Zeeble

Paper Cranes 

Situation:
Morris had been drinking when he entered the Bank of the Philippine Island
Branch located in Mendiola, “I have a 9mm handgun in my pocket,” he said to the teller
“and I want all your money.” The teller set off a silent alarm but when she handed Morris
the cash, he said he had been joking all along. He left the bank empty handed, but upon
stepping out of the Bank door, he was arrested by the Police.

Morris is charged in the Court of Attempted Robbery

First of all in approaching this case let us first define what robbery is, as it is the issue at
hand. Robbery is defined by the revised penal code as follows:

Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with intent to
gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall
be guilty of robbery.

This provision shows the elements of robbery which must be evidently shown in order for
the crime of robbery to consummate. These elements are the following:

(a) that there be personal property belonging to another;

(b) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
(c) that the taking is with intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Let us take a good look at each of these elements to see if Morris’ case falls upon robbery

(a) that there be personal property belonging to another

The first element is easily understandable, that there be a material thing,

physical in form which belongs to another person who has the lawful and just
right for the ownership and possession of the property subject.

In the case of Morris, the personal property belonging to another is the money
which was brought out by the teller of the bank.
The first element was satisfied.

(b) that there is unlawful taking of that property

Unlawful taking exists when another person who does not have the legal right
to a certain property takes it with the intention of appropriating the same.
 Unlawful taking or otherwise known as apoderamiento was clearly defined in
the case of Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007. It defines Apoderamiento as such:

“In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with

apoderamiento, or “unlawful taking,” to characterize theft. Justice
Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a
controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already
discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of
apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with “the intent to
appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to
appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.”
However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals
ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking or an
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; or that
there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the
mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the
proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento.
Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter
thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking.”

Insofar as we consider the present question, “unlawful taking” is most

material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s
personal property, is the element which produces the felony which is being
punished by the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, without unlawful
taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted robbery, if
at all. Morris’ act of threatening the teller which caused the disturbance of the
proprietary rights of the owner of the money brought out by the teller
therefore constitutes unlawful taking.

(c) that the taking is with intent to gain or animus lucrandi

This third element of robbery is the most crucial element in question in

this case of Morris. As Morris did declare to the teller that “I [He has] had a
9mm handgun and I want all your money” clearly states that he had the intent
to do the act of robbery. However, Morris then later on never took the money
when it was brought out by the teller and told the latter that it was all a joke.
With those acts committed by Morris it clearly shows a shallow and blurred
intent of Morris to commit robbery. The first statement manifests his intent to
commit robbery while the latter diminishes his intent to do so. These two
statements are conflicting to show Morris’intent to gain or animus lucrandi. It
was also held in the case of Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines and
Court of Appeals regarding intent to gain that:
 The long-standing Latin maxim “actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea” supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that
“ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to
be a crime,” and accordingly, there can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material
in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,” and
“essential for criminal liability.” It follows that the statutory
definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the
mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that “a criminal law that contains no mens rea
requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights.” The
criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute
the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough
that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find
expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As
a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it
is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly
provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision,
disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether
or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable
and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned
the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised
Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory
definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded
which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution.
For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide
expressly uses the phrase “shall kill another,” thus making it clear
that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and
conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.

Though it shows that Morris does not have the intent to gain or the animus
lucrandi, he is still criminally liable for the acts of robbery with respect to the
third element which resulted though it be different from that which he
intended as defined in the revised penal code of the Philippines that:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

Par.1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the

wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
 The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense
of danger which causes such person to do so and creates an injury, the
person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez,
41 Phil. 4911, 500)

(d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Intimidation was evident with the declaration of Morris declaration that

“I [He has] have a 9mm handgun and I want all your money”, whereupon
this statement the teller acted to Morris’ will and brought out the money,
that without the fear instilled by the offender as to the idea that he is
carrying a handgun, the teller wouldn’t have acted in that way. Whereas in
Fortuna vs. People G.R. No. 135784. December 15, 2000, Diosdada gave
all her money to the offenders in fear of his brother being apprehended and
admitted to the police detention cells also implying the idea that his brother
would be beaten by the convicts, harassed by the media and with other evil
things to come. It was ruled that the offenders were found guilty of having
conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of persons. It can also
be said in the case of Morris. With the reasoning given above, we can
clearly state that this intense infusion of fear was intimidation, plain and
simple.

With the following elements satisfied: we can say that Morris may have committed an
attempted robbery.

However, we must also give light as to the definition of an attempted felony.

An Attempted felony is also defined in the Revised Penal Code where:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated

felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous desistance.

We can clearly say that Morris has commenced the commission of the felony of
robbery directly by overt acts due to the fact that Morris has commences (1) external acts;
and (2) that such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.

The external acts referred in the attempt must be related to the overt acts of the
crime the offender intended to commit. It should not be mere preparatory acts, for
preparatory acts do not have direct connection with the crime which Morris intended to
commit. An overt act is some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit
a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into the concrete offense of robbery. In this case, Morris’ approaching to the bank
teller and threatening him/her that he has a 9mm handgun and wants all her money.

The attempt was also evident since Morris failed to take the money which is a part
of all the necessary acts of execution, however there is the last clause of “other than his
own spontaneous desistance” which justifies Morris’ act. Where if the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of his own spontaneous desistance, there is no
attempted felony. That it is a sort of reward granted by law to those who, having one foot
on the verge of the crime, heed the call of their conscience and return to the path of
righteousness. (Viada, Cod. Pen.,35-36) That this spontaneous desistance as cited in
People vs. Pambaya, 60 Phil. 1022, may be through fear or remorse, or in Morris’ case
humor due to alcoholic influence. It is not necessary that it be actuated by a good motive.
The Revised Penal Code requires only that the discontinuance of the crime comes from
the person who has begun it, and that he stops of his own free will.

WHEREFORE, Morris is not found guilty and is acquitted of the crime of

attempted robbery.

If Morris is not guilty is not guilty of attempted robbery, what then is his criminal
liability?

Morris is criminally liable for Grave Threats.

Grave threats is defined in the revised penal code as such:

Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of
his family of any wrong amounting to a crime.

The following elements of grave threat is also satisfied by Morris’ acts where the
elements of grave threat are the following:

(1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction
upon his person of a wrong;
(2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and
(3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner
could have been convicted thereunder.
In the case of Rosauro Reyes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-
21529, March 28, 1969 the ruling regarding grave threats was given that:

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main

gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing
Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by
petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats
were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the
person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect."
Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the
protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he
stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the
threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger,
motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the
incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in
upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

It was ruled that the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person
threatened, as to Morris’ case the teller, the belief that the threat would be carried into
effect is the result of a grave threat. Therefore the act of Morris’ in threatening the teller
that he has a gun and that he wants all of her money constitutes grave threat, that he
threatened the teller with the infliction of his handgun, that such wrong as spoken by
Morris would amount to a robbery, and the threat was not subject to any other options or
condition that the teller may take for the safety of her life, which led her to press the
silent alarm in call of rescue.

WHEREFORE, Morris is found guilty of Grave threats with the aggravating/mitigating

circumstance of intoxication(if habitual or intentional/if not habitual or not subsequent to
the plan to commit the felony of robbery, must still be proven by the prosecution).