FIRST DIVISION governed by section 9, which has reference to items 426 in the light of the rules and regulations
426 in the light of the rules and regulations adopted
[G.R. No. L-4465. July 12, 1951.]
CHINESE FLOUR IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION,
MANILA, PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Appellee, v.
PRICE STABILIZATION BOARD (PRISCO),
Respondents-Appellants. MANUEL RUSTIA,
ERNESTO Y. SIBAL and other members of the
Philippine Flour Institute, Inc., Intervenors and
appellants.
Government Corporate Counsel Pompeyo Diaz
and Second Assistant Corporate Counsel Hilarion
U. Jarencio for respondents and appellants.
Claro M. Recto, Manuel O. Chan, Vicente
Formoso, Jr., Tan & Nuguid for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. IMPORT CONTROL; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 426. —
While the Pratra, now Prisco, is given the power and
authority to determine and regulate the allocation of
wheat flour, the allocation shall be made in
accordance with the pattern set in section 14 of
Republic Act No. 426, and not under Executive Order
No. 305. The only purpose of the appendices to said
Republic Act is to itemize the commodities which are
deemed controlled, the import quota of which need to
be fixed by the Import Control Board in accordance
with section 7 of the law for the purpose of allocating
them to the importers. They do not necessarily
indicate that those excluded therefrom are not subject
to the operation of said Act, because they also come
under the provisions of section 9 which have
reference to items of import not enumerated in the
appendices. It must be noticed that, aside from wheat
flour, there are other commodities that are excepted
from Appendix C, among which may be mentioned
oats and infant foods, umbrella fabrics, salmon and
sardines, corned beef, hams and shoulders, master
records, yarn and threads, industrial starch and table
cutlery. Other articles are similarly excepted in
Appendix D. The importation of those articles is
of import not enumerated in appendices C and D.
2. IMPORT CONTROL; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 426;
PROVISO OF SECTION 15 CONSTRUED. — The
second part of section 15, which is preceded by the
word "provided" can only refer to the clause
immediately preceding it in section 15 and can have
no other meaning than that the function of allocating
the wheat flour instead of being assigned to the
Import Control Commissioner was assigned to the
Pratra which heretofore has been charged with said
duty by Executive Order No. 305. It simply means that
the authority to determine and grant flour quota
allocations was taken from the Import Control
Commissioner and given to the Pratra now Prisco,
which must have been done presumably because of
the practice and experience heretofore enjoyed by
said office in so far as the allocation of wheat flour
import quota is concerned under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 305, which was issued to
implement and carry out the objectives of the
International Wheat Flour Agreement.
3. IMPORT CONTROL; PRISCO’S FUNCTIONS IN
QUOTA ALLOCATIONS. — The fixing of quota is a
function that the law gives to the Import Control Board
(sec. 3) in accordance with the schedule and pattern
set in sections 7 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426, so
that once the quotas are fixed, the allocation thereof
becomes the concern of the Import Control
Commissioner. The Import Control Board is the
policy- determining body that fixes and allocates the
import quota, whereas the Import Control
Commissioner is the executive officer charged with
the execution of the policy and directives of the
Board. Upon the other hand, the proviso gives to the
Pratra exclusive power and authority to determine and
regulate the allocation because the intention is to give
to that office the power and authority not only to
allocate the quota but also to pass on the financial
capacity and other requisite qualifications of the
importers to whom the quota should be allocated.
This is a function which the Pratra has been
exercising before the approval of Republic Act No.
by the Import Flour Board under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 305, and the Pratra has a
machinery for determining and passing upon the
fitness and financial qualifications of the importers,
and that machinery is the one contemplated in the
proviso of section 15. But in allocating the import
quota to the importers once they have been screened
and determined, the Pratra should follow the pattern
set in section 14 of Republic Act No. 426.
4. IMPORT CONTROL; NATIONALIZATION OF
FLOUR TRADE. — The policy of our government of
placing the importation of wheat flour exclusively in
the hands of Filipino importers in line with the policy of
our Government to encourage and foster the spirit of
nationalism among our people in business, commerce
and industry in the Philippines, is indeed very
plausible and should be encouraged to give a break
to our countrymen so that they may have a greater
share in our local trade, business and commerce but
plausible though it may be, such policy should,
however, be adopted gradually so as not to cause
injustice and discrimination to alien firms or
businessmen of long standing in the Philippines and
who have been long engaged in this particular trade
thereby contributing with their money and efforts to
the economic development of our country. In fact, this
is the policy that our Congress has set in an
unmistakable manner in Republic Act No. 426. When
the Pratra decided to ignore entirely the rights of the
old importers, simply because they are aliens, in
complete disregard of this policy of our Government,
these importers have the right to recur to the
sanctuary of justice for redress for they too are
entitled to certain rights under our Constitution.
5. MANDAMUS; SECTION 14 OF REPUBLIC ACT IS
MANDATORY. — The guaranteed purchases of the
Philippine Government of wheat flour must be
allocated among old and new importers in accordance
with the mandatory provisions of section 14 of
Republic Act No. 426. And being old importers of
wheat flour, the members of the plaintiff association
are entitled as a matter of right to quota allocations of
this commodity; hence, their remedy is mandamus.
6. MANDAMUS; NON-EXISTENCE OF APPEAL TO
PRESIDENT — Executive Order No. 90, creating the
Pratra, now Prisco, contains no provision requiring
direct appeal to the President before action could be
taken in court against the Pratra in connection with
the performance of its functions. The Pratra (Prisco)
being an agency created by the President, it is
presumed that its action bear his official approval.
Such appeal, therefore, is deemed unnecessary.
Neither can the acts of the Pratra be considered as
acts of the President even if the import licenses to be
issued by the Pratra are to be signed by authority of
the President, because the Pratra is a mere agency or
instrumentality of the executive branch of the
Government whose functions can be looked into by
the Courts without infringing the principle of the
separation of powers.
7. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PARTIES; REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST; ORGANIZATION OR
ASSOCIATION AS PARTY IN REPRESENTATION
OF ITS MEMBERS. — In Gallego v. Kapisanan
Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, (83 Phil., 124) it was
held that a labor organization has legal personality to
file a complaint in representation of its members. By
analogy, the plaintiff has legal personality to represent
its members in this case. This case can also be
considered as class suit under section 18, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by respondents as well
as intervenors from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila ordering the Price Stabilization
Corporation (PRISCO) to grant flour quota allocations
to the members of the petitioner association and other
qualified importers pursuant to the provisions of
sections 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426 on the
basis of their quota allocations for the years 1948 and
1949, and dismissing the complaint of the intervenors.
On September 5, 1950, the Chinese Flour Importers
Association, Manila, Philippines, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus to
compel the Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation
Administration (PRATRA) and the Philippine Wheat
Flour Board to issue in favor of petitioner’s members
the import quota allocations of wheat flour to which
they claim to be entitled under sections 12 and 14 of
Republic Act No. 426, known as Import Control Law,
with a prayer that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to restrain the PRATRA and the Wheat Flour
Board from granting flour allocations and import
licenses therefor to new importers in excess of the
latter’s shares in the portion reserved for new
importers by the provisions of Republic Act No. 426.
After hearing, the writ was granted. In the meantime,
Manuel S. Rustia, Ernesto Y. Sibal, and other
members of the Philippine Flour Institute Inc., were
allowed to intervene. The parties having agreed to
submit the case on the pleadings and on their
respective memoranda, because it involves only a
question of law, the trial court rendered judgment as
stated in the early part of this decision. From this
judgment respondents and intervenors appealed. On
November 16, 1950, petitioner filed a motion for a writ
of execution pending appeal from the judgment of the
trial court. The motion was granted over the objection
of the respondents, and in order to stay the execution,
respondents were allowed to file a supersedeas bond.
The case is now before us purely on questions of law.
The background of this case is as follows: On March
23, 1949, the Republic of the Philippines signed the
International Wheat Agreement together with the
governments of forty-one (41) other countries, which
was entered into for the purpose of assuring supplies
of wheat to importing countries and markets of wheat
to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices
(Part 1, article 1). The agreement fixes the quantities
of wheat representing the guaranteed sales of an
exporting country to the importing countries and the
guaranteed purchases of an importing country from
the exporting countries, and specifies the prices for
such sales and purchases (arts. III and VI). The
guaranteed purchases of the Philippines as an
importing country is 196,000 metric tons of wheat
every crop year during the period of the agreement
which expires on July 31, 1953, (Annex A to art. III).
The Agreement also provides that the exporting and
importing countries shall be free to fulfill their
guaranteed quantities through private channels or
otherwise (art. III).
By a resolution approved on February 17, 1950, the
Senate of the Philippines concurred in the acceptance
of the Agreement by the President "with the
understanding that nothing contained in this
Agreement shall be construed as in any way curtailing
or abridging the right, authority and discretion of the
Philippine Government to distribute and allocate
among the private importers in the Philippines the
guaranteed purchases of the Philippine Government."
This Agreement became effective with respect to the
Philippines on February 27, 1950.
On March 17, 1950, the President issued Executive
Order No. 305 regulating the importation of wheat
flour into the Philippines by way of implementation of
the International Wheat Agreement and authorizing
the PRATRA to control its importation and distribution.
The Order provides that from March 17, 1950, no
wheat flour should be imported into the Philippines
without any import license duly issued by the
PRATRA which shall be signed by its General
Manager by authority of the President. It also provides
that the 196,000 metric tons of wheat, which the
Philippine Government has guaranteed to purchase
yearly under the International Wheat Agreement, shall
be imported in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and that the said quantity of wheat shall in
turn be allocated to local consumers, dealers and/or
importers of flour who may be authorized by the
General Manager of the PRATRA pursuant to the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
Philippine Wheat Flour Board created in said order.
On the same date, the Philippine Flour Board issued
circular No. 1, containing the required rules and
regulations, and since said date, the PRATRA began
allocating the importation of wheat flour into the
Philippines under the Agreement by virtue of
Executive Order No. 305.
On May 19, 1950, Republic Act No. 426 was
approved. This Act provides for the allocation of
import commodities to old and new importers and lays
down the pattern to be followed with respect to the
amount of quota allocations. It provides that 70 per
cent, 60 per cent and 50 per cent of the total import
quota for the fiscal years 1950- 51, 1951-52 and
1952-53 respectively shall be allocated to old
importers, and 30 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per
cent respectively of said quota for the same fiscal
years shall be allocated to new importers (section 14).
It designates the Import Control Commissioner as the
official authorized to allocate the import quota among
the various importers, with the exception of wheat
flour for the allocation of which the Pratra was given
exclusive power and authority.
On October 3, 1950, Executive Order No. 350 was
issued by the President creating the Price
Stabilization Corporation, known as PRISCO, and
dissolving the PRATRA effective as of that date. In
view thereof, the PRISCO was substituted for
PRATRA as party in this case.
Appellee is an association of fifty-nine (59) licensed
Chinese importers of flour which was organized under
the laws of the Philippines and was registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Its members
individually imported wheat flour in 1946, 1947 and
1948, and as such are old importers within the
meaning of section 1 of Republic Act No. 426. They
are duly licensed to do business in the Philippines
and have individually filed with the PRATRA the
prescribed applications for wheat flour import quota
allocations and for licenses to import their quota into
the Philippines. They made representations and
demands upon the PRATRA and the Philippine
Wheat Flour Board in order that they may be given
import quota allocations of wheat flour in the amount
which should correspond to them in accordance with
section 14 of Republic Act No. 426, but their demands
were disregarded and their representations ignored.
They made the same representations and demands
upon the Prisco, but with the same result. Considering
this attitude of the PRATRA to be discriminatory,
unfair and oppressive, appellee filed the present
action.
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the basic issue
involved in this case may be boiled down as follows:
Shall the PRATRA, now PRISCO, make the allocation
of import quota on wheat flour in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the
appellee, or shall it make such allocation in
accordance with sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order
No. 305 in conjunction with section 15 of Republic Act
No. 426, as claimed by the appellants?.
Let us discuss both theories.
Appellants’ theory is "that the importation and
allocation of wheat flour must be governed by
sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 305, in
conjunction with section 16 of Republic Act No. 426."
