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COURT FILE NO.

NO DU DOSSIER

IN THE COURT OF QUEENS BENCH COUR DU BANC DE LA REINE DU


OF NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK

TRIAL DIVISION DIVISION DE PREMIERE INSTANCE

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONCTON CIRCONSCRIPTION JUDICIAIRE DE

BETWEEN ENTRE

THERESA JONES

PLAINTIFF DEMANDEUR

- and - - et -

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA DEFENDEUR


as representative of THE ROYAL
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, and
JOHN PITCHER

DEFENDANTS

NOTICE OF ACTION WITH STATEMENT AVIS DE POURSUITE ACCOMPAGNÉ


OF CLAIM ATTACHED D’UN EXPOSÉ DE LA DEMANDE
(FORM 16A) (Formule 16A)

To: Attorney General of Canada


Atlantic Regional Office
Department of Justice Canada
Suite 1400 Duke Tower
5251 Duke Street
Halifax, NS B3J 1P3
Telephone: (902) 426-3260
Fax: (902) 426-7913

And To: John Pitcher


RCMP Woodstock Detachment
410 Connell Street
Woodstock, NB E7M 5G9
Telephone: (506) 325-3000
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN PAR LE DÉPÔT DU PRÉSENT AVIS DE
COMMENCED AGAINST YOU BY FILING POURSUITE ACCOMPAGNÉ D’UN EXPOSÉ
THIS NOTICE OF ACTION WITH DE LA DEMANDE, UNE POURSUITE
STATEMENT OF CLAIM ATTACHED. JUDICIAIRE A ÉTÉ ENGAGÉE CONTRE
VOUS.

If you wish to defend these proceedings, Si vous désirez présenter une défense dans
either you or a New Brunswick lawyer acting on cette instance, vous-même ou un avocat du
your behalf must prepare your Statement of Nouveau-Brunswick chargé de vous représenter
Defence in the form prescribed by the Rules of devrez rédiger un exposé de votre défense en la
Court and serve it on the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s forme prescrite par les Règles de procédure, le
lawyer at the address shown below and, with proof signifier au demandeur ou à son avocat à l’adresse
of such service, file it in this Court Office together indiquée ci-dessous et le déposer au greffe de cette
with the filing fee of $50, Cour avec un droit de dépôt de $50 et une preuve de
sa signification :

(a) if you are served in New Brunswick, a) DANS LES 20 JOURS de la signification
WITHIN 20 DAYS after service on you of this qui vous sera faite du présent avis de poursuite
Notice of Action With Statement of Claim accompagné d’un exposé de la demande, si elle vous
Attached, or est faite au Nouveau-Brunswick ou

(b) if you are served elsewhere in Canada or in b) DANS LES 40 JOURS de la signification, si
the United States of America, WITHIN 40 DAYS elle vous est faite dans une autre région du Canada
after such service, or ou dans les États-Unis d’Amérique ou

(c) if you are served anywhere else, WITHIN


c) DANS LES 60 JOURS de la signification, si
60 DAYS after such service.
elle vous est faite ailleurs.

If you fail to do so, you may be deemed to Si vous omettez de le faire, vous pourrez être
have admitted any claim made against you, and réputé avoir admis toute demande formulée contre
without further notice to you, JUDGMENT MAY vous et, sans autre avis, JUGEMENT POURRA
BE GIVEN AGAINST YOU IN YOUR ÊTRE RENDU CONTRE VOUS EN VOTRE
ABSENCE. ABSENCE.

You are advised that: Sachez que :

(a) you are entitled to issue documents and a) vous avez le droit dans la présente instance,
present evidence in the proceeding in English or d’émettre des documents et de présenter votre preuve
French or both; en français, en anglais ou dans les deux langues;

(b) the plaintiff intends to proceed in the (b) le demandeur a l’intention d’utiliser la
English language; and langue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .; et

(c) your Statement of Defence must indicate (c) l’exposé de votre défense doit indiquer la
the language in which you intend to proceed langue que vous avez l’intention d’utiliser.
.

THIS NOTICE is signed and sealed for CET AVIS est signé et scellé au nom de la Cour du
the Court of Queen’s Bench by Banc de la Reine par. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
_____________________________________, greffier de la Cour à . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clerk of the Court at Moncton, on the ., ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 . . . . . . . . .
_____day of March, 2017

Court _____________________________ . Sceau de ____________________________


Seal (clerk) la Cour (greffier)

Moncton Law Courts (adresse du greffe)


145 Assomption Blvd.,
Moncton, NB Canada E1C 0R2
4

Statement of Claim

1. The Plaintiff, Theresa Jones, resides in the City of Moncton in the Province of New Brunswick.

2. The Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf

3. The Defendant, John Pitcher, (herein the “Defendant Pitcher”) currently resides in New
Brunswick and was at all material times a peace officer, servant and employee of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (herein the “RCMP”) pursuant to s. 7(1) of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police Act, RSC. 1985, c R-10 (the “RCMP Act”).

4. The Defendant, the Attorney General of Canada as representing the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (herein the “Defendant RCMP”), a duly incorporated body pursuant to the RCMP Act,
represents the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick and the RCMP in this
proceeding pursuant to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick Liability and
Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50 s.32 (the “AG Act”). The Office of the Attorney General
of New Brunswick’s liability arises from the conduct, negligence, malfeasance and vicarious
liability of the Defendant RCMP, who was, at all material times, considered to be the Office of
the Attorney General of New Brunswick employees, agents and servants.

5. The Plaintiff states that, on or about May 29, 2014, she telephoned the Defendant RCMP using
the telephone number as was printed in the telephone book, specifically, 1-888-506-RCMP
(7267).

6. On or about May 29, 2014, the Plaintiff requested the Defendant RCMP’s dispatch operator
who received her call to permit her to speak to an officer for the purpose of reporting, as she
stated, crimes she believed that were committed against her.

7. The Plaintiff states that, and the fact is, an RCMP officer called the Plaintiff’s residence,
specifically (506) 375-4599. Said RCMP officer identified himself as the Defendant Pitcher.

8. The Plaintiff states that she conversed with the Defendant Pitcher for approximately three
quarters of an hour, in which time the Plaintiff provided details of her complaint to the
Defendant Pitcher and she informed the Defendant Pitcher that she had evidence in support of
her allegations.

9. The Defendant Pitcher expressly represented himself as a delegate of the Defendant RCMP, the
fact is the Defendant Pitcher spoke for, and on behalf of, the Defendant RCMP.

10. The Plaintiff states that, during that telephone conversation, aforementioned, the Defendant
Pitcher expressly stated to the Plaintiff that he, together with the Defendant RCMP, (herein at
times referred to as the Defendants) would not assist the Plaintiff with her complaints, the fact
is, the Defendant Pitcher expressly stated that the Plaintiff’s complaints did not constitute
criminal actions on the part of the subject of her complaint and the Defendant Pitcher further
5

stated that the Defendants were unable to pursue any action in relation to the Plaintiff’s
complaints.

11. The Plaintiff states that, during the aforementioned conversation, the Defendant Pitcher
expressly stated that it is not a crime for one person to fraudulently represent their identity for
the purpose of manipulating another person into consenting to sexual activity including sexual
intercourse. The Defendant Pitcher also stated that it is not a crime for one person to abuse
another person’s trust in order to deceive that other person for their own sexual gratification.
The fact is, the Defendant Pitcher stated to the Plaintiff that her complaints merely constituted
a lie and that the Defendants could not charge a person for lying. By the end of the telephone
conversation between the Defendant Pitcher and the Plaintiff, aforementioned, the Defendants
refused to assist the Plaintiff any further.

12. The Plaintiff states that, during her telephone conversation with the Defendant Pitcher on the
29th day of May, 2014, aforementioned, the Defendant Pitcher refused to provide the Plaintiff
with assistance in relation to her complaint alleging Threats had been conveyed toward her.
The fact is, the Plaintiff stated to the Defendant Pitcher that she had evidence to provide in
relation to the Threats that she was alleging were uttered against her, including evidence of the
tone of voice of the man she accused of uttering the threats, which the Plaintiff stated gave
proof that the words spoken were discernably threatening.

13. At all material times during the telephone conversation mentioned above, wherein the Plaintiff
spoke to the Defendant Pitcher on or about the 29th of May, 2014, the Plaintiff states that she
maintained her belief that crimes were committed against her the Defendant Pitcher maintained
his insistence that the Defendants would not assist the Plaintiff with any of her complaints.

14. The Plaintiff states, and the fact is, that by the end of the approximate forty-five-minute
telephone conversation, aforementioned, the Plaintiff accepted as truth and fact the Defendant
Pitcher’s statements that the Defendants were unable to pursue any action in relation to any of
the Plaintiff’s complaints. The fact is, prior to the Defendant Pitcher ending the aforementioned
telephone conversation with the Plaintiff, he assured the Plaintiff that she did not have any
avenue available to her for pursuing any legal action against the subject of her complaints in
relation to the allegations she made.

15. The above-mentioned actions on the part of the Defendant Pitcher, a representative of the
Defendant RCMP, constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.

16. The Plaintiff states that she was in afraid for her safety, constantly wondering how the subject
of her complaint would carry out his threats she alleges he conveyed against her, previously
mentioned. The Plaintiff states that, due to those fears together with the Plaintiff’s stated
inability to emotionally and psychologically process the violation she was feeling at the time,
the Plaintiff made the decision to call the Defendant RCMP to report what she believed to be
crimes committed against her.
6

17. The Defendant Pitcher and the Plaintiff spoke on the phone for approximately forty-five
minutes wherein the Plaintiff attempted to report to the Defendant RCMP the facts as she knew
them to be, including explaining to the Defendant Pitcher the course of events of the previous
four months and the aftermath of the various negative emotions the Plaintiff states she felt
resulting from her becoming aware of the reality of the circumstances of those previous four
months.

18. The Defendant Pitcher had succeeded in convincing the Plaintiff that the Defendant RCMP did
not consider any of the Plaintiff’s allegations to be criminally actionable. The Defendant
Pitcher adamantly and repeatedly stated to the Plaintiff that the Defendant RCMP were not
going to assist her with her complaints, the Defendant Pitcher specifically stated that nothing
described to him was illegal and that the Defendant RCMP was unable to assist the Plaintiff
with these matters.

19. On or about the night of May 29, 2014, the Plaintiff states that she searched the internet and
that she discovered a Canada.ca website containing a section of the Criminal Code of Canada
relating to Assault and consent.

20. The day following the Plaintiff’s internet search wherein she discovered Fraud is a vitiating
factor to consent in relation to Assault, the Plaintiff attempted to contact the Defendant Pitcher.
The Plaintiff called the Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock, New Brunswick detachment and spoke
with Kathy Godhan Albert (spelling?), a receptionist with the Defendant RCMP Woodstock
detachment.

21. The Plaintiff states that Ms. Albert, the Defendant RCMP, informed the Plaintiff that no sexual
assault occurred against the Plaintiff.

22. The Plaintiff states that she did not provide Ms. Albert, the Defendant RCMP, with any facts in
relation to the matters referred to herein.

23. The Plaintiff states that she called the Defendant RCMP, at the Defendant RCMP detachment
the day following her internet search wherein she discovered Fraud is a vitiating factor to
consent in relation to Assault, for the sole purpose of discussing her complaint with a uniformed
member of the Defendant RCMP, not to discuss her complaint alleging crimes committed
against her with a receptionist of the Defendant RCMP and most definitely not to have an
RCMP receptionist make a judgment decision in relation to what crimes may or may not have
been committed against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff discontinued the telephone call with the
Defendant RCMP, specifically Mr. Albert, and the Plaintiff subsequent efforts to contact the
Defendant Pitcher and, as the Plaintiff states, she was informed that the Defendant Pitcher was
not on duty that day.

24. On or about June 1, 2014, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant RCMP’s dispatch number, 1-
888-506-7267, and requested to speak with any officer on duty.
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25. The Plaintiff states that she believed the Defendant RCMP did not create a report in relation to
the telephone conversation she had with the Defendant Pitcher on May 29, 2014,
aforementioned. The Plaintiff maintains that, during the telephone conversation herein
mentioned, the Defendant Pitcher was adamant that no crime had been committed. The Plaintiff
states that she desired and preferred to speak to a different member of the Defendant RCMP,
one who, as the Plaintiff states, she hoped would listen to her complaints, who would take into
consideration the circumstances surrounding her complaint, and one who would also take into
consideration the evidence and/or proof the Plaintiff alleged was available to be provided to
and reviewed by the Defendant RCMP.

26. A male member of the Defendant RCMP called the Plaintiff’s residence on June 1, 2014, as per
her request, aforementioned, and identified himself to the Plaintiff as Constable Guiste (“Cst.
Guiste”). During the telephone conversation that ensued, the Plaintiff read to Cst. Guiste some
excerpts, word for word, from a printout she had made from the Canada.ca website, the same
website the Plaintiff discovered on the night of May 29, 2014 and that contained information in
relation to the Criminal Code of Canada stating Fraud is a vitiating factor to consent in relation
to Assault. The Plaintiff also repeated to Cst. Guiste her allegations and complaints, same as
she had done with the Defendant Pitcher days earlier.

