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EVACUATION PLAN – NAIROBI, KENYA

RESTRICTED CIRCULATION.

Prepared by: Douglas R. Parker


Raymond B. Van Staden

Prepared For: Binaifer Nowrojee


Director
Open Society Initiative for East Africa (OSIEA)
ACS Plaza
Lenana Road
Kenya

Date: Tuesday, 26th February 2008


EVACUATION PLAN: NGO PERSONNEL. NAIROBI, KENYA

1. Introduction

The guidelines presented in this Evacuation Plan are intended to assist


representatives of OSIEA to prepare for an emergency evacuation. Planning and
forethought are important, as is flexibility of execution. A static, inflexible
emergency plan will almost certainly result in a lack of preparedness and a
poorly rated crisis response.

In the interest of safety for all concerns, family, employees and property, you
should never yield to the temptation to ignore contingency planning for
emergencies because of "a feeling that it will not happen to me" or "it cannot
happen here." Such an attitude may be costly.

2. Preplanning

2.1. Evacuation plans should be communicated to employees

2.2. OSIEA should determine that adequate information and personnel files
are available.

2.3. A local staging area and embarkation point for assembly of personnel
and their families has been identified as St Augustine Gardens in
Lavington, Nairobi which has been ear-marked by our local security
interest as a “Safe Area”.

2.4. It is preferable to assemble evacuees at a secure staging location. From


there move the evacuees to embarkation points in groups, sized to the
available transport and on a schedule calculated to minimize the
exposure of evacuees.

2.5. OSIEA liaise with other NGO’s regarding their evacuation plans for co-
ordination purposes and possible implementation of the same.

2.6. Primary and alternate modes of travel are currently being been
identified.

2.7. OSIEA should distribute copies of the evacuation plan (only necessary
portions) to employees.
2.8. In the event of any emergency, personnel should be directed to stay
away from the area of trouble or potential trouble and to advise all other
personnel accordingly. During major disturbances, all personnel should
be advised to return to their living quarters and to remain there and
await instructions.

2.9. No personnel should be allowed unilaterally to attempt either to travel


internally or to leave the country without authorization and direction.

2.10. The success of evacuating personnel is enhanced greatly by having


advance warning allowing personnel to be withdrawn by commercial
airline. The time required and the procedures necessary to obtain exit
visas should be taken into consideration.

2.11. Local laws should be observed at all times unless the situation results in
a total breakdown of authority.

2.12. An evacuation of personnel under threat from local authorities and/or


the general public is usually not advisable. The risk of harm to personnel
is greater when trying to move about the country than when maintaining
a low profile and staying indoors. Waiting at home or a safe location for
the situation to stabilize is less of a risk than traveling or being outdoors.

2.13. The decision to evacuate personnel under hostile conditions should be


taken only when the risk of staying put becomes greater than the risk of
being exposed. These conditions could arise during a period of civil
disorder or a military uprising. If a hostile evacuation is necessary, it is
hoped that all dependents and nonessential personnel will already have
been withdrawn by commercial airline. This action presumes that some
advance warning of worsening conditions within the country or of
military action from outside the country will have been received and
acted upon. Should an emergency arise suddenly without advance
warning to withdraw nonessential personnel, and if the circumstances
dictate an evacuation under hostile conditions, OSIEA will have to rely on
support from outside sources. The safety of all personnel and
dependents is of the utmost importance. In no case should any action
be taken if that action puts the personnel and dependents in more
jeopardy than they are in already.
3. Evacuation Guidelines

3.1. Phase I-Alert Stage

3.1.1. This is a period during which routine collection and assessment of


information about local and international events are in progress.

3.1.2. Documents should be identified or set aside for possible future


destruction.

3.1.3. Potential staging areas for assembling employees and their


dependents should be reviewed and/or selected.

3.1.4. The senior manager should consider meeting periodically with the
expatriate employees to review current events and trends. It is
important to develop a procedure to deal with rumors that have a
tendency to emerge with the onset of any crisis situation. Left
unattended, rumors can have a demoralizing effect. The best
countermeasures are to have an open line of communication
designed to address rumors and a set of clear evacuation
instructions.

3.1.5. Evacuation priorities should be established and individually assigned.


The following categories should be considered:

3.1.6. First priority-dependents.

3.1.7. Alternate routes to the international airports, seaports, or land


borders should be established and checked for accessibility under
emergency conditions.

3.2. Phase II-Limited Action, Increased Preparation for Evacuation

3.2.1. This phase should be initiated when, in the judgment of the senior
manager, a situation has reached a level of tension or instability that
could lead to partial or complete evacuation of expatriate employees
and their dependents. The earlier an evacuation decision can be
made, the more likely it can be affected in a calm, secure, and less
politically sensitive atmosphere.

3.2.2. The contents of departure kits should be examined and reviewed.


3.2.3. An inventory of household effects should be prepared in duplicate,
one to accompany the employee and his or her dependents and one
to be left behind with an appropriate corporate representative. The
possibility of having to secure or abandon personal property prior to
evacuations should be addressed.

3.2.4. Normal work routines should continue; however, certain preparatory


actions, such as obtaining required clearances, conducting
programmed document destruction to begin on the order of the
senior manager, etc., should be undertaken, if appropriate.

3.3. Phase III-Evacuation Phase, Final Preparation and/or Evacuation

3.3.1. This phase should be initiated when, in the judgment of the senior
manager in conjunction with the security advisors, the situation has
deteriorated to the point that the decision to evacuate is imminent
or has already been made. At this point, the company home office
should arrange for the services of other companies and outside
commercial resources necessary to support and coordinate the
evacuation process. It is assumed that total withdrawal of personnel
will not meet active resistance from the authorities.

3.3.2. The senior manager in conjunction with the security advisors should
determine whether it would be prudent and desirable to relocate
evacuees from their quarters to preselected primary or alternate
staging area(s), prior to proceeding to the international airport or
other departure site(s), for final coordination of procedures for
evacuation.

3.4. Stand Fast

3.4.1. A special phase could be implemented in the event that evacuation is


not considered prudent under certain circumstances, for example, if
a coup or serious unrest has occurred. This concept is one in which
operations may slow down or even temporarily be suspended.
Employees and their dependents would remain in their homes,
apartments or quarters for an undetermined period of time, awaiting
further instructions. Liquids, canned foods, medicines, and staples to
support the family for an extended period, should be kept on hand to
support such an eventuality, depending on the local situation.
3.4.2. Instructions to and between families should be transmitted by
whatever means available, depending on the circumstances.
However, it is vital that whatever means are employed the senior
manager receive positive feedback to ensure that all OSIEA
employees are in touch and to confirm their daily whereabouts.

4. EVACUATION

In the event of an evacuation, our Kenyan Security Specialists in Nairobi are on


standby, to immediately assist OSIEA. Security Specialists and ops medic will
proceed from South Africa to oversee the complete evacuation process.

4.1 Task.

In the case of civil unrest or military action the two main we recommend:

4.1.1. Extract by air from the City of Nairobi, Kenya, the civilians in the
employ of the company OSIEA and selected NGO employees.

4.1.2. Should evacuation not be possible by air due to circumstances, we


will move to and contain the OSIEA and NGO Employees at a safe
location in the City of Nairobi, the civilians in the employ of the
company OSIEA and selected NGO employees.

4.2. Situation.

Prior to the breakdown of law and order; several scenarios might take
place:

4.2.1. Street Riots.

4.2.2. Ethnic related violence,

4.2.3. Rioting and looting in the cities and towns.

4.2.4. Assassination of political figures.

4.2.5. Attacks on public building or facilities.

4.2.6. The abduction / murder of foreign nationals.

4.2.7. Inability of Government to pay its Army / Police / Civil Servants.


4.3. Immediate Action - Nairobi

In the event of minor unrest, warning of unrest or diplomatic / UN alert


to evacuate foreign nationals. The following will take place:

4.3.1. NGO personnel to be air evacuated by Scheduled Airline or

4.3.2. Chartered Aircraft:

4.3.1.1 Scheduled Airline


If by Scheduled Airline evacuation will be to Uganda or
South Africa. (Note: In the event of unrest, scheduled airline
flights will in all probability be cancelled)

4.3.1.2 Charter Aircraft


If by chartered aircraft: Bellair (Pty) Ltd., based at Lanseria
Airport, North West of Johannesburg, South Africa have a
variety of aircraft on charter and are ready to assist in the
evacuation of NGO personnel.

Staff will be evacuated will be to Lanseria Airport, in South


Africa.
(Note. Visas: To negate problems with evacuee’s entry
into RSA. Personnel and dependants requiring entry
visas should take care in keeping their visas up to date)

4.3.2 Airports / Landing Strips

4.3.2.1. First choice is Jomo Kenyatta International.

4.3.2.2. Second choice is Wilson Airfield

4.3.2.3. Third choice, if the above are denied to us. We


will, weather permitting use the dirt strip HKMG
Magadi. Situated approximately 100 km’s outside
of Nairobi.
4.3.3. Aircraft

4.3.3.1. Aircraft: Lanseria – Jomo Kenyatta / Wilson


In the event of an emergency evacuation our
intention is to use our executive DC9. This aircraft
has the capability of carrying the twenty proposed
passengers and sufficient fuel for the round trip
Jhb – Kyn Kyn –Jhb.

4.3.3.2. Aircraft: Lanseria – HKMG Magadi


In the event of an emergency evacuation and
being denied landing at Kenyatta or Wilson. The
Magadi runway has insufficient length (5741 ft) to
land the DC9. The type of aircraft to be used will
be dependant on the state of the runway and
prevailing weather conditions. It may be necessary
to use two aircraft for this operation.

If we are required to utilise Madagi airfield, the


aircraft will divert to Entebbe, Uganda, Tanzania or
Kigali, Rwanda for refuelling.

5. Casavac

In the case of casualties requiring medical attention, a fully equipped Para Medic
will be attached to the advanced evacuation team.

6. Assembly Prior to Air Evacuation

6.1. Should evacuation be necessary, all designated NGO personnel should


assemble at St Augustin Gardens, Lavington which has been ear-marked
by our local security interest as a “Safe Area”.

6.2. The South African Security Specialists, medic and local security personnel
will be present to receive evacuees.

6.3. Transport and escort will be provided to take evacuees to the designated
airfield
7. Containment of NGO Personnel in Safe Area

7.1. Should it be found movement from the “Safe Area” to air evacuation
points be impossible. Designated NGO personnel will be housed at St
Augustin Gardens until unrest subsides or police/military suppress
subversives.

7.2. Protection by armed guards will be provided our Kenyan appointed


Security Company.

8. Safe Area – Helicopter Extraction

Should it be required, helicopter transport is available to move NGO’s from the


“Safe Area” to the designated airfield

9. In the Event of Imminent Unrest

In case of the situation getting out of hand in Kenya, the following will happen:

9.1. Aircraft at Lanseria airport will be put on standby.

9.2. The Air Crew and Para Medic will be briefed.

9.3. Local Security Agent in Nairobi to be put on standby to provide guards


accommodation and victualing at the “Safe Area” and transport for
evacuees.

9.4. South African Security Specialists and Para-Medic to make their way to
Nairobi by scheduled Airline or Chartered aircraft.

9.5. South African Security Specialists and Para-Medic will arrive in Nairobi
and make contact with NGO’s, who will be briefed by the South African
Security Specialists and come under the South African Security Specialists
command.

9.6. The South African Security Specialists will make contact with his Kenyan
Agents and be briefed on the local situation.
10. Action On NGO Staff Wishing to Remaining At Their Posts

10.1. NGO Staff, Medic and South African Security Specialists will remain
resident at the “Safe Area”.

10.2. The South African Security Specialists will re-initiate contact with the
local Police Commander and negotiate possible extra protection for NGO
Staff.

10.3. In the event of guarantees of protection. The NGO staff may remain
operational until and / if the South African Security Specialists gives the
order to abandon their work positions and fall back permanently to the
“Safe Area”.

10.4. NGO staff, medic and the South African Security Specialists will remain at
the “Safe Area” until hostilities cease or the writer, via the Police
Commander, UN or other agency. Negotiate a safe passage for NGO
personnel to Jomo Kenyatta or alternate airfield.

11. Evacuees Personal Details

The following has been requested:

11.1. Names and addresses of evacuees


11.2. Copies of passports
11.3. Details of any medical conditions

12 Pets

12.1. A facility will be made available on the aircraft for the evacuation of
family pets.
12.2. Size will have to be restricted to that of a large dog.
12.3. We require information on animals as soon as possible for the
arrangement of cages, tranquilisers etc.
12.4. Pets will require inoculations including Rabies and Distemper along with
relevant proof of same from a reputable Vet.
12.5. Animals entering RSA from Kenya will be required to spend a term in
quarantine.
12.6. A veterinary surgeon will be on hand at Lanseria to facilitate the removal
of animals to a quarantine facility.
12. Personal Effects

Dependant on the aircraft to be used, the following is recommended:

12.1. Evacuees should take no more than 20 Kg’s of luggage.


12.2. Prescription medicines should be included in your personal effects.
12.3 Passports, visas, credit cards and any important personal documentation
should be included. See Appendix I: Departure Kit
Appendix I: Departure Kit

Departure Kit

The departure kit is a collection of items that should always be available for use in an
emergency situation. The kit should be in two parts:

Part 1 consisting of sustenance items and equipment.

Part 2 a packet of vital personal papers and documents and a departure kit checklist.
The kit should be checked periodically to ensure it is complete and up to date. It should
be properly tagged for identification and in a state of complete readiness at the outset
of Phase II - Limited Action.

Part 1 - Sustenance Items and Equipment

 Without hoarding, maintain a reasonable supply (5-7 days) of food, water, and
fuel. If you have a personal or company automobile, be sure it is ready for
immediate use. Maintain a full fuel tank and a reasonable supply of spares and
other extras as may be necessary. Also, periodically check oil, water, and tires.

 Maintain a family-size first-aid kit and an adequate supply of necessary


prescription medicine(s).

 Have a flashlight with fresh batteries and/or candles.

 Keep a supply of matches.

 Keep a small battery-operated shortwave radio with fresh batteries. Monitor


the local news media, Voice of America, and the British Broadcasting Company
closely, if available, for relevant announcements from the local government.

 Have one blanket and/or sleeping bag for each family member.

 Do not carry baggage that exceeds 20 Kilogram’s of clothing and personal


effects per individual. (This weight is the absolute maximum that will be
permitted on an evacuation aircraft). Carry the most essential items in a small
handbag or carry-on bag in case it becomes necessary to restrict baggage
further.

 Do not include in the kit firearms or any other weapons or liquor.


Part 2-Vital Personal Papers and Documents and a Checklist

 Current passports for all members of the family. (If passports are in the
company's custody, they will be distributed by the custodian at the appropriate
time).

 Sufficient cash in U.S. dollars and traveler's checks should be a regular part of
your kit to cover family incidental expenses for at least 3 days of travel. Include
sufficient currency in small denominations to take care of incidental expenses
while en route to a safe haven.

 Up-to-date International Certificates of Vaccination, especially the “yellow


fever”.

 Current inventory of household effects.

 All host country identification papers.

 Essential personal papers (birth certificates, marriage license, etc.).

 A blank company expense statement to keep track of expenses.

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