They allege that the allocation of wheat flour is not
subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 426; that
wheat flour being considered as a class by itself,
Republic Act No. 426 does not apply to this particular
commodity; and that in so far as wheat flour is
concerned, the PRATRA, now PRISCO, has the
exclusive power to use its discretion in the allocation
of wheat flour, which discretion is not subject to
judicial control.
On the other hand, it is appellee’s theory (1) that
being old importers of wheat flour, appellee’s
members are entitled as a matter of right to quota
allocations in the amount which should be determined
in accordance with section 14 of Republic Act No.
426; (2) that as the agency designated by section 15
of said Act and charged with the function of
determining and regulating the allocation of wheat
flour among importers, it is the duty of the PRATRA,
now PRISCO, to allocate this commodity in
accordance with section 14; (3) that in denying,
neglecting, and refusing to give import quota
allocations to appellee’s members in the amount
indicated in section 14, the PRATRA, now PRISCO,
has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which is specifically enjoined upon it by section 14,
and has thereby excluded appellee’s members from
the use and enjoyment of their rightful shares in the
wheat flour quota under section 14; and (4) that
appellee’s remedy is mandamus.
The theory of appellants "that the importation and
allocation of wheat flour must be governed by
sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 305, in
conjunction with section 15 of Republic Act No. 426",
is mainly based upon the provisions of said section 15
and appendix "C" of Republic Act No. 426. It is
therefore important to examine and analyze these
provisions.
Section 15 of said Act
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any existing law, executive order or regulation to the
contrary notwithstanding, no Government, office,
agency, or instrumentality, except the Import Control
Commissioner, shall allocate the import quota among
the various importers: Provided, That the Philippine
Rehabilitation and Trade Rehabilitation Administration
shall have exclusive power and authority to determine
and regulate the allocation of wheat flour, among
importers.
"Quota allocations of any importer for any particular
article, including wheat flour, shall not be transferable.
"It shall be illegal to cede, transfer, sell, rent, lease or
donate, his or its import quota allocation or license
either directly or indirectly by the use of any
simulation, strategy or scheme, under the provisions
of this Act, and any violation thereof shall be
punishable with the forfeiture by the Commissioner of
the import quota or license of the erring party without
prejudice to his subjection to the penal provisions of
this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appendix "C" likewise provides in
part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(Controlled Non-essential Imports)
"Flour, all kinds, except wheat flour."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It is contended that, under the above quoted
provisions, wheat flour has been removed from the
scope and operation of Republic Act No. 426 and
placed under Executive Order No. 305 and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder by the Wheat
Flour Board because, while on one hand, section 15
of said Act declares that no government office,
agency or instrumentality, except the Import Control
Commissioner, shall allocate the import quota among
the various importers, on the other hand, the same
section declares in its proviso that Pratra shall have
exclusive power and authority to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour among
importers, and while Appendix "C" of Republic Act No.
426 contains a list of all controlled non-essential
imports, however, in the group of flour of all kinds
listed therein, wheat flour is excepted, or excluded
therefrom. The said proviso and exclusion, appellants
claim, confirm their view that wheat flour has been
excluded from the operation of Republic Act No. 426.
This argument is met by appellee in this wise: In
arguing that because wheat flour is excluded in
Appendix "C" this commodity is deemed removed
from the scope and operation of Republic Act No.
426, appellants have completely misunderstood the
purpose of the appendices. These appendices were
made part of the Act merely to establish a range of
percentage reductions on the items listed therein
which shall guide the Import Control Board in fixing
the import quota of said items in accordance with
section 7 where express reference is made to the
appendices. If wheat flour was excepted from
Appendix "C", it is because the amount of wheat flour
which may be imported into the Philippines and its
price are already fixed and determined in the
International Wheat Agreement. There is, therefore,
no need for fixing the import quota of wheat flour.
We agree with this line of reasoning of counsel for the
appellee. The only purpose of the appendices is to
itemize the commodities which are deemed
controlled, the import quota of which need to be fixed
by the Import Control Board in accordance with
section 7 of the law for the purpose of allocating them
to the importers. They do not necessarily indicate that
those excluded therefrom are not subject to the
operation of said Act, because they also come under
the provisions of section 9 which have reference to
the items of import not enumerated in the appendices.
In this connection, we also notice, as pointed out by
counsel for the appellee, that, aside from wheat flour,
there are other commodities that are excepted from
Appendix "C", among which may be mentioned: Oats
and infant foods, umbrella fabrics, salmon and
sardines, corned beef, hams and shoulders, master
records, yarn and threads, industrial starch and table
cutlery. Other articles are similarly excepted in
appendix "D." Certainly, appellants can not seriously
contend that these articles are not within the purview
of Republic Act No. 426 by the mere fact that, like
wheat flour, they are excepted in appendices "C" and
"D." To our mind, their importation is governed by
section 9 we have already adverted to, which has
reference to items of import not enumerated in the
appendices. This section provides that no such items
of import shall be allowed an import license and
exchange cover in excess of its import value (C. I. F.)
for the year 1948, except agricultural machineries,
equipment and other machinery, and materials and
equipment for dollar-producing and dollar-saving
industries, which means that as regards those articles
not mentioned in the appendices they can also be
imported by those who had imported them in 1948,
subject only to the limitation that the import quota
shall not exceed their import value in 1948, and to the
reservation in favor of new importers provided for in
section 14 of Republic Act No. 426.
As regards appellants’ contention that the second part
of section 15, which is preceded by the word
"provided" operates as an exception to exclude wheat
flour from the provisions of the Act, we likewise find
more tenable the line of reasoning of the appellee on
the matter. Said proviso, in our opinion, can only refer
to the clause immediately preceding it in section 15
and can have no other meaning than that the function
of allocating the wheat flour instead of being assigned
to the Import Control Commissioner was assigned to
the PRATRA which heretofore has been charged with
said duty by Executive Order No. 305. It simply
means that the authority to determine and grant flour
quota allocations was taken from the Import Control
Commissioner and given to the PRATRA, now
PRISCO, which must have been done presumably
because of the practice and experience heretofore
enjoyed by said office in so far as the allocation of
wheat flour import quota is concerned under the
provisions of Executive Order No. 305, which was
issued to implement and carry out the objectives of
the International Wheat Flour Agreement. If the
intention of the law is to exempt said wheat flour from
the provisions of Republic Act No. 426, the proper
place of said proviso would be in section 22, which
contains the repealing clause, and not in section 15.