27. The Plaintiff states that, throughout her telephone conversation with the Defendant RCMP,
specifically, Cst. Guiste, on June 1 2014, the Defendant RCMP again succeeded in convincing
the Plaintiff, as she states, that none of her complaints or allegations merited any action on the
part of the Defendant RCMP. The phone conversation, herein, lasted approximately a little
more than an hour, at all material times the Defendant RCMP persisted in stating to the Plaintiff
that no crimes had been committed in relation to her complaints. In fact, the Plaintiff sates, the
Defendant RCMP insisted the Plaintiff’s complaints amounted to a lie, that a lie is not a criminal
offence, and that fraud could not be a vitiating factor in the Plaintiff’s case because no money
was involved. Cst. Guiste resolutely maintained that the Defendant RCMP is not obligated nor
mandated nor to assist the Plaintiff in relation to the Plaintiff’s complaints.

28. The Plaintiff states that she repeated informed the Defendant RCMP that she felt strongly that
the actions of the subject of her complaints merited legal action of some kind. Cst. Guiste
successfully convinced the Plaintiff that there was not anything the Defendant RCMP was able
to do in relation to pursuing any criminal action against the subject of her complaints. The
Defendant RCMP, however, did offer to the Plaintiff some suggestions on avenues that she
might pursue in order to hold the subject of her complaints accountable for his actions. Cst.
Guiste offered to contact Victims Services on the Plaintiff’s behalf to arrange for them call her
to schedule an appointment with her.

29. Victims Services contacted the Plaintiff Monday, June 2, 2014, and scheduled an appoint her
for Tuesday, June 3, 2014.

30. On or about June 18, 2014, the Plaintiff attended the Woodstock, New Brunswick Court House.
The Plaintiff states that a Sheriff working at the Court House stated to the Plaintiff that her
8

matter pertained to a criminal matter and that she should seek assistance from the Defendant
RCMP.

31. The Plaintiff followed the advice of the Sheriff to seek assistance from the Defendant RCMP,
and she attended the Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock detachment on June 18, 2014. The
Plaintiff spoke with the Defendant Pitcher while she was there. The Defendant Pitcher admitted
to the Plaintiff that he would be required to speak with the Office of the Attorney General of
New Brunswick for direction on what he should do in relation to the information the Plaintiff
provided to him, specifically, the information contained on the printout taken from the website,
the same website wherein the Plaintiff discovered that the Criminal Code of Canada states how
Fraud is a vitiating factor to consent as it relates to all forms of Assault.

32. The Defendant Pitcher stated that he was unaware of and unfamiliar with the section of the
Criminal Code of Canada relating to Fraud as a vitiating factor to consent as it relates to all
forms of Assault, including Sexual Assault.

33. On or about June 20, 2014, the Defendant Pitcher called the Plaintiff and informed her that the
Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick suggested he take a statement from the
Plaintiff, gather the Plaintiff’s documentation together with any proof, evidence and/or other
material facts, then provide it all to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick who,
in turn, would send same off to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick’s “special
investigation” department, owed, in part, to the section of the Criminal Code of Canada the
Plaintiff relied upon with respect to her complaints related to her consent allegedly being
vitiated by Fraud.

34. On or about July 11, 2014, the Plaintiff attended the Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock
detachment and provided her statement.

35. From the time the Plaintiff provided her statement on or about July 11, 2014, up to the morning
of September 5, 2014, the Defendant Pitcher several times stated to the Plaintiff that he would
provide the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick with her documentation for them
to begin their investigation into the Plaintiff’s complaints herein referred to. During the period
of time from July 11, 2014 to September 5, 2014, each time the Plaintiff requested an update
from the Defendant Pitcher he responded to her with various reasons for his delay in providing
the documents to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick. The Defendant
Pitcher’s responses were that he was “working on it”, that the Plaintiff needed to “hurry up and
wait”, that he was not able to organize and/or print the large volume of documents easily, as
well as other times the Defendant Pitcher replied to the Plaintiff that he had been on vacation
or he had lengthy court appearances or he had to attend a course. The Defendant Pitcher stated
to the Plaintiff that he would provide the documents to the Office of the Attorney General of
New Brunswick no later than the end of August, 2014, because, as the Plaintiff states, the
Defendant Pitcher advised her he was changing job positions within the Defendant RCMP and
was required to have all of his files finished prior to his change of position.
9

36. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant Pitcher did not explain nor provide to her any other
process other than what he had previously explained to the Plaintiff on June 20, 2014 and again
on July 10, 2014, specifically, the understanding that, due to the special nature of the Plaintiff’s
complaints, the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick was going to investigate
them.

37. On or about the evening of August 28, 2014, the Defendant Pitcher called the Plaintiff’s
residence to say that the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick had been at the
Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock detachment and had been provided with a “CD” containing the
Defendant RCMP’s case file in relation to the Plaintiff’s complaints, including evidence the
Plaintiff had compiled and provided to the Defendant RCMP, both physical documentation and
electronic documentation that was contained on her jump drive.

38. Between August 26, 2014 and September 4, 2014, the Plaintiff contacted several the Office of
the Attorney General of New Brunswick Prosecutor’s offices requesting an on her file, which,
as had been reported to her by the Defendant RCMP, the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick had been provided.

39. Between August 26, 2014 and September 4, 2014, the Woodstock the Office of the Attorney
General of New Brunswick Prosecutor, Brian Munn, did not have any recollection of any file
that bore the name of the Plaintiff, nor any file related to the subject of the Plaintiff’s complaints,
nor of any file that involved the Defendant Pitcher. Two other the Office of the Attorney
General of New Brunswick Prosecutor’s Offices in Fredericton, New Brunswick, also had no
knowledge of any file associated with the Plaintiff, the subject of the Plaintiff’s complaints or
having had come from either the Defendant Pitcher or Brian Munn in relation to the matters
herein mentioned.

40. As a result of being unable to locate her file purportedly being investigated at that time, as stated
to the Plaintiff by the Defendant RCMP, the Plaintiff made several attempts to contact the
Defendant RCMP Officer in charge of the Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock detachment,
Sergeant Don Daigle (“Sgt. Daigle”), a member of the Defendant RCMP.

41. On the morning of September 5, 2014, the Defendant Pitcher called the Plaintiff’s cell phone
and informed her that the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick had made the
decision there was nothing to pursue in relation to the Plaintiff’s complaints, specifically,
allegations of Sexual Assault, Threats, Identity Fraud, Unlawful Entry, and Harassment.

42. The Plaintiff states that, due to the fact that the Defendant Pitcher expressly implied that the
Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick was tasked to investigate the Plaintiff’s
complaints, and due to the fact that not one the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick Prosecutor’s Office the Plaintiff contacted was aware of any file being investigated
in relation to her complaints, and due to the fact that the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick had only been in possession of the documents for less than a week, and, due to the
fact that the Plaintiff was led to believe by the Defendant Pitcher that the Office of the Attorney
General of New Brunswick was responsible to undertake an investigation of the Plaintiff’s
10

complaints, specifically, Sexual Assault, Identity Fraud, Threat and anything else the Office of
the Attorney General of New Brunswick would deem as being criminally actionable based on
the facts together with the evidence they received, the Plaintiff states that she was in a state of
shock and dumbfounded when the Defendant Pitcher stated to her that nothing more would be
done in relation to the Defendant RCMP’s file created as a result of the Plaintiff’s complaint
provided to the Defendant RCMP on May 29, 2014.

43. The Plaintiff arranged to attend the Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock detachment to discuss her
concerns with the Defendant Pitcher’s supervisor, Sgt. Daigle. During the Plaintiff’s meeting
with the Defendant RCMP, Sgt. Daigle and the Defendant Pitcher, the Plaintiff was made aware
that the Defendant Pitcher had been strategically lying about the Defendant RCMP’s complaints
process as well as the scope of his true responsibilities in that process, since June 20, 2014. The
fact is, the Defendant Pitcher merely requested an opinion from the Office of the Attorney
General of New Brunswick. The Defendant Pitcher did not explain to the Plaintiff the true facts
surrounding the Defendant RCMP’s complaints process. In so doing the Defendant Pitcher and
the Defendant RCMP denied the Plaintiff her right to have investigation updates from the
Defendant RCMP, pursuant to the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, Bill C-32 s. 7.(a). The
Defendant Pitcher portrayed himself as “the middle-man” who’s only responsibility in this
matter was to arrange documentation to be sent to the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick, thereby assigning accountability for investigating the Plaintiff’s complaints to the
Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick.

44. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant Pitcher told the Plaintiff to “hurry up and wait”, therefore
the Plaintiff states that she was restricted from being able to ask for any status updates of the
investigation into her complaints until such time as the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick possessed the documents to be provided to them by the Defendant RCMP.

45. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant Pitcher, from the moment he called the Plaintiff on June
20, 2014 to inform her of the “special” circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff’s complaints,
maintained his unwavering misconceptions that the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick was going to investigate the Plaintiff’s allegations in relation to the Plaintiff’s
complaints submitted to the Defendant RCMP on May 29, 2014 and subsequent dates as stated
herein.

46. During the Plaintiff’s meeting with the Defendant RCMP, on September 5, 2014, the Defendant
RCMP, Sgt. Daigle, specifically stated to the Plaintiff, “constable Pitcher’s investigation is very
well documented” and, “his documentation which is done very well … with respect to his
investigative technique”. The Plaintiff was permitted to read the email response from Claude
Haché, the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick Prosecutor who reviewed the
Defendant Pitcher’s opinion request, dated September 3, 2014.

47. Mr. Haché’s email response addressed to the Defendant RCMP, dated September 3, 2014, did
not provide any opinion of the Threat allegations, nor did it contain any opinion as it relates to
Sexual Assaults under s.271 or s.273.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada, nor did it contain an
opinion as it relates to the Identity Fraud allegations, of which the Plaintiff complained.
11

48. The Defendant RCMP committed to the Plaintiff to submit a second package for the Office of
the Attorney General of New Brunswick requesting an addition opinion in relation to the
opinions omitted in Claud Haché’s opinion response email to the Defendant RCMP dated
September 3, 2014, as outlined in paragraph 47.

49. The Defendant Pitcher did not send another request for opinion package to the Office of the
Attorney General of New Brunswick, instead he emailed Mr. Haché at approximately 11:43
a.m., Friday, September 5, 2014, Mr. Haché replied at 11:55 a.m., September 5, 2014,
maintaining his original opinion, previously stated.

50. On September 8, 2014, the Defendant Pitcher informed the Plaintiff that the Office of the
Attorney General of New Brunswick had returned the same opinion as its September 3, 2014
opinion provided to the Defendant RCMP. The Plaintiff states that she asked the Defendant
RCMP how the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick came to be of the same
opinion in spite of the fact that the Defendant RCMP had stated to the Plaintiff that it provided
an opinion request in relation to Sexual Assault, s.271, relying on s.271.3(2)c),d) of the
Criminal Code of Canada, and the opinion request was to have also included allegations of
Threats and Harassment pursuant to the Criminal Code of Canada. The Plaintiff further states
that the Defendant RCMP was unwilling to provide her an answer to her inquiry, herein.

51. The Plaintiff states that she called the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick, Mr.
Claude Haché, on September 8, 2014, to request an explanation as to the Office of the Attorney
General of New Brunswick’s second opinion provided to the Defendant RCMP, however, as
the Plaintiff further states, the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick directed the
Plaintiff to the Defendant RCMP for any and all of her requests for information.

52. On or about September 8, 2014, the Plaintiff states that she spoke with the Defendant RCMP’s
Staff Sergeant Marie Josée Darveau (“Ssgt. Darveau”), the responsible Member for the Western
District of the Defendant RCMP. At that time, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau committed
to looking into the Plaintiff’s concerns, specifically, the Plaintiff’s concerns that there was a
huge problem with the investigation process of the Defendant RCMP in relation to the
Plaintiff’s complaints.

53. On September 12, 2014, the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle left a telephone message with the
Plaintiff requesting she call him to discuss a “go forward process” relating to her complaint.
The Plaintiff made several attempts to contact the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle, however, the
Defendant RCMP was unavailable. Due to the additional evidence the Plaintiff wished to
provide to the Defendant RCMP and due to the fact that the “go forward” might proceed prior
to including the additional evidence the Plaintiff wished to include, aforesaid, on September 17,
2014 the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant RCMP’s Woodstock detachment and requested to
speak with the responsible officer in charge in the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle’s absence.
The Plaintiff states she was informed that the only responsible officer available in the Defendant
RCMP Sgt. Daigle’s absence was the Defendant Pitcher.
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54. On September 17, 2014, the Defendant Pitcher called the Plaintiff in response to her request
to speak with the Defendant RCMP in charge in Sgt. Daigle’s absence, mentioned above. The
Plaintiff states that, during said telephone conversation, herein, the Defendant Pitcher informed
the Plaintiff that:

(a) he had finalized preparations of the package for the “go forward”;

(b) he was not responsible to review, understand, or incorporate any of the French evidence
contained in the Defendant RCMP’s investigation file relating to the Plaintiff’s
complaints. Same evidence was not implemented during the course of the Defendant
Pitcher’s investigation nor was said evidence referenced during the preparation of the
Defendant RCMP’s “court package”;

(c) he was not familiar with the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, as the Plaintiff states he
was unable to recall her name at first;

(d) he never listened to the electronic evidence containing the alleged Threats, and he never
read or listened to any of the correspondences and communications that were in French;

(e) he was on special leave from his new position within the Defendant RCMP in order to
prepare the court package for the “go forward” and the Defendant Pitcher directed the
Plaintiff to provide any additional evidence she wished to provide to the Defendant
RCMP to another member of the Defendant RCMP, at which time the Plaintiff states she
requested that a French speaking member of the Defendant RCMP be made available to
review her additional evidence she wished to provide: and

(f) the Plaintiff states she was also informed by the Defendant Pitcher that, if he had wanted
to review all of the evidence contained in the Defendant RCMP’s investigation file
relating to the Plaintiff’s complaints then the Defendant Pitcher was required to request
the Defendant RCMP for assistance with the evidence that was in French.

