THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 124320 March 2, 1999

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY, NAMELY:
LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, EMILIO ENCISO, AURORA ENCISO, AND
NORBERTO ENCISO, REPRESENTED BY LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN,
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS,
CAVITE; THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR TRECE MARTIRES CITY,
GEORGE T. CHUA, SPS. ALFONSO NG AND ANNABELLE CHUA, SPS.
ROSENDO L. DY AND DIANA DY, SPS. ALEXANDER NG AND CRISTINA
NG, SPS. SAMUEL MADRID AND BELEN MADRID, SPS. JOSE MADRID
AND BERNARDA MADRID, SPS. DAVID MADRID AND VIOLETA MADRID,
JONATHAN NG, SPS. VICTORIANO CHAN, JR. AND CARMELITA CHAN,
SPS. MARIE TES C. LEE AND GREGORIE W.C. LEE, JACINTO NG, JR., SPS.
ADELAIDO S. DE GUZMAN AND ROSITA C. DE GUZMAN, SPS. RICARDO
G. ONG AND JULIE LIM-IT, SPS. MISAEL ADELAIDA P. SOLIMAN AND
FERDINAND SOLIMAN, SPS. MYLENE T. LIM AND ARTHUR LIM, EVELYN
K. CHUA, GOLDEN BAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing
the Orders dated October 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996, respectively, of Branch 21 of
the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite ("RTC").
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an
area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid
properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development
Corporation ("Golden Bay") under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT") 225254 and
225255. With the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed
a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO.
493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative
Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC
BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that "Golden Bay" sold portions of the parcels of land in question,
petitioners filed with the "RTC" an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional
defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed
the Amended Complaint.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint.
The motion was granted by the RTC in an Order 1 dated July 7, 1995, which further
allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, 2 which they
promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss 3 on the
grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a
right of action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being
claimed is different from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs' claim was barred by
laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in its
Order 4 dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners "have not shown any proof or
even a semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-
named Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple."
Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 but to no avail. The same was
denied by the RTC in its Order 6of February 23, 1996.
Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent
court's Orders under attack.
Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could
proceed. It is petitioners' submission that the respondent court should have proceeded
with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
To begin with, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper
recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal. An order of dismissal, be it
right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject
of certiorari. 7 Where appeal is available as a remedy certiorari will not lie. 8
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly
ratiocinated and ruled:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it —
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance (Elena c. Monzon, et al., v. Angelita
Taligato, CA-G-R- No. 33355, August 12, 1992).
In Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera 9 this court opined that the declaration of heirship must
be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This
doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals 10 where the court held:
In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which
they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share
of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera,
 the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were
not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were
paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was
his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations
(that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in
Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court
in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will
not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
partition." (p. 378).
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule
1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second
Amended Complaint, which stated no cause of action. In Travel Wide Associated
Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 11 it was ruled that:
. . . If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in
interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.
MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
(BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M.
ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S.
MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et.
Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of
the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4which denied petitioner' motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate
on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11)
children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M.
Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia
Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under
the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La
Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children
of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto,
Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and
for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for
hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further
directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the
petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an
order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the
reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial
court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando
who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,
culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat
aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the
motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the
immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July
20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of
the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing
on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its
Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the
share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was
absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and
(5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari in its Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether
or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the
petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to
aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family
have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an
ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it
contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial
nature, to wit:
X X X
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his
father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-
judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage
xxx.
X X X
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of
the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and
prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X X X
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were
compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and
will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the
services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees
plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule
16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a
complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has
not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition
in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to
Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in
a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the
late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila
at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence
within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains
an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties
left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In
addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the
intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable
Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner
ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable
Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal
heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO
MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with
law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of
P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium
of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and
costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which
may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took
advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto
which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and
denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to
make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule
16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by
raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special
jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may
be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always
been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case
either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it
should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person,
Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue
of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners
contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article
222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of
the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring
supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is
clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law
or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable
only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same
family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be
made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion
in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than stranger.25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded
therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it
is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with
the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit,
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000]
RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA
CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS,
ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY,
INC. respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the
inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No.
38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 1995[2], 12 September
1995[3] and 15 September 1995[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93,
sitting as a probate court.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate
is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In
Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy,
Petitioner".
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations
formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties
covered under the Torrens system.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse
and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint
petition[5] for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the
estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion[6] for the lifting of lis pendens and
motion[7] for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
In an order[8] dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93,
sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents twin motions, in this wise:
"Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift,
expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further
ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as those
properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123,
236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition[9] which contained the
following averments:
"3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the
following business entities, to wit:
Business Entity Address:
XXXX
Alliance Marketing ,Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca
BF Homes,
Paraaque,
Metro Manila.
XXXX
Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog,
Aguinaldo Highway,
Bacoor, Cavite.
XXXX
Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City.
XXXX
Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila.
XXXX
Action Company 100 20th Avenue
Murphy, Quezon City
or
92-D Mc-Arthur Highway
Valenzuela Bulacan.
"3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business
with the public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were
however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged
stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of
incorporation of the above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor
Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other
banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
"5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of
the above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his
marriage with petitioner, to wit:
Corporation Title Location
XXXX
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo
TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizal
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance,
Metro Manila
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
XXXX
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late
Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him
during the existence of his marriage with petitioner.
"8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim
which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit
to this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary
documents covering the same as soon as possible."
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioners motion issued an
order[10], thus:
"Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted
and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant
petition.
SO ORDERED."
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator[11] and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly
issued.
In an order[12] dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private
respondents motion for exclusion, in this wise:
"The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil,
a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and
not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease
vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular
court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere
extension of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled
that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the
SECs exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is
simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during
his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his
instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED."
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by
petitioner, issued an order[13] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
produce and submit to the special administrators , through this Honorable
Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective
records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits
in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned,
showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings /current
accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
XXX XXX XXX
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari[14], with an urgent prayer for
a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents,
rendered the assailed decision[15], the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for
certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent
court on July 4,1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set
aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is
nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are
concerned.
SO ORDERED."
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy
Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of error[16]:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the
lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion
of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic)
Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself
the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit
provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby
preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special
administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules."
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by
the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over
probate proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691[17], which introduced amendments to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross
value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or,
in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
 demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys, litigation expenses and costs shall be included in
the determination of the filing fees, Provided further, that
where there are several claims or causes of actions between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
xxx xxx xxx"
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of
probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the
principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain
properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its
probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,[18] held:
"X X X As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS[19]:
"X X X The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the courts determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which
may be instituted by the parties."
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE[20] citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE[21],
We made an exposition on the probate courts limited jurisdiction:
"It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
 parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so."
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO[22], We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr.
Justice Andres Narvasa[23]:
"Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and
thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate
court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether
or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be
waived. x x x
x x x. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as
here, the Torrens title is not in the decedents name but in
others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion
to rule x x x."(emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens
system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be
included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after
all the determination by the probate court of whether these properties should be
included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a
final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and
for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the
name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY
vs., ALCID[24] is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence
purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x"
"x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if
a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when
as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title. x x x"
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever
presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased
Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, " The
Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law."
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property
subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We
categorically stated:
"x x x Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in
the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. x x x"
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor
Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents motion for
exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted
capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue
orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by
jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system
in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy
fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter
disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.
Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of
law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedents estate but also the private respondent
corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late
Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations,
which are the private respondents in the instant case.[25] Petitioner thus attached as
Annexes "F"[26] and "G"[27] of the petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim
and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the incorporators of
Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual participation in the
organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the
persons whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing,
Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually
contributed any amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have been merely
asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that
of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders
or those of the entities connected with it.[28]
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct
and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal
fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law
with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS[29], We enunciated:
"x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an
illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law
covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who
compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
aggregation of individuals. x x x"
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective
shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be
subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not
for the existing corporate fiction.[30]
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a
corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges
of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be
justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to
naught.[31]
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control,
but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had
at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have
been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements
prevent "piercing the corporate veil".[32]
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of
the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the
fiction of separate corporate personalities.[33]
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-
doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[34]
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a
limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent
evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly,
the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani
Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no
weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to
stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not
at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it
differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to
relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with
the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs.
LEONIDAS[35] finds pertinence:
"Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon."
As to the order[36] of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in
issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand the production of
bank accounts in the name of the private respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified
and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a
probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000]
MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MENANDRO A. RESELVA, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision dated
September 9, 1994 of the Court of Appeals[1] in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 33826;
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the assailed
order of October 18, 1993, issued by the respondent court in Special Proceeding No. 90-
54955 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID. With costs against the
private respondent."[2]
and the reinstatement of the order of the probate court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, Menandro Reselva and all those acting for or through him, is/are
ordered to vacate forthwith the house and lot of the estate situated in 173 Ilaw St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila, and to deliver to the executrix Milagros R. Cortes the possession thereof
as well as the owner's duplicate certificate of the title thereof."[3]
The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:
"Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in this petition)
Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of
the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11,
1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a property
particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address
at 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the records, Lucrecia
Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will
which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the
appointed Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a
motion before respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the
occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof (Annex 'D').This is
the motion which the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18,
1993."[4]
In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for having
been issued beyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as a probate court.[5]
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.[6] Stated
otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal or real property, made
by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third
persons, cannot be entertained by the (probate) court."[7]
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused
to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T.
Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory
heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's
estate.[8] By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all
heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the
question of title to property."[9] Here, the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum
of society and a separate action would be most expensive and inexpedient.[10]
In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the
decedent since the former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter.[11] In
the same way, when the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the
conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among the heirs.[12]
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court, thus:
"RULE 73
"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."
Hence, in the 1991 case of Vita vs. Montanano we ruled:
"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of
the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra
Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the
latter."[13]
Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the probate court for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the
settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, without reinstating the assailed order of the trial court, the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33826 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID G.R. No. 188921

AMANDO C. ROMERO,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
AURORA C. ROMERO and Promulgated:
VITTORIO C. ROMERO,
Respondents. April 18, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for
the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April 2009 and the
subsequent Resolution [2] dated 21 July 2009.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners
which alleged grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated 14 December 2007
and 29 January 2008 issued by Judge Maria Susana T. Baua in her capacity as
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The said
Resolutions dismissed petitioners complaint against private respondents Aurora C.
Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death on 18 October 1974, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and
personal properties in trust for her children.[3] Since that year until the present, she
continues to be the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments
comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale
were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their
parents. These included the following real and personal properties:
1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in
Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one
thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16142 and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290013 in the name of Vittorio C. Romero.
A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by Declaration of Real Property No.
16142.
2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in
Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one
thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 405, and TCT
No. 77223 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in
Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one
thousand square meters under Declaration of

Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante Y.
Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in
Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one
thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 406, and TCT
No. 77225 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224
situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area
of four hundred ninety-four square meters under TCT No. 113514 in the name of
Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.
6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
containing an area of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square meters
under Declaration of Real Property No. 16136. It is not yet registered under Act
496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law, but registrable under Act 3344 as
amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified as a warehouse, is
covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing
an area of more or less two hundred four square meters under Declaration of
Real Property No. 16139. It is not yet registered under Act 496 or Act 3344 as
amended. The improvement thereon is covered by Declaration of Real Property
No. 16140.
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
containing an area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six square
 meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No. 284241 in the
name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.

9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 725 and TCT No. 284242 in the
name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.[4]
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio through
fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the above-mentioned
properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother,
Aurora.[5] Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even administered
drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale
without reading or knowing their contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended)[6] against private respondents
Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that
the properties in question were acquired long after the death of their father, Judge
Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal. They allege that
the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010, 290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136
and 11639 were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio
purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The lots
covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-
in-fact of her children on 23 November 2006, since her authority to do so had never
been revoked or modified.
On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners
complaint, stating thus:
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending
in that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante Y.
Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his compulsory
heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in
this case could not be adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court
without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the
intestate court as to the share of each of the heirs of the late
Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the
properties being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same
being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and established in
the intestate proceedings.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to recover the
title or possession of lands until such lands have actually been assigned. The court ruled
that plaintiffs must first cause the termination of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its
logical conclusion before this case could be entertained by the Court.[8]
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering the
said Resolutions, petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On 14 April
2009, the CA rendered the assailed judgment dismissing the Petition, ruling that the
properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero,
the partition of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January
1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI).[9] The CA based its judgment on the
findings of the RTC that the inventory of the estate of Judge Romero submitted to the
CFI included the same parties, properties, rights and interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate court
may rule on issues pertaining to title over property only in a provisional capacity. They
assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just because the intestate proceeding
has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as heirs, are purportedly allowed to exercise their
option of filing a separate civil action in order to protect their interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this case
may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite
the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y.
Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction to
determine the issues in the present case
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons
or the appointment of executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions
of ownership that arise during the proceedings.[10] They cite Ongsingco v.
Tan,[11] Baybayan v. Aquino[12] and several cases which state that when questions arise
as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
the intestate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate these questions. Petitioners
conclude that the issue of ownership of the properties enumerated in their Petition and
included in the inventory submitted by respondent Aurora Romero to the intestate
court, must be determined in a separate civil action to resolve title.[13]
The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both arose out
of facts different from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved a summary
settlement for the estate of the decedent, in which a parcel of land representing the
share of decedents nephews and nieces was already covered by a TCT under the name of
a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by the probate court, the third party,
petitioners Baybayan et al., had to file a separate civil action for quieting of their title
and for damages. The issue before the Court then devolved upon the propriety of the
probate courts order to amend the Complaint for quieting of title before the regular
court. More importantly,Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving third parties
who were not heirs, and not privy to the intestate proceedings in the probate court. The
present action was instituted precisely by heirs of Judge Romero, against their brother,
who is also an heir, and their mother, who is the administrator of the estate.
In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass
upon the issue of title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, subject of the proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
 jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a
mode of practice "which may be waived."

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be

passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should
be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate

or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of

title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the

general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the

ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion
for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties are the
heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.[15] (Citations
omitted.)
While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over properties which
may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only
as between the representatives of the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early
as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated thus:
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in
the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are
allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In
the case of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia,
Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:

A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate

proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the properties included therein or excluded
therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such
a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and
without prejudice to the right of interested parties, in a
 proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.

To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.

* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to

try the title to property as between the representatives
of an estate and strangers thereto is too well established
by the authorities to require argument.

