ (for "the state-level version o f the universal
principle o f j u s t i c e ' ) . T h e f o r e m o s t d u t y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l justice is f o r states to
a d h e r e to the SUPJ, which seems, in light o f p r i o r r e a s o n i n g , to be c o m p o s e d
o f the following c o m p o n e n t principles: 1) the SFPJ, which c o m m a n d s t h a t all
states o u g h t to coexist u n d e r a c o h e r e n t , o r d e r e d , a n d d e t e r m i n a t e i n t e r n a -
tional system o f positive laws; 2) the SMPJ 1, which stipulates t h a t the c o n t e n t
o f such a system o f positive i n t e r n a t i o n a l law m u s t be a i m e d , first a n d f o r e -
most, at r e s p e c t i n g a n d realizing the rights o f every state; a n d 3) SMPJ 2,
which m a n d a t e s that the positive system o f interstate laws is to p r o v i d e the
g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k within which practical r e a s o n a n d g o o d will can b e p r o -
m o t e d a n d m a t u r e to their fullest d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e d e e p e s t i m p o r t o f the SUPJ, a n a l o g o u s to the d o m e s t i c UPJ, is that
we are, t h r o u g h o u r state m e c h a n i s m s , to o r d e r o u r c o n d u c t a n d to r e f o r m
global institutions a n d practices such t h a t t h e y satisfy SFPJ-SMPJ 2. T h i s
m e a n s , notably, that: 1) we are to m o v e f r o m the a n a r c h y o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
state o f n a t u r e to s o m e kind o f c o s m o p o l i t a n civil society; a n d 2) we are to
structure the global juridical condition so that it satisfies the rights o f states
qua m o r a l persons. W h y do states have rights vis-d-vis o n e a n o t h e r ? States
have rights because: 1) their citizens, as individuals, have h u m a n rights; a n d
2) in o r d e r to secure the objects o f these h u m a n rights f r o m possible d e p r i v a -
tion by outsiders, a collective agency, like the state, n e e d s to be a u t h o r i z e d , or
entitled, to certain objects a n d actions in its own right, vis-a-vis these n o n -
m e m b e r s a n d the collective agencies which act on their behalf. A n d w h a t
rights do states have vis-a-vis o n e a n o t h e r ? T h e r e is extensive textual evi-
dence 26 that K a n t affirms the following state rights (SR) a n d correlative state
duties (SD):

State Rights:
S R x. T h e right o f negative f r e e d o m f r o m force a n d f r a u d in the state o f
nature.
S R 2. T h e right o f positive f r e e d o m to s e l f - g o v e r n a n c e (i.e., political sover-
eignty) within a global juridical condition.
S R 3. T h e right to e m p l o y a n d dispose o f o n e ' s n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s as o n e
sees fit, p r o v i d e d such use does n o t m a t e r i a l l y violate the rights o f o t h e r states.
S R 4. T h e r i g h t o f p r o p e r t y in o n e ' s t e r r i t o r y (i.e., territorial integrity).

26Kant, Theory, 87-92 (P 3o7-313); Kant, Perpetual, 93-13o (P 343-86); Kant, Right, 132-36
(P 2"~9-33) and 164-75 (P 343-55) and I. Kant, Idea for a UniversalHistory with a Cosmopolitan Intent,
trans. H. Nisbet, in H. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995),41-53 (P 15-31).
 K A N T ' S J U S T WAR T H E O R Y 333

SR 5. T h e r i g h t to e n t e r i n t o c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s t a t e s a t o n e ' s
will.

State Duties:
SD z. D o n o t e m p l o y f o r c e a n d f r a u d in o n e ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r states.
SD 2. D o n o t i n t e r f e r e in t h e i n t e r n a l m a t t e r s o r s e l f - g o v e r n a n c e o f a n o t h e r
state.
SD 3. D o n o t t r e s p a s s o n t o o r s t e a l (i.e., i n v a d e o r c a p t u r e ) t h e r i g h t f u l
property/territory of another state.
SD 4. D o n o t b r e a k l a w f u l c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t s o n e h a s f r e e l y m a d e w i t h
o t h e r states.
SD 5. A l l o w f o r b a s i c c o n t a c t a n d r e l a t i o n s ( " h o s p i t a l i t y " ) ~7 b e t w e e n c i t i z e n s
of other nations and one's own.

S t a t e r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s , m u c h like i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s , m a p o u t a
set o f f i r m c o m m a n d s a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s , o r s i d e - c o n s t r a i n t s , o n h o w t h e s t a t e in
q u e s t i o n s h o u l d , a n d s h o u l d n o t , b e t r e a t e d b y o t h e r states. T h e y a r e j u s t
c l a i m s w h i c h all o t h e r states a r e b o u n d to r e s p e c t . A g a i n , t h e c o r e e m p h a s i s in
K a n t is o n d e o n t o l o g y : w e a r e to t r e a t r a t i o n a l a n d m o r a l p e r s o n s ( w h e t h e r
i n d i v i d u a l s o r states) in p a r t i c u l a r w a y s w h i c h r e s p e c t t h e i r d i g n i t y , a n d to
a v o i d t r e a t i n g t h e m in o t h e r w a y s w h i c h i n j u r e t h e m as m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h e s e
rights and duties may not be overridden or ignored for the sake of such other
social g o a l s as p u b l i c w e l f a r e o r h u m a n h a p p i n e s s in g e n e r a l . P e r h a p s two
a s p e c t s o f this issue r e q u i r e f u r t h e r c o m m e n t . T h e first is t h a t , in t h e f i n a l
analysis, SRs l - 5 d o n o t s e e m to c o n t a i n s u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e t h a n is c o n t a i n e d
in t h e two m o s t t r a d i t i o n a l a n d w i d e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d r i g h t s o f s t a t e s : p o l i t i c a l
s o v e r e i g n t y a n d t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . T h e s e c o n d is t h a t this s y s t e m o f s t a t e
r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s , SRs 1 - 5 a n d S D s 1 - 5, e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s t i t u t e s K a n t ' s i d e a l
conception of international law and order. An international system wherein
SRs l - 5 w e r e r e s p e c t e d a n d SDs 1 - 5 w e r e a d h e r e d to w o u l d e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s t i -
tute a just global order.
T h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m a t i c in i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e is t h u s t h e m o v e f r o m a
lawless i n t e r n a t i o n a l state o f n a t u r e to a l a w - g o v e r n e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l civil soci-
e t y w h e r e i n SRs l - 5 a n d S D s 1 - 5 a r e r e a l i z e d . T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t , f o r
K a n t , t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n is a s t a t e o f n a t u r e , i n t h a t n o r e l e v a n t
s u b j e c t (i.e., n o state) e n j o y s s e c u r e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e o b j e c t s o f its r i g h t s . ~s A n d

~7By "hospitality" Kant means allowing foreigners to establish diplomatic relations with one's
nation and, above all, allowing for private contact (particularly in terms of trade and commerce)
between citizens of other countries and one's own. Kant, Perpetual, lO6- 7 and P 358-59 .
28This is an important premise for Kant, and for our considering the applicability of his
theory to the current context. For it is on the basis of this premise that Kant grounds a theory of
 334 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:3 APRIL 1999

this h a s t h e i m p o r t a n t , a n d d a m n i n g , c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s
must themselves lack secure possession of the objects of their human rights,
which form the entire material focus of Kant's conception of justice. The
a b s e n c e o f c e n t r a l c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y o n t h e g l o b a l level g i v e s rise to a f u n d a -
m e n t a l l a c k o f a s s u r a n c e , w h i c h r e n d e r s s t a t e s f e a r f u l , selfish a n d p r o n e to
v i o l e n c e in t h e case o f c o n f l i c t o v e r r i g h t s - c l a i m s , w i t h all t h e d e l e t e r i o u s
e f f e c t s t h a t h a s u p o n d o m e s t i c r i g h t s - f u l f i l m e n t . T h i s s i t u a t i o n a m o u n t s to
b e i n g g o v e r n e d b y m i g h t r a t h e r t h a n r i g h t a n d , as s u c h , it v i o l a t e s all t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e S U P J ( a n d t h e UPJ) a n d o f f e n d s a g a i n s t o u r d e e p e s t
r a t i o n a l selves. B u t w h a t e x a c t l y is t h e n a t u r e o f t h e g l o b a l civil s o c i e t y t o w a r d s
w h i c h s t a t e s a r e to o r i e n t a t e t h e m s e l v e s ?
O f d e c i s i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e is t h e f a c t t h a t , f o r K a n t , t h e g l o b a l j u r i d i c a l c o n d i -
t i o n is n o t to b e m o d e l l e d d i r e c t l y a f t e r a d o m e s t i c n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t , w i t h
its c o e r c i v e p o w e r a n d d e c i s i v e s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y . K a n t d o e s n o t b e l i e v e in a
world government. He offers a variety of reasons why world government does
not form the end of international justice. The most potent of these are the
c l a i m s t h a t : 1) n o w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d b e r e a s o n a b l y e f f e c t i v e , g i v e n t h e
s h e e r size o f its d o m a i n a n d t h e i n c r e d i b l e d i v e r s i t y o f its p e o p l e ; a n d 2)
p r o v i d e d t h a t a s t a t e r e a s o n a b l y fulfils t h e d o m e s t i c c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e , t h e
U P J , t h e n it o u g h t n o t to b e c o e r c e d i n t o j o i n i n g a n o t h e r p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n .
I t w o u l d b e i m p e r m i s s i b l e to c o e r c e a j u s t state. T h u s , in K a n t ' s w o r d s : " ( T ) h e
p o s i t i v e i d e a o f a w o r l d r e p u b l i c c a n n o t b e r e a l i z e d . I f all is n o t to b e lost, this
c a n at b e s t f i n d a n e g a t i v e s u b s t i t u t e in t h e s h a p e o f a n e n d u r i n g a n d g r a d u a l l y
e x p a n d i n g federation l i k e l y to p r e v e n t w a r [his italics]." C o s m o p o l i t a n f e d e r a l -
ism, a n d n o t a w o r l d r e p u b l i c , is t h e s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m o f w a r a n d t h e
g u a r a n t o r o f p e r p e t u a l peace.~9
B u t this K a n t i a n f e d e r a t i o n is n o t like v a r i o u s f e d e r a t i o n s f a m i l i a r to us
f r o m h i s t o r y a n d politics. K a n t d o e s n o t i m a g i n e a n a c t u a l , e n f o r c e a b l e d i v i -
sion of powers between the global and national (and perhaps sub-national)
levels o f g o v e r n m e n t . " T h i s f e d e r a t i o n , " in his w o r d s , " d o e s n o t a i m to a c q u i r e
a n y p o w e r like t h a t o f a s t a t e b u t m e r e l y to p r e s e r v e a n d s e c u r e t h e freedom o f