55. The Plaintiff states that she requested the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau to have a member
of the Defendant RCMP, who was proficient in both the French and the English languages, and
who had a background and/or experience in investigating Sexual Assault complaints, review
the Defendant Pitcher’s investigation together with all of the evidence provided to the
Defendant RCMP, both French and English evidence, hard copies and electronic copies.

56. The Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau stated to the Plaintiff that, because of her request for a
bilingual member of the Defendant RCMP to review the Defendant Pitcher’s investigation and
evidence in relation to her complaints, a second investigation with a new investigator would be
the appropriate process for the Defendant RCMP.

57. On September 23, 2014, the Plaintiff began a complaint process with the Office of the Attorney
General of New Brunswick, specifically, in relation to Claud Haché. Mr. Haché's supervisor at
the time was Hilary Drain, Q.C.
13

58. On September 24, 2014, the Plaintiff sent an email correspondence to the Office of the
Attorney General of New Brunswick, Ms. Drain, wherein the Plaintiff questioned Mr. Haché’s
approach he took which enabled him to provide the opinion he provided to the Defendant
RCMP. In the correspondence, herein, the Plaintiff advised Mr. Drain of inaccuracies and
omissions in relation to Mr. Haché’s email opinion provided to the Defendant RCMP dated
September 3, 2014 [see par. 47]. The Plaintiff also requested Ms. Drain to review Mr. Haché’s
process which led him to his opinion.

59. Ms. Drain stated to the Plaintiff that a review of the actions and processes taken by Mr. Haché
was undertaken by the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick and it was determined
that, as stated to the Plaintiff in a correspondence from Assistant Deputy Attorney General Luc
LaBonte, Mr. Haché “erred” in “that he failed to have a complete file to come to any
determination. Furthermore, he should have been clearer with the police that his opinion was
based on incomplete material and that his opinion could be different upon a full review.”

60. On or about September 30, 2014, the Plaintiff was contacted by the Defendant RCMP
Constable Liette Theriault (“Cst. Theriault”) who identified herself to the Plaintiff as the
investigator assigned to the Defendant RCMP’s second investigation into the Plaintiffs
complaints originating on May 29, 2014.

61. Due to the inconsistencies and abnormalities of the Defendant RCMP’s and the Office of the
Attorney General of New Brunswick’s processes to date, which, in part, included errors, both
on the part of the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick in that its “opinion was
based on incomplete material” and on the part of the Defendant RCMP in that it provided an
“incomplete file” to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick for their opinion, an
incomplete file which the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle had earlier praised when he expressly
stated that, “constable Pitcher’s investigation is very well documented” and his ”documentation
… is done very well”, and due to the lack of transparency from the Defendant RCMP, due to
the lies of the part of the Defendant RCMP to the Plaintiff, and due to negligence of the
Defendant RCMP’s fiduciary duty in relation to the Plaintiff’s complaints to the Defendant
RCMP, herein mentioned, on October 23, 2014, the Plaintiff submitted to the New Brunswick
Police Commission (“NBPC”), via email correspondence, a complaint alleging criminal
offences had been committed by various RCMP members involved in the Defendant RCMP’s
investigation of the Plaintiff’s complaints to them. The Plaintiff’s complaint provided to the
NBPC, herein, contained allegations including, but not limited to, breaches of the Criminal
Code of Canada, including but not limited to Obstruction of Justice and Conspiracy to Obstruct
Justice.

62. The Plaintiff received a response from the NBPC dated October 24, 2014, stating complaints
against members of the Defendant RCMP are not within the jurisdiction of the New Brunswick
Police Commission, and which advised the Plaintiff of two options for submitting such a
complaint; either to the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (the “CPC”),
currently the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (the “CRCC”), or
the Plaintiff was advised she could contact the Defendant RCMP Roger Brown directly.
14

63. On October 24, 2014, the Plaintiff emailed her complaint, previously mentioned and provided
to the NBPC on October 23, 2014, to the CPC, currently the CRCC.

64. On or about October 29, 2014, the Plaintiff received a package in the mail from the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police Professional Standards Unit, currently the Professional
Responsibilities Unit, (the “Unit”), which contained the following documentation:

(a) A letter dated October 27, 2014 in reference to a complaint the Plaintiff made on October
23, 2014 through the NBPC who, without request or approval, forwarded same to the
attention of the Defendant RCMP’s District Commander, West District, this despite the
NBPC’s earlier correspondence to the Plaintiff advising the Plaintiff of her options for
how she would prefer to submit her complaint;

(b) A Defendant RCMP Public Complaint form (Form PIB P-PU-085), inaccurately and
incompletely filled out; and

(c) A copy of a correspondence from the NBPC and addressed to the Plaintiff dated October
24, 2014.

65. The CRCC refused to investigation the Plaintiff’s complaint she submitted to them October 24,
2014, citing a complaint had already been submitted with the Defendant RCMP. The CRCC
informed the Plaintiff that any related complaints against the Defendant RCMP would need to
be investigated through the same Defendant RCMP process currently in process by the Unit.
The CRCC further informed the Plaintiff that all future complaints in relation to the Defendant
RCMP’s investigation involving the Plaintiff’s complaints originating on May 29, 2014, could
not be investigated by the CRCC but instead would need to be submitted to the Unit, if the
Plaintiff wished to submit any additional complaints relating to the Defendant RCMP’s
investigation of her May 29, 2014 complaints.

66. On or about December 12, 2014, the Plaintiff called the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau to
follow up on a previous telephone conversation with Ssgt. Darveau, wherein, the Plaintiff
requested to discuss her complaints. The Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau denied the Plaintiff
said discussion. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau stated a conflict of
interest prevented the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau from discussing the Plaintiff’s
complaint against the Defendant RCMP. During the December 12, 2014, telephone
conversation, herein, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau informed the Plaintiff that, on
December 11, 2014, she spoke with the supervisor of the Sergeant she wished to assign as
investigator for the Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant RCMP in order to request said
supervisor if the Defendant RCMP could, “use your guy”.

67. On or about December 17, 2014 the Plaintiff received a 3rd correspondence from the Unit dated
December 16, 2014, wherein the Plaintiff was advised the investigator of her complaints against
the Defendant RCMP was reassigned from the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, as was
indicated in a correspondence from the Unit dated December 10, 2014, to the investigator whom
15

the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau had specifically requested, Sergeant Jean-Pierre Dufresne
(“Sgt. Dufresne”).

68. Each correspondence from the Unit up to an including December 17, 2014, stated the
investigator, “will be in contact with you”, while the December 2014 correspondences followed
up with, “to discuss your concerns”, “you” and “your” being the Plaintiff.

69. In December of 2014 and January of 2015, the Plaintiff contacted various members of the
Defendant RCMP in an attempt to meet with the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne to discuss her
concerns, specifically, the Plaintiff’s concerns that the Public Complaint form (Form P-PU-
085), same that had been filled in by the Defendant RCMP and which had subsequently been
sent to the Plaintiff, was negligently filled in by the Defendant RCMP.

70. The Plaintiff made several attempts to arrange a meeting with the Defendant RCMP, Cst.
Theriault and Sgt. Daigle, so that she could discuss her concerns regarding the Defendant
RCMP’s investigation into her complaints initiated May 29, 2014. In December of 2014, the
Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault refused the Plaintiff’s request outright and the Defendant
RCMP Sgt. Daigle did not respond to the Plaintiff’s multiple voice and telephone messages left
with and for him.

71. The Plaintiff made several attempts to speak with the Defendant RCMP in relation to her
various complaints, attempts including, but not limited to, the following communications:

(a) On December 11, 2014, the Plaintiff called the Defendant RCMP’s Dispatch requesting
to be transferred to the “Unit”. The Plaintiff was transferred to the Defendant RCMP
Oromocto, NB detachment and spoke with a man who identified himself as Inspector Dan
Goodwin;

(b) On December 17, 2014, the Plaintiff again spoke with the Defendant RCMP Cst.
Theriault who refused to provide the Plaintiff an update;

(c) On January 5, 2015, the Plaintiff left a 4th message with the Defendant RCMP Sgt.
Daigle requesting a meeting to discuss her questions;

(d) On January 8, 2015, the Plaintiff attended the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment
and provided the Defendant RCMP her notes relating to telephone conversations she had
previously provided electronically to the Defendant RCMP. The Defendant RCMP Sgt.
Daigle was at the detachment on January 8, 2015, and he permitted the Plaintiff to meet
with him for a brief period of time. At that time the Plaintiff requested the Defendant
RCMP to update her on which charges the Defendant RCMP was requesting/“putting
forward” in the Defendant RCMP’s court package and which charges were not be
requested/put forward. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle informed
her that he would have to verify with the Defendant RCMP supervisor as to whether or
not the Defendant RCMP was permitted to provide the Plaintiff with that information;
16

(e) On January 13, 2015, the Defendant RCMP Constable Heather Ellis (“Cst. Ellis”) called
the Plaintiff as a result of the Plaintiff’s attempts to speak with the Defendant RCMP
Chief Superintendent Wayne Gallant (“CSup. Gallant”). During the Plaintiff’s telephone
conversation with the Defendant RCMP Cst. Ellis the Plaintiff again requested permission
for an update in relation to her complaints initiated May 29, 2014; and

(f) On January 14, 2015, the Plaintiff called the Defendant RCMP’s Oromocto detachment
to leave a message with the Defendant RCMP Dan Goodwin’s assistant, Sheila. The
Plaintiff was transferred to Sheila’s phone, however, another officer answered her phone.
The Plaintiff was not permitted to leave a voice message for the Defendant RCMP
Inspector Goodwin. The male who answered Sheila’s phone offered to take a message
for Sheila. The Plaintiff chose to call Sheila again, a second attempt to leave her a voice
message, however, the receptionist, at that time, informed the Plaintiff there was no way
for the Plaintiff to leave a voice message, therefore the receptionist offered to send Sheila
an email regarding the Plaintiff’s call.

72. On January 11, 2015, or there about, the Plaintiff received a correspondence update from the
Unit wherein the words, “will be in contact with you to discuss your concerns”, were replaced
by, “Please be advised that your complaint is still investigation. Sergeant Dufresne will attempt
to have it completed as soon as possible.” the Plaintiff continued to reach out to various
members of the Defendant RCMP, whomever the Plaintiff thought might be able to assist her
to arrange a meeting with the Defendant RCMP’s investigator assigned to her complaints
against the Defendant RCMP, Sgt. Dufresne.

73. On January 12, 2015, the Plaintiff spoke with the Defendant RCMP Inspector Goodwin’s
assistant respecting the Defendant RCMP’s lack of transparency and/or updates of information
relating to the Defendant RCMP’s investigation into the Plaintiffs complaints initiated May 29,
2014. The Defendant RCMP Inspector Goodwin’s assistant committed to taking a message
from the Plaintiff and providing it to the Defendant RCMP Inspector Goodwin.

74. On January 14, 2015, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau called the Plaintiff in response to
the Plaintiff’s messages left earlier that day with Sheila, the Defendant RCMP Inspector Dan
Goodwin’s assistant. The Plaintiff again requested the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau to
provide the Plaintiff with an answer as to whether or not the Plaintiff was permitted an update
on the status of the Defendant RCMP’s investigation into her complaints initiated May 29,
2014.

75. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau informed the Plaintiff that she, Ssgt.
Darveau, was of the opinion that both the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick,
specifically, Hilary Drain, and the Defendant RCMP Corporal Marty VanDijk (“Cprl.
VanDijk”) provided the Plaintiff with information relating to the legal aspects of the Defendant
RCMP’s investigation relating to the Plaintiff’s complaints initiated May 29, 2014. The
Plaintiff immediately corrected the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau at that time stating that at
no point did the Plaintiff receive any information on the processes of the Defendant RCMP’s
investigation, in fact, the Plaintiff states she told the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau that the
17

meeting between herself and the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick was for Ms.
Drain to explain to the Plaintiff the outcome of the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick’s review into the Plaintiff’s complaint relating to Mr. Haché’s “error”, which by
way of fact, Ms. Drain informed the Plaintiff that Mr. Haché was talked to and he agreed to
never do it again.

76. During the above-mentioned conversation, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau stated that the
only possible legal aspect available to pursue was that of emotional harm the Plaintiff suffered,
the Defendant RCMP stating she could not recall the section of the Criminal Code, however
the Defendant RCMP stated to the Plaintiff it was what was being suggested to the Office of
the Attorney General of New Brunswick prosecutor in the court package.

77. During the same telephone conversation of January 14, 2015 with the Defendant RCMP,
aforesaid, the Defendant RCMP stated that charges of Threat “won’t go ahead”, the Defendant
RCMP stating that they didn’t have the evidence for that, specifically, the Defendant RCMP
stated that she read the text messages, yet the fact is, the threats are contained in audio files, not
text. Then the Defendant RCMP went on to explain that a Threat must be specifically stated in
words in order to be considered illegal and the Defendant RCMP were not requesting Threat
charges.

