LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD and JOSE R.
CAGUIAT G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition before the trial
court for the determination of just compensation
for their agricultural lands, which were acquired
by the government pursuant to PD 27. The RTC
ordered Land Bank and DAR to pay respondents'
land for P30 per square meters.
Land Bank was not able to file its motion for
reconsideration on time because the motion filed
by its counsel lacked a notice of hearing. Land
Bank argues that the failure of its counsel is due
to intense work-pressure and constitutes
excusable negligence, so the trial court should
have heard the relief in accordance with Sec 1 of
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Land Bank also argues that respondents failed to
exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a
petition for the determination of just compensation
directly with the trial court because they should
have first sought reconsideration of the DAR's
valuation of their properties.
Issues:
1. Whether or not counsel's failure to include a
notice of hearing constitutes excusable
negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from
judgment.
2. WON respondents should have sought
reconsideration from DAR.
Answer: The petition is unmeritorious.
Reasoning: Land Bank's argument that its
counsel committed an excusable negligence
when he was not able to file the motion on time is
untenable. Primary jurisdiction is vested in the
DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just
compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination
is subject to challenge before the courts. The
resolution of just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of
the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the
courts of justice.
Landbank of the Philippines vs CA
Facts:
• Yap and Santiago are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by the DAR,
subjecting it for transfer to qualified CARP
beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the compensation
valuation of DAR and LBP, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with a
preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was
referred to CA for proper determination and
disposition.
• Respondents argued that DAR and LBP
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
without jurisdiction when they opened trusts
accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or
bonds, before the lands was taken and the titles
are cancelled. Respondents claim that before
the taking of the property, the compensation
must be deposited in cash or bonds.
• DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit
was a substantial compliance with the rule on
taking and compensation. LBP confirms that the
certificate of deposit expresses “reserved/
deposited".
• CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR
filed a petition. DAR, maintain that the word
"deposit" referred merely to the act of depositing
and in no way excluded the opening of a trust
account as form of deposit.
Issue: Whether the opening of trust account
tantamount to deposit.
Ruling:
• Contention of DAR is untenable. Section 16 of
RA 6657 provides: (e) Upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or, in
case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
 accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
• It is very explicit that the deposit must be made
only in cash or LBP bonds, there is no
ambiguity.
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA vs. LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
• Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2
of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of
agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT).
• In 1972, a portion of the said property with an
area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under
the land reform program pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) 4 and
Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5 The land was
thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer
beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of
the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was
deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
• Nenita Suntay-Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay
III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely,
Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot
2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a
total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only
128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and
valued the same at P1,512,575.05.
• Petitioners rejected the valuation of their
properties, hence the Office of the Provincial
A g r a r i a n R e f o r m A d j u d i c a t o r ( PA R A D )
conducted summary administrative proceedings
for determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: WON the determination of just
compensation should be based on the value of
the expropriated properties at the time of
payment.
HELD:
• Yes. Petitioners were deprived of their
properties without payment of just
compensation which, under the law, is a
prerequisite before the property can be taken
away from its owners. 27 The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the
government are conditioned upon the receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with
the landowner.
• The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No
outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
• Petitioners were deprived of their properties way
back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet
received just compensation. Thus, it would
certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided
by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering
the failure to determine just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No.
227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering
that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being
real, substantial, full and ample.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS:
• Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled
Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non
Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all
private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced and all
 untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988.
• March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules
and Regulations on Conversion of Agricultural
Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the
following: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional
and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to
be devoted to another type of agricultural
activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond
─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to
non-agricultural use other than that previously
authorized; and (4) those reclassified to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988
pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160
and other pertinent laws and regulations, and
are to be converted to such uses.
• The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an
AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to
non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural
use.The AO was amended again in 2007 to
include provisions particularly addressing land
conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the conversion to lands to non
agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing
and approval of land conversion through DAR
Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is a
slowdown of housing projects because of such
stoppage
ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?
HELD:
• RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as
lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by a person whether natural or
juridical, and not classified by the law as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
• However, he issued an AO included in this
definition - lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands
reclassified from agricultural to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be
agricultural lands for purposes of conversion,
redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of
RA 6657 because there is nothing in Section 65
of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other
provision of law that confers to the DAR the
jurisdiction or authority to require that non-
awarded lands or reclassified lands be
submitted to its conversion authority. I
• t also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7160, because it was not provided therein that
reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to
conversion procedures or requirements, or that
the DARs approval or clearance must be
secured to effect reclassification.