just war. But we may well wonder, as Rudolf Makkreel has perceptively suggested, whether
further progress from the international state of nature to a global civil society might incrementally
undermine grounds for states resorting to armed conflict.
~9The most relevant material regarding the denial of world government is in Kant, Perpetual,
x~ (P 354-57). The quote is at lo 5 (P 357). This paragraph denotes one instance of a very
important disanalogy between the domestic and the international case: persons (even otherwise
ethical ones) may be coerced to form a domestic state but states, provided they fulfil the UPJ
reasonably well, may not be coerced to form a global state. Once more, Kant is not dogmatic about
his application of the domestic analogy. See also Cavalier, "Kant's Society," 461-82; Pogge,
"Kant's Theory," 4o7-33; and T. Carson, "Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have Said," Social
Theory and Practice 14 (1988): 173-214.
 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 335
e a c h state in itself, a l o n g with t h a t o f t h e o t h e r c o n f e d e r a t e d states, a l t h o u g h
this d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e y n e e d to s u b m i t to p u b l i c laws a n d to a c o e r c i v e
p o w e r w h i c h e n f o r c e s t h e m . . . " [his italics]SO It seems, t h e n , t h a t K a n t ' s i d e a is
o f a v o l u n t a r y o r r e n e w a b l e c o n t r a c t a m o n g l i k e - m i n d e d n a t i o n - s t a t e s to re-
n o u n c e w a r b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s , a n d to p e r f o r m t h e i r state duties, SDs 1 - 5 ,
a n d to h a v e t h e i r state rights, SRs 1 - 5 , r e s p e c t e d . I n short, states are to act as i f
t h e r e w e r e a real, effective f e d e r a l s y s t e m o p e r a t i v e at t h e g l o b a l level. T h e
result will be the s a m e in e i t h e r case: a stable, s e c u r e c o n d i t i o n o f p e a c e - w i t h -
rights, the u l t i m a t e e n d o f the t h e o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l justice. I n d e e d , K a n t
i n t o n e s t h a t p e r p e t u a l p e a c e is "the e n t i r e u l t i m a t e p u r p o s e o f the t h e o r y o f
right." P e r p e t u a l p e a c e is "the h i g h e s t political g o o d , " t r u l y "the u l t i m a t e
p u r p o s e o f law within the b o u n d s o f p u r e r e a s o n . " 3 '
So m u c h f o r the b a c k g r o u n d r e q u i r e d to g r a s p the p r i n c i p l e s a n i m a t i n g
K a n t ' s j u s t w a r t h e o r y . W e c a n n o w t u r n t o w a r d s t h e p r i n c i p a l task o f r e c o n -
s t r u c t i n g this t h e o r y , w h i c h is an i m p o r t a n t a n d r e w a r d i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n to
r e f l e c t i o n o n the ethics o f w a r a n d peace.

4. N E I T H E R REALISM NOR PACIFISM

T h e r e are, at b o t t o m , t h r e e basic p e r s p e c t i v e s o n t h e ethics o f w a r a n d p e a c e ,
with realism a n d pacifism at the e x t r e m e s a n d j u s t w a r t h e o r y in the m i d d l e .
Realism, to b e g i n with, is a p r o t e a n d o c t r i n e . T h e r e exists a wide v a r i e t y o f
p e r s p e c t i v e s w h i c h fall, o r p u r p o r t to fall, u n d e r its r u b r i c . I n g e n e r a l , all
realists s h a r e a s t r o n g s u s p i c i o n a b o u t a p p l y i n g m o r a l c o n c e p t s a n d j u d g m e n t s
to the c o n d u c t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs, e i t h e r as d e s c r i p t i o n s of, o r p r e s c r i p t i o n s
for, state b e h a v i o u r . Realists are also u n i t e d by t h e i r e m p h a s i s o n t h e salience o f
p o w e r a n d s e c u r i t y issues, o n the p e r c e i v e d n e e d f o r a state to m a x i m i z e t h e
a t t a i n m e n t o f its (enlightened) self-interest a n d , a b o v e all, by their view o f t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a as i r r e d u c i b l y o n e o f a f e a r f u l a n a r c h y , w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to
g r o u n d their claims a b o u t t h e p r i m a c y o f the will to p o w e r . ~

S~ Perpetual, lo 4 (P 356).
3, Kant, Right, x74-75 (P 355)- See also Mulholland, "War, 25-41 and System, 348-79; Riley,
Kant's, 114-34; Gallie, Philosophers, 3-36 and F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and
Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 62-
79.
32Prominent classical realists often mentioned include Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes.
More contemporary realists include Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr and
Henry Kissinger, as well as so-called neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane.
Notable realist tracts include Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1973) , Ken-
nan's Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) and Waltz's
Man, The State and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978 ). See also R. Keohane, ed.,
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and S. Forde, "Classical
Realism," 62-84, andJ. Donnelly, "Twentieth Century Realism," 85-11, both in T. Nardin and D.
Mapel, eds., Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
336 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 2 APRIL 1 9 9 9
In terms r e f er r i n g specifically to war, realists believe that it is an intractable
pa r t o f an anarchical world system; t h a t it o u g h t to be r e s o r t e d to only if it
makes sense in terms o f national interest; a n d that, o n c e war has b e g u n , a state
o u g h t to do w h a t e v e r it can to win. So if a d h e r i n g to a set o f just war con-
straints h i n d e r s a state in this regard, it o u g h t to disregard t h e m a n d stick
soberly to a t t e n d i n g to its f u n d a m e n t a l interests in p o w e r a n d security.33
Kant's attitude towards realism is co m plex, b u t in the e n d constitutes, o n
the whole, a rejection. Consider first realism's descriptive side. O n the o n e
hand, K a nt does believe that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a really is a state o f nature.
He also believes that states s t u b b o r n l y refuse to accept any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
their rights and interests o t h e r than their o w n - - a n d that the result is a quite
insecure a n d fearful e n v i r o n m e n t in which the o u t b r e a k o f war is always a
d a n g e r a n d sometimes a devastating reality. H e believes, in addition, that the
instinctual side o f o u r n a t u r e inclines us towards selfishness a n d p o w e r -
seeking, a n d his emphasis on h u m a n a n t a g o n i s m clearly reveals his u n d e r -
standing o f h u m a n relations, w h e t h e r i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y or internationally, as
being (fiercely) competitive. At the same time, K a n t insists that, due to the
duality o f o u r nature, there is also, factually, an aspiration for s o m e t h i n g
more, namely, the realization o f a m o r e j u s t world a n d for m o r e ethically
a de qua t e relations between people. H e says that the very fact that states often
seek to justify their self-serving actions ill moral terms reveals that even states
in the midst o f a n a r c h y display this longing. T h e reason why we long for such
things is because o f o u r rational nature, in which we actually find o u r d e e p e s t
sense o f self a n d identity.34
M o r e o v e r it is clear that, for Kant, it is both possible and m e a n i n g f u l to
evaluate state b e h a v i o u r vis-d-vis moral concepts. I n d e e d , his entire interna-
tional t h e o r y o f justice would n o t m ak e sense unless that were the case. K a n t
does n o t believe that state b e h a v i o u r is utterly d e t e r m i n e d by the d e m a n d s o f
realpolitik; rather, he sees states as f o r m u l a t i n g intentional choices a n d policies,
some o f which m a y well be moral in motivation. A n d K a n t a d a m a n t l y refuses
to accept war as an e n d e m i c reality o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l life. We shall see, shortly,
that the bulk o f his j u s t war t h e o r y is a i m e d at progressively limiting the
incidence a n d destructiveness o f w a r - - a process whose e n d state, he hopes,
will be one o f p e r p e t u a l peace.
So K a nt believes that states can a n d o u g h t to act morally, a n d that we can
and o u g h t to j u d g e their b e h a v i o u r in m o r a l terms. Yet he also believes that, in
the status q u o o f international affairs, states are, on the whole, inclined to be
self-seeking. In the absence o f progressive r e f o r m towards a c o s m o p o l i t a n

33Op. cit., note 32.