There is also authority abroad that where the court is without

jurisdiction to determine questions of title, as for example, as between
the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and
judgments relating to the sale do not render the issue of title res
judicata.[17] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the case at bar
pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a separate civil
action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership, but the
determination of which particular properties should be included in the inventory of the
estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the properties alleged by petitioners
to have been conjugal properties of their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that
was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be
the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.[18]
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also seek to
be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim, they argue
that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For
his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that
she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Supreme Court declared that the determination
of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the
inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a
deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong
to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so
because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of
the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of
the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed
him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which
each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community
property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary
corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the
distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete
 settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are
affected.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the

question of ownership of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs
who are all parties to the proceedings.[20] xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To
date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating the
shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently rule on whether the
properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that can
liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts
of the estate have been paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from
filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule on
their Complaint, the submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is merely
optional, and not mandatory upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to
bring these issues in a separate civil action, if they so choose. They argue further that
Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable to the present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or
administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the
title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be
maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the
court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed
for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They
invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the recovery of
property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may maintain such
action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has allegedly participated in
the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners theory must again fail. There is nothing on the
record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or entered
into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-
heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties which they allege to be
properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora
Romeros acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the
probate court. In Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] the Court stated:
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a
pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
 approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter
should be threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do
not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity
as a probate court.[22]
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They are, in
effect, questioning the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can
only be properly threshed out by the probate court. Paragraph 13 of petitioners
Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant
Aurora C. Romero to and in favor of Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are
nullities since all were simulated, entered into without the intent and
volition of Defendant Aurora C. Romero, attended by force, intimidation,
duress and fraud and not supported with any valid or sufficient
consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of depriving the other
compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful share
in the estate.[23] (Emphasis omitted.)
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property
under administration is the recognition that the probate court has the power to rescind
or nullify the disposition of a property under administration that was effected without
its authority.[24] That petitioners have the prerogative of choosing where to file their
action for nullification whether with the probate court or the regular court is erroneous.
As held in Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over the estate of deceased
individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked,
and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be
ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to
determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural
child; the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and to
pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.[25] (Citations
omitted.)
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners
co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court, because it is the probate
court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction
over Auroras actions and dispositions as administrator. In Peaverde v. Peaverde,[26] the
Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-shopping for filing a separate civil
action despite the pendency of the said petitioners own case seeking that letters of
administration be granted to them. Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners
in Peaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir:
 The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471,
which seeks letters of administration for the estate of Mariano Peaverde;
and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peaverde and the
annulment of titles in his name as well as the reopening of the distribution
of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to
share in the estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land previously
owned in common by Mariano and his wife, Victorina.This is also what they
hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.
Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the
ultimate distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also
manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for the
"Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peaverde. In both cases,
petitioners would have to prove their right to inherit from the estate of
Mariano Peaverde, albeit indirectly, as heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.
Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-
shopping.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No.
Q-94-19471 and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no
question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are
identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina,
wife of Mariano. Likewise, the reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share in
the estate of Mariano --- are the same, such relief being founded on the
same facts ---their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife, Victorina.[27]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are
already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009
judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND
HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-
CHING, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he
leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate remains, providing a fertile ground for
discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such
reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious
dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein
petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision[1]dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution[2] dated January 27, 1997
in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.[3] The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioners
motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles;
and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits
amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her
husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition[4] for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an
opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration
on the grounds that (a)petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed
of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be
issued to her instead.[5] Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as
special administratrix.[6]
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has
no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that
he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as
administrator under the law.[7]
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because
she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of
them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners.[8]
In her omnibus motion[9] dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.[10] Both were issued letters of
administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the
estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas
estate.[11] Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children
as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.[12]
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion[13] praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of
estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared
heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet
no determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.[14] Respondent claimed that she owns the
bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she prayed that a
hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate
taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution
of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. The intestate court ratiocinated as
follows:
On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared heirs,
the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing
on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to
determine whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by
petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in
their partnership venture.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking
to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution
dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the
challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining private respondents unsupported claim of ownership against
the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a
finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed
upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to
schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents claim, is being
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted
with an iota of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
I
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURTS
ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST
BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE
INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS
ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHINGS
OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties
claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.[15] The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.[16]
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the
adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate
court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such
reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the
purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of
ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose
of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition[18] dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory
prepared by petitioner, thus:
6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended
Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not
October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor,
however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and
reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.
Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion
of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But
instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the
low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of
Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator,
is to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his
possession or knowledge.[19] He could have submitted an inventory, excluding
therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The
fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a
ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted
something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of
her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas
estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution[20] dated May 7, 1996, thus:
On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita
Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the
subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be
implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the
propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns
the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the
deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the
estate and hence, should be given her day in Court.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by
the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety of oppositors
(respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is true that the
oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it
means that she has a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she
should be given her day in court. The intended day in court or hearing is geared
towards resolving the propriety of respondents contention that she is the true owner of
the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a
proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas estate.
Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of
petitioners inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her
real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its
proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-
settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that
when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence
teaches us that:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.[22]
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her
adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional
or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondents claim cannot
prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners
inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered
either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are
considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid[23] relevant, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support
her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should
be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration
Decree, proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present
convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony,
thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this
sworn statement of yours which I quote: In accordance with the Chinese
tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to
our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will
take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage.
Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that
right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and
the other half was given to Emmanuel.
 Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember
any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the
one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate
among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of
your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po.[24]
She further testified as follows:
Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land,
stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and
abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your
pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be
partitioned or what should be done with these properties?
According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of
the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land
located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in
San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo,
paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong
iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or
hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in
petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove
her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to
improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelitas estate is
composed of paraphernal properties.[26]Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen
her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and
Miguelita were business partners and that she gave to the latter most of her properties
to be used in a joint business venture.[27] Respondent must have realized early on that if
the properties listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the
absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be
vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children.[28]
 At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or
deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be
rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be
part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction.[29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL
REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES, petitioners, vs. CESAR R.
REYES, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46761[1] which affirmed the
Order[2] dated January 26, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, in
Special Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for issuance of letters of administration, and
the resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration.[3]
Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels
of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar,
Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.
On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was
notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which
arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to
settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment
was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983
was levied[4] sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of
the government.[5]
Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax
amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983[6] upon
payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000.[7]
On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to
Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public
auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from
1974-1981.[8]
On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an
amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of
Felisa R. Reyes.[9]
On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a
petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael
Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983
and 3598.[10] Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the
Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had
acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.[11]
 The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar
Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of
properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers of attorney
executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot
conforming to his appointment as administrator.[12] Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of
real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a
total area of 1,009 sq. meters.[13] On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to
the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the
government and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR
using his own funds.[14]
A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was
required to present evidence to establish that the properties belong to the estate of
Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to adduce evidence in support of his objection to the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory.[15] After hearing the parties respective
arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated January 26, 1994, the dispositive
portion of which reads:[16]
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the
inventory submitted by the administrator and declares to belong to the estate of the late
Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit:
1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing
an area of 31,054 square meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate
value of P405,270.00;
2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street,
Cubao, Quezon City, with total area of 1,009 square meters, more or less,
covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an approximate value of
P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional in character and shall
be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in
the proper Court on the issue of ownership of the properties; and,
3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental
income from the inception of the lease, whether such income be in the
possession of oppositor, in which case he is hereby directed to account
therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the
administrator should move to collect the same.
Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa
R. Reyes, in her personal capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street properties,
may commence the necessary proper action for settling the issue of ownership of such
properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform the Court of the
commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.
The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other
properties, particularly the real properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in
Marikina, Metro Manila (near Boys Town); and in Bulacan, otherwise referred to as the
Hi-Cement property truly pertained to the estate; to determine their present condition
and the status of their ownership; and to render a report thereon in writing within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this Order.
The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby
denied for being unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received from
Sonny Bernardo, which he is hereby directed to turn over to the administrator within
thirty (30) days from finality of this Order.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order
dated May 30, 1994.[17] He then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of
Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs,
herein petitioners.
On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed
the probate courts order. It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that
the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased
Ismael Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of
any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership of the
properties; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the contested properties in
the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of intestate court. It
further stated that although the general rule that question of title to property cannot be
passed upon in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for adjudication, such has no
application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not
the only parties with legal interest in the subject property as they are not the only heirs
of the decedent; that it was never shown that all parties interested in the subject
property or all the heirs of the decedent consented to the submission of the question of
ownership to the intestate court.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution
dated July 28, 1999. Hence this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the
respondent Court erred (1) in ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half
(1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the
inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court a
quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership.
Petitioners argue that a probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the
determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate
of a deceased person since the probate court has the power and competence to
determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of the estate or
not, thus the Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the Arayat
properties in the inventory of the estate of Ismael Reyes despite the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner-oppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim of
ownership. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership over the Arayat properties
as testified to by their predecessor Oscar Reyes was based on two (2) grounds, to wit (1)
his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2) the abandonment of the properties by
his co-heirs; that his act of redeeming the properties from the BIR in 1976 and therefter
from the City Treasurer of Quezon City using his own funds have the effect of vesting
ownership to him. Petitioners claim that private respondent is already barred from
claiming the Arayat properties since he only filed this petition 16 years after the death of
Ismael Reyes and after the prices of the real properties in Cubao have already escalated
tremendously.
We find no merit in this argument.
The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the
appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.[18] The
question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot
resolve with finality.[19] Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.[20]
We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion
of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to
the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of
ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens
system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in
the law.[21] The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.
Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of
limited jurisdiction, the court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when the
parties interested are all heirs of the deceased and they submitted the question of title to
the property, without prejudice to third persons. Petitioners allege that the parties
before the probate court were all the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes and they were
allowed to present evidence proving ownership over the subject properties, thus private
respondent cannot argue that he did not in any way consent to the submission of the
issue of ownership to the probate court as the records of this case is replete with
evidence that he presented evidence in an attempt to prove ownership of the subject
properties.
We are not persuaded.
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises
but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the
issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.[22]
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the
exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the
introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether
the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the probate
courts competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as
administrator of the properties in the courts Order dated July 26, 1989, he was ordered
to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal properties of the estate
which may come into his possession or knowledge which private respondent complied
with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his objection to the inventory on the
ground that it included the subject properties which had been forfeited in favor of the
government on April 21, 1975 and which he subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976.
The Court resolved the opposition as follows:
At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents could
not be resolved without introduction of evidence.
Accordingly, the hearing on the inventory of real and personal properties is hereby set
on April 24, 1990 at 10:00 A.M. at which date and time the petitioner/administrator
shall be required to present evidence to establish that the properties stated in the
inventory belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes. The oppositor shall thereafter adduce his
evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties of the estates
in the inventory.
Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing
was for the merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the
opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the
parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included therein
or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that for resolution is
the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be
included in the inventory and what should not be included. There was nothing on record
that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the
respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue of ownership conclusively.
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its
determination of the ownership was merely provisional and suggested that either the
administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action in the
Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not competent to pass
upon the ownership of the subject properties, thus:
Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than that
of the petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the recitals of facts
found in the several public documents submitted as evidence in this case and is
corroborated to the greatest extent by the fact that the properties were,
indeed, abandoned in his possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged ownership
of the Arayat Street properties cannot still be sustained in a manner which would
warrant their exclusion from the administrators inventory.
To begin with, there are portions in the records which show that the oppositor himself
was somehow uncertain about his rights on the properties and the basis
therefor. During his cross-examination (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991), he gave the following
statements:
xx xx xx
(Atty. Habitan)
Q: And if we will add the other taxes you have paid, (you) are now claiming to be the
owner of the Arayat property because you have paid all these taxes?
A: The amounts I have paid and all the expenses I have and if I had not paid all
these amounts the property in question would have been lost, sir.
Q: So, in effect, you are now claiming ownership over the property, I want a
categorical answer, Mr. Witness?
A: If I am going to sum up all these expenses, my share in the Hi-Cement property,
my share in the Bulacan property, the amount of the property in Cubao is small
and also all my sufferings because of the property in Cubao, this cannot be paid in
terms of money, sir. (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991, pp. 10-12)
On re-direct examination (tsn, Sept. 18, 1992), he clarified his statements as follows:
xx xx xx
(Atty, Javellana)
 Q: Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, you were asked by the petitioners counsel
whether because you had paid the BIR P17,872.44 you are now claiming to be the
owner of the property in Arayat Street to which you answered no, will you explain
your answer?
A: When I paid almost P18,000.00, it does not mean that I claim the property
already; on the contrary, I have my own reasons to claim it now on other
conditions which are the following: number one, there was a levy by the
BIR on the property, it was forfeited due to delinquency of real estate taxes;
number two, for abandonment, when my mother, brother(s) and sisters left the
property, they told me it is my problem and I should take care of it. Number
three, the disposition, my mother, my brothers and sisters sold the property of
my father, the Hi-Cement and the property in Visayas Street without giving my
share. And another thing I have to sell my own property, my own assets so that I
can redeem from the BIR the Arayat property and which I did with my personal
funds, and number five, nobody helped me in my problems regarding those
properties, I was alone and so I felt that the property in Arayat is mine.
xx xx xx
(tsn, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 2-3)
Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of
the Court on the issue is not entirely favorable to him. Apart from the absence of a
specific document of transfer, the circumstances and factors he gave may not suffice in
and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at best, they may only be the basis of
such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to dispose in his favor or
as evidence of a set off among the heirs, which seems to be what he has in mind. There
might also be substance in his assertions about the abandonment in his favor, which, if
raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It is hardly
needed to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to predicate the exclusion
of the properties from the inventory.
Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on
the property covered in TCT 4983 and did not include the property covered
in TCT 3598 (39303).This somehow detracts from the logic of the oppositors
assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his assertion is
valid and true, it can encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIRs levy and
declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598
(39303).
These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of
whatever rights or properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his. Although the
circumstances and factors he has given to the Court herein may have legal consequences
that could have defeated opposing-claims and rendered oppositors claim on the
properties unassailable, this Courts competence to adjudicate thus in this proceedings is
clearly non-existent. In Baybayan vs. Aquino (149 SCRA 186), it was held that the
question of ownership of a property alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal
ownership of the properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude
oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for the purpose of having his claims or
rights established over the properties. If he still cares hereafter to prosecute such claim
of ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother Felisa. As
stated in Valera, et al. vs. Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting
as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction; accordingly, its determination that
property should be included in the inventory or not is within its probate jurisdiction, but
such determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
xx xx xx
The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of
ownership ventilated elsewhere. Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots
known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half that could pertain to the estate) could
be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence adduced so far (including
that bearing on the oppositors basis for excluding from the estate the property) was
inadequate or otherwise inconclusive.
A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate
court, does not consider itself competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat
property.
Finally, anent private respondents allegation that the instant petition was filed one
day late, hence should be dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit. Petitioners
received copy of the decision denying their motion for reconsideration on August 13,
1999, thus they have until August 28, 1999 within which to file petition for review.
Petitioners filed their motion for extension on August 27, 1999 praying for 30 days
extension from August 28, 1999 or until September 27, 1999 to file their petition which
this Court granted. Petitioners filed their petition on September 27, 1999, which is
within the period given by the Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6476 November 18, 1955
FRANCISCO DE BORJA as Executor of the Estate of the deceased JOSEFA
TANGCO, petitioner,
vs.
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
JOSE DE BORJA, respondents.
Alejo Mabanag and Luis Pangilinan, Jr. for petitioner.
David Guevara for respondents.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge Bienvenido A. Tan to
approve and admit the record on appeal filed before him and to give due course to the
appeal. The facts involved as gathered from the record may be briefly stated as follows.
On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for
the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will
was probated on April 2, 1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One
of the heirs who is now one of the respondents herein Jose de Borja appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals but later his motion for dismissal of the appeal as granted. All the
records of the case were destroyed or lost during the last Pacific war but were on
January 1, 1946, reconstituted. On March 26 of that year Francisco de Borja qualified as
executor and administrator.
Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the estate he being
quite weak and unable to see, on August 25, 1951, on petition of Matilde de Borja, one of
the heirs, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-
administrator. Crisanto qualified as co-administrator on August 29, 1951.
On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of or notice to
anyone appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator, this, after holding in
abeyance consideration of Francisco de Borja's amended account dated March 25, 1952.
Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose
de Borja but by order of August 14, 1952, respondent Judge indirectly denied the motion
for reconsideration, and acting upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose,
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed De Borja, revoked the appointment of
Crisanto as co-administrator and directed administrator Jose de Borja to comment on
the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja.
On July 22, 1952, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order
appointing Jose de Borja as co-administrator and the order denying the motion for
reconsideration and later they filed the corresponding record on appeal. By order of
December 27, 1952, respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and
refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Jose de
Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable. Hence,
this petition for mandamus, as already stated, to compel respondent Judge to approve
the record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal.
An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable (See Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Liac
Suy, 8 Phil., 594). On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order
appointing a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a co-
administrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions
rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not
subject to appeal. We cannot share this view. The powers and functions of a special
administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is
appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from
any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge
of the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or
administrator thereon appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is
also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate
he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to
the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special
administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally,
because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by
the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. On the
other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all
the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration.
Further taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that
petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designated administrator, is and has for
several years been one only in name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result
of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator there is no
question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-
administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or general
administrator.
In view of the foregoing, holding that the appointment of a co-administrator, especially
in the present case, is appealable, the petition for mandamus is granted and respondent
Judge is hereby directed to approve the record on appeal and to give due course to the
appeal. No costs.
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the
September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their
complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations
claims of the parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary
evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose
Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua
Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father, Mariano
Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings
waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located
in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of
Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole
Heir of Estate of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land.
TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead
TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9,
1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M.
Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer
by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before
the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for
annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of
title issued in her name.
 In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to
the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that
she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of
Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the
TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be
ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in
their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order
chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an account
of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary
evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case
for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status and right as putative
heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of
jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth,
pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent.
Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was
sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right,
or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1,
1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a).
The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a
right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been
established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs
cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to
sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial
courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts
following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579
[1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No.
13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that
of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be
inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of
the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death
benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz.,
Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in
said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his
lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly
celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely
an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other
hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the
deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties,
herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal
heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not,
therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such
questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special
proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The
institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it
cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the
establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary
civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to
impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial
courts dismissal of the case.
 Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court
to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a
cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the
existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the
lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the
questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the
prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence
adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the
determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the
determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the
determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is
discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass
on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it
is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts
ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute
a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case
for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her
name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein
petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned
therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two
lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and
Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual
respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of
titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an
improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of
Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special
proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who
died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven
(7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in
China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage
with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving
spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of
administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed
a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator
Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their
complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations
made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents
in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it
rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin
were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al.,
found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that,
among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of
the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened
in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence
presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged
marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . .
as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have
declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent,
for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed
before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as
sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother.
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved
to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent,
she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil
case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court
affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other
issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil
action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the
same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court
should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal
court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are
still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva]
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to
proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her
an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the
therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved
in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive
mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be
archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the
project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her
adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of
partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her
adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties
agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint
in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial
on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she
acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she
was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her
motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there
was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for
the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of
April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
 The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records
of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate
proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of
partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson,
supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for
the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-
opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate
o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano,
supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs.
Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the
civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it involves no longer
the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-
opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property
or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir
to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or
intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate
estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it
is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is
valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24,
2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-
trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF
CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO,
BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO;
and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO
CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA,
YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ,
namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-
RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF
ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO
RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as
Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668,
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October
24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into
two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his
illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never
married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural
children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before
him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to
the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall
within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly
married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa
Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would
be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would
be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within
the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support
thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much
as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is
that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting
any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage
did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo
Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on
June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether
a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually
lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors
referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and
from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September
8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among
their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the
United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting
from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim
No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the
United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June
1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their
own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie
Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the
local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his
own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status
from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which
was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their
children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo
Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest
in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an
illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo
Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia.
He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death
on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia
Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the
original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This
petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,
claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived
together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion
was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in
this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who
died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the
same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of
the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single
administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota
Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the
petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to
turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income
due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records
and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual
administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the
record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial
justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the
reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October
10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain
matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the
party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal,
but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical
ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision.
Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate
of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and
4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to
the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-
appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to
such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her
(Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a
period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of
the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts
are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than
50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their
reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as
"spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the
absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that
they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption
of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence
need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to
Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily
relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband
and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered
by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita")
civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common
rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on
only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado
and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio
and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural
children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y
would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed
each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between
them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding
this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of
the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That
prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate
children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on
the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters
should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full
blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have
validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo
Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in
the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but
only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on
February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s
report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared
by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian
holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death
of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could
have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in
the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal
to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by
Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death.
We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab
intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all,
but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements
must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming
its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia
Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the
lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of
the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference
in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo
Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate
of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-
siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa
Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at
the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s
estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the
late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective
shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
 and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain
to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and
to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators,
upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be
determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH CUA, G.R. No. 156536
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA
VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, October 31, 2006
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA
VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
Respondents.

