TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

CASE 1: Euro-Med vs LGU Batangas GR 148106

FACTS:
On several occasions form August 19, 1992 to August 11, 1998 (6 yrs), Prov of Batangas
thru Governor Hermilando Madanas, purchased Intravenous Fluid products to Euro-Med
worth P487,662.80 as of 02/28/1998, purchases were evidences in invoices. EM made several
demand on LGU Batangas including several dialogues but these proved fruitless. LGU
Batangas admitted the alllegations but said that payments have already been made and such
was not included on the computation phase. (Note: did not state aha na court nag file ang
Euro Med).

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss invoking doctrine of primary jurisdiction on the

ground the primary jurisdiction over petitioner’s money claim is loged with COA (who has
primary jurisdiction DAW). LGU Batangas pointed out that Euro-Med’s claim, arising as it did
from a series of procurement transactions with the province, was governed by the Local
Government Code provisions and COA rules and regulations on supply and property
management in local governments. Respondent argued that the case called for a
determination of whether these provisions and rules were complied with, and that was within
the exclusive domain of COA to make.
Decisions: RTC (05/07/2001: dismissed Euro med case and suggested filing of money claims
to COA. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Then SC na dayon no CA.
Issue (1)
What is Doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
Held:
doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter
may well be within their proper jurisdiction.i[10] It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency.
Issue (2) Who has primary jurisdiction over the money claim of Euro-Med against LGU
Batangas?
Held: COA
Section 26, Government Auditing Code:
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend all
matters relating to x x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of
any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities.

The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed, however, by
an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only liquidated claims,
or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers
within reach of accounting officers.ii[15] Petitioners claim was for a fixed amount and
although respondent took issue with the accuracy of petitioners summation of its
accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and
other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COAs jurisdiction under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view1[11] or,
if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.2[12]
petitioners money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies
of respondents public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed
by the Local Government Code provisions on supply and property management3[16] and
their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA4[17] pursuant to Section
383 of said Code.5[18] Petitioners claim therefore involved compliance with applicable
auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of
knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of
COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioners complaint.

Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTCs
jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent
proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary
jurisdiction sua sponte (their own accord) and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure
of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between
judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.

CASE 2 : TASK FORCE SAGIP KALIKASAN VS JUDGE PADERANGA

FACTS:
On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG,
DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans of MV General Ricarte
Lines, Inc base on the report that it contained illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to
Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers
and consignees.

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other
pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR
Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest
products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and,
on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines,
Inc. DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and
PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown
owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City
CENRO. Hence, nobody appeared during the adjudication, Rivac, acting as adjudication
officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the
forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.

In a complaint dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger
C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR,
CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him. On 29 March 2005,
Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take
possession of the forest products.

In a motion to quash the writ of replevin, the defendants prayed that the writ of
replevin be set aside. However, Judge Paderanga denied the motion. The defendants
subsequently, filed a motion to dismiss ad cautelam, they prayed that the complaint for
replevin and damages be dismissed:

(1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines;

(2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
(3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and
(4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the
possession of the forest products.

July 8, 2005, Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an
affidavit charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming
a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:

a) Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the
DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him and that
the prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga to have done was to dismiss the replevin
suit outright.

b) Judge Paderangas] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x xx replevin suit, issuing

the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly
demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law.
 (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended
that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be held
liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary;[16] and that he be fined P30,000.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;

Held:

Yes. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency
responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that
members of DENRs Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought
them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have
alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that
administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be
dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan[25] a case with a similar set of facts as the instant
case the Court held that:

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by
the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI
turned over the seized items to the DENR for official disposition and
appropriate action. x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been
sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized
items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for
respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit
outright.(Emphasis ours)

In Paat,[26] the Court held that:

[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial
court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes
an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction
 over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. (Emphasis ours)

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of
replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest
products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court held that
properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was
in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly
deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action for
replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)

Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of
replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,[28] the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of

cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he
plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The
prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin
suit outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his
authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.

xxxx

Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly

demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to have
more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to
follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from
which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours)

CASE 3 : Carlos Go Sr. vs Ramos GR 167569

FACTS:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit 9for deportation initiated by Luis T.
Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against
Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.

Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so.

a. Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy Go, issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”
b. Luis argued that the birth certificate was tampered because even if indicated that
Jimmy’s parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan are Filipinos, the entry on citizenship of Carlos
was handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten.
c. On Sept. 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy was able to procure a Philippine passport from the
Dept. of Foreign Affairs with the use of falsified documents.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for
deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful
share in their business dealings.

