Case Digest for Constitutional Law II

1. Balacuit v. CFI, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners in this case are theater owners who is now invoking to the court the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan
on April 21, 1969. This called ordinance is for a reduction to "of the ticket price given to
minors from 7-12years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month
imprisonment. The Trial Court issued said complaint and subsequently a Temporary
Restraining Order was then issued to prevent the law to be enforced relying on the notion that
it violates the equal protection clause. However, the respondent court came into its decision
declaring said law to be valid and should stand on its own. Aggrieved on the merits, the
petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the sole ground
that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance
No. 640 is not with in the power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section
15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license
fees for theaters and not admission rates. The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of
the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited
law.

Issue: Does the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of Police Power?

Held: Yes

Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power,
the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated,
it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting
to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business
or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the
exercise of police power.33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the
citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property
shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to
manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. 36

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption
is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence.37 The exercise of police power by the
local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.38

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if
We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing
considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

2. Lozano vs. Matinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)

Facts: The constitutionality of Bats Pambansa Bilang 22 A.K.A the Bouncing Check Law
which approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision.
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as
the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. These petitions arose from cases
involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute
an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent
trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have
come to us for relief.
Issue: Whether or not BP. 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt.
Held: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as and offense against property, but an offense against public order. The
effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt The welfare of society and he public interest. The enactment
of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of
penal sanctions.
 3. Carlos Superdrug Corporation vs. DSWD, et al., GR No. 166494, (June 29, 2007)
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in
the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand, include the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of
Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and Local
Government(DILG)which have been specifically tasked to monitor the
drugstores compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments. On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No.
7432,[3] was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective
onMarch 21, 2004.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the Expanded
Senior Citizens Act. Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because
it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1)
drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed
to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

Issue: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section
9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1

Held: NO. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact
definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness
to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same.The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and
the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property
rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police
power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various
laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and
public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished
upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. Undeniably, the success of
the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other
private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in
invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose
or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof
that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the
Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.

4. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor Mayor, 20 SCRA 849
(1967)
Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar
Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of
Manila. They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate
due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of
the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information. There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorities. They
claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.

The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary. It was also
unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. There
was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue: whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.

Held: NO. Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective
as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated
with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police
power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation
of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does
"to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as
annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same
time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action
for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to
those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.

5. - Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)

Facts: Petitioners in this case assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the
operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with
nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation
or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June
20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power
to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of
Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The
municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate
by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other
similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:On May 21, 1954, the first
section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit
... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council
may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way
altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which
prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The
lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed
the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of
a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
Held: In this case the Supreme Court ruled against Paras the respondent. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test
of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State.
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to
be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.

6. Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)

Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This is an
appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are
challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to
deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due process of law. The
assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop
to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or
rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber
shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is
conducted is the same person. " Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is
constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power).
Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and
their means of livelihood.
Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed. Enactment of
such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power. The objectives of the Ordinance are: (1)
To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and; (2) To
forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for
massaging customers. This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners rights were not violated and they
are not deprived of the due process of law. Matajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]
(Municipal Corporation Tests of a Valid Ordinance) Facts: The Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help
centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the
benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the
government. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing
a port ion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino. On
December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting
the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit t o any establishment
for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a
casino. On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of c
asino and providing penalty for violation therefore. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the
CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.

The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Ru les of Court with
the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment
of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution. Held: No. Gambling is
not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there
is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
matter, even mentioning i t at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of g
ambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Under Sec. 458 of
the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Ordinances should not
contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair
or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may
regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be
unreasonable. Presley vs Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 86774, August 21, 1991)
Constitutional Law II, Non-impairment Clause FACTS: A complaint was filed by BAVA
against the Almendrases for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the
subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes.
However, the Court ruled in the Sangalang case that the Jupiter Street where the house and
lot of the Almendrases which was leased to Presley who is the owner and operator of the Hot
Pan de Sal Store are located is open to the general public and is not covered by the restrictive
easements based on the deed restrictions but chiefly because the National Government itself,
through the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into a 'high
density commercial (C-3) zone. ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 81-01 violates the Non-
impairment clause. RULING: No. The Court upheld its ruling in Ortigas and Co. vs Feati
Bank which states that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of
contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can
be enforced against the petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the
land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to
reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICE
POWER OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES BASED ON
THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE SUSTAINED BY THE COURTS; ATTACK
AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE 4964 CANNOT SUCCEED. — The
objectives behind the enactment of Ordinance 4964 are: "(1) To be able to impose payment
of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow
out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." This Court has been
most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as
U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made
clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police
power to a municipality. This clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities
and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by
the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of the Philippine Jurisprudence."
As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the
unconstitutionality of such ordinance|||

7. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)

Facts: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The trouble arose
when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand
its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No.
3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce
assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement
Issue: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
Held: NO. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons
it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their
acts, and not to the courts of justice.

8. City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993,
MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L.
Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on
30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION

OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).On 11 January 1995,
petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by
the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

Held: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring
the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment
of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the
State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in
this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative
bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and
in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided
under the Code.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.

9. Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 719

Facts: On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels
of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at
Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests
over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the
purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma
Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the
stipulations or restrictions that:
 "1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or
remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and
properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected
either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be
at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines." 2
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. 3
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and
106092 issued in its name, respectively, and the building restrictions were also annotated
therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all
liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D'," 5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired from
Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the
name of Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-
appellee claims that Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith, free
from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and
Emma Chavez. Cdpr
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511,
101719, 101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for
the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the
big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also
designated or established
Issue: whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power |||

Held: YES. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee — referring to the restrictions incorporated in
the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to
defendant-appellee — it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people."
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a
sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may
be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and
prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution
being reasonable, and it being a "legitimate response to a felt public need," not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the
municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when
he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to the challenge that
thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject
building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and
106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said
resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as
residential, cannot be enforced.|||

10. Presley vs. Bel-Air Village Association, 201SCRA 13

Facts: A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was
filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against
TeofiloAlmendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-
appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that
the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes
and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3,803.55. Presley,
as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the
same address. At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati
Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions (Exh. "C") was already annotated in their
title (Exh. "B") providing (among others) 'that the lot must be used only for residential
purpose' (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2"). When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de
sal' store, it sent a letter to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store (Exh.
"D"). Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is
classified as a purely residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and
registered in the name of BAVA.
During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley
died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia
V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson. The issues raised in the instant petition have already
been dealt with in the consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgated on December
22, 1988 entitled Sangalang Doctrine.
Issue: Does the Deed of Restrictions entirely wrong?

Held: In the instant petition, BAVA assails the Court's decision in the Sangalang case, more
specifically the Court's interpretation of Ordinance No. 81-01 passed by the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) on March 14, 1981. It avers that due to the multitude of issues raised
and the numerous pleadings filed by the different contending parties, the Court was misled
and unfortunately erred in concluding that Jupiter Street was reclassified as a "high density
commercial (C-3) zone" when in fact, it is still considered as a "(R-1) residential zone." prcd
If indeed private respondent's observations were accurate, the Court will certainly not hesitate
to correct the situation and the case at bar would be the proper occasion to do so. We have
carefully examined the pleadings but have found no reason to reconsider
the Sangalangdoctrine. In assailing the Court's decision, the private respondent has come out
with mere assertions and allegations. It failed to present any proofs or convincing arguments
to substantiate its claim that Jupiter Street is still classified as a residential zone. (See
Filinvest v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 664 [1990]) No new zoning reclassification,
ordinance, certification to the effect or jurisprudence for that matter was brought to the
attention of this Court which would necessarily compel us to take a second look at
the Sangalang Case. The Court can not reverse a precedent and rule favorably for the private
respondent on the strength of mere inferences.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed
of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed
of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties.
Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. However, these
contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the
torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police
power.