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the decision[1] dated March 26, 2002, and the resolution[2] dated December
17, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled Gloria A. Vargas,
Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v.
Joseph Cua.

The facts are as follows:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San

Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4,
1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and
among Paulina Vargas heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan
Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria
Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square
meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document.
Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three
consecutive weeks.[3]

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs

with Sale[4] was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property
and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were
sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents
herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was
being demolished sometime in May 1995.[5] She likewise claimed she was unaware that
an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the
same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.[6]

After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas
tried to redeem the property, with the following letter[7] sent to petitioner on her behalf:

29th June 1995

Mr. Joseph Cua

Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes

Sir:

This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas,[8] (c/o Atty. Prospero

V. Tablizo) one of the lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas, original owner
of Lot No. 214 of Virac, Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her
name.

I understand that a document Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with

Sale was executed by some of my clients co-heirs and alleged
representatives of other co-heirs, by virtue of which document you acquired
by purchase from the signatories to the said document, five (5) shares with
a total area of fifty-five square meters of the above-described land.

This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right of legal
redemption of said five (5) shares as well as other shares which you may
likewise have acquired by purchase. And you are hereby given an option to
agree to legal redemption within a period of fifteen (15) days from your
receipt hereof.
 Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15-day-period,
proper legal action shall be taken by my client to redeem said shares.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA

When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an
amicable settlement at the barangay level,[9] Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of
Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and consigned the amount
of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20,
1996.[10] Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago, namely, Aurora,
Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.

Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive
owner of the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the case.[11]

Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated

to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise
alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-
owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as
no written notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were
null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.[12]
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision[13] in favor of petitioner,
dismissing the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit, and
declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and
binding. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction purportedly
occurred after the partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined
that the other heirs could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC
found that although there was a failure to strictly comply with the requirements under
Article 1088 of the Civil Code[14] for a written notice of sale to be served upon
respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the formers right of redemption, this
deficiency was cured by respondents actual knowledge of the sale, which was more than
30 days before the filing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price
with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled
that respondents failed to establish by competent proof petitioners bad faith in
purchasing the portion of the property owned by respondents co-heirs.[15]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42,
of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC decision in a judgment dated November 25,
1999. The matter was thereafter raised to the Court of Appeals (CA).
 The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed decision
dated March 26, 2002, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and
the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4,
1994 and November 15, 1994, respectively, were void and without any legal effect. The
CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, [16] the extrajudicial
settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the
latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition for review.
The issues are:

Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound,

regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and
partition has been duly published; and,

Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does

not bind persons who did not participate therein, whether the written
notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with
the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article
1088 of the Civil Code[17] can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have
actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-
heir can exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser
shall commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale.

Petitioner argues, as follows:

Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the
extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The
publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore estopped from denying the validity of
the partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.

Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.

Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its subject
matter was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have been filed
with the RTC.

Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-heirs who sold
their interest in the subject property not having been impleaded by respondents.
 Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it was not properly
verified by respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that she was authorized to
represent the other respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the petition. Moreover,
the verification was inadequate because it did not state the basis of the alleged truth
and/or correctness of the material allegations in the petition.

The petition lacks merit.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule

plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.[18] It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed[19] as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of
creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedents estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without
their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

This is not to say, though, that respondents co-heirs cannot validly sell their
hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who
actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included
the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by
the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares
pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because
respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on
the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time
that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is
indispensable and mandatory,[20] actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time
advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir
thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or
her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.[21]

Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method of notification
remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law.[22] This proceeds from the
very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint
ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other
heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.[23]

It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves
upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other
co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale.[24] This will remove all
uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet
any doubt that the alienation is not definitive.[25] As a result, the party notified need not
entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. [26]

Considering, therefore, that respondents co-heirs failed to comply with this

requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares
sold to petitioner given the formers obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

Likewise untenable is petitioners contention that he is a builder in good

faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building
on is ones own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in ones title.[27] Petitioner
derived his title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs With Sale
dated November 15, 1994. He was very much aware that not all of the heirs participated
therein as it was evident on the face of the document itself. Because the property had not
yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the
property could have been identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. This
is because the alienation made by respondents co-heirs was limited to the portion which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of respondents, petitioner still
constructed improvements on the property. For this reason, his claim of good faith lacks
credence.

As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from raising the same
for the first time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below and
sought affirmative ruling from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to him
of a portion of the subject property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among
heirs. Having failed to seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court
at this late stage. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any
time, an exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.
 Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate
its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative
relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time
and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction when adverse.[28]

Petitioners fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of indispensable parties,

similarly lacks merit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there
can be no final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either
plaintiff or defendant.[29] The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought is so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that the formers legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence, an indispensable
party is one whose interest will be directly affected by the court's action in the litigation.
In the absence of such indispensable party, there cannot be a resolution of the
controversy before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.[30]

In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint filed by respondents
ultimately prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by their
co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the
property to petitioner is not in dispute. Respondents concede that the other heirs acted
within their hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter completely and
effectively relinquished their interests in the property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner

thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the property with
respondents. As a result, only petitioners presence is absolutely required for a complete
and final determination of the controversy because what respondents seek is to be
subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by respondents with the CA
should have been dismissed because the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping appended to it were defective, citing specifically the failure of respondent
Gloria Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was authorized to represent her co-respondents in
the petition, and (2) state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by
all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient.[31] Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective.
Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.[32] Under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.[33]
 Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the

certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules.[34] The co-
respondents of respondent Gloria Vargas in this case were her children. In order not to
defeat the ends of justice, the Court deems it sufficient that she signed the petition on
their behalf and as their representative.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, G.R. No. 156021
FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE
P. COLLADO, JUDITH Present:
PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PUNO, J.,
PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA Chairman,
E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO CALLEJO, SR.,
ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH TINGA, and
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO
MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and
MATHILDE MARIN, Promulgated:
Petitioners,
September 23, 2005

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS and

FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Resolutions[1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221,[2] dismissing petitioners petition for
annulment of judgment.

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a

petition, docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament[3] of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent), who died on 26
October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo.[4] Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the
decedent and the executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,[5] allowing
the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary
to respondent.[6]

More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion
for the reopening of the probate proceedings.[7] Likewise, they filed an opposition to the
allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent,[8] claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners
claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment
of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the
signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent
lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by
force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to
make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the
properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer
belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be
withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.[9]

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order[10] denying petitioners motion for being
unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were
deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required
respondent to pay the deficiency.[11] Moreover, the RTCs Decision was already final and
executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen.[12]

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition[13] with an application for preliminary injunction

with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001
and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent,
petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to discuss the matter of
dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6)
portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to
implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent
refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest
in participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his
intention to secure the probate of the will.[14] They claimed that they learnt of the
probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to
reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4
October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on
the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.[15]

In its Resolution[16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It

found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.[17] Moreover, the CA declared as
baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic
fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. [18]Petitioners
sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of
merit.[19]

Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the
alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of
their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the
proceedings before the RTC.[20] In addition, they assert that this Court has yet to decide
a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition should
be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar.[21]

For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the
remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for
new trial.[22] Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment
since they learned of the RTCs judgment only three and a half months after its
promulgation.[23] Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to
warrant the annulment of the RTCs Decision, since there was no showing that they were
denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate proceedings
because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs.[24] Besides,
assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them is
not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.[25] Finally, respondent charges
petitioners of forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same
issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No. 1181[26] filed before Branch 23, RTC of
General Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R.
No.74924.[27]

It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores), who is a
niece of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of
General Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue,
survived by five groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of
Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has
jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is
the place where the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first
court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other
courts, the RTC added.[28] On 9 January 2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal [29] and on
28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA.[30]
 Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondents offer
of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute
extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTCs judgment.[31]

The petition is devoid of merit.

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new
trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same

Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive
award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that
the decision or final order is contrary to law.[32] Both motions should be filed within the
period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order.

Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is

resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same
case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry
thereof.[33]

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed

judgment is rendered.[34] In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to
the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from
judgment.[35]

However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not
become parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or
any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.[36] Notice of the time and
place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province,[37] as well as furnished to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [38] Thus, it has
been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.[39]

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to
bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.[40] Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for
probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of
the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for
new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of
further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time,
long after the Decision became final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they
could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion
to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or
almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed
to avail of the remedy.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies
available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of
judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.[41]

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment
must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court
ruled.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case

where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[42] The purpose of such action
is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner,[43] and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud,
and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.[44] A person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.[45]
 An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character.[46] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which
it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.[47]

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of

respondents deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as
the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not
notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition,
they claim that respondents offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the
petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.

The Court is not convinced.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,

legatees, and devisees of the testator.[48] A perusal of the will shows that respondent was
instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the
decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs[49] who are entitled to be notified of
the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the

purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice
upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite.[50]

The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners
were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the
proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-
shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related
causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs,[51] on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[52] Obviously, the parties in
the instant case, as well as in the appealed case before the CA, are the same. Both cases
deal with the existence and validity of the alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners
anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners
position has always been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not
comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their
present petition. Of course, respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other
hand, in the petition for letters of administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her
appointment as administratrix of the

estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of
review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.

Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their
certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter.
The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners failed
to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the
notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of judgment was
instituted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, G.R. No. 139868

Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J. (Chairperson)

- versus - *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
DALAYGON, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it,
she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. [1] The
will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A,
which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richards renunciation of his
appointment.[2]The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.[3]

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has

two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.[4] As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines, petitioner
filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share
in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro
Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys
name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors,
Inc. worth P64,444.00.[5]

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.[6] The will was also admitted to probate by the
Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise
appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member
of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.

Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.[7] Atty. Quasha
was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.[8]

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.[9] Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987,
a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided
interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48
from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati
property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.[10]

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its
Order dated February 12, 1988.[11] The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988,
directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of
Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (
undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G
Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111
shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the
ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.[12]
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823
in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.[13]

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also

filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richards three
children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State
of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in
the property subject of the legacy.[14] Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then
his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order
dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects
the Makati property.The trial court also adjudicated Richards entire undivided interest
in the Makati property to respondent.[15]

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an
amended complaint for the annulment of the trial courts Orders dated February 12,
1988 andApril 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.[16] Respondent contended
that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the
State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her
will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely thereof, and since
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner contended

that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in
Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on
testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the best
interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive
their just shares. Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are
already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial
courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No.
9625.[17] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April

7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered
ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey

in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
 (b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the
Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the
estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per
Resolution dated August 27, 1999.[19]

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY
GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR,
ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND
HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO
LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD

FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.[20]

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February
12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment,
which is conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment
or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the
proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined, and the same has already
been executed.[21]

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties
as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of
partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the
partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes
knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating
that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how
the estate will be divided.[22]

Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary

administrator of Aubreys estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent,
petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubreys will, and his denial of
knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in
a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project
of partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of
Aubreys will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a
project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richards
estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the
land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely
appeal.Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem.[23] However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be
set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.[24] Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,[25] the Court
ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.[26]

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before
the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law
is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An
annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic
fraud.[27] For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic
or actual,[28] and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.[29]

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment
of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in
respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to follow the terms of Audreys will,
despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled
that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is
applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with
the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute
Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey
and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action had already prescribed

because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audreys
will,[30]and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand,
justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question
petitioners acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was
only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888,
reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another
counsel to protect her interest.[31]

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment
based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or
fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial
in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent
act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and
therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondents
discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards estate,
the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.[32] Respondent cannot
be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through
Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of
petitioners acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances
but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly,
the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,[33] the Court stated that man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will
always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary.

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of

B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from
hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment
itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of
the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former
judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.[34]

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the

fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.[35]

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a

position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable
diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not
a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet
the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average
capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard
by which his conduct is to be judged.[36]

Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate

according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled

in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it
was shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys death, she was residing in the
Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated
August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of
Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by
the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was
authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State
of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect

to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will

Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the

court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the
will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
 shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will
may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them;[37] however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent
law of the State of Maryland.[38]

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law
is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court
peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial
court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good
faith. The Court cannot accept petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly
presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audreys will
before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S.
citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a
senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a big legal staff and a large library.[39] He
had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him
to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to
discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform
his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the
trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs,
and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner.This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her
full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,[40] the Court held that when the rule
that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed
to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes
of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of Audreys estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by
petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should
equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court
adopts, thus:
 In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and
responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which
presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam
vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the
latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his
actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the
defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary
administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the
will of Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established under
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and
the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the
defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on
the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the
national law of Audrey ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the
court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject
estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to
put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct
examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of

Audrey ONeill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo
H. Anchetas concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiffs
adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action

appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty
admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants
position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedents
last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the
national laws of the decedent and to follow the latters last will, in sum,
resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair
submission of the real issues involved in the case.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a
total disregard of the law as a result of petitioners abject failure to discharge his
fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to which law should be
made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus
excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence
of her own, as petitioners omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission and it was belatedly that she
realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of
justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid
to parties who are deprived of their rights.[42]

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-
888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the

Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, all property of a
decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his
death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the
legal title for administration and distribution, while Section 4-408
expressly provides that unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in
the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in
the property which is the subject of the legacy. Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-
Title 1, on the other hand, declares that a personal representative is a
fiduciary and as such he is under the general duty to settle and distribute
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the
estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value
as is reasonable under the circumstances.[43]

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the
following: (1) Audreys conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audreys
death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then
passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the
State of Maryland which allows a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy, was sufficiently proven in
Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in
view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.[44] Therein, the Court took judicial notice of
the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court

below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the
motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share,
the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See
pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted
by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance,
Vol. 1).
 In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada
Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such
law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to
record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately
took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richards
estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter,
does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audreys and Richards estate
should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project
of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs
to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v.