He maintained that he is not an alien, but a natural-born Filipino.

a. His father Carlos, son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine
Citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance on July 11, 1950. An affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship was also executed on July 12, 1950.
b. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the
reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit.
c. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections.
d. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging
that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-
affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact,
speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
e. With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he
maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees
of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding
surname when making the said entry.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla

dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla
affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that
Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935
Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was
transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that
Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to
Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof,
the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against
Jimmy.

On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of
violating Section 37(a)(9)19 in relation to Section 45(c)20 of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known
as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition23 with
application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City. In essence, they challenged the
jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision24 dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-
117, ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive
reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on
the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however,
the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the
dismissal of the petition.

Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.29

Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of
deportation30 which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas
corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their
citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of
the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that
the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action,
and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in
the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also
rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.

The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their
citizenship.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended
to the Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to one’s claim of Philippine citizenship.
Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship
within the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it
held that the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath
of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of election was executed after
the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office
was not satisfactorily explained.

The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The
Court of Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal
bases warranting the deportation proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate
court found that due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board,
contrary to the claim of Jimmy.

Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been
denied,33 Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court,
respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.

Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation dated November 16, 2004
to carry out the April 17, 2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the
apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center,
pending his deportation to China.

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC
of Pasig City assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and
his release on recognizance.

In an Order dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the
remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation
order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order,
but this was also denied by the trial court in an Order dated December 28, 2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality
by the court.

Their motion for reconsideration40 having been denied on March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio
Fernandez, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, and Atty. Faisal
Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration, are before this Court as petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.

ISSUE:

(Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction)

Whether or not the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine
citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with
the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the
issue of alienage.

HELD:

There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the
deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine also the question of
citizenship raised by him.

However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary
jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board
wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. Moreover,
when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings.

While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in
the sound discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings. After all, the Board’s
jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship. Moreover, a deportee who claims
to be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship
reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. The decision of the Board on the
question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same
was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings
considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as
those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens.
Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was
offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question
of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular
courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of
facts. None of the exceptions in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to
exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented once
again, the same conclusion will still be reached.

One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of
jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the
Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the
acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus
soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited those
who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the
mistaken application of jus soli.

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.

As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented
substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Board’s jurisdiction
over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not
Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to
pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be
enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the
opinion that said proceedings should not be enjoined.

OTHER ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had
prescribed.

NO.
We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.

Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is
untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of
an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided
upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,48 we said that decisions
declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status
with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter,
lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.49 Indeed,
if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still
open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not
be precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when
the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.

Jimmy’s invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act
No. 613 states:

Section 37. …

xxxx

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time
after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises….

xxxx

As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9), 50 in
relation to Section 45(e)51of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his
deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years from the time the
cause for deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period
should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his complaint for
deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting
point for the computation of the period of prescription.52 Additionally, Section 2 of Act No.
3326,53 as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run," provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

xxxx

The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because the
government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been
aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies
attending his application for such passport, it would have denied his application.
2. Whether or not the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to
implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein

NO.

As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an

indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. 54 To be
indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.55 Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on
the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is the
propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section
1(3),56 Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a
citizen.57 Since his citizenship hinges on that of his father’s, it becomes necessary to pass
upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos’
citizenship will in no way prejudice him.

Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases,
res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court
said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence,
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:

1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59

In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought,
the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered
hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor
benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this
case.
3. Whether or not due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the
Board

YES.

Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need

not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met. Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the
subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that he was
given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus:

x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by
BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that
when his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter
chanced upon the Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the
Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for Extension
of Time to File Memorandum" and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an
extension of ten (10) days to submit his required memorandum. x x x84

This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.

4. Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

YES.

The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it
is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the
adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision
will be re-evaluated.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed
by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine
whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest,
the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at
its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 498 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.99
 Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would
be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail
cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail
even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested
pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not
ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to
touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.

CASE 4 : THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

CORP., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013

Administrative law; The Commission on Audit (COA) has primary jursidiction over money
claims against the government. It is the COA and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to
pass upon petitioner’s money claim against respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction
may not be waived by the parties’ failure to argue the issue nor active participation in the
proceedings. Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such
money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have
suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover,
petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice
of appeal and before the CA.

FACTS:
The Province of Aklan and Jody King Construction entered into a contract for the design
and construction of the Caticlan Port and terminal (phase 1). In the course of construction,
Petitioner Aklan issued a change orders for additional works and again entered into a negotiated
contract with respondent for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase 2). After
the construction of Phase 1 and change orders were agreed, respondent allegedly failed to settle.
Then, respondent sued petitioner to RTC for collection a sum of money. The trial court issued
a writ of preliminary attachment, Petitioner denied any unpaid balance. RTC rendered decision
in favour of respondent, issued a writ execution and garnished petitioners funds deposited in
different banks. Petitioner filed petition in the CA, but it was denied for its failure to file a timely
motion for reconsideration and is stopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as
it stopped from making the doctrine or primary jurisdiction as it only raised after its notice of
appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC
and the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

RULING:
Petition GRANTED. COA has primary jurisdiction over money claim and petitioner is
not stopped from not raising the issue of jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small
so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. All
the proceedings and decisions of the court in violation of the doctrine rendered null and void.

CASE 5: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DPWH, COA ET. AL. vs CARLITO LACAP
517 SCRA 255, Gr. No. 158253, March 2, 2007

Facts:
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,
with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and
damages filed by Lacap against RP. Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated
Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified. Being the lowest bidder,
Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the works
and purchased materials and labor in connection with.

On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount
it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the
DPWH.DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of
funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired. Dist. Eng sought the opinion of
DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566)
does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is void and
that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract. DPWH Legal Dept,
through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that
payment be made to Lacap.

Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued. On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.

On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not
appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim. Following the
submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order dated
March 11, 1996denying the Motion to Dismiss.
The OSG filed a Motion forReconsideration1 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order
dated May 23, 1996.On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State. Petitioner
contends that respondent’s recourse to judicial action was premature since the proper remedy
was to appeal the District Auditor’s disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to Section
48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money
claim against the government under Section 2(1), Article IX of the 1987Constitution and Section
26 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.

Issue:

Whether or not exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case.

Held:

Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative

nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience
but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. Said question at best could
be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter
rests not with them but with the courts of justice.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative
agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to
a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same
after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Nonetheless, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules.

There are many accepted exceptions, such as:

(a)where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;

(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive;
 (e)where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice;

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(i)when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;

(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,

(l)in quo warranto proceedings.

Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.

Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its
contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Thus, while it is
undisputed that the District Auditor of the

COA disapproved respondent’s claim against the Government, and under Section 48 of P.D. No.
1445, the administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim
by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e)
narrated above, the complaint for specific performance and damages was not prematurely filed
and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaustadministrative
remedies

CASE 6: San Miguel Properties vs. BF Homes

G.R. No. 169343 August 5, 2015

BF Homes represented by Orendain (receiver) sold to SMPI 130 parcels of land the latter with
an area of 44,345 sqm for the aggregate consideration of P106, 247,701.00, and had completed
the payments in December1995. BF Homes only delivered 110 TCTs out of 130. SMPI demanded
the delivery of the 20 TCTs. BF Homes failed to deliver. SMPI filed a Complaint for specific
performance with damages. BF Homes alleged that the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed in 1992
to 1993 were entered into by Orendain in his personal capacity and without authority, as his
appointment as rehabilitation receiver was revoked by the SEC on May 17, 1989 and that the
consideration paid by SMPI for the 130 lots was inadequate and disadvantageous to BF Homes;
and that the Deeds of Absolute Sale were undated and not notarized.

ISSUE: Whether or not SMPI is entitled to the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs for the lots it
purchased from BF Homes.

RULING: YES. Sec. 25of Presidential Decree No. 957 explicitly mandates that "[t]he owner or
developer shall deliver the title of the [subdivision] lot or [condominium] unit to the buyer
upon full payment of the lot or unit." SMPI submitted adequate proof showing full payment to
and receipt by BF Homes of the purchase price. BF Homes expressly admitted receipt of some
payments. Upon full payment by SMPI of the purchase price for the 130 lots to BF Homes, it
became mandatory upon BF Homes to deliver the TCTs for said lots to SMPI.

The contracts of sale of the 130 lots between BF Homes and SMPI were actually reduced
into writing into the three Deeds of Absolute Sale which were signed. The only defect was
that the Deeds were not notarized and, therefore, were not public documents as required by
Article 1358(1) of the Civil Code. The requirement of a public document in Article 1358 is
not for the validity of the instrument but for its efficacy. Although a conveyance of land is
not made in a public document, it does not affect the validity of such conveyance. Article
1358 does not require the accomplishment of the acts or contracts in a public instrument in
order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy, so that after the existence of
said contract has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the proper
document.