11. Knights if Rizal vs Torre de Manila

Facts: DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Condominium, after it was issued
Building permit by the City Of Manila Office allowing it to build a 49 Storey with Basement
& 2 penthouse Level Residential Conduminium. However the City Council of Manila issued
Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the
Building Permit og DMC citing among others, that “the Torre de Manila Condominium,
based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the
national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights,
would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard
vantage point.” Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of
Manila’s City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121.8 In
his letter dated 12 September 2012, City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there
is “no legal justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor
of [DMCI-PDI]” since the construction “lies outside the Luneta Park” and is “simply too far
to be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical
significance” of the Rizal Monument.9 He also pointed out that “there is no showing that the
[area of] subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or archeological
area. Neither has it been categorically designate. National Historical Commission of the
Philippines Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is
outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and
thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument. On 26 November
2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that garnered about
7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its
directive in Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila’s building officials to temporarily
suspend DMCI-PDI’s Building Permit.
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board
Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI’s application
for variance, which was later on amended. The City Council resolution later states that “the
City Council of Manila find[s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid
recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratifies] and confirm[s] all previously issued
permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]”
On 12 September 2014, the Knights Of Rizal, a “civic, patriotic, cultural, non- partisan, non-
sectarian and non-profit organization”18 created under Republic Act No. 646,19 filed
a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project.
The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of “transcendental
importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far-
reaching implication” involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument.

Issue: Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop
the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project?

Held: The Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law x x x.”61 It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be
taken away from an individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The
dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in one’s
own property, would violate substantive due process. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear
that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the
officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has
a clear legal right to the performance of such act. In the present case, nowhere is it found in
Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of
a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background
sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City
of Manila “to consider,” in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, “the standards set under
Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila
since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of
Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where
Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is “not part of the Rizal Park
that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is
in fact “well-beyond” the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I.
Diokno.62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a “heritage zone, a
cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure.”63 Also, to declare that
the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve
making a finding of fact. A finding of fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission of
evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is the Regional
Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a proper
finding of fact, and determine whether the Torre de Manila project properly complied with
the standards set by the ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service Commission,64 we held that it is
the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the proper
court or tribunal. To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance
No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards
cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park- and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal
Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial duty
to consider these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be no such
ministerial duty because these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of the Rizal
Park. The KOR also invokes this Court’s exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of
review under Section 1, Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only
exercise its extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits
and licenses, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the City of
Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCI-
PDI. Thus, there is no justification at all for this Court to exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power. Moreover, the exercise of this Court’s
extraordinary certiorari power is limited to actual cases and controversies that necessarily
involve a violation of the Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality or
validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does not raise
the issue of constitutionality or validity of the statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the
Court’s direct exercise of its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR’s recourse lies with
other judicial remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court. In Association of
Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,66 we
held that in cases where the question of constitutionality of a governmental action is raised,
the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise identified as the power of judicial
review– the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of
government. As a rule, as required by the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed
with the lowest court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The judicial review that
the courts undertake requires:

1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The lower court’s decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Supreme Court
through the appeal process, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court in an original
petition for injunction which we later on treated as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There
is, however, no clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance
No. 8119 for applications for permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal Park.
Even if there were such legal duty, the determination of whether the City of Manila failed to
abide by this legal duty would involve factual matters which have not been admitted or
established in this case. Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this Court.
Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background
sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part of the “physical integrity” of the Rizal
Monument. How far should a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument-
one, two, three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral
Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how sightline is determined,
neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether a construction that is not
part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can be said to violate
the Rizal Monument’s physical integrity, except only to say “when you stand in front of the
Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired.” This kind
of a standard has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far as the
human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court
cannot apply such a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property rights
several kilometers away from a historical sight or facility. The Dissenting Opinion claims that
“the City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous construction of its own Ordinance, had failed
to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in DMCI-PDI’s
favor.” However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A67easily dispel this
claim. According to the resolutions, the City of Manila, through the MZBAA, acted on
DMCI-PDI’s application for variance under the powers and standards set forth in Ordinance
No. 8119. Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or
arbitrarily in issuing said resolution, the Court should respect MZBAA’s exercise of
discretion. The Court cannot “substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a
better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested
in them by law.”68 Since the Court has “no supervisory power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government,” it “should not generally
interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions.”69 The power of the Court in
mandamus petitions does not extend “to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either”70 Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the City of
Manila, through the CPDO, of the permits previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila
project to determine compliance with the standards under Ordinance No. 8119. It also
declares that the circumstances in this case warrant the pro hac vice conversion of the
proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a “contested case” necessitating notice and
hearing with all the parties involved. Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute
a precedent because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in other cases.
A pro hac vice decision violates statutory law- Article 8 of the Civil Code- which states that
“judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.” The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac
vice because by mandate of the law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system
of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case
must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of
equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary
executive acts of the executive branch unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. And subject to well-settled exceptions,
mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting
in the exercise of their official ministerial functions. This emanates from the respect accorded
by the judiciary to said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of
powers. In De Castro v. Salas, we held that no rule of law is better established than the one that
provides that mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court when
honestly exercised and when such power and authority is not abused. In exceptional cases,
the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in matters involving judgment
and discretion, only “to act, but not to act one way or the other,” and only in cases where
there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority. In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of
Manila had been negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that
this determination will involve questions of fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper
permits and had secured all approvals and licenses months before the actual construction
began. Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City of Manila had violated
and could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter which
do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The Venice Charter
is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration of ancient
monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together principles in the field of historical
conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and and laid down by
experts over the years. Each country, however, remains “responsible for applying the plan
within the framework of its own culture and traditions.”

The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The
Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but
mere guidelines- a set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the
years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and
buildings. The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI’s Zoning Permit was granted without
going through the process under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was properly
rectified when, faced with mounting opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from
the City of Manila and immediately began complying with the procedure for applying for a
variance. The MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of the variance and the
City Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying the licenses and permits already given
to DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The
City Council of Manila could have denied the application had it seen any reason to do so.
Again, the ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion
and well within the authority granted it by law and the City’s own Ordinance No. 8119. The
main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and
welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger,
or hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses
an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal
Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA,
and its subsequent ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise
of discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not unduly
tread upon the local government’s performance of its duties. It is not for this Court to dictate
upon the other branches of the government how their discretion must be exercised so long as
these branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in the proper case and
before the proper forum. It is not within the power of this Court in this case to make such
determination. Without such determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of
Manila had failed to consider its duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the permits
in DMCI-PDI’s favor without making a finding of fact how the City of Manila failed “to
consider” its duties with respect to areas outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first
place, this Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original action like this
before this Court. Moreover, the City of Manila could not legally apply standards to sites
outside the area covered by the ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, taken in
light of the lack of finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City of
Manila, there is no basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the City of Manila.

12. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (1982)

Facts: Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing
out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No.
52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing
personnel of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the
said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive
due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars
without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other
documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to
taxicabs and not to other transportation services.|| |

Issue: Whether or not there is a denial of due process.

Held: The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling
the taxicab operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a
conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the
options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101;
and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard
adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The Court also ruled
that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars
only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to
those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus
making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other
transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal
protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed

13. PPA v. Cipres Stevedoring, G.R. No. 145742, July 14, 2005

Facts: Petitioner PPA is a government entity created by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 857 and is tasked to implement an integrated program for the planning, development,
financing, and operation of ports and port districts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, and porterage business,
including cargo handling and hauling services, in the province of Negros Oriental and in the
cities of Dumaguete and Bais. Since the commencement of its corporate existence in 1976,
respondent had been granted permits of varied durations to operate the cargo handling
operations in Dumaguete City. In 1991, petitioner awarded an eight-year contract 5 to
respondent allowing the latter to pursue its business endeavor in the port of Dumaguete City.
This contract expired on 31 December 1998. At about the time respondent was awarded an
eight-year contract in 1991 or, on 12 June 1990, PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90
(PPA AO No. 03-90) dated 14 May 1990 took effect. This administrative order contained the
guidelines and procedures in the selection and award of cargo handling contracts in all
government ports as well as cargo handling services that would be turned over by petitioner
to the private sector.
PPA AO No. 03-90 is an administrative order decision to bid out the cargo holding services
in the ports around the country, which is within the province and discretion of the petitioner.
Respondent withhold-over permits for the continuance of its stevedoring business, contends
that the administrative order above violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment
of contract.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance and implementation of PPA AO No. 03-2000 violated the
constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract.
Held: We agree with petitioner and hold that respondent was not able to establish its claimed
right over the renewal of its cargo handling agreement with the former.
To begin with, stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the state's
police power as we have declared in Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, to wit:
The Manila South Harbor is public property owned by the State. The
operations of this premiere port of the country, including stevedoring work,
are affected with public interest. Stevedoring services are subject to regulation
and control for the public good and in the interest of general welfare.
As "police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep," whatever proprietary right that respondent may have acquired must necessarily give
way to a valid exercise of police power, thus:
 4. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power,
especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of
one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law . . .
In connection with the foregoing, we likewise find no arbitrariness nor is irregularity on the
part of petitioner as far as PPA AO No. 03-2000 concerned. It is worthwhile to remind
respondent that petitioner was created for the purpose of, among other things, promoting the
growth of regional port bodies. In furtherance of this objective, petitioner is empowered, after
consultation with relevant government agencies, to make port regulations particularly to
make rules or regulation for the planning, development, construction, maintenance, control,
supervision and management of any port or port district in the country. 51 with this mandate,
the decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the ports around the country is properly
within the province and discretion of petitioner which we cannot simply set aside absent grave
abuse of discretion on its part. The discretion to carry out this policy necessarily required prior
study and evaluation and this task is best left to the judgment of petitioner. While there have
been occasions when we have brushed aside actions on the part of administrative agencies for
being beyond the scope of their authority, the situation at the case at bar does not fall within
this exception. |||

14. Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

Facts: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the
members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert
the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend
the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). This case arose
from the petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
“Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence” issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police
power.
Held: Yes. At any rate, assuming that petitioner's PTCFOR constitutes a property right
protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed
beyond the reach of the State's police power. All property in the state is held subject to its
general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional
guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property
rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace
and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed
by the New People's Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community,
President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating
factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general. C
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive.
In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms.
What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those
who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR.
This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they
do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be
difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier
for the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as
reasonable exercise of the police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the
legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace.
With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the
means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable
exercise of police power. The ruling inUnited States vs. Villareal, is relevant, thus:
"We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory
regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure
well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments
of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such
a regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to
suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the practice of
carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly
oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its
enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state."

15. City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919)

Facts: The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by
the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the
expropriation? The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said
city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose
of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner alleged that for the purpose of
constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire
ownership of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo. The defendants – the
Chinese Community of Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado
– alleged in their Answer (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the
land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was
covered with sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a
street for public purposes. One of the defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant
right of way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that
the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed. The Honorable
Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under
the complaint, without any finding as to costs. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city
of Manila has authority to expropriation private lands for public purposes.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private property for public use.
Held: NO. he city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property.When a
municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an objection is made
thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry,
and to hear proof upon an-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not
the purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is
not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot
expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the
purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said
condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the
property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights
call for protection by the courts. The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. The very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking of the property. The
general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and
no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.
The Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public
use and devote it to another. When the power to take land already applied to one public use
and devote it to another is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no
question can arise and already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for
another use which is inconsistent with the first without special authority from the Legislature
or authority granted by necessary and reasonable implication. Land applied to one use should
not be taken for another except in cases of necessity. A public cemetery is one used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church. A private cemetery is one used only by a
family, or a small portion of a community. The Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a
public cemetery. Cemeteries, while still devoted to pious uses, are sacred, and it cannot be
supposed that the Legislature has intended that they should be violated in the absence of
special provisions on the subject authorizing such invasion. That since the city of Manila is
only permitted to condemn private property for public use and since the Chinese Cemetery in
the city of Manila is a public cemetery already devoted to a public use,
the city of Manila cannot condemn a portion of the cemetery for a public street

16. Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)

Facts: Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case
against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and
other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the
expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be
used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.
Issue: W hether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held: YES. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property
for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking
must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a
provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when
such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president
making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there
are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB
resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

17. Lagcao vs. Judge Labra, GR No. 155746, October 3, 2004

Facts: Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029,
situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners
purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot
1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of
Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province
for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu
to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the
Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of
petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name
of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment
proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,
Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC's decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
demolition. C

However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayor's request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120
days from February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029
as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu
City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for
socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu
City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended
acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the
actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount of
P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia
on August 2, 2000
Issue: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter
parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
Held: Yes it does. Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking
authority are denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon
local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant
to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws .
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners' lot was enacted by the
SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of
the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems of the
country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such
exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private
property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation
and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and
liberty. Whether directly exercised by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of
eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights. For this reason, the need for a
painstaking scrutiny cannot be overemphasized.
The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the
expropriation of a private individual's property. The courts cannot even adopt hands-off
policy simply because public use or public purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just
compensation has been fixed and determined.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why
petitioners' property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity
impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the
choice of petitioners' property as the site of a socialized housing project.
Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random
expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is
certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is
depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to
the public.
 18. Jesus is Lord Christian Foundation vs. Mun. of Pasig, GR No. 155230 August 9,
2005

Facts:
Issue:
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest
proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a
political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the
power.The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against
the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited
to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the
essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish
that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain. The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory
requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint
and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all
reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with
the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint.
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration
of a contract. It creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer,
to transform the offerors promise into a contractual obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be
complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely
stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other
things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned
contract.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner
is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes
in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give to the
owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted
and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right which should be protected in every
instance. It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner but
also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It permits the landowner to receive
full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the
property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire
the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona
fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. The expropriating authority is burdened to
make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. However, it has a
right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated.
Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all,
it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are
not required to go beyond what appears on its face. It bears stressing, however, that the
respondent offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a
right-of-way. The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and
valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the
respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The respondent, likewise,
failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-
owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto
Kho.
The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer
be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for
religious worship and a school for its members. The respondent has demonstrated the
necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses,
who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways
through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could
enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than
sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the
area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will
suffice.

19. San Roque vs Republic, GR No. 163130, Sept. 7, 2007

Facts: The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and were part of Lot No.
933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally
owned by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5 September
1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the subject of an
expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed as
Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of
P9,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May
1940, a Decision was rendered (Exhibit "D," Records, pp. 204-214) condemning the parcels
of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government.
Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new titles were
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot
No. 933-B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-appellee. In 1995,
defendant-appellee begun construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging
that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the
expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that
defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because it was not its lawful
owner.
In its Answer (Records, pp. 28-38), defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good
faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the
executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never
consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor were the owners
paid any compensation.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's
ownership over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and
its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that SRRDC's ownership is borne out by the
original owner's title to Lot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees' respective titles all of
which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and did not indicate the Republic's
favorable lien. It also found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft
of a showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties.|| Aggrieved, the Republic
appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute ownership over the subject properties
grounded on the following: (1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civil Case No.
781; (2) the ruling of this Court in Valdehueza v. Republic; and (3) the expropriated properties,
including Lot No. 933, are devoted to public use. I
The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision in
the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject properties,
and thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on the original owners,
and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further
held that laches and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its failure from 1940
to register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to record the decree of expropriation on the title.|||

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the (a) validity of the expropriation
proceedings.
Held: The Republic's bare contention and assumption cannot defeat SRRDC's apparent
ownership over the subject properties. As we have previously found in Valdehueza, Republic v.
Lim and Federated Realty Corporation v. CA, by the very admission of the Republic, there was
no record of payment of compensation to the land owners.
In Republic v. Lim, we emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. Without full payment of just
compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Thus,
we ruled that the Republic's failure to pay just compensation precluded the perfection of its
title over Lot No. 932. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of the unpaid
owner to recover the property if within five years from the decision of the expropriation court
the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.
Time and again, we have declared that eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed
against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for
public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of
eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual,
notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of
governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.
From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related cases, the Republic
manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just
compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. Notably, the CFI Decision in Civil
Case No. 781 makes no mention of the initial deposit allegedly made by the Republic.
Furthermore, based on the CFI Decision fixing the amount of just compensation for some of
the lots, the initial deposit, if it was indeed disbursed, would still not adequately recompense
all the owners of the 18 expropriated lots. More importantly, if the Republic had actually
made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led
to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on
the certificate of title covering Lot No. 933. From the foregoing, it is clear that it was
incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or
record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register
the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.|||
|||

20. RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

Facts: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of
the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government
Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make
use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
Issue: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone
System can be a valid object for expropriation.
Held: Where the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with
it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that the real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter
service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either
case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under
Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services
in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. |||
 21. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349

Facts: The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by
the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the
expropriation? The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said
city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose
of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner alleged that for the purpose of
constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire
ownership of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo. The defendants – the
Chinese Community of Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado
– alleged in their Answer (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the
land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was
covered with sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a
street for public purposes. One of the defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant
right of way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that
the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed. The Honorable
Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under
the complaint, without any finding as to costs. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city
of Manila has authority to expropriation private lands for public purposes.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private property for public use.
Held: NO. he city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property.When a
municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an objection is made
thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry,
and to hear proof upon an-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not
the purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is
not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot
expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the
purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said
condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the
property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights
call for protection by the courts. The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. The very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking of the property. The
general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and
no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.
The Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public
use and devote it to another. When the power to take land already applied to one public use
and devote it to another is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no
question can arise and already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for
another use which is inconsistent with the first without special authority from the Legislature
or authority granted by necessary and reasonable implication. Land applied to one use should
not be taken for another except in cases of necessity. A public cemetery is one used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church. A private cemetery is one used only by a
family, or a small portion of a community. The Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a
public cemetery. Cemeteries, while still devoted to pious uses, are sacred, and it cannot be
supposed that the Legislature has intended that they should be violated in the absence of
special provisions on the subject authorizing such invasion. That since the city of Manila is
only permitted to condemn private property for public use and since the Chinese Cemetery in
the city of Manila is a public cemetery already devoted to a public use,
the city of Manila cannot condemn a portion of the cemetery for a public street

22. Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000

Facts: This Petition for Review on Certiorari questioned the March 29, 1999 order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City dismissing a complaint for eminent domain.
According to the RTC, an action for eminent domain affected title to real property and since
the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.00, the action should have been filed
before the Municipal Trial Court.
The subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
|||

Issue:
Held: In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a
sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right
to take private property for public use. In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled
that expropriation proceedings have two phases: "The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.' An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final
one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by
the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter
as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, 'no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.' "The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of 'the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.' This is done by the Court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would
be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more
to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . ."' It should be stressed that
the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence,
the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation
suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,
for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely
incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied
with the propriety of the expropriation.

23. Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the

Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-
appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso
de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo
Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-Gozun over two parcels of land. In its complaint,
the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned
lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more
than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the
provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to
take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the
court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. After the owner of a parcel of land that
has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter
commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation,
the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced
and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not
taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered
and occupied the property as lesse.
Held: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2)
for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it
to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way
as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.

The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year
1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd
edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking"
(in eminent domain) as follows:

Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as

entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under
the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof. 13

Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be present in the

"taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.

First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the
instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
possession of the property of Castellvi.

Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
"Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The Oxford
English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a
very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International
Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy
of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or
permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year
to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent
nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a
year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express
provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It
is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be
inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot
prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in
the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud —
the question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the language used.
(City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick,
71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code).
If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's
property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease
agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this land of
Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of
land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them
into a jet air base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the
lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice
— of such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not,
and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be
actually commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).

Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This
circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the
Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.

Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted
to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.

Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of
the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as
owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal
of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither
was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic
was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time
when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain
cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential
elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period,
and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property
and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied
the Castellvi property in 1947.
 24. City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

Facts: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the
Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF"
provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six
months from the date of approval of the application."
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the
burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and
resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.” On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that
the taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held: NO, it is not a valid exercise of police power. We now come to the question whether
or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police
power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537. Police power is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property
for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms. "It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law
by Tañada and Carreon, V-II, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.

25. Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)

Facts: Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his
son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor
for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the
public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason
among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza
(Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh.
3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded
with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
they had been living on leased property.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the
peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants
appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced
appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in
question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view
of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the
accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because
the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the mayor of Baao is justified.

Held: Yes. The mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys
the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and
in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was
predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public
plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not
overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as
conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in
the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive
to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise
of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it
would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for
which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized
as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between
restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the
burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that
burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property
is confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment.
(Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs.
Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).

Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made
of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such
property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership
therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be
utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius
of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine
shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused,
then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable
compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private
property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827)
(Emphasis supplied.)
 26. Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

Facts: The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled

corporation created to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power and
the production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the construction,
operation, and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains,
transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the purpose of
developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the
Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof. Under Republic Act No.
6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners
thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No.
SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son,
Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which
was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida,
Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria
executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC
paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon.
||| On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan against Maria and other landowners. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 28-M-98. According to NPC, in order to construct and maintain its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project (San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission
Line Project), it was necessary to acquire several lots in the Municipalities of San Jose del
Monte and Norzagaray, Bulacan for an easement of right of way in the total area of more or
less 35,288.5 sq m. Maria San Pedro filed her Answer on February 2, 1998, alleging that there
had already been an agreement as to the just compensation for her property. She prayed,
among others, that she should be paid the consideration stated in the Right of Way Grant,
P600.00 per sq m for the residential portion of the land as agreed upon by her and NPC, and
to base the values from Resolution No. 97-005 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee.|||
Issue: Whether or not the easement of right-of-way is considered to be a “taking”.
Held: YES. On the question as to whether petitioner shall pay only an easement fee to
respondent's heirs, the following pronouncement in National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-
Paderanga is enlightening: D
Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the
present case, also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." As explained in National
Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, viz:
The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that ". . . While
it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the
plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three
(3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through
said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the
latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property."
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of
easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just
compensation for private property condemned for public use (See National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 102
SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines v. PLDT, thus held
that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power
may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way."
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of
the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

27. U.S. vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Facts: Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal airport. The safe
path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondents' property
at 83 feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the
highest tree. It was used 4% of the time in taking off and 7% of the time in landing. The
Government leased the use of the airport for a term of one month commencing June 1, 1942,
with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever was earlier. Various military aircraft of the United States used the
airport. They frequently came so close to respondents' property that they barely missed the
tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare from their landing lights lighted the place
up brightly at night. This destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused loss
of sleep, nervousness, and fright on the part of respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims
to recover for an alleged taking of their property and for damages to their poultry business.
The Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an easement over respondents'
property, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000; but
it made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of the easement.

Issue: Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Held: Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court
concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice
Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the
idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth
described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full
enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over
the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused
by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the
government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.

28. PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

Facts: A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, filed by Philippine Press Institute Inc for the court to declare Comelec Resolution
No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by
the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March
1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the
same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary
servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution.
Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. On the other
hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec
alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor
General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in
connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of
allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's
utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General
argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed
as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections i
s valid.
Held: To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified
in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2722 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of
private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the
intended frequency of such compulsory "donation": only once during the period from 6 March
1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often
as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use
of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of private property for public use is, of
course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation"
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for
"Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,
whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of
authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelecpurposes,
or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section
1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking;
another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are
unwilling to sellprint space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the
unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted
the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of
election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. . . . Section 2 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain

29. City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001

Facts: Respondents Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio and Rodolfo, all surnamed
Aguilar, were the registered owners of three adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area
of 1,847 square meters located at 9 de Febrero Street, Brgy. Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong.
Several decades ago, on a portion of the said lots, respondents constructed residential houses
which they leased out to tenants and on the vacant portion, other families also constructed
residential structures which they likewise occupied. In 1983, those lots were classified by the
Board of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Counsel as an area for priority
development for urban land reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284. As a result, the
tenants and occupants of the said lots offered to purchase those lots from respondents but the
latter refused. On November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of
Mandaluyong authorized Mayor Benjamin Abalos through a resolution to initiate action for
the expropriation of the subject lots and the construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants therein. On January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents
offering to purchase the said lots, but the latter did not answer. Thus, Mayor Abalos filed a
complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168 of Pasig City. In
their answer, respondents alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious and is not for public purpose. Moreover, the subject lots are their only real property
and are too small for expropriation. On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended
Complaint. It reduced the area sought to be expropriated to two parcels of land only totalling
1,636 square meters. At the preliminary hearing, Antonio Aguilar testified and presented
documentary evidence to support their claims while petitioner did not present any evidence.
On September 17, 1997, the trial court dismissed the Amended Complaint. Hence, this
petition.|||
Issue:
Held: The Court ruled that upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma,
Rodolfo and Antonio Aguilar each had a share of 300 square meters under TCT Nos. 13849,
13852, 13850, 13851. Eusebio Aguilar's share was 347 square meters under TCT No. 13853,
while Virginia Aguilar's was 89 square meters under TCT No. 13854. Eusebio died on March
23, 1995, and, according to Antonio's testimony, the former was survived by five (5) children.
Where there are several co-owners, and some of them die, the heirs of those who die, with
respect to that part belonging to the deceased, become also co-owners of the property together
with those who survive. After Eusebio died; his five heirs became co-owners of his 347 square-
meter portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five would entitle each heir to 69.4
square meters of the land subject of litigation. Consequently, the share of each co-owner did
not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A. 7279. Finally, the Court noted that the
subject lots are now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and
the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of the land before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and 60. Orders of eviction were issued
and executed on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other
occupants from the land in question. Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be
acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage;
(2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the
government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The
mode or expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small
property owners are exempt from such acquisition. |||

30. Lagcao vs Judge Labra- GR No. 155746, October 13, 2004

Facts: The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu
City toinitiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners
Diosdado, Doroteo andUrsula Lagcao.In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City
of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029. 1965,petitioners purchased said lot on installment but
in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale
which resulted to the filing of the case of the petitioners. RTC and CAruled in their favor and
as such a deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued in their favor. Whenthey tried to
take possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied by squatters. Thus,
theyinstituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed
by RTC.However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of the demolition
since the city was stilllooking for a relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During
the suspension the Sang.Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about
the lot 1029). Ord. No. 1843likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment

of subject land; this was approved bythe Mayor .

Issue:

Held: Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners' lot
was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the
homeless and low-income residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social
problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled
authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this
problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; 12 and (2)
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. 13 Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly
states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's
right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right
necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and
intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. 14 Whether directly
exercised by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent
domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights. 15 For this reason, the need
for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be overemphasized.
The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders
the expropriation of a private individual's property. The courts cannot even adopt
hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is invoked by an
ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined. In De
Knecht vs. Bautista, 16 we said:
It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of
protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on
arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of
whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an oppressive manner.
It is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is
the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the
exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so
emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, "Acts of Congress, as
well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of
nullity. . . ..
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of public character. 17 Government may not capriciously
or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case,
there was no showing at all why petitioners' property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular
choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of
petitioners' property as the site of a socialized housing project. HTDAac

Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the

random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants
or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the
Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a
few without perceptible benefit to the public.
||| (Lagcao v. Labra, G.R. No. 155746, [October 13, 2004], 483 PHIL 303-315)

31. Filstream International v. CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998)

Facts: Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Antonio
Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment suit against the
occupants (private respondents) of the said parcels of land on the grounds of termination of
the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final and executory
as no further action was taken beyond the CA.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the picture
when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition
through legal means of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part
of the properties of Filstream. The said properties were sold and distributed to qualified
tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. The City of
Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate lands in Antonio
Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the City.

Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion
to dismiss was premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does
not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the
writ execution issued by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment suit; violation of the
constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligation and contract; price offered was
too low hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution.

The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which
dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance, aside from the fact that
copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable.

Issue: WON City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the existence of a
final and executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the lots.
WON expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken.
Held: YES. Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the
properties and the existence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents
ordering the latter’s ejectment from the premises.

Private respondents’ claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which
has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights moot, that is, the expropriation
proceedings undertaken by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of
herein private respondents. For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power
of eminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner’s properties for public
use.

There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner
Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this
dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had
already became final and executory.

However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise
its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property
for public use is expressly granted to it under Sec 19 of the Local Government Code. Sec 100
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila further empowers the city government to
expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program. The
city’s right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and
executory judgment over the property to be expropriated had already been previously upheld
by the court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs Panis:

“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants
or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and
shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast
tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be
expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122
SCRA 63 [1983]).

NO. We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task
in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro
Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are
not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit
of solutions to these problems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just
compensation for the expropriation of private property must be complied with. Other laws
have also set down specific rules in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, to wit:

• Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.

• Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides an order of
priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with private lands listed as the last
option.

• Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to the government, etc.
have been exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted.

Compliance with the above legislated conditions are deemed mandatory because these are
the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to DUE PROCESS
when their property is expropriated for public use.

There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied with
the above conditions. Filstream’s properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in
favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed
under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner
Filstream’s right to due process.

It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power
of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate
private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of
private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights
affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that
the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by
the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.

32. Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its
Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism
value.||| The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case
No. R19562 filed a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil Case No. R-
19864. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the taking is
allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for
tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be
paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the
land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the
Court of First Instance, that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu
City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to
take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
|||

Issue: Whether or not the public use requirement has been complied with.
Held: Yes. here are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, Section 2, Article IV states that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the
State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation
to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon
payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small
lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court emphasized that the
power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. The only
purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the
sovereign power. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the
construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications
systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals,
government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.
In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized the statutory
and judicial trend as follows: "The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the Constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is.
One is expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals.
The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power. Of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."
(Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523.524)
The petitioner's contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private
concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels,
stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms,
taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets and
highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and
streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not
make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private
airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for
slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is
later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies,
and other private concerns.
An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) and Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier cited, shows
that from the very start of constitutional government in our country judicial deference to
legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain proceedings.
The invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause has never
been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. As stated in
Manigault v. Springs (199 U.S. 473) "parties by entering into contracts may not estop the
legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."

33. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)

Facts: This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the expropriation
of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR. December 1988,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm
for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial
government employees. Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases
for expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the
issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing. San Joaquins later
moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take
possession of the properties. San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In
their petition. Asked by the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval
of the president for the province to expropriate properties, however, the approval of the DAR
is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing purpose).CA
set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the
property until the province has acquired the approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the requirement of public use was achieved.
Held: There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, Section 2, Article IV states that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the
State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation
to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon
payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small
lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens PURPOSE THEREOF IS TO PROVIDE
SOME FORM OF RESTRAINT ON THE SOVEREIGN POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRAINTS ARE PUBLIC USE AND JUST COMPENSATION. In the leading
case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court emphasized that the
power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. The only
purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the
sovereign power. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. There
can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads,
bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric
power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and
flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited
to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear
cases of “use by the public" has been discarded. The petitioner's contention that the
promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to
maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is
impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and
other private businesses using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the
public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in
underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private
purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies
are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private
homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private
concerns.

34. Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved
to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and
constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in
at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise
to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

35. Reyes vs. NHA, GR No. 147511, January 20, 2003

Facts: Petitioners' lots were ordered expropriated in favor of the NHA for the public purpose
of expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters relocated
from the Metropolitan Manila area. The NHA, however, had failed to relocate the squatters
on the expropriated lands and had not fully paid petitioners the just compensation fixed by
the court. Hence, petitioners prayed for the forfeiture of NHA's rights under the expropriation
judgment.|||
Issue: Whether or not there is public purpose.
Held: The Court found the petition not impressed with merit. Public purpose was not
abandoned by failure to relocate the squatters to the expropriated lands. The low-cost housing
project of the NHA on the subject lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries is not
a deviation from public purpose; it is in furtherance of social justice. Further, non-payment of
just compensation is not a ground to recover possession of the expropriated lots. At any rate,
petitioners are entitled to the full payment of the just compensation with legal interest of 12%
per annum computed from the taking of the property until full payment.

