Buenaflor v.

CA
G.R. No. 142021
November 29, 2000
J. Kapunan

FACTS:
• Petitioners filed against respondent United Rural Bank of Panay Island with the RTC an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of realty.
• The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondent bank. The decision was received by
petitioners on January 17, 1998.
• On January 30, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the RTC with postal money orders in the
amounts of P352, payable to the Clerk of Court of the SC, and P68, payable to the Clerk of Court of
the CA attached as payment of the appellate docket fees.
• Petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of Formal Order, alleging that the Clerk of
Court of the trial court returned the money orders without mentioning the reasons for such act except
to quote Sec 4 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion
ruling that the appellate docket fee was not paid in accordance with said section 4. Since the money
orders were made payable to SC and CA, and not the RTC the RTC ruled that such omission is
considered as failure to pay the docket fee within the period for taking an appeal.
• The CA declared the petition as abandoned, ruling that the payment is ineffectual and does not toll
the period of appeal.

ISSUE: W/N docket fees were duly paid within the period of appeal.

HELD:
• SECTION 4 provides: Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. — Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees…
• Petitioners pray for a liberal construction of the Rules.
• The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court
docket fee within the reglementary period allows only discretionary dismissal, not automatic
dismissal, of the appeal. Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the Court's sound
discretion "in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection
considering all attendant circumstances."
• The rule of liberality in the interpretation of Rules are to achieve substantial justice. Rules of Court are
rules of procedure and whenever called for they should be construed as to give effect rather than
defeat their essence.
• The underlying consideration in this petition is that the act of dismissing the notice of appeal, if done
in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction, amounts to an undue denial of the petitioners' right to appeal.
• It cannot be denied that there was actual delivery of the postal money orders to the Clerk of Court of
the trial court intended to be used to pay for the appellate docket fees.
• Payment has been defined as a delivery or money or its equivalent in either speci c property or
services by one person from whom it is due to another person to whom it is due. Delivery is the act by
which the res or substance thereof is placed within the actual or constructive possession or control of
another.
• Article 1234 of the Civil Code allows substantial performance in the payment of obligations. In order
that there may be substantial performance of an obligation, there must have been an attempt in good
faith to perform, without any willful or intentional departure therefrom. In this case, there is good faith.
The postal money orders which were intended for the payment of the appellate docket fees were
actually sent to the trial court. They were filed within the reglementary period and received by the trial
court. The petitioners clearly intended to file an appeal.
• The fact that the postal money orders were addressed to the clerks of court of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, respectively, is a minor technicality, which if treated too rigidly would run
counter to the spirit of the Rules and thwart the ends of justice. Petition is granted.