D.

To the Clients

RIVERA vs. ATTY. ANGELES AC No. 2519 (2000)

FACTS:

Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and
2 others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a
favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from
one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the
judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told
his clients of the amount he had received and never remitted the
same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own.
Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suspension of the IBP should be upheld

HELD:

The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines. Respondents act of deceit and malpractice
indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties
as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their
trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a
lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client
but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating
to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never
be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he
won to the fees of his own lawyer.

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID

G.R. No. L-691 September 21, 1949
FACTS:
On April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action
against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and
lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado’s now
deceased husband. Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an
answer on behalf of the defendant and Attorneys Delgado, Dizon,
Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the
plaintiff. Jacob Assad was included as a party defendant on a later
date. Attorney Francisco then entered his appearance as attorney
of record for the defendant in substitution for the Attorneys of the
defendant who withdrew from the case.
Attorney Dizon then wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that Mrs.
Hilado, the plaintiff, had consulted with him about her case and
that Francisco sent her a written opinion which was identified in
the evidence. It was alleged in the letter that Francisco gave an
opinion that the action filed by Mrs. Hilado against Mr. Assad will
not ordinarily prosper. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion,
Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo filed a formal motion
with the court wherein the case was and is pending to disqualify
Attorney Francisco. Attorney Francisco answered the attorneys’
complaint alleging that and he signed the letter without reading it
and without keeping it for a minute in his possession and that he
told his assistant, Attorney Agrava, that the firm should not handle
Mrs. Hilado’s case, calling Agrava’s attention what he (Francisco)
already had said to Mrs. Hilado.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for disqualification should be

allowed.

HELD:
Yes. Here, the attorney-client relationship must first be
established. In order to constitute such relation, the attorneys
must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to
prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and
draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the
like. An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counsellor when he is listening
to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
Formality is not an essential element since the contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance
of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession. The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter and
that Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it, would
not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written
under the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he
was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give
Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. The
letter binds and estop him in the same manner and to the same
degree as if he personally had written it. Therefore, the motion for
disqualification should be allowed.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS

vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in

one a case before the before the National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La
Union. Herein, complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as
attorney by representing conflicting interests. The case was filed
with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline which found Atty.
Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of
suspension for 6 months. The governors of the IBP increased the
penalty for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension

from the practice of law.

Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to

observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and
transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall
not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned
clients’ written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts.
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a
conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three
separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer
is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to
oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new
retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may
injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new
relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired
through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance
of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s
duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse
interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that
a lawyer’s representation of both sides of an issue is highly
improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such
conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest
intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is
suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.

STEPHAN BRUNET vs. ATTY. RONALD GUAREN

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
FACTS:
Complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants)
filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty.
Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED),
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Petitioner’s Contention:
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the
services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they
acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres. Atty. Guaren asked for a fee
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative
to its proceeding. It was agreed that full payment of the fee shall
be made after the delivery of the title. Atty. Guaren asked for an
advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave.
Atty.
Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of
their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of
the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan,
and original copy of the waiver. On March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren
asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00)
which they dutifully gave. From 1997 to 2001, they always
reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say
that the titling was in progress. They became bothered by the slow
progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money
they paid. Respondent agreed to return the same provided that the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer
for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a
special appearance against them in a case pending before the
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Respondent’s Contention:
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an
acceptance fee of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount was
inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however,
that he received the payment of P1,000.00 and P6,000.00; that
their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the
complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the
documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy
of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust
and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and
in behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who
failed to appear in the said hearing.
IBP Report and Recommendation:
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have
violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted
the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of
P7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long
years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty.
Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against
complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD
recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
The IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD,
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3)
months only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Guaren should be held administratively liable?

HELD:
Yes, in the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted
the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee.
He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the
titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty.
Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren was found GUILTY of having
violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS.

ELMER CANOY vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ C. No. 5485.

March 16, 2005
FACTS:
In 1998, Atty Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in the complaint
of the latter against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers. The
labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit their position papers.
Thereafter, several unfruitful follow-ups and visits were made by
Canoy and to his dismay found 2 years after that the case was
dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not
having submitted their position papers. Defense of Atty Ortiz were
his workload, being a host in a radio program and being elected as
councilor, his policy that clients are the ones to follow up, and as
far as he could recall, the conveyance of message to him by Canoy
that he had another lawyer to handle.

ISSUE:
Whether or not offering legal service to indigent litigants is a reason
for a lawyer not yo properly do his job as such. No.

RULING:
If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was
such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should
have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client
being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of
the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and
manner in which his/her interests are being defended. As to the
follow up policy, he cannot shift the blame to complainant for failing
to inquire about the status of the case, since it was his duty as
lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him.
Atty. Ortiz’ election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, does not
exonerate him of his negligent behavior. City councilors are even
allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation
except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as
Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant
to this case.
Furthermore, assuming that Canoy had acquired the legal service
of another lawyer, there was no apparent coordination between
Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
Lawyers like Atty Ortiz who devote their professional practice in
representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve
commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not
deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the
consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all
pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They
deserve quality representation as well. Atty Ortiz is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for 1 month.

BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA VS. ATTY. BALMES OCAMPOS

AM No. 4401. January 29, 2004
Facts:
Complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged
the services of respondent Atty. Balmes Ocampos in a civil case for
recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. An
adverse decision was rendered against complainants. Atty.
Ocampos filed a Notice of Appeal at their behest. The Court of
Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but Atty.
Ocampos was granted a 90-day extension. The extended period
lapsed without an appellant’s brief being filed, hence their appeal
was dismissed. The dismissal was not challenged, but complainants
filed a complaint contending that respondent violated his duty to
inform them of his failure to file appellant’s brief and of the
dismissal of the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the
protection of the client’s interests.

Held:
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost
diligence. By failing to file appellant’s brief, respondent was remiss
in the discharge of such responsibility. He thus violated the Code
of Professional which states:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after attaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
That respondent accepted to represent complainants gratis et
amore does not justify his failure to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duty. Every case deserves full attention,
diligence, and competence regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or free.
Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a
counsel of record is under obligation to protect the client’s interest.
If a party has a counsel of record, a court does not recognize any
other representation in behalf thereof unless in collaboration with
such counsel of record or until a formal substitution of counsel is
effected. Since respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as
he in fact filed a motion for extension of time to file brief, he was
under obligation to discharge his professional responsibility.

ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY

HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VICENTE A. PICHON v. ATTY.
ARNULFO M. AGLERON Sr. A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014
FACTS:
Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow
of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in
Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump
truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant
decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr.
(Atty. Agleron). On three 3 occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and
received from complainant the following amounts for the payment
of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 P3,000.00;
(2) June 7, 1996 Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 -P5,250.00 or
a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however,
no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of
Caraga.
Defendant’s Defense:
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional
service and received the amount of P10,050.00. He, however,
explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay
the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the
complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would
pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7,
1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant
to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the
30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty.
Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court,
the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting
the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Agleron violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
The Investigating Commissioner’s Report:
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected
a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months.
The BOG’s Recommendation:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of only one 1 month.
RULING: The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors except as to the penalty imposed. Atty. Agleron
violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that: Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. Once a lawyer takes up the cause
of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence,
and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. In a number of cases, the Court held
that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action
such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In
this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the
practice of law for a period of three months sufficient.

In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani

A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000

Facts:
Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal
case. He failed to submit his proof of service in his appellant’s brief
which subsequently caused the inability of the appellee to file his
own brief. The IBP was order to investigate on the matter and
despite repeated notices, Bayani failed to submit the proof of
service and his answer to the IBP’s query. Hence, this
administrative complaint.

Held:
GUILTY. Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit proof of service of
appellant’s brief and his failure to submit the required comment
manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme
Court, a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics. It
appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the circumspection
required of a member of the Bar. A counsel must always remember
that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A lawyer
owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in
that representation. Further, lawyers are expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure and
anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-
hearted fealty to his client’s cause. Having been remiss in his duty
to the Court and to the Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended from the
practice of law for 3 months and until the time he complies with
the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of
service.

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS S. MERDEGIA

AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ETC./RE:
RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI NO. 12-
205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II, IPI No. 12-
205-CA-J/A.C. 10300, December 10, 2013

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. We also
directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court
held Atty. Adaza II guilty of indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza
prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused
to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and
the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause:
the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments
of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for
inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias.
If they doubted the legality of the Resolution, they could have filed
a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be administratively
liable.
HELD: Administrative complaints against justices cannot and
should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against
an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to
represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds
provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client
the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and
to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty.
Adaza failed to impress upon his client the features of the Philippine
adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect
for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties
as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in
acting for his client before the courts.

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, et.al vs. ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR.

A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land. They entered
into an agreement with Gerry R. Fevidal (Fevidal), a subdivision
developer. Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of
the subdivision project and failed to account for the titles to the
subdivided land. Thus, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney
they had previously executed in his favor.

COMPLAINANTS:
Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose
of assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged
them to institute actions against Fevidal in order to recover their
properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal services,
in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and
appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants
would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties.
In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent
prepared and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to
annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in the
possession of Fevidal. Unknown to him, the adverse claim was held
in abeyance, because Fevidal convinced complainants to agree to
another settlement.
Respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and
revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal. Complainants
found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they
terminated the services of respondent and finalized their amicable
settlement with him.

RESPONDENT:
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition before the RTC,
alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the
complaint had been done with the intent of defrauding counsel. He
also filed a Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in the
Records.
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal,
with the latter denying the former’s allegation of collusion,
complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of respondent.
Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and
underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits of their properties
because the disposition thereof was “now clothed with legal
problems” brought about by respondent. In their complaint, they
alleged that respondent had violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of
one year for entering into a champertous agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of entering into a
champertous contract.

HELD:
We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by
complainants. Respondent cannot be faulted for advising
complainants to file an action against Fevidal to recover their
properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of P10,000,000 – a
measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under
which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of
P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to
protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends
of justice. Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants
against the abuses of Fevidal under the circumstances, and we
cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer
only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath.
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent
for the recording of his attorney’s charging lien as the “legal
problem” preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their
property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to
intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of
his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained
by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene
in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault.
Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed
with complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract – an
agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses
of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for
some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts
are contrary to public policy and are thus void or inexistent. They
are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a
client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the
client.
A reading of the contract for legal services shows that respondent
agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees.
He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of
complainants’ adverse claim.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal
matter they are handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights,
it is imperative that the advances be subject to reimbursement.
The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a
personal stake in the client’s cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the
contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation
advanced by respondent shall be subject to reimbursement by
complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances
(bali), gasoline and transportation allowance to them for the
duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits that
the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he
extended to complainants.
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in
balancing the client’s interests with the ethical standards of his
profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this case,
an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the
needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any appearance
of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing
the litigation expenses in a legal matter he handled for a client
without providing for terms of reimbursement and lending money
to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

DORCAS PETALLAR VS. JUDGE JAUNILLO PULLOS

A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004

Facts:
Complainant Dorcas Petallar averred that after the preliminary
conference in a case for forcible entry, he, as plaintiff and the
defendants were ordered to submit their respective position papers
and evidence. Two months from the submission of their position
papers, complainant personally went to the Court to verify the
judgment had been rendered. He caused his lawyer to file a motion
for rendition of judgment which was duly received by the court on
August 6, 2001 but still no judgment was rendered on December
27, 2001 when the complaint was filed. Hence, complainant
Petallar charged Judge Juanillo Pullos, former presiding judge of
the MCTC of Surigao del Norte of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 &
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as Rule
140, Section 4 & Rule 70, Section 10 & 11 of the Rules of the Court
for undue delay in rendering a decision in a case for forcibly entry.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent be held liable for undue delay in
rendering judgment.

Held:
Respondent is guilty of undue delay in rendering judgment. The
records show that the parties had filed their respective position
papers as early as February 2, 2000. Thus, respondent had until
March 4, 2000. Had there been circumstances which presented him
from handling down his decision within the prescribed period,
respondent should have at least requested from the Court for an
extension within which to render judgment. Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decisions within the period fixed by law constitutes
serious violation of Article III, section 16 of the Constitution.
Judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if
public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. A judge cannot
by himself prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by law. Without any order of extension granted by the
court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.