Civil-military relations in Pakistan

The civil-military relations form an essential strand of national security strategy. In peace,
they affect the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the outcome. In the
developed countries the military is mostly busy in participation of formulation of national
security policy. However, in the developing countries, particularly those with a colonial past,
the military have long maintained a substantive role in domestic politics. That is, the
military have either overthrown the legally constituted governments, or overly influenced
decision-making at national levels. Same is the case in Pakistan.

Historical context
The evolution of the civil-military relations in Pakistan was affected by many factors that
were unique to the developing world. The political and administration infrastructures of
Pakistan have to be built from the scratch is one these factors. Like Indian Army, Pakistan
army originated from the British Indian army. However, unlike India, the civil military
relations in Pakistan evolved along the deadly different path. That is why Pakistan witness
frequent military interventions; at least three of them were overt. Thus, Since independence
in 1947, Pakistan has experienced 30 years of military rule (1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988
and 1999 to 2008); even when not in government the military has constantly sought to
centralise and consolidate political power, and the military (notably military intelligence, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)) exerts significant overt and covert control over the civilian
authorities in both domestic and foreign affairs. Given Pakistan’s volatile relationship with
India, centred on the decades-long conflict for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has always been
a ‘security state’, and the national military has historically been a key player in the
geopolitical arena. However, information on Pakistan’s armed forces is very limited, and
interaction with Western civilian and military institutions is heavily controlled. The climate of
secrecy within the Pakistan military and its associated security services directly and
indirectly affects civil–military coordination and presents humanitarian actors with a highly
complicated operational environment.

The role of the military in Pakistani society

Pakistan’s military has multiple roles: preparing for and responding to natural disasters,
contributing military personnel to UN missions (Pakistan has a long history of contributing
troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations and has consistently been in the top three
of contributor nations.), under special circumstances maintaining law and order and
defending Pakistan’s borders and conducting security operations, counter-insurgency or
counter-terrorism operations. Pakistan’s volatile relationship with India has ensured that the
military has been well-resourced.
The armed forces consist of the Army (550,000), Navy (22,000) and Air Force (70,000),
totalling 642,000 military personnel in active service. Paramilitary forces number 304,000,
and there is a reserve force complement of 500,000.
The Army is structured using the traditional British two-tier hierarchy of officers and enlisted
ranks, a legacy of colonial rule. Officer ranks follow British military naming conventions, the
lowest being Second Lieutenant and the highest Field Marshal. In addition, there are three
ranks of Junior Commissioned Officer: Naib Subedar, Subedar and Subedar-Major. Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) ranks range from Solider at the lowest echelon to Battalion
Havildar Major at the highest. Officers are predominantly drawn from Pakistan’s middle
classes; indeed, employment as an officer is the predominant profession of the middle and,
increasingly, lower-middle classes. Selection is highly competitive, but once recruited
members of the military and their families enjoy extensive support, including medical care
at well-equipped facilities and a patronage network. According to Lieven (2011), the military
forms a separate ‘giant kinship group’ that ‘sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great
effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different
from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civilian society’. Regionally, the northwest Punjab
and KP and Punjabi and Pashtun/Pathan ethnicities respectively have provided the majority
of military recruits, particularly for the Army (Lieven, 2011). Moves are being made to make
the military a more national institution; recruitment initiatives have focused on Sindhi,
Mohajir and Baloch in an effort to increase their numbers in the forces, and new
cantonments have been built in Sindh and Balochistan. What effect this is having on the
ethnic make-up of the forces is impossible to say as statistics are not made available.
Preparing for disaster response has long been part of military training. When called on to
support civil authorities, military assistance has predominantly been channelled into less
secure areas, with civilian actors responding in the more accessible locations. The military
provides relief and rescue, logistical support, engineering expertise, emergency health
provision and basic reconstruction of infrastructure. The armed forces also have a disaster
preparedness role, for example by coordinating with the civil authorities in maintaining
water channels, in joint inspections of flood defences and participation in pre-monsoon
coordination meetings. In relation to complex emergencies, the Army feels that it has a
legitimate interest not only in responding to terrorism but also in rebuilding after security
operations. Given Pakistan’s longstanding commitment and experience as one of the
principal contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations, it is conceivable
that the security services consider themselves to be the best organisation to address both
disaster and conflict. The experience and expertise the Pakistan military brings is recognized
by the humanitarian community, and the Army is considered to be a significant player, with
the ability to provide personnel, logistics and key skills in response to disasters. A cross-
section of respondents were either comfortable with the military role in disaster response,
or felt that the armed forces were obliged to act due to the high level of state funds and
government resources they received.
The Army’s counter-insurgency operations against Taliban militants began in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2001, and continue today at various points along the
Afghan–Pakistan border (the Durand Line). Pakistan’s counter-insurgency strategy has been
described as ‘engage, destroy, and negotiate’, the inverse of the ‘clear, hold, build’
strategies of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO military forces in
Afghanistan (Zaidi, 2010). Local populations are evacuated before overwhelming force and
heavy firepower is used to attack militants headon; this is followed by the negotiation of a
ceasefire.
Collateral damage, mass internal displacement and the destruction of infrastructure have
been the result.
A lack of reconciliation and reconstruction initiatives following these offensives has
exacerbated the conflict and generated increasingly negative opinions of military activities
among local populations.
Western governments, especially the US, have been supportive of Pakistan’s counter-
insurgency operations. Foreign aid for disaster response operations, most notably from the
US, has been used to promote stability and gain local and national support for international
counter-terrorism and stabilisation objectives. This has had an impact on the provision of
humanitarian aid, with the Pakistan military controlling and in some cases blocking aid
flows. As discussed in the sections that follow, the response to the 2005 earthquake was
seen as a large-scale ‘hearts and minds’ opportunity by national and international military
forces, to improve local perceptions of military forces and their respective governments.2
An essential objective from the national military perspective was to decrease local
opposition to security operations in the mountainous region of South Waziristan on the
Afghan–Pakistan border. For the US, the response was seen as a way to reduce vitriolic
anti-American sentiment amongst local populations, which had been compounded by drone
attacks against Taliban militants. With the international drawdown
from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014, Pakistan is facing increasing pressure to reform its
security strategy. In an attempt to stem insurgency and unrest during the transition, it is
likely that Pakistan will step up counter-insurgency operations along the border, with
significant implications for the humanitarian response in this highly troubled region.

Why Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan have Always been on a Bumpy Road?

The most basic precondition of a true democratic setup is a healthy civil-military
relationship. In all democratic countries, an elected civilian government enjoys full control
over the military. However, in Pakistan, control over governance has oscillated between the
two; a decade of civilian supremacy followed by a decade of military rule. The reasons for
this periodic shuffling are incompetent political leadership, weak political parties and
institutions, rising power of civil-military bureaucracy, serious security threats to the
country and frequent use of military in aid of civil power.

In the early days of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam clearly articulated the role of the military in the
following words: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do
not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty
to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.”

Leadership Void
Soon after independence, in 1948, the Father of the Nation and the first Governor-General,
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, passed away. Thus, a leadership void was created
after just one year of the country's establishment. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Liaquat Ali Khan, who was Quaid's right hand lieutenant, was also assassinated in 1951.
About the rest of the leadership lot, the Quaid had ruefully remarked that “he had false
coins in his pocket.”

Delayed Finalisation of Constitution

Similarly, in 1954, there were nine members of the Prime Minister's cabinet, who were not
members of the Parliament, including Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan.
Moreover, Pakistan took nine long years to finalise its first constitution that was enforced on
23 March 1956. This inordinate delay allowed the Governor-General to continue with his
authoritarian rule. This all was happening at a time when the country direly needed healthy
democratic traditions. In addition, the first general elections in the country, which were due
in 1951, were held after a lapse of almost quarter of a century, in 1970. This further
strengthened the non-democratic and authoritarian tendencies providing space to civil and
military bureaucracies to assume a dominant position in governance.

Weak Political Parties

For any healthy constitutional and political system to function smoothly, strong and well-
entrenched political parties are essential. Unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan have
failed to develop into strong vehicles of national political will. The main reason is that most
of our leaders belonged to feudal and capitalist classes and were thus, by their very nature,
inimical to a democratic polity. Their incompetence and constant wrangling for power led to
ceaseless infighting. For instance, as early as 1953, a clash between the leadership of the
Punjab and the central government led to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the
provincial capital.

Weak Institutions
After independence, Pakistan had to start from scratch. There was no established
parliament, no civil secretariat, no supreme court, no central bank and no organised armed
forces. There was a paucity of competent parliamentarians. The proportion of the Indian
Civil Service officers who opted for Pakistan was small. The same was true of the higher
judiciary. Unlike other institutions, the proportion of Muslims in the Indian Army was
comparatively substantial, i.e., 33 per cent. This is also one of the reasons why the armed
forces of Pakistan assumed greater importance right in the beginning and were better
established than other institutions of the state.

Rising Power of Civil-Military Bureaucracy

Due to lack of basic infrastructure, Pakistan had to make new beginning in all spheres. But
the low level of literacy made this task very difficult. The country needed competent and a
determined leadership to build and nurture democratic institutions. But such a leadership
was hard to come by in a rural society in which the political, social and economic life was
dominated by the landed aristocracy. The feudal leadership of political parties was not
capable of dealing with the multifarious problems faced by the country. It depended heavily
on the civil and military bureaucracy. The result was the bureaucratic elite became
disproportionately assertive, steadily increasing their power at the expense of the political
elite. For instance, a civil bureaucrat Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad
(1951-55), dissolved the National Assembly in 1954 and the Federal Court justified and
validated his unconstitutional act on the basis of the “law of necessity.”