36. MCWD v. J. King and Sons Co., Inc. 175983, April 16, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a government-owned and controlled

corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its
purposes are to acquire, install, improve, maintain and operate water supply and
distribution systems within the boundaries of the District. Petitioner wanted to acquire a
five (5)-square meter lot occupied by its production well. The lot is part of respondent's
property covered by TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioner initiated
negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the
latter's property. Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioner's proposal. After the
negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated expropriation proceedings
through Board Resolution No. 015-2004 which was duly approved by the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). On 10 November 2004, petitioner filed a complaint to
expropriate the five (5)-square meter portion of respondent's property.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner wanted to tender the amount to respondent during a rescheduled
hearing which petitioner's counsel had failed to attend. Petitioner deposited with the
Clerk of Court the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the
current zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at
P3,500.00 per square meter. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and issued
the writ of possession. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.
It sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals
granted. Thus, petitioner was not able to gain entry to the lot.||
Issue: Whether there was sufficient authority from the petitioner's board of directors to
institute the expropriation complaint.
Held: Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property for public use
upon payment of just compensation. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government. Its
exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there must be just
compensation, and second that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains to the
legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often does, delegate the exercise of the
power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner is one of
the numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter, P.D. No. 198, as
amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the power of eminent domain.
For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be
met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation,
and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the
LWUA. In this case, petitioner's board of directors approved on 27 February 2004, Board
Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and other
cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a
complaint for the expropriation of respondent's lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its
Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioner's manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter
dated 28 February 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case "against the
owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805,
pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended. It is settled that the validity of a
complaint may be questioned immediately upon its filing through a motion to dismiss or
raised thereafter as an affirmative defense. However, there is no need to further belabor the
issue since it is established that petitioner has the legal capacity to institute the expropriation
complaint.

37. NPC & Pobre v. CA, G.R. No. 106804. August 12, 2004

Facts: Antonio Pobre owns a land which he developed into a resort subdivision, beneath
which is thermal mineral water and steam. For one year, Pobre leased to NPC eleven lots
from the approved subdivision plan. To own the land for industrial purposes, NPC filed an
expropriation case against Pobre, during the pendency of which the former dumped waste
materials beyond the site agreed upon by the parties. Then NPC filed its second expropriation
case against Pobre to acquire an additional area of the property. In his motion to dismiss the
complaint, Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC’s actions and
for the payment of damages. But NPC itself filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation
case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already
abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre’s opposition. The trial court
ruled that because of the pollution generated by NPC’s geothermal plants NP C had rendered
Pobre’s entire Property useless as a resort -subdivision. The Property has become useful only
to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s entire Property and pay for it. But NPC insists that
it has the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint, relying on Section 1, Rule
17 of the 1964 Rules of Court (the Rules in effect at that time).
Issue: Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent
domain.
Held: In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right
to automatically dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already
suffered damages at the start of the taking. If the propriety of the taking of private property
through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must
also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The
dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily.
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer makes the dismissal of the
complaint automatic. The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant has
filed his answer or asked for summary judgment must be first confirmed by the court in an
order issued by it.

38. ATO v. Gopuco, G.R. No. 158563, June, 30 2005

Facts: In 1949, the NAC informed the owners of the various lots surrounding the Lahug
Airport, including hereinrespondent, that the government was acquiring their lands for the
purposes of expansion.2. Some land owners were convinced to sell their property on the
assurance that they will be able to repurchase thesame when these would no longer be used
by the airport. Others, including Gopuco refused to do so.3. CCA form NAC filed for an
expropriation proceeding where they were awarded the land and just compensation tobe paid
in full to Apolonio Gopuco for the said land.4. No appeal was taken from the above decision
and the judgement became final and executor.5. In 1989, the Lahug Airport was ordered
closed by then President Corazon Aquino.6. In 1990, Gopuco wrote to the Bureau of Air
Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking thereturn of his lot and
offering to return the money previously received by him as payment for the
expropriation.7. Gopuco filed a complaint for recovery of ownership of his lot, but the trial
court rendered a decision dismissing thecomplaint.8. Aggrieved by the holding, Gopuco
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which overturned the RTC decision.9. A Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on May 2003, hence this petition.
Issue: WON Gopuco may still recover his property which was expropriated for public use,
when such public use is abandoned.
Held: The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has
the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon
condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city
abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary. If upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then of course, the land becomes the absolute property of
the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-
user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
Eminent domain is generally described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation
and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation, an inherent
power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant,
the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the
state for public use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. In fact,
"all separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit
agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent
domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the
aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it."
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the
condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus,
by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to
prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the
power is sought to be enforced.
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the compensation
received have long become final. We have also already held that the terms of that judgment
granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant to our ruling
in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 38 no rights to Lot No. 72,
either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent.
|||

39. Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Facts: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in
Lahug, Cebu City forthe purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The
Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on
March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim
for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961,
Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20,
1961, the Denzons· successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI
an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in
possession of the property. On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names
of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National
Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment
of a reasonable market value". On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as
such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P

4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on

their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. They
appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still
the registeredowners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation
by the Republic. SC still ruled that theyare not entitled to recover possession of the lots but
may only demand the payment of their fair market value. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza
and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim herein respondent, as security for their loans.
For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot
title was issued in his name. On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of
titlewith the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights
of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This
is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just"...µPetitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC
a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.

Issue: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondent· predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment
of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
Held: No. Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with
the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to
the detriment of the individual's rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the
property owner.
Ironically, in opposing respondent's claim, the Republic is invoking this Court's Decision
in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932
when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? The
recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands
consists of two stages, to wit:
". . . The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order,
if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint" .
. . ECDaTI
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. . . .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation
process incomplete.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover
possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are
aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation
proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated
lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 17 and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. However, the facts of the present case do not
justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second,
in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe
the Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that
recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully
retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful entry is
made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed
upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.
|||

40. Vda. De Ouano v. Republic, GR No. 168770, February 9, 2011

Facts: At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the
issue of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport
in Cebu City to repurchase or secure conveyance of their respective properties. At the outset,
three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized: First, the MCIAA and/or
its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of
expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the
government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. Second, the Lahug
Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been
purchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex. Third, it has
been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators,
had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase the
irrespective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. "No less than Asterio
Uy," the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, "one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal
Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airport’s expansion,
affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as
the Lahug Airport is abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to
reacquire their properties." In Civil Case No.CEB-20743, Exhibit "G," the transcript of the
deposition of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally
offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil
Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA,
recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successor’s in
interest and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and
promise of the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do
not materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus: This is a difficult case calling
for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists an undeniable historical narrative
that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties
covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could do.
Issue: Should the MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners?
Held: YES. Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to
the proposition that the agreement package between the government and the private lot
owners was already partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the
lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the
more important condition in the CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots
litigated upon: the expansion of the Lahug Airport. The project — the public purpose behind
the forced property taking — was, in fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the lots
expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in an
action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce
parol evidence to prove the transaction.
In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase, MCIAA, citing cases, points
to the dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as couched, granted
the Republic absolute title to the parcels of land declared expropriated. The MCIAA is
correct about the unconditional tone of the dispositive portion of the decision, but that
actuality would not carry the day for the agency. Addressing the matter of the otherwise
absolute tenor of the CFI's disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881, the Court, in Heirs of
Moreno, after taking stock of the ensuing portion of the body of the CFI's decision, said:
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really
without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words,
in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the
mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must
show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property,
the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning
to include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity — the very reason or
condition as it were — allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government's retention of
the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the
property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is offensive
to our laws.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose.
If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any
manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not
in keeping with the idea of fair play.
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires
unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable.
We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently in Lozada,
Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which
was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely
entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell.
In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to
apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public
purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course
to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter
pill to swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield
ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall
be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent
domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence and power
in the political process, including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is not at
all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery. Even as the Court deliberates on these
consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell,
if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an
added dimension to abandon Fery.

41. Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)

Facts: Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office
of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan an application for a permit to fence
a parcel of land. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the
respondent’s heavy equipment and variousfinished products.
The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution manifesting theintention to expro
priate the respondent’s parcel of land. It was opposed by the respondent
Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation with the office of the Provincial Governor.
Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or
annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality
of Meycauyan to expropriate the respondent’s property for use as a public road.
Then Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution disapproving andannulling the
Resolution passed by the Municipal Council of Meycauayan.
However, Petitioner (Municipality of Meycauayan) filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan a special civil action for expropriation, and upon deposit of the amount ofP24,
025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the PNB, the trial court issued
a writ of possession in favor of the Petitioner.
The respondent went to IAC, on petition for review, which the appellate courtaffirmed the
trial court’s decision. But upon MR, the decision was reversed and held that there is
no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as public road as there were several other
roads for the same purpose and another more expropriate lo for the proposed public road.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to expropriate
Held: The Petitioner’s purpose in expropriating the respondent’s property is to convert the
same into a public road for the purposes to ease the traffic in the area of vehicles.
However, it reveals that there are other connecting links or several roads for the same
purpose and another lot for proposed public road. The Petitioner itself admits that there are
four (4) such cross roads in existence.
The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine
necessity and thatnecessity must be of public character. Condemnation of privateproperty is
justified only if it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of a public character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence,
the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the
equal protection clause will not allow.
There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed
road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the
petitioner’s attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.
Petition DISMISSED.

42. Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990

Facts: On February 20, 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the
houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them Cristina De Knecht (de
Knecht for short) together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some fifteen other defendants,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7001-P.

On March 19, 1979 de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency
of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and
erroneous valuation of the properties. On March 29, 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent
motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic from
proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control of the property sought to be
condemned. In June, 1979 the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the
complaint. In an order dated June 14, 1979 the lower court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be
condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the
lands involved in the proceedings.

On July 16, 1979 de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. L-51078 and directed against the order of the lower court dated June
14, 1979 praying that the respondent be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the
expropriation action and from implementing said order.

Issue: whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this
Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held: Yes Expropriation of lands by the government may be undertaken not only by voluntary
negotiation with the land owners, but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
B.P. 340 superseded the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court in De Knecht vs.
Bautista.-
There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in De Knecht
vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. It is based on the recommendation of the
Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the extension
will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly
motels. x x x While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take
private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in
the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the
petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang
Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the very properties subject of the present
proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that
occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the
expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. The social impact factor which
persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents
in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall
and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Only private respondent remains as the
solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem
but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. x x x The Court finds justification in
proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets from EDSA to Roxas Boulevard due to the a fore stated supervening events after the
rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht. B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively
superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. And the trial court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground
of the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340. Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative
arm of the Government in thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity
of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to this
subsequent legislative fiat.
.P. 340 is not a legislative reversal of the ruling of the Supreme Court in De Knecht vs.
Bautista, 100 SCRA 660.-
While the ponencia is plain enough, I wish to make it even plainer that B.P. Blg. 340 is not a
legislative reversal of our finding in De Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660, that the
expropriation of the petitioner’s property was arbitrary. As Justice Gancayco clearly points
out, supervening events have changed the factual basis of that decision to justify the
subsequent enactment of the statute. If we are sustaining that legislation, it is not because we
concede that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. It is simply because we ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the
present expropriation is no longer arbitrary. I must add that this decision is not a reversal
either of the original De Knecht case, which was decided under a different set of facts.

43. De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

Facts: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a
letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent,
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property
to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents... of
Barangay Caniogan. On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the
intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area
of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our... community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that
the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational
facilities to its poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. On May
7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[5] on the ground that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities
of the residents of Pasig.
Issue: whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property
Held: In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as
"the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever
the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor." It has also been described as the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty
and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public
entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local
governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic
Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local
government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. Judicial review of the exercise
of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the
compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose
of the taking.
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine
necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the
intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for
the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports
development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully
operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan.
Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the
expropriation. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates
from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that "necessity within
the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an
absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest
benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and
the property owner consistent with such benefit." Applying this standard, we hold that
respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance
No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous
of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest
vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility
for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park,
available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so
fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law
prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one's property is
clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their
private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity
which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the
purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking,
which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.
 44. Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Facts: Subject matter of this petition is a lot known as Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, with an
area of 39,512 square meters covered by TCT No. T-22121 registered in the Registry Office
of Koronadal, South Cotabato, in the name of Clarita Vda. de Onorio, herein respondent, and
her late husband. Respondent secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent.
The National Irrigation Authority (NIA) subsequently took 24,660 meters of the said lot for
construction of an irrigation canal.
Petitioner, in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, brought this petition for review before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surallah,
South Cotabato ordering the NIA to pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just
compensation for the questioned portion of respondent's property taken by NIA which it used
it for its main canal. Among others, it was contended that an encumbrance was imposed on
the land in question in view of §39 of the Land Registration Act (now P.D. 1529, Sec. 44).
The only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the
government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or
any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been
pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may
be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought
to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner
thereof. In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property
was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on May
13, 1976. Accordingly, the Court ruled that prior expropriation proceedings should have been
filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use.
Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
Held: Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public
use, the first thing obviously that the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner
is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a
voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of
a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to
the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public
use.
With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or
"that sum of money which a person, desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Further,
just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where the expropriating
agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation
shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent
domain.
The value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." Even before the new rule,
however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the
land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the true value to
be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the
just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the
complaint. In the case of Burgos, it was also the property owner who brought the action for
compensation against the government after 25 years since the taking of his property for the
construction of a road.

45. RP vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005

Facts: The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in
Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified
the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine
Government(Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto.The agreement had
authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years.
The contracts were nullified and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time
of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by
PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal
status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever
rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. After
the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the
possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport
terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds
of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint
for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government
insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case
to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act
No. 8974 which does apply.
Issue: Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case?
Held: The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before
the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just
compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation
case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases. Rule
67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a
procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies
in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national government
infrastructure projects.” Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for
purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the
deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case,
particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the
proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards
or methods for the determination of just compensation. Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the
implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in
abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered
value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.

46. Office of the SolGen v. Ayala Lang Inc., GR No. 177056, September 18, 2009

Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA which
affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The
RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land
Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls
to their patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by
shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has
“expropriated” the land for parking. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking
fees would be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the State’s
policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National Building
Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the
Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the
Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to
discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.

As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should institute
the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of
National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the provisions of Code
relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to
prohibit the collection of parking fees and its waiver of liability.

Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court against DPWH and local
building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX of Implementing Rules and Regulations of
National Building Code is unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has the legal right to lease
parking spaces; and 3) National Building Code IRR is ineffective as it was not published for
3 consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Section 211 of PD
1096.

OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against respondents,
prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that their practice of charging
parking fees is violative of National Building Code.

The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a controversy
of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper since all the requisites are
present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose that parking spaces
shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be considered as unlawful
taking of property right without just compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence to
justify any award for damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide
parking spaces free of charge.

OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge. On the otherhand,
respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA, contending that: 1) RTC erred in failing to
declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to declare IRR
ineffective for not having been published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in dismissing the
OSG’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC erred in failing to
declare that OSG has no legal standing as it is not a real party-in-interest.

CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following grounds: 1) OSG
did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies and that an administrative review is not a
condition precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a legal one and
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; 2) the validity of National Building
Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could be
settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since the courts should refrain
from passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and 3) Section 803 of National Building
Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only intended to control the occupancy of
areas and structures, and in the absence of provision of law, respondents could not be obliged
to provide parking spaces free of charge.

As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.

Issue: Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
Held: No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid exercise of
the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the use,
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose
fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such
fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees.
It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental
competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to
collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations
not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society.
True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely,
they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present
case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of
regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking
fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such
collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such
parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test
of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends
sought to be accomplished.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately
owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of
parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally
prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include
the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare;
for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer
exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain.
Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title
nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains
with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of
a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives
any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be
justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the
right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property,
and the owner may recover therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with
respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the
use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The
State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces
for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not
only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they
are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its
IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power,
since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just
compensation.

