www.iacsp.

com

A member
of the Israeli
police bomb squad
surveys the scene of a
suicide bombing in the southern
town of Dimona February 4, 2008.
A Palestinian carried out the first suicide
bombing in Israel in a year on Monday, killing a
woman in a desert town where a top-secret nuclear
reactor is located. REUTERS/Amir Cohen (ISRAEL)

Vol.14, No.2
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Introduction and based on policies and training by emergency
medical service (EMS) responders, and subse-
The frequency of mass casualty incidents (MCI) due to terrorist attacks has increased quently, lethal force was utilized to neutralize
the threat by law enforcement. The effective
in recent weeks in Israel and worldwide. These events can occur in central or peripheral work by law enforcement in neutralizing the
towns, and in urban or rural areas. Numerous events, mainly involving conventional imminent and life threatening presence of the
second suicide bomber prevented a much more
bombs detonated in heavily populated areas, have occurred throughout the world extensive attack and minimized casualties.
Incident Control and Management
as indicated in the London bombing (Almogy, 2004), and in Israel in the vicinity of
After more than a year without a suicide attack
surrounding trauma centers (Bloch, Y., Schwartz, D., Bar-Dayan, Y., et al., 2007). in Israel and in a place that had never experi-
enced an attack, security forces generally have
become complacent to the immediate threat of
The last successful suicide bombing attack in Israel was in the southern City of Eilat suicide bombers and shooting attacks occurring
in Jewish towns throughout Israel. Supporting
on January 29, 2007. The attack was carried out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad this is the fact, only a week before the attack,
the special transportation security unit created
(PIJ) in collaboration with a Fatah terror cell. The suicide bomber originated from the to prevent bus bombings a few years earlier,
was disbanded. It also should be noted that
Gaza Strip and detonated himself at bakery, killing three Israelis (Ministry of Foreign during the production of this article, on March
6, 2008 a terrorist infiltrated the library at the
Affairs, 2007). Prior to the Eilat bombing, the last Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al- Mercaz Harav Yeshiva seminary in Jerusalem
Islamiyya) suicide attack was on August 12, 2005. This attack also took place in the killing eight students and wounding 11 others
with an automatic rifle (Ministry of Foreign
southern part of Israel in the City of Beersheba. The target for this attack was the Affairs, 2008).

central bus transportation node where 40 civilians were injured and responsibility
claimed by the PIJ (BBC News, 2005).
The management of a terror incident
differs according to the location, the
character of the event, the number and
severity of casualties, the rate and ease
of evacuation, experience and skills of
the command and emergency teams
operating in the arena, and the number
and level of the nearby hospitals and
their capacities. Researching the unique
characteristic of the management and
outcomes of every one of these events
has taught us different new lessons and
it was suggested that proper manage-
ment of the event can be a key factor
in reduction of the mortality rate in a
mass casualty incident (Bloch, et al.,
2007). Therefore, we believe that les-
sons learned from every event must be
prospectively described and analyzed
using the same methodology to allow
generalization from the accumulated
experience and to draw conclusions
from them.
Incident Background
On February 4th, 2008, at approximately
1030 hours, (Israel local time 0830 GMT),
two suicide bombers arrived at the open mar-
ket in the City of Dimona. The terror group
that planned and executed the attack was the
Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, a terrorist squad
from Hebron—the military wing of the Hamas
organization (Jerusalem Post Online, 2008). The
first bomber detonated himself on a crowd of
innocent bystanders at the open market while
inadvertently injuring the second bomber that
arrived with him. As a result of the attack, a
female was killed and 48 civilians were injured.
After more than a year without a
suicide attack in Israel and in a
place that had never experienced
an attack, security forces generally
have become complacent to the
immediate threat of suicide bombers
and shooting attacks occurring in
Jewish towns throughout Israel.
Supporting this is the fact, only a
week before the attack, the special
transportation security unit created
to prevent bus bombings a few years
earlier, was disbanded.