• The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, also contravenes the constitutional
mandate on local autonomy under Section 25,
Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. There is deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law
because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, lands that are not within DARs
jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and
oppressively prohibited or restricted from
legitimate use on pain of administrative and
criminal penalties. More so, there is
discrimination and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because
the aforesaid administrative order is patently
biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense
of all other sectors of society.
Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.
G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of
several parcels of land. By virtue of a Municipal
Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as
industrial lands. As part of their preparation for the
development of the subject lands as an industrial
park, petitioners secured all the necessary
permits and appropriate government
certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the
conversion of the subject lands for industrial use
and directed the petitioners to cease and desist
from further developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint
for Injunction with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. However, the RTC, ruling that it is the
DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the
complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it
was referred to the CA. However, the CA affirmed
the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary
jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands,
though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is
vested in the DAR.
The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) is mandated to “approve or disapprove
applications for conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-
agricultural uses,” pursuant to Section 4(i) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to
authorize under certain conditions, the
reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands.
It being settled that jurisdiction over
conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed
by the trial and appellate courts under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction
has initially been lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. For agrarian reform
cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of
injunction against the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657
provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government
Agencies from Undue Interference. – No
injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts
against the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the
program.
Province of Camarines Sur vs Court of
Appeals
Facts:
• This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision
on the issue on whether the expropriation of
agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior
approval of the DAR.
• December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
CamSur authorized the provincial governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to
the provincial capitol site in order to establish a
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.
• Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed
two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin.
Upon motion for the issuance of writ or
possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at
the hearing.
• San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the
complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. The court denied
the motion to dismiss and authorized the
province to take possession of the properties.
• San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but
denied as well. In their petition. Asked by the
CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no
need for the approval of the president for the
province to expropriate properties, however, the
 approval of the DAR is needed to convert the
property from agricultural to non-agricultural
(housing purpose).
• CA set aside the decision of the trial court
suspending the possession and expropriation of
the property until th province has acquired the
approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Expropriation
Ruling:
• The rules on conversion of agricultural lands
found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive
Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the
source of the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a
parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to
which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversions
of agricultural lands for residential, commercial
or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the
applications for reclassification submitted by the
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
• To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean
that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of
these projects would naturally involve a change
in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize
whether the expropriation is for a public purpose
or public use.
• Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local
government unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an
expression of legislative policy. The courts defer
to such legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular undertaking
has no real or substantial relation to the public
use.
Fortich vs. Corona (G.R. No. 131457)
Facts:
- This case involves a 144-hectare land located at
San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of
the petitioners.
- In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple
plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation,
now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI) for a
period of ten (10) years. The lease expired in
April, 1994.
- During the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory
acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38
million.
- NQSRMDC sought and was granted by the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction
which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of
the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized
representatives "to desist from pursuing any
activity or activities" concerning the subject land
"until further orders."
- Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992,
the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum directing the Land Bank to open a
trust account for P2.38 million in the name of
NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings
to determine the just compensation of the subject
property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves
and filed an Omnibus Motion to enforce the
DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the
summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation
of the subject property.
- DARAB acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion.
Land Bank complied with the DARAB.
- In the meantime, the Provincial Development
Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor
Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No.
6, 8 dated January 7, 1993, designating certain
areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of
the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the
subject property is situated.
- Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on
March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land
in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of
providing an opportunity to attract investors who
can inject new economic vitality, provide more
jobs and raise the income of its people.
- Under said section, 4th to 5th class
municipalities may authorize the classification of
five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area
and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition.
- On 11 December 1993, the instant application
for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio
Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon
Agro-Industrial Development Association). This
was favorably recommended by a lot government
officials. The people of the affected barangay
even rallied behind their respective officials in
endorsing the project.
- Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable
recommendation, however, on November 14,
1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking
its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order
denying the instant application for the conversion
of the subject land from agricultural to agro-
industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the
distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries.
- Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order was filed by applicant but the same was
denied. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the
DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
property."
- Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon
appealed" the order of denial to the Office of the
President and prayed for the conversion/
reclassification of the subject land as the same
would be more beneficial to the people of
Bukidnon.
- NQSRMDC filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
- Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable
Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant
for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of
the proposed project, sent a memorandum to the
President favorably endorsing the project with a
recommendation that the DAR Secretary
reconsider his decision in denying the application
of the province for the conversion of the land.
- On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution ordering the parties to
observe status quo pending resolution of the
petition.
- In resolving the appeal, the Office of the
President, through then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case
No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing
the DAR Secretary's decision. It stated that:
deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB
correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A.
No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be
the subject of compulsory acquisition until after
the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte
Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until
April 1994. xxx the language of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for
any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal
mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power
to convert portions of their agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization and
disposition to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
- On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the
OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the former donated four (4) hectares
from the subject land to DECS for the
establishment of the NQSR High School.
- When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title
over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property
was no longer in its name. It soon found out that
during the pendency of both the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary
Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of
Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without
giving just compensation, caused the cancellation
of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had
it transferred in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. On September 25, 1995, DAR
caused the issuance of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had
it registered in the name of 137 farmer-
beneficiaries.
- On April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a
complaint 21 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for annulment and
cancellation of title, damages and injunction
against DAR and 141 others. RTC then issued a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction restraining the DAR and
141 others from entering, occupying and/or
wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the
subject land.
- On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by
some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying
the RTC case.
- On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-
beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of
the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the
OP Decision of March 29, 1996.
- On November 7, 1997, the Office of the
President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing
the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona which modified the decision of the Office
of the President, through Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996:
• NQSRMDC's application for conversion is
APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare
portion of the land adjacent to the
highway.
• remaining approximately one hundred
(100) hectares traversed by an irrigation
canal and found to be suitable for
agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law with a right of way to said
portion from the highway provided in the
portion fronting the highway.
- A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received
by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon,
Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and
NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 and, on
December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction against then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
- Respondents, through the Solicitor General,
opposed the petition and prayed that it be
dismissed outright.
[long discussion on rules of procedure]
Issues:
1. Whether or not the power of the local
government units to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
2. Whether the final and executory Decision
dated March 29, 1996 can still be
substantially modified by the "Win-Win"
Resolution was ruled upon by the SC in
the negative.
Held:
1st issue: (as was stated in the OP Decision)
Local Government Units need not obtain the
approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It should
be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision was declared final and executory, vested
rights were acquired by the herein petitioners,
namely, the province of Bukidnon, the municipality
of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR
Management and Development Corporations, and
all others who should be benefited by the said
decision. The issue here is not a question of
technicality but that of substance and merit.
Whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has
the legal authority to reclassify the land into
industrial/institutional use, the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed
the issue. Converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great
opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained
economic growth of the municipality.



Procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/
reclassifying the subject property for agro-
industrial purposes cannot be allowed to defeat
the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to
local government units in the management of their
local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is clear and affords
no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
governments units autonomy in their local affairs
including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization and disposition to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
2nd issue: When the Office of the President issued
the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory,
as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify
its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office
of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second
motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-
Win" Resolution.
The assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which
substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void.
Fortich vs. Corona (AJG)
G.R. No. 131457 August 19, 1999
Facts:
• Background facts: On October 1997,
alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced
a hunger strike in front of the Department
of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon
City. They protested the decision of the
Office of the President (OP) dated March
29, 1996 which approved the conversion
of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to
agro-industrial/institutional area. Note that
this decision already became final and
executory.
o The land is located at San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto
Quisumbing Sr. Management and
Development Corp). It was
leased as a pineapple plantation
to Del Monte.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao, Bukidnon became
interested in the property, and
enacted an ordinance converting
the said land to industrial/
institutional with a view to attract
investors in order to achieve
economic vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion
issues need to go through the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
The DAR rejected the land
conversion and instead opted to
put the same under CARP and
ordered the distribution of the
property to the farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The
OP rendered a decision reversing
the DAR and converting the land
to agro-indusrial area, which
became the subject of the strike
of the farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic
and well-publicized which
commanded nationwide attention
that even church leaders and
some presidential candidates
tried to intervene for their “cause”.