78. During the January 14, 2015, telephone conversation with the Defendant RCMP, the Defendant
RCMP reiterated to the Plaintiff that she, Ssgt. Darveau, was the Plaintiff’s point of contact for
whenever the Plaintiff had any concerns and the Plaintiff was to go to her, Ssgt. Darveau, and
not her superiors, as her superiors would, in turn, contact her, Ssgt. Darveau, and would not
speak directly with the Plaintiff, which, the Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP told her, would
delay any response the Plaintiff was looking for.

79. During the January 14, 2015, telephone conversation, the Defendant RCMP responded to the
Plaintiff’s concern that the Defendant RCMP Corporal Lloyd Harquail (“Cprl. Harquail”),
whom the Plaintiff had submitted a complaint against, was the supervising officer assigned to
review the Defendant RCMP’s investigation file relating to the Plaintiff’s complaints initiating
May 29, 2014. The Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, at that time, informed the Plaintiff that
the RCMP are “like the Military in a lot of ways”, in this instance that the RCMP have processes
in place to address possible conflicts of interest. the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau also stated
to the Plaintiff that the Defendant RCMP Cprl. Harquail, Sgt. Daigle and herself were all in this
file together.

80. On January 18, 2015, the Plaintiff sent an email correspondence to Assistant Deputy Attorney
General, Luc LaBonte describing the abuse of process of the Defendant RCMP the Plaintiff
was facing. Mr. LaBonté’s reply, dated January 19, 2015, redirected the Plaintiff, again, to
contact the Defendant RCMP’s Criminal Operations Officer Wayne Gallant at the Defendant
RCMP Headquarters in Fredericton, New Brunswick.

81. On or about January 21, 2015, the Defendant RCMP, Jean Denys Richard, the Public
Complaint Reviewer from the Unit, finally contacted the Plaintiff as a result of her numerous
18

phone conversations with the Defendant RCMP Julie Beaulieu of Criminal Operations, RCMP
Headquarters. The Plaintiff was able to convince the Defendant RCMP Richard to add to her
Complaint Form (Form P-PU-085) the names of the other members of the Defendant RCMP as
listed in the Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant RCMP of, but not limited to, breaches
of the Criminal Code of Canada, dated October 23, 2014, addressed to the NBPC.

82. On January 22 and 23, 2015, the Plaintiff spoke with the Defendant RCMP Julie Beaulieu a
few times requesting to know what charges were in the court package. At one point the Plaintiff
states she was told by the Defendant RCMP Beaulieu that a second package could be created
and sent requesting Threat charges if they weren’t requested in the first package. During one
of the conversations the Plaintiff states that the Defendant RCMP Beaulieu confirmed that
Sexual Assault Fraud, Sexual Assault Position of Trust and Threats were all being brought
forward in the package.

83. On February 3, 2015, during a telephone conversation with the Defendant RCMP Ssgt.
Darveau, the Defendant RCMP denied that Threat charges were being put forward in the court
package and admitted that she was responsible for misdirecting the Defendant RCMP Beaulieu
with the misconception of what charges the Defendant RCMP was putting forward.

84. Despite several attempts, the Plaintiff states, on the part of the Plaintiff to speak with the
Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, it was not until February 24, 2015, the day after the Plaintiff
submitted a complaint to the CRCC dated February 23, 2015 that the Defendant RCMP Sgt.
Dufresne contacted the Plaintiff.

85. The Plaintiff met with the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne on February 26, 2015, at the
Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment.

86. On February 26, 2015, the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne explained to the Plaintiff, as she
states, that he thoroughly reviewed the Defendant Pitcher’s entire file. The Defendant RCMP
Sgt. Dufresne was confused with the Plaintiff’s adamant statements that she reported Sexual
Violation/Sexual Assault during her initial complaint to the Defendant RCMP on May 29, 2014.
In fact, Sgt. Dufresne was convinced that not a single mention of allegations of Sexual Assault
was part of the Plaintiff’s initial complaint on May 29, 2014, and that he understood, from his
thorough review of the Defendant Pitcher’s investigation file, that only Threats were reported
during the Plaintiff’s original complaint on May 29, 2014.

87. The Plaintiff stated to the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, during the February 26, 2014
meeting, above, that, if the above were a fact and that no mention of Sexual Assault was
documented in relation to her initial complaint to the RCMP on May 29, 2014, then in that case,
as the Plaintiff states she told to the Defendant RCMP, it must mean that the first and only
report the Defendant RCMP documented in regard to her initial complaints was in relation to
the Plaintiff’s telephone call to the Defendant RCMP dispatch on or about June 13, 2015,
wherein the Plaintiff specifically stated to the Defendant RCMP dispatch operator that she felt
Threatened by the subject of her complaint.
19

88. The Plaintiff states that she told the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, during their meeting,
aforesaid, that she was then forced to believe that no report could have been created by the
Defendant RCMP in relation to her calls to the Defendant RCMP dispatch, and subsequent
telephone conversations with the Defendant Pitcher and the Defendant RCMP Constable
Aldrene Guiste, aforesaid, conversations that took place with the Defendant RCMP at the end
of May and beginning of June 2014.

89. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, during his meeting with the Plaintiff on February 26,
2014, opened his investigation folder and read directly from it to the Plaintiff. The Defendant
RCMP read the date as May 29, 2014 being the date of the Defendant Pitcher’s report. The
Defendant RCMP read in the first person, meaning, the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne read
words such as, “I”, “I didn’t think”, “so I” etc, reading to the Plaintiff word for word from the
paper, skimming his finger across the page, near the words he was reading out loud.

90. The Defendant RCMP’s report, composed by the Defendant Pitcher and relating to the
Plaintiff’s initial complaint call to the Defendant RCMP, dated May 29, 2014, as stated by the
Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne when he confirmed the date to the Plaintiff during their
February 26, 2014 meeting, aforesaid, and not one mention of Sexual Assault was written
therein.

91. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, during the February 26, 2014 meeting with the Plaintiff,
aforesaid, informed the Plaintiff he was not conducting an investigation into any criminal
allegations.

92. The Plaintiff states she was informed by the Defendant RCMP during their meeting, above, that
the Defendant RCMP was tasked only to review the Defendant RCMP’s administrative
processes, focusing his review on the current and ongoing investigation in order to ensure that
all of the correct procedures were currently being followed in relation to the Defendant RCMP
Cst. Theriault’s investigation and court package.

93. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP gave her the impression they wanted all their i's dotted
and all their t’s crossed to ensure the Plaintiff’s complaints initiated May 29, 2014 were being
handled aright. the Plaintiff took it as a huge slap in the face because if the Plaintiff had wanted
the current, ongoing investigation to be reviewed the Plaintiff would have asked for the current,
ongoing investigation to be reviewed. The Plaintiff wanted the Defendant Pitcher investigated.

94. The Plaintiff attended the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment on February 27, 2015, to
report breaches of the Criminal Code of Canada allegedly committed by members of the
Defendant RCMP, requests for criminal investigation that the Plaintiff had thought she had
already done properly when the Plaintiff reported said allegations to the NBPC on October 23,
2014.

95. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne informed the Plaintiff, during their February 26th, 2015
meeting, aforesaid, that it was not the Defendant RCMP’s mandate to investigate criminal
allegations, yet he did not explain to the Plaintiff how she was supposed to initiate a complaint
20

process that would result in an unbiased investigation into the allegations of breaches of the
Criminal Code of Canada. The Plaintiff was left to guess as to what she was required to do in
order to have the Defendant RCMP investigated, so the Plaintiff attended the Defendant RCMP
Woodstock detachment and requested to speak with a uniformed member of the Defendant
RCMP.

96. On February 27, 2014, the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment’s receptionist and a
female uniformed member met the Plaintiff at the desk window. The female member, herein,
would not permit the Plaintiff speak to any RCMP officer, citing that the Plaintiff had already
submitted a complaint in relation to the matter and that that process was the only avenue
available to the Plaintiff for lodging complaints against the Defendant RCMP. The Plaintiff
explained to the female member that the Defendant RCMP assigned to investigate her
complaints against the Defendant RCMP had specifically stated that he was not investigating
any criminal allegations, only administrative actions. The Plaintiff was again refused the right
to speak with an RCMP member therefore the Plaintiff requested the female member to write a
note in her note pad indicating the date the Plaintiff was at the detachment, aforesaid, that the
Plaintiff requested to speak to an RCMP member, and that the Plaintiff was refused. The female
RCMP member would only write the Plaintiff’s name in her notepad but refused to write any
details relating to the Plaintiff purpose for attending the detachment.

97. Due to the six-month statute of limitations on summery offences having expired, a fact of which
the Plaintiff had only recently become aware, due to the fact that the Defendant RCMP only
chose to inform the Plaintiff after the fact that the statute of limitations had run out for her being
able to pursue Threat charges for summery offences, due to the fact that the Plaintiff thought
she might be within the statute of limitation for the summary offence of Obstruction of Justice,
the Plaintiff states the only choice she believed she had available to her for having criminal
charges laid against the Defendant Pitcher was to lay information, which is what the Plaintiff
did.

98. The judge (it was an in camera proceeding so the Plaintiff can’t say much – the Plaintiff has the
recordings of all three hearings, the Judge referred to the hearing as an “exercise” as he put it)
he did not permit the Plaintiff to present her case to the court nor did he permit the Plaintiff to
refer to the abundance of her evidence or to any case law the Plaintiff had submitted to the court
prior to the hearings, information she believed she was entitled to have available so as to be
permitted to reference it. The Judge did permit the Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick who was there present to refer to his two single documents he had submitted to the
court though.

99. From March 7, 2015, in a correspondence to the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, the Plaintiff
requested an update on her complaints against the Defendant RCMP as to why he was not
investigating the criminal offenses the Plaintiff alleged were committed by the Defendant
RCMP. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne did not respond to the Plaintiff’s update request
so the Plaintiff attended the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment to verify the Defendant
RCMP Sgt. Dufresne’s email address. After verifying the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne’s
email address the Plaintiff sent subsequent requests. The Plaintiff states she felt the need to
21

provide the emails to the CRCC also, same which the Plaintiff wanted included with her
complaint to CRCC, as she was directed by CRCC in an email correspondence addressed to her
dated February 27, 2015.

100. On March 11, 2015, the Plaintiff left several messages for both the Defendant RCMP Ssgt.
Darveau and Sgt. Dufresne with specific details that the Plaintiff was requesting direction from
the Defendant RCMP on how to proceed with having her allegations of criminal offences
investigated.

101. On March 12, 2015, the Plaintiff received a reply from the NBPC stating, again, that, if the
Plaintiff was unsatisfied with the Defendant RCMP, she could contact the CRCC.

102. On March 13, 2015, after being refused her right to speak to any member of the Defendant
RCMP in February, aforesaid, so as to report on the Defendant Pitcher’s criminal offences, after
the Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault refused the Plaintiff transparency and/or to provide her
with an update in relation to the Defendant RCMP’s second investigation, aforesaid, because
of delay’s due to the Defendant RCMP’s second investigation, aforesaid, delays which caused
statute of limitations of summary offences to expire, thereby removing any possibility for any
legal action to be taken against the subject of the Plaintiff’s complaints for any and all summary
offences, after being told by the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne that criminal allegations
against members of the Defendant RCMP are not investigated through the Public Complaints
process, after being ignored by the Defendant RCMP Sgts Darveau, Daigle and Dufresne in
relation to requests to be provided direction on how to report criminal offences allegedly
committed by members of the Defendant RCMP, and because the Plaintiff wanted to report
new and different allegations of criminal offences committed by a different member of the
Defendant RCMP, a new report that wasn’t already caught in the Defendant RCMP Professional
Standards/Responsibility Unit’s Public Complaints web of self investigation, the Plaintiff did
the only thing the Plaintiff states she could think of apart from laying another information, the
Plaintiff went to the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment, aforesaid, to report on the
Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault’s actions and omissions and breaches of her fiduciary duty.

103. The Plaintiff states it was her intention, on March 13, 2015, above, to report on the Defendant
RCMP Cst. Theriault, specifically, that the Defendant RCMP Theriault infringed on the
Plaintiff’s rights to fair, timely and equal justice. It was at that point in time that the receptionist
at the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment informed the Plaintiff that the only three (3)
members of the Defendant RCMP which the Plaintiff was permitted to speak with were,
specifically:

(a) the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle, who was refusing to respond to the Plaintiff’s requests
to speak with him;

(b) the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, who was refusing to respond to the Plaintiff’s
requests for direction on how to initiate an investigation into criminal wrongdoing, same
who was:
22

1. conflicted from investigating the Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant


Pitcher; and
2. responsible for selecting both:
i. the Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault, same who is currently under investigation
for allegations of breaches of the Criminal Code of Canada; and
ii. the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, same who is currently under investigation
for allegations of breaches of the Criminal Code of Canada; and

(c) the 3rd member the Plaintiff was only permitted to speak with was the Defendant RCMP
Sgt. Dufresne, who also was refusing to respond to the Plaintiff’s requests to speak with
him.