Manarang,[45] wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have

substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the
testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word
of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament.
Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of
that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved
in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably distributing Audreys estate

cannot prevail over Audreys and Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:[46]

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our

system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.[47]

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and
Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines,
although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired
the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to
acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of
the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities
owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,[48] the Court clarified that the
Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business
enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does
not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition
against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution
under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as
provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the
1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to
private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or
if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid.[49] In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent
who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by
the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties

as an official of the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60575 March 16, 1987

FRANCISCO E. POBRE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ARSENIO M. GONONG, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ILOCOS NORTE, BRANCH IV, ILUMINADA P. LLANES AND FELIX G.
LLANES, respondents.
Arturo A. Romero for petitioner.
Wilfred M. Guerrero for private respondents.

ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer
for preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the Orders of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch IV (now Regional Trial Court) through
Respondent Judge, dated February 19, 1982, February 24, 1982, and July 29, 1982,
which ordered, allegedly without trial, (1) the exclusion of certain parcels of land from
the administration of the regular administrator of the estates of Maxima Pobre de
Quianzon and Jovita Pobre, in Special Proceedings No. 754-IV, and likewise (2) ordered
that possession of said properties be maintained in favor of Private Respondent
Iluminada P. Llanes. The petition also assails the order of Respondent Judge, dated
April 15, 1982, enjoining Petitioner to desist from interfering with the possession of the
properties excluded from the Inventory, and ordering the tenants of the estates to
deliver all shares of the harvests from said properties including 3 sheep to respondent
Iluminada P. Llanes, under pain of being declared in contempt of court.
It is indicated that the parties-litigants in this case are related to each other, tracing
their common ancestry from the original owners of the properties involved, who appear
to be Bonifacio Pobre and Irene Blanco, to whom was born an only son, Isidoro Pobre.
Petitioner avers that Irene Blanco predeceased Bonifacio Pobre and later Bonifacio
Pobre married Teresa Blanco, to which marriage Maxima Pobre and Jovita Pobre were
born (Memorandum of Petitioner, Rollo, p. 135). Maxima Pobre later was married to
Basilio Quianzon. Isidoro Pobre married Maria Evangelists and out of this marriage
were born the following: Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre; Respondent Iluminada Pobre
Llanes; Violeta Pobre; Josefina Pobre; and Cresencio Pobre.
After the death of Bonifacio Pobre and later, Teresa Blanco, all properties left by them
intestate, consisting of 35 parcels of untitled agricultural lands, located mostly in the
towns of Paoay and Pinili, Ilocos Norte, were inherited by Maxima Pobre de Quianzon
and Jovita Pobre. Maxima Pobre de Quianzon died on January 19, 1959 without any
issue and without any will. Thus, Jovita Pobre inherited the entire estate of her sister,
Maxima.
Upon the death of Jovita Pobre on August 5, 1976, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre,
Respondent Iluminada Pobre Llanes, Violeta Pobre, Cresencio Pobre, who are all
children of the late Isidoro Pobre, (half-brother of Jovita Pobre and Maxima Pobre de
Quianzon) became the surviving heirs of the intestate estate of Jovita Pobre as they were
the latter's nephews and nieces.
On May 28, 1977, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, praying that after due
hearing and publication, letters of administration be issued to him for the
administration of the intestate estate of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre,
and that the said estates of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre be settled
and distributed among their legal heirs. This Intestate Proceedings was docketed as
Special Proceedings, No. 754-IV.
On October 7, 1977, Respondent Iluminada P. Llanes, assisted by her husband, Felix G.
Llanes, filed her opposition to the Petition. She alleged that Maxima Pobre de Quianzon
was only an illegitimate child of the deceased Bonifacio Pobre; that Jovita Pobre was the
only legitimate child of the spouses Teresa Blanco and Bonifacio Pobre and, therefore, it
should be Jovita Pobre alone who should succeed to the entire estate left by her mother
Teresa Blanco, except for such portion that may be alloted to an illegitimate child as
prescribed by Art. 895 in relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code; that at the time
of the death of Maxima Pobre, her only legal heir was her husband Basilio Quianzon;
that Petitioner Francisco Pobre and the other heirs mentioned in the Petition are
precluded from inheriting the estate of Maxima Pobre who was an illegitimate child;
that furthermore, Jovita Pobre had disposed of all her properties before her death and
Respondent spouses Llanes, acquired by purchase from Jovita Pobre parcels 3, 5, 6, 8,
10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 (to the extent of 1/3 of the whole only) and parcels 25, 26, 27,
and 32, in the Inventory of Properties co-owned by Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and
Jovita B. Pobre; and that Francisco Pobre was disqualified to be appointed as
administrator.
The lower court on February 20, 1978, appointed the Clerk of the lower court, Atty.
Julian Duco as special administrator of the intestate estate in question but on January
13, 1979, said appointment was revoked and petitioner Francisco Pobre was appointed
administrator of the estate. The latter then submitted to the Court an Inventory and
Appraisal of the Real and Personal Estate of the decedents Maxima Pobre and Jovita
Pobre.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of January 13, 1979 appointing Francisco E.
Pobre, as the regular administrator was filed by Respondent Iluminada Llanes who
insisted that they are the legal owners and possessors of the real properties in the
Inventory to the extent of one-third of the whole of the real properties in paragraphs 3,
5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 of said Inventory and the whole of those in paragraphs
25, 26, 27 and 32 of the same.
On November 16, 1979, the lower court issued an order denying said motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
This development led Respondent Iluminada Llanes, along with her husband and her
daughter Evangeline Llanes to file an independent Civil Action to Quiet Title with
damages in Branch IV of the CFI of Ilocos Norte, alleging therein that respondent
spouses purchased most of the lots in question from deceased Jovita B. Pobre; that the
other lots were donated by the late Jovita Pobre to Evangeline P. Llanes, daughter of the
spouses Iluminada Llanes and Felix Llanes. It was, therefore, prayed that the properties
described in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of their complaint be excluded from the
Inventory of the Estate of Jovita B. Pobre and that a judgment be decreed in their favor,
declaring them as the absolute and exclusive owners and legal possessors of the stated
properties. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1128-IV in the lower court.
In his Answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 1128-IV, Francisco Pobre disputed the
claim of Llanes regarding the ownership and possession of the properties in question.
He contended that the instruments of sale and donation in favor of the Llaneses are
fictitious; that the house and lot claimed in the said Civil Case No. 1128-IV by
respondents Llanes is titled under O.C.T. No. 0-44 which is still registered in the name
of Teresa Blanco; and that the properties allegedly sold by the late Jovita Pobre to the
Llaneses were not exclusive properties of Jovita Pobre, as the same were owned by
Teresa Blanco.
Civil Case No. 1128-IV is said to be still pending in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 754-IV, Respondent Iluminada P. Llanes filed on September
10, 1980 a Motion to Exclude from the administration of Petitioner the properties being
claimed by her.
The lower court treated said motion as a Motion-Complaint and thus Petitioner
Francisco Pobre filed his Answer thereto. He once again denied the allegations of
movant Llanes and stressed the fact that the properties covered by O.C.T. No. 044 are
still registered in the name of Teresa Blanco. He insisted that the other properties were
never validly transferred to Oppositors as the referred deeds of conveyances are
fictitious.
On January 22, 1981, Respondent Judge issued an order denying respondent Llanes'
motion to exclude properties. However, under date of August 29, 1981, respondent
Llanes, through counsel, filed a pleading entitled "Rejoinder to: Motion to Exclude
Oppositor's Properties from Administration and Rejoinder to: Opposition for Admission
to Inventory and Appraisal of Real Estate Dated December 12, 1980 and January 15,
1981 (See page 71, Rollo). To this pleading, petitioner filed his Reply.
Respondent Judge, in his order of February 19, 1982, reconsidered his order of January
22, 1981, and his order of November 16, 1979. His finding was that respondents Llanes
have been in actual possession under claim of ownership of the properties in question to
the extent of 1/3 of the whole of Lots 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 and the whole of
Lots Nos. 25, 26, 27, and 32, in the Inventory. He ordered, therefore, that these
properties be excluded from the inventory under administration, and maintained the
possession asserted by Iluminada Llanes.
On February 24, 1982, the lower court issued an order amending its February 19, 1982
order by directing the total exclusion from the inventory of the properties under
administration to the extent of not only 1/3 of each of said lots but the whole of each of
Lots 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, and 35,
and 1/3 of parcels 23, 24, and 27; and ordering also that the possession thereof by
respondent Iluminada Llanes be maintained (Annex N, Rollo, p. 76).
Petitioner herein filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order but the same was
denied by the trial court in its order dated March 19, 1982.
On April 25, 1982, the lower court, acting on the Manifestation filed by counsel for
respondent Llanes, issued an order directing Administrator Francisco E. Pobre to desist
from interfering with the possession of the properties excluded from the Inventory and
ordered the tenants of said properties to deliver the owner's share in the harvests
thereon to Iluminada Llanes and not to Francisco Pobre.
As the motion for reconsideration of Administrator Francisco Pobre was denied, the
present petition for certiorari was, therefore, filed with this Court.
Under the Resolution of April 13, 1983 (Rollo, p. 125) of this Court, the Petition was
given due course.
Petitioner avers in his Petition that the issues are: (1) whether or not the Court orders,
alleged to have been issued without trial, excluding the properties claimed by
respondents Llanes from the Inventory submitted, are null and void; (2) whether or not
the exclusion of the properties in question by virtue of the court orders of February
1982, allegedly to be based mainly on the "Special Administrator's Inventory-Report on
the Status and Possessors of Properties" was arbitrary; (3) whether or not private
respondent's claims of possession and/or ownership based on the alleged documents of
sale, donation and oral contract of sale have any factual or legal basis.
On the first issue regarding denial to petitioner of his right to due process because there
was no actual trial conducted on the Private Respondents' motion-complaint and the
Respondent Court simply disposed of the matter by issuing the orders of exclusion
complained of, Petitioner argues that pursuant to the pronouncements in the case
of Coca vs. Pangilinan, L 29547, January 31, 1978 (81 SCRA 278-286), "it became the
duty of the trial court, after the issues have been joined and no amicable settlement has
been reached, to receive evidence or conduct a full dress hearing and if necessary to pass
upon the validity of the donations of the portions of the estate." Petitioner contends that
if a hearing had been held, due process could have been rightfully accorded him and his
co-heirs.
We find no merit in the above submissions of Petitioner.
Due process was properly observed by the Respondent Judge because Petitioner in fact
made a Reply to private respondents' pleading, entitled "Rejoinder to: Motion to
Exclude Oppositor's Properties from Administration and Rejoinder to: Opposition for
Admission to Inventory and Appraisal of Real Estate dated December 12, 1980 and
January 15, 1981."
Further to this, in the order of February 24, 1982, it appears that the case was called for
hearing on said date, but only Oppositor's counsel, Wilfredo Guerrero, appeared; that
Petitioner-Administrator, through counsel, was notified of the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration, amending the order of February 19, 1982, but neither petitioner nor his
counsel appeared. Thus, Respondent Judge amended his order of February 19, 1982, so
that the whole of parcels 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, and 35; and one-third of parcels 23, 24, and 27 were excluded from the
Inventory and the possession thereof in Oppositor Iluminada Llanes was maintained
(Annex N, Rollo, p. 76). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was
later denied for want of merit. (Annex 0, Rollo, 77).
Another hearing of the case was called on April 15, 1982 but only Atty. Wilfredo
Guerrero for Private Respondents herein appeared. Petitioner and his counsel were both
absent.
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not
lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard (Cornejo vs. Secretary
of Justice, L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663). Respondent Judge afforded
Petitioner and his counsel ample opportunity to be heard at the hearings of February 24,
1982 and April 15, 1982 but Petitioner and his counsel were absent at those hearings.
The fact remains that petitioner was afforded opportunity to be heard and he even later
filed motions for reconsideration of the challenged orders. Even assuming that
petitioner was not given prior notice of the various motions of private respondents or
her rejoinders, it has been held that there is no denial of due process where the adverse
parties were given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of an order which
was issued pursuant to a petition filed without prior notice to them (Dormitorio vs.
Fernandez, L-25897, August 21, 1976,72 SCRA 388).
As the assailed orders of February 19, 1982, February 24, 1982 and April 15, 1982, do
not appear to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion, said orders cannot be set
aside. In said orders, Respondent Judge provisionally passed upon the question of
exclusion of property from the Inventory. His conclusions regarding the ownership of
said properties are not final but provisional. In Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 606, this Court stated:
... even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still acted
within its jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the
jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may"
provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should." The
obvious reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle
that questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or
exclusion from the inventory of property, can only be settled in a separate
action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed all the way that the
properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that
would not prevent nor defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit. (Pio
 Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-62431-33,
August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 606, 608).
The final determination of the ownership of the properties in question in the case at bar,
is not to be made in the Intestate Proceedings, Sp. Proc. 754-IV, but in Civil Case No.
1128-IV which is the separate Civil Action to Quiet Title, filed by respondent Iluminada
Llanes in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The assailed orders of exclusion in
the intestate proceedings are merely interlocutory orders, because the question of title of
the properties excluded from the Inventory of the Administrator cannot be determined
by the intestate court. In an earlier case, this Court held:
We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final
order. It was interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all
the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots. The probate court in the inclusion
incident could not determine the question of title. (Valero Vda. de
Rodriquez vs. Court of Appeals, L-39532, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 540).
Reliance of Petitioners on the pronouncements made in the case of Coca vs. Pangilinan,
L-29547, January 31, 1978 (81 SCRA 278-285) that after the issues have been joined and
in case no amicable settlement had been reached, the probate court should receive
evidence or conduct a full dress hearing on the motion in the form of complaint, is not
applicable to the case at bar. In Coca vs. Pangilinan, the appellees therein did not
institute a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve (12) hectares or
portion of the estate involved. Because of this circumstance, it was ruled that it would be
just, expeditious and inexpensive solution to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to
file in the intestate proceedings, a motion in the form of complaint setting forth therein
their claim for the twelve (12) hectares portion which the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan, should then file their Answer thereto. After the issues have been joined and
no amicable settlement reached, the probate court should receive evidence.
However, in the case at bar, there was already a separate action that had been filed by
respondents Llanes in Civil Case No. 1128-IV, of the CFI of Ilocos Norte for the quieting
of title over the properties excluded from the Inventory before the assailed orders in this
case were issued. Respondent Llanes opted to file a separate civil action and this was a
right she could exercise.
The general rule is that question of title t• property cannot be passed
upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are all
heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate
court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate
court may definitely pass judgment thereon. (Sebial vs. Sebial, L-23419,
June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385).
The second issue raised by Petitioner Administrator as to whether or not the exclusion
of the properties in question by the lower court was arbitrary for being based mainly on
the Special Administrator's Inventory-Report on the Status and Possession of
Properties, which report has no valid basis. Petitioner is raising a factual issue which is
not a proper subject of certiorari proceedings. (Ygay vs. Escareal, L-44189, February 28,
1985, 135 SCRA 78,82).
As to whether or not private respondents' claim of possession and/or ownership based
on the alleged documents of sale, donation and oral contract of sale has any factual or
legal basis, again the same should not be resolved at this time and by means of a special
civil action for certiorari. The resolution of the conflicting ownership claims should be
threshed out in the separate civil action (Civil Case No. 1128-IV), already filed by Private
Respondent Iluminada Pobre. On a similar question, We ruled:
Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the
sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances
and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister
and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may only be
threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent
administrator against the petitioner and not in the intestate proceedings.
(Quizon vs. Ramolete, L-51291, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 495; 501).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-56504 May 7, 1987
POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and MANUEL R.
FABIANA, respondents.
Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987
EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON. MIDPANTAO L.
ADIL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth
Division), respondents-appellants.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Avelino T Javellana for petitioners.
Dominador G. Garin for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of
deceased spouses, on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and
their lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings now docketed in this Court
as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R. Nos. 59867-68.
Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses,
Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro
Valera had been appointed administrators 2 — the heirs of a deceased daughter of the
spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be
declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her
administration. 3 Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose
Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an
18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in
turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, 4 so that it might be partitioned among
the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate,
asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never
been included in any inventory of the estate.
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs'
motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate,
as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the
purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 5 It accordingly set said incidents for
hearing during which the parties presentee evidence in substantiation of their
positions. 6 Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980
commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in
question * * to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. 7
The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the
testimony of the two administrators that:
1. the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to
Rafael Valera in his lifetime;
2. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter,
Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she
might use the property to provide for her children's support and education, and was
subject to the resolutory term that the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon
completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's Children; and
3. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased
from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the
Original Certificate of Title issued in their favor.
Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating
Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance
with Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his
declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor,
there is an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is
contemplated.
Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a
fiduciary relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and
causes a conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is
established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the fund
belongs.
The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not
yet prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having been
filed well within ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa Garin's
heirs allegedly acquired title over it. 8
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the
estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to
determine whether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventory of estate
assets. So it was evidently understood by the administrators who have more than once
asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the
fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties. 9 So it was made
clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the
matter 10 was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be
included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be made
to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate. 11 And so it was emphasized in another
Order, denying reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980, which states that:
**(i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finish to the issue of
ownership of the fishpond in dispute. The movants may pursue their claim
 of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile,
however, it is the finding of this probate court that the fishpond must be
delivered to the estate.
Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of
this probate court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87,
and the contention of the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue
of ownership should be in a court of general jurisdiction. 12
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order
pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to
reconvey the fishpond to the estate. 13 The corresponding writ was served on Manuel
Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and
declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, 14 Fabiana voluntarily relinquished
possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the
administrators. 15
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking
vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease
between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil dismissed his
complaint on the following grounds, to wit:
(1) it was filed out of time because not only had judgment been rendered, but execution
as regards transfer of possession had already taken place; and
(2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as against the
estate. 17
G.R. No. 56504
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with
application for a preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and
assigned to Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding. 18 Judge
Inserto issued a temporary restraining order enjoining estate administrators from
disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond, as lessee. 19
The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the
temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court's
prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the
act sought to be restrained had already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily
surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. 20 When Judge Inserto failed to
act on their motion within what the administrators believed to be a reasonable time,
considering the circumstances of the Case, the administrators filed with the Supreme
Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for Preliminary
mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order, which was docketed as G.R. No.
56504. 21 In their petition, the administrators contended that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI
(Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the Probate Court
(Branch I I, Judge Adil, presiding) in the legitimate exercise of its j jurisdiction over the
proceedings for the Settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.
G.R. Nos. 59867-68
In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in
which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no
competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond, 22 which motion had been
denied 23-filed a notice of appeal from said Order. 24 But he quickly abandoned the
appeal when, as aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending
appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus
)with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as
CA-G. R. No. SP-1154-R.
Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action for
certiorari and injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-11577-R; this, notwithstanding
the pendency in judge Inserto's sala of the case he had earlier filed. 26
These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court
granted the petitions and ruled in substance that:
1. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership
based merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted
under Section 6, Rule 87;
2. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in the names
of the Heirs of Teresa Garin as registered owners, and therefore no presumption that the
estate owns the fishpond is warranted to justify return of the property on the theory that
it had merely been borrowed; and
3. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership question,
the estate administrators would have to recover possession of the fishpond by separate
action, in view of the lessee's claim of right to superior possession, as lessee thereof.
From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court
by certiorari, 27 docketed as G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the Appellate
Court the following errors, viz: Page 542
1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, Presiding) had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir
adversely to the decedent spouses;
2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the
recovery of the possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and
3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling the final
judgment of another branch, acting as probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and
inhibiting the enforcement and implementation of said judgment.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, 28 and thus has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a
third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission
of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are
not thereby prejudiced, 29 the reason for the exception being that the question of
whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land
registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
involving a mode of practice which may be waived. 30
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception
to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to
the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it
was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing
"finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil
action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the
inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in
the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the
parties. 32
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on
the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. 33 The
examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant
to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge
thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the
latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the estate,
no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the
delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a
right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no
authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator
to recover the property. 34
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have
admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining
the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of
title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It
dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the
bridge.
Possession of Fishpond Pending
Determination of Title Thereto
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was
merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority,
definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the
inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should
not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in
another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated
and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency
where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in
others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
consider as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when
as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title. 35
Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in
Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action
Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the
recognition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be
appropriately determined in a separate action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate
action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise,
to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledge
judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is
filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain
that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved
in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense
be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership
involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed superior to
otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the exercise of what may be,
regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The
petitions in G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the
Appellate Court, subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining order
dated April 1, 1981 is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. L-6829 December 29, 1954
Intestate Estate of RUFINA MERCADO, deceased. CATALINA
JAVIER, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EULOGIO MAGTIBAY and SOLEDAD MAGTIBAY DE
HERNANDEZ, respondents-appellants.
Javier and Javier for appellee.
Ozaeta, Roxas, Lichauco and Picazo for appellants.