• These events led the OP, through then
Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the
so-called “Win-Win” Resolution,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision
(see decision dated March 29, 1996) after
it had already become final and
executory.
o It modified the approval of the
land conversion to agro-industrial
area only to the extent of forty-
four (44) hectares, and ordered
the remaining one hundred (100)
hectares to be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
• The Supreme Court, in their decision
dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and
company and declared that the “Win-Win”
Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996
resolution of the OP already became final
and executory.
• ALERT – This is where the issue relevant
to our topic arose: Aggrieved,
respondents Corona and Garilao filed
[separate] motions for reconsideration
for the said ruling (separate MRs pero
rinesolve ng Court through one
resolution).
o The Court, in their Resolution
dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-
TWO on the separate MRs filed
by Corona and Garilao assailing
the April 24, 1998 Decision.
• Hence, this motion. The respondents pray
that this case be referred to the Court en
banc. They contend that inasmuch as
their earlier motions for reconsideration
(of the Decision dated April 24, 1998)
were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
required number to carry a decision, i.e.,
three, was not met. Consequently, the
case should be referred to and be
decided by this Court en banc, relying on
the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or
matters heard by a division shall
be decided or resolved with the
 concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of
such Members. When the
required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by
the Court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by
the Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned
resolution of the Court (the resolution addressing
the MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be
referred to the Court en banc – NO.
Ratio:
• A careful reading of the above
constitutional provision, however, reveals
the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between CASES and
MATTERS.
o CASES are “decided”.
o M AT T E R S , w h i c h i n c l u d e
motions, are “resolved”.
• Otherwise put, the word “decided” must
refer to “cases”; while the word “resolved”
must refer to “matters”, applying the rule
of reddendo singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-
quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3),
but also of the other provisions of
the Constitution where these
words appear.
• With the aforesaid rule of construction in
mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision
whenever the required number of votes is
not obtained.
• Conversely, the rule does not apply
where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolution of
a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted
provision speaks only of “case” and not
“matter”.
• The reason is simple. The above-quoted
Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If
there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the
case then is to refer it to the Court en
banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the
division and the losing party files
a motion for reconsideration, the
failure of the division to resolve
the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the
decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the
members of the division to
muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration.
• Quite plainly, if the voting results in a
tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling
of this Court in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
• Respondents further argue that the
issues submitted in their separate
motions for reconsideration are of first
impression. They are arguing that the
local government unit concerned still
needs to obtain the approval of DAR
when converting land. However, this was
rebutted in the resolution dated
November 17, wherein it was expressed
that:
o “ R e g r e t t a b l y, t h e i s s u e s
presented before us by the
movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the
attention of the Court en banc. In
the case of Province of
Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that
local government units need not
obtain the approval of the DAR to
 convert or reclassify lands from o Why was there no standing on
agricultural to non-agricultural the part of the farmer-intervenors
use.” who derived their rights from the
o The Court voted uninamously in Win-Win resolution? The
that case, hence, the argument issuance of the CLOA to them
of the petitioners that their MRs does not grant them the requisite
are motions involving first standing in view of the nullity of
impression is flawed. the “Win-Win” Resolution. No
• M o r e o v e r, a s e c o n d m o t i o n f o r legal rights can emanate from a
reconsideration is generally prohibited, resolution that is null and void.
unless there is a showing of
extraordinary persuasive reasons and a
leave of court is filed. In this case, there
was none.
• Remember that the Court, in its Decision,
upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the
OP because it was already final and
executory thus the Win-Win resolution
cannot be implemented anymore? Well,
because of this, there was a litany of
protestations on the part of respondents
and intervenors including entreaties for a
liberal interpretation of the rules. The
sentiment was that notwithstanding its
importance and far-reaching effects, the
case was “disposed of on a mere
technicality”.
o The Court however said that it
was not a “mere technicality”
because the finality of the March
29, 1996 OP Decision
accordingly vested appurtenant
rights to the land in dispute on
petitioners as well as on the
people of Bukidnon and other
parts of the country who stand to
be benefited by the development
of the property.
• Lastly, the Court determines whether or
not the farmer-intervenors have standing
to intervene in this case. The Court said
there was none, because the source of
their “standing to file” is the “Win-Win
Resolution” (note that in that resolution,
pinamigay nga yung lupa sa mga
farmers, ngayon, meron silang Certificate
of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil
dun, nag intervene sila).