Indeed, if the intention of the law is to except
Executive Order No. 305 from the operation of Act
No. 426, that exception would have been clearly
stated in said section 22.
"The proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding parts of the clause, to which it
is attached. Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, sections 352, 420; Friedeman v.
Sullivan, 48 Ark. 213, 2 S. W. 785; United States v.
Babbit, 1 Black 55, 17 L. Ed. 94; McRae v. Holcomb,
46 Ark. (306), 310; Towson v. Denson, 74 Ark. 302,
306, 86 S. W. 661. (Hackney v. Southwest Hotels,
195 S. W. 2d. 55, 58.)"
"The term "provided", is frequently regarded as used,
not as qualifying the operation of the statute, but as
conjunctive to an independent paragraph. Provisos
have therefore frequently been held to bring in new
matter rather than to limit or explain that which has
gone before. (50 Am. Jur., sec. 436.)"
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is to
modify the operation of that part of the statute
immediately preceding the proviso, or to restrain or
qualify the generality of the language that it follows.
Indeed, the presumption is that a proviso in a statute
refers only to the provision to which it is attached,
and, as a general rule, a proviso is deemed to apply
only to the immediately preceding clause or provision.
(50 Am. Jur., sec. 438.)"
"The operation of a proviso is usually and properly
confined to the clause or distinct portion of the
enactment which immediately precedes it, and does
not extend to or qualify other sections, unless the
legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly
disclosed; and, a fortiori, a proviso contained in an
amendatory statute will not be extended to the original
act. (50 Am. Jur., sec. 640.)"
"Since the proviso in sec. 7205 applies only to that
section, and not to sec. 7204, it follows that there is
no limitation of liability as to the value of property
entrusted by the guest to the hotelkeeper under sec.
7204. (59 C. J. 1090)."cralaw virtua1aw library
To bolster up the contention that the proviso of
section 15 of Act No. 426 has the effect of excluding
the importation of wheat flour from the operation of
said Act, counsel for appellants lay stress in the
phraseology used by the law in that, while the first
part provides that the Import Control Commissioner
shall allocate the import quota, the proviso prescribes
that the PRATRA shall have power and authority to
determine and regulate the allocation. In other words,
the first part uses the word "allocate" with respect to
Import Control Commissioner, whereas the proviso
employs the phrase "to determine and regulate the
allocation" which, it is contended, is broader in scope
and confers absolute discretion upon the PRATRA to
make the allocation without following the pattern set in
section 14 of the same Act.
The claim is based upon a misconception of the true
import of the terms used in the law. The reason why
the first part of section 15 merely employs the word
allocate when referring to Import Control
Commissioner is because the fixing of quota is a
function that the law gives to the Import Control Board
(section 3) in accordance with the schedule and
pattern set in sections 7 and 14 of Republic Act No.
426, so that once the quotas are fixed, the allocation
thereof becomes the concern of the Import Control
Commissioner. The Import Control Board is the
policy-determining body that fixes and allocates the
import quota, whereas the Import Control
Commissioner is the executive officer charged with
the execution of the policy and directives of the
Board. Upon the other hand, the proviso gives to the
PRATRA exclusive power and authority to determine
and regulate the allocation because the intention is to
give to that office the power and authority not only to
allocate the quota but also to pass on the financial
capacity and other requisite qualifications of the
importers to whom the quota should be allocated.
This is a function which the Pratra has been
exercising before the approval of Republic Act No.
426 in the light of the rules and regulations adopted
by the Import Flour Board under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 305, and the PRATRA has the
machinery for determining and passing upon the
fitness and financial qualifications of the importers,
and that machinery is the one contemplated in that
proviso. But in allocating the import quota of the
importers once they have been screened and
determined, it is our opinion that the PRATRA should
follow the pattern set in section 14 of Republic Act No.
426.
We wish to take note of the inference drawn by
appellants from the use of the phrase "including
wheat flour" in the second paragraph of section 15
which prohibits the transfer of quota allocations of any
importer for any particular article pointing out that by
the use of that phrase, the legislator meant to exclude
wheat flour from the other provisions of the Act,
specially the provisions of sections 12 and 14 relative
to the quota allocations. The argument is spacious,
for it fails to recognize that the intention of Congress
in inserting said phrase is precisely to dispel the doubt
that may be engendered by the proviso of the first
paragraph of section 15. The preceding paragraph
excluded wheat flour from among the imported
commodities which the Import Control Commissioner
is called upon to allocate, and the insertion becomes
necessary to avoid any inference that wheat flour is
also excepted from the second paragraph of the
section. The insertion was made just to leave no
doubt that wheat flour comes within the purview of
Republic Act No. 426.
Appellants may inquire, what are the provisions of
Executive Order No. 305 which are inconsistent with
Republic Act No. 426? The answer is simple. There
are several that may be mentioned, the most
important of which are: on the matter of allocation, the
Executive Order provides that wheat flour shall be
allocated to local consumers, dealers and/or
importers (sec. 2), whereas Act No. 426 provides that
the wheat flour shall be allocated only among
importers within the meaning of said Act (sec. 15).
While the Executive Order does not classify who are
qualified importers, nor give any pattern for the
allocation of quota, the Act divides the importers into
old and new importers, prescribes their qualifications
(sections 1 and 14), and establishes the basis to be
followed in determining the amount of quota
allocations which may be given to them (sections 9,
12, 13 and 14). The Executive Order creates a Board
which is authorized to issue rules and regulations to
be followed by the PRATRA in the allocation of wheat
flour (section 3), whereas the Act provides that the
determination and regulation of wheat flour among
importers is a function that is exclusively given to the
PRATRA, which as a consequence it may exercise
without necessarily being bound by such rules and
regulations (section 13). Needless to say that, as far
as the issue involved in this case is concerned, where
the provisions of Executive Order are inconsistent
with or repugnant to the provisions of the Act, the
mandate of the Act must prevail and must be
followed. In this connection, we note that section 5 of
the Rules and regulations adopted by the Wheat Flour
Board to implement the provisions of Executive Order
No. 305, provides that 20 per cent of wheat flour to be
imported may be reserved for direct importation by
the PRATRA for stabilization purposes, and the 80
per cent shall be distributed first to direct consumers
who are financially able and who by themselves have
been regularly importing their flour requirements, then
to qualified Filipino importers, and finally to other
importers. Because these provisions are repugnant to
the pattern set for the allocation of quota in section 14
of Republic Act No, 426, they must be deemed to
have been impliedly repealed by section 22 of the
same Act. It follows that PRATRA can only make the
allocation of wheat flour now by observing the pattern
set in said section 14.
We are urged to interpret the provisions of Act No.
426 in a way that may exclude wheat flour from its
operation in order to allow the PRATRA to carry out
its policy of placing the importation of wheat flour
exclusively in the hands of Filipino importers in line
with the policy of our Government to encourage and
foster the spirit of nationalism among our people in
business, commerce and industry in the Philippines.
We have been informed, and have taken notice of the
claim, that the PRATRA recently in line with the above
mentioned policy of nationalism has determined to
allocate the import quota of wheat flour exclusively
among the new importers, to the complete exclusion
of the old importers, under the claim that it has
absolute discretion to do so subject only to the
restrictions that may be imposed by the Chief
Executive.
We are not oblivious of this policy of our Government
which is indeed very plausible and should be
encouraged to give a break to our countrymen so that
they may have greater share in our local trade,
business and commerce in line with the spirit of
nationalism underlying our Constitution, but plausible
and patriotic though it may be, such policy should,
however, be adopted gradually so as not to cause
injustice and discrimination to alien firms or
businessmen of long standing in the Philippines and
who have been long engaged in this particular trade
thereby contributing with their money and efforts to
the economic development of our country. In fact, this
is the policy that our Congress has set in an
unmistakable manner in Republic Act No. 426. This is
also the policy that our President has expressed in
the letter he sent to the PRATRA relative to the
determination of import quota allocations of wheat
flour. 1 When the Pratra decided to ignore entirely the
rights of the old importers, simply because they are
aliens, in complete disregard of this policy of our
Government, these importers have the right to recur
to the sanctuary of justice for redress, for they too are
entitled to certain rights under our Constitution.
"Aliens within the state of their residence enjoy certain
rights and privileges like those enjoyed by its citizens,
such as free access to the courts and the equal
protection of the laws. Nor may aliens be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Citizens may, of course, be preferred to non-citizens
without violating constitutional guaranties. They are
excluded from the enjoyment of political rights, such
as the right to vote and to hold public office. Other
restrictions may be imposed for reasons of public
policy and in the exercise of police power." (Padilla’s
Civil Code, pp. 95-96).
It is claimed that wheat flour as a commodity is a
class by itself because it has been the subject of an
International Wheat Agreement and as such should
be excepted from the provisions of Republic Act No.
426. What is their special in wheat flour which should
make it a class by itself? This commodity is an import,
as are other import items, and the International Wheat
Agreement is merely a trade agreement the
objectives of which are to assure supplies of wheat to
importing countries and markets for wheat to
exporting countries at equitable and stable prices.
The Agreement merely regulates the outflow and
inflow of flour between and among the countries
signatories thereto. But the agreement does not
interfere with the internal laws of the signatory
countries regarding imports and exports, and as a
matter of fact it provides in Article II that "Nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to exempt any
private trader from any laws or regulations to which
he is otherwise subject", and in the resolution
approved by the Senate on February 17, 1950, the
Senate concurred in its acceptance by the President
"with the understanding that nothing contained in this
Agreement shall be construed as in any way curtalling
or abridging the right, authority and discretion of the
Philippine Government to distribute and allocate
among the private importers in the Philippines the
guaranteed purchases of the Philippine
Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
Wheat flour is, therefore, like any other commodity
whose importation should be regulated, and as such
should be included within the purview of Republic Act
No. 426. A perusal of this act will show that it is all
comprehensive and covers the whole field of imports.
It is the general and basic law on imports intended to
replace and substitute all prior laws, executive orders,
and rules and regulations on the same subject.
Section 22 which provides that "Any Act or executive
order, rules or regulations whose provisions are
contrary to, or in contravention with any provision of
this Act are hereby repealed", clearly reveals the
intent of Congress to establish a uniform system of
rules on imports and to nullify the heretofore existing
laws, executive orders, and rules and regulations
which may be inconsistent with the Act. No reason is
perceived, therefore, why wheat flour shall be
regarded as a class by itself and should be excluded
from its operation simply because it has been the
subject of an international agreement.
To the foregoing considerations we may add that to
interpret Republic Act No. 426 as excluding wheat
flour from its operation, as contended by appellants,
would be tantamount to an undue delegation of
powers to the PRATRA and would render the Act
unconstitutional and void. As a general rule, the
functions of legislation may not be delegated by the
legislative to the executive department or to any
executive or administrative officer, board, or
commission, except as such delegation may be
expressly authorized by a constitutional provision.
And a statute that vests an arbitrary discretion in
administrative officers with respect to an ordinary
lawful business, profession or appliance, or fails to
prescribe a uniform rule of action or to lay down a
guide or standard whereby the exercise of discretion
may be measured, is void and unconstitutional. We
are not prepared to adopt such interpretation.
"As the general rule is stated in Corpus Juris, which
statement has been cited and quoted with approval,
the functions of legislation may not be delegated by
the legislative to the executive department or to any
executive or administrative officer, board, or
commission except as such delegation may be
expressly authorized by a constitutional provision, and
the constitution affords the measure of the powers
which may be granted to purely administrative boards
or officers. Hence, where executive officers or bodies
are charged with the administration of statutes, the
legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy,
standard, or rule for their guidance and must not vest
them with an arbitrary or uncontrolled discretion with
regard thereof or as to the matters or persons to
which the statutes shall be applied. So the legislature
cannot vest in executive officers or bodies an
uncontrolled power to vary, change, or suspend a
statute unless the constitution so provides." (16 C. J.