~4Kant, Perpetual, lo2-o 3 (P 355).
 K A N T ' S J U S T WAR T H E O R Y 337

f e d e r a t i o n , states will tend, descriptively, to be egoistic a n d f o c u s e d o n their

relative level o f p o w e r a n d security.
At first glance, K a n t seems to reject utterly the p r e s c r i p t i o n s o f realism. F o r
n o w h e r e does K a n t advocate a f o r e i g n policy b a s e d on a p r u d e n t i a l c o n c e r n
with national i n t e r e s t s - - r a t h e r , he staunchly advocates h e e d i n g the d e m a n d s
o f justice, as c o n t a i n e d in the U P J a n d the S U P J . J n s t as we are n o t individually
to o r d e r o u r p e r s o n a l lives b a s e d on the p u r s u i t o f p r u d e n c e a n d h a p p i n e s s , so
states qua m o r a l p e r s o n s are n o t to r u n their f o r e i g n policies with an eye
towards national interest a n d calculations of p o w e r a n d benefit. K a n t is ada-
m a n t that the p u r e l y p r u d e n t i a l a p p r o a c h to f o r e i g n policy is " i m m o r a l a n d
o p p o r t u n i s t i c . " A p u r e l y p r u d e n t i a l f o r e i g n policy betrays o u r m o s t f u n d a m e n -
tal identity as rational beings responsive to the d e m a n d s o f m o r a l i t y a n d j u s -
tice. A p r u d e n t i a l f o r e i g n policy can only be b a s e d on m a x i m s violative o f the
u P J a n d the SUPJ.
N o t only is such an a p p r o a c h to w a r b o t h i m m o r a l a n d unjust, K a n t also
questions its very feasibility, r e p e a t e d l y q u e s t i o n i n g o u r capacity to a c c u r a t e l y
foresee, in a dispassionate light, all possible relevant c o n s e q u e n c e s , all possible
costs a n d benefits, o f l a u n c h i n g a particular war in the n a t i o n a l interest. "(R)ea-
son," he proclaims, "is not sufficiently e n l i g h t e n e d to discover the whole series
o f p r e d e t e r m i n i n g causes which w o u l d allow it to p r e d i c t accurately the h a p p y
or u n h a p p y c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h u m a n a c t i v i t i e s . . . But r e a s o n at all times shows
us clearly e n o u g h w h a t we have to do in o r d e r to r e m a i n in the p a t h s o f
duty.'35 I n d e e d , t h e r e is the hint (for instance in his r e m a r k s a b o u t the "illu-
sions" of the c o n c e p t u a l device o f the b a l a n c e o f power, so b e l o v e d by realists)
that such s h a m calculations could well result in wars disastrous to the n a t i o n a l
interest. T h e y could also result in far m o r e wars t h a n following the dictates o f
j u s t war theory. Far clearer a n d m o r e plausible, he c o n t e n d s , to follow the
system o f state rights a n d duties, SRs 1 - 5 a n d SDs 1 - 5, o u t l i n e d a b o v e in his
t h e o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l justice a n d law. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , things do n o t s e e m to
be so straightforward.36
While we do have K a n t ' s clear a n d f o r c e f u l r e m a r k s on the n e e d to reject as
implausible a n d unjust any kind o f p r u d e n c e - b a s e d f o r e i g n policy, we shall see
that he h i m s e l f e m p l o y s calculative r e a s o n i n g , for instance w h e n discussing
"the right o f a n t i c i p a t o r y attack" (anticipation necessarily involving c o m p l e x
j u d g m e n t s o f p r o b a b i l i t y a b o u t the o p p o n e n t ' s intentions a n d f u t u r e b e h a v -
iour). A n d it does s e e m as if K a n t believes that, in the face o f serious n o n -
c o m p l i a n c e a n d egoism on the p a r t o f o t h e r states, states m a y well t e n d to t h e i r
own citizens for the sake o f p r o t e c t i o n a n d security. T h e r e is the f u r t h e r

3~Kant, Perpetual, 116 (P 37o).

36Kant, Perpetual, 116-2o (P 37o-86).
338 JOURNAL or THE HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:~ APRIL a99 9

c o m p l i c a t i o n that, for K a n t as f o r Plato, a d h e r e n c e to the dictates o f m o r a l i t y

a n d justice is also to the l o n g - t e r m p r u d e n t i a l b e n e f i t o f all (qua rational
agents). So a s h a r p p r u d e n c e - m o r a l i t y split is p e r h a p s , at least in the i n t e r n a -
tional s p h e r e , n o t as t h o r o u g h l y sustainable as certain o f K a n t ' s r e m a r k s indi-
cate he w o u l d like it to be.
P e r h a p s the m o s t charitable a n d consistent r e a d i n g w o u l d be to say that,
for Kant, those circumstances which m o r a l l y justify the r e s o r t to war (to be
discussed below) also p r o v i d e c o m p l e m e n t a r y (but m u c h weaker) p r u d e n t i a l
g r o u n d s for d o i n g so. T h i s view clearly privileges the m o r a l o v e r the p r u d e n -
tial in vintage K a n t i a n fashion w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g K a n t to various implausi-
bilities, ironies or p r o b l e m s o f s e l f - r e f e r e n c e that would s e e m to follow a d h e r -
ence to a s h a r p split b e t w e e n t h e m .
T h e above considerations have only served to rule o u t realism as K a n t ' s
overall p e r s p e c t i v e on the ethics o f war a n d peace. W h a t r e m a i n s to be d o n e in
this section is to d e m o n s t r a t e h o w K a n t is n o t a pacifist. Pacifism, o f course, is
the view that n o war is or c o u l d be just. As J e n n y T e i c h m a n quips, "Pacifism is
anti-war-ism."37 In short, pacifists categorically o p p o s e war as such, t h o u g h
their reasons t e n d to vary (from an e x t r e m e version, which eschews a n y k i n d
of violence or killing as an intrinsic h a r m or evil to a m o r e plausible version,
which c o n t e n d s that it is the kind a n d scale o f violence or killing that w a r
involves which is i n s u r m o u n t a b l y objectionable). So, unlike s o m e realists, paci-
fists d o believe that it is b o t h possible a n d m e a n i n g f u l to a p p l y ethical j u d g -
m e n t to questions o f international relations. In this they a g r e e with j u s t w a r
theorists. B u t pacifists differ f r o m j u s t war theorists by c o n t e n d i n g that the
substance o f such m o r a l j u d g m e n t s is always that we s h o u l d n e v e r r e s o r t to
war.3S
So for K a n t to be a pacifist w o u l d be f o r h i m to be o p p o s e d to all w a r s - - f o r
h i m to d e n y the justice, or the right, or the m o r a l permissibility, o f e v e r
fighting a war. But Kant, in the Doctrine of Right, says that it is the "original right
o f free states in the state o f n a t u r e to m a k e w a r u p o n a n o t h e r (for e x a m p l e , in
o r d e r to b r i n g a b o u t a condition closer to t h a t g o v e r n e d by right) [my e m p h a -
sis]." H e also says that "(i)nternational r i g h t is thus c o n c e r n e d partly with the
right to make war, partly with the right o f war itself, a n d p a r t l y with questions o f
right after a war, i.e., with the right o f states to c o m p e l each o t h e r to a b a n d o n

:~7j. Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, a986 ).
3sT h e two most sophisticated defences of pacifism in recent English literature are: R. Holmes,
On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and, indirectly, R. Norman,
Ethics, killing and war (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See alsoJ. Narveson, "Paci-
fism: A Philosophical Analysis," Ethics 67 (1967); and G. E. M. Anscombe, "War and Murder," in
R. Wasserstrom, ed., War and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 197o ).
 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 339

their war-like condition a n d to create a constitution which will establish an

e n d u r i n g peace [my emphases]."39
F u r t h e r m o r e , w h en we think back to the passage in Perpetual Peace, m e n -
tioned at the outset, w h e n Kan t claims that hiring m e n to kill a n d be killed is at
odds with their h u m a n rights, the explicit emphasis is on the hiring o f those
m e n for those d r e a d purposes. T h e passage is an a n t i - m e r c e n a r y passage, n o t
a pro-pacifist one. We k n o w this because, i m m e d i a t e l y following it, he says that
"it is quite a different m a t t e r [and thus, p r e s u m a b l y , not a violation o f h u m a n
rights] if the citizens u n d e r t a k e v o l u n t a r y military t r a i n i n g . . , in o r d e r to
secure themselves and their f a t h e r l a n d against attacks f r o m outside.'4o In-
deed, this last clause seems to indicate w h a t for K ant m a y well be a j u s t cause in
fighting a war: the defence o f one's state f r o m external aggression. P e r h a p s
m os t explicitly, K an t says that: "In the state o f nature, the right to make war (i.e.,
to e n t e r into hostilities) is the permitted m e a n s by which one state p r o s e c u t e s its
rights against a n o t h e r " [first em p h asi s Kant's; s e c o n d em phasis mine]. " T h u s , "
K a n t continues, "if a state believes that it has been injured by a n o t h e r state, it is
entitled to resort to violence, for it c a n n o t in the state o f n a t u r e gain satisfaction
t h r o u g h legal p r o c e e d i n g s . . . " [ m y emphasis]4' It seems quite clear, in light o f
all these remarks, that K a n t believes there are some circum stances in which
states have the right to go to war. This is to say that there is the possibility o f a
j u s t war for Kant, which m e a n s that K a n t c a n n o t be a pacifist.