Wrangling for Power

The first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, relied on the military to ensure state's
integrity when the PML President, Qayyum Khan, threatened direct action and the Khan of
Kalat declared his secession from Pakistan. In order to deal with the disturbed situation,
Mirza took extreme step; he abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the legislative
assemblies, dismissed the central and provincial governments, banned all political parties
and postponed general elections indefinitely. He also declared Martial Law and appointed
General Ayub as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), who in turn removed Iskander
Mirza on October 27, 1958 and himself became the President. Thus began the era of
military-dominated governance.

Military's Sway over Political Setup

After seven years of instability (1951-58), in which as many as seven prime ministers rose
and fell, the military regime put the country on the path of economic and political stability.
Hamid Khan, a renowned lawyer, writes in “Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan”,
“Ayub's term of office [1958-69] was the golden era for the bureaucracy, which exercised
its powers, unbridled by any political interference.”
Again, after the restoration of democratic governance during 1988-99, four governments
were dissolved by the President of Pakistan invoking Article 58 (2)(b). On 12 October, 1999,
the military once again ousted the elected government and Pakistan was again under their
despotic rule.

Civil Dependence on Army

From the very beginning, the Army remained involved in civil administration. In 1947, it
was the Army that was asked to establish civil secretariat in Karachi. They vacated their
barracks, renovated them to house the secretariat and the staff coming from Delhi. It was
the Army which largely contributed to safeguarding the movement of several refugee
convoys carrying millions of refugees from East Punjab as well as establishing their camps
at Lahore. In short, the army was frequently called in aid of civil authorities in all natural
disasters, emergencies and other civil functions.

Present Situation
Presently, however, the situation is different. Pakistan's political leadership is more mature
and political parties are better established. The country has developed a middle class, an
active civil society, a vibrant media and an independent judiciary. Whenever required,
Parliament is getting briefing on security matters from the Services Chiefs and decisions are
taken through consensus. Although military enjoys autonomy in its internal affairs,
somewhat healthy civil-military relations exist. The Army is more deeply involved now than
a decade ago in support of activities for the civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief
and rescue operations after natural disasters; the use of its organisational and technological
resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of its personnel in civilian
institutions; anti-terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking.
A National Action Plan (NAP) was jointly formulated by the political parties and the armed
forces to win the war in the cities. Speaking to Russian magazine Sputnik, DG ISPR
conceded that only a part of the plan has so far been implemented while the rest remains
stalled due to ‘political challenges’. There is a need to correctly define the political
challenges. The major challenge is the pressure from the religio-political parties which are
strongly opposed to any government regulation or external oversight of the madrassas.
They also reject any revision of the mainstream educational curricula to remove hate
material and introduce tolerance. The army has to support the government in blocking the
two major sources of the spread of extremist ideas.
There has to be full cooperation between the army and the civilian governments at the
centre and the provinces. Similarly, Rangers and Police, and military and civilian intelligence
agencies have to work together rather than work at cross purposes. Terrorists will have a
field day if a tug of war was to ensue between governments led by the mainstream parties
and the establishment or if there is disregard for civilian institutions by the military-
controlled intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
The civilian institutions have to play a major role in the war against urban terrorism. What
one sees happening vis-a-vis the delay in setting up of NACTA indicates a trend which is not
healthy. The arrest of a policeman by Rangers after raiding a police station and his
subsequent release is also an indication of the malaise. One also does not expect military
commanders to issue statements with political implications.

The Way Forward

Presently, civil-military relations do not seem as healthy and cordial as they should be.
There are apprehensions on both sides. The government's tacit support to Geo in ISI
bashing case has increased the tensions between the two pillars of the state. Apparently,
army and the government are poles apart on the issue of operation against Taliban.
It is imperative that in the larger interest of the country both these institutions join hands to
save Pakistan from the monster of terrorism and steer the country out of multifaceted crises
which are adversely affecting Pakistan and its citizens. It is often said that Pakistan is in a
state of war and no war can be won when there is disunity among the state institutions.
1. Laws and clear constitutional provisions should be put in place that define the chain of
command and civilian authority over the military. Although apparently a piece of paper, this
provision establishes the legitimacy for any action to resist any encroachment by the
military.
2. Bring a change in culture, values and acceptability among the masses that civilian rule is
possible and should be put in place. This enculturation would be possible through a
committed media and impartial press.
3. Structures and processes should be put in place, detailing who will command. Fourth,
openness and transparency or freedom of information is vital so that everything is open to
the public and civilian leadership.
4. Let the military budgets or expenditures be controlled by civilian authorities. No doubt
the civilians linked to this process should be thoroughly scrutinised for their integrity.