REYES, A., J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, granting
letters of administration and appointing a judicial administratrix for the estate of the
deceased Rufina Mercado.
It appears that Rufina Mercado died intestate on September 20, 1949, survived by her
second husband Eulogio Magtibay, her only living daughter Catalina Javier and the
descendants of her two deceased daughters — all three daughters being of the first
marriage. Shortly after Rufinas' death, these heirs made an extrajudicial partition of her
properties. But alleging that there were some properties not included in the partition,
one of the heirs, the said Catalina Javier, on August 15, 1952, petitioned the said
Catalina Javier, on August 15, 1952, petitioned the court for letters of administration
and the appointment of herself as administratrix. The other heirs opposed the petition
on the ground that there was not necessity for subjecting the estate to judicial
administration since, according to them, the decedent left no debts, all her properties
had already been partitioned and the heirs were all of age or represented by guardian.
But the Court overruled opposition and granted the petition. Hence this appeal.
For the purpose of the appeal, it may be assumed that, as alleged by the appellees, not
all the properties of the deceased have been divided among the heirs. But there being no
question that the deceased left no debts and the heirs are all of age with the exception of
one who, however, is represented by a guardian, the case comes squarely under section 1
of Rule 74, which reads:
 SEC. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent
left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are presented
by their judicial guardians, the parties any, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of as amended by
Act administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
This rule provides for the partition of the estate of the deceased where no debts are due
from it and the heirs are all of age or properly represented. But on the theory that the
provision is not mandatory and does not prohibit recourse to an administration
proceeding, one of the heirs in the present case insists on the issuance of letters of
administration notwithstanding the opposition of the other heirs. The question,
therefore, for determination is whether in a case like the present where recourse to
partition without letters of administration is authorized, the estate — or what remain of
it after the part already partitioned has been segregated — and nevertheless be subjected
to an administration preceeding despite the opposition of the majority of the heirs.
The question is not new. Time and again this Court has had to pass upon it in cases
arising under section 596 (as amended by Act 2331) of the old Code of Civil Procedure,
from which the precept embodied in the above copied provision of the present Rules of
Court was taken Resolving that question in those cases, this Court has repeatedly held
that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are bound to submit the property to judicial administration,
which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by
the court, "for in such the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superflous and unnecessary proceedings." (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil.,
302 citing Ilustre Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; and Fule vs.
Fule, 46 Phil., Phil., 317.)
The words in quotation sum up the doctrine of the cases cited, which, though rendered
under section 596 of the former code of civil procedure, has equal validity under section
1 of the Rule 74, because the two sections are fundamentally the same. It is, therefore,
our view that, now as before, the rule is that where administration proceeding is
unnecessary because the estate has no debts and the more expeditious remedy by
partition is available the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit
the estate to such proceeding.
The rule harmonizes with the law of succession contained in the Civil Code under whose
provisions "the right to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death," the heirs succeeding "immediately to all the property of the deceased
ancestor . . . as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death," so that as co-owners they may immediately, if the
property is not burdened with debts, administer it joint or divide it among themselves.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321.) For, as was said in a case, since the property
of the deceased belongs, from the moment of his death, to the heirs, "what reason can
there be, " if there are no debts, "for the appointment of a judicial administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled" (Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) Withholding the
inheritance from the heirs by subjecting it to an administration proceeding for no useful
purpose, would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered as
not infrequently happens.lawphil.net
The rule , in our opinion, is fundamentally sound and should be adhered to rather than
departed from. We cannot allow it to be overridden by the adverse ruling in Orozco vs.
Garcia, 50 Phil., 149, which, as pointed out by counsel for the appellants, would appear
to be the result of a misinterpretation of the following quotation from the decision in
Castillo vs. Castillo and Quizon, 23 Phil., 364:
. . . it is not a principle authorized by law that heirs of legal age may not demand
by division of a real property, left them by their predecessor-in-interest and held
by a co-heir, without first initiating special interstate proceedings during which a
judicial administrator is to be appointed, who alone is vested with the personality
to claim the property that belongs to the succession. On the contrary, such heirs
are expressly authorized to do so, unless, for the reason of there being unpaid
debts, judicial intervention becomes necessary, which was not alleged as a special
defense in this suit.
The court was in the Orozco case apparently led stray by the use of a double negative in
the quotation and without good reason made to deviate from the doctrine repeatedly
followed in its previous decisions. In any event, the doctrine was reaffirmed in the
subsequent case of Utulo vs. Pasion, supra, and with this admonition: "We conceive of
the powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly
applied. We are convinced that if the court had followed it in all cases to which it has
application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration
proceedings as they are now."
The trial court, however, chose to depart from the accepted doctrine in the mistaken
belief that it had already been overruled by our decision in the case of
Rodriguez vs. Tan, 92 Phil., 273, where the statement was made that section 1 of Rule 74
"does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons an
ordinary action of partition." That statement, it should be noted, sanctions recourse to
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts only if, as heren expressly
stated, the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition, and is
thus a reaffirmance rather than a repudiation of the doctrine being in line with its policy
that where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. This
adequacy of the reasons given for the issuance of letter of administration in the
Rodriguez case because it there found "that the core of petitioner's objection is that the
heirs have erroneously instituted his administration proceeding but that the (lower)
court erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate "instead of the
persons proposed by them.
Proof that the doctrine has not been abandoned is its recent application in the case of
Macalinao et al., vs. Valdez et al., * 50 Off Gaz., 3041, which is subsequently to the
Rodriguez case. It appears that in that case of Macalinao the hearing of a land
registration case had been ordered suspended until ownership of the property involved
therein could be decided in the interstate proceedings which one of the heirs to the
property (which was conjugal) agreed or was directed to institute, but that his heirs, in
conjunction with her husband, instead of instituting such proceedings, filed an action
for accounting, liquidation and partition. Objected to the defendants on their ground
that the directive of the trial court was for the plaintiff to file an intestate proceeding, the
action was ordered dismissed, but upon appeal this Court set aside the order of
dismissal, saying:
Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 3167, provides
that: 'When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered and liquidated, and the
debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the
administration and liquidation of the estates of the deceased persons, or in an
ordinary liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of
age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this
Code of proceeding to an extra judicial partition to them by this Code of
proceeding to an extra judicial partition and liquidation of said property.'
(emphasis supplied.) Expressly recognized by this legal provision, the ordinary
action instituted herein by the appellants is even preferred to an intestate
proceeding where the heirs are of age or duly represented, and the estate has no
debts. 'When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an
administration.' (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Bondad vs. Bondad,
34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.) As repeatedly held, 'when
a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
court . . . . It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superflous and unnecessary
proceedings' (Utulo vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302, 306, citing other cases).
The fact that the lower court suspended the land registration case upon appellant'
manifestation that an interstate proceeding would be filed, did not legally deprive
them of availing themselves of the proper judicial (and for that matter less
burdensome) remedy, especially in the absence of any law requiring that the
estates of deceased persons must always be brought to the courts for
administration and liquidation. At any rate, the essential basis of the order
suspending the registration case was the necessity for determining the ownership
of controverted land. The theory of the lower court in dismissing the present case,
would prefer form to substance.
In an attempt to justify these administration proceedings the appellee confesses in her
brief that she has been obliged to institute the same in order to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, because she proposes to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of conjugal
property made by they surviving husband of the deceased in favor of one of the heirs
Soledad Sales Magtibay de Hernandez, and the validity of those transfers could be
ventilated in these proceedings without need of bringing a separate action before the
purpose. But if the aims is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits, that same objective
could be achieved in an action for partition, where the validity of those transfers could
also be required into in line with our decision in Monserrat vs. Ibañez et al., G.R. No. L-
3367, promulgated May 24, 1950 where we said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to
the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section
1, Rule 74 of the Rukles of Court apply', and that in this case 'the parties are at
loggerheads as to the Corpuz of the hereditary estate because' respondents'
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate'. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to
what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly
be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in
the hands of one heir.
Moreover, if appellee's purpose is really to avoid a multiplicity of suits, she has herself
nullified that objective by actually filing, as reported by the appellants and admitted by
her, a separate action for the annulment of the property transfers already referred to.
There appearing to be no good reason fore burdening of the estate of the deceased
Rufina Mercado with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding, the trial
court was not justified in issuing letters of administration. With this ruling, it is no
longer necessary to decide which, as between the appellee Catalina Javier and the
widower Eulogio Magtibay, should be preferred in the appointment of an administrator.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the appointment of the appellee
Catalina Javier as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado revoked.
With costs against the appellee.
G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL,
ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX,
RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by
their mother, MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and
ROSARIO MARTILLANO respondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on
20 October 1989, 1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite)
of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-
17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario
Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola, 2 and the
resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have
been preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70
hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to
bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property.
Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The
application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his
property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In
the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a
specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"),
were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan
Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of
title for the whole property — OCT No. 255 — was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan
Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of
Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431
square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5").
According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision
plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14.
The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land
taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As
reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the
lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead
adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in
representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in
the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were,
however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino
Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the
Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267.
One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The
case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial
court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his
possession. 3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron,
pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-
in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the
above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents
(defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for
indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having
definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14),
they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic)
defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the
former, but defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land
to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982.
They further allege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful
possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 — which coincides with
the date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and
assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from
Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was
known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have
been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription
and/or laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional
defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the
following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio
Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they
mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their
failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the
questioned land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the
person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the
pendency of the above captioned case. The corresponding redemption was
effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . . 6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for
indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of the
property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over
the subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and
enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are
hereby ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the
plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case
are dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that
the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based
on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land
sold to private respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of
the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of
the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the
defendants covered the land in question — Lot No. 1-A-14 — and that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud,
the claim of the defendants over the said property is already barred. Action
for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If
there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered the same
in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario
 Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr.
created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again,
the claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their
answer (let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case
sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had already
elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is ten (10) years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which
it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the
property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed
the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent
Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the
late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by
his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that
no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land
sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under
litigation. 10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible
error when it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was
partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual
partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence
on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was
not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower
court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes
consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as
evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a
subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants'
witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the
law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes
regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions,
extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if
freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason
for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason
that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but
rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. It must
also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his
property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in
1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the torrens
system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs
have indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed
estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when
a parcel of land is covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision
Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land
belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his
children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said property even
without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case
of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed
by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold
therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone
would confirm the contention of the appellants that there was already an
actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes
in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an
(sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to controvert not to
mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said
plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was already
surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren
of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the
property subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned in
1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots
supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were
the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in
1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in
the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels
of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision
plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land allegedly
inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his
father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for
which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it
concluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest
to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under
litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land
which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never an
issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already conceded that
the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same
parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in
Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower
court declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's
description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land
in litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the
discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that the description of
 the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language
whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in
technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the
property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943,
the only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that
time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the
existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in 1967.
Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by the
vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. However,
the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was
exactly the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan
(Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if
the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could
have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing
circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied the
identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What they
were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the document
denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5). 11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone
acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It
thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful
owners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs. 12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990, 13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6
April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita
Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in
accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in
1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition was already
partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof, they claim that
(a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is
owned by petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court;
(b) private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of
estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also
constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard the
binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private
respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against the
indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14 and allows
reconveyance which is not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as
stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition.
But even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court,
filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition
For Review On certiorari 15 wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of
facts of respondent Court are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be
contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by this Court; 16 (b) it
also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings are based on
speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on petitioners' title
is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already
prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment. 17 We
required petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990. 18 A
rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10
December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in
G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court
of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also
involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in 1936,
and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement
in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for
convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties
themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The
subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did
not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes
corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that
Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the
same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter
lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and
possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite
this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed
three days thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this
Honorable Court is not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The
reason is that to date, we have not yet received any resolution to our
Motion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution that will be
issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this Honorable
 Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili
case before the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged
confirmation of the sale executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes
case before this Second Division, there was no sale that was executed by
the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the
following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De
Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b) This motion was
denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners
therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer Case To
The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For Reconsideration 21 wherein
they specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have "identity and/or
similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of
"graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie. 22d) This motion was denied in the
resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for
petitioners. 23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a copy thereof
was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief
of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue:
whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting
aside the decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable
because the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and
clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The
trial court erred in holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino
Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that
there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific
subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr.
to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and
adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and
that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was
an action for reconveyance, which should have been brought within four (4) years from
the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since
private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino
Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires
partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. 24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this
Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement
that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights
of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of
the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is
valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real
property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the
other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by
this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not
valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon
the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-
hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent. 26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership
by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the
property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to
him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership
of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same,
except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the
portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same
property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr.,
represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of
1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to
Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that
the description of the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael
did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at
that time, the property had already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to
him. In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court on this
issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had this property declared
for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the
description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale,
vendee — herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola — immediately took possession
of the property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this case
and which petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents. The main evidence
adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that the
property claimed by private respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes,
Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement
did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-
27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of
her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not
sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael
Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the
estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of
Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon
his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his
father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so
far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its
owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this
Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or
right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere
execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent
registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in
favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he
never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate
predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private
respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners
bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership and possession of
the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in
their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely
discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full
knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it
was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an
action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in
the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to
place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four
(4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the
name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The instant petition then is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100993 March 30, 1993
CONCEPCION MUÑOZ DIVINA as represented by her daughter Amelia
Tinoco, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITA N. MUÑOZ. respondents.
Bermudez, Bermudez-De Jesus Law Office for petitioner.
Milagros Abrogar for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
The petition before us is an action for recovery of sum of money based on an extra-
judicial agreement. The counsel for the private respondent informed this court that
respondent, Juanita Muñoz has succumbed to old age during the pendency of this
appeal, and that despite efforts exerted, none of her relatives has come forward to
substitute the deceased in this proceeding.
The contending parties are in-laws, who are contesting the inheritance of the deceased
spouse of the now deceased respondent. Eleuterio M. Muñoz was the brother of
Trinidad Muñoz-Marticio, Maximo M. Muñoz and Concepcion Muñoz-Divina (herein
petitioner, represented by her daughter Amelia Tinoco). Eleuterio was married to
Juanita, although their union was not blessed with a child. Upon Eleuterio's demise,
Juanita invited her three in-laws to participate in the extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of her husband, they being the only heirs.
Eleuterio's properties, both personal and real, were assessed in the amount of
P709,403.00, less the expenses for the burial, wake and other incidental costs, the
remaining balance left for partition amounted to P669,458.50. Based on the "Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of Eleuterio M. Muñoz, with Deed of Sale" 1 the heirs
agreed that three-fourths (3/4) of the total net value of the property or P502,093.87
shall be adjudicated to respondent, Juanita, while the remaining one-fourth (1/4) or the
amount of P167,364.00 shall be divided equally among Eleuterio's brother and sisters,
each to receive more or less P55,788.00.
In the same instrument, the heirs agreed that Maximo, Trinidad and Concepcion were to
sell to Juanita all their rights and participation to the estate and in consideration
thereof, Juanita is to pay each of the heirs P55,788.00 or a total of P167,364.00 to
expedite the settlement of the estate. The document was prepared and notarized by Atty.
Teodulo C. Gabor, and signed by all the parties on December 18, 1980. On the same day,
Juanita executed an affidavit promising to pay the other heirs their share in Eleuterio's
inheritance within six (6) months from January 18, 1980. 2
On January 24, 1984, Concepcion signed a "Statement of Partition, Assets of the Late
Eleuterio M. Muñoz". 3 This document itemized the amount due to Concepcion, the
agreed deductions and advances made by her and her daughter, Amelia, from Juanita.
Two days thereafter, Concepcion caused Juanita to sign a certification which states that
the residential house located at 4548 Quintos Street, Makati, (where Amelia with her
family used to reside) was part of the inheritance received by Concepcion from the
estate of Eleuterio. 4
Sometime on September 1986, Juanita filed an accion publiciana against Ernesto
Tinoco, husband of Amelia and two other tenants occupying the apartments on Quintos
Street. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 15030, 5was decided in favor of Juanita and
became final on March 1988, there being no appeal instituted by the defendants.
Defendant, Ernesto, was ordered to immediately vacate the property and allow plaintiff,
Juanita to recover possession thereof.
On February 1988, or almost eight years after the signing of the extra-judicial
settlement, Juanita's in-laws filed a complaint for revocation and annulment of the
extra-judicial settlement of estate of Eleuterio, naming Juanita as defendant. In due
time, however, Maximo and Trinidad withdrew as plaintiffs, leaving Concepcion,
represented by her daughter, Amelia Tinoco, to pursue the case.
The complaint alleges that Juanita, by means of strategy and stealth and through fraud
and illegal means, convinced and lured the plaintiffs therein in executing the Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Eleuterio M. Muñoz; that defendant Juanita has not
paid each of the plaintiffs the amount of P55,788.00 or a total of P167,364.00 contrary
to the stipulation in the said document; and that a certain property (apartment units)
designated as 4544, 4546 and 4548 located at Quintos St., Makati together with the
parcel of land on which the units were constructed were not turned over by defendant to
Concepcion as promised by her in the certification 6she signed on January 26, 1984.
The trial court, while upholding the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement, is of the
belief that petitioner Concepcion was not paid the balance of her share giving credence
to the affidavit of respondent Juanita signed in 1980 acknowledging such fact.
The affidavit, however, was executed on the same day that the extra-judicial partition
was signed. On that very day, it is understandable that respondent did not have the cash
to pay her co-heirs and as she testified, she had to sell some properties in order to give
her in-laws their agreed share. 7
On the other hand, the appellate court, while also finding the Extra-Judicial Settlement
valid, found that all the heirs, namely Concepcion, Trinidad and Maximo were indeed
paid their share.
Moreover, defendant-appellant's evidence reveal that the three (Maximo
Muñoz, Trinidad Marticio and Concepcion Divina) were paid their
respective shares on different dates. On December 1, 1981, Maximo Muñoz
executed a sworn statement wherein he acknowledged receipt of
P30.000.00 "as evidence and partial payment of my share to the estate
(Exh. 13, p. 136, Rec.) Subsequently, on August 11, 1984, he acknowledged
receipt of the amount of P9,762.00 in full payment of (his) share in the
estate (p. 131, Rec.). Likewise, Trinidad Marticio signed a list which
showed cash advances in the amount of P23,200.00 taken from
defendant-appellant Juanita Muñoz and her share of the estate tax in the
amount of P16,056.00 or a total of P39,256.00. Thus, the total amount
due her was only P16,532.00 of her share of P55,788.00 in the estate of
Eleuterio Muñoz. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the statement
of partition on January 23, 1984. On January 24, 1984, plaintiff-appellee
Concepcion Divina likewise acknowledge receipt of a statement of
partition (Exh. 2) similar to those given to Maximo Muñoz and Trinidad
Marticio. It itemizes the cash advances taken either by appellee
Concepcion Divina or her daughter Amelia Tinoco which totaled
P15,415.00. Her share in the estate tax amounted to P16,056.00. Thus, the
total amount due her was P24,317.00. While appellee's signature appears
at the bottom of the statement of partition (Exh. 2), she, however, denies
having signed it. To affirm the fact that the signature appearing on the
statement of partition (Exh. 2 and Exh. E) is not hers, appellee wrote her
name on a piece of paper in open court (Exh. F). The trial court, however,
did not find any need to make a comparison . . . 8
The appellate court, however, found the signature of Concepcion in the statement of
partition (Exhibit "2") evidencing proof of payment of her share by respondent, genuine.
Said the court:
We, however, must disagree with the opinion of the trial court that "it
cannot lend credence to the statement of partition (Exh. 2) as proof of
payment of Concepcion's share by defendant." First of all, We are of the
view that the signature of appellee Concepcion Divina on the statement of
partition (Exh. 2) is in her genuine signature. We have compared it with
her signatures on the Special Power of Attorney (p. 6, Rec.) and the extra-
judicial settlement agreement (Exh. 8) and We find that it is strikingly
similar to the questioned signature. By the naked eye, and by cursory
examination of the three signatures, We are convinced that they were
written by the same person, i.e., appellee Concepcion Divina. Additionally,
since appellee disclaims her signature in Exhibit 2, she should have
utilized a handwriting expert to prove it is a forgery.
Moreover, if it is true that she was not paid her share, Concepcion Divina
should have brought this to the attention of appellant Juanita Muñoz
within two (2) years from the time she signed the extra-judicial settlement
agreement. There is nothing in the record that she ever made any written
demand for payment of her share. On the contrary, the statement of
partition (Exh. 2) indicates that she was fully paid her share in the estate
of her brother. Surely, when she acknowledged receipt of the statement of
partition (Exh. 2), she should have questioned the amount which reflected
the cash advances taken by her or daughter Amelia. She did not do so at
the time of receipt or immediately thereafter. In effect, she confirmed the
contents of the partition settlement. 9
The extra-judicial settlement agreement is a contract, wherein the parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that
the legitime of the compulsory heirs are preserved. In the absence of fraud and provided
all requisites are met, the same should be upheld as valid and binding between parties.
Extra-judicial partition, being a speedy and less expensive method of distribution of the
estate, is specifically provided for in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, that in the
absence of a will and where the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, the
heirs may divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed, the
parties, of course, are duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights agreed upon in
the document. 10 A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the
fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. 11
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED. The ruling of the appellate court is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R.
INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE,
TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE
DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-
INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166,
PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.
Belo, Abiera and Associates for petitioners.
Miguel J. Lagman for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de Aranz, et
al., petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al., respondents," dismissing petitioners'
petition for certiorari and prohibition as-, sailing the orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively, in Sp. Proc. No.
9995, entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and Testament of
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner."
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the
late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of
herein petitioners as legatees and devisees, as follows:
Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86 10th St., New
Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes,
Makati, Metro Manila;
Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila;
Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386 P. Guevarra St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila;
Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A Scout Tobias St., Quezon City,
Metro Manila;
Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, Metro Manila;
Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B Scout Tobias St., Quezon City,
Metro Manila;
Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle Sancho Davila, 13-19-
D, Madrid, 28028 Spain;
Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St., Cubao, Quezon City,
Metro Manila;
Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San Juan, Metro Manila;
Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15 Briones, Makati,
Metro Marta. 3
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5
May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to
12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued the following order:
 There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the oner to-
receive Branch Clerk of Court is hereby designated Co evidence ex-parte of
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 4
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and
placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the
proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May
1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec.
4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and
the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. 5Hence, the instant petition.
It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal
notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional
requirement in the probate of a will. Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals that
the requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of
procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due
process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said
requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error for
being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion. 6
We grant the petition:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time
and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the
Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office
with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the
hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in
like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if
their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice
at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to
mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of
residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners
legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of
the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the
testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the
notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will
was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The case of Joson vs. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to
support its theory is not applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners
Purificacion Joson and Erotica Joson failed to contest the will of Tomas Joson because
they had not been notified of the hearing of the petition for probate. he the petition
included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila, petitioners
claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila. There the Court
said:
Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly because
their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83 as alleged in the petition
for probate. If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true
residence of petitioners was not known, then notice upon them
individually was not necessary. Under the provision abovequoted,
individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only when
they are known or when their places of residence are known. In other
instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and
exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a
newspaper of general circulation. ... 9
In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 10 the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla,
said:
... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be
made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4,
t.s.n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or
come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of
notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of
such interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said
to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental
concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted
as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore,
the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of court. 11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 48840. December 29, 1943.]
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ROSARIO GUEVARA and
her husband PEDRO BUISON, Respondents-Appellees.

Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for Appellant.

Pedro C. Quinto for Appellees.

SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; PRESENTATION OF WILL FOR PROBATE IS MANDATORY;
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE ON BASIS OF INTESTACY WHEN DECEDENT LEFT A
WILL, AGAINST THE LAW. — We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to
Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make
an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do
away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression
of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given
to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and
devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of
the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to
the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition
of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate
of the court: first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real
or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court" ; and, second,
because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with
and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending
against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property
by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under
the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the
personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve
and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in
personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of
the land involved in an ordinary action for reivindicacion or partition.

3. TORRENS REGISTRATION; REGISTRATION DOES NOT AFFECT RIGHTS OF

PARTITION BETWEEN LEGATEES. — It results that the interested parties consented
to the registration of the land in question in the name of E. M. G. alone subject to the
implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them
their corresponding shares after all the debts of the original owner of said land had been
paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of
registration, which merely confirmed the petitioner’s title; and in the absence of any
intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfill the promise
 by virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land
Registration Act, cited by the Court of Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in
Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited.

DECISION

OZAETA, J.:

Ernesto M. Guevara and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their
inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by
Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict
ligitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased — to wit, a portion of
423,492 square meters of a large parcel of land described in original certificate of title
No. 51691 of the province of Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara —
and to order the latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages for withholding
such legitime from her. The defendant answered the complaint contending that
whatever right or rights the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation
of law.

It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A),
apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following bequests:
To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain
worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture,
pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of the testator in
Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings
worth P120; to his stepson Pio Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second
marriage, Angustia Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth P1,020.

He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M. Guevara
y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara," a
residential lot with its improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan,
having an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas
he confirmed the donation propter nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion
of 25 hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-
66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of
complete settlement of her usufructuary right.

He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him
during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his
pending debts and to defray his expenses and those of his family up to the time of his
death.

The remander of said parcel of land he disposed of in the following

manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(d). — Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la extension superficial

aproximada de ciento veintinueve (129) hectareas setenta (70) areas, y veinticinco (25)
centiareas, con todas sus mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y distribuyo, pro-indiviso,
a mis siguientes herederos como sigue:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas, ocho (8) areas y
cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas, hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de las cien (100)
hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento, como su propiedad
absoluta y exclusiva, en la cual extension superficial estan incluidas cuarenta y tres (43)
hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos (42) centiareas que le doy en concepto
de mejora.

"A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectareas, sesenta y un
(61) areas y setenta y un (71) centiareas, que es la parte restante.

"Duodecimo. — Nombro por la presente como Albacea Testamentario a mi hijo Ernesto

M. Guevara, con relevacion de fianza. Y una vez legalizado este testamento, y en cuanto
sea posible, es mi deseo, que los herederos y legatarios aqui nombrados se repartan
extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con mis disposiciones arriba
consignadas."cralaw virtua1aw library

Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale
(exhibit 2) in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara whereby he conveyed to him the southern half
of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above
mentioned, in consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable considerations, among
which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not less than
P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and
funeral expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he declared: "Hago
constar tambien que reconozco a mi referido hijo Ernesto M. Guevara como dueño de la
mitad norte de la totalidad y conjunto de los referidos terrenos por haberlos comprado
de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia vendido con
anterioridad."cralaw virtua1aw library

On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case
No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original
certificate of title No. 51691 of the same province was issued on October 12 of the same
year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land described in the deed
of sale above referred to. The registration proceeding had been commenced on
November 1, 1932, by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with
Rosario, among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L.
Guevara withdrew as applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-oppositors also
withdrew their opposition, thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of
Ernesto M. Guevara alone.

On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara died. His last will and testament, however,
was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding
ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees
mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given
due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their
favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of
Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have
possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have
disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his
father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father’s last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions
made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural
daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of
21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four
years after the testator’s demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present
action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it
was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the
purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara
had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she
claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he
died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted,
the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals sustained
that theory.

Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure
adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant
(petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
I

We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being
in our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and
disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure,
which was in force up to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the
following pertinent provisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass
either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First
Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

"Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will shall,
within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the
court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
"Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A person named as
executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, or
within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such
knowledge after knowing of the death of the testator, present such will to the court
which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and
shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known
in writing his refusal to accept it.

"Sec. 628. Penalty. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two
preceding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be subject to a
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.

"Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. — If a person having custody of a
will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same
to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed
to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close
confinement until he delivers the will."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which
took effect on July 1, 1940.

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the
whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator (section 630, C. C. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not contested
(section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the
time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress,
menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court,
and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will
devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be
recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule
77, and section 624, C. C. P.)

It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will
to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of a will, the law
punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not
exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to
prison and kept there until he delivers the will.

The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that
a will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted
by the respondent for the following reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the
filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much
expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status
which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all,
since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion (Leaño v. Leaño,
supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides,
section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any
suitable process or mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to
the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be
in accordance with law."cralaw virtua1aw library

Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left

no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters
of administration within two years after the death of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw
library

That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all
the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are
no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in
court."cralaw virtua1aw library

The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of the word
"legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of a deceased
person’s estate, whether he died testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions
specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as
the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for
probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to
present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously
provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial
partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letters of administration." It does
not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate
among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate.
The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two
different things, altho both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a will
precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78).
One can have a will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of
administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the
decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do
away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression
of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given
to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and
devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of
the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the
existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be
disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of
the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity
and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in
accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court,
first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court" ; and, second, because the
probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will
in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will
thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal
notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow
the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam,
any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land
involved in an ordinary action for reivindicacion or partition.

We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, does not sanction the procedure adopted by the Respondent.

The case of Leaño v. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like section 1 of
Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a
decedent, but not the nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina Ver
executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1, 1902. Her will was
presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and was approved and allowed by the
Court on August 16, 1904. In the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went
ahead and divided the properties among themselves and some of them subsequently
sold and disposed of their shares to third persons. It does not affirmatively appear in the
decision in that case that the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the
will or that they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order dated
September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the partition, and one of the heirs,
Cunegunda Leaño, appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in
deciding that the heirs and legatees of the estate of Dña. Paulina Ver had voluntarily
divided the estate among themselves."cralaw virtua1aw library

In resolving that question this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been a
voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees, and in the absence of
positive proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court had some evidence
to support its conclusion."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and decided in
that case. That decision cannot be relied upon as an authority for the unprecedented and
unheard of procedure adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status
as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and attempts to nullify and
circumvent the testamentary dispositions made by him by not presenting the will to the
court for probate and by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the
basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law
requiring her to present the will to the court for probate.

In the subsequent case of Riosa v. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court departed from
the procedure sanctioned by the trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the
Leaño case, by holding that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession.
In the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avanceña,
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE SUCCESSION. —

Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing the heirs of a person who died
intestate to make extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without going
into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate succession, and therefore
excludes testate succession.

"2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. — In the instant case, which is a testate
succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial partition of the estate and at the same time
instituted proceeding for the probate of the will and the administration of the estate.
When the time came for making the partition, they submitted to the court the
extrajudicial partition previously made by them, which the court approved. Held: That
for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations created thereby, in
connection with the relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted to
the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said
partition was approved by the court." (Syllabus.)

The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the
procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said
Rules. That provision is not applicable here for the simple reason that the procedure
which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically pointed
out and prescribed in detail by Rules 74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing of
testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to
the parties." We see no injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply
with the law. On the contrary, an injustice might be committed against the other heirs
and legatees mentioned in the will if the attempt of the plaintiff to nullify said will by not
presenting it to the court for probate should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience,
delay, and expense, the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the
will and she violated the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which
command her to deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and
of imprisonment for contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of
inconvenience, delay, and expense, but on the contrary he is insisting that the procedure
prescribed by law be followed by the plaintiff.

Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by
the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff
in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven
existence of a will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to
the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon
her by the law.

It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in said
will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did not
signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of Rule
76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his contention is that
said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is concerned, has been
superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens
certificate of title in his favor.
II

This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant
Ernesto M. Guevara. So that the parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as
that question is concerned, we deem it proper to decide it now and obviate the necessity
of a new action.

The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M.
Guevara before a notary public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into two parts: (a)
insofar as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the southern half of
Victorino L. Guevara’s hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and other
valuable considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto
M. Guevara became the owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by
repurchasing it with his own money from Rafael T. Puzon.

A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in

consideration of the latter’s assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the
deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because:" (a) it has
not been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than the value of
the property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the defendant did not comply with
the conditions imposed upon him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court
of Appeals found: "It appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his
father. To accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable portions of the above-
mentioned land. And we cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven
that they have exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of the deed of July
12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the inheritance." The finding of the
Court of Appeals on this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent,
who did not appeal therefrom.

B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of law made
by the Court of Appeals are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought from Rafael
Puzon one-half of the land in question, but the Court a quo, after considering the
evidence, found it not proven; we hold that such conclusion is well founded. The
acknowledgment by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions, which
was inserted incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly belied by the fact
that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia, to whom Victorino
L. Guevara had sold a parcel of land with the right of repurchase. The defendant, acting
for his father, received the money and delivered it to Rafael Puzon to redeem the land in
question, and instead of executing a deed of redemption in favor of Victorino L.
Guevara, the latter executed a deed of sale in favor of the defendant.

"The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in
the name of the defendant, because of the latter’s promise that after paying all the debts
of their father, he would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding shares. As
their father then was still alive, there was no reason to require the delivery of her share
and that was why she did not insist on her opposition, trusting on the reliability and
sincerity of her brother’s promise. The evidence shows that such promise was really
made. The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the effect of
altering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint
tenants, and other cotenants nor does it change or affect in any other way any other
rights and liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec. 70, Land
Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor can the doctrine of res
judicata be invoked against her claim. Under these circumstances, she has the right to
compel the defendant to deliver her corresponding share in the estate left by the
deceased, Victorino L. Guevara."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the foregoing
findings of the Court of Appeals. But the findings of fact made by said court are final and
not reviewable by us on certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the money with
which the petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in question from Rafael
Puzon was not his own but his father’s, it being the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of
land made by the latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent
withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner
upon the latter’s promise that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver
to her and to the widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the
interested parties consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of
Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the implied trust on account of which he is under
obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of
the original owner of said land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a
reversal of the decision and decree of registration, which merely confirmed the
petitioner’s title; and in the absence of any intervening innocent third party, the
petitioner may be compelled to fulfill the promise by virtue of which he acquired his
title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act, cited by the Court of
Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the
cases therein cited.

Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
northern half of the land described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title
No. 51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event
the petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he is under
obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent portion from the southern half of
said land that has not yet been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara
still belongs one half of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of
title, to be taken from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner, the
other half having been lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming
the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased.

Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that
notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the
name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title
belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in
consideration of the latter’s assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the
deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any
relief to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside,
and the parties herein are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the
proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties under
section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is approved and allowed by the court as
the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees
therein named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to
partition the estate of the testator, taking into consideration the pronouncements made
in part II of this opinion. No finding as to costs in any of the three instances.

Yulo, C.J., and Hontiveros, 1 J., concur.

Separate Opinions

BOCOBO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the result. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement among the heirs is

authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 only "if the decedent left no debts." In this case,
according to the findings of the Court of Appeals, Ernesto M. Guevara "has been paying
the debts left by his father." It is true that said Ernesto M. Guevara, in consideration of
the conveyance to him of the southern half of the hacienda, assumed all the debts of the
deceased, but this agreement is binding only upon the parties to the contract but not
upon the creditors who did not consent thereto. (Art. 1205, Civil Code.) There being
debts when the father died, section 1 of Rule 74 is not applicable.

MORAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I would be agreeable to the majority decision but for a statement therein made which in
my view repeals by an erroneous interpretation the provisions of Rule 74, section 1, of
the Rules of Court, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS. — If the

decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files
a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the
decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

The majority holds that under this provision, the heirs and legatees, even if all of them
are of age, and there are no debts to be paid, cannot make an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate left by the decedent without first submitting in court for probate the will left
by the testator. This erroneous interpretation clearly overlooks not only the letter and
the spirit but more specially the whole background of the provision.

It is admitted that the provision has been taken from section 596 of Act No. 190 but with
a modification consisting in that it is made to apply in testate succession. Said section
596 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN INTESTATE ESTATES WITHOUT LEGAL

PROCEEDINGS. — Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful
age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have
been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not
otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court."cralaw virtua1aw library

It must be observed that the procedure contemplated in this legal provision is

completely extrajudicial and the same procedure intended in section 1 of Rule 74 above
quoted which is captioned "Extrajudicial Settlement by Agreement . . ." Justice Laurel,
who was one of the members of this Court when the new Rules were promulgated, in
commenting upon Rule 74, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"RULE 74. SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES. — The corresponding provisions

in the Code of Civil Procedure are sections 596-598. There is substantial analogy
between the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and those of Rule 74, save that: (1)
Under section 1 of Rule 74, there may be extrajudicial settlement whether a person died
testate or intestate, while under section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure extrajudicial
settlement can be had only when a person died intestate. (2) Under Rule 74, section 1,
extrajudicial settlement may take place ’if the decedent left no debts,’ while under
section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure it may take place ’when there are no debts due
from the estate, or all the debts have been paid.’ (3) Under section 596 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, extrajudicial settlement may take place when all the heirs are of lawful
age and legal capacity, while under section 1 of Rule 74 it may take place when ’the heirs
and legatees are all of legal age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
guardians’. (4) Unlike the Code of Civil Procedure, section 596, section 1 of Rule 74
requires the extrajudicial agreement to be filed in the office of the register of deeds;
provides that should the heirs disagree, ’they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition’, and that ’if there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds’, and
that ’it shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.’" [(Italics
mine); Laurel, Procedural Reform in the Philippines, pp. 137-138].

The phrase "extrajudicial settlement" unquestionably means liquidation and

distribution of the estate without judicial proceeding. In other words, even in cases of
testate succession, the heirs and legatees, when they are all of age or are represented by
their judicial guardians, and there are no debts to be paid, are allowed by section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court to liquidate and distribute among themselves the estate
left by the decedent and need not go to court even for the probate of the will. Unless
legal terms mean nothing, this is clearly what is meant in said provision by the words
"extrajudicial settlement" and by the clause." . . the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit." . . When judicial
administration is made unnecessary by the provision, the inevitable implication is that
the probate of the will is also unnecessary, the probate having no other object than
administration for purposes of distribution according to the provisions of the will. That
is why section 4 of Rule 78 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ESTATE, HOW ADMINISTERED. — When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and
the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country."cralaw virtua1aw library

If judicial administration and distribution is made unnecessary by section 1 of Rule 74,

then, I repeat, the probate of the will being purposeless, becomes unnecessary. If the
parties have already divided the estate in accordance with the will, the probate of the
will is a useless ceremony. If they have divided the estate in a different manner, the
probate of the will is worse than useless; it is ridiculous. The following words of this
Court in a previous case may well be here reiterated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent
without proceedings in court. The provisions which they contain are extremely
important. The wisdom which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of
every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who
owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent
and imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which
underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares
that one has the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it is only in the
presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is
prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave
birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which destroyed the feudal
despotism and created the democracy of private owners.

"These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that the
intent of the framers may be fully carried out. They should not be straitened or
narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and fullness of application without
which they cannot produce their most beneficial effects.

". . . The purpose which underlies them, as we have already intimated, is to put into
one’s hands the property which belongs to him not only at the earliest possible moment
but also with the least possible expense. By permitting the partition and division without
proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all expense and waste are saved.
This is as it should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the
machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property of a decedent
is so cumbersome, unwieldly and expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is
absorbed in the process of such division.." . . (McMicking v. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211;
219-220).

Indeed, there can be no valid reason why the probate of a will may not be dispensed with
by agreement of all the parties interested and the estate left by the decedent settled
extrajudicially among all the heirs and legatees, as is now provided in section 1 of Rule
74. It is well recognized that the allowance of a will gives conclusiveness merely to its
due execution, but not to the intrinsic validity of its provisions which are governed by
the substantive law regarding descent and distribution. If so, why cannot all the parties
interested agree, without going to court, that the will of the decedent is in form valid
(this being the only point to be litigated in a probate proceeding), and that they will
divide the inheritance in the manner acceptable to them? The procedure would not be
against public policy or the law placing in the hands of the courts the probate of wills,
because what the courts are enjoined to do for the benefit of the parties, the latter have
already done. As long as the extrajudicial partition of the estate does not affect the rights
of third parties and is not rendered invalid by any provision of the substantive law, no
possible objection can be raised thereto. On practical considerations, it would be useless
to force the parties, at their expense, to go thru the formality of probating a will and
dividing the estate in accordance therewith, because as soon as the routine is over, they
are of course free to make such transfers to one another as will be necessary to effect a
partition which they would have made if they were allowed to settle the estate
extrajudicially. It is true that there are provisions in the Rules of Court compelling the
delivery of a will to the competent court and punishing omissions to do so, but said
provisions are calculated to protect the interests of the persons entitled to share in the
inheritance. The latter may waive such benefit. This waiver cannot be said to be a
withdrawal or diminution of the jurisdiction of the court, since it only implies a desire of
the parties not to litigate. The fear that "absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others", is wisely provided against in the requirement of
the Rule that all the parties interested and all the beneficiaries under the will should be
parties to the extrajudicial settlement. The participation of all the interested parties
excludes the probability of fraud or collusion and, even in that eventuality, the aggrieved
beneficiaries are not without adequate remedy for the voidance of the partition under
the Civil Code.

And this is in accordance with the weight of authority in this and other jurisdictions. In
Leaño v. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), all the heirs and legatees have made an extrajudicial
partition of the estate left by the decedent and then filed the will in court which was
probated. Nine years of costly probate proceedings have followed after which the
extrajudicial partition was made known to court. Such extrajudicial partition was
objected to by one party upon the ground that it was not in conformity with the
provisions of the will. But the trial Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Naturally the partition made by the heirs voluntarily and spontaneously must produce
and has produced a legal status, which cannot be annulled merely for the caprice of one
person. And it cannot be said that, because the partition was not made in accordance
with the will, if such be the case, the latter has to be annulled, for by voluntarily and
spontaneously concurring therein they implicitly renounced the effects of said will, of
which they were aware." (See p. 183).

On appeal, this Court affirmed the ruling with the following

pronouncement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been a
voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees and in the absence of
positive proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court had some evidence
to support his conclusion. If the heirs and legatees had voluntarily divided the estate
among themselves, then their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that
there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid. No claim is made
whatever by third parties nor objections of any character are made by others than the
heirs against said partition. We see no reason why the heirs and legatees should not be
bound by their voluntary acts." (Pages 183-184).