104. Immediately following being refused assistance from the Defendant RCMP Woodstock
detachment, after being refused her right to speak with a member of the Defendant RCMP, the
Plaintiff called the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau to again inquire about how she, the
Plaintiff, was specifically supposed to report breaches of the Criminal Code of Canada
allegedly committed by members of the Defendant RCMP. After requesting the Defendant
RCMP Ssgt. Darveau to explain to the Plaintiff how she was supposed to report criminal
wrongdoing against members of the Defendant RCMP, the Plaintiff states that the Defendant
RCMP Ssgt. Darveau told the Plaintiff that she, the Plaintiff, had the option to lay an
information and the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau refused to arrange for the Plaintiff to speak
with any one in relation to her new complaint. The fact is and the Plaintiff states, the Defendant
RCMP Ssgt. Darveau told the Plaintiff that, “nobody tells me what to do”, after the Plaintiff
demanded that the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau document her requests for direction, as
stated herein.

105. Immediately following her conversation with the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, the Plaintiff
called the Defendant RCMP’s dispatch, 1-888-506-RCMP, in relation to her requests relating
to reporting criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the Defendant RCMP and
to state that the Defendant RCMP was refusing to facilitate said reporting, specifically, that the
Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau had just refused her any assistance.

106. On March 16, 2015, in a correspondence to the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, the Plaintiff
informed Sgt. Dufresne that she had been trying to contact him in regard to his comments he
made to her during their February 26, 2015 meeting, aforementioned, wherein he specifically
stated that he was not investigating any criminal allegations, aforesaid. The Plaintiff further
informed the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, in said correspondence, that the Defendant
RCMP refused to permit the Plaintiff to make a statement at the Defendant RCMP Woodstock
detachment in regard to her allegations of criminal wrongdoing if the wrongdoing alleged to
have been committed was allegedly committed by a member of the Defendant RCMP. The fact
is and the Plaintiff states that she was informed by the Defendant RCMP that she was only
permitted to make a public complaint if the Plaintiff wanted to report crimes allegedly
committed by members of the Defendant RCMP, and she was further informed that, because
she had already initiated a complaint, she was not permitted to speak to any member of the
Defendant RCMP.
23

107. In the above-mentioned correspondence to the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, the Plaintiff
expressed her concern that the Defendant RCMP was delaying in responding to her reporting
of criminal offences, and the Plaintiff suggested that the delay was a deliberate attempt to again
allow statute of limitations to expire for the summary offence of Criminal Obstruction, which,
as the Plaintiff states she verily believed, would again remove any opportunity for summary
offence charges to be a possibility for her, this time, however, preventing her from having
summary offence charges brought against the Defendant RCMP and/or the Defendant Pitcher.

108. Also in the above-mentioned correspondence to Sgt. Dufresne, the Plaintiff stated her concerns
that the Defendant RCMP were not facilitating her right to report on crimes allegedly committed
by members of the Defendant RCMP. The Plaintiff stated that, not only were the Defendant
RCMP not facilitating a process for her to be able to report criminal activity, they were, in fact,
refusing to permit the Plaintiff to do so.

109. The Plaintiff again requested the Defendant RCMP to instruct her on how a person is supposed
to have allegations of criminal wrongdoing investigated with a view to having the wrongdoer
held criminally responsible. The Plaintiff subsequently received acknowledgement from the
Defendant RCMP that her emails had been received and she was instructed to, “let me look into
your request and I will get back to you”. The Defendant RCMP never did “get back to” the
Plaintiff in relation to her March 16, 2015 correspondence.

110. The Plaintiff states she emailed the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne on March 16, 2015, since
he was not responding to her attempts to contact him, and the Plaintiff states she wished to
inform him that the Defendant RCMP would not permit her to make a statement in regard to
her allegations of criminal wrongdoing when and if the wrongdoing is alleged to have been
committed by a member of the Defendant RCMP. The Plaintiff was told, as stated, that the
Plaintiff must make a public complaint if the Plaintiff wanted to report crimes allegedly
committed by member of the Defendant RCMP, and the Plaintiff was told that because the
Plaintiff had already initiated a complaint, which the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne himself
was assigned to investigate, the Plaintiff was not permitted to do any other reporting on the
matter with any member of the Defendant RCMP.

111. The Plaintiff states she was seeking clarification from the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne as
to why the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne stated that he would not, and was not, investigating
anything in relation to criminal wrongdoing.

112. On March 17, 2015, Sgt. Dufresne replied to the Plaintiff’s inquiries stating he would review
her request and he wrote,” I will get back to you”. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne did not
“get back to” the Plaintiff in relation to her request for clarification, above.

113. The Plaintiff states that, because the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne did not respond to her
request for clarification, on March 23, 2015, she forwarded some correspondences to the
Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne’s supervising Officers, specifically, the Defendant RCMP
Ssgt. Darveau and the Defendant RCMP Chief Superintendent Wayne Gallant, thereby bringing
24

to the attention of the Defendant RCMP that her attempts, and rights, to be provided direction
from the Defendant RCMP in relation to reporting allegations of criminal offences/wrongdoing
committed by members of the Defendant RCMP, were being infringed upon by the Defendant
RCMP.

114. The Plaintiff states and she verily believes that, as at March 17, 2015, the Defendant RCMP
was fully aware, or ought to have known, or was willfully blind to the facts that the Plaintiff
was alleging criminal wrongdoing on the part of various members of the Defendant RCMP and
that the Plaintiff was requesting the Defendant RCMP to investigate said criminal allegations.

115. In the above-mentioned correspondence to the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, dated March
16, 2015, among other things, the Plaintiff expressed her concern that the Defendant RCMP
were delaying in responding to her reporting of criminal offences, and the Plaintiff suggested
therein that the delays were a deliberate attempt to allow statute of limitations to expire, thereby
eliminating the option to pursue any summary offence charges for Criminal Obstruction and/or
related offences against the Defendant RCMP and the Defendant Pitcher.

116. Also in the above-mentioned correspondence to the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, March
16, 2015, the Plaintiff stated her concerns that the Defendant RCMP was not facilitating her
right to report crimes allegedly committed by members of the Defendant RCMP. The Plaintiff
stated therein, that, not only was the Defendant RCMP not facilitating the Plaintiff being able
to report criminal activity, it was, in fact, refusing to permit the Plaintiff to do so, and the
Plaintiff again requested to be provided direction on how a person is supposed to have
allegations of criminal wrongdoing investigated with a view to having the wrongdoer held
criminally responsible when said alleged wrongdoer is a member of the Defendant RCMP.

117. On March 26, 2015, the Plaintiff again sent correspondence to the Defendant RCMP Chief
Superintendent Wayne Gallant. The Plaintiff states she sent said correspondence due to the fact
that she was not receiving direction from the Defendant RCMP on how to pursue criminal
action against its Member(s).

118. The Plaintiff states that, because the Defendant RCMP did not respond to her correspondence
to the Defendant RCMP Chief Superintendent Wayne Gallant, above, on March 30, 2015 she
sent an email to: specifically, the Defendant RCMP Chief Superintendent Wayne Gallant at
wayne.gallane@rcmp-grc.gc.ca, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau at marie-
josee.darveau@rcmp-grc.gc.ca, the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne at jean-
pierre.dufresne@rcmp-grc.gc.ca, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission at
complaints@crcc-ccetp.gc.ca, and the Plaintiff also attempted to include the Defendant RCMP
Inspector Daniel Goodwin at Daniel.goodwin@rcmp-grc.gc.ca, but his email did not send.
(Inspector Goodwin’s email address returned to her inbox a notification re, Delivery to the
following recipient failed permanently: Daniel.goodwin@rcmp-grc.gc.ca).

119. The Plaintiff states and verily believe that, as at March 30, 2015, the Defendant RCMP was
fully aware, or ought to have known, or was willfully blind to the fact that the Plaintiff was
25

alleging criminal wrongdoing on the part of members of the Defendant RCMP and that the
Plaintiff was requesting the Defendant RCMP to investigate said criminal allegations.

120. On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, the Plaintiff states that because the Defendant RCMP had not
acknowledged her several requests for direction on how to report crimes committed by
members of the Defendant RCMP, the Plaintiff again called the Defendant RCMP requesting
direction on how she was supposed to provide a statement in regard to the alleged criminal
offences allegedly committed by members of the Defendant RCMP.

121. On April 1, 2015, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau responded, via email, to the Plaintiff’s
correspondence of March 30, 2015.

122. At approximately 11:30 a.m., April 1, 2015, the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau emailed the
Plaintiff in response to the Plaintiff’s telephone call to the Defendant RCMP Woodstock
detachment., wherein the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau stated she was made aware of the
Plaintiff’s phone call, “regarding a complaint against an RCMP officer”, and the Defendant
RCMP Ssgt. Darveau further stated, “Your request is with my supervisor and someone will be
in touch with you.”.

123. The Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau did not commit to the Plaintiff on March 13, 2015, that
“someone will be in touch”, despite the fact, as the Plaintiff states, that the Plaintiff begged the
Defendant RCMP Ssgt. to arrange for someone to get in touch with.

124. The Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau’s comments in her April 1, 2015 email to the Plaintiff at
approximately 11:30 a.m., are deceptive and manipulative of the fact that the Defendant RCMP
Ssgt. Darveau was well aware of the Plaintiff’s attempts to make a “complaint against an RCMP
officer”.

125. The Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau’s comments in her April 1, 2015 email to the Plaintiff at
approximately 11:30 a.m., are deceiving and manipulative to the fact that she, the Defendant
RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, herself personally arranged for the Plaintiff to be denied the option to
provide any statement to the Defendant RCMP in relation to a “complaint against an RCMP
officer”.

126. The actions of the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau are contrary to the RCMP Act wherein it
states that RCMP Members are required to assist the complainant in the complaint process and
shall not, in any way, hinder the complainant and/or the complaint process.

127. The fact that the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau made arrangements to deny the Plaintiff
access to the Defendant RCMP, other than herself, Sgt. Dufresne, or Sgt. Daigle, so that the
Plaintiff was unable to make any further complaints, was specifically detailed to the investigator
assigned to investigate the Plaintiff’s public complaint against the Defendant RCMP Ssgt.
Darveau, namely, the Defendant RCMP Staff Sergeant James Bates, (“Ssgt. Bates”), as
confirmed in a correspondence received from Sgt. Christensen dated May 5, 2015.
26

128. On April 2, 2015, the Plaintiff spoke with the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen on the phone.
At that time, he was misdirected in relation to the subject of the Plaintiff’s public complaint, as
the Plaintiff states in her correspondence of April 12, 2015.

129. The Plaintiff states and she verily believes that inaccuracies and discrepancies such as those
described in her correspondence of April 12, 2015, further support her allegations that the
Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau had been refusing to discuss and/or consider her multiple
requests for direction from the Defendant RCMP.

130. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen requested the Plaintiff to provide him with details of
her complaint/allegations, which the Plaintiff did via email dated April 7, 2015, and the
Plaintiff copied the Commission on same. Various correspondences were exchanged between
the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen and the Plaintiff, to arrange a date and time to discuss
and sign her complaint.

131. On April 16, 2015, the Plaintiff requested the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen to explain to
her why arrangements had so quickly been made for the Plaintiff to be permitted to sign her
complaint forms, same complaints submitted on April 7, 2015, when she did not yet, and was
not permitted to, sign her complaint submitted to the NBPC October 23, 2014.

132. Up to and including April 16, 2015, the Defendant RCMP refused to arrange and/or facilitate
an opportunity for the Plaintiff to review, discuss, and sign a copy of her complaints relating to
her October 23, 2014 complaint submitted to the NBPC, despite the Plaintiff’s several requests
to do same.

133. By denying a complainant the opportunity to be provided assistance when requested, in relation
to complaints against members of the Defendant RCMP, the Defendant RCMP acted contrary
to, but in no way limited to, the RCMP Act complaints process.

134. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen, after arranging a date and time to meet with the
Plaintiff in order to discuss and sign her complaint, after assuring the Plaintiff that he is
“required to conduct a short interview”, after suggesting, “perhaps we can meet on Friday,
2015-04-17, to do this portion of the investigation”, as stated in his correspondence dated April
13, 2015, and after reassuring the Plaintiff how open to discussion he was by stating, “I strongly
feel is it all about communication”, as stated in his correspondence dated April 15, 2015, the
Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen insisted there would be no opportunity for the Plaintiff to
discuss with him her complaint/allegations as stated in his correspondence dated April 16,
2015, received by the Plaintiff the night before their meeting. This abrupt change by the
Defendant RCMP left the Plaintiff with concerns, as she states, relating to her complaint, which
the investigator refused to acknowledge and/or address.

135. On April 17, 2015, the Plaintiff signed both Public Complaint forms (Form PPU-085) in
relation to her complaints against the Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault and the Defendant RCMP
Darveau. Neither of the complaints against the Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault and the
Defendant RCMP Darveau had begun the investigation process and no report had yet been
27

provided to the Unit in relation to any investigation into said complaints as at April 17, 2015.
Both complaint forms, herein, were classified by the Defendant RCMP.

136. The Defendant RCMP did classify the Public Complaint forms (Form PPU-085) for both the
Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault and the Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau, wherein, at Appendix
B - Table of Allegations, the classification F. Neglect of Duty, was filled in by the Defendant
RCMP, same classification was input on said forms as at the signing of same on April 17, 2015.

137. The surveillance footage and/or activity log of the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen will
indicate that he was actually at the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment for at least an
hour and a half, walking in and out of the interrogation room where the Plaintiff was placed so
that the Plaintiff could sign the complaint forms.