47. Internal Revenue vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006
Facts: In 1995, respondent Bicolandia Drug Corporation, a corporation engaged in the
business of retailing pharmaceutical products under the business style of "Mercury Drug,"
granted the 20 percent sales discount to qualified senior citizens purchasing their medicines
in compliance with R.A. No. 7432. Respondent treated this discount as a deduction from its
gross income in compliance with Revenue Regulations No. 2-94, which implemented R.A.
No. 7432. On April 15, 1996, respondent filed its 1995 Corporate Annual Income Tax Return
declaring a net loss position with nil income tax liability.
On December 27, 1996, respondent filed a claim for tax refund or credit in the amount of PhP
259,659.00 with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue — because its net
losses for the year 1995 prevented it from benefiting from the treatment of sales discounts as
a deduction from gross sales during the said taxable year. It alleged that the petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in treating the 20 percent sales discount given to
senior citizens as a deduction from its gross income for income tax purposes or other
percentage tax purposes rather than as a tax credit.
On April 6, 1998, respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals in order to toll the running
of two (2)-year prescriptive period to file a claim for refund pursuant to Section 230 of the Tax
Code then. Respondent argued that since Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 provided that discounts
granted to senior citizens may be claimed as tax credit, Section 2(i) of Revenue Regulations
No. 2-94, which referred to the tax credit as the amount representing the 20 percent discount
that "shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax
purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes," is
illegal, void and without effect for being inconsistent with the statute it implements.
Petitioner maintained that Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is valid since the law tasked the
Department of Finance, among other government offices, with the issuance of the necessary
rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of the law.
Issue: Should private establishments, which count respondent in their number, be allowed to
claim tax credits for discounts given to senior citizens, they would be earning and not just be
reimbursed for the discounts given.
Held: It cannot be denied that R.A. No. 7432 has a laudable goal. Moreover, it cannot be
argued that it was the intent of lawmakers for private establishments to be the primary
beneficiaries of the law. However, while the purpose of the law to benefit senior citizens is
praiseworthy, the concerns of the affected private establishments were also considered by the
lawmakers. As in other cases wherein private property is taken by the State for public use,
there must be just compensation. In this particular case, it took the form of the tax credit
granted to private establishments, purposely chosen by the lawmakers. In the similar case
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, scrutinizing the
deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on Social Justice on February
5, 1992 which finalized R.A. No. 7432, the discussions of the lawmakers clearly showed the
intent that the cost of the 20 percent discount may be claimed by the private establishments
as a tax credit. It is clear that the lawmakers intended the grant of a tax credit to complying
private establishments like the respondent.
If the private establishments appear to benefit more from the tax credit than originally
intended, it is not for petitioner to say that they shouldn't. The tax credit may actually have
provided greater incentive for the private establishments to comply with R.A. No. 7432, or
quicker relief from the cut into profits of these businesses.

48. LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29, 2012

Facts: Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner of two
parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate. Honeycomb Farms voluntarily offered
these parcels of land, with a total area of 495.1374 hectares, to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). From
the entire area offered, the government chose to acquire only 486.0907 hectares.

The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the responsibility of
determining the land valuation and compensation for parcels of land acquired pursuant to the
CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series
of 1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of
land. When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and the DARs valuation for being too low,
Honeycomb Farms filed a case with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
against the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying that it be compensated for its landholdings
in the amount of P12,440,000.00, with damages and attorneys fees. The RTC constituted a
Board of Commissioners to aid the court in determining the just compensation for the subject
properties. Since the Board of Commissioners could not reach a common valuation for the
properties, the RTC made its own valuation. First, the RTC took judicial notice of the fact
that a portion of the land, measuring approximately 10 hectares, is commercial land, since it
is located a few kilometers away from Sitio Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, Masbate, which is a
commercial district.
The lower court thus priced the 10 hectares at P100,000.00 per hectare and the remaining 476
hectares at P32,000.00 per hectare. Both parties appealed to the CA. The LBP argued that the
RTC committed a serious error when it disregarded the formula for fixing just compensation
embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994.
The LBP also argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice that 10 hectares of the land
in question is commercial land. In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains that the DAR AOs
were issued merely to serve as guidelines for the DAR and the LBP in administratively fixing
the valuation to be offered by the DAR to the landowner for acceptance or rejection.
However, it is not mandatory for courts to use the DAR AOs to fix just compensation as this
would amount to an administrative imposition on an otherwise purely judicial function and
prerogative of determination of just compensation for expropriated lands specifically reserved
by the Constitution to the courts. The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC
judgment with respect to the computation of the amount fixed by the trial court and the award
of attorneys fees is deleted.
Issue: Did the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply the mandatory formula
for determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994?
Did the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the subject land?
Held: It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation
for parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to determine
just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.

In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply
the formula provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:
While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just
compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by
the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the
government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the
DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR
[Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by
providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account.
The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the
said provision.
These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the
pertinent DAR administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA
and the RTC acted with grievous error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the
DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land.
While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must
exercise this right within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject
property, which is the very issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given
the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the lower court took
judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholdings.

GRANTED.

49. EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these
lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government
without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD
1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition
for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation
in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a
matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The
valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make
the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of
the decreed compensation. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends
to render this Court initial in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property
as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled
since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking.
However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short
of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the
owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The
court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even
a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of
constitutional just compensation is concerned.|||
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the
decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established
doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up
to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz
Paño, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.)
The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must
necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the
final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In this particular case,
the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by
the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only
much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only
a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the
properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the
lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost
of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide
areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion.
Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such
generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land
described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms
of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often
inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for
just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they
had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal
clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of
expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency
authorized to do so. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to
prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk
to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con
have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To
hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first
place.

50. Belen vs. CA, 195 SCRA 59

Facts: A small portion of land (Lot No. 10, Block 18 at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila)
measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services,
Inc., was leased to Pedro M. Belen, which the latter has built a house. Respondents Alfredo
Juliano and his family occupied a portion of the said land and later on bought a house
standing thereon, not belonging to Belen and moved in without the latter's knowledge. On
learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and they came to an agreement that Juliano
could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay one-half of the rental to
Manotok Realty, Inc. Later a fire razed both Belen's and Juliano's houses to the ground.
Belen told Juliano not to build anything on the land any more. However, on Juliano's pleas,
Belen acceded to Juliano's continued stay on the land on the explicit condition that his
occupancy should not be longer than two and a half (2 1/2) years. Juliano failed to leave
after the stipulated term. Metropolitan Trial Court: Ordered defendant to vacate the land.
Regional Trial Court: Reversed the judgment of MTC by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
1670.
Court of Appeals: Resolved against Belen.

Issue: Whether or not the Manotok Realty, Inc divested its title to the National Housing
Authority and was there an appropriate action of eminent domain.
Held: The petition was hereby granted and the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals,
reversed. Presidential Decree No. 1670 was struck down as "unconstitutional and therefore,
null and void." Also refer to: The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of
hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation
of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide
for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because
the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions
with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In effect, the properties
under the decrees were "automatically expropriated." This becomes more evident when the
NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the
petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its
request.

This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe when it exercises
the power of eminent domain. The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the
petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and
that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just
compensation."

This Court further observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees
provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the actual
taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court, whichever came first."
Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the City
Assessor.

PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith
must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the
property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a
housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

51. Republic vs. CA, 227 SCRA 401

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

52. Sps. Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422, March 7, 2008

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

53. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147 August 3, 1990

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

54. NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 170846, February 6, 2007

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

55. Assoc.of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

56. Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

57. Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, September 27, 2006

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

58. NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

59. Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

60. City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

61. Rep. v. Holy Trinity Realty Dev. Corp., 551 SCRA 303

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

62. City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 114 (1959)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

63. Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

64. YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

65. Lladoc vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 292 (1965)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

66. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino , 162 SCRA 106 (1988)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

67. Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil.46 (1954)

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

68. Physical Therapy Org. vs. Municipal Board, G.R. 10448, August 30, 1957

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

69. MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005)

Facts:
Issue:
Held: