1. [No. L-3246.

November 29, 1950]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; REQUISITES.—In order that a
person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be
exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing
his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor,
Page | could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
1 1. 3.ID. ; ID. ; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—
Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in
either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code and the fact that the accused evidently
killed his wife in a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise, entitled to the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same
article—that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; PENALTY.—The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
composed only of two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusión perpetua to death. Altho the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, article 63 of the
said code is the one applicable and must be applied.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ATTENTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO THE CASE.—When the court believes that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in
his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusión perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000,
and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to
live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of
Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946,
late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous
quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back,
the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter.
The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who,
taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his
eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted
that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels
with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that
the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty,
as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not
guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo
was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person;
that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at
times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash
his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow
prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he
suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.

The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined
to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined
him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are
copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote
Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1

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 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should
absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not exclude imputability.2

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had
Page | previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will
2 be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it
is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his
mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote
the following syllabus:

Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved by
a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement
awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The
conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced
by remorse.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the
evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as
to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his
work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent
measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so
he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified,
is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.

But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of hallucination
and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In
addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his
wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his
grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias
not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly
confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.

The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and
even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife
after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours,
shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although
he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him
down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made
no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of
catching him, and insuring his conviction.

Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least
said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the
Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the
existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants
the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise
of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first
we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for
the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion
perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain
three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where
the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of
the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two

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 indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable
in the present case.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar
legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of
parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63,
paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:
Page |
3 And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a
qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced
to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-
mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the
Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)

Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the
law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of
the Penal Code; and.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with
the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the
prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.

Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming
the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article
63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:

We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as
requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we
respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after appellant
has served an appreciable amount of confinement.

In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with
the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
Appellant will pay costs.

Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and believing
that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive
who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply
executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.

2. No. L-568. July 16, 1947]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JUAN FRANCISCO, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; MOTIVE, WHEN UNNECESSARY.—It is not necessary to prove motive in case
the commission of the crime is established as required by law.

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 1. 2.ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE; INCOMPETENCY TO TESTIFY FOR OR AGAINST EACH OTHER;
REASONS FOR.—"The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any
case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the
other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy
of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappines; and, fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other." (70 C. J., 119.)
Page | 1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS; REASONS FOR.—The rule that the husband and wife cannot testify for or
4 against each other, as all other general rules, has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses
and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting
will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER; CASE AT BAR.—The defendant, who was accused of killing his son, testifying in
his own behalf, not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but went further and added what was
really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. Held: That in giving such testimony,
the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its natural and necessary consequences. By his
said act, the husband—himself exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their
marital relations—must be taken to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal,even
considering that such objection would have been available at the outset.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER, CASES OF, ENUMERATED BY COURTS AND TEXT-WRITERS NOT
EXCLUSIVE.—For obvious reasons neither text-writers nor the courts have attempted to make an enumeration
of all possible cases of waiver. In the very nature of things, it would be impossible to make a priori such a complete
enumeration and to say that it is exclusive. So long as the Legislature itself does not make its own statutory and
exclusive specification of cases of such waiver, no complete and exclusive enumeration can, nor should, be
attempted by the courts, for in the absence of such legislation the cases of waiver will be as indefinite in number
as indefinite are and always will be the varying and unpredictable circumstances surrounding each particular case.
1. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; REBUTTAL EVIDENCE SECURED TO BOTH STATE AND ACCUSED.—The right to present
rebuttal evidence is secured to the State, no less than to the accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the
provision further authorizing the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the other party to offer "new
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question."
1. 7.ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ILLNESS DIMINISHING WILLPOWER; CASE AT BAR.—Whether
the accused be considered simpleton or an eccentric, or the case one of those well-nigh inexplicable phenomena
in human conduct where the judge finds himself at a loss to discover an edequate motivation for the proven acts
of the accused,—indulging all reasonable intendments in favor of appellant, it was held that when he committed
the crime charged against him he must have been suffering from some illness (of the body, the mind, the nerves,
or the moral faculty) as is contemplated in paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code as a mitigating
circum-stance, namely, "such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts."

HILADO, J.:

Convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, Juan Francisco appeals to this Court and asks
us to reverse the decision of the trial court and to acquit him of the crime charged.

On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as detention
prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he
was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the house, the
sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant remained at
the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's
wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant
lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a
wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.

The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit,
Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is a virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the record made by
the justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and
(3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of the appellant.

Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn to by the appellant before the justice of the peace of Mansalay on March 5, 1945,.
Exhibit C-1 is its English translation. In said affidavit appellant declares that: "I asked permission from the chief of police so
that I may be able to raise my bond and to indicate to me the house of one Guillermo Gervasio, a policeman, and I was
consented and the sergeant of police accompanied me to my house; that upon arriving at the house, Sgt. Pacifico Pimentel
allowed me to go up in order that I may be able to talk to my wife and the sergeant of police awaited me in the stairs of the
house; when I was in the house, I remembered what my uncle told me to the effect that he would order someone to kill me
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 because I am a shame and a dishonor to our family and suddenly I lost my sense and I thought to myself that if someone
would kill me it would be more preferable for me to kill myself; when I looked at the bed I saw a scissor near my wife and
unconsciously I picked up the said scissor and immediately stabbed my wife whereupon I looked for my child on the bed
and stabbed him; I killed my son Romeo Francisco whose age is more or less two years and after that I stabbed m yself;
after stabbing myself, I heard a shot and the sergeant of police asked me if I would surrender to him or not; I replied him
"yes" then I lost my consciousness."

Sergeant of Police Pimentel, whose veracity we find in the evidence no reason to doubt, declared (p. 6, t.s.n., Lunar) that
Page |
the accused confessed to him that because he was already tired or disgusted with his life "on account of the accusation of
5 his father-in-law" against him, he wanted to wipe out his family by stabbing his wife, his son and himself, and killing the three
of them. The same witness also stated (p. 9, ibid.) that the accused confessed to him that he stabbed his wife, his child and
himself because he was ashamed, as his father-in-law told him that he should rather die than live in shame for having
dishonored the family of his wife.

The voluntariness and spontaniety of the confession contained in Exhibit C was testified to by the justice of the peace of
Mansalay and police sergeant Pimentel, one Sebastian Punzalan, and the chief of police Alfredo Iwahi; that said justice of
the peace had previously read the contents of the same affidavit to the accused and that the accused signed without any
intimidation having been exerted in the presence of said justice of the peace; that the accused signed voluntarily in the
session hall of the justice of the peace court in Barrio Paclasan (pp. 26-27, ibid.) Pimentel testified, upon the same point,
that no force was exerted upon appellant to state what is contained in the affidavit; that he had not maltreated or boxed the
accused as pretended by the latter; that the contents of the exhibit were read to the accused; that he did not threatened the
accused to shoot the latter if he would not swear to Exhibit C before the justice of the peace, as declared by said accused
(pp. 25-26, ibid.) In this connection we note from the testimony of the accused himself that on the way to the house of the
justice of the peace after the incident, he was being helped by the chief of police Iwahi when, according to him, Sergeant
Pimentel told him that he was going to swear to the contents of Exhibit C and that if he would not do so Pimentel would
shoot him (p. 17, ibid.); that (the same accused assured the court) Iwahi treated him well (t.s.n., p. 20, ibid.); and really from
the entire testimony of this accused the good treatment accorded him by Chief of Police Iwahi is clearly discernible. He was
under preventive detention in the house of Iwahi and it was Iwahi who suggested or told him, after he had killed and dressed
the former's pig, that he bring a kilo of the meat to his (appellant's) wife (p. 13, ibid.) It was also Iwahi who allowed him to
go to his house on the same occasion for the purposes of the procurement of his bail (p. 13, ibid.).

Under these circumstances, besides the complete absence of proof of any reason or motive why Pimentel should so
threaten the accused, we find the accused's version incredible. On page 16 of the same transcript, answering a question
by the Court of First Instance, the accused testified that he understands English and the translation Exhibit C-1 of the
affidavit Exhibit C is in that language.

Other indications of appellant's lack of trustworthiness are: While on page 14 of said transcript he testified that he was the
only one who went to the house of his wife because Pimentel, according to him, remained in the house of Roberto Magramo,
on page 13 he declared that he was accompanied by the sergeant of police of Mansalay, Pacifico Pimentel to the house of
his wife and that the chief of police ordered Pimentel to so accompany him. Contradicting the same pretension of his having
gone alone to his wife's house is his own testimony on page 17 of the transcript wherein he assured affirmatively the question
of his own counsel whether Pimentel was the policeman who was with him to guard him on the occasion of his going to his
wife's house; and really, while he imputed upon his wife the wounding of their child, who died as a consequence thereof, he
admitted that he did not tell this to the justice of the peace of Mansalay (p. 18, ibid.), and the reason he assigned for this
passive conduct on his part to the effect that he was afraid of Pimentel (p. 19, ibid.) is patently unacceptable, for no motive
whatsoever has been established to make us believe that the accused had reasons to be so afraid of Pimentel. Appellant's
testimony to the effect that Pacifico Pimentel was testifying against him because Pimentel "being my guard that time he
might be held responsible for allowing me to go alone" (p. 17, ibid.) is absolutely without merit. This testimony clearly reveals
a desire to show that because Pimentel allowed the accused to go up the house while the former stayed at the foot of the
stairs, said Pimentel would be responsible for what had happened unless the accused was the one who killed the child and
wounded his wife rather than the wife having accidentally wounded the child and killed him and been stabbed by the
accused, who also stabbed himself. As we said a moment ago, we do not give any merit to this purpose in testifying against
the accused to relieve himself of all responsibility for what had happened, it would have been more conducive to this result
if Pimentel had testified that it was not the accused, whom he had allowed to go upstairs unguarded, who was guilty, but
his wife, of the wounding of the child, and that the accused wounded his wife only as the result of the obfuscation produced
by the child's death. And the fact that Pimentel gave the version which might place no small blame on him for allowing the
accused to go up the house alone, gives special weight to his testimony.

This case, as developed by the evidence for the prosecution, which has not been destroyed nor enervated by that of the
defense, presents a truly strange happening. But the fact of the commission of the crime of parricide appears to us to have
been established beyond reasonable doubt. As to the reasons impelling the commission of the act, the case is a strange
one and admittedly not common. But while it is not necessary even to prove motive in case the commission of the crime is
established as required by law (U.S. vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil., 173; U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil., 561; U.S. vs. Reyes, 18 Phil., 495;
U.S. vs. Balmori and Apostol, 18 Phil., 578), here we have a case of a crime proven beyond reasonable doubt, not absolutely
without a proven motive, but with proof of a motive testified to by the accused himself in his confession, strange though it
be. But at times "truth is stranger than fiction," and it so happens here. The law must be applied to the facts.

We have scanned and searched the evidence and the record diligently for facts and circumstances which might sufficiently
establish insanity or any allied defense, but we have failed to find them.

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 As we construe the evidence, we believe that Exhibit C contains the truth, as narrated by the accused himself who, at the
time of making it, must have been moved only by the determination of a repentant father and husband to acknowledge his
guilt for facts which, though perhaps done under circumstances productive of a diminution of the exercise of will-power, fell
short of depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts. We will have occasion to further consider this aspect of the
case later.

Exhibit C was signed and sworn to by appellant the day following the fatal event. Presumably, on making this confession
appellant had not yet had time to reflect upon the consequences of such a confession to himself — egoism was not yet
Page |
allowed to operate against the promptings of his conscience. But when on February 23, 1946 — almost one year after —
6 this man testified in his own defense in the Court of First Instance, he already had had ample opportunity to reflect upon
those consequences. And what happened? As in similar cases, he repudiated his confession, and alleged torture and
violence to have been exerted upon his person and his mind in order, so he now pretends, to extract it from him. As we find
the confession to have been given voluntarily, we feel justified in concluding that its subsequent repudiation by the accused
almost a year after must have been due to his fear of its consequences to himself, which he not improbably thought might
cost him his own life. It was the struggle between the noble and the ignoble in the man, and the latter, aided by instinct of
self-preservation, won.

Defense counsel attacks the value of Exhibit C as evidence of guilt for the reason that the statements contained therein
were not, counsel contends, given spontaneously but through use of violence and intimidation. He also questions the
admissibility of Exhibit D on the ground that it has not been properly identified; and, with more vigor and stronger emphasis,
he impugns the admissibility of the testimony of appellant's wife, invoking the provision of section 26 (d) of Rule 123
prohibiting the wife and the husband from testifying for or against each other.

As to Exhibit C, this document was sworn to and subscribed by said accused before the justice of the peace of Mansalay.
This official testified that he asked the prisoner before the latter signed said exhibit whether he understood the contents
thereof, and that said latter answered in the affirmative. The witness further declared that appellant signed the exhibit
voluntarily and that said appellant said that the said affidavit was his (p. 10, ibid.). There is a total absence of evidence,
besides the testimony of appellant himself, to show that his statements contained in said exhibit were extracted form him
by the use of violence and intimidation. While we are not unaware of the practice resorted to by some peace officers of
extracting admissions or confessions from persons accused of crime by the employment of third-degree methods, in the
present case we fail to find from the evidence sufficient proof to destroy the categorical testimony of the justice of the peace
that Exhibit C was signed by appellant voluntarily and with a full understanding thereof. Furthermore, the statements of
appellant in said Exhibit C were corroborated by the testimony of his wife on rebuttal. This leads us to the consideration of
the admissibility of the wife's testimony.

The rule contained in section 265 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the subject have assigned as
reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the
law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure
of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
fourth, because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other. This has been said in the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 64; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A.L.R., 133),
thus:

The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated
thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems
it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice,
and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other. (70 C.J., 119.)

However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal
cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons
which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears
and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.

At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but under circumstances
presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own
defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. (p. 15, ibid.) By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution,
which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in
rebuttal; and the the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected to
punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which
might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding
authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral and social sense, her being believed by
those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may read the same, once put in writing, to be the killer
of her infant child. It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the law of common sense. Presuming the husband who
so testified against his wife to be endowed with common sense, he must be taken to have expected that the most natural
6
evidenceCases5
 reaction which the said testimony would give rise to on the part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to deny upon
rebuttal the new matter which was involved in the same testimony, namely, the imputation that it was his wife who killed
their little son. Upon the part of the prosecution, because he not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but
went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. And upon the
part of the wife, because of the reasons already set forth above. Hence, in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all
fairness, be held to have intended all its aforesaid natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband —
himself exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations — must be taken
to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been
Page | available at the outset.
7
At this point, it behooves us to emphasize the all-important role of the State in this case. The State being interested in laying
the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the
rebutting testimony in question, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the latter himself who gave rise
to its necessity. It may be said that the accused husband thought that he would have more chances of convincing the court
of his pretended innocence if he pointed to his wife as having caused the death of their child, instead of simply denying that
he was the author of the fatal act. To this we would counter by saying that if he was to be allowed, for his convenience, to
make his choice and thereby impute the act upon his spouse, justice would be partial and one-sided if both the State and
the wife were to be absolutely precluded from introducing the latter's rebutting testimony.

As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be waived.

Waiver of incompetency. — Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution
against the other may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or
her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
examination in the usual manner. It is well-established that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in
his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct
examination. It is also true that objection to the spouse's competency must be made when he or she is first offered
as witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to the
admission of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony admitted,
especially if the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly. Other courts have held that
the witness's testimony is not admissible even with the other spouse's consent. Clearly, if the statute provides that
a spouse shall in no case testify against the other except in a prosecution for an offense against the other, the
failure of the accused to object does not enable the state to use the spouse as a witness. (3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, 11th Ed., section 1205, pp. 2060-2061.)

Wharton, in note 10 at the foot of page 2060 of the cited volume refers us to section 1149 appearing on page 1988 of the
same volume, dealing with waiver objection to incompetency of witnesses in general. We transcribe this section for
convenient reference:

Waiver of objection to incompetency. — A party may waive his objection to the competency of a witness and permit
him to testify. A party calling an incompetent witness as his own waives the incompetency. Also, if, after such
incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the incompetency,
the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental capacity or for some other
reason. If the objection could have been taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will not
be available on writ of error. If, however, the objection of a party is overruled and the ruling has been excepted to,
the party may thereafter examine the witness upon the matters as to which he was allowed to testify to without
waiving his objections to the witness's competency. (Ibid., section 1149, p. 1988.)

It will be noted, as was to be expected, that in the last above-quoted section, the author mentions certain specific cases
where the courts concerned hold that there was waiver, but for obvious reasons neither the author nor said courts have
attempted to make an enumeration of all possible cases of waiver. In the very nature of things, it would be impossible to
make a priori such a complete enumeration and to say that it is exclusive. So long as the Legislature itself does not make
its own statutory and exclusive specification of cases of such waiver — and we doubt that it ever will — no complete and
exclusive enumeration can, nor should, be attempted by the courts, for in the absence of such legislation the cases of waiver
will be as indefinite in number as indefinite are and always will be the varying and unpredictable circumstances surrounding
each particular case.

To illustrate, Mr. Wharton says above that the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness
for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner, the reason being that the State
is entitled to question the spouse so presented as to all matters germane and pertinent to the direct testimony. In the same
way, and for a similar reason, when the herein appellant gave his testimony in question in his defense, the State had the
right to rebut the new matter contained in that testimony consisting in the imputation upon his wife of the death of the little
boy. And that rebuttal evidence, which was rendered necessary byappellant's own testimony, could be furnished only by
his wife who, as he fully knew, was alone with him and their son at the precise place and time of the event. This right to
rebut is secured to the State, no less than to the accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the provision further
authorizing the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the other party to offer "new additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue in question." So that if the waiver that we here declare to flow from the above-mentioned testimony of
appellant does not happen to be among those which were mentioned in the cases cited by Mr. Wharton, that is no reason
against the existence of said waiver.

7
evidenceCases5
 When the husband testified that it was his wife who caused the death of their son, he could not, let us repeat, justly expect
the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting such new matter in his testimony, through the only witness available,
namely, the wife; nor could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger of criminal
proceedings against her being started by the authorities upon the strength and basis of said testimony of her husband, or
to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the killer of her own offspring.
A decent respect and considerate regard for the feelings of an average mother will tell us that such a moral and social
stigma would be no less injurious to her than a criminal punishment. And if the wife should, in such a case and at such a
juncture, be allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the scope of her testimony should at least be the same as that of her husband.
Page | This is only simple justice and fairness dictated by common sense. Since the husband had testified that it was his wife who
8 caused the death of the little boy, she should be allowed to say that it was really her husband who did it. We hold that it is
not necessary, to justify such rebuttal evidence, and to declare the existence of the waiver upon which it was based, that
the wife be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case by reason of such testimony of her accused husband. The rule of
waiver of objection to the competency of witnesses generally does not require this prerequisite in the case between husband
and wife. Rather the rule makes the determination of the question hinge around the consequences which by common sense,
in justice and in fairness, should be deemed to have been expected by the spouse who first testified naturally to flow from
his act of giving that testimony. At any rate, the trial court not only had the power to allow the State to utilize the wife as
rebuttal witness, but also the discretion to permit "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." But
even restricting the wife's testimony to merely contradicting her husband's version that she was the one who killed their
child, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the killer. With the testimony of both spouses upon the
point, instead of that of the accused alone, let justice take its course.

As to Exhibit D, this document was a part of the record of the case in the justice of the peace of court which was expressly
presented by the prosecution as evidence in the Court of First Instance.

But after all has been said and done, in justice to the accused, we believe that, whether we are dealing with a simpleton or
an eccentric, or we have here one of those well-nigh inexplicable phenomena in human conduct where the judge finds
himself at a loss to discover an adequate motivation for the proven acts of the accused, — indulging all reasonable
intendments in favor of appellant, we are of opinion that when he committed the crime charged against him he must have
been suffering from some illness (of the body, the mind, the nerves, or the moral faculty) as is contemplated in paragraph
9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code as a mitigating circumstance, namely, "such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts."

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63, paragraph
3, of the same code, provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there
is no aggravating circumstance, and the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty
shall be applied; in this case, in view of the above indicated circumstance and there being no aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty is reclusion perpetua, which was the penalty correctly applied by the trial court, which penalty, of course,
carries with it the accessory penalties provided for in article 41 of the said Code. The accused should also be sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Romeo Francisco in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.

As above modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

3. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant, against FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Cagayan, AND
OTHERS, appealed.

The Attorney General. Mr. Ozaeta on behalf of the Government.

D. Manuel G. Manzano and D. Jose Whitney in representation of the appellant Jacobo Amalan.

SYLLABUS

1. WITNESSES; HUSBAND AND WIFE. - In view of the facts related in the decision, It is declared: That the woman can not
testify against her husband in a criminal case in which he is accused of having killed his natural daughter.

8
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 DECISION

AVANCEÑA, C.J. :

In criminal case No. 6520 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Jacobo
Page | Amalan," he is accused of having killed Rosita Awingan, a one-year-old daughter, a natural daughter of her wife Seferina
9 Awingan with another man. At the hearing of the case, when Seferina Awingan was presented as a witness, the defendant
J. cobo Amalan objected and the Court, accepting the objection, refused to admit her testimony as the accused's wife.
Against this resolution the Pro General Curator, on behalf of the Government, presented before this Court the present
remedy of certiorari and mandamus, alleging that the Court, in issuing its resolution, exceeded its jurisdiction and abused
its discretion.

Article 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, except with the consent of both spouses, or, in case of offense
committed by one against the other, the husband and wife are not competent witnesses in favor or against the other in an
action criminal in which one of them is a part.

The prohibition is clear and the exception is not applicable to the case. There is no consent of both spouses nor is it an
offense committed by one against the other. The reason for the prohibition, which is fundamentally the legal fiction of the
identity of the persons of the spouses, by virtue of marriage, does not exist as regards the child of one of the spouses.
Although there are cases in the Courts of the United States in which this exception has been extended to crimes committed
by a spouse against the child of another spouse, there are many other cases in which the contrary theory has been upheld
in favor of which the weight of the authorities.

Being clear the prohibition of the law and there being no basis to consider the case within the exception of this prohibition,
the resolution of the Court is correct.

The appeal is denied, without special pronouncement regarding the costs. This is how it is ordered.

Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Moran, MM., Are satisfied.

4. No. L-25643. June 27, 1968.

JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, JOSE DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE PLANT & COLD STORAGE Co., INC.,
and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Evidence; Husband and wife; Rule that a husband cannot be examined for or against his wife; Scope of its
application; Reason for the rule; Case at bar.—A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other (Sec. 20 [b], Rule 130, Rules of Court). This provision and rule deals
with two different matters which rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each
other’s behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against each other. The fundamental theory of the common law is said
to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification. Indeed section 20 of
Rule 130 is entitled “Disqualification by reason of x x x relationship.”

9
evidenceCases5
 On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons has been offered (see U.S. v.Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182; and
People v.Francisco, 78 Phil. 694) for the privilege, the true explanation which is after all the simplest (Wigmore, sec. 2227
at 212) and which constitutes the real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the privilege, “is the natural
repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other’s condemnation and
to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner (Id., sec. 2228, at
217).
In the case at bar where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be
compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without violating section
Page | 20(b) of Rule 130? Even in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party
10 as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or
separable, or the spouse offerred as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party (97 C.J.S. 477). Section 6 of Rule 132
(Rule on Direct Examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses) is a mere concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule
which precludes the husband or the wif e f rom becoming the means of the other’s condemnation. The said rule of discovery
should therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one’s spouse in a situation where this
natural repugnance obtains.
DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

The issue tendered for resolution in this case is whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be
examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party under Section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, without infringing on
her marital privilege not to testify against her husband under Section 20(b) of Rule 130. The trial court, presided by the
respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in the affirmative and required the wife to appear and testify. The petitioners sued
for certiorari but the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition 1 and denied their motion for reconsideration. 2 Hence this
appeal. 3

On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N.
Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment rendered
against the La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case 39327. Named as defendants were
Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The
complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership
of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant
in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that summons
was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the
Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons
was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila acquired no jurisdiction
over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that court was void.

In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the company was placed under
receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as
such he had authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in Civil Case 39827. They denied entering
into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque’s claim because they knew it to be a legitimate
obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.

Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to
Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request
was granted over the objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision of the Rules of
Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without
his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other." 4

This provision deals with two different matters which rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband and
wife to testify in each other’s behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against each other. 5 The fundamental theory of
the common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification.
6 Indeed Section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled "Disqualification by reason of . . . relationship."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons has been offered 7 for the privilege, the "true explanation [which] is
after all the simplest" 8 and which constitutes "the real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the privilege," is the
natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other’s
condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner.
9

Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the
case and, indeed, in the light of the allegations both in the complaint and in the answer, the request was apparently one
that could reasonably be expected to be made. Thus, the complaint charged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"13. — That in obtaining the judgment by default in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila against La

10
evidenceCases5
 Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. defendants, in gross and evident and faith, and, in fraudulent conspiracy, made it
appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained a loan of P150,000.00 from defendant Marciano C.
Roque thru defendant Jose Manuel Lezama allegedly upon an authority vested upon defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by
the alleged Board of Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. allegedly evidenced by the minutes of the
meetings of the Board of Directors of the said corporation signed by defendant Jose Manuel Lezama and attested to by
Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita B. Lezama and that defendants spouses Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita B. Lezama
had manipulated the books of the corporation by making it appear that such fictitious loan was then in existence."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Page |
11 On the other hand, the answer claimed

"13. That the herein defendants specifically deny all the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint; the truth is,
that the herein defendants have not conspired and acted in bad faith with the plaintiff [Marciano C. Roque] in Civil Case No.
39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for the rendition of the said judgment referred to therein; for the truth is, that
the herein defendants, in their capacities as President-Manager and Secretary of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.,
Inc., believing as they believe that the obligation sought to be enforced by said civil action being legitimate and the
allegations of the complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila are true, they did not deem
it wise to contest the same; that the obligation of P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., which the
defendant Marciano C. Roque sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila was
legitimately contracted in accordance with law; that said obligation was duly entered in the books of the corporation and that
the said loan is not fictitious; that the amount realized therefrom was spent for the benefit of the said corporation."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it was Paquita
Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama was allegedly
authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary, made the entry in the books of the
corporation.

It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan transaction was above board that Dineros, the company
receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse witness "for or against her husband," but rather as
an adverse party in the case.

It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, such forays into his opponent’s position on the strength of Section 6 of
Rule 132 which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading
questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or
of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party and the witness thus called may be contradicted
and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined to the adverse party only upon the
subject- matter of his examination in chief."cralaw virtua1aw library

The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In this case where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against
the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged
fraud without violating Section 20(b) of Rule 130?

It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony would be receivable only against her. 10 It is even suggested
that "each may testify in his or her own behalf, although the testimony may inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or
against his or her own interest, although the testimony may also militate against the other spouse." 11 Upon the other hand,
it is insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to testify will transgress Section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially if her testimony
will support the plaintiff’s charge.

The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the spouses and one Marciano C. Roque to make it appear
that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to
testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme: "that it was
Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed the minutes of the meeting during which Manuel Lezama was
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the books of
the corporation."cralaw virtua1aw library

Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked questions
on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be
adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of
husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife’s own interests would tend to
show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense that
the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may
unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.

Because of the unexpansive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife cannot be examined "for or against her
husband without his consent," it is further argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason
why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his or her testimony could operate
only against himself or herself. 12

11
evidenceCases5
 Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be
inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident
purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge.

Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile
witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the
spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party. 13
Page |
12 The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife
as an instrument of fraud; for then what better way would there be to prevent discovery than to make a co-conspirator in
fraud immune, to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party? This argument overlooks the fact
that Section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or
the wife from becoming the means of the other’s condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded
in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one’s spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.

It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros has not demonstrated that there is no evidence available
to him other than the Lezama’s testimony to prove the charge recited in the complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are reversed, and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.

5.
G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001.*
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
Partnership; Contracts; A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights
are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary.—A partnership may be constituted in any
form, except where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be
necessary. Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language
and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise. The essential points that must be proven to show that a partnership
was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits. Understandably so,
in view of the absence of a written contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the
introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is whether
or not the “Dead Man’s Statute” applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondent’s testimony and that of his
witness, Josephine.

12
evidenceCases5
 Same; Evidence; Dead Man’s Statute; Requirements; The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.—The “Dead
Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial
evidence, it is necessary that: “1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person
Page | of unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
13 against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; When it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.—Two reasons forestall the application of the “Dead Man’s Statute” to this case. First, petitioners filed a
compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim,
petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s Statute.” Well entrenched is the rule
that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant
in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and
not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.”—The testimony of Josephine is not covered by
the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.” Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence
of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent
does not make her an assignor because the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action which has
arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.” Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
Same; Dissolution; The Civil Code expressly provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal
personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business culminating in its termination.—With regard to petitioners’
insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished respondent’s claim, we agree with the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting filed by respondent three (3) years after Jacinto’s death was well within
the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years while
the right to demand an accounting for a partner’s interest as against the person continuing the business accrues at the date
of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary agreement. Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution
of the partnership, in this case, it was after Jacinto’s death that respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an
account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto’s death dissolved the partnership, the
dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code expressly provides that upon dissolution, the
partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business, culminating in its
termination.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled "Lamberto T. Chua vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga" and of the
Resolution dated May 23, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia
Sunga (hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter
petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto
L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the
business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto
as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the
latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided
between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister
of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the
gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other remuneration from the
business.

Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation went quite and was
profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to success of their business because of the volume of orders and
deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished
respondent with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent

13
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 however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and
Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.

Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner
Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of
his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of
Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
Page |
14 On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and reasons to evade respondent's
demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent.
Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter's share in
the partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the
business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with their duty to account, and
continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent.

On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed
the motion to dismiss.

On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance denied the motion to dismiss.

On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending that they are not liable for
partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a
cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the
agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.

On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the claim for winding up of
partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in
partnership assets/properties should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or
intestate proceeding.

On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss.

On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial Conference.

On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.

On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.

On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, "as petitioners failed to show
that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court."2

On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was remanded to the trial court on
April 26, 1995.

On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of the case of January 17,
1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to have waived their right to present evidence
for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.

On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:

(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under accounting procedures and
standards of the properties, assets, income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center Since the time
of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued the business operations including all businesses
derived from Shellite Gas Appliance Center, submit an inventory, and appraisal of all these properties,
assets, income, profits etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for approval or disapproval;

(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties, assets, income and
profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and advantage the legally pertain to the plaintiff and
account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of this petition as basis;

14
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 (3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff ½ shares and interest of the plaintiff in the
partnership of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of the
petition;

(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and profits from the partnership
from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per
month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
Page |
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its business activities pursuant
15 to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the ½ interest, shares, participation and equity in the partnership,
or the value thereof in money or money's worth, if the properties are not physically divisible;

(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and hold them
liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and,

(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's (sic) and P25,000.00 as
litigation expenses.

NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.

SO ORDERED."3

On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case to the Court of Appeals.

On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all respects." 4

On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon following grounds:

"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a partnership between respondent
Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter'' invitation and offer and that upon his death the
partnership assets and business were taken over by petitioners.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or prescription did not apply in the
instant case.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was competent and credible evidence to
warrant the finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership, the finding of
highly exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets and profits."5

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed
between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the
testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court that provides:

"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."

Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have
been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.

We are not persuaded.

A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights are contributed thereto, in
which case a public instrument shall necessary.6 Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts
and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise. 7 The essential profits that must
be proven to that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in
the profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The
15
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 crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible
respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.

The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity,
or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial
evidence, it is necessary that:
Page |
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
16
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind."10

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim 11 against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the
filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's
Statute".12 Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets
up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters
of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.14

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a
party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent
offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners'
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a
party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of
action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value because she was allegedly
coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was
requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see
how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.

Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since
relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.16

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail over the factual findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not
only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered
the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an informal one.

Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of judicial precedents, a factual
matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this
Court on review.17 This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess
and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that
piece of evidence of one party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of
evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the
documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that
such evidence was offered.19

With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished respondent's claim, we agree
with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting filed by respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's
death was well within the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in
six (6) years20 while the right to demand an accounting for a partner's interest as against the person continuing the business
accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary agreement. 21 Considering that the death of a partner
results in the dissolution of the partnership22 , in this case, it was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving partner
had the right to an account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's death dissolved the
partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code23 expressly provides that upon

16
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 dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business,
culminating in its termination.24

In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners maintain
that said partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should have been registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) since registration is mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that
partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register with the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not
mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code25 explicitly provides that the partnership retains its juridical personality even if it
Page |
fails to register. The failure to register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so
17 long as the contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties,
and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract. 26 In the case at bar, non-
compliance with this directory provision of the law will not invalidate the partnership considering that the totality of the
evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed forged the partnership in question.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

6.
No. L-51034. May 29, 1987.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELO V ALDEZ y MANZON, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Rape; Credibility of witnesses; Rape victim's testimony as to the rape, sufficiently
corroborated by another witness and by medical findings, credible; Absence of motive of victim to implicate the accused—
Upon a consideration of the whole record, We find the testimony of the victim aside from being sufficiently corroborated by
the other witness and by medical findings, credible to any reasonable person. It is true that there were a few inconsistencies
but they are too minor to affect the girl's credibility. Such inconsistencies are well-expected to come from an unexposed
barrio lass not used to the rigours of a public trial. Next, appellant failed to show Us a good reason for the girl's alleged
disposition to lie in court and the complicity of her family thereto. As he admitted, he was treated very well just like any
member of the Baliton family. Indeed, it is very doubtful that the victim and her young friend would make up a story of rape
for no motive at all. Needless to say, Lolita, a girl of such tender age, will not expose herself to public shame and humiliation
by having to undergo a physical examination and testify in open court if her rape charge is not true.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defense that the accused and the victim were sweethearts, not true; Offer of marriage
considered an admission of guilt by the accused—The Court cannot believe that the appellant and Lolita were in fact
17
evidenceCases5
 sweethearts. The ring presented in evidence could not have belonged to the victim because, as has been successfully
proven by the prosecution, it was too small for her. It should also be noted that no other substantial evidence to support
appellant's claim, like love letters, notes or other tokens was shown in Court. The offer of marriage, instead of helping him
in his defense, betrays the appellant's culpability. lt was made in the presence of the Barangay Captain at the time when an
investigation was already being conducted. This could only be taken as an admission of guilt. Furthermore, if the appellant
and Lolita were really sweethearts, the latter would have readily accepted the proposal of marriage. Had there been love
between the two, the girl would not have jeopardized their relationship by exposing everything to her mother and to the
authorities, much less filing a complaint for rape against him.
Page | Same; Same; Same; Victim's testimony that her panty was torn evidenced the consummation of the sexual act.—
18 Regarding the appellant's claim that in line with Lolita's testimony that her panty was only pulled down to her thighs, there
could have been no sexual intercourse, We find this incorrect because said testimony did not stop there. The girl went on
to say that her panty was eventually torn, allowing the consummation of the sexual act.
Same; Same; Same; Delay of victim in telling her mother and making a complaint about the rape, sufficiently
explained; Concealments by young girls of the rape and delay in reporting a rape incident due to death threats, justified.—
The delay on the part of the victim in telling her mother and making a complaint should not be taken against her. The cause
of this delay was well-explained in the lower court and that is, the girl feared for her own life and the lives of her friend and
their families. This Court has already recognized that concealments by young girls of rape against them are not uncommon
because of threats on their lives. We have also repeatedly held that delay in reporting a rape incident due to death threats
is justified.
Same; Same; Same; Testimony of accused that it was the victim who suggested to have sex with him, incredible;
Reason.—Appellant's story appears incredible from every angle. It is unbelievable that young Lolita, fresh from her
elementary grades, would lure a much older man to have sex with her when the latter has not even told her about his
feelings towards her. It is even more difficult to believe that this girl would suggest sex in a place very near her house, stay
there for a long period of time to have more sex, knowing the danger of being caught by any member of her family or her
neighbors.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. A-51,
Marcelo Valdez was charged with rape for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously having sexual knowledge, through force,
threats and intimidation, of Lolita Baliton, against the latter's will.

On May 11, 1979, the said Court rendered its decision convicting accused as charged, with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused MARCELO VALDEZ y MANZON guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, sentences him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify Lolita Baliton in the amount of P12,000.00
(People vs. Rapada, 80 SCRA 63) and to pay the costs.

Let the accused be credited with the full period of his preventive detention under Republic Act 6127.

The case is now before Us on appeal, with the accused-appellant raising the following assignments of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES WHICH
ARE REPLETE OF INCONSISTENCIES AND INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES, AND LACKING IN CANDOR AND
CREDIBILITY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES ARE "VERY
CONVINCING, FRANK, STRAIGHT-FORWARD AND SINCERE" IGNORING THE DULY RECORDED OBSERVATIONS
OF THE COURT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WHICH REVEALS HER LACK OF SINCERITY.

III

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPRECIATED THE WHOLE CONTEXT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED BY HOLDING
THAT COMPLAINANT ASKED ACCUSED TO MAKE LOVE TO HER EVEN BEFORE THE LATTER HAD COURTED HER.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AT LEAST ON REASONABLE DOUBT.

The facts of the case are as follows:

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 Appellant of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, who was then 20 years of age, left his hometown in 1976 for San Quintin, Pangasinan,
in order to harvest palay. During each harvest season, he stayed with the Baliton family where he was given free board and
lodging. Whenever he was there, he slept in the camarin near the Baliton house.

At about 10:30 in the morning of December 21, 1977, while Lolita, a 13 year old barrio lass, was alone folding clothes with
her 12-year old friend Victoria Flores, appellant suddenly entered the house holding a balisong. He threatened the two girls
that he would kill them and their families if they screamed or told anyone about what would happen. Thereafter, he pulled
Lolita towards him, twisted her hands and put them at her back. He made her lie down, lowered her panty, opened the
Page |
zipper of his pants, put out his sexual organ, went on top of her, inserted his organ in her private part and then went through
19 with the push and pull movement. At this instance Lolita cried in pain.

All throughout this sexual abuse, the two girls were not able to do anything because of the continuing threats of appellant
who did not stop brandishing his balisong. After appellant left, Lolita's tears did not stop flowing until her mother arrived.
When asked for an explanation, both girls kept silent having in mind the threat made by appellant that if they talk, he will kill
them.

Lolita testified that this heinous act was repeated in January 1978 with appellant repeating the same threats on her.
Sometime in February, while appellant was away, Lolita finally narrated to her mother the gruelling experience she had.
Mrs. Baliton immediately reported the matter to the Barangay Captain and on February 26, 1978, had her daughter undergo
a physical examination. The medical findings included the following — "presence of old lacerations at 3:00 o'clock, 6:00
o'clock, and 9: 00 o'clock positions."

On February 27, 1978, the matter was brought to the police of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and this led to the filing of the
information charging appellant of rape.

The first and second assigned errors will be taken up together as they revolve around the same issue of credibility. Appellant
insists that the lower court should not have given the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses much weight as said
witnesses were not sincere, lacked candor, seriousness and integrity. To discredit the testimony of the victim, appellant
maintains that both of them were in fact sweethearts who before December 21, 1978 have had sexual intercourse on several
occasions in the camarin. 1 To support this allegation, he presented as evidence a ring supposedly given to him by the
victim. 2 He further adds that he even proposed marriage to the girl. 3

Next, appellant contends that the victim was obviously lying in Court because of her testimony that her panty was only
lowered up to her thighs. His claim is that if this is true, then rape could not have been committed because of the impossibility
of insertion of the penis into the victim's vagina. 4

Also, according to the appellant the delay of the victim in telling her mother and making a complaint only proves that there
really was no rape.

We do not agree. Upon a consideration of the whole record, We find the testimony of the victim aside from being sufficiently
corroborated by the other witness and by medical findings, credible to any reasonable person. It is true that there were a
few inconsistencies but they are too minor to affect the girl's credibility. Such inconsistencies are well-expected to come
from an unexposed barrio lass not used to the rigours of a public trial. Next, appellant failed to show Us a good reason for
the girl's alleged disposition to lie in court and the complicity of her family thereto. As he admitted, he was treated very well
just like any member of the Baliton family. 5 Indeed, it is very doubtful that the victim and her young, friend would make up
a story of rape for no motive at all. Needless to say, Lolita, a girl of such tender age, will not expose herself to public shame
and humiliation by having to undergo a physical examination and testify in open court if her rape charge is not true.

The Court cannot believe that the appellant and Lolita were in fact sweethearts. The ring presented in evidence could not
have belonged to the victim because, as has been successfully proven by the prosecution, it was too small for her. 6 It
should also be noted that no other substantial evidence to support appellant's claim, like love letters, notes or other tokens
was shown in Court.

The offer of marriage, instead of helping him in his defense, betrays the appellant's culpability. It was made in the presence
of the Barangay Captain at the time when an investigation was already being conducted. 7 This could only be taken as an
admission of guilt. 8 Furthermore, if the appellant and Lolita were really sweethearts, the latter would have readily accepted
the proposal of marriage. Had there been love between the two, the girl would not have jeopardized their relationship by
exposing everything to her mother and to the authorities, much less filing a complaint for rape against him.

Regarding the appellant's claim that in line with Lolita's testimony that her panty was only pulled down to her thighs, there
could have been no sexual intercourse, We find this incorrect because said testimony did not stop there. The girl went on
to say that her panty was eventually torn, allowing the consummation of the sexual act. Thus:

Q When you were sexually abused by Marcelo Valdez on December 21, 1977, you said on
cross examination that your pantie was just lowered 6 inches above the knee, will you
please tell the Court what happened to that pantie when Marcelo Valdez sexually abused
you?

19
evidenceCases5
 A It was torn, sir.

Q Where is that pantie now?

A No more, sir.9

The delay on the part of the victim in telling her mother and making a complaint should not be taken against her. The cause
Page | of this delay was well-explained in the lower court and that is, the girl feared for her own life and the lives of her friend and
20 their families.10 This Court has already recognized that concealments by young girls of rape against them are not
uncommon because of threats on their lives. 11 We have also repeatedly held that delay in reporting a rape incident due to
death threats is justified.

On the third assignment of error, We agree with the lower court that the following testimony of the accused-appellant is not
only unreliable but hard to believe:

Q The fact is your activities while in the house is eating during lunch time, help the parents
of Lolita Valeton till the fields, also in the harvest and at night time sleep in the camarin is
it not?

A At harvest time, we all harvest in the field and when the afternoon comes I go to the
camarin and sleep there, sir.

Q And you never had any occasion to be very close to Lolita Valeton because of her age
and because of your relationship to the family because you are the "Kasugpong," is that
right?

A I used to sleep in the camarin of Lolita and Lolita voluntarily came to the place where I
was, sir.

Q When was that?

A In 1977, sir.

Q What date or month?

A I already forgot it, sir.

Q But you are sure that it was in 1977?

A Yes, sir.

Q At what time when she went to you without asking her to come?

A 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

Q What happened there at 3:00 o'clock?

A She went to the place where I was and laid down and told me how she felt, sir.

Q What did she tell you as her feeling at the time?

A Lolita said to me, "I am waiting for you to tell me how you feel but I think you are
ashamed."

Q With that statement of Lolita Valeton what did you do?

A I kissed her, sir.

Q Only?

A She told me that we would have sexual intercourse, so we did it, sir.

Q It was Lolita Valeton who told you that?

A Yes, sir.

20
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 Q And you had the sexual act with her?

A Yes, sir. ,12

Appellant's story appears incredible from every angle. It is unbelievable that young Lolita, fresh from her elementary grades,
would lure a much older man to have sex with her when the latter has not even told her about his feelings towards her. It is
even more difficult to believe that this girl would suggest sex in a place very near her house, stay there for a long period of
Page | time to have more sex, knowing the danger of being caught by any member of her family or her neighbors.
21
At this point, it is apt to consider the lower court's observation that not only was appellant's testimony incredible but that
appellant did not appear as a credible witness. Thus:

Considering the testimony of the accused and the evidence he adduced, this Court, try as it would, (sic)
could not give any credence to the testimony of the accused in view of the very unstable, nervous, shuffling
and hesitant manner in which it was given on the witness stand. Accused testified on three occasions. On
the first occasion, it was claimed that he was sick and the court granted the motion to reset. On the
succeeding times he testified, he did so in the same nervous, excited, tense, shuffling and hesistant manner,
breathing heavily, frequently clearing his throat, sweating profusely indicating not only unreliability but a
troubled conscience as well. But far more unreliable is his testimony itself that Baliton, a young girl of 13
years would go up to him unsolicited and seek him in the afternoon when the possibility of detection was
great and ask him who was not courting her to tell her that he loved her and without his saying anything to
her she kissed him and then openly invited him to have sexual intercourse with her in a manner which would
even put courtesans or women of loose morals or easy virtue to shame. The narration of the accused is
difficult to believe. Baliton was a barrio girl only 13 years old, of an age when one is still a child barely
entering the stage of puberty and residing in a barrio which is shielded from the corroding influence of social
and sexual mores and practices of highly advanced societies. What is ascribed to her by the accused
betrays it as a figment of a fecund imagination. Being so, it fails to impress this Court for evidence to be
credible must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be also credible in itself (People vs. Dayag,
56 SCRA 439). 13

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the lower court did not err in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the amount of
indemnity to be paid the complainant by the appellant is increased to P20,000.00.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED

7.
G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigation; Exclusionary Rule; Evidence; The exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.—Plainly,
any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant
is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality
for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation
or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired.
Same; Same; Same; An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts
to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e, when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.—It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded
21
evidenceCases5
 to “[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense.” An investigation begins when it is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers “investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.”
Same; Same; Same; Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Where the police failed to inform the accused of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated, his confession secured thereby, as well as the fruits of his
uncounselled confession, is inadmissible in evidence.—Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he
Page | confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was
22 investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered
from appellant’s house. x x x The victim’s bags were the fruits of appellant’s uncounselled confession to the police. They
are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
Same; Same; Same; When the accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer,
his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights.—The police detained appellant after his initial
confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a
private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for
forgiveness. x x x Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant’s confession before the
mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and
may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In
fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally
admits having committed the crime.— Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by
the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Confessions to the media in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating officer, are admissible.—Appellant’s confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We
have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual—it governs the relationship between the individual and the State.—We rule that appellant’s verbal
confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away
by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights
lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies.
Same; Rape; Absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen.—We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina does not negate the commission of rape nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. What is
essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration
is proved by the lacerations found in the victim’s vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by
any injury in the first autopsy.

PER CURIAM:

Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide committed as
follows:

That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent; and the above-
named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack,
assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death.

Contrary to Law.1

22
evidenceCases5
 The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan,
Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her
school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne
wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal
effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.

Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her
Page |
distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought
23 her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the
house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard.
The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant
stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot.
When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After
silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and
abandoned it.2

At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest
down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.

The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:

1. Abrasions:

1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to left.

2. Abrasions/contusions:

2.1 temple, right.

2.2 cheek, right.

2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.

2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.

2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width, from
right MCL to left AAL.

2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.

3. Hematoma:

3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.

3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.

3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

4. Lacerated wounds:

4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.

4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.

5. Fractures:

5.1 maxillary bone, right.

5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.

6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.

7. External genitalia
23
evidenceCases5
 7.1 minimal blood present.

7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed vaginal
wall.

8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative for spermatozoa
(Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
Page |
24 CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3

Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team
of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered
a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair
of shoes which were identified as Marianne's.4

Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard.
They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that
accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several
articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the
stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5

The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February
24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the
patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge
of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the
bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
Marianne.6 Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise
brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved
from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were
taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags. 7

Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical
examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran.8 Appellant was found to sustain:

HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions (scratches at the
back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt.9

By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the
investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police
and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The
mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place
where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because
of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and
tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 14

Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and
television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the
crime. 15

On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he
was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home
after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the
next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents'
house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there
until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16

Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the policemen covered his
face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. When he
refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed
to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was
ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for
his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
24
evidenceCases5
 In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as
actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof
beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in
accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the
heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of
Page |
Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as
25 actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review of this
case and the decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.

SO ORDERED. 18

This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant contends that:

I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE
ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE
ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;

II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN
ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED. 19

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team,
the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based
on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because
they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) . . .

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) . . .

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2)
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired. 23

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission
of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
"investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC
and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." 25

25
evidenceCases5
 When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed,
appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the
testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:

COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?

WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the house of the accused.
Page | Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his
other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and
26 whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.

Q: So you had a possible suspect?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then, what else did you do?

A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his
parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police
failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His confession is
therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar
Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:

Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked as
Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these bags?

A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of the
toilet.

Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were located?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you do?

A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know where the
two (2) bags were hidden, sir.

Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the place
where the bags were located?

A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed
where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28

The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence
also inadmissible. 29

The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant
approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone
committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:

Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people from
the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to talk to me
alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of police.

Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of Police,
mayor?

26
evidenceCases5
 A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will
tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this to me, I
told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was
going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir.
This was even covered by a television camera. 30

xxx xxx xxx

Page |
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you something and
27 then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police and you stated
that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .

Court: He said to you the following words . . .

Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang
pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?

A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the second
one was before the media people, sir.

Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?

A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further
admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say, sir. 31

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible.
It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know
that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the
crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession
to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions
by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made
by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37

The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February
27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly
in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also
interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:

Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place where the
body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what particular place?

Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police station
of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I
asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from
him that the victim was his cousin.

Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?

A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for raping
and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was voluntary or that
there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because I
knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it
voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of drugs but
he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.

27
evidenceCases5
 Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle beside
him at the time that you asked the question?

A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime scene
or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside
the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature
of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to him
Page |
freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who raped and
28 killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where
the reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.

Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the accused
Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag PNP, you
also went to the scene of the crime?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who accompanied you?

A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and some of
the relatives of the accused.

Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.

Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?

A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at that
time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Bulacan, what transpired?

A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was committed
by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to
accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how he carried out
the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.

Q: Did he voluntarily comply?

A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.

Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up to
the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?

A: Yes, sir. 39

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three successive
days. 40 His testimony is as follows:

Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?

A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so that we
can have a direct interview with the suspect.

Q: Were there people?

28
evidenceCases5
 A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of police,
several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I asked
the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted
that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you
aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital offense? And
you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you
were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Page |
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
29
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures of
the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of Inday
Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.

Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?

A: The same group of people who were there, sir.

Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?

Court: Use the vernacular.

A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa
ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong
kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay
at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?

A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped his
mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic magazines,
pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday before the crime.

Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and the
public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?

A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really down
physically and I think he was in good condition.

Court: So he was not happy about the incident?

A: He even admitted it, your Honor.

Court: He was happy?

A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.

Court: Was he crying?

A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that fell
on his face.

Court: Was he feeling remorseful?

A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx 41

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:

Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the permission
that you asked from him?

29
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 A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?

A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the chief
investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was suspended, it was
the deputy who was there, sir.
Page |
30 Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the accused?

A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There were
people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.

Q: How about the other representatives from the media?

A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from the
radio and from TV Channel 9.

Q: How about Channel 7?

A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.

Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also present?

A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the wife but
they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions that I asked from
the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.

Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?

A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.

Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know what
question did you ask and the answer.

A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."

Q: What was the next question?

A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a tricycle.
He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.

Q: What was the next question that you asked him?

A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim was
because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.

Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on that?

A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.

Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: "Ano iyon?"

A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.

Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the fence?

A: I cannot remember the others, sir.

Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?

30
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 A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 43

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction
and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant
45
Page | them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him.
They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his
31 guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in
the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to
protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual
against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48

In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc,
a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent
physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation. 50

We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer
of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's
hymen had lacerations, thus:

Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51

Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by an object forcibly inserted
into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His testimony is as follows:

Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock
position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .

Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.

Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the lacerations, I
found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.

Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver was
merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you did you
re-autopsy?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have been
sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?

A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim which was
already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce blood
because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed
that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal
retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible that the
lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because the victim was
already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.

Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood at 6
and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been inflicted or
could have been sustained while the victim was alive?

A: Yes, sir.

31
evidenceCases5
 Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds, now
will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of the
lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?

A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I
found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges of the lacerated
wounds, sir.
Page |
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
32
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small
opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.

Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?

A: It is possible, sir. 53

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape 54 nor
does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be penetration of the female
organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's
vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.

Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by other evidence, real and
testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:

(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near appellant's house; 57

(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their house; 58

(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains
were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59

(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over a flat rough surface. 60This

supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;

(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house;

(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the presence of blood type "B," the
probable blood type of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had type "A" and type
"AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63

(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain; 64

(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were later found at his parents' house in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65

In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.

Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical
improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from Concepcion
Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-
94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her
death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

32
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Page |
33

8. G.R. No. 125938. April 4, 2003.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO alias “OGCO”, appellants.
Witnesses; The findings of the trial court concerning credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect
unless the trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if considered
would materially affect the result of the conviction.—Generally, the findings of the trial court concerning credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had the opportunity to observe closely in the first instance the
demeanor of the witnesses presented before it. However, when the trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant
contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if considered would materially affect the result of the conviction, such
findings will not bind this Court. Such is the case at hand.
Same; Affidavits; While courts generally brush aside inconsequential contradictions between declarations of the affiant
in her sworn statements and those in court, the rule is otherwise where the discrepancies touch on substantial and
irreconcilable facts such as those omissions in the affidavit concerning important details which the affiant would not have
failed to mention and which omissions could well affect the credibility of the affiant.—While courts generally brush aside
inconsequential contradictions between declarations of the affiant in her sworn statements and those in court, the rule is
otherwise where the discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable facts such as those omissions in the affidavit
concerning important details which the affiant would not have failed to mention and which omission could well affect the
credibility of the affiant. If indeed, the victim recognized one of her assailants as Ricky Pinantao because of his amputated
hand, she should have mentioned such glaring trait the first time she gave her statement to the investigating officers. But
she never mentioned anything. On the contrary, she admitted that she did not recognize any of her assailants. She also
admitted that it was only after Joel Janson was apprehended and ‘confessed’ to the crime, implicating Ricky Pinantao, that
she confirmed her suspicion.
Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions; Right to Counsel; It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an
uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in
evidence against the confessant.—Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted
in evidence. The manner by which it was obtained violated accused’s constitutional right to counsel. It is well-settled that
the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be
regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession; The purpose of providing counsel to a
person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion no matter how
33
evidenceCases5
 slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false.—Under the Constitution and existing law as well as
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The
purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting
confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be
avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense,
the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have been made
available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.
Page | Same; Same; Same; If the lawyer’s role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a priorly prepared
34 document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accused’s constitutional rights, the constitutional standard is not
met.—It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a prepared statement when they went to the
lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel. This is not what is contemplated by law.
In People v. Quidato, Jr., where the police officers already prepared the affidavits of the accused when they were brought
to the CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, and the latter explained the contents of the affidavits in Visayan to the accused who affirmed
the veracity and voluntary execution of the same, the court held that the affidavits are inadmissible in evidence even if they
were voluntarily given. As also ruled in People v. Compil the belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if
prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect of lack of counsel for the investigators
were already able to extract incriminatory statements from the accused therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus,we said that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and
signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution. As pointed out in People v. Deniega, if the lawyer’s
role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a priorly prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused’s constitutional rights, the constitutional standard is not met.
Same; Same; Res Inter Alios Acta; An extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized
unless repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his
extrajudicial statements.—Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao.
An extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in open court or when
there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered
hearsay as against said co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVII, Kidapawan, Cotabato promulgated on September
15, 1995, declaring appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with rape, and sentencing each of them to the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, and ordering them to pay P30,000.00 and P10,000.00 in favor of Marites Alcantara and Cesario
Alcantara, respectively.
The information filed on August 31, 1987 alleged:

That on or about the 24th day of March 1986, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay Mateo, Municipality of
Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
JOEL JANSON, RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO in company with alias ABDUL, alias PUTO, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,
who are still at large and whose names are still unknown, constituting a band and armed with long and short firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away, at gun point, cash money in the amount of P1,400.00, three
(3) pieces of wrist watches, one (1) can coffee beans and one (1) chicken and if converted into cash it amounted to
P1,845.00 or a total amount of Three Thousand Two Hundred Fourty (sic) Five Pesos (P3,245.00), Philippine Currency,
owned by Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA; and on the same occasion, the above-named accused, with the use of force,
violence and intimidation and armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take turns in having
carnal knowledge with one MARITESS ALCANTARA, a girl about 13 years old, daughter of Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO
ALCANTARA, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid persons in the aforesaid amount.

All contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and the use of unlicensed firearms.

Kidapawan, Cotabato, August 31, 1987.[2]

On December 9, 1987, both accused pleaded not guilty. [3] Trial then ensued.
For the prosecution, the following witnesses were presented: Teresa Alcantara, Marites Alcantara, Dante Alcantara,
Cesario Alcantara, Dr. Cesar Manuel, Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, and police officers Pedro Idpan, Jr. and Ortello Achas.
TERESA ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986 at about 10:00 in the evening, the accused with six (6) other
companions asked for food. She asked them to come back the following day but they threatened to strafe and burn the
house if they are not let in. The accused then entered the house and once inside, made all occupants lie down before
covering them with a blanket. The accused demanded money from Teresa and she gave them P1,000. She was brought to
the kitchen and someone guarded her. For a while, there was complete silence.Then she went inside the room of her
daughter Marites, and saw her totally naked. Her daughter told her that she was raped. She gave an additional P1,000 to
the accused who also got two (2) wristwatches worth P690.00, two (2) Seiko watches worth P443.00, a chicken worth
approximately P20.00, and one can of coffee beans. The appellants were speaking among themselves in the Manobo
dialect.

34
evidenceCases5
 Teresa identified appellants Janson and Pinantao as two of the men who robbed their house and raped her daughter
that night. She testified that she knew appellants since they were their neighbors at Mateo. She also claimed that while
Janson and Pinantao were masked during the incident, she recognized them through their body built, physical appearance,
and their voices while speaking in Manobo.[4]
MARITES[5] ALCANTARA testified that she was thirteen (13) years old at the time of the incident. She corroborated
the testimony of her mother and added that after the group entered their house and hogtied her father, the appellants
entered her room and turned off the lights inside. Someone poked a gun at her. Then Ricky Pinantao, who had an amputated
Page | right hand; Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona raped her. In open court she identified appellants Pinantao and Janson as two of
35 her abusers, claiming that they were previously known to her. She claimed that she knew Ricky because he was their
neighbor and that he often went to their house to buy bananas, while she knew Joel because he often went to their barangay
to visit his relatives.She likewise claimed that while the appellants turned off the lights in their house, there was a full moon
that night which gave her enough light to see her abusers. She immediately told her parents that she was raped, and she
underwent medical examination the following day.[6]
DANTE ALCANTARA testified that on the day of the robbery he was only nine (9) years old. He said he recognized
appellants Janson and Pinantao because they were their neighbors.On cross-examination, he admitted that the four robbers
were masked, but the witness insisted that he was able to recognize Pinantao with his cut wrist and mustache, and also
Janson because of his built.[7]
CESARIO ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986, their house was robbed and his daughter was raped. He
admitted that during the incident, he was not able to identify the perpetrators since he was hogtied face downwards, and he
was covered with a blanket.[8]
The prosecution also presented DR. CESAR MANUEL. He testified that the physical examination he conducted on
Marites Alcantara a day after the incident revealed that there were lacerations between the labia majora, labia minora, and
the prepuce caused by a sharp instrument. There was also the presence of seminal fluid in the vagina of the victim indicating
that there was actual sexual contact.[9]
ATTY. JORGE ZERRUDO testified that he only assisted appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel, and that the
sworn statement was already prepared when he signed it.Nevertheless, he asked appellant Janson if the contents of the
statement were true, and whether he wished to be assisted by counsel.[10]
P/SGT. PEDRO IDPAN, JR. testified that he was a member of the Integrated National Police (INP), Kidapawan,
Cotabato, assigned in the investigation of the crime of robbery with rape involving appellant Joel Janson. He identified
Jansons sworn statement saying it was signed by him without being forced. He admitted that during the investigation, there
was no lawyer present and that Atty. Zerrudo signed the affidavit only after the investigation was conducted. He claimed,
however, that prior to the custodial investigation, he informed Janson of his constitutional rights and that despite being a
Manobo, Janson fully understood Cebuano,[11] which was the language used during the custodial investigation.
Finally, P/SGT. ORTELLO ACHAS testified that he was at the police station when Teresa Alcantara appeared on June
24, 1986, and requested that she be accompanied to the jail to identify the person who was earlier apprehended and
detained. She identified the person as appellant Joel Janson. On cross-examination, P/Sgt. Achas admitted that he was not
the one who conducted the investigation on the person of Joel Janson and that he could not remember whether appellant
Janson who was then sixteen (16) years old and a Manobo was assisted by a lawyer. Neither could he remember whether
a mental or physical examination was made upon Janson.[12]
For the defense, the following witnesses were presented: Datu Amado Pinantao, Atty. Francis Palmones, Jr., and the
two appellants: Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao.
DATU AMADO PINANTAO testified that he is an uncle of Ricky Pinantao, and that they belong to a cultural minority
group, the Manobos. He admitted that they lived near the house of Cesario Alcantara. He said that on March 24, 1986,
appellant Pinantao was in their house and that it was impossible for him to be elsewhere because earlier, in 1985, Pinantao
was hacked by one Bernardo Agio resulting in the amputation of Pinantaos hand. He averred that Pinantao could not go
out of their house because at the time of the incident, the wound he sustained was not yet completely healed.[13]
ATTY. FRANCIS PALMONES, JR., testified that he notarized the sworn statement [14] of the appellant Janson on April
3, 1987, marked as Exh. 4 and that Janson affirmed and understood the contents of said affidavit because it was translated
to him in the Visayan vernacular.[15]
Appellant JOEL JANSON, for his own defense, declared that he was assisted by a lawyer when he was investigated
and made to sign a sworn statement before the police on June 26, 1986. But he denied the accusation against him and
claimed that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he did not know how to read
or write, and that he was made to execute a sworn statement before a certain policeman named Ulep. Only after the
investigation did Atty. Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-examination, he said that he was put in jail for another crime,
robbery.[16]
Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against him, saying that he did not know Marites and Cesario
Alcantara. He claimed that he was arrested in March 1987 because he was implicated by appellant Janson as one of the
perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina Agio. [17]
On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment thus:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from all of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby pronounces the accused Ricky
Pinantao alias Ogco and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly,
sentences Ricky Pinantao and Joel Janson each to undergo a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Marites
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 Alcantara the sum of P30,000.00; to indemnify Cesario Alcantara the sum of P10,000.00. No award of other damages in
the absence of proof thereof.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Both appellants filed their notices of appeal and submitted separate appellants briefs. Appellant Ricky Pinantao averred
that:
Page | I
36
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF APPELLANT JOEL
JANSON, SAID EVIDENCE BEING INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED RICKY
PINANTAO, UNDER THE INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE AS AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED RICKY PINANTAO EITHER FOR
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE RESULTANT CONVICTION OF RICKY PINANTAO;

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES OF THE
ALCANTARA FAMILY WHICH WERE SHOT THROUGH WITH MATERIAL CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES
AND UNNATURAL TESTIMONIES; and

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THAT IN FACT THERE WAS A REASONABLE
DOUBT IN THE IDENTITIES AND GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED.[19]

Appellant Joel Janson, for his part, averred that:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT JOEL JANSON WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT JOEL JANSON GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH RAPE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[20]

Simply put, the issues in this case are as follows: (1) Was the guilt of appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond
reasonable doubt? (2) Is the extrajudicial confession of Janson admissible as evidence for the prosecution? and (3) May
said confession be used against co-accused Pinantao?
We find the appeal impressed with merit. Appellants should be acquitted.
Generally, the findings of the trial court concerning credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect
because it had the opportunity to observe closely in the first instance the demeanor of the witnesses presented before
it.[21] However, when the trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which
if considered would materially affect the result of the conviction, such findings will not bind this Court.[22] Such is the case at
hand.
Consistent with the testimonies of Teresa, Marites, Cesario, and Dante Alcantara, we can gather that what transpired
that fateful night is as follows:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of Cesario Alcantara threatening to strafe and burn
it should they not be let in. Once inside, the masked group of men turned off the lights, hogtied Cesario, pushed him
facedown and covered him with blankets. They asked for money and Teresa gave them P400.[23] Teresa was then led to
the kitchen.During this time, her daughter Marites was raped[24] by four men. Then Marites was led to the kitchen where the
culprits threatened to abduct her if her mother would not give them money.Teresa then gave them an additional P1,000
while the group took three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one chicken. Then they left the house, all the while speaking
in the Manobo dialect.[25]
While the testimonies of the witnesses up to this point are credible and undisputed, it is unfortunate that the certainty
ends here.
Marites testified in open court that she was raped by Ricky alias Ogco Pinantao, Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona. [26] She
said that she came to know Ricky Pinantao because he is a neighbor and that he often goes to their house to buy
bananas. She also said that she came to know Joel Janson because he is always going to Mateo since he has a relative
there.[27]

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 Upon cross-examination, however, Marites admitted that she was not certain of the identity of her perpetrators at the
time of the incident or immediately thereafter. According to her, it was only after Joel Janson was apprehended for another
crime, and after he confessed to the police, that she was able to confirm her suspicion. When asked in open court, she was
not able to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy in her initial sworn statement before the police and her testimony later.
Pertinent portions of her testimony in court are instructive:
Q: Was this Ricky Pinantao armed when he entered your room?
Page | A: No sir, he wasnt.
37
Q: Where (sic) you afraid of him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Knowing that, according to you, you know him, did you not question him, Ricky, why are you doing this to me?
A: I did not because I was only suspecting.[28]
xxx
Q: Is it not Marites, to refresh your memory, is it not that when a sworn statement was taken from your (sic), you
stated in your affidavit that you did not recognize anybody?
A: That was what I stated in my statement.[29]
xxx
Q: Miss Marites, in this sworn statement of yours, which was already marked as Exhibit E for the prosecution and
Exhibit 1 for the defense, there is a question here: Can you recognized (sic) any of the four men or any of
the six men that robbed and raped you? [you answered, I do not know anyone sir. Now] in your testimony
here, you said that you know the two accused, how will you reconcile this one?
A: It is like this, what I am telling now in Court is the one true, during that time, when the statement was taken on
me (sic), I have already suspect in my mind and I could not tell their names but there were some evidence
that dovetailed in my mind, like, the cut wrist of the one perpetrator, Ricky Pinantao and the mustache. And
these are the things that I recall.
Q: Now, how come that you did not tell the police of the perpetrators during that time of investigation?
A: Sir, it is very hard to name names during that time when a statement was taken on me. But when this Joel
Janson was first apprehended, it was confirmed by his statement to the policeman. (sic)[30]
xxx
Q: So, when Joel Janson was apprehended, that was the time you confirmed that he was the perpetrator?
A: xxx Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Therefore, you failed to recognize Joel Janson during said time of the incident?
A: I knew him through his body built.
xxx
Q: So, you merely assumed that Joel Janson is one of those persons who robbed you, because of the aforesaid
statement, that his alleged statement in the police?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: According to you, you have confirmed your suspicion of this Joel Janson after he was apprehended?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the same manner you confirmed your suspicion of Ricky Pinantao after he was apprehended?
A: He himself revealed. Aside from that I already suspected because of his cut wrist and his
mustache.[31] (emphasis ours)
While courts generally brush aside inconsequential contradictions between declarations of the affiant in her sworn
statements and those in court, the rule is otherwise where the discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable facts
such as those omissions in the affidavit concerning important details which the affiant would not have failed to mention and
which omission could well affect the credibility of the affiant. [32] If indeed, the victim recognized one of her assailants as
Ricky Pinantao because of his amputated hand, she should have mentioned such glaring trait the first time she gave her
statement to the investigating officers. But she never mentioned anything. On the contrary, she admitted that she did not
recognize any of her assailants. She also admitted that it was only after Joel Janson was apprehended and confessed to
the crime, implicating Ricky Pinantao, that she confirmed her suspicion.
The testimony of Teresa Alcantara is also riddled with uncertainties:
37
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 Q: How many day had lapsed (sic) before you reported the incident to the police?
A: Three months after the incident.
xxx
Q: Will you please explain why you reported the incident after three months?
A: It was only upon hearing through radio DXND the name of this person Joel Janson who was reported to have
Page | robbed the corn of a certain Atty. Jalipa, that I reported to the police.
38 Q: That was the only reason why you reported to the police after three months already?
A: It is like this: After hearing that, I went to the police right then and there. I saw this Joel Janson who was the
person among those who raped my daughter and entered our house.
Q: If you knew already that Joel Janson was among those persons who robbed you, why did you not report to the
police immediately?
A: The following morning, I immediately reported, sir.
Q: And you gave sworn statement before the police on the following morning?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: Of course, this Joel Janson was unmasked when those six men came to your house?
A: This Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao were the one (sic) wearing mask.
Q: In other words, during the incident you failed to recognize outright who were those persons masked?
A: I identified them through their body built and voice because they were speaking Manobo.
Q: But you identified them because of their voice?
A: Voice and bodybuilt.
Q: But of course, you did not actually see the face of Joel Janson?
A: How can I see when he is masked.
xxx
Q: You only mentioned his (Joel Jansons) name (to the police) after you heard his name over the DXND?
A: Yes...[33] (emphasis ours)
What stands out in the testimonies of the victims is that they were uncertain of the identities of the masked men who
committed the robbery and rape that night and anchored their suspicion on the alleged confession of Joel Janson. This
confession, however, is itself inadmissible for failing to meet the constitutional requirements for admissibility.
The lawyer who allegedly assisted Joel Janson in the waiver of his right to counsel, Atty. Zerrudo, testified:
Q: In other words, this sworn statement marked Exhibit B was already typewritten and prepared when it was
brought to you by the police?
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.[34]
xxx
Q: But before he was brought to your office allegedly to assist him in his waiving of his right, he was already
subjected to investigation as this sworn statement was already prepared?
A: That is true, but not signed.
Q: Of course he was not assisted because he was already subjected to police investigation in his waiving of his
constitutional rights?
A: May be, I am not sure about that. That was may be, that was already prepared when they came to my office
but only unsigned.
Q: What was prepared, the whole investigation or this entire part or that part of waiving his rights?
A: As far as I can remember, it was already prepared, Your Honor.[35]
xxx
Q: Atty. Zerrudo, we are clear to the fact that this document was already prepared before when it was brought to
your office?
A: Yes, sir.[36] (emphasis ours)
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, also admitted in open court that the sworn statement of appellant
Joel Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that this statement together with the waiver of his right to
counsel, was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for signing.
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 As shown by the transcript:
Q: But the accused during the investigation was not assisted by counsel, is that right?
A: At the time when I conducted the investigation, the counsel is not yet present.
Q: In other words, during the conduct of the investigation there was no counsel being present assisting the
accused Joel Janson?

Page | A: None, sir.

39 Q: So in all the sworn statement of the accused Joel Janson made earlier was made without the assistance of
counsel? (sic)
A: When I prepared the investigation I advised him to get a counsel of his own choice but the counsel was not yet
present.
Q: He was not assisted by counsel during the conduct of the investigation?
A: Yes, sir.
Court : What do you mean, Sergeant, Atty. Zerrudo was not yet present?
A: When I conducted the investigation, Atty. Zerrudo was not present.
xxx
Court: He signed it after the investigation?
A: The prepared testimony.
Court: After the investigation?
A: After the investigation.[37] (emphasis ours)
Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner by
which it was obtained violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. [38]
As provided for in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.

In People v. Javar,[39] this Court was clear in pronouncing that any statement obtained in violation of the Constitution,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. [40] In People v. Gomez,[41] citing People v. Rodrigueza,[42] this
Court held that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to a person under
custody even when he waives the right to counsel.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.[43]
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of
extracting confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought
to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an
offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have been
made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation. [44]
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel,[45]and it must be in writing. Indeed, any waiver of the
right to counsel without the assistance of counsel has no evidentiary value. [46]
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Appellant
Joel Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the time of the offense. As held in the case of People v.
Bonola,[47] where the accused was unschooled and only nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe that
considering the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In such instances, the need
for counsel is more pronounced.

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 It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a prepared statement when they went to the
lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel.
This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato, Jr.,[48] where the police officers already prepared the
affidavits of the accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, and the latter explained the contents of
the affidavits in Visayan to the accused who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same, the court held that
the affidavits are inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. As also ruled in People v. Compil,[49] the
belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does
Page | not cure the defect of lack of counsel for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from the
[50]
40 accused therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus, we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without
the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the
Constitution.
As pointed out in People v. Deniega,[51] if the lawyers role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of
a priorly prepared document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accuseds constitutional rights, the constitutional
standard is not met.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial
confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in open court or when there is an
opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as
against said co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another.[52]
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court finding Janson and Pinantao guilty of the
crime of robbery with rape fails to persuade us that appellants have been adequately identified as the perpetrators of the
heinous offense. In our view, to affirm that judgment of conviction on the basis of contradictory testimony of prosecution
witnesses and the flawed extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson is to sanction a possible miscarriage of justice.
What befell the Alcantara family, particularly to Marites, is abhorrent and should be condemned. But after due reflection
and deliberation, we still find difficulty in sustaining the trial courts conclusion regarding appellants guilt because of
inconclusive identification. Doubts persist in our mind as to who are the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense has been
perpetrated, but who are the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts! But we
have only uncertain testimonies to rely on. It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the persons on trial are the ones
who committed the offense that the judgment should be for conviction. Only when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
can we be certain that, after trial, only those responsible should be made answerable. [53] The evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[54] In this exacting standard, the prosecution failed. It follows that the judgment of the lower court convicting
appellants ought to be set aside for failure to meet the quantum of evidence constitutionally required.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato, Branch XVII, in Criminal Case No.
2016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao are ACQUITTED, on grounds of
reasonable doubt, and ordered released from prison unless they are being held for some other lawful cause. The Director
of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

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