S. pp. 348-349.)
"The practical question which arises in this problem is
the determination of what is a proper and reasonable
discretion and what is an invalid arbitrary discretion.
The general accepted rule as to this question is to the
effect that a statute or ordinance vests an arbitrary
discretion in administrative officers with respect to an
ordinarily lawful business, profession, or appliance, if
it fails to prescribe a uniform rule of action or fails to
lay down a guide or standard whereby the exercise of
discretion may be measured. Any law which
authorizes the issuing or withholding of licenses,
permits or approvals or sanctions other administrative
functions in such a manner as the designated officials
arbitrarily choose, without reference to all of the class
to which the law under consideration was intended to
apply and without being controlled or guided by any
definite rule or specified conditions to which all
similarly situated may conform, is unconstitutional and
void." (11 Am. Jur., p. 947.)
Our attention has been invited to resolution No. 43,
approved by the Senate of the Philippines after this
case has been decided by the lower court, in which it
is reiterated that the intent and policy of the Senate in
inserting in the law the proviso under consideration is
to afford Filipino business enterprises more
substantial participation in the vital wheat flour import
trade. Indeed, in that resolution, it is intimated that the
proviso of section 15 of Act No. 426 came into being
as an amendment of the Senate with the considered
object of utilizing the PRATRA as the sole arbiter in
fixing wheat flour allocations in consonance with the
national policy to advance the field of Filipino
participation in the business enterprises in the
Philippines. But it is to be regretted that the attempted
clarification has not been written into the law, and the
resolution has not been concurred in by the House,
and as such it does not have any binding effect in the
determination of this case. The resolution does not
have the effect of law. The same cannot swerve this
Court from its constitutional duty to interpret the law in
accordance with well-known rules of statutory
construction.
"While a court may not inquire into the intent of a
legislator, it is bound to ascertain the legislative intent
from what was done by the legislature as an entity."
(People v. Marxhauson, 171 N. W. p. 537.)
"A legislative construction placed on a prior statute is
without binding force in a judicial proceeding and
court is free to place its own construction on the prior
statute." In re Cauldwell’s Estate, 36 N. Y. Swd 43,
178 Misc. 916. (10 Fifth Dec. Digest, p. 1527.)
"A legislative declaration of opinion as to meaning of
earlier statute, without a positive legislative act, is not
binding on the court in the construction of the earlier
statute, since statutory construction is a ’judicial’ not a
’legislative function’. — State ex rel Washington-
Oregon I v. Co. Dobson, 130 P2d 939, 169, Or. 546."
(40 Fifth Dec. Digest, p. 1528.)
". . . under the general rule that a legislative resolution
does not have force or effect as a law, a legislative
resolution as to the proper construction of a statute is
not binding on the courts." Boyer — Campbell Co. v.
Fry, 271 Mich. 221, 260 N. W. 165, 98 ALP. 827 (50
Am. Jur. p. 331.)
The other point stressed by the appellants is that
mandamus does not lie in this case because the
power vested in the PRISCO to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers
requires exercise of discretion. They claim that it is
elementary that mandamus will not lie to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty, and in issuing
the writ, the trial court in effect has ordered the
PRISCO not merely to act, but to act in a particular
manner, to wit: to give wheat flour allocations to
Chinese importers. The contention presupposes that
the power and authority vested in the PRISCO to
determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour
among importers is to be governed exclusively by the
provisions of Executive Order No. 305. Under this
theory, the claim is indeed well taken, for there is no
doubt that the aforesaid order gives to the PRISCO
wide range of discretion to allocate the import quota
of wheat flour to the importers. But the assumption
runs counter to our theory that, while the PRISCO is
given the power and authority to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour, the allocation
shall be made in accordance with the pattern set in
section 14 of Republic Act No. 426. Such being the
case, the guaranteed purchases of wheat flour must
be allocated among old and new importers in
accordance with the mandatory provisions of section
14. And being old importers of wheat flour, the
members of the appellee are entitled as a matter of
right to quota allocations of this commodity, hence
their remedy is mandamus.
The claim that appellee has a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other
than the special civil action for mandamus, by a direct
appeal to the President of the Philippines, would be
tenable if Executive Order No. 90, creating the
PRATRA, now PRISCO, contain a provision requiring
such appeal before action could be taken in court
against the PRATRA in connection with the
performance of its functions. But no such appeal is
therein provided, and the PRATRA, now PRISCO,
being an agency created by the President, it is
presumed that its actions bear his official approval.
Such appeal, therefore, is deemed unnecessary.
Neither can the acts of the PRATRA be considered as
acts of the President even if the import licenses to be
issued by the PRATRA are to be signed by authority
of the President, because the PRATRA is a mere
agency or instrumentality of the executive branch of
the Government whose functions can be looked into
by the Courts without infringing the principle of the
separation of powers.
"In addition to the various federal boards and officers
considered supra this section, mandamus may lie, in
a proper case, to compel action by other federal
boards or officers. Thus it has been held that a
collector of customs may be compelled by mandamus
to perform purely ministerial duties;" (55 C. J. S. p.
202).
"Mandamus lies to compel the interstate commerce
commission to perform a purely legal duty, in the
performance of which no act of judgment is involved;
also to proceed and decide a case according to its
judgment and discretion, where it refuses to proceed
at all on the ground that it is without jurisdiction and
where in fact the law requires it to do so." (55 C. J. S.
p. 202).
"Mandamus lies to compel the commissioner of patent
to perform ministerial duties; and it is a proper remedy
where he acts beyond his authority and without
warrant of law." (50 C. J. S. p. 201).
The remaining question to be determined refers to the
claim that the Chinese Flour Importers Association is
not the real party in interest in this case and,
therefore, the petition should be dismissed. It is true
that the petition has been filed in the name of the
association, but it is likewise true that the association
has filed the petition in behalf of its members who are
all old importers and are entitled to import quota
allocations under the law. This association dealt with
the PRATRA directly, and vice versa, in so far as the
subject matter of litigation is concerned, and it is this
association that filed the bond for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
In Gallego Et. Al. v. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga
Manggagawa, * 46 Off. Gaz., 4245, it was held that a
labor organization has legal personality to file a
complaint in representation of its members. By
analogy, the appellee has legal personality to
represent its members in this case. This case can
also be considered as class suit under section 12,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against the appellants. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court is
hereby made final.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
and Jugo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16968 October 6, 1921
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appelle, vs. CHAN FOOK, Defendant-
Appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant Chan Fook was prosecuted for the
crime of resistance and disobedience to the public
authority, and sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to two months and one day of
arresto mayor and to pay a fine or 1,301 pesetas and
the costs of the action, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
From the record it appears that the accused, a
Chinese subject, was a passenger of the United
States Military Transport South Bend, which arrived in
Manila on April 6, 1920. Having been allowed by the
immigration authorities to land, he left the boat on the
same day, April 6. At about 3 or 4 o'clock in the
afternoon of the following day, he went to pier no. 1 to
get his baggage. After the search of the baggage in
which postcards of an indecent character were found,
a customs agent, Eugenio M. Cruz, attempted to
search the body of the accused, to which the latter
apparently objected. A dispute took place between
the two, which terminated in the secret agent seizing
the Chinaman by the arm with intent to search his
body, after showing him his police badge. The
accused resisted and struck the secret agent on the
stomach. The latter in turn struck him on the neck.
Here the customs inspector, Anastacio Jacinto,
intervened, and explained to the accused that Cruz
was a customs secret service agent and had the right
to search him in order to find whether he had on his
person any contraband. Then the appellant made no
further resistance and allowed himself to be
searched.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under such circumstances, has the accused
committed the crime of resistance and disobedience
to the public authority as alleged in the information?
To decide this question, it is first necessary to
determine whether the agent, Cruz, was authorized to
search the person of the
accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The prosecution alleges that under section 1338 of
the Administrative Code all persons coming into the
Philippine Islands from Foreign countries shall be
liable to detention and search by the customs
authorities under such regulations as may be
prescribed relative thereto. The defense, however,
contends that once the accused has arrived at the
point of his destination by being allowed to leave the
boat and to land he was beyond the jurisdiction of the
customs authorities, and, therefore, not liable to
search without judicial warrant. Section 1338 of the
Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 1338. Search of persons arriving from
foreign countries. - All persons coming into the
Philippine Islands from foreign countries shall be
liable to detention and search by the customs
authorities under such regulations as may be
prescribed relative thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Female inspectors may be employed for the
examination and search of persons of their own sex.
Having in mind the aim of the law in authorizing the
search of persons coming from foreign countries,
which is to avoid the clandestine introduction into the
Philippine Islands of goods subject to the payment of
customs duties, or the importation of the articles
prohibited by law, or the entrance of persons who
have no right to reside in these Islands, we are of the
opinion that after the customs authorities have
permitted the accused to land in Manila, the terminus
of his voyage, he ceased to be a passenger within the
meaning of said section 1338 of the Administrative
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The fact that the accused returned to pier No. 1 to get
the baggage that he had left there the day before
does not subject him to the operation of said section.
He could have gone back there several weeks or
months after his arrival, and in such case, if the
contention of the prosecution is sustained, all
foreigners arriving in the Philippines would be in the
highly anomalous situation of being liable to detention
of the right to be secured against unreasonable
searches guaranteed by section 3 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, known as Jones Law,
which provides:
That the right to be secured against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.
It is urged that the object of searching the person of
the accused was to find whether he had with him any
contraband. It was too late to look for any contraband.
He had already been searched when he left the boat.
The accused had reached his destination, spending
the night in the house where he had taken lodging. It
is not, therefore, reasonable to believe that when he
returned to pier No. 1 the next day, he had about his
body any contraband. Thus the search made by the
agent Cruz appears to be
unreasonable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Commenting on the meaning and score of resistance
and disobedience, as elements of the crimes against
public authority and its agents, Groizard, among other
things, says:
A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who
exceeds his power can not be said to be in the
exercise of the functions of his office. The law that
defines and establishes his powers does not protect
him for anything that has not been provided
for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The scope of the respective powers of public officers
and their agents is fixed, If they go beyond, it and they
violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the
latter may resist the invasion, specially when it is clear
and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive
with the excess, and should not be greater than what
is necessary to repel the
aggression.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The invasion of the prerrogatives or rights of another
and the excess in the functions of an office, are the
sources that make for legitimate resistance,
especially, in so far as it is necessary for the defense
of the persons or their rights in the manner provided
for in article 8 of the Penal Code. (3 Groizard, pp.
456, et seq.)
In the case at bar the action of the accused in laying
his hands on the agent Cruz is, in our opinion, an
adequate defense to repel the aggression of the
latter, who had seized him by the arm for the purpose
of searching him. In accordance with the repeated
decisions of the supreme court of Spain, the gravity of
a disobedience to an order of a person in public
authority is measured and graded by the
circumstances surrounding the act, the motives
prompting it, and the real importance of the
transgression rather than by the source of the order
disobeyed. And, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the present case, wherein the agent
Cruz had exceeded his functions, and wherein the
accused acted in defense of the most highly
esteemed of individual rights - the constitutional right
to be secured against unreasonable searches - we
are of the opinion that there is no ground for finding
the accused guilty of the crime defined in article 252
of the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The supreme court of Spain, in a decision rendered
December 26, 1876, held that the act of obstinately
disregarding an order of an agent of the authority
does not constitute the crime of grave resistance and
disobedience to an agent of the public authority where
it appears that upon being directed for the third time,
the accused obeyed, though uttering unpleasant
words, for although the accused did not leave the
premises on the first and second requests, he,
however, obeyed on the third, and did not render it
necessary for the public officer to make use of the
means authorized by law to make himself respected.
That the accused had no intention to resist and
disobey the agents of the authority, in the legal sense
of the word, is shows by the fact that by the mere
explanation of the customs inspector, Anastasio
Jacinto, he finally allowed himself to be searched.
Jacinto's words were sufficient to make the Chinaman
submit himself peacefully to the requirement of the
agent Cruz.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
That foreigners in the Philippines are entitled to the
benefits of the individual rights secured by the
Philippine Bill is undeniable. In the case of Kepner vs.
U. S. (195 U. S., 100), the Supreme Court said:
When Congress came to pass the Act of July 1, 1902,
it enacted, almost in the language of the President's
instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In
view of the expressed declarations of the President,
followed by the action of Congress, both adopting,
with little alternation, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, there would seem to be no room for argument
that in this form it was intended to carry to the
Philippine Islands those principles of our government
which the President declared to be established as
rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom,
at the same time expressing regret that the
inhabitants of the Islands had not therefore enjoyed
their benefit.
And according to the principles underlying the
Constitution, as extended to the Philippine Islands by
the President's instructions to the Commission and by
the Philippine Bill, foreigners are entitled to the
protection of their life, liberty, and property. In the
case of Yick Wo vs. Hopkins (118 U. S., 356, 369),
Justice Matthews says:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not
confined to the protection of citizens. It says: "Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
properly without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." These provisions are universal in their
application to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from
is reversed, and the accused must be, and is hereby,
acquitted with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Johnson, Araullo, Street and Avanceña JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15972 October 11, 1920
KWONG SING, in his own behalf and in behalf of
all others having a common or general interest in
the subject-matter of this action, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellant.
City Fiscal Diaz for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila
requiring receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish
duly signed showing the kind and number of articles
delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments, must be decided on this appeal. The
ordinance in question reads as follows:
[ORDINANCE No. 532.]
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE DELIVERY
AND RETURN OF CLOTHES OR CLOTHS
DELIVERED TO BE WASHED IN LAUNDRIES,
DYEING AND CLEANING ESTABLISHMENTS.
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila, that:
SECTION. 1. Every person, firm or corporation in the
city of Manila engaged in laundering, dyeing, or
cleaning by any process, cloths or clothes for
compensation, shall issue dyed, or cleaned are
received a receipt in duplicate, in English and
Spanish, duly signed, showing the kind and number of
articles delivered, and the duplicate copy of the
receipt shall be kept by the owner of the
establishment or person issuing same. This receipt
shall be substantially of the following form:
No. ______________
MANILA,
___________________________________________
____, 19________
Received
Mr.________________________________________
__
(Name)
_______________________________________ the
following articles delivered
(Residence.)
to me to be
_______________________________________
(Washed, cleaned or dyed.)
"__________________________________________
________
"__________________________________________
________
"__________________________________________
________
"__________________________________________
________
This articles will have been
___________________________________________
(Cleaned, washed or dyed.)
may be taken at ___________m. on the ________
day of ______________, 19 _____ upon payment of
P________ the amount of compensation for the work
done.
_________________________________________
(Owner or person in charge.)
Provided, however, That in case the articles to be
delivered are so many that it will take much time to
classify them, the owner of the establishment, through
the consent of the person delivering them, may be
excused from specifying in the receipt the kinds of
such articles, but he shall state therein only the total
number of the articles so received.
SEC. 2. No person shall take away any cloths or
clothes delivered to a person, firm, or corporation,
mentioned in the preceding section, to be washed,
dyed or cleaned, unless he returns the receipt issued
by such person, firm, or corporation.
SEC. 3. Violation of any of the provisions of this
ordinance shall be punished by a fine of not
exceeding twenty pesos.
SEC. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect on its
approval.
of Approved February 25, 1919.
In the lower court, the prayer of the complaint was for
a preliminary injunction, afterwards to be made
permanent, prohibiting the city of Manila from
enforcing Ordinance No. 532, and for a declaration by
the court that the said ordinance was null and void.
The preliminary injunction was granted. But the
permanent injunction was not granted for, after the
trial, judgment was, that the petitioner take nothing by
his action, without special finding as to costs. From
this judgment plaintiff has appealed, assigning two
errors as having been committed by the trial court,
both intended to demonstrate that Ordinance No. 532
is invalid.
The government of the city of Manila possesses the
power to enact Ordinance No. 532. Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 2744, section 8, authorizes the
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees
for the
following: . . . laundries . . .
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary
and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and
such others as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this chapter. . . .
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section
2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes
the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but
"regulate" should not be construed as synonymous
with "supress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the
power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities
could make proper police regulations as to the mode
in which the employment or business shall be
exercised. And, under the general welfare clause
(subsection [ee], section 2444 of the Manila Charter),
the business of laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments could be regulated, as this term is
above construed, by an ordinance in the interest of
the public health, safety, morals, peace good order,
comfort, convenience, prosperity, and the general
welfare.
The purpose of the municipal authorities in adopting
the ordinance is fairly evident. Ordinance No. 532 was
enacted, it is said, to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. The object
of the ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion of
peace and good order and the prevention of fraud,
deceit, cheating, and imposition. The convenience of
the public would also presumably be served in a
community where there is a Babel of tongues by
having receipts made out in the two official
languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful business
for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The legislative body is the best judge of
whether or not the means adopted are adequate to
accomplish the ends in view.
Chinese laundrymen are here the protestants. Their
rights, however, are not less because they may be
Chinese aliens. The life, liberty, or property of these
persons cannot be taken without due process of law;
they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws
without regard to their race; and treaty rights, as
effectuated between the United States and China,
must be accorded them. 1awph!l.net
With these premises conceded, appellant's claim is,
that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation;
that it unjustly discriminates between persons in
similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an
arbitrary infringement of property rights. To an extent,
the evidence for the plaintiffs substantial their claims.
There are, in the city of Manila, more than forty
Chinese laundries (fifty-two, according to the Collector
of Internal Revenue.) The laundrymen and employees
in Chinese laundries do not, as a rule, speak, read,
and write English or Spanish. Some of them are,
however, able to write and read numbers.
Plaintiff's contention is also that the ordinance is
invalid, because it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and not
justified under the police power of the city. It is, of
course, a familiar legal principle that an ordinance
must be reasonable. Not only must it appear that the
interest of the public generally require an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
If the ordinance appears to the judicial mind to be
partial or oppressive, it must be declared invalid. The
presumption is, however, that the municipal
authorities, in enacting the ordinance, did so with a
rational and conscientious regard for the rights of the
individual and of the community.
Up to this point, propositions and facts have been
stated which are hardly debatable. The trouble comes
in the application of well-known legal rules to
individual cases.
Our view, after most thoughtful consideration, is, that
the