LEGASPI v.

MINISTER OF FINANCE
24 July 1982

Ponente: Barredo, J.
Topic: Aids in interpretation

Facts:

Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, praying that the SC
declare PD 1840 unconstitutional. The said PD was issued in accordance with the legislative powers
granted on the President in Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595.
Petitioner claims that the said amendment is not one of the powers granted the President by the
Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981.

Law:

Amendment No. 6

“Whenever in the judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof,
or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law
of the land.”

Sec. 1, Art. 8
“The Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa”
Sec.11, Art. 7
The President may grant amnesty “with concurrence to the Batsang Pambansa”

Sec. 16, Art. 7

“All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land
which are not herein provided for on conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the
President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise.

Issues:
 Whether or not PD 1840 is unconstitutional?
o Whether or not Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution is unaffected or
repealed by the April 7, 1981 amendment?
o Whether or not the term “incumbent President”, as seen in all other
Amendments and which only refers to Marcos, is the person referred to as
President in Amendment No.6 ?
o Whether or not the phrase “President (Prime Minister)” means that since the
position is no longer held by one person, neither the President nor the Prime
Minister can have the power vested in Amendment No. 6?
o Whether or not Amendment No. 2, which refers to the legislative assembly
simply as Batasang Pambansa, intends to convert or upgrade the present
existing assembly (interim Batasang Pambansa) into the regular Batasang
Pambansa?
Decision:
Held
1. PD 1840
2. Amendment No. 6 is unaffected
3. The term “incumbent President” does not
apply to Amendment No. 6
4. The phrase “President (Prime Minister)”
does not limit Amendment No. 6
5. Amendment No. 2 did not mean to convert
or upgrade the present assembly
Ratio
Constitutional
The 1981 plebiscite does not repeal Amendment
No. 6 by omission. Since it was not voted on, it
would be unfair to the people to repeal it just
because it was not included as one of the
questions in the plebiscite.
Amendment No. 6 uses the term “President” and
not “incumbent President”. Therefore, it refers to
all future presidents.
When the two offices are separated and held by
separate people, the power originally for the
Prime Minister is transferred to the President.
The power in Amendment No. 6 was meant for
the executive official, which in this case is the
President.
The only change made by the 1981 amendment
to Amendment No. 2 is the non-inclusion of the
“incumbent President” to the assembly. The
reference to the legislative body as Batasang
Pambansa (as opposed to interim Batasang
Pambansa) is a non-essential issue since the
present existing assembly is still the interim
Batasang Pambansa.
 HIDALGO VS HIDALGO

FACTS:

 Case jointly decided two petitions for review of decisions with the same issue involving
the same landowners and vendees which dismissed petitioner’s actions as share tenants
for the enforcement of the right to redeem agricultural lands. Petitioners have been
working on the lands as share tenants for several years.
1. First case: respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it with
two other parcels of land for 4,000. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as
tenants alleged that the area of land they worked on is worth 1, 500 and thus they
seek the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount by respondents-vendee
in their favor by way of redemption.
2. Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent. Petitioner-spouses
Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo sought the execution of a deed of sale for the
same price by way of redemption.
 Sec12 of the Land Reform Code or RA 3844 is available to leasehold tenants only but not
to share tenants. It provides that:
Lessee’s Right of Redemption—In case the landholding is sold to a third person without
the knowledge of agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price and consideration.; Provided: further, that where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of
the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be
exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have the priority
over any right of legal redemption.
 No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the pre-emption
prescribed by Sex11 of the Agricultural Land Reform was given

ISSUE: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is applicable to share tenants
also. Or, WON the plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are
working from the purchasers thereof where no notice was previously given to them by the
vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter’s intention to sell their property and where the
vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the
deed of sale.

RATIO:
The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of
redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” only and
not “shares tenants” and that their respective rights and obligations are not coextensive or
coequal.
 The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share
tenancy. It was error of the agrarian court to state that “the systems of agricultural
tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy” even
after the enactment of the Land Reform Code.
 The difference between share and leasehold tenancy as premised in the agrarian court’s
decision refers to the contractual relationship between the tenant and the landowner, but
the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law a vinculum juris (civil obligation)—
whether for a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant. Juridical consequences
coming from thus are security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant’s right to continue in
possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or
transfer of the land to third persons, and the farmer’s pre-emptive right to buy the land
he cultivates as well as the right to redeem the land if sold to a third person without his
knowledge.
  The Code did not mention tenants, whether leaseholds or share tenants, because it
outlaws share tenancy and envisions the agricultural leasehold system as its replacement,
and the agrarian court’s literal construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the
proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy of the State of establishing
owner-cultivatorship for the farmers who invariable were all share tenants before the
enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the status of the lessees.
 Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter
thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to
the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the
plain and vital purpose of the statute.
 Basbas v Entena is not applicable, as there, the tenant-redemptioner was shown by the
evidence to have no funds and had merely applied for them to the Land Authority which
was not yet operating in the locality and hence, the Court held that no part of the Code
“indicates or even hints that the 2-year redemption period will not commence to run
until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or “stops the tenant from securing
redemption funds from some other source.” In the present case, the sole legal issue is the
right of redemption being available to the redemption of the share tenants.
 The historical background for the enactment of the Code’s provisions on pre-emption
and redemption further strengthens the Court’s opinion

RULING: Decisions appealed are REVERSED, petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are
GRANTED.
 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of
the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad
hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.

The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article
VII which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in
Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
ISSUE No. 1 : Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
No.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While
all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed
as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?
 The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required
by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must
be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,
remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such
additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the
offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de
jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments
received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.