Rule 68

Sps. Trayvilla vs Sejas

An action for specific performance with prayer for reconveyance of a property was filed, but the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the
property. But the declaration in the Amended Complaint stated that the property is valued at P6,000.00 based on the handwritten document sued
upon and the pleadings indicated that the property was purchased for the price of P6,000.00. The relevance of the said alleged value of the property
was the subject that the SC discussed where it was

Held: The action is one for specific performance. In other words, the aim is to secure the claimed ownership and title to the property which qualified
it as a real action.

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest
therein.

Since the action is a real action, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC28 relative to declaring the fair market
value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was
made in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the
Amended Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.

In the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot
be determined whether the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action, since the jurisdiction of these
courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property.

Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:

2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value
of the adjacent lots.

In determining jurisdiction, the Court can rely on the declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000,00. The
handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes
of filing the civil case against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence of a current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the BIR. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC and Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No.
35-2004, provides that –

a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for
filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES,
SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR
MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees to be paid. Since the
value of the subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in
the first instance; it should have dismissed the case. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the case, the trial court clearly committed
grave abuse of discretion.

Biaco vs Phil. Countryside Rural Bank

Facts: Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure
the loans, he mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank. He was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans obtained in 1998
which amounted to more than a million pesos.

Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by the trial judge. The Sherriff served the
summons to Ernesto at the latter’s office. No summons was served to Teresa.

Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa because she was not aware sans the summons being served her). The case was heard ex-
parte and the spouses were ordered to satisfy the debt and failure to do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property.

Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+ debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy
was issued against the personal properties of Teresa to satisfy the deficiency.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to have the judgment annulled as she now claims
that she was deprived of due process when she did not receive summons; that it was only her husband who received the summons; that there was
extrinsic fraud because her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure proceeding.

PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresa’s participation is not required so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in the case at bar; that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in
her case because she is a co-defendant of Ernesto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court should be annulled.

HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem proceeding and that the presence of Teresa is not required because the trial court was
able to acquire jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged property). HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is superior over the procedural
matters mentioned. Her right to due process was violated when she did not receive summons. Teresa, as a resident defendant, who does not
voluntary appear in court must be personally served with summons as provided under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is
quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband’s
office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such
efforts failed. Further, the order of the trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using her personal property is a judgment in personam which
the court cannot do because it only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of Teresa.

On the issue of extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with PCRB, is correct that there is none in the case at bar. Extrinsic fraud exists when
there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The above is not applicable in the case of Teresa. It was not PCRB which made any fraud. It
should be noted that spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same interest.

Sps. Perez vs Hermano

TOPIC: JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed after the CA dismissed the petitioners’ original action for certiorari for being filed out of time. The
original action filed with the CA questions the decision of the RTC ruling that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action in the civil case filed by
the petitioners, and consequently dropping respondent Hermano from the said case.

FACTS: Petioner spouses and Aviso filed three causes of action based on the following allegations. Sometime in November 1997, the spouses Perez
and Aviso entered into a Contract to Sell with Zecson Land Inc. as the buyer through its president Zenie Sales-Contreras. The subject properties were
five parcels of land valued at P19, 104, 000. In the agreement entered into by the parties, Zecson Land Inc. shall pay a down payment to the spouses
and Aviso, another portion of the purchase price will be given as cash advance upon the execution of the contract, while the rest shall be used by
Zecson as payment for loans earlier contracted by the three from the company. This is the first cause of action.

In the second cause of action, the spouses Perez and Aviso contend that they were tricked to sign other documents simultaneous with the execution
of the Contract to Sell. Two of the said documents were mortgage deeds over the same 5 properties in favour of respondent Hermano, whom they
have never met. Sales-Contreras allegedly explained to them that “the mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price
agreed upon in their Contract to Sell.” However, the spouses and Aviso assert that it was never their intention to mortgage their properties to
Hermano and that they have never received a single centavo from mortgaging their properties to him. They now then seek a TRO against Hermano
who informed them that he would be foreclosing the subject properties.

In their third cause of action, the spouses and Aviso pray for damages against Zecson Land, Inc. and/or Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele
and Antonio Hermano. They claim that they are entitled to damages from the aforementioned defendants for Zecson and Contreras’ failure to comply
with their obligations under their Contract to Sell and in misleading and misrepresenting them into mortgaging their properties to Hermano, who in
turn, had not paid them the proceeds thereof.

Thus, the first cause of action was for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between the spouses and Aviso and Zecson, the second was for
annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between the spouses and Aviso and Hermano, while the last one was for damages
against all the mentioned defendants. A joinder was made on these causes of action and a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie
Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano was filed before the RTC.

Hermano denied the spouses and Aviso’s allegations through his Answer with Counterclaim. Hermano also filed a “Motion with Leave to Dismiss the
Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" which was granted by the trial court on the ground that there was a misjoinder in the causes of
action. As a consequence, Hermano was dropped from the civil case. The spouses Perez and Aviso moved for reconsideration but was also denied by
the trial court. So, they filed an original action for certiorari before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition "for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, as amended." The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE RELATED TO THE TOPIC: WON the trial court erred in dropping Hermano in the civil action and ruling that there was a misjoinder in the causes
of action.

HELD: Yes. The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said
to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule
of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem
presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

What the SC gathered from the trial court’s Orders was that the trial court ruled that there was a misjoinder in the civil case filed because it did not
comply with the conditions on joinder of parties. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different
parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out
of the same transaction or series of transaction.

It can be deduced from the averments made in the complaint that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zecson Land, Inc. and Hermano
arising from a series of transaction over the same properties.

There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of
respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085
of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent
Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of
Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners
were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as
represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages.

Thus, the petition was granted, the Orders of the RTC were annulled and set aside, and the RTC was ordered to add respondent Antonio Hermano as
one of the defendants in Civil Case filed by spouses Perez and Aviso.

Robles vs Yapcinco

Exec. Judge Reyes vs Baliwag, Sheriff IV

Rule 69
Maglucot-aw vs Maglucot

Facts: Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D(subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed
Maglucot, rentedportions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor.Said respondents built houses on their
corresponding leased lots. They paid the rentalamount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs ofRoberto Maglucot,
petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject
lot.Petitioners thus filed the complainta quo .Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physicallysubdivided among the
co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actualexecution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares
in1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. Petitioners opine that in1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding
for a formal subdivision ofLot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs ofPascual Olis were not agreeable to the
partition. Petitioners further contend thatrespondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that theyare "constructed
on the land of Roberto Maglucot. Simply put, petitioners vigorouslyassert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject
lot inview of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondentsacquiescence because they themselves exclusively
exercised ownership over Lot No.1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid oral partition

Held: Yes. The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By virtue of
this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639
was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate
certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained o until this case arose, or about forty (40)
years later. From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein.
Further, it appears that said court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan.It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and
holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. It follows that a party to a partition is also barred
from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed
ownership rights over their share for a long time .Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of
the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot claim both under and against the
same instrument. The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that
they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. The payment of rentals by respondents reveals that they are mere
lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a
mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Since the possession
of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the
concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement
was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took
possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate
titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any
change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents
rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore ,that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the
bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately,
we now deal with oral partition in1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639
in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such
oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled.
Sps. Butiong and Villafria vs Plazo

Facts: Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras,
his second wife Benita Tenorio and other children, as well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No.
51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and
40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.

Respondents Plazo filed an action for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession dated September 15, 1993, on the ground
their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold Pedro’s resort and family home to petitioners, spouses Francisco
Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B.Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When
confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale,
which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an

extra- judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondents due to the irregularities irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly
commissioned as such on the date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and
the typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the document was not signed.

The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Before the SC, petitioners contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction. According to them, the allegations in the
complaint filed by the respondents show that the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction, while judicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the respondent’s complaint.

Issue: WON the RTC had no jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint filed is for the settlement of the estate of Pedro and not of Partition.

Held: Yes. The RTC had jurisdiction. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left
behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs and the nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed
for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.— A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule,
setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

Here, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception
of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) thatthe heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of
Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6)
that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear,
therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying
the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.

Heirs of Restar vs Heirs of Cichon

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where
there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

FACTS:
-In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate leaving 8 children-compulsory heirs. In 1960, Emilio’s eldest child, Flores caused the cancellation of a tax
declration under Restar’s name covering a lot located at Brgy Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan and a new tax declaration issued under his name. Flores died in
1989. The co-heirs of Flores discovered the acts of Flores.
-The heirs of Flores’ sisters together with Flores’ surviving issters filed a complaint against Flores’ heirs for partition of the said lot and declaration of
nullity of documents, ownership before the RTC.
-Flores’ brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded as defendants but they were unwilling co-plaintiffs.
-The respondents alleged that during the lifetime of FLores, they were given their shares of Palay from the lot eand even after the death of Flores.
Flores’ widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her childreen to which the respondents agreed
on the condition that when they finish their education, the lot would be divided into 8 equal parts. Upon demand for the partition, the Heirs of Flores
refused claiming that they were the lawful owners of the land which they inherited from Flores.
-The Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than 30 years and been paying the realty
taxes ever since. They denied the claims of the respondents. They further claimed that after WW2, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands
in Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Emilio and that an extra-judicial partition took place in 1973 which was notarized
by an Atty. Jose Igtanloc and appointing among themselves 4 parcels of land.
-Adolfo interposed no objection to the partition of the lot while Policarpio acknowledged Flores as the owner of the lot but part of it was sold to him
which he prayed for the exclusion in the partition.
-The RTC of Aklan stated that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, and have aquired the
lot by prescription. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC .

ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs of Flores acquired the land through adverse possession.
RULING: YES. When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never
possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the
present petition.

In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.

The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax
declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have
been on said date become aware of the adverse claim.

Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted
Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.

The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means
of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his
name. It was admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio
Restar to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation
made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x

Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable
partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit "20"). If they were able to demand the
partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father
Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the
signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when
he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores’ death.

From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax declaration was transferred
in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to run from this date. Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in
him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of
the action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs.

While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with
actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.

Oribello vs CA

Quintos vs Nicolas

Magno vs Magno

Dadizon vs Bernades