The planned adversarial operation was designed
and intended to be a double suicide attack with
the first bomber detonating himself in an open
market, and the second bomber targeting first
responders operating within the scene. Prior to
detonation, the second bomber was identified
Because of the timing and place of the attack,
and days after Hamas destroyed the wall sepa-
rating the Gaza Strip from the Northern Sinai
Peninsula, it was widely speculated the bombers
came from Gaza by way of Sinai and through
the unfenced area only a few dozen kilo-
meters south of Gaza. Final reports disprove
this concept after the bombing was claimed
by the Al Aksa Martyr Brigades—the
militant wing of the Fatah in Hebron. The
bombers most likely infiltrated to Israel
from the 26 km wide gap in the southern
section of the Security Barrier, approxi-
mately 30 km north of Dimona. The desert
moon-like landscape demands that local
Bedouins residents, most knowledgeable
about the region paths of movement, helped
in some way with or without knowledge of
the bombers intent. It is a known fact that
hundreds of illegal Palestinian workers
infiltrate this area weekly with the help of
local Bedouins (Barzilai, 2008).
What is known is that the two suicide bomb-
ers arrived to the same location. The intent
was for the first suicide bomber to direct the
detonation towards civilians at the commu-
nity center. Once this attack was executed,
the second suicide bomber would target the
first responders inbound to the scene as well
as operating within the seat of the explosion.
Immediately upon knowledge of the attack,
emergency medical services responded to the
scene. Their mission is the immediate evacuation
of the injured from the potentially dangerous scene,
while law enforcement secure the scene as bomb
technicians render any suspicious devices safe.
Behavior, Target,
and Attack Operation
Local Pizza Café owner “Ravital” reported after
the attack she believes that one of the bombers
ordered coffee at her establishment only minutes
www.iacsp.com
before the attack. Her statement as reported was
that a “nervous Arab man in a red coat came in
and demanded ‘coffee, quick!’” Although not
confirmed, this action is considered rare in cases
of Palestinian suicide bombings and if confirmed
true, shows a level of cool headedness and self
confidence that is unprecedented. Most reports
of civilian interactions with suicide bombers in
the minutes before acting were short, evasive
and somber. Terrorists justifiably believe they
are being watched and are seconds away from a
special forces “take-down” before leaving their
residences. Although their has been reports of
calm and collected behavior prior to an attack,
(for example the 9/11 terrorists; but these were a
group of hand picked special well trained “cream
of the crop” terrorists who made a mission out of
the operation) the natural psychological behavior
of someone who is about to detonate himself, can
be noticed. If covered up by some type of drug
use (which is common), the bomber will likely
act sedated, again raising suspicions through
prior law enforcement training.
The fact Dimona has not been hit by acts of terror
is both expected and a surprise. As a target, it is
small and far away from Palestinian cities, and
has a larger city (Beer Sheba) between it and
the Southern Palestinian Territory of the Hebron
Hills. On the other hand, the (supposed) exis-
tence of a nuclear reactor and weapons facility
near the city makes it a high profile target rather
than a target-rich environment. Nearly every
news report outside of Israel added at the end
of the report the nuclear facility in the vicinity
portrays Dimona as a high profile target city.
Incident Command
and Scene Mitigation
Response was immediately initiated by (EMS)
and incident command was established. Again,
for Dimona, it is the first time residents have
ever experienced a terror attack, and therefore
operating and response procedures could have
potentially been slower to coordinate a smooth
and safe process. The response was fast by all
agencies. EMS was supported by local medical
clinics that dispatched “Good Samaritans” to
the scene to assist emergency crews. The Good
Samaritan team comprised of a physician and
nurse. The pair immediately began to treat the
seriously injured, which included the would-
be bomber. While treating the injured suicide
bomber, the crew identified an imminent threat,
evacuated the scene and notified law enforce-
ment. As the team evacuated the scene, and
relayed the details of the threat to law enforce-
ment on location, they were able to continue to
meet their mission objectives and successfully
dragged an additional wounded woman with
them to safety.