138. The Plaintiff states and verily believes, despite the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen’s
insistence to her that he did “not have time” to discuss her complaint, that he, in fact, did have
time. The fact is and the Plaintiff further states, the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen
wandered in and out of the room, where he placed the Plaintiff, for approximately an hour,
leaving the room each time when he noted the Plaintiff hadn’t signed, but refused to stay in the
room to give the Plaintiff the opportunity to pose any questions. The Plaintiff was left with
what she states she believes was the only option, that being to sign the forms, as they were and
having been previously filled out by the Defendant RCMP.

139. The Plaintiff later provided the Defendant RCMP with an email requesting amendments to the
forms she signed but was not permitted to discuss with the Defendant RCMP. The Plaintiff
further states she felt compelled by the Defendant RCMP to sign the forms as they were, on
April 17, 2015.

140. The actions of the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Christensen, given that did have time available to
discuss the forms with the Plaintiff, aforesaid, but that he chose to avoid being in the same room
with the Plaintiff for any length of time so as to afford the Plaintiff the opportunity to pose
questions in relation to said forms, those actions are contrary to the RCMP Act wherein it states
that RCMP Members are required to assist the complainant in the complaint process and shall
not, in any way, hinder the complainant and/or the complaint process.

141. The Defendant RCMP later transferred RCMP Sgt. Jim Christensen who was initially assigned
to investigate the Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault and the
Defendant RCMP Ssgt. Darveau.

142. The Defendant RCMP reassigned the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne to investigate the
Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant RCMP Cst. Theriault., the same Sgt. Dufresne who
refused to investigate the Plaintiff’s allegations of criminal offences against the Defendant
Pitcher.

143. The Plaintiff requested the CRCC to interview/question RCMP Sgt. Jim Christensen to
determine if he might shed light on the circumstances surrounding his initial assignment to
28

investigate her complaints/allegations of criminal offences committed by the Defendant RCMP


Cst. Theriault, and what, if any, explanation he was provided in relation to his subsequent
transfer which removed him from his investigative assignment, herein.

144. On May 8, 2015, the Plaintiff again requested the Defendant RCMP to permit her an
opportunity to review her complaint form for potential signing. Up to and including this date,
herein, not one member of the Defendant RCMP followed up with the Plaintiff to
arrange/facilitate an opportunity for the Plaintiff to review any complaint form which the
Defendant RCMP had created on her behalf.

145. The Plaintiff states that a representative of the CRCC for the RCMP advised her that the
Commission does not investigate any allegations against the Defendant RCMP and/or its
member(s) relating to breaches of the Criminal Code of Canada, nor does it investigate
allegations of other criminal acts which breach other Acts of Parliament when alleged to have
been committed by the Defendant RCMP.

146. The Plaintiff further states that she was advised by a representative of the CRCC for the RCMP
that the Commission only investigates allegations against the Defendant RCMP and/or any of
its member(s) when the complaint(s) relate to administrative wrong doing.

147. The Defendant RCMP Richard, member of the Unit, was the Public Complaint Reviewer
assigned to the Plaintiff’s complaints, the same who signed the updates that were sent to the
Plaintiff by the Unit. As such, the Defendant RCMP was aware of, or ought to have been aware
of, or was willfully blind to the Plaintiff’s attempts to have her complaint form amended to
reflect her allegations accurately.

148. The Defendant RCMP Richard was in communication with the Plaintiff on several occasions,
as he was her contact within the Unit for over a year and as such, he was intimately aware of
her requests to amend her complaint form due to its omissions and inaccuracies, as the Plaintiff
states she expressed to the Defendant RCMP on several occasions.

149. On May 15, 2015, the Defendant RCMP permitted the Plaintiff to provide a statement and sign
the associated complaint form, aforesaid, at the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment in
regard to her complaints against the Defendant Pitcher.

150. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP discouraged her from amending the complaint form
the Defendant RCMP presented to the Plaintiff to sign. The Plaintiff further states the
Defendant RCMP would not amend the complaint form, stating to the Plaintiff that all of the
information was contained in the Plaintiff’s original complaint dated October 23, 2014,
aforesaid, and therefore did not need to be referred to in the complaint form which the
Defendant RCMP gave to the Plaintiff to sign.

151. Prior to signing the complaint form on May 15, 2015, the same form provided to the Plaintiff
and filled out beforehand by the Defendant RCMP, the Plaintiff physically amended the
complaint from by writing on it with a pen, adding couple of charges that were omitted on the
29

form presented to her by the Defendant RCMP, aforesaid. The amendments were initialed by
the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne and the Plaintiff both, same was subsequently initialed by
the Defendant RCMP Richard.

152. Also on May 15, 2015, the Plaintiff again specifically requested to have the Public Complaint
form, aforesaid, classified in Appendix B as, G. Statutory Offences, “reserved for PCs alleging
violation of the Criminal Code”.

153. The Plaintiff states that she made both the Defendant RCMP Richard and the Defendant RCMP
Sgt. Dufresne aware of the Plaintiff’s specific request, above, several times prior to her same
request on May 15, 2015. The Plaintiff further states that both the Defendant RCMP Richard
and the Defendant RCMP Dufresne refused to classify her complaint form in Appendix B as,
G. Statutory Offences, in relation to her complaints against the Defendant Pitcher.

154. The Plaintiff further states that the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne’s response to her request,
above, is noted in his correspondence to the Plaintiff dated May 19, 2015, wherein he says, “My
report will be sent to Mr. Jean Denis Richard once completed. His office will qualify the
complaint and he will update you on it.”

155. On or about December 14, 2015, during another telephone conversation with the Defendant
RCMP Richard, the Plaintiff states she was frustrated and confused over the Defendant RCMP
the Unit’s discrepancies in its process, the Plaintiff demanded that her complaint form be
amended to reflect that the Plaintiff was alleging criminal Obstruction of Justice.

156. The Plaintiff further states that, during her telephone conversation of December 14, 2015 with
the Unit, she told the Defendant RCMP Richard that the Defendant RCMP does not have the
right to omit to document the form as such, same as the Plaintiff had been requesting since the
Plaintiff first contacted the Unit in December of 2014. Shortly thereafter the Plaintiff received
in the mail an amended Public Complaint form (Form P-PU-085) with the following addition:

3. Committed the criminal offence of obstruction in relation to your complaint of


sexual assault and threats against Benoit Charron (Amended on December 14, 2015).
“Added as part of initial complaint” JDR

157. It is a fact that the copy of the Public Complaint form the Plaintiff received shortly after
December 14, 2015, above, did not contain her handwritten amendments which the Plaintiff
had specifically added on May 15, 2015 at the time of her audio/video statement, amendments
the Plaintiff made prior to signing said form, herein mentioned, amendments which were
initialed by herself, the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne, and subsequently initialed by the
Defendant RCMP Richard.

158. The Defendant RCMP was willfully, blatantly negligent of its duties in these matters, contrary
to the RCMP Act
30

159. As the person “In charge of Professional Standards Unit”, (the Unit), the Defendant RCMP
Staff Sergeant Major Gilles Cote (Ssgt. Cote) was responsible for the Unit, the Unit’s
investigations, the Unit’s investigators, the complaints received by the Unit, and any issues a
complainant had in relation to the complaint process.

160. The Defendant RCMP SSgt. Cote knew, or ought to have known, or was willfully blind to the
fact that the Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant Pitcher and the Defendant RCMP
Guiste were being investigated by the Defendant RCMP Dufresne, a member of the Defendant
RCMP who was involved in the very investigation he was assigned to investigate.

161. The Plaintiff received a heavily redacted RCMP Occurrence report through her access to
information request. Contained therein, under the heading, “Involved officers”, Dufresne, J.
#000038199 is listed as an Assisting officer involved in the Plaintiff’s complaint, 2014788032
Sexual Assault 271 CC.

162. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant RCMP Darveau was aware, or ought to have been aware,
or was willfully blind to the conflict of interest of the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne to be in
charge of investigating the Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant Pitcher and the
Defendant RCMP’s investigation, being that the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne was involved
with the investigation he was assigned to investigate.

163. As such, and in light of the Defendant RCMP Richard’s disregard for and cooperation with the
Defendant RCMP Sgt. Dufresne’s negligence as to their duty of care, the Defendant RCMP
SSgt. Cote was also negligent in his duties as the responsible person in charge of the Unit,
contrary to the RCMP Act.

164. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant RCMP Sergeant Donald Daigle (Sgt. Daigle), from the
day she first met him on September 5, 2014, lied to her and misrepresented the truth to her
regarding the actions taken on the part of the Defendant RCMP in relation to the Plaintiff’s
allegations of Sexual Assault, Threats/Intimidation/Harassment, and Fraud.

165. As the Officer in charge of the Defendant RCMP Woodstock detachment, Sgt. Daigle was the
responsible Member for that detachment including investigations, investigators, all complaints,
and any issues a complainant might have in relation to the complaint process.

166. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle was well aware, or ought to have known, or was willfully
blind to the fact that the Plaintiff had serious concerns in relation to the investigation relating
to her allegations of criminal wrongdoing on the part of the subject of her initial complaint to
the Defendant RCMP on May 29, 2014.

167. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle was also well aware, or ought to have been aware, or was
willfully blind to the fact that the Defendant RCMP, prior to June 18, 2014, had created a
complaint file under the Plaintiff’s name in relation to Uttering Threats, file #2014624753,
which file number is documented in the Defendant RCMP’s Occurrence details as being
“related” to the General occurrence report #2014788032 Sexual Assault 271 CC.
31

168. The Defendant RCMP was well aware that its complaint file in relation to Uttering Threats
(2014624753) and its complaint file of Sexual Assault (2014788032) were not merely “related”
but were combined, interwoven, originating from and being an integral part of the same
incident/complaint, that which originated by the Plaintiff on May 29, 2014.

169. From the day of the Plaintiff’s meeting with the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle and the
Defendant Pitcher on September 5, 2014, the Defendant RCMP did not rectify the fact that the
Plaintiff was complaining that her allegations of Threats were not being addressed by the
Defendant RCMP.

170. The Defendant RCMP did not take measures to ensure that the Plaintiff’s complaints were being
properly addressed in accordance with the RCMP Act.

171. The Defendant RCMP was willfully and maliciously deceptive when it misrepresented itself to
the Plaintiff on September 5, 2014 when it promised the Plaintiff that a new court package
relating to Threats and Sexual Assault would be presented to the Office of the Attorney General
of New Brunswick for another opinion.

172. The fact is, a second court package was not provided to the Office of the Attorney General of
New Brunswick, as the Defendant RCMP had committed to do. No court package, nor any
documents, were provided to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick by the
Defendant Pitcher on September 5, 2014 or afterward.

173. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Daigle, as Officer in charge of the Defendant RCMP Woodstock
detachment, knew, or ought to have known, or was willfully blind to the fact that proper
procedures, both for investigating allegations of indictable offences and for requesting an
opinion from the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick, were not followed.

174. As such, the Defendant RCMP was negligent in its duties.

175. The Defendant RCMP, the Unit, failed to respond to the Plaintiff’s inquiries in relation to the
processing of her Public Complaints against the Defendant RCMP. Therefore, the Plaintiff
states she was denied her right to discuss omissions, errors, and discrepancies with the
Defendant RCMP’s process relating to her public complaint. The Plaintiff further states the
refusal on the part of the Defendant RCMP, the Unit, denied her the opportunity to correctly
document her allegations that members of the Defendant RCMP allegedly committed criminal
offences and that the Defendant RCMP allegedly did not adequately investigate at least three
(3) criminally indictable offences.

176. On November 8, 2015, the Plaintiff copied the Defendant RCMP Chief Superintendent Wayne
Gallant on an email wherein she reported allegations of injustices relating to her situation and
dealings with the Defendant RCMP.
32

177. On November 28, 2015, the Plaintiff forwarded a series of emails to the Defendant RCMP
CSup. Gallant, which also related to the injustices the Plaintiff stated she had endured
throughout her dealing with the Defendant RCMP.

178. On December 29, 2015, the Plaintiff drove from Moncton, NB to the Defendant RCMP
Headquarters in Fredericton to speak to someone in person about her complaints against the
Defendant RCMP, the Unit.

179. The Plaintiff states that she spoke with reception at the Defendant RCMP Headquarters and
specifically requested to speak with an investigator from the Defendant RCMP Criminal
Operations.

180. The Plaintiff states she was escorted through the Defendant RCMP Headquarters security doors
by non-commissioned officer Defendant RCMP Gilles Blinn. The Defendant RCMP took the
Plaintiff to a room and requested she provide details relating to her complaints against the
Defendant RCMP.

181. The Plaintiff states she was at the Defendant RCMP Headquarters with the Defendant RCMP
Blinn providing her statement for approximately an hour and a half.

182. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP Blinn repeatedly assured her that he was the right
person the Plaintiff should be talking to in order to initiate the complaint process against the
Defendant RCMP.

183. The Plaintiff states the Defendant RCMP informed her that her statement was not recorded.

184. The Plaintiff states she saw the Defendant RCMP Blinn take less than half a page of notes
during her statement to him, that he did not request her to fill out any complaint form or
otherwise, nor did he request she provide him with any documentation relating to her
complaints/allegations.

185. The Plaintiff states that, after she stated to the Defendant RCMP that she was concerned about
some RCMP dispatch audio recordings being destroyed, the Defendant RCMP Blinn committed
to retrieving said audio files so as to have them secured.

186. The Plaintiff further states the Defendant RCMP Blinn also committed to reaching out to his
superiors in relation to her complaints about the Defendant RCMP and assured the Plaintiff that
he would get back to her for what next steps would need to be taken.

187. The Plaintiff states that the Defendant RCMP never followed up with the Plaintiff in relation to
her statement provided to the Defendant RCMP at Headquarters on December 29, 2015 and,
further, that the Defendant RCMP never initiated a complaint process against the Defendant
RCMP, like the Plaintiff states she was repeatedly reassured it would do.
33

188. The Defendant RCMP was negligent as to its duties in relation to its responsibilities and its
commitment to commence a complaint process in relation to allegations of administrative
wrongdoing allegedly committed by the Defendant RCMP Professional Responsibilities Unit.

189. Due to her attempts to speak with the Defendant RCMP CSup. Gallant and/or the Defendant
RCMP Assistant Commissioner Roger Brown, and after the Defendant RCMP Blinn did not
follow-through on his promises to initiate the complaint process against the Defendant RCMP,
the Plaintiff states she was put in contact with the Defendant RCMP Sergeant Desilva (Sgt.
Desilva).

190. Communications with the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Desilva attest to the fact that he too was
willfully blind to the Plaintiff’s complaints relating to the Defendant RCMP. The Defendant
RCMP Sgt. Desilva’s refusal to address the fact that the Defendant RCMP Blinn lied to the
Plaintiff about initiating a complaint against the Defendant RCMP, and the Defendant RCMP
Sgt. Desilva’s refusal to address the Plaintiff’s several requests for direction on how to proceed
with complaints against the Defendant RCMP, are an abuse of the Defendant RCMP’s position
of authority.

191. The Defendant RCMP Sgt. Desilva should have provided the Plaintiff with direction on what
avenue she needed to take to resolve her serious concerns, if not criminal breaches, relating to
the Defendant RCMP.

192. The Plaintiff’s communications with the Defendant RCMP Sgt. Desilva left him with no doubt,
or he ought to have know, or he was willfully blind to the fact that the Plaintiff was alleging
special considerations were being given to members of the Defendant RCMP who were being
investigated in relation to the Plaintiff’s complaints.

193. The Defendant Sgt. Desilva was also aware, or ought to have been aware, or was willfully blind
to the fact that the Plaintiff was alleging abuses of administrative authority committed by
members of the Defendant RCMP, including members who were in charge of investigating.

194. As the Defendant RCMP’s assistant to commanding officer Roger Brown, as the Plaintiff states
she was told by Suzanne, assistant for the Defendant RCMP Brown’s, the Defendant RCMP
Sgt. Desilva’s inactions and lack of consideration of the above noted facts is inexcusable and a
clear neglect of his duties as a member of the Defendant RCMP.

195. As the person “In charge of Professional Responsibilities Unit”, (the Unit), the Defendant
RCMP SSgt. Craig was responsible for the Unit, the Unit’s investigations, the Unit’s
investigators, the complaints received by the Unit, and any issues a complainant might have in
relation to the complaint process.

196. The Defendant RCMP SSgt. Craig was aware, or ought to have been aware, or was willfully
blind to the facts herein stated.
34

197. At or about the end of April, 2016, beginning of May, 2016, the Plaintiff received some of the
information she had requested from the Defendant RCMP through the access to information
process. Although heavily redacted, from a review of the materials received by the Plaintiff
from the Defendant RCMP, the Plaintiff states she became aware that the Defendant RCMP
committed acts contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada, the RCMP Act, and, but not limited
to, the Police Act.

RCMP Negligence

198. At all material times, certain individual who were Members, Civilian Members, and Public
Service Employees, and who were each Crown employees, agents and servants (the “Negligent
Individuals”) owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff pursuant to Laws and Acts of Parliament, same
to be detailed throughout subsequent proceedings initiated from this Action.

199. Section 37 of the RCMP Act makes it incumbent on every Member and Civilian Member to,
among other things:

(a) to respect the rights of all persons;

(b) to maintain the integrity of the law, law enforcement and the administration of justice;

(c) to perform the member’s duties promptly, impartially and diligently, in accordance with
the law and without abusing the member’s authority;

(d) to avoid any actual, apparent or potential conflict of interests;

(e) to ensure that any improper or unlawful conduct of any member is not concealed or
permitted to continue;

(f) to be incorruptible, never accepting or seeking special privilege in the performance of the
member’s duties or otherwise placing the member under any obligation that may
prejudice the proper performance of the member’s duties;

(g) to act at all times in a courteous, respectful and honourable manner; and

(h) to maintain the honour of the Force and its principles and purposes.

200. The Code of Conduct established by regulation under s.38 of the RCMP Act requires Members
and Civilian Members to, among other things, respect the rights of every person. The Plaintiff
pleads and relies upon the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988 (the “RCMP
Regulations”), Part III.

201. The Negligent Individuals breached the aforementioned duties by, among other things:
35

(a) pursuing practices that deprived or tended to deprive the Plaintiff of her access to justice
for crimes committed against her;

(b) failing or neglecting to adhere to the appropriate legislation, policies, procedures, codes
of conduct and guidelines in respect of upholding the law and the administration of
justice;

(c) failing to properly investigate allegations of, but not limited to, Sexual Assault,
Harassment, Threats, Identity Fraud, Unlawful Entry, Obstruction of Justice, and
Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice;

(d) failing or neglecting to exercise their authority to ensure the conduct of its Members
and/or Civilian Members adhered to the appropriate legislation, policies, procedures,
codes of conduct and guidelines;

(e) failing to adhere to s. 37 of the RCMP Act;

(f) failing to hold accountable those found to be in breach of the applicable legislation,
policies, procedures, codes of conduct and guidelines; and

(g) failing to properly supervise Members, Civilian Members and Public Service Employees.

202. The conduct of the Negligent Individuals was repetitive and extreme and calculated to pervert
the course of justice. As a result of the conduct by the Defendants and due to the fault and
negligence of the Defendants and the Negligent Individuals, the Plaintiff suffered and has
sustained serious injuries and consequences including but not limited to:

(a) excessive stress;

(b) diminished self worth;

(c) diminished ability to concentrate;

(d) anxiety;

(e) difficulty in coping with emotional stress;

(f) suicidal ideation;

(g) feelings of guilt, responsibility, and self-blame;

(h) nervous shock;

(i) emotional anguish;


36

(j) stress pains;

(k) insomnia;

(l) loss of consortium; and

(m) loss of enjoyment in life.

Criminal Code of Canada and Acts of Parliament

203. The Crown is vicariously liable for torts committed by Members, Civilian Members and
Public Service Employees in the course of their duties. The Plaintiff pleads and relies upon
the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, ss. 3 and 36.

204. The above noted actions of the Defendant RCMP and the Defendant Pitcher are contrary to,
but not limited to being contrary to, the Criminal Code of Canada, the RCMP Act, the Police
Act, the RCMP Regulations, the Financial Administration Act, and the Public Servants
Disclosure Protection Act:

(a) The Criminal Code of Canada states and the Plaintiff pleads and relies upon ss.:
21. Parties to Offence
21. (1) Every one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it;

(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it;
or

(c) abets any person in committing it.

Common intention
(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful
purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common
purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the
commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the
common purpose is a party to that offence.

22. Person counselling offence


22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offence and that
other person is afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party
to that offence, notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way different from
that which was counselled.

(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offence is a party to
every offence that the other commits in consequence of the counselling that the person
37

who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in


consequence of the counselling.

Definition of “counsel”
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite.

22.1 Offences of negligence — organizations


22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an
organization is a party to the offence if

(a) acting within the scope of their authority


(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or
omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative,
that representative would have been a party to the offence; and

(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities
that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively, depart
— markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably
be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to the
offence.

22.2 Other offences — organizations


22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault — other
than negligence — an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least
in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers

(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;

(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within
the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the
organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence;
or

(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to


the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party
to the offence.

23. Accessory after the fact


23. (1) An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has
been a party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of
enabling that person to escape.
38

23.1 Where one party cannot be convicted


23.1 For greater certainty, sections 21 to 23 apply in respect of an accused
notwithstanding the fact that the person whom the accused aids or abets, counsels or
procures or receives, comforts or assists cannot be convicted of the offence.

24. Attempts
24. (1) Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do
anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit
the offence whether or not it was possible under the circumstances to commit the
offence.

Question of law
(2) The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an
offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute
an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law.

PROTECTION OF PERSONS ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING THE LAW

25. Protection of persons acting under authority


Limitation
25. (11) Nothing in this section justifies

(a) the intentional or criminally negligent causing of death or bodily harm to another
person;

(b) the willful attempt in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of
justice; or

(c) conduct that would violate the sexual integrity of an individual.

Protection, defences and immunities unaffected


(12) Nothing in this section affects the protection, defences and immunities of peace
officers and other persons recognized under the law of Canada.

Compliance with requirements


(13) Nothing in this section relieves a public officer of criminal liability for failing to
comply with any other requirements that govern the collection of evidence.

121 Frauds on the government


121. (1) Every one commits an offence who

(a) directly or indirectly


(i) gives, offers or agrees to give or offer to an official or to any member of
his family, or to any one for the benefit of an official, or
39

(ii) being an official, demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept from any
person for himself or another person,

a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation,


assistance, exercise of influence or an act or omission in connection with
(iii) the transaction of business with or any matter of business relating to the
government, or
(iv) a claim against Her Majesty or any benefit that Her Majesty is
authorized or is entitled to bestow,

whether or not, in fact, the official is able to cooperate, render assistance, exercise
influence or do or omit to do what is proposed, as the case may be;

(b) having dealings of any kind with the government, directly or indirectly pays a
commission or reward to or confers an advantage or benefit of any kind on an
employee or official of the government with which the dealings take place, or to any
member of the employee’s or official’s family, or to anyone for the benefit of the
employee or official, with respect to those dealings, unless the person has the
consent in writing of the head of the branch of government with which the
dealings take place;

(c) being an official or employee of the government, directly or indirectly demands,


accepts or offers or agrees to accept from a person who has dealings with the
government a commission, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind for themselves
or another person, unless they have the consent in writing of the head of the branch
of government that employs them or of which they are an official;

(d) having or pretending to have influence with the government or with a minister of
the government or an official, directly or indirectly demands, accepts or offers or
agrees to accept, for themselves or another person, a reward, advantage or benefit
of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an
act or omission in connection with
(i) anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii) or (iv), or
(ii) the appointment of any person, including themselves, to an office;

(e) directly or indirectly gives or offers, or agrees to give or offer, to a minister of


the government or an official, or to anyone for the benefit of a minister or an official,
a reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation,
assistance, exercise of influence, or an act or omission, by that minister or official,
in connection with
(i) anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii) or (iv), or
(ii) the appointment of any person, including themselves, to an office; or

(f) having made a tender to obtain a contract with the government,


40

(i) directly or indirectly gives or offers, or agrees to give or offer, to another


person who has made a tender, to a member of that person’s family or to
another person for the benefit of that person, a reward, advantage or benefit
of any kind as consideration for the withdrawal of the tender of that person,
or
(ii) directly or indirectly demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept from
another person who has made a tender a reward, advantage or benefit of any
kind for themselves or another person as consideration for the withdrawal of
their own tender.

122. Breach of trust by public officer


122. Every official who, in connection with the duties of his office, commits fraud or a
breach of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of trust would be an offence if it
were committed in relation to a private person.

126. Disobeying a statute


126. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an Act of Parliament by
wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it
requires to be done is, unless a punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

Attorney General of Canada may act


(2) Any proceedings in respect of a contravention of or conspiracy to contravene an Act
mentioned in subsection (1), other than this Act, may be instituted at the instance of the
Government of Canada and conducted by or on behalf of that Government.

128. Misconduct of officers executing process


128. Every peace officer or coroner who, being entrusted with the execution of a
process, wilfully

(a) misconducts himself in the execution of the process, or

(b) makes a false return to the process,

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years.

134. Misleading Justice


134. (1) Subject to subsection (2), every one who, not being specially permitted,
authorized or required by law to make a statement under oath or solemn affirmation,
makes such a statement, by affidavit, solemn declaration or deposition or orally before a
person who is authorized by law to permit it to be made before him, knowing that the
statement is false, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
41

Application
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a statement referred to in that subsection that is made
in the course of a criminal investigation.

137. Fabricating evidence


137. Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be
used as evidence in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, by any means other than
perjury or incitement to perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen year

139. Obstructing justice


(2) Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in
subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

(3) Without restricting the generality of subsection (2), every one shall be deemed
wilfully to attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice who in a judicial
proceeding, existing or proposed,
(a) dissuades or attempts to dissuade a person by threats, bribes or other corrupt
means from giving evidence;

141. Compounding indictable offence


141. (1) Every one who asks for or obtains or agrees to receive or obtain any valuable
consideration for himself or any other person by agreeing to compound or conceal an
indictable offence is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years.

PART XIII ATTEMPTS — CONSPIRACIES — ACCESSORIES

463. Attempts, accessories


463. Except where otherwise expressly provided by law, the following provisions apply
in respect of persons who attempt to commit or are accessories after the fact to the
commission of offences:

(b) every one who attempts to commit or is an accessory after the fact to the
commission of an indictable offence for which, on conviction, an accused is liable
to imprisonment for fourteen years or less is guilty of an indictable offence and
liable to imprisonment for a term that is one-half of the longest term to which a
person who is guilty of that offence is liable;

(c) every one who attempts to commit or is an accessory after the fact to the
commission of an offence punishable on summary conviction is guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction; and
42

(d) every one who attempts to commit or is an accessory after the fact to the
commission of an offence for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment
or for which he is punishable on summary conviction
(i) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding a term that is one-half of the longest term to which a person who is
guilty of that offence is liable, or
(ii) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

464. Counselling offence that is not committed


464. Except where otherwise expressly provided by law, the following provisions apply
in respect of persons who counsel other persons to commit offences, namely,

(a) every one who counsels another person to commit an indictable offence is, if the
offence is not committed, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the same
punishment to which a person who attempts to commit that offence is liable; and

(b) every one who counsels another person to commit an offence punishable on
summary conviction is, if the offence is not committed, guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction.

465. Conspiracy
465. (1) Except where otherwise expressly provided by law, the following provisions
apply in respect of conspiracy:

(c) every one who conspires with any one to commit an indictable offence not
provided for in paragraph (a) or (b) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
the same punishment as that to which an accused who is guilty of that offence
would, on conviction, be liable; and

(d) every one who conspires with any one to commit an offence punishable on
summary conviction is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(b) The RCMP Act states and the Plaintiff pleads and relies upon ss.:

Act current to 2015-05-11 and last amended on 2014-11-28


PART I
CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZATION
Oaths
14. (1) Every member shall, before entering on the duties of the member’s office, take th
e oath of allegiance and the oaths set out in the schedule.

Duties
18. It is the duty of members who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the
Commissioner,
43

(a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the
preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of
Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the
apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into
custody;

PART IV CONDUCT
Responsibilities
37. It is the responsibility of every member

(a) to respect the rights of all persons;

(b) to maintain the integrity of the law, law enforcement and the administration of
justice;

(c) to perform the member’s duties promptly, impartially and diligently, in


accordance with the law and without abusing the member’s authority;

(d) to avoid any actual, apparent or potential conflict of interests;

(e) to ensure that any improper or unlawful conduct of any member is not concealed
or permitted to continue;

(f) to be incorruptible, never accepting or seeking special privilege in the


performance of the member’s duties or otherwise placing the member under any
obligation that may prejudice the proper performance of the member’s duties;

(g) to act at all times in a courteous, respectful and honourable manner; and

(h) to maintain the honour of the Force and its principles and purposes.

Code of Conduct
38. The Governor in Council may make regulations, to be known as the Code of
Conduct, governing the conduct of members.

Contravention of Code of Conduct


39. (1) Every member who is alleged to have contravened a provision of the Code of
Conduct may be dealt with under this Act either in or outside Canada,
(a) whether or not the alleged contravention took place in or outside Canada; and
(b) whether or not the member has been charged with an offence constituted by,
included in or otherwise related to the alleged contravention or has been tried,
acquitted, discharged, convicted or sentenced by a court in respect of such an
offence.

No interference with jurisdiction of courts


44

(2) Nothing in this Act affects the jurisdiction of any court to try a member for any
offence triable by that court.
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/R-10/FullText.html 23/75

In force between June 19, 2013 and Nov. 27, 2014

24.1(1) Boards of Inquiry


24.1 (1) The Minister or the Commissioner may appoint such persons as the Minister or
Commissioner considers appropriate as a board of inquiry to investigate and report on
any matter connected with the organization, training, conduct, performance of duties,
discipline, efficiency, administration or government of the Force or affecting any member
or other person appointed or employed under the authority of this Act.

Return of documents, etc.


(11) Any document or thing produced pursuant to this section to a board of inquiry shall,
on the request of the person producing the document or thing, be released to that person
within a reasonable time after completion of the board’s investigation and report.

PART IV DISCIPLINE
37. Standards
37. It is incumbent on every member

(a) to respect the rights of all persons;

(b) to maintain the integrity of the law, law enforcement and the administration of
justice;

(c) to perform the member’s duties promptly, impartially and diligently, in


accordance with the law and without abusing the member’s authority;

(d) to avoid any actual, apparent or potential conflict of interests;

(e) to ensure that any improper or unlawful conduct of any member is not concealed
or permitted to continue;

(f) to be incorruptible, never accepting or seeking special privilege in the


performance of the member’s duties or otherwise placing the member under any
obligation that may prejudice the proper performance of the member’s duties;

(g) to act at all times in a courteous, respectful and honourable manner; and

(h) to maintain the honour of the Force and its principles and purposes.
45

38. Code of Conduct


38. The Governor in Council may make regulations, to be known as the Code of
Conduct, governing the conduct of members.

39. Contravention of Code of Conduct


39. (1) Every member alleged to have contravened the Code of Conduct may be dealt
with under this Act either in or outside Canada,

(a) whether or not the alleged contravention took place in or outside Canada; and

(b) whether or not the member has been charged with an offence constituted by,
included in or otherwise related to the alleged contravention or has been tried,
acquitted, discharged, convicted or sentenced by a court in respect of such an
offence.

No interference with jurisdiction of courts


(2) Nothing in this Act affects the jurisdiction of any court to try a member for any
offence triable by that court.

40. Investigation
40. (1) Where it appears to an officer or to a member in command of a detachment that
a member under the command of the officer or member has contravened the Code of
Conduct, the officer or member shall make or cause to be made such investigation as
the officer or member considers necessary to enable the officer or member to determine
whether that member has contravened or is contravening the Code of Conduct.
Member not excused from answering

(2) In any investigation under subsection (1), no member shall be excused from
answering any question relating to the matter being investigated when required to do so
by the officer or other member conducting the investigation on the ground that the
answer to the question may tend to criminate the member or subject the member to any
proceeding or penalty.

Answer not receivable


(3) No answer or statement made in response to a question described in subsection (2)
shall be used or receivable in any criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, other
than a hearing under section 45.1 into an allegation that with intent to mislead the
member gave the answer or statement knowing it to be false.

PART VII PUBLIC COMPLAINTS


45.35(1) Receipt and Investigation of Complaints
Complaints by public
45.35 (1) Any member of the public having a complaint concerning the conduct, in the
performance of any duty or function under this Act or the Witness Protection Program
Act, of any member or other person appointed or employed under the authority of this
46

Act may, whether or not that member of the public is affected by the subject-matter of
the complaint, make a complaint to

(a) the Commission;

(b) any member or other person appointed or employed under the authority of this
Act; or

(c) the provincial authority in the province in which the subject-matter of the
complaint arose that is responsible for the receipt and investigation of complaints by
the public against police.

Acknowledgment of complaint
(2) Every complaint under subsection (1) shall be acknowledged in writing, if the
complaint is in writing or if the complainant requests that the complaint be so
acknowledged.

Investigation
45.36 (4) Where a complaint is not disposed of informally, the complaint shall be
investigated by the Force in accordance with rules made pursuant to section 45.38.

Right to refuse or terminate investigation


(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Part, the Commissioner may direct that
no investigation of a complaint under subsection 45.35(1) be commenced or that an
investigation of such a complaint be terminated if, in the Commissioner’s opinion,

(a) the complaint is one that could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or
completely, according to a procedure provided under any other Act of Parliament;

(b) the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; or

(c) having regard to all the circumstances, investigation or further investigation is not
necessary or reasonably practicable.

Final report
45.4 On completion of the investigation of a complaint, the Commissioner shall send to
the complainant and the member or other person whose conduct is the subject-matter of
the complaint a report setting out

(a) a summary of the complaint;

(b) the results of the investigation;

(c) a summary of any action that has been or will be taken with respect to resolution
of the complaint; and
47

(d) in the case of a complaint under subsection 45.35(1), the right of the complainant
to refer the complaint to the Commission for review if the complainant is not satisfied
with the disposition of the complaint by the Force.

Reference to Commission
45.41 (1) A complainant under subsection 45.35(1) who is not satisfied with the
disposition of the complaint by the Force or with a direction under subsection 45.36(5)
in respect of the complaint may refer the complaint in writing to the Commission for
review.

45.45 Commission
Expenses
(13) Where the Commission sits at a place in Canada that is not the ordinary place of
residence of the member or other person whose conduct is the subject-matter of the
complaint, of the complainant or of the counsel of that member or other person or that
complainant, that member or other person, complainant or counsel is entitled, in the
discretion of the Commission, to receive such travel and living expenses incurred by the
member or other person, complainant or counsel in appearing before the Commission as
may be fixed by the Treasury Board.

SCHEDULE

OATH OF OFFICE
I, , solemnly swear that I will faithfully, diligently and impartially execute and perform
the duties required of me as a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and will
well and truly obey and perform all lawful orders and instructions that I receive as such,
without fear, favour or affection of or toward any person. So help me God.

OATH OF SECRECY
I, , solemnly swear that I will not disclose or make known to any person not legally entitled
thereto any knowledge or information obtained by me in the course of my employment
with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. So help me God.

(c) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 2014 states and the Plaintiff pleads
and relies upon ss.:

PART 3 CODE OF CONDUCT


18. Code of Conduct
18. All members must conduct themselves in accordance with the Code of Conduct set
out in the schedule

SCHEDULE
(Section 18 and subsection 23(1))
48

CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE


STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
Maintaining the confidence of Canadians in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is
essential. Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are responsible for the
promotion and maintenance of good conduct in the Force. This Code of Conduct sets out
responsibilities, consistent with section 37 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,
that reinforce the high standard of conduct expected of members of the Force.

(d) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988 states and the Plaintiff pleads
and relies upon ss.:

PART III DISCIPLINE


43. Code of Conduct
43. A member shall not, without lawful excuse, destroy, mutilate, alter or conceal any
correspondence, report, record or other official document.

45. A member shall not knowingly or wilfully make a false, misleading or inaccurate
statement or report to any member who is superior in rank or who has authority over
that member pertaining to

(a) the performance of that member’s duties;

(b) any investigation;

(c) any conduct concerning that member, or any other member;

(d) the operation of the Force; or

(e) the administration of the Force.

47. A member shall not knowingly neglect or give insufficient attention to any duty the
member is required to perform.

48. (1) A member shall respect the rights of every person.

50. A member shall not knowingly contravene or otherwise breach any oath taken by
the member pursuant to section 14 of the Act.

(e) The Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act states and the Plaintiff pleads and relies
upon ss.:

CODE OF CONDUCT
Obligation to establish — Treasury Board
5. (1) The Treasury Board must establish a code of conduct applicable to the
public sector.
49

Chief executives shall establish codes of conduct


6. (1) Every chief executive shall establish a code of conduct applicable to the
portion of the public sector for which he or she is responsible.
WRONGDOINGS
Wrongdoings
8. This Act applies in respect of the following wrongdoings in or relating to the
public sector:
(a) a contravention of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province,
or of any regulations made under any such Act, other than a contravention of
section 19 of this Act;
(b) a misuse of public funds or a public asset;
(c) a gross mismanagement in the public sector;
(d) an act or omission that creates a substantial and specific danger to the life,
health or safety of persons, or to the environment, other than a danger that is
inherent in the performance of the duties or functions of a public servant;
(e) a serious breach of a code of conduct established under section 5 or 6;
and
(f) knowingly directing or counselling a person to commit a wrongdoing set
out in any of paragraphs (a) to (e).

Relief Sought

205. These negligence and injuries as stated in paragraphs 198 to 202 have caused and continue to
cause the Plaintiff pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of physical, mental and
emotional health, and loss of earning, past and prospective.

206. As a further result of the fault and the negligence of the Defendants and the Negligent
Individuals, the Plaintiff has sustained certain special damages and loss and expenses for
medical and psychological treatment. The Plaintiff continues to undergo medical and
psychological care and treatment and to incur loss and expense.

207. In the alternative, the Negligent Individuals knew or ought to have known that the Plaintiff is
especially vulnerable and dependant on the Defendant RCMP to uphold the laws and
appropriate legislation, policies, procedures, codes of conduct and guidelines in its
administration of justice and that their failure to do so would cause the Plaintiff extreme
emotional and psychological harm, among other negative effects and consequences to be
detailed throughout these judicial proceedings.

208. As such, and in light of the facts herein stated, facts of which the Defendant RCMP is, and at
all material time was, fully aware, or ought to have been aware, or was willfully blind in
knowing, and given that a concerted effort has unquestionably been made on the part of the
Defendant RCMP to contain and conceal such actions and inactions of the Defendant RCMP,
the Plaintiff seeks restitution from the Defendant RCMP in relation to these matters and also
for its deliberate, willful negligence and its malicious intent to obstruct and pervert the course
of justice.
50

209. Further, the Plaintiff states that the Office of the Attorney General engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct throughout its involvement with the Defendant RCMP as it relates to these matters.

210. The Plaintiff claims, on her own behalf, as follows and to be assessed by the Court:

(a) general damages and special damages;

(b) exemplary and punitive damages;

(c) interest on all such damages;

(d) costs; and

(e) all such other relief or remedy as this Honourable Court shall deem just

DATED AT Moncton, New Brunswick, FAIT à _________ le _____________ 20___


on this _____ day of March, 2017

_______________________________________
THERESA JONES, Plaintiff in her own right

412 – 257 Robinson Street


Moncton, NB E1C 0R1
Telephone: (506) 204-6388
Email: t.jones91216@gmail.com