5" T H E VERY POSSIBILITY OF K A N T B E I N G A .JUST WAR THEORIST

So Kant is a just war theorist: he believes morality has a place in international

relations and that there are some circumstances a n d reasons which can morally
(and n o t j us t prudentially) justify resorting to war. W h a t r e m a i n s to be shown is
the core principles a n d the substantive c o n t e n t o f his just war theory. B u t the
first question which n e e d s to be a n s w e r e d is: even if K a n t is n e i t h e r a realist n o r
a pacifist, and even if he seems to say explicitly that j u s t wars are possible, how
exactly is it possible, in a substantive sense, for K a n t to be a j u s t war theorist,
given his o t h e r c o m m i t m e n t s , especially to the categorical imperative?
C o n s i d e r first the passage in Kant's Doctrine of R i g h t w h e r e he discusses a so-
called "right o f necessity." H e r e he says that, w h e n A violently threatens the
life o f B, B m a y justifiably kill A in r es p onse: "a wrongful assailant u p o n m y
l i f e . . . [is one] . . . w h o m I forestall by d e priving him o f his life." [his italics]
K a n t says that, in such an instance, "a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to show m o d e r a -

,~gQuotes are at Kant, Right, 164-65 (P 344) and x67 (P 346), respectively.
4~ Perpetual, 95 (P 345).
4, Kant, Right, a67 (P 346).
34 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL ~999
t i o n . . , belongs n o t to Right b u t to ethics." O n e m a y justly kill a n o t h e r h u m a n
being in self-defence, t h o u g h one is to be praised if o n e is able to repel the
attacker in such a way as to spare his life. T h e m o s t relevant conclusion to draw
f r o m this passage is that states, qua m o r a l persons, w o u l d seem to possess quite
similar rights to violent r es p o n se in the case o f an a r m e d attack by a n o t h e r
state which credibly t h r e a t e n e d to seriously injure its b o d y politic. We shall see
that this is precisely true for Kant.
K a n t p r o c e e d s to assert in this passage that t h e r e is n o right to take the life
o f an i n n o c e n t p e r s o n (i.e., one w h o is n o t violently t h r e a t e n i n g o n e ' s life),
even w h e n d o i n g so is reasonably d e e m e d necessary to save o n e ' s own life.
Kant's e x a m p l e is when, following a shipwreck, o n e p e r s o n p u s h e s a n o t h e r o f f
the plank they b o t h cling to for safety b u t w h i c h will quickly sink with the
weight o f both o f them. H o w e v e r , he says that, while there is n o such "right o f
necessity," such action is nevertheless excusable a n d o u g h t n o t to be p u n i s h e d .
It is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e that, in the powerful, p r i m o r d i a l grip o f the fear o f d e a t h
and the desire for survival, an a g e n t m i g h t u n d e r t a k e such brutal measures.
Besides, there is no p u n i s h m e n t , i n c l u d i n g the d e a t h penalty, which c o u l d
suffice to deter the a g e n t in such d esp e rate circumstances: if he sincerely
believes he is j u st a b o u t to face d e a t h anyway, n o t h r e a t o f i m p r i s o n m e n t or
possible execution in the f u t u r e is g o i n g to be able to influence his decision-
m a k i n g processes. So his action, while unjust (and also ethically w r o n g ) , is
nevertheless excusable and unpunishable.4~
T h e main idea b e h i n d viewing K an t as e x t e n d i n g permission to resorting
to war u n d e r certain conditions is that such m e t h o d s a n d m e a s u r e s - - k i l l i n g
h u m a n beings for political p u r p o s e s - - c a n be justified if, a n d only if, they can
be justified in terms o f the nexus between the CI, the u P J a n d the SUPJ,
which resides at the very heart o f Kant's m o r a l a n d political doctrine. All t h r e e
principles (which are, we have seen, variations o f the same imperative, as
applied to different spheres of action) r e q u i r e that all rational agents be
treated equally in a fair and public m a n n e r , a c c o r d i n g to laws or rules to w h i c h
they themselves can be seen to give their own rational c o n s e n t (qua free ra-
tional beings). A n d we have already seen the core i m p o r t o f the nexus between
these principles: it m a n d a t e s t h at we must, w h e r e v e r possible, preserve, p r o -
tect and e n h a n c e each and every instance o f rational agency. It is o u r rational
agency which is the source o f the " h u m a n i t y " a n d "dignity" K ant makes so
m u c h of, and to such acclaim. This is so because the h a v i n g o f rational a g e n c y

4~Kant, Right, P 235-36 (from the 1991 M. Gregor translation, 59-60, Cambridge University
Press) ; and T. Hill, Jr., "Making exceptions without abandoning the principle: or how a Kantian
might think about terrorism," in R. G. Frey and C. W. Morris, eds., Violence, Terrorism and Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 196-229. I am indebted to this article for the
reconstruction on just war which follows in this section.
 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 341
is a necessary condition for h a v i n g a g o o d will, the only t h i n g in the universe
possessed o f intrinsic value.43
H o w are we, qua rational beings, to preserve, protect, a n d e n h a n c e each
instance o f rational agency? (Which is to say: h o w are we to respect o u r m u t u a l
h u m a n i t y a n d treat everyone with the dignity that he or she deserves as an
"end-in-itself"?) We preserve, p r o t e c t a n d e n h a n c e rational a g e n c y a n d h u -
m a n dignity, above all, by s t r u c t u r i n g a n d / o r r e f o r m i n g existing political a n d
legal structures so that they are in a c c o r d with the dictates o f the C I - U P J -
s u P J . We respect h u m a n i t y a n d pay full tribute to h u m a n dignity only w h e n
we all live u n d e r a d e t e r m i n a t e , public, a n d universal system of laws w h i c h has
as its p u r p o s e a n d f u n c t i o n the effective p r o t e c t i o n a n d realization o f o u r
h u m a n rights. It follows that a n y t h i n g r e a s o n a b l y d e e m e d to be a requisite
part o f such a system is consistent with the core Kantian principles o n which it
is based.44
T h e system o f state rights, SRs 1 - 5 , a n d state duties, SDs 1 - 5 , is for K a n t
as close as we can possibly get to having a public, d e t e r m i n a t e , universal, a n d
juridical international system which is d e s i g n e d to protect, preserve, a n d en-
h a n c e the rational a g e n c y (read h er e as sovereignty, security, a n d integrity) o f
each and every state qua moral person, b o t h via the domestic a n a l o g y a n d as
the necessary a n d secure o r d e r e d context in which individual h u m a n beings
can enjoy their h u m a n rights. T h e Kantian system of international law a n d
order, c ont a i n ed in SRs 1 - 5 a n d SDs 1 - 5 , is d e s i g n e d to allow each state its
own full f r e e d o m , thereby e n a b l i n g its citizens to live full a n d free lives. T h u s ,
a state who wilfully crashes over these b o u n d a r i e s , violating SRs 1 - 5 a n d SDs
1 - 5, is violating its own r e q u i r e m e n t s as a state. It is willing a m a x i m which
violates the CI-UPJ-SUPJ. T h u s , in spite o f its instinctual inclinations, it m u s t
actually c o n s e n t rationally to w h a t e v e r is r e a s o n a b l y d e e m e d necessary to se-
cure the integrity o f the international system. A n d for K ant the resort to war is
one such grim necessity. Cast in looser l an g uage, such a r o g u e state p r e s e n t s a
serious threat to, and h i n d r a n c e of, the f r e e d o m that resides at the h e a r t o f
Kant's practical philosophy. Such an outlaw r e g i m e (R) is seeking to i m p o s e its
will by force on a n o t h e r political c o m m u n i t y (P) for no just cause, thus disre-
specting P's own free choices a n d treating P as m e r e m e a n s to R's e n d (for
example, o f f u r t h e r i n g its power, or a u g m e n t i n g its resource e n d o w m e n t ) .
A n d a r m e d force a n d coercion can be justified for K a n t to the e x t e n t to which
it can itself h i n d e r such a h i n d r a n c e to f r e e d o m .
States can go to war justly in the international system because the absence
o f any kind o f international coercive a u t h o r i t y leaves t h e m v u l n e r a b l e to just

43Hi11, "Terrorism," 196-9o4.

44Hill, "Terrorism," 904- 16.
342 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL ~999
such violations a n d boundary-crossings, to just such threats to their f r e e d o m .
"Thus," K a nt says, "if a state believes that it has been injured by a n o t h e r state,
it is entitled to resort to violence, for it c a n n o t in the state o f n a t u r e gain
satisfaction t h r o u g h legal p r o c e e d i n g s . . . " So, in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, "the
right to m a ke w a r . . , is the p e r m i t t e d m e a n s by which o n e state p r o s e c u t e s its
rights against another."45 States can only rely on a r m e d self-help in the face o f
violations o f their rights. H e n c e , w h e n faced with a violation o f o n e or m o r e o f
their rights, they are entitled to r e s p o n d with force. T h e y have n o o t h e r
feasible, self-respecting option. By this K a n t means, in contrast to the pacifist,
that the d e f e n c e o f one's basic rights is s o m e t h i n g w o r t h fighting for. T h e r e -
fore, force is n e e d e d to vindicate those core rules a n d principles, SRs 1 - 5 a n d
SDs 1- 5, which, if a d h e r e d to, w o u l d secure for each a n d every state its rights
and needs. T h e dictum appears paradoxical, yet is not: we can l a u n c h a j u s t
war w h e n d o i n g so is the only m e a n s available for vindicating those i n t e r n a -
tional rules and principles which, if they were a d h e r e d to correctly by every
state, would result in p e r p e t u a l peace. T h e very value we, as rational beings
organized into states, put on having a j u st a n d lasting peace is w h a t justifies
resorting to war.
Perhaps it would be apposite to s u m m a r i z e this latter, i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t
in a series o f c o n d e n s e d propositions:

1. All states have moral rights, SRs l - 5 (in o r d e r to p r o t e c t a n d secure the

objects o f the h u m a n rights o f their citizens) a n d duties, SDs 1 - 5 , vis-gz-vis
o t h e r states. These rights a n d duties are the f o u n d a t i o n , a n d m ost f u n d a -
m e n t a l priority, o f c o n c e r n for international justice for all.
2. These rights, SRs l - 5, entitle states to e m p l o y reliable m e a s u r e s necessary
to secure the objects o f these rights a n d p r o t e c t t h e m f r o m violation.
3. T h e r e is no reliable or effective i n t er n ational a u t h o r i t y which can c u r r e n t l y
assure states in the possession o f (the objects of) their rights. T h u s , states
are on their own with r e g a r d to such assurance.
4- Currently, the m o st effective a n d reliable f o r m o f such self-help assurance
with r e g a r d to rights-protection, at least in the last resort, is the use o f
a r m e d force.
5. T h u s , faced with serious violation o f their rights, SRs 1 - 5, states are enti-
tled to e m p l o y a r m e d force a n d war in o r d e r to p u n i s h the rights-violator,
vindicate their rights a n d re-secure their objects (and those of their citizens'
h u m a n rights).

In this section, I have o f f e r e d two substantive reasons or e x p l a n a t i o n s as to

how K a n t can possibly be a just war theorist, given that he is n e i t h e r a realist

45Kant, Right, 167 (P 346). (Back to the Nisbet/Reiss collection.)

 KANT'S J U S T WAR THEORY 343

n o r a pacifist a b o u t t h e e t h i c s o f w a r a n d p e a c e . T h e first is that, s i n c e r a t i o n a l

a g e n t s are e n t i t l e d to use l e t h a l f o r c e to d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t v i o l e n t
attacks o n t h e i r lives, a n d s i n c e states, qua m o r a l p e r s o n s , a r e r a t i o n a l actors, it
s e e m s to f o l l o w s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y t h a t they, too, m u s t h a v e s u c h a r i g h t o f
a r m e d s e l f - d e f e n s e . S e c o n d l y , a n d m o r e p r o f o u n d l y , it was c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e
r e s o r t to w a r i n K a n t c a n b e j u s t i f i e d b y a p p e a l i n g to his v e r y c o r e p r i n c i p l e s :
the c I - u P J - S U P J . W h e n w a r is r e a s o n a b l y d e e m e d a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t f o r t h e
s e c u r i t y a n d i n t e g r i t y o f a j u s t s y s t em o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d o r d e r , t h e n it
m a y b e r e s o r t e d to. W h e n t h e s y s t e m d e s i g n e d to a c h i e v e a j u s t a n d p e r p e t u a l
peace can only be u p h e l d a n d v i n d i c a t e d with the use of a r m e d force a n d the
l a u n c h i n g o f a war, t h e n s u c h a w a r is j u s t .
W e c a n see, t h e n , t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h K a n t ' s l a t e r w o r k i n t h e Doctrine of
Right (1797) s e e m s m o r e s o m b r e a n d less o p t i m i s t i c t h a n his e a r l i e r w o r k in
PerpetualPeace (1795), TheoryandPractice (1793) a n d UniversalHistory (1784).The
Doctrine of Right s e e m s p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e i d e a l w o r l d e n v i s i o n e d b y Perpetual
Peace a n d Universal History b e i n g a v e r y d i s t a n t f u t u r e p r o s p e c t . It t h u s seeks to
set t h e m o r e l i m i t e d a n d p l a u s i b l e g r o u n d - r u l e s f o r h o w states a r e to b e h a v e
d u r i n g t h e l o n g t r a n s i t i o n a l p h a s e f r o m t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l state o f n a t u r e to, at
l o n g last, a c o s m o p o l i t a n civil society p e a c e f u l a n d p r o s p e r o u s i n s t r u c t u r e .
Since w a r is p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f the state o f n a t u r e , it follows t h a t h e m u s t , a n d
t h e r e f o r e does, d r a f t g u i d e l i n e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s f o r r e g u l a t i n g state b e h a v i o u r
even in that most e x t r e m e a n d h a r r o w i n g of h u m a n experiences.46

6. T R A D I T I O N A L J U S T WAR THEORY
W e h a v e s e e n t h a t K a n t is a j u s t w a r t h e o r i s t a n d t h a t this fact is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
his m o s t basic p r i n c i p l e s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s . W h a t r e m a i n s to b e d o n e is to lay
o u t the specific p r i n c i p l e s o f K a n t ' s j u s t w a r t h e o r y . P e r h a p s , b e f o r e l a u n c h i n g
t h a t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , it w o u l d b e h e l p f u l h e r e by way o f c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n to list
some of the m o r e traditional e l e m e n t s of the j u s t war doctrine.
J u s t w a r t h e o r y , at least i n t e r m s o f w h a t we m i g h t call t h e J u s t W a r
Tradition ( c o m p o s e d o f t h i n k e r s like A u g u s t i n e , A q u i n a s , a n d e s p e c i a l l y

46Thus~ Makkreel's question, first raised in note '28, assumes considerable importance when
we consider the contemporary context: where exactly are we in this transformation process and
how far do we have to be along it before the right to resort to war loses its normative purchase on
our attention? I do not pretend to have ready and satisfactory answers to these potent queries. But
we may well wonder whether recent developments--the formation of the United Nations, the
increased concern over human rights and augmented ties of globalization--have moved us fur-
ther along Kant's proffered time line. If so, has the right to engage in war to vindicate interna-
tional law been transferred from nation-states to the UN? Has it evaporated altogether? Or is the
residual assurance problem sufficient to retain the standard assumption that, despite some prog-
ress, we remain mired in an international state of nature, and so states retain all their rights as
listed in the text above? My own sense is that the latter would still hold true for Kant.
344 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 2 APRIL 1 9 9 9
Grotius), typically makes a f u n d a m e n t a l distinction between jus ad bellum a n d
jus in bello.Jus ad beUum c o n c e r n s the justice o f fighting a war in the first place. It
sets the nor mat i v e criteria which m u s t be m e t by any state c o n s i d e r i n g the
resort to a r m e d force. Most typically, the traditionaljus ad bellum criteria (JWT,
for '~ust war tradition") include the following:

J W T 1 . J u s t cause. A state m u s t have a j u s t cause in l a u n c h i n g a war. T h e

causes most f r e q u e n t l y m e n t i o n e d by the j u s t war tradition include: self-
defence by a state f r o m external attack; the p r o t e c t i o n o f i n n o c e n t s within its
bor de r s ; p u n i s h m e n t for w r o n g d o i n g ; and, in general, vindication f o r a n y viola-
tion o f the two core state rights: political sovereignty a n d territorial integrity.
J W T 5. Right intention. A state m u s t i n t e n d to fight the war only for the
sake o f those just causes listed in J W T 1. It c a n n o t legitimately e m p l o y the
cloak o f a just cause to advance o t h e r intentions it m i g h t have, such as ethnic
h a t r e d or national glory.
J W T 3. P r o p e r au t h o r i t y a n d public declaration. A state m a y go to war only
if the decision has been m a d e by the a p p r o p r i a t e authorities, a c c o r d i n g to the
p r o p e r process, a n d m ad e public, notably to its own citizens a n d to the e n e m y
state(s).
J W T 4. Last resort. A state m a y resort to war only if it has e x h a u s t e d all
plausible, peaceful alternatives to the resolution o f the conflict in question, in
particular diplomatic negotiation.
J W T 5. Probability o f success. A state m a y n o t resort to war if it can reason-
ably foresee that d o i n g so will have no m e a s u r a b l e i m p a c t o n the situation.
T h e aim here is to block violence, killing a n d d e s t r u c t i o n which is g o i n g to be
futile.
J W T 6. (Macro-) Proportionality. A state must, p r i o r to initiating a war,
weigh the expected (universal) g o o d to accrue f r o m p r o s e c u t i n g the war
against the e x p ect ed (universal) evils which will result. O n l y if the benefits
seem reasonably p r o p o r t i o n a l to the costs m a y the war p r o c e e d .
J W T 7. C o m p a r a t i v e justice. T h i s final criterion is hotly disputed, even
within the just war tradition. Grotius, for instance, v e h e m e n t l y d e n o u n c e d it as
i n c o h e r e n t whereas Vattel insisted u p o n it as b e i n g essential to m o d e r a t i o n
within war. T h e idea here is that every state m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e that each side
to the war m a y well have some justice to its cause. T h u s , all states are to
acknowledge that there are limits to the justice o f their own cause, thus f o r c i n g
t h e m to fight only limited wars.
O n l y i f J W T 1 - 6 (and p e r h a p s 7, d e p e n d i n g on the theorist) can be, a n d
are, jointly satisfied is a state justified in g o i n g to w a r y

47Contemporary restatements of traditional just war theory can be found in Walzer, Wars;
 KANT'S J U S T WAR THEORY 345
J u s in bello, by c o n t r a s t , sets o u t the n o r m a t i v e criteria f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e
j u s t i c e o f p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s u n d e r t a k e n o n c e w a r h a s b e g u n . So, j u s ad bellum
c o n s i d e r s the justice o f g o i n g to w a r in the first place (the r e a s o n s f o r f i g h t i n g ,
the e n d s f o r w h i c h states m a y fight) w h e r e a s j u s in bello c o n s i d e r s t h e j u s t i c e o f
the f i g h t i n g itself (the m e a n s e m p l o y e d in t h e p u r s u i t o f the end). T h e r e are
two traditional j u s in bello criteria:

JWT 8. (Micro-) P r o p o r t i o n a l i t y . Similar to J W T 6, states are to w e i g h t h e

e x p e c t e d (universal) g o o d s / b e n e f i t s a g a i n s t t h e e x p e c t e d (universal) evils/costs
n o t o n l y in t e r m s o f the w a r as a w h o l e b u t also in t e r m s o f e a c h significant
military tactic a n d m a n o e u v r e w i t h i n t h e war. O n l y if the g o o d s / b e n e f i t s o f the
p r o p o s e d tactic o r action s e e m r e a s o n a b l y p r o p o r t i o n a l to the evils/costs m a y a
state (or its a r m e d forces) e m p l o y it.
J W T 9. D i s c r i m i n a t i o n . It is s o m e t i m e s w r y l y n o t e d t h a t j u s t w a r t h e o r y is
the o n e a r e a in political p h i l o s o p h y in w h i c h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is a c c e p t a b l e . T h e
key distinction to be m a d e h e r e is b e t w e e n c o m b a t a n t s a n d n o n - c o m b a t a n t s .
N o n - c o m b a t a n t civilians, u n l i k e c o m b a t a n t soldiers, m a y n o t be d i r e c t l y tar-
g e t e d by a n y military tactics o r m a n o e u v r e s ; n o n - c o m b a t a n t s ( t h o u g h t to be
" i n n o c e n t " o f the war) m u s t h a v e t h e i r h u m a n r i g h t s r e s p e c t e d .
H e r e too, it is o n l y w h e n a state ( t h r o u g h its a r m e d forces) fulfils b o t h J W T
8 a n d 9 t h a t it can be said to be f i g h t i n g a w a r justly.
T w o f u r t h e r c o m m e n t s are r e l e v a n t h e r e . T h e first is t h a t m o s t j u s t w a r
theorists insist t h a t j u s ad beUum a n d j u s in bello a r e s e p a r a t e ( t h o u g h this is m o r e
c l o u d e d with those theorists w h o a c c e p t c o m p a r a t i v e justice). T h e idea h e r e is
t h a t a war can be b e g u n f o r j u s t r e a s o n s , yet p r o s e c u t e d in an u n j u s t f a s h i o n .
Similarly, t h o u g h p e r h a p s less c o m m o n l y , a w a r b e g u n f o r u n j u s t r e a s o n s

Holmes, War, 114-82; P. Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, x994); J. B. Elshtain, ed.,Just War Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 199~); R. Wasserstrom,
ed., War and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 197o); W. V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and
Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981); R. Regan,Just War: Principles and Cases (Washington, DC:
Catholic University Press of America, 1996); R. Phillips, Can Modern War BeJust ? (New Have n: Yale
University Press, 1984); and P. Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968 ).
In terms of the actual figures and corpus of the Just War Tradition, notables include Angus-
tine, Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Vattel and Vitoria. The best historical studies of this corpus are in
J.T. Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, z 2oo-z 74o
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 ) andJ. T. Johnson,Just War Tradition and the Restraint
of War: A Moral and HistoricalInquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 ). For the primary
documents themselves, see St. Augustine, Basic Writings (New York: Random House, 1948); St. T.
Aquinas, Summa Theologica (London: Washbourne, 1912-22), II, Q. 4 o, A. 1; Q 64, AA. 6, 7; and
the following from J. B. Scott, ed., Classics of International Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925): H.
Grotius, DeJure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres; E. Vattel, The Law of Nations; F. Vitoria, De Indis et DeJu re BeUi
Reflectiones; and F. Suarez, De triplici virtute theologica (De caritate, disputatio z3).
346 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : Z APRIL 1 9 9 9

m i g h t b e f o u g h t w i t h strict a d h e r e n c e to jus in bello. T h e c a t e g o r i e s a r e at l e a s t

logically o r c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s t i n ct . T h e s e c o n d c o m m e n t is t h a t t h e jus ad beUum
c r i t e r i a are t h o u g h t to be t h e p r e s e r v e a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s
w h e r e a s t h e jus in bello c r i t e r i a are t h o u g h t to b e t h e p r o v i n c e a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
o f m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r s , officers a n d soldiers.48

7. THE PRINCIPLES OF K A N T ' S J U S T WAR THEORY

7"t. Jus ad Bellum

It s e e m s to m e t h a t we c a n d i s t i n g u i s h p r o f i t a b l y b e t w e e n jus ad beUum a n d jus
in bello w i t h i n K a n t ' s t h o u g h t s s u r r o u n d i n g j u s t w a r t h e o r y . W e c a n also c r e d i t
K a n t f o r r e a l l y b e i n g t h e first g r e a t t h i n k e r to stress, i n a w a y t h e J u s t W a r
T r a d i t i o n h a d f a i l e d to do, the t o p i c o f j u s t i c e a f t e r w a r , jus post bellum. I n t e r m s
ofjus ad bellum, K a n t s e e m s to s t i p u l a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a :

KJWT (Kant's Just War Theory)

KJWT I. J u s t cause. A state m a y r e s o r t to a r m e d f o r c e if, a n d o n l y if, its
r i g h t s (especially t h o s e o f p o l i t i c a l s o v e r e i g n t y a n d t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y ) h a v e
b e e n v i o l a t e d a n d / o r are m a t e r i a l l y a b o u t to b e v i o l a t e d . T h e key p r i n c i p l e
h e r e is t h e d e f e n s e , p r o t e c t i o n , a n d v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s o f
political c o m m u n i t i e s a n d t h e i r citizens. K a n t says t h a t a state c a n r e s o r t to w a r
e i t h e r i n r e s p o n s e to "actively i n f l i c t e d i n j u r y " ( p a r t i c u l a r l y a n i n v a s i o n o r
attack) o r to "t h r eat s " ( p r e s u m a b l y t h e c r e d i b l e a n d i m m i n e n t t h r e a t o f s u c h
a n i n v a s i o n o r attack). So, t h e r i g h t to go to w a r is, f o r K a n t , n o t p u r e l y o r
literally d e f e n s i v e ; p r o v i d e d t h e r e is a s e r i o u s e n o u g h t h r e a t , " t h e r i g h t o f
a n t i c i p a t o r y attack" c a n also b e legitimate.49
KJWT 2, R i g h t i n t e n t i o n . A state m a y go to w a r o n l y w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f
u p h o l d i n g its j u s t c a u s e , as s p e c i f i e d i n K J W T 1.
KJWT 3. P r o p e r a u t h o r i t y a n d p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n . T h i s is a v e r y i m p o r t a n t

48Op. cit., note 47.

40Kant, Right, 167 (P 346). Here, in the case of anticipatory attack, is where we see Kant employ
some of that forward-looking, probability-based, calculative reasoning which he elsewhere de-
nounces as muddled, at least relative to the clear dictates of morality and justice. The relevant
reasoning would be: if we do not attack S, there is a very high probability that S shall materially
violate our rights. Thus, we ought to launch a pre-emptive strike against S. Perhaps it should be
noted how this conception of anticipatory attack can be squared with Kant's mainjustification of the
resort to war, which has been framed in terms of the defence of rights, punishment of rights-
violation, and rights-vindication. The looser formulation of coercion beingjustified as a "hindrance
to a hindrance of freedom," is relevant here: the imminent and credible threat by S to violate the
rights of A (i.e., S presenting a clear and present danger to A) is no less a hindrance to A's freedom
than is the actual rights-violation by S because the threat produces, and is intended to produce, the
same effect as the actual attack: the capitulation by A to S regarding the matter in question. A may
reasonably and permissibly respond with lethal force in either case.
 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 347
jus ad bellum criterion for Kant. H e stresses time a n d again that the h e a d o f
state does n o t have the right to declare war with i m p u n i t y ; rather, the p e o p l e
m us t be consulted on each a n d every declaration o f war. "For a citizen," K a n t
intones, " m u s t always be r e g a r d e d as a co-legislative m e m b e r of the state (i.e.,
n o t j us t as means, but also as an e n d in himself), a n d he m u s t t h e r e f o r e give
his free c o n s e n t t h r o u g h his representatives n o t only to the w a g i n g o f war in
general, b u t also to every particular declaration o f war. O n l y u n d e r this limit-
ing condition m a y the state p u t him to service in d a n g e r o u s enterprises.'5o
T h e war in question m u s t be justifiable to the p e o p l e qua rational co-
legislators; which is to say, it m u s t be consistent with the C I - U P J - S U P J , as
c o n t e n d e d above. F u r t h e r m o r e , the resort to a r m e d force m u s t be publicly
p r o c l a i m e d to the e n e m y state so that duplicity a n d deceit do n o t m a r the
process.
K J W T 4. Last resort. K an t a p p e a r s to have s o m e t h i n g like this in m i n d w h e n
he says that "an act o f retribution.., w i t h o u t any a t t e m p t to gain c o m p e n s a t i o n
f r o m the o t h e r state by peaceful m e a n s is similar in f o r m to starting a war
without a p r i o r declaration [his italics].'5' G r a n t e d , there is n o m e n t i o n h e r e o f
war b e i n g strictly the last resort (such an assertion does n o t a p p e a r to m a k e
m u c h sense) but it o u g h t n o t to be, a c c o r d i n g to Kant, the very first. S o m e
serious a t t e m p t at a reasonable non-violent solution, p e r h a p s t h r o u g h diplo-
matic negotiation, is to be m a d e before r es orting to war.
T h e r e does not seem to be a n y t h i n g in K a n t which parallels the traditional
criteria o f probability o f success a n d (macro-) proportionality. This is n o t that
surprising since they m a k e explicit appeals to consequentialist considerations,
d e t e r m i n i n g probabilities, a n d w e i g h i n g costs a n d benefits, a n d so on. A n d we
have seen that there is a strong anti-consequentialist streak in Kant's m o r a l
a n d political thinking. A n d a l t h o u g h I have m e n t i o n e d h o w such p r u d e n t i a l
c o n c e r n s n e e d not be utterly alien to Kant's views on these matters, t h e r e are
simply no passages in the relevant works which even hint at his e n d o r s e m e n t
o f these two j ust war criteria, which were c o m m o n c u r r e n c y d u r i n g his time. It
would thus strain textual credibility to attribute t h e m to him.
W h e t h e r there exists a criterion o f c o m p a r a t i v e justice in K a n t is m o r e
difficult to say. O n the one h a n d , he does m a k e some H o b b e s i a n c o m m e n t s to
the effect that the a n a r c h y o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a rules o u t any d e t e r m i n a t e
c o n c e p t i o n o f morality a n d justice. H e d e n o u n c e s w h a t he calls " o n e - s i d e d
maxims backed by force."5~ O n the other, appeal to the C I - U P J - S U P J , a n d the
criterion o f just cause resulting f r o m it, w o u l d seem to question w h e t h e r b o t h

5~ Right, 166-67 (P 345-46).

~l Kant, Right, 167 (P 346).
52Kant, Perpetual, lo2- 5 (P 356-57).
348 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 2 APRIL 1 9 9 9
sides can always have s o m e justice in their cause. I f o n e state S attacks a n o t h e r
T (in the absence o f any " a l a r m i n g i n c r e a s e " in the p o w e r o f T w h i c h m i g h t
justify an a n t i c i p a t o r y attack), w h a t is the c o m p a r a t i v e justice o f S's cause?
I a m inclined to think that, on balance, t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g like c o m p a r a t i v e
justice in Kant's j u s t war theory. For, the lack o f central authority, a n d thus o f a
fully d e t e r m i n a t e positive system o f juridical state rights a n d duties, does leave
r o o m f o r interpretative conflict b e t w e e n states r e g a r d i n g the justice o f t h e i r re-
spective causes. O f course, K a n t is not h e r e a d v o c a t i n g s o m e k i n d o f t h o r o u g h -
g o i n g subjectivism with r e g a r d to the a p p l i c a t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ofjus ad bel-
lumcriteria; he does believe that the C I - U P J - S U P J clearly rules o u t s o m e actions
a n d clearly justifies others. H o w e v e r , t h e r e is e n o u g h residual i n d e t e r m i n a c y
r e g a r d i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l rules for it to be a r e q u i r e m e n t o f r e a s o n to self-
critically a c k n o w l e d g e s o m e kind o f limit to the justice o f o n e ' s cause.53 T h u s :

KJWT 5. C o m p a r a t i v e Justice. A l t h o u g h the C I - U P J - S U P J is sufficiently

d e t e r m i n a t e for us to m a k e a c c u r a t e a n d authoritative j u d g m e n t s r e g a r d i n g
the justice o f (and in) war, the lack o f total d e t e r m i n a c y m a k e s it r e a s o n a b l e to
require that all states self-critically a c k n o w l e d g e limits to the justice o f their
own cause a n d thus the i m p e r a t i v e o f fighting only limited wars, c i r c u m s c r i b e d
by the criteria of jus in hello.
KJWT 6. Consistency with the ideal o f p e r p e t u a l peace. T h i s suggestive yet
imprecise criterion seems to serve two functions. T h e first is to u n d e r l i n e the
fact that a state m a y resort to w a r f a r e only for the p u r p o s e o f v i n d i c a t i n g a n d
u p h o l d i n g the universal system o f law a n d o r d e r which K a n t constructs. T h e
second, a n d a r g u a b l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t , f u n c t i o n is to force a state r e s o r t i n g to
a r m e d force to consider in advance w h e t h e r it can do so while a d h e r i n g to the
n o r m s ofjus in hello a n d even to those ofjuspost beUum. In o t h e r words, K J W T 6
seeks to r u n a n o r m a t i v e t h r e a d t h r o u g h all t h r e e j u s t w a r categories: a state
c o n s i d e r i n g resorting to war m u s t n o t only fulfil all the jus ad bellum criteria b u t
to c o m m i t itself in advance to avoiding, as far as possible, a n y b r e a c h o f the
n o r m s ofjus in bello andjuspost beUum as the war unfolds. T h i s f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g
c o m m i t m e n t to j u s t c o n d u c t a n d a p p r o p r i a t e w a r - t e r m i n a t i o n is n e e d e d , K a n t
suggests, if the idea o f p e r p e t u a l p e a c e following w a r f a r e is ever to have a
chance o f b e c o m i n g practical reality.

7"2 Jus in Bello

T h e principal aspect to n o t e a b o u t K a n t ' s a c c o u n t ofjus in bello is that it is quite
weak a n d diffuse, at least relative to that o f the J u s t W a r T r a d i t i o n a n d to his

5~See Pogge, "Categorical," passimand Pogge, '~ustice," for more on the residual indetermi-
nacy of the CI and the UPJ.
 K A N T' S J U S T WAR T H E O R Y 349
own c o n c e r n s with jus ad beUum a n d jus post bellum. I n t e r m s o f the first s t a n d a r d
criterion of jus in beUo, K a n t m a k e s n o m e n t i o n o f a n y consequentialist crite-
rion o f (micro-) p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y . H e does, h o w e v e r , a p p e a r to m a k e o n e m e n -
tion o f discrimination: "(T)o force individual p e r s o n s [in a c o n q u e r e d state] to
p a r t with their b e l o n g i n g s . . , w o u l d be r o b b e r y , since it was n o t the c o n -
q u e r e d p e o p l e w h o w a g e d the war, b u t the state o f which they w e r e subjects
which w a g e d it t h r o u g h them."54 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this is n o t a terribly precise
a c c o u n t o f the discrimination familiar f r o m the J u s t W a r T r a d i t i o n . T h e glar-
ing omission in K a n t is a n y kind o f explicit m e n t i o n a n d e n d o r s e m e n t o f n o n -
c o m b a t a n t i m m u n i t y . T h i s is i n d e e d d i s a p p o i n t i n g , given the i m p o r t a n c e o f
the principle, b u t it seems to m e that we can safely infer t h a t K a n t m u s t h a v e
s o m e such p r i n c i p l e in m i n d because: 1) the q u o t e j u s t m e n t i o n e d d o e s e n u -
m e r a t e an i m m u n i t y o f a kind u p o n the n o n - c o m b a t a n t civilian p o p u l a t i o n ;
a n d 2) n o w h e r e does K a n t m e n t i o n a right to kill i n n o c e n t p e o p l e (even in self-
defence), which n o n c o m b a t a n t civilians are p r e s u m e d by traditional j u s t w a r
t h e o r y to be. I n d e e d , in the s h i p w r e c k / p l a n k case cited earlier, he d e n i e d the
existence o f such a right. It is only rational actors ( w h e t h e r states or individu-
als) w h o either actually attack, or are i m m i n e n t l y a b o u t to attack, that m a y be
r e s p o n d e d to with lethal a r m e d force. So:

KJWT 7" Discrimination b e t w e e n c o m b a t a n t s a n d n o n - c o m b a t a n t s . N o n -

c o m b a t a n t s are n o t to be m a d e direct targets o f a r m e d force.
KJWT 8. N o intrinsically h e i n o u s m e a n s . T h i s s e e m s to be the only truly
explicitjus in bello c a t e g o r y for Kant. F o r h i m , this r a t h e r v a g u e a n d s w e e p i n g
criterion rules out any wars o f " e x t e r m i n a t i o n , " "subjugation," a n d "annihila-
tion." Civilian p o p u l a t i o n s c a n n o t be m a s s a c r e d or enslaved. It also m e a n s t h a t
states c a n n o t e m p l o y "assassins or p o i s o n e r s , " or even spies.55 In short, "(t)he
attacked state is allowed to use a n y m e a n s o f d e f e n c e e x c e p t those w h o s e use
w o u l d r e n d e r its subjects unfit to be citizens. F o r if it did n o t observe this
condition, it w o u l d r e n d e r itself unfit in the eyes o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l right to f u n c -
tion as a p e r s o n in relation to o t h e r states a n d to s h a r e e q u a l rights with them.'56
Such a state would, in effect, be an outlaw a n d u n j u s t state. So, it is clear that, f o r
K a n t the anti-consequentialist, the e n d or cause d o e s n o t justify the use o f a n y
m e a n s to attain it. K a n t asserts this quite c l e a r l y w h e n he says t h a t "(t)he rights o f
a state against an unjust e n e m y [i.e., o n e w h o violates state rights, SRs 1 - 5 , a n d
state duties, SDs 1 - 5] are u n l i m i t e d in q u a n t i t y or d e g r e e , a l t h o u g h t h e y do
h a v e limits in relation to quality. I n o t h e r words, while the t h r e a t e n e d state m a y

54Kant, Right, 168-7o (P 347-48).

5~Kant, Perpetual,96-97 (P 346-47).
56Kant, Right, 168-69 (P 347).
35 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL ~999
n o t e m p l o y every m e a n s to assert its own rights, it m a y e m p l o y a n y intrinsically
permissible m e a n s to wh at ev er d e g r e e its own s t r e n g t h allows." (his italics)57

K J W T 8 is explicitly a n d r e p e a t e d l y c o n n e c t e d u p with w h a t we m i g h t call,

again for a d d e d emphasis, K J W T 9: N o m e a n s m a y be e m p l o y e d which are
inconsistent with the l o n g - t e r m ideal o f p e r p e t u a l peace. I n K a n t ' s words, "a
state mus t n o t use such t r e a c h e r o u s m e t h o d s as would d e s t r o y that c o n f i d e n c e
which is r e q u i r e d for the f u t u r e es t ab l i sh ment o f a lasting peace.'58 As we saw
in c o n n e c t i o n with jus ad bellum, this r a t h e r sweeping principle o f "consistency
with pe r pe t ua l peace" enjoins u p o n the just state in question a c o m m i t m e n t
n o t to violate the o t h e r relevant j u s t war categories. I n particular, in its jus in
bello form, this criterion d e m a n d s that states n o t u n d e r t a k e m e a s u r e s which
would u n d e r m i n e the process o f w a r - t e r m i n a t i o n a n d t h e r e b y r e n d e r very
difficult the search for a just peace treaty as the war draws to an end.

7"3" Jus post Bellum

Kant, unlike the J u s t W a r Tradition, is n o t c o n t e n t to rest with the two stan-
dard categories ofjus ad bellum a n d jus in beUo. I n d e e d , he essentially invents a
new just war category, jus post bellum, to consider in detail the justice o f the
move f r o m war back to peace. In terms ofjus post beUum, we n e e d to distinguish
between m o r e i m m e d i a t e a n d m o r e distant rights a n d duties, as well as be-
tween particular wars a n d the p r o b l e m o f war in general. W h e n it c o m e s to
talking a b o u t the relevant rights a n d duties o f states in the i m m e d i a t e p e r i o d
after a particular war, Kant is, if anything, m o r e elusive than he is aboutjus in
bello. O n the one hand, he firmly believes that victory in war does not, o f itself,
c o n f e r rights u p o n the victor which the v a n q u i s h e d is d u t y - b o u n d to obey.
Might does n o t equal right. T h e victor thus has n o right to p u n i s h the van-
quished or to seek c o m p e n s a t i o n . In fact, the victor m u s t respect the rights o f
the p e o p l e o f the vanquished c o u n t r y to be sovereign a n d self-determining.
But against a v a n q u i s h e d e n e m y w h o was clearly u n j u s t in terms o f the war
(for instance, by being the blatant rights-violating aggressor), K a n t says the
people o f such a state "can be m a d e to accept a new constitution o f a n a t u r e
that is unlikely to e n c o u r a g e their warlike inclinations."59 This latter r e m a r k
seems to f o r m a limiting co n d i t i o n to w h a t m a y be d o n e to states in the
a f t e r m a t h o f a war: p r o v i d ed that t h e r e clearly was a b l a t a n t aggressor S
(whose maxims o f action "would m ak e peace a m o n g nations impossible") a n d
that S has be e n d ef eat ed the very m o s t that can be d o n e to S in vindication o f

57Kant, Right, t7o-71 (P 349).

~SKant. Right, IS8 (P 347)-
59Kant, Right, 169-7a (P 348-49).
 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 351
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d o r d e r is the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a m o r e p e a c e a b l e ( p r e s u m -
ably republican) constitution in S.
I n t e r m s o f m o r e distant duties o f j u s p o s t bellum, a n d with a focus o n w a r in
general, Kant's very original a n d suggestive t h e o r y o f jus post bellum is essen-
tially that c o n t a i n e d in his f a m o u s list o f the six p r e l i m i n a r y , a n d t h r e e defini-
tive, articles o f p e r p e t u a l peace. 6~ T h e s e articles really s e e m to constitute the
final p r o p o s i t i o n , K J W T lO, o f K a n t ' s j u s t war theory. T h e s e articles are as
follows:

z) The Preliminary Articles:

PA z. "No treaty o f p e a c e shall be c o n s i d e r e d valid as such if it was m a d e
with a secret reservation o f the m a t e r i a l f o r a f u t u r e war."
PA 2. "No i n d e p e n d e n t l y existing state, w h e t h e r it be large or small, m a y be
a c q u i r e d by a n o t h e r state by i n h e r i t a n c e , e x c h a n g e , p u r c h a s e or gift."
PA 3. " S t a n d i n g a r m i e s will g r a d u a l l y be a b o l i s h e d a l t o g e t h e r . "
PA 4. "No national d e b t shall b e c o n t r a c t e d in c o n n e c t i o n with the e x t e r n a l
affairs o f the state."
PA 5. "No state shall forcibly i n t e r f e r e in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d g o v e r n m e n t
o f a n o t h e r state."
PA 6. "No state at war with a n o t h e r shall p e r m i t such acts o f hostility as
would m a k e m u t u a l c o n f i d e n c e impossible d u r i n g a f u t u r e time o f peace. Such
acts include the e m p l o y m e n t o f assassins or poisoners, breach of agreements, the
instigation of treason within the e n e m y state, etc. (his italics)."

2) The Definitive Articles:

DA I. " T h e civil constitution o f e v e r y state shall be r e p u b l i c a n . "
DA 2. " T h e r i g h t of n a t i o n s shall be b a s e d on a f e d e r a t i o n o f free states."
DA 3. " C o s m o p o l i t a n right shall be limited to conditions o f universal
hospitality."

It is b e y o n d the a m b i t o f this p a p e r to discuss these articles o f l o n g - t e r m jus

post bellum in g r e a t detail. W h a t is relevant h e r e is to p o i n t o u t that m o s t o f these
articles (eg., PAs 1, ~, 5 a n d 6, a n d DAs 2 a n d 3) essentially m a n d a t e a p o s t - w a r
re-dedication to realizing Kant's ideal system o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e - - S R s 1 - 5
a n d SDs 1 - 5 , within the c o n t e x t o f a c o s m o p o l i t a n f e d e r a t i o n - - a s p r e v i o u s l y
detailed. W h a t is p e r h a p s m o s t significant a b o u t these articles is that they m a n -
date n o t j u s t international, b u t also domestic, r e f o r m (eg., in DA 1, a n d PAs 3
a n d 4). A m o r e j u s t a n d p e a c e f u l world r e q u i r e s that states b e c o m e r e p u b l i c a n
(i.e., h u m a n rights-respecting, as e n j o i n e d by MPJ x) a n d that they take

G~ Perpetual, 93- lo8 (P 343-6o).

352 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37:2 APRIL 1999
c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g m e a s u r e s (eg., w e a p o n s r e d u c t i o n s a n d d e c r e a s e d military
spending), which can substantially r e d u c e the f e a r f u l tensions i n h e r e n t in the
c u r r e n t world system. T h e e m p h a s i s on r e p u b l i c a n i s m is key f o r K a n t : he be-
lieves that w h e n p o w e r is dispersed, w h e n the p e o p l e are sovereign, a n d w h e n
they have their h u m a n rights r e a s o n a b l y fulfilled on the d o m e s t i c front, states
will face dramatically r e d u c e d incentives to r e s o r t to war. A j u s t a n d lasting
peace, f o r Kant, begins at h o m e with r e s p e c t for h u m a n rights a n d is to be a i d e d
a n d abetted, on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane, by g r a d u a l a n d v o l u n t a r y c o n f i d e n c e -
building m e a s u r e s .
So, even t h o u g h K a n t is m o r e s o m b r e a b o u t the p r o s p e c t s for lasting p e a c e
in his later writings, a n d even t h o u g h he is m u c h m o r e explicit a b o u t allowing
w a r f a r e (albeit u n d e r certain r i g o r o u s constraints), he n e v e r gives u p on his
earlier h o p e s for a m o r e e n d u r i n g solution to "the scourge o f m a n k i n d . " States
are to c o m e together, based o n a "right o f p r e v e n t i o n " (of war),6' to r e n o u n c e
b o t h w a r f a r e a n d certain state actions or tactics which incline states to go to
war in the first place. States are to r e f o r m t h e m s e l v e s i n t e r n a l l y in a r e p u b l i -
can, h u m a n rights-respecting fashion and, eventually, to s t r u c t u r e the i n t e r n a -
tional a r e n a in such a way that all SRs a n d SDs stipulated by the S U P J can be
actually realized a n d fulfilled, as if t h e r e were an effective a n d fully instituted
c o s m o p o l i t a n f e d e r a t i o n o f p e a c e uniting each a n d e v e r y o n e o f t h e m .

8. CONCLUSION

It has b e e n a r g u e d that, c o n t r a r y to the traditional reading, K a n t d o e s in fact

have a just war theory. H e is n e i t h e r a realist n o r a pacifist, a n d his b e l i e f t h a t
resort to war can be morally justified is consistent with his own core principles,
notably the categorical i m p e r a t i v e . W a r is j u s t if, a n d only if, d u r i n g the l o n g
transition f r o m the i n t e r n a t i o n a l state o f n a t u r e to a c o s m o p o l i t a n civil society,
a r m e d force r e a s o n a b l y seems r e q u i r e d to vindicate universal p r i n c i p l e s o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l justice. Attention was t h e n paid to d e v e l o p i n g the detailed set o f
rules constitutive of Kant's j u s t w a r doctrine. K n o w l e d g e o f these rules, K J W T
1-1 o, reveals that K a n t differs f r o m traditional j u s t war t h e o r y by: 1) eschew-
ing consequentialist appeals to p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y a n d p r o b a b i l i t y o f success; a n d
2) g o i n g b e y o n d the tradition's s t a n d a r d criteria ofjus ad bellum a n d jus in bello
by constructing, in addition, an a m b i t i o u s a n d f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g a c c o u n t ofjus
post bellum. It s e e m s that K a n t ' s j u s t w a r t h e o r y is quite c o h e r e n t a n d b o t h
morally a n d politically defensible. At the very least, it is a systematic a n d
suggestive a c c o u n t o f the ethics o f war a n d peace, as viewed by o n e o f the t r u e
giants o f m o r a l a n d political p h i l o s o p h y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , I have n o t h a d time to
offer a t h o r o u g h critical evaluation o f his theory. B u t it s e e m s to m e that,

6, Kant, Right, 167-68 (P 346).

 KANT'S JUST WAR THEORY 353

whatever t h e t h e o r y ' s d e f i c i e n c i e s , 62 i t is v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t ( f o r b o t h K a n t s c h o l a r -
ship and incisive reflection on current issues of war and peace) to understand
that Kant indeed has a just war theory and to be informed o f w h a t it c o n s i s t s . 6 3

University of Waterloo

62Amongst the deficiencies of Kant's just war theory, I would list the following: the weakness
and vagueness of the account ofjus in belloand short-term jus post bellum; and the relative neglect
and/or denigration of consequentialism and the related unclarity of the link, if any, between
morality a n d prudence.
631 would like to thank Marko Ahtisaari, Christian Barry, David J o h n s t o n , Frances Kamm,
Bonnie Kent, J a n e Lomic, J o n a t h a n Neufeld, J e r e m y Waldron a n d especially T h o m a s Pogge for
constructive comments and criticisms. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers and the editor of
the Journal. Work on this essay has been supported by funding from Columbia University and the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.