CASE 7 : UST v Sanchez

G.R. No. 165569

July 29, 2010

Facts: A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent)

against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and
the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged
unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records (ToR). Instead of filing an
Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release
respondent’s ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled in
the university for the last three semesters.

After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21,
2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters
pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was premature.

Issue: WON Rule on Primary Jurisdiction applies in this case

Held: NO.

The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply
is

the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not shown that the
CHED possesses any such power to “investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed, Section8 of Republic Act
No. 772

2 otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any
express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.

CASE 8: Machado vs Gatdula GR 156287

******There are 2 adjoining parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, 1 belong to
Machados and other to Gatdula. *******

On 02/02/1999; Gatdula wrote a letter to COSLAP requesting assistance because Machados

blocked the right of way of his private property by construction a 2-door appt on their property.
A mediation conference was made in response by COSLAP, both agreed to have a verification
surbery to the properties. Thereafter COSLAP issued an order on 03/16/1999 stating that in the
event no surveyor is available, parties may use the services of private surveyor whom CENRO-
DENR survey division would deputize. Junior Geodetic Engineer Abet F. Arellano (Engr.
Arellano), conducted a verification survey of the properties in the presence of both parties. Engr.
Arellano submitted a report to the COSLAP finding that the structure built by the Machados
encroached upon an alley found within the Gatdula property. Engr. Arellano’s findings
corroborated the separate report of Engineer Noel V. Soqueco of the CENRO, Los Baños, Laguna
that had also been submitted to the COSLAP.The Machados contested these reports in their
position paper dated August 26, 1999. They alleged that Gatdula had no right of action since
they did not violate Gatdula’s rights.5 They further assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP,
stating that the proper forum for the present case was the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna.

COSLAP Ruling: COSKAO directed the Machados to reopen the right of way for Gatdula.,.
relying on the verification surbey. It also declared Machados estopped because they have
actively participated during the trial. Machados filed MFR which was denied last 01/24/2000.
Machados filed a notice of appeal to Office of President. COSLAP then issued a writ of
execution.Machados filed motion to quash because the COSLAP resolution was not yet ripe for
execution pending OP.Machados persistently refused to reopen the right of way and provincial
staff recommended to COSLAP to issue a writ of demolition to which it did on 07/12/2001.

Machados filed to CA, petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that the Writ of execution
and demolition is with grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed such, declared that COSLAP
correctly issued the writs as the resolution became final and executory and Machados failed to
avail of any other remedy under Section 3(2) of EO 561.

Mentioning the case of Sy vs Comm on the settlement of land problems, it was held that "under
the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, the orders, resolutions and decisions of the COSLAP, as a
quasi-judicial agency, are directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and not to the Supreme Court. Thus, the CA ruled that the Machados’ appeal to the
OP was not the proper remedy and did not suspend the running of the period for finality of the
October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution." MFR was filed by CA== denied.

Issue: WON Machados are correctly in saying that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the case?

Held: Yes.
The COSLAP’s forerunner, the PACLAP, was created on July 31, 1970 pursuant to Executive
Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate
the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other
solutions. On March 19, 1971, Executive Order No. 305 was issued reconstituting the PACLAP.
The committee was given exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other
lands of the public domain: 1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land
disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive
measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain. The PACLAP
was abolished by EO 561 effective on September 21, 1979, and was replaced by the COSLAP.
Unlike the former laws, EO 561 specifically enumerated the instances when the COSLAP can
exercise its adjudicatory functions:

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:

xxxx

2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any
land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in
the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical
and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber

concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP considers:

(a) the nature or classification of the land involved;

(b) the parties to the case;

(c) the nature of the questions raised; and

(d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage
or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general
power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem.22 Thus, under EO 561, the
instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public
lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease
agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants he properties involved in the present
dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a squatter, a patent lease
agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any
cultural minority. the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive
in nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require
immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present case primarily involve the
application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way.The
statutory construction principle of ejusdem generic prescribes that where general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.26 A dispute between two
parties concerning the right of way over private lands cannot be characterized as similar to those
enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (d). urisdiction is conferred by law and a
judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void.

On estopped against Machados:Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet
another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even
after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and
not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may
not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel’ However if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction.
Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction in conferred by law, and does
not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. In this case, the COSLAP did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by Gatdula, yet it proceeded
to assume jurisdiction over the case and even issued writs of execution and demolition against
the Machados. The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’ participation in the
proceedings before the COSLAP.31 Under the circumstances, the Machados can rightfully
question its jurisdiction at anytime, even during appeal or after final judgment. A judgment
issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void.32 It cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. The void judgment can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
likewise void.