In Israel, the patrol commander tends to be one
of the first commanders on location at an at-
tack. The patrol commander or the equivalent
in similar police units receives the initial report
50
from the first on scene officer and relieves the
first arriving officer of incident command du-
ties. Once a ranking officer is on location, the
officer ultimately has the overall responsibility
to maintain command until an officer of higher
rank transfers the authority. The first command
on the scene, upon arrival will rendezvous with
the emergency personnel on site, receive an up-
date from the personnel on location, and in turn,
maintain command and control of the incident
while relaying the details of the incident to the
upper level command.
With the first suicide bomber killed in the
primary attack, the second suicide bomber was
critically injured and had been identified by
emergency personnel. As per law enforcement
personnel on location, the second suicide bomber
posed a clear and imminent threat to the rescuers
and civilians on location. The intended plan of
action of this bomber can only be speculated that
he intended to target the first responders entering
the seat of the explosion. This is considered a
known criteria and a successful tactic perpetrated
by adversarial elements of such globally. The bomb
technician as well as the superintendent had used
lethal force against the second bomber; however,
the threat had not been fully neutralized. The
danger associated with such an attacker, is the po-
tential for the injured bomber to use what strength
is left of him to initiate any switch to detonate the
explosive device.
Until the threat can be rendered safe, no addi-
tional rescue attempts can continue. Identifying
the danger to the civilians, rescuers, himself, and
operating off of training and policy, a superinten-
dent from the Israeli Police fired several shots,
fatally wounding the second suicide bomber
before he could detonate his explosive device.
As soon as the threat was neutralized, and bomb
technicians rendered the explosive device safe,
emergency crews were able to re-enter the scene
and continue with their overall mission.
Vol.14, No.2
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Lessons Learned
and Outcomes
Perhaps the single most important lesson learned
is the continued need to conduct and review
interagency field exercises to improve agency
response an interdiction to an incident. The
Dimona incident was a classic presentation of
the “secondary device” against first responders
and would have proven deadly if not for proper
training and effective decision making skills.
Moreover, many organizations have policies
and procedures in place specific to blast inci-
dents, but as in the case of Dimona, responders
were well into casualty evacuations before the
secondary device was discovered. This devel-
oping crisis prompted law enforcement to make
fast operational and tactical decisions in order
to minimize responder and civilian casualty.
Learning from Dimona, it is clear training and
exercise objectives should include an evaluation
of emergency communications between agen-
cies for evacuation of personnel from scenes
determined to be unsafe.
References
Almogy, G., Belzberg, H., Mintz, Y., Pikarsky, A.K.,
Zamir, G., Rivkind, A.I. (2004). Suicide bombing
attacks: update and modifications to the protocol.
Ann Surg., 239(3), 295-303.
Barzilai, A. (2008, March). The Bedouin intifada:
it’s not if, but when. Retrieved March 9, 2008,
from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.
jhtml?itemNo=431607&contrassID=2&subCont
rassID=20&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y
Bloch, Y., Schwartz, D., Bar-Dayan, Y., et al.
(2007). Distribution of casualties in MCI with
three local hospitals in the periphery of a densely
populated area: lessons learned from the medical
management of a terrorist attack. Prehospital and
Disaster Medicine, 22, 176-182.
Bomb hits Israeli bus station. (2005). BBC News.
Retrieved August 28, 2005, from http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4192208.stm
Suicide bombing in Eilat bakery. (2007). Israel of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved March 9,
2008, from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since
+2000/Suicide+bombing+in+Eilat+bakery+29-
Jan-2007.htm
Terror shooting at Mercaz Harav Kook Yeshiva
in Jerusalem. (2008, March). Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Retrieved March 8, 2008, from http://www.
mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/
Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Terror+shootin
g+at+Mercaz+Harav+Yeshiva+in+Jerusalem+6-
Mar-2008.htm
Woman killed, 38 wounded in Dimona suicide
bombing. (2008, February). Jerusalem Post Online.
Retrieved February 4, 2008, from http://www.jpost.
com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost
%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1202
064575658