This case furnishes precisely a valuable experience as to the practical wisdom underlying
the procedure established in section 1 of Rule 74. After the will was probated and after
nine years of costly administration proceedings, nothing — absolutely nothing — was
accomplished by the court except to make the belated pronouncement that the
extrajudicial partition made by the parties prior to the institution of the proceedings was
proper and binding upon them. Thus, the whole proceedings for nine years have proved
no more than a futile chronicle of wasted time and money for the parties and the court.
This disgraceful experience could not and did not pass unnoticed to the members of this
Court who drafted the new Rules of Court. The solemn admonition made by this Court
in a previous case (McMicking v. Sy Conbieng, supra) when it said that "the State fails
wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division and
distribution of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwieldly and expensive
that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division",
rang with re-echoing insistence and was heeded to when the new Rules of Court was
drafted and promulgated. The fundamental policy pervading the whole system of
procedure adopted in said Rules is speed, economy and justice. Thus, features of
procedure were done away with when, without them, the same purpose may be
achieved. The result is brevity and simplicity of procedure with such guarantees as are
necessary to assure due process. And to remedy such evil as is disclosed in the Leaño
case, a completely extrajudicial settlement is allowed even in testate succession with the
probate of the will dispensed with, when the heirs and legatees who are all of age or
represented by their judicial guardians, so agree, and there are no debts to be paid.
Thus, the scope of section 596 of Act No. 190 was amplified and with it the ruling of this
Court in Riosa v. Rocha (48 Phil. 737). The procedure is in consonance with the almost
unanimous weight of authority in other jurisdictions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The complaint, to which a demurrer was sustained, shows that all the persons
interested in a decedent’s estate, as widow, heirs, distributees, legatees, or devisees,
including the person appointed executrix by the will, and the husbands of femes covert,
(all being adults), by agreement divided among themselves all the property of the estate
according to the direction of the will, paid off all debts against the estate, and delivered
the note described to the plaintiff, as a part of her share; and all this was done without
probate of the will, or administration of the estate. The effect of such a division was to
invest the plaintiff with an equitable title to the note. In the absence of the will, the
decisions of this court, heretofore made, would meet every argument in favor of an
opposite conclusion. (Anderson v. Anderson, 37 Ala., 683; Marshall v. Crow, 29 Ala.,
278; Vanderveer v. Alston, 16 Ala., 494; Miller v. Eatman, 11 Ala., 609). Does the
presence of an unprobated will, as a feature of this case, take it out of the principle of
those decisions? We can perceive no sufficient reason why it should. All the parties
interested, or to be affected, may as well by agreement divide property, where there is a
will, without employing the agency of courts, as in case of intestacy. Parties, competent
to act, ought to do that, without the agency of courts, which the courts would ultimately
accomplish. To deny them the privilege of so doing, would manifest a judicial
abhorrence of harmony. By the probate of the will, the claims of heirs and distributees,
and of the widow, would have been subordinated to the directions of the will. This has
been accomplished by agreement. There being no debts, the executrix would have had
no other duty to perform, than to divide the property according to the will. This, too, has
been done by agreement of competent parties. All the ends and objects of judicial
proceedings have been accomplished, by agreement of the parties; and that agreement
must be effective." (Carter v. Owens, 41 Ala., 215; 216-217).

"The absence of sound objection on this ground to a contract having for its sole purpose
the disposition of property in a manner different from that proposed by a testator, even
where the contract contemplates the rejection of the will when offered for probate or its
setting aside when admitted to probate, when it is entirely free from fraud, and is made
by all the parties in interest, may be freely conceded. As has often been substantially
said, the public generally has no interest in the matter of the probate of a will; and only
those interested in the estate under the will or otherwise are affected by such a contract.
If they all agree upon some course to be followed, and their contract is otherwise free
from contemplated fraud or violation of any law, no one else has any such interest as
warrants complaint. Such was the character of contract involved in Spangenberg v.
Spangenberg (App.) , 126 Pac., 379, especially relied on by plaintiff here, where the
contract purported to affect only such property of the deceased as should in fact be
received by the parties thereto. In Estate of Garcelon, 104 Cal., 570; 38 Pac., 414; 32 L.
R. A., 595; 43 Am. St. Rep., 134, another case much relied on by plaintiff, a contract by
an heir to refrain from contesting a will was involved. It was said that the contract was
one that concerned the parties alone, and one that did not appear to be against public
policy." (Gugolz v. Gehrkens, 130 Pac. Rep., 8, 10; 164 Cal., 596).

"The question of public policy is introduced. The disposition of one’s property after
death is controlled by statute. One of the next of kin has no vested interest in such
property. In cases of intestacy, a next of kin has such interest as the statute declares. In
case there is a will, he has an interest which gives him a standing and right to contest the
will. This right is his alone; in it the public has no interest; he may refrain from
exercising it, or he may dispose of it as he wishes, by release or assignment or
settlement, and the law of public policy is not of offended." (In re Cook’s Will, 217 N. Y.
S., 176, 180-181).

"Agreement. — ’It has been definitely decided by the courts of this state, and of many
other states, that the beneficiaries under a will have a right to agree among themselves
upon any distribution they see proper of the property bequeathed to them . . . That
holding is based upon the proposition that the property is theirs. No one else is
interested in its disposition, and they may, with propriety, make any distribution of it
that suits them, so long as they do not invade the rights of other parties or infringe some
rule of public policy’." (Fore v. McFadden, 276 N. W., 327; 329).

"The first assignment of error presented by appellants complains of the action of the
court in sustaining exceptions to averments asking the enforcement of the agreement
that the will should not be probated, and that the estate should be divided among the
parties as they would be entitled as heirs at law of the deceased, the proponent of the
will surrendering thereby his rights as principal legatee. This assignment must be
sustained. It cannot be seen that the agreement is contrary to public policy. Parties may
make any contract with reference to their property rights that is not illegal, may adjust
by compromise their differences and disputes concerning the same and, as they bind
themselves, so shall they be bound. It is difficult to understand why this cannot be
effected by an agreement not to probate a will, or how it interferes with public policy.
The power to litigate and to establish a right by appeal to the courts is as much the
subject of contract as any other right in property. Such adjustments by contract are
favored by the law and the courts, and are not deemed to be an unwarranted
interference with the jurisdiction of the courts, or against public policy. On the contrary,
public policy favors them.

"Appellants have cited a case in point, — the case of Phillips v. Phillips, 8 Watts, 197, in
which it is held competent for devisees and legatees to bind themselves by a written or
parol agreement to destroy a will before probate, and that a party to the agreement
would be estopped from claiming any interest under the will. The court says: ’It cannot
admit of doubt that before probate the parties in interest under a will would have the
right to set aside a will, and such an act would be favored, when the object was to avert a
family controversy’. The agreement that the will should not be probated, and that the
parties would take the property as heirs at law of the deceased, destroyed the legal effect
of the will; and it could not thereafter have legal existence in conferring rights upon the
legatees." (Stringfellow v. Early, 40 SW. 871, 873-874; 15 Tex. Civ. App., 597).

"The contention that the complaint does not state a cause of action, because the contract
sued on is against public policy, and therefore void, is made here for the first time. It is
to the interest of the public generally that the right to make contract should not be
unduly restricted, and no agreement will be pronounced void, as being against public
policy, unless it clearly contravenes that which has been declared by statutory
enactment or by judicial decisions to be public policy, or unless the agreement
manifestly tends in some way to injure the public. Whether or not a contract in any
given case is contrary to public policy is a question of law, to be determined from the
circumstances of each particular case. Smith v. Du Bose, 78 Ga., 413; 3 SE., 309-316; 6
Am. St. Rep., 260; Weber v. Shay, 56 Ohio St., 116; 46 NE., 377; 37 L. R. A., 230; 60 Am.
St. Rep., 743; Pierce v. Randolph, 12 Tex., 290; Printing Numerical Registering Co. v.
Sampson, 19 L. R. Eq. Cas., 465.

"The contract in controversy is in effect but an agreement whereby the parties thereto,
’because of their love and affection for one another’ and ’being desirous of avoiding
litigation over the estate’ of their father ’in case of his death,’ agreed to ignore his will in
the event that he made one, and then share his estate equally as if he had died intestate.
In other words, the contract was but an agreement of heirs apparent not to contest the
will of an ancestor. There is nothing to be found in our code or statutory law prohibiting
the making and enforcement of such a contract, and it has been held in this state that a
contract, made after the death of the deceased, not to contest his will, is purely personal
to the parties making it, that it is not against public policy, and that, when fairly made, it
will be enforced." (Spangenberg v. Spangenberg, 126 Pac. Rep., 379, 382; 19 Cal. App.,
439).

"Probate Dispensed With. — Probate of a will may be dispened with by an agreement

between the persons interested; or it may be dispensed with where the testator, before
his death, conveyed to the devisees all the property which he had devised to them, or
where the will makes no other disposition of the testator’s property than the law would
have done had he died intestate, and the rights sought to be established are admitted by
all concerned. But where the language of the will expressly invokes the jurisdiction of
the probate court the fact that no administration is necessary does not affect the power
of the court to probate the will." (68 C. J., pp. 877-878).

"Agreement between Persons Interested: a. Requisites and Validity. (1) In General. — It

has been held that, since the nature of a probate proceeding is one in rem, the parties
cannot submit a controversy arising therein to arbitration. The law, however, favors the
settlement, in good faith, of will contests, by a so-called ’family settlement’, although it
changes the mode of disposition of the estate; and, therefore, subject to the limitation
that a contestant cannot compromise anything beyond his own personal interest in the
contest, persons, such as devisees, legatee, heirs, or next of kin, having interests in the
will or estate, sufficient to entitle them to oppose probate or contest the will, may enter
into an agreement which, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, is valid and
binding on all the parties thereto, whereby they waive probate of the will and bind
themselves to abide by its provisions, or whereby they agree that the will is not to be
probated or is to be superseded or destroyed; or whereby any controversy relative to the
probate or contest of the will is compromised or settled, and a contest is avoided,
whether or not there were, in fact, valid grounds for the contest. Such an agreement, in
order to be valid, must not exclude anyone entitled under the will, must be entered into
by all the persons affected thereby, and all the parties thereto must be competent to
make the agreement, and either they or their representative must fully execute it, and,
under some statutes, it must be properly approved by the court." ([Italics supplied] 68
C. J., pp. 909-910).

"As to Probate. — The operation and effect of the agreement may be not to supersede the
provisions of the will, but to carry out its provisions without a probate, and under such
an agreement the parties are precluded from denying the probate, or insisting on the
invalidating of the will for want of probate. So, also, a person who agrees not to contest
the will is precluded from opposing probate; or the probate of a will may be dispensed
with, and the persons interested in the estate under the will given at least an equitable
interest in the property, where they, being under no disability, divide the estate,
pursuant to an agreement among themselves. Where the effect of the agreement of all
interested parties is to repudiate or renounce the will, it will not be probated, especially
where the agreement expressly so provides; but it has been held that, where the
executor, defending a torn will, agrees, for a consideration, not to probate it, the court
should not refuse probate without notifying other beneficiaries and requiring testimony
as to the tearing of the will by the testator. Probate, however, is not prevented by an
agreement executed by a part only of the beneficiaries, and the parties to such
agreement are not prevented thereby from taking under the will which is probated by
another interested person." ([Italics supplied] 68 C. J., pp. 914-915).

"Thus, where the parties, being in doubt as to the instrument being construed as a will,
and for the purpose of saving a family controversy and for the purpose of dividing the
estate, enter into a compromise and settlement agreement, under the terms of which the
entire estate is to be, and has in part been, divided, and agree that the instrument shall
not be offered for probate, it is sufficient to prevent a probate." (Brown v. Burk, 26 NW
[2d ed. ], 415).

"Validity of Agreements to Dispense with Probate or to Modify or Set Aside Will. —

Though in some jurisdictions an agreement to dispense with the probate of a will has
been declared to be against public policy and void, in a majority of the decisions on the
point it has been held that all the persons interested in a decedent’s estate may by
agreement divide the estate among themselves, without probating such decedent’s will
or administering the estate, and the validity of a contract having for its sole purpose the
disposition of property in a manner different from that proposed by a testator, even
where the contract contemplates the rejection of the will when offered for probate or its
setting aside when admitted to probate, when it is entirely free from fraud, and is made
by all the parties in interest, would seem to be freely conceded. Thus it has been held
that all the parties in interest may agree to eliminate from a will a clause providing for
survivorship among them. But an agreement to resist the probate of a will and procure it
to be set aside so as to cut off the interest of one who is not a party to such agreement is
against public policy. Nor does the right of all the parties in interest to set aside or
disregard a will extend to the case of an active trust, for a definite term, created by a
testator as he deems proper for the protection of his beneficiaries. A contract between
the next of kin of a decedent, that they will each have a certain portion of the estate, does
not amount to an agreement to divide the estate without probating the will." (28 R. C.
L., pp. 357-358).

The minority decision pointed out in the last quotation from the Ruling Case Law (Vol.
28, pp. 357-358) is from the Supreme Court of only one State — that of Wisconsin, in re
Will of Dardis (135 Wis., 457; 115 NW., 332). All the other States held the contrary
doctrine that is now embodied in section 1 of Rule 74. Commenting upon the Wisconsin
rule, the Editor of the L. R. A. says the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No case has been found other than Re Dardis wherein any court passed upon the
validity of a stipulation to secure the denial to probate of a will theretofore offered for
probate, on the ground that the testator was mentally incompetent to make a will at the
time of its execution. The decision of the court is based upon the doctrine therein
enunciated, that proceedings to probate a will are proceedings in rem, which public
interest demands should be pursued to a final adjudication, regardless of the wishes of
the interested parties. In this connection and with reference to this broader question, it
is of interest to note that courts of other jurisdictions, although generally recognizing
that proceedings to probate a will are proceedings in rem, hold that the proceeding is
inter partes to the extent that all the parties in interest may control the probate
proceedings, even to the extent of doing away with the probate." (23 L. R. A. [N.S. ], p.
783).

For the sake of fixity in judicial policy, this Court in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, has solemnly given a form of a rule — section 1, Rule 74 — to what was merely
the consensus of judicial opinion. We cannot now repudiate the procedure outlined in
said provision unless we amend it by another rule.

The majority, however, expresses fear that abuses may easily be committed under the
Rules. Such fears have always been the bugbear set up against all task of procedural
reforms. To be sure, there has never been any provision of law that is not liable to
abuses. If by a mere possibility of abuse we are to disregard clear provisions of a
procedural law, the result would be not only the abrogation of all laws but also the
abolition of all courts. When a procedural law is calculated to remedy an evil under a
specific situation therein contemplated, it must be deemed good even if other situations
may be simulated or falsified and placed within its purview. And when that law is duly
enacted, it is no concern of the courts to pass upon its wisdom, their duty being to apply
its provisions in a manner which shall not defeat the intention underlying it. Laws are
promulgated to be obeyed and when they are abused there are the courts to check up the
abuse. Courts must deal with the specific circumstances of each case and construe the
provisions in such a manner as to make it impregnable if possible to further abuses. This
is constructive, not destructive, jurisprudence. This explains why laws are more often
worded so broadly as to lay merely general principles — a skeleton — the flesh to be
supplied with judicial decisions. Judicial statemanship requires that courts in deciding
judicial controversies should be careful not to advance opinions which are not necessary
to a proper disposition of the case. Judicial experience has shown that such advanced
opinions may not infrequently place the court in an embarrassing position when a
proper case with the proper factual environment is properly presented with all its angles
before the court. Jurisprudence must be carefully progressive and not impetuously
aggressive. For instance, the majority, impressed by the awful circumstances of the
present case, has found it dangerous to hold that the probate of the will may be
dispensed with. While this conclusion is constructive under the peculiar facts of the
case, to generalize it is to make destructive. If a proper case is presented to the court
wherein all the heirs and legatees who are all of age have agreed to dispense with the
probate of a will and have actually made an extrajudicial partition, and if it appears
further that each of the recipients is in peaceful enjoyment of his share in the estate, I
am sure that the majority, with the practical wisdom they have shown in other cases,
would not dare disturb the peace enjoyed by such heirs and legatees and compel them to
go into court and litigate.

The majority, without the necessity of holding whether the probate of a will may or may
not be dispensed with under Rule 74, section 1, could have decided this case by stating
that said provision is not applicable, its requirements not being present. And I would be
wholly agreeable to this conclusion because the beneficiaries under the will do not
appear to have made an extrajudicial settlement of the estate left by the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara, nor the action brought by the natural daughter, Rosario Guevara,
is one for partition against all such beneficiaries founded either on an extrajudicial
settlement or on the provisions of the will as accepted by all parties to be valid and
binding. Upon the contrary, Rosario Guevara appears to be wishing to take advantage of
the will in so far as it is favorable to her, and repudiate it in so far as it is favorable to
others. Apparently, Rosario Guevara was in possession of the will and the other heirs
and legatees were not aware of its contents. The situation not being the one
contemplated by section 1 of Rule 74, plaintiff may not invoke its provisions.
Endnotes: