JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc.
ALAMEDA of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;2. An
[G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010]
Facts:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati
Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial court approved, he was
released from detention, and his arraignment was set.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
Issue:
Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of
preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
Held:
No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal
case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the
reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party
for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.
Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the
criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by
counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public
prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-
investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or
otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken
but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is
deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.
Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with
discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial
court’s approval of the resulting proposed course of action.
BORLONGAN, JR VS PENAGR NO. 143591 (NOV 23, 2007)
Facts:-
Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation
and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.- Respondent
anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with
the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent
any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.- Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the
respondent as agent or counsel.-Attached to the MD were the following documents:1. A
letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf
unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G.
Ong;3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by
Marilyn G. Ong; and4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla
III.- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the
respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.-
Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago
City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before
the RTC knowing that they were falsified.-City Prosecutor’s Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the
report, the Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4)
counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that
the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI
was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were
falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents
formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as
evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their
Pre- Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Information were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
6683, 6684, 6685,and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the
arrest of the petitioners.-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that
they were denied due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit
and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied
on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of
arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondent’s
affidavit was not based on the latter’s personal knowledge and therefore should not have
been used by the court in determining probable cause.-On the same day that the Omnibus
MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided that they do
not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of
arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the
legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.-MTCC’s
answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of the
warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides,
(according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant
since they already posted bail.
Issue:
1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial
of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;
2) WON the Information charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for
their arrest were properly issued;
3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and4) WON the petitioners
posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.
Ruling:
Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.
RD:
For issues numbered 1 and 3:-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure are relevant to the aforesaid issues:
“SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. …SEC. 3. Procedure. – Except as provided for in
Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:(a) The complaint shall
state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two
(2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits. …SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. –(a)
Where filed with the fiscal. – If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall
take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.”
-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by
the complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not
be faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated
to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined
on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.-Regarding the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were illegally issued as they were
solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution
underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make
a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied
that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which makes the
submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could determine probable
cause. For issue number 2:- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has
been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.- On the
basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit
executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These
same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.-
The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence
of probable cause. The respondent’s claims of the falsity of the documents were
mere assertions.- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his
witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of
the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify as personal
knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the
time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the
signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion-A finding of probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless,
although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion. While probable cause
should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with
care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and
the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of
unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false,
fraudulent or groundless charges.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner VS. THE HONORABLE AGNES VST DEVANADERA,
ACTING SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; HONORABLE JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO,
PEDRITO L. RANCES, ARMAN A. DE ANDRES, e. al., Respondents
(G.R. No. 193253, September 08, 2015)
FACTS:
 The Bureau of Customs (BOC) informed the President of OILINK International, Inc.
(OILINK) that the Post Entry Audit Group of the BOC will be conducting a compliance audit.
Thus a pre-audit conference was held, whereby OILINK made a partial submission of the
required documents.
 OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the production of
additional documents, but claimed that it was hampered by the resignation of its
employees from the Accounting and Supply Department. The Audit Team informed OILINK
of the adverse effects of its continuous refusal to furnish the required documents.
 An administrative case was filed against OILINK before the Legal Service of the BOC,
which found OILINK guilty and imposed an administrative fine. A Hold Order was thereafter
issued against all shipments of OILINK, for failure to settle its outstanding account with the
BOC and to protect the interest of the government.
 UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. (UNIOIL) requested for permission to withdraw base
oils from OILINK’s temporarily closed terminal, citing its existing Terminalling Agreement
with OILINK for the storage of UNIOIL’s aromatic process oil and industrial lubricating oils.
This request was granted.
 A Warrant of Seizure and Detention was issued by the District Collector, directing the
BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of OILINK located in Bataan. Despite
said Warrant, UNIOIL was allowed to withdraw oil according to its earlier request.
 A complaint-affidavit was filed against OILINK and UNIOIL, esaccusing both companies of
unlawful importation and fraudulent practice against customs revenue. The State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause.
 The BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition outright due to procedural defects, namely: (a) it contained no explanation why
service thereof was not done personally; (b) it had no proper verification and certification
against forum shopping; and (c) docket and other lawful fees were not fully paid. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case?
RULING:
No, it is the Court of Tax Appeals that has jurisdiction over this case. Although the question
of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised by either of the parties, the Court
deemed it proper to address such question before delving into the procedural and
substantive issues of the instant petition. The elementary rule is that the CA has
jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, with the passage of RA
9282, amending RA 1125, enlarging the membership of the CA and elevating its rank to the
level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which between the
CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ
resolution in preliminary investigations involving tax and tariff offenses. Concededly, there
is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in the
Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. The Court
declared that the CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and that such petition shall
be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not
the CA, which has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of
dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the
Tariffs and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).
Roberts vs. CA, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products
Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever” promotion by
handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the
petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of
estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything
accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was forwarded
to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of
Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in
abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public
prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the
final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on
the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners
and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest “after June
1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his
order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever
opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the
independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary
of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not
the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had
in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied
petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint
Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in
convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence
of any express declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not
give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought
reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of
Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved?
2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation?
3. May the Supreme Court determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable
cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their
prosecution for the crime of estafa?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution
of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.]
1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of
Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.”
Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter of
guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the
motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary
of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this
Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of
the aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest
and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw
the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint
Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw
the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the
Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution which is made
the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this
Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page
resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the
trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court
only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent judge’s clerk of
court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof
were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge
Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the
issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and
Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding
of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest “after June 21,
1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable
cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of
individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
3. NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for
their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed
by injunction, preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to reevaluate
the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists,
and if he did he did not have the basis therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary
investigation in this case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement
of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corp.
G.R. No. 164321 (2011)
FACTS
Skechers, USA Inc. is the owner of the registered trademarks “Skechers” and “S within an
oval logo”.
Skechers filed a criminal case for trademark infringement against several store-owners that
were selling shoes branded as “Strong” and bearing a similar “S” logo. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) issued search warrants, allowing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
raid the stores and confiscate 6,000 pairs of shoes.
The accused moved to quash the warrants, saying that there was no confusing similarity
between the “Skechers” and the “Strong” brands.
The RTC granted the motion to quash and ordered the NBI to return the seized goods. The
court said that the two brands had glaring differences and that an ordinary prudent
consumer would not mistake one for the other.
On certiorari, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC ruling.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court (SC).

Issue:
Did the accused commit trademark infringement?
Ruling:
Yes, the accused is guilty of trademark infringement.
Under the IP Code (RA No. 8293), trademark infringement is committed when:
Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the
registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other
preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant
feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be
used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for
infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the
infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this
subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services
using the infringing material.
There is trademark infringement when the second mark used is likely to cause confusion.
There are two tests to determine this:
1. Dominancy Test – the court focuses on the similarity of the dominant features of the
marks that might cause confusion in the mind of the consumer. Duplication or imitation is
not necessary. Even accidental confusion may be cause for trademark infringement. More
consideration is given to the aural and visual impressions created by the marks on the
buyers and less weight is given to factors like price, quality, sales outlets and market
segments.
Applied to this case: The SC found that the use of the “S” symbol by Strong rubber shoes
infringes on the registered Skechers trademark. It is the most dominant feature of the mark
-- one that catches the buyer’s eye first. Even if the accused claims that there was a
difference because the “S” used by Skechers is found inside an oval, the fact that the
accused used the dominant “S” symbol already constitutes trademark infringement.
The SC disagreed with the CA reasoning that the “S” symbol is already used for many
things, including the Superman symbol. Even if this is true, the fact that Strong used same
stylized “S” symbol as that of the Skechers brand makes this a case of trademark
infringement. The same font and style was used in this case. The Superman “S” symbol is
clearly different from the “S” in this case.
2. Holistic or Totality Test – the court looks at the entirety of the marks as applied to the
products, including the labels and packaging. You must not only look at the dominant
features but all other features appearing on both marks.
Applied to this case: Both RTC and CA used the Holistic Test to rule that there was no
infringement. Both courts argued the following differences:
The mark “S” found in Strong Shoes is not enclosed in an “oval design.”
The word “Strong” is conspicuously placed at the backside and insoles.
The hang tags and labels attached to the shoes bears the word “Strong” for respondent
and “Skechers U.S.A.” for private complainant;
Strong shoes are modestly priced compared to the costs of Skechers Shoes.
Also using the Holistic Test, the SC corrected the lower courts and ruled that the striking
similarities between the products outweigh the differences argued by the respondents:
Same color scheme of blue, white and gray;
Same wave-like pattern on the midsole and the outer sole;
Same elongated designs at the side of the midsole near the heel;
Same number of ridges on the outer soles (five at the back and six in front);
Same location of the stylized “S” symbol;
The words "Skechers Sport Trail" at the back of the Skechers shoes and "Strong Sport Trail"
at the back of the Strong shoes, using the same font, color, size, direction and orientation;
Same two grayish-white semi-transparent circles on top of the heel collars.
The features and overall design of the two products are so similar that there is a high
likelihood of confusion.
Two products do not need to be identical, they just need to be similar enough to confuse
the ordinary buyer in order to constitute trademark infringement (Converse Rubber
Corporation v. Jacinto Rubber & Plastic Co., 186 Phil. 85 [1980]). Also, the difference in
price cannot be a defense in a case for trademark infringement (McDonald’s Corporation v.
L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc., 480 Phil. 402, 434 [2004]).
There are two types of confusion:
Product Confusion – where the ordinary prudent purchaser would be induced to purchase
on product in the belief that he was buying another.
Source or Origin Confusion – although the goods are different, the use of the mark causes
the consumer to assume that both products originate from the same source.
Trademark law protects the owner not only from product confusion but also from source
confusion. Protection is not limited to the same or similar products but extends to all cases
where:
The consumer is misled into thinking that the trademark owner extended his business into
a new field;
The consumer is misled into thinking that the trademark owner is in any way connected to
the infringer’s activities; or
The infringement forestalls the normal potential expansion of the trademark owner’s
business.

Trademark law does not only protect the owner’s reputation and goodwill, it also protects
the consumers from fraud and confusion.
In this case, it is clear that there was an attempt to copy the trademark owner’s mark and
product design. In trademark infringement cases, you do not need to copy another's mark
or product exactly. Colorable imitation is enough.
GEORGE MILLER V. SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ [G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 2011]
Facts:
Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum Security
Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa City. He wrote two confidential
letters addressed to NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agalo-os which contain a report on
alleged irrehularities and drug activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo
(Bernardo). On January 6, 1999, at around 2:00 p.m, Miller was stabbed at back of his head.
An investigation was thereafter conducted. In the course of the investigation, Quirante and
Ceballos admitted their participation in the attack on petitioner. PGIII Lopez recommended
that Quirante and Ceballos be charged with Frustrated Murder and the case be placed
under further investigation “pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict
inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid. Prosecutor Antonio V. Padilla
issued his resolution finding the evidence sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted
murder while dismissing the case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence. Therafter,
an information attempted murder was filed against Quirante.
On December 2, 1999 Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new affidavits which
contained a more detail of the incident and pointed to Bernardo and Aprid allegedly
planned the killing of petitioner together with Toledo. Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas issued
his Memorandum addressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against
Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo in conspiracy with Bernardino, Aprid and Bernardo, for the
crime of attempted murder. Consequently, an Amended Information was filed with the
RTC.
Bernardino filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to support a claim of conspiracy,
which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a language foreign to the
affiants. Petitioner filed his opposition, alleging that contrary to the claim of Bernardino,
the Bureau’s investigation was far from complete as the Report of PGIII Lopez itself stated
that the case is recommended for further investigation “pending the establishment of
sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid”.
Public respondent, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez, issued his Resolution
finding merit in the petition. According to Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of Quirante,
Ceballos and Toledo are not credible considering “the length of time they were executed
since the commission of the crime” and also because said documents cannot be considered
newly discovered evidence. Motion to Admit Second Amended Information, which
dropped the name of respondent Bernardino as one of the accused, was filed in court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied under Resolution. On
appeal, CA rendered its Decision sustaining the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned resolutions. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether CA erred in sustaining the ruling of secretary Peres for exclusion of Bernardino in
the information of attempted murder as accused.
Ruling:
Yes. In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it
does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only prima facie evidence is required; or that
which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of
facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted,
will remain sufficient. Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the conspirators,
are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. The term “probable cause”
does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge. While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable
cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the
Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority. Where
the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent despite sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus
warranting a reversal. The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez
for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a
prima facie case against him having been established by the evidence on record.
-PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts:
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the
issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was
planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.
Held:
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized
that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein.
The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
GUILLERMA DE LOS SANTOS-REYES, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Pairing Judge, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan,respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-93-983 August 7, 1995, 247 SCRA 85
PER CURIAM:
In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes charges the
respondent judge with gross ignorance of law and evident dishonesty in the performance
of his work in that he granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 487-M-91, 488-M-
91, and 488-M-91 without the required petition for bail and without conducting any
hearing to accord the prosecution an opportunity to establish that the evidence of guilt of
the accused was strong.
In compliance with the resolution of 24 May 1993, the respondent judge filed his comment
wherein he disclosed that the issue raised was the subject of G.R. Nos. 108478-79 1
pending before the Second Division of this Court.
On 22 September 1993, this Court, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), dismissed this case, "the issues raised . . . being sub-judice but
without prejudice to its revival should the Court in G.R. Nos. 108478-79 find the orders to
have been issued with grave abuse of discretion."
In the decision promulgated on 21 February 1994, 2 this Court dismissed G.R. Nos. 108478-
79. The complainant then filed on 23 November 1994 a motion to revive this complaint.
On 23 February 1995, the respondent judge filed an Additional Comment and Observation
to stress that what he did was to quash the warrant of arrest, determine probable cause on
the basis of the record and documents available, order the arrest of the accused, and grant
bail to those against whom the evidence of guilt was weak.
Issues having been joined and the revival of this complaint being in order, this Court
required the parties to manifest whether they agree to submit this case for decision on the
basis of the pleadings they have submitted. In their separate manifestations, the parties
responded in the affirmative.
The antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant complaint (as well as to G.R. Nos.
108478-79) are summarized in the decision in G.R. Nos. 108478-79 as follows:
On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain Pedro Panganiban and
Armando Vitug were ambushed along Ipo-road, Kay-Pian, San Juan del Monte, Bulacan,
resulting in the untimely death of Reyes and Panganiban. The National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an inquisition of the incident and after which charged petitioners
Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo Bolsico, together with Romeo Adviento, Romeo Permejo,
Rolando Gozum and four (4) John Does with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte, then presided over by Judge
Virginia Pagarogon.
Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the witnesses and on November
14, 1990 issued an order admitting the complaint and ordering the detention of all the
accused after finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused are probably guilty thereof. No bail was
recommended.
Judge Pagarogon then forwarded the records of the cases to the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office of Bulacan for appropriate action. The Investigating Prosecutor, without conducting
a thorough investigation of the cases, concluded that there was no probable cause and
ordered motu proprio the release of the accused from custody. So, the widow of Patrolman
Reyes petitioned the Department of Justice to disqualify the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
from conducting the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases.
In due course, the DOJ acted favorably on the petition and designated State Prosecutor
Santiago Turingan to take over and handle the cases. The State Prosecutor found probable
cause for murder and frustrated murder against all the accused and consequently, they
were formally charged with said crimes on March 13, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 487-M-91, 488-M-91 and 489-M-91.
No bail was recommended and the corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.
The accused were quick to learn of the filing of the informations. On the same day (March
13, 1991), they filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest," praying for the suspension of court proceedings on the ground that they are filing
a petition for review of the resolution of the State Prosecutor.
On March 21, 1991, the accused, who were not yet arrested or placed under the
jurisdiction of the trial court (after their precipitate release earlier), filed a "Petition to
Grant Bail" in C.C. Nos. 487-M-91 and 488-M-91 and a "Petition to Reduce Bail in C.C. No.
489-M-91.
On March 25, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying the petitions since the accused
had not yet surrendered and/or apprehended and, therefore, the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over their persons.
On the same day (March 25, 1991), the accused filed another petition entitled
"Reinstatement of the Petition to Grant Bail in the above entitled cases and Motion to
Reduce Bail Bond and Motion to Set Petition for Hearing with Manifestation to Surrender
the Accused on the Hearing of this Petition."
On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of heart, issued an order
consolidating the petitions for bail, set them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the
DOJ and/or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the
preliminary investigation of the cases within ten (10) days from notice.
On April 15, 1991, petitioners filed an urgent motion to quash the warrants of arrest
alleging want of probable cause.
On April 22, 1991, the accused withdrew their motion for reinstatement of their petition
for bail bond and opted to pursue their motion to quash the warrants of arrest.
On May 2, 1991, the trial court quashed the warrants of arrest and set the hearing on May
15, 1991 for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause.
On May 17, 1991, after examining the records of the cases as forwarded to him by the
prosecution, the trial court found the existence of probable cause but instead of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest, for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the persons
of the accused upon their apprehension or voluntary surrender, it ex mero motu granted
bail to them despite the absence of (because it was previously withdrawn) a petition for
bail and, worse, the lack of a hearing wherein the prosecution could have been accorded
the right to present evidence showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
On August 23, 1991, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion praying for the cancellation
of the bail bonds as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest on the fundamental ground
that the trial court could not legally grant bail in a capital offense without the prosecution
being accorded the right to show that the evidence of guilt is strong.
On October 28, 1991, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion on the principal
ground that its questioned orders had become final and executory. On December 2, 1991,
the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On March 3, 1992, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order before respondent
Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27430, assailing the following orders of the trial court:
the May 17, 1991 order which granted bail to the accused; the October 28, 1991 order
which denied the prosecution's omnibus motion praying for the issuance of warrants of
arrest's as well as the cancellation of what it perceived to be irregularly posted bail bonds;
and the December 2, 1991 order which denied the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration. Upon the filing of said petition, respondent court issued the temporary
restraining order.
On the other hand, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
before the same court, CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27472, seeking: (a) to annul the orders of the trial
court resetting the hearings on different dates for being dilatory and violative of their
constitutional right to a speedy trial; (b) to command the trial court to dismiss with
prejudice all the criminal cases; and (c) to perpetually prohibit the prosecution of the
criminal cases.
On July 31, 1992, respondent [Court of Appeals] ruled in favor of the prosecution. The
dispositive portion of its consolidated decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition (SP No. 27430) is hereby granted and the questioned
orders of respondent Court dated May 17, 1991, October 28, 1991, and December 2, 1991
are annulled and set aside. Accordingly, the accused herein (private respondents) are
ordered arrested/committed pending the trial of their cases, without prejudice on their
part to file in the proper court a petition for bail after the arrest, detention or deprivation
of their liberty, wherein the prosecution is accorded the right to present evidence to prove
that evidence of guilt is strong. SP No. 27472, on the other hand, is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit, considering that the delays incurred herein were due to unavoidable
circumstances and were therefore reasonable in nature.
No costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners Hipolito, et al. filed with
this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 108478-79, which, as earlier stated, was dismissed on 21 February 1994.
Respondent judge asserts that he is not administratively liable for what he did because he
was merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix, 3 to the effect that the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be personally determined by
the judge. Since in these cases the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on
the certification of the state prosecutor, he granted the motion to quash the warrants of
arrest and, considering that on the date of the hearing to determine probable cause the
witnesses for the prosecution did not appear and the private prosecutor submitted the
issue on the basis of the proceedings had at the preliminary investigation and the affidavits
of witnesses, he formally resolved it on such basis. He further alleges that since he found
the evidence purely circumstantial, except as against Romeo Permejo who was positively
identified as the gunman, he believed that the evidence of guilt as against the others was
not strong and, accordingly, admitted them to bail in the amount of P80,000.00 each.
The explanation of the respondent judge is wholly unacceptable for, contrary to his belief
that he has shown perfect knowledge of the rules on the issuance of warrants of arrest and
grant of bail, he has demonstrated either gross ignorance of the constitutional and
statutory principles and settled jurisprudence thereon or gross incompetence which no
claim of good faith can exculpate or even mitigate.
From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the criminal cases
before the trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed their petitions to grant bail and to
reduce bail, motion to reinstate petition to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants
of arrests before the court acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the
effective service and enforcement of the warrants of arrest or their voluntary surrender,
i.e., before they were placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their
liberty. Such being so, the trial court, initially, denied correctly the petition for grant of bail
but subsequently disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted on the motion
to reinstate the petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on 6 April 1991,
directing, for that purpose the Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the preliminary investigation.
In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. 4 While it may be true that the disregard of this
precept was not consummated, it was not because the respondent judge corrected
himself, but because the accused withdrew their petition for the grant of bail and opted to
pursue their urgent motion to quash the warrants of arrest grounded on want of probable
cause. Instead of retracing his steps back to the proper judicial path, the respondent judge,
still forgetting that the accused remained scot-free, not only quashed the warrants of
arrest, but, thereafter motu proprio converted, in effect, the "hearing" for the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, which he set on
15 May 1991, to a hearing on the matter of admission to bail, as his order of 17 May 1991
indisputably shows. In so doing, the respondent judge had either utterly confused the
proceeding to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
proceeding on a petition for admission to bail, order deliberately ignored the basic
requisites for the grant of bail.
The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest is mandated by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. 5 Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. 6 A hearing is not necessary therefor. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following the established
doctrine and procedure, shall either (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of the information he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutor's certification and require the
submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
to the existence of probable cause. 7
This procedure is dictated by sound public policy; otherwise judges would be unduly laden
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. 8 At this stage of a
criminal proceeding, the judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation; it is sufficient that he personally evaluates the report
and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause. 9
This judicial function does not carry with it a motu proprio review of the recommendation
of the prosecutor in a capital offense that no bail shall be granted. Such a recommendation
is the exclusive prerogative of the prosecutor in the exercise of his quasi-judicial function
during the preliminary investigation, which is executive in nature. 10 In such cases, once
the court determines that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
warrant of arrest shall forthwith be issued and it is only after the accused is taken into the
custody of the law and deprived of his liberty that, upon proper application for bail, the
court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing called for the
purpose may, upon determination that such evidence is not strong, admit the accused to
bail. 11
Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was then nothing to be
heard or acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they did not withdraw their petition, they
have no right to invoke the processes of the court since they have not been placed in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of
the filing of the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the
petition.12
Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the application for bail was regularly
filed, the respondent judge wantonly ignored the due process requirement of hearing to
afford the prosecution reasonable opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the
applicants is strong. 13 To grant an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without
such hearing duly called for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is
strong constitutes ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith or excusable negligence 14 or constitutes inexcusable conduct which
reflects either gross ignorance of the law or cavalier disregard of its requirements. 15
At the very least, the respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence. Gross ignorance of
law and incompetence are characteristics and quirks impermissible in a judge. A judge is
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.16 He should he
studious of the principles of the law, 17 and he must be faithful to the law and must
maintain professional competence. 18
The respondent judge does not have an enviable record as a living personification of justice
and the rule of law. 19
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-753, 20 for abuse of discretion, this Court censured
the respondent judge for issuing an order granting bail to an accused without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to present evidence to show that the evidence of guilt was
strong.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-742, 21 for gross ignorance of law and serious
misconduct, the respondent judge was admonished to be more circumspect in the
resolution of the cases before him and given a last warning that any form of infraction
cases hereafter would be dealt with severely.
The respondent judge has indisputably failed to comply with the strict and exacting
demands of the public-trust character of his office.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of law or incompetence and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, respondent Judge CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of
Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
service of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. His
dismissal shall take effect immediately upon his receipt of a copy of this decision which
must be personally served by the Office of the Court Administrator.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of the respondent with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
-VICENTE LIM vs HON. FELIX, G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991
Facts:
At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio
Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort
of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered
a gunshot wound. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the accused
were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57),
Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim
and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded
that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the
same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.
The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate.
Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to
transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against the
accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:
“In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense
of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two
competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence
of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no
visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s
certification in each information xxx”
Issue:
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution’s certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists
Held:
No.
The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x
probable cause to be personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or
person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate
and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal
issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the
respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He
could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation
of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant
of arrest.
-AMARGA vs ABBAS, 98 Phil. 739
Facts:
Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested
palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde
transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is
prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was
“premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against
the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he
found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA.
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear,
legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had
an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA
in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of
his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.
HELD:
THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the
1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue,
the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and
his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable
cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his
sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information
immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
-20th CENTURY FOX vs CA, 164 SCRA 655
FACTS:
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in
conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign.
Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the
video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search
warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution
of the CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable
cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses
during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject
matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by
the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the
application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by
the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioner’s
counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who
have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these
would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master
tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of
the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to
the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video
tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of
the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
-QUINTERO vs NBI, 162 SCRA 655
FACTS:
Petitioner is a delegate of the First District of Leyte to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
He delivered a privileged speech at the plenary session and disclosed that certain persons
are bribing some delegates. He eventually released from his hospital bed a sworn
statement the names of the persons who gave him the money, implicating the First Lady
among others. On the basis of a search warrant, agents of the respondent National Bureau
of Investigation raided petitioner’s house and a criminal complaint for direct bribery was
filed against him.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid.
RULING:
NO. The interrogations conducted by the respondent judge upon the applicant NBI agent
showed that the latter knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to show that
petitioner had committed any offense. The statement of Congressman Mate, which was
the sole basis for the issuance of the search warrant, was replete with conclusions and
inferences drawn from what he allegedly witnessed when he visited petitioner in the
hospital. It lacked the directness and definiteness which would have been present, had the
same statement dealt with facts which Congressman Mate actually witnessed.
- THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs CA, GR NO. 83578
-SOLIVEN & BELTRAN vs MAKASIAR
167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must
Be Invoked by the President
FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely
she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president,
the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may
be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD:
No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the
President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
PENDON VS. CA G.R. No. 84873, November 16, 1990
FACTS: 1. First Lieutenant Felipe Rojas, Officer-in Charge of the Philippine Constabulary-
Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS) filed an application for a search warrant since he
was informed and that he believed that Kenneth Siao of Kener Trading had in his
possession NAPOCOR supplies like bolts, aluminium wires and other tower parts and line
accessories which were illegally acquired. He claimed that a Search Warrant (SW) should be
issued to enable him or any agent of the law to take possession of those properties. 2. The
application, which was subscribed to before Judge Magallanes of Bacolod City was
supported by two witnesses, an employee of Napocor and a member of the CIS of Bacolod
City, to be known as joint deponents.. On the basis of the application and joint deposition.
Judge Magallanes issued Search Warrant (SW) No. 181 commanding the search of the
property described in the warrant. 3. The PC officers conducted the raid and seized bolts
and angular bars. The receipt was by signed by PC Sargeant Digno Mamaril and marked
“from Kenneth Siao.― A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed
against Siao by National Power Corporation (NPC) before the City Fiscal. 4. Siao filed a
counter-affidavit alleging that he had relinquished all his rights and ownership of Kener
Trading to Erle Pendon Jr., Petitioner. The office of the City Fiscal recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation
against petitioner. Thereafter, a complaint for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed
against petitioner. 5. Before his arraignment, Pendon filed an application for the return of
the seized items on the ground that the search warrant was illegally issued. - The
prosecuting fiscal opposed the application. The application was subsequently amended to
an application for the quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of
the seized articles. 6. Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application for
the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the issuance
because one of the seized items bears the identifying mark of NPC, the complainant and
that there was no statement that such item was acquired in the usual course of business. 7.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but such was also denied. Pendon then filed with
the CA a motion for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the legality of the
search warrant and prayed for the permanent prohibition against the use of the articles as
evidence and to return the same to him, but such was denied since the CA found that a
probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant. A Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. 8. The contention of the petitioner was that the issuance of
the Search Warrant was illegal for the following reasons that the application and
supporting document: a. Failed to fulfil the requirements prescribed by the Constitution
and the rules. b. Failed to comply with the requisites of searching questions and answers.
The deposition showed that the questions were pre-typed, mimeographed and the
answers of the witnesses were merely filled in. No examination of the applicant and joint
deponents was PERSONALLY conducted by Judge Magallanes as required by law and the
rules. c. Both the applicant and joint deponents had no personal knowledge that any
specific offense committed by Pendon and that the articles sought to be seized were or
stolen or that being so, they were brought to Siao. d. Assuming that the articles belong to
NPC, Pendon claims that his Constitutional rights prevail over NAPOCOR.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there exists probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
2. Whether or not the search warrant was issued validly
HELD:
1. No. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Art
III (Bill of Rights) Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The issuance of a search
warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a
search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that:
1) the judge (or) officer must examine the witnesses personally;
2) the examination must be under oath; and
3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions
and answers. These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
New Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: "Sec. 4.) Examination of
complainant;record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
any affidavits submitted. It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting
the examination, however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a
certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record. In this case, we find
 that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must
personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied
with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge
Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant,
Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The
application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant
had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof
are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant
was sought to be issued. "Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able
to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. "It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to
be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application." [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the
search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the
discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground
to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one
authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or
investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held
in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or
investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the
required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant,
and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
2. No. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
alter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.― Another infirmity of Search Warrant
No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the articles sought to be seized
must be described with particularity. In this case, the items listed in the warrant,
to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum
wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so general that
the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the
premises searched. The items described in the application do not fall under the
list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint
deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an
offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an
offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES, CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID
WARRANT. No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner
may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. While
the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.""Thus, in issuing a
search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given
in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumptionof
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify it." In the case at bar, the seized articles described in the receipt issued by
PC Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet
angular bar (p. 21, Record). There is no showing that the possession thereof is
prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is proper. Also, the use
in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is
enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. ACCORDINGLY, the
petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring Search Warrant
No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2) ordering
the return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner;
and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in evidence the articles
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.
PEOPLE vs. INTING
187 SCRA 788
Facts:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of
Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay
and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie
case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal
case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In
an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused OIC Mayor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the
trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not
authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving
election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the
Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or
not probable cause exists?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable
cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The
evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right
and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office
would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor.
UMIL vs RAMOS, 187 SCRA 311
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital
with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5)
male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31
January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City
Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded
man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he
was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.
Issue:
Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
Held:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
PADERANGA vs DRILON
In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public
respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for
multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain them from
prosecuting him.
The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar
Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on
May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II.
Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-
2-244.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused
remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been
apprehended since then.
In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas,"
"Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner
Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to
Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The trial
court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City
Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to
grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his
defense."
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas
implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the
preliminary investigation against petitioner at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his
resolution dated July 7, 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated
July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to designate a state
prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against herein petitioner.
In a resolution dated September 6, 1989,1 respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of the previously amended
information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the accused therein.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,2 contending that the preliminary investigation was
not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his
right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however,
denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990.3
From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review4 with the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum,5 and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional
Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,6 attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated
June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990 wherein
he implicated herein petitioner.
On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent Undersecretary
Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution No. 6487 dismissing the said petition for review. His
motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, petitioner then flied the instant
petition for mandamus and prohibition.
Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation as to him
was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to
justify his inclusion in the second amended information.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal
to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place
the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.8
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has
the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court.9 Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a
criminal prosecution.10 The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.11 cites several exceptions
to the rule, to wit:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily
show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence, the petition
at bar must be dismissed.
1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by reason of the
fact that at the time the resolution of September 6, 1989 was issued, there were still
several incidents pending resolution such as the validity of the testimonies and affidavits of
Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as bases for preliminary investigation, the polygraph
test of Roxas which he failed, and the clarificatory questions which were supposed to be
propounded by petitioner's counsel to Roxas and Hanopol. Petitioner likwise claims that he
was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit to the subpoena of April 25,
1989. These contentions are without merit.
Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to
the subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against
him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link
him to the crime. We hold that this is sufficient compliance with the procedural
requirement of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides,
petitioner failed to show that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989 involved a separate
complaint charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in the complaint
attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters of
defense best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute.1âwphi1 The
fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to
the parties or witnesses concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which
the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine
or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the to the
investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary
investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to
be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court."12
2. Petitioner further submits that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public trial, on the basis of jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature
the following grounds: the questioned resolution of respondent Gingoyon is full of factual a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling
misrepresentations or misapprehensions; respondent's reliance on the decision of the justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that
Regional Trial Court against Felipe Galarion suffers from constitutional and procedural under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation
infirmities considering that petitioner was not a party thereto, much less was he given any does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the
opportunity to comment on or rebut the prosecution evidence; reliance on Rogelio testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not
Hanopol's testimony is likewise "contemptible," it being merely hearsay in addition to the presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present
fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine Hanopol at the time such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the
he testified in court; and the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30, 1989, which is the only admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel
evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his affidavit of retraction dated the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.
June 20, 1990. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of SO ORDERED.
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.13 The quantum of evidence now
required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well
founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a wen grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.14 We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the
case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the
commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the
facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and
Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-
examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to
cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-
examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during the
separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to
cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never
available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be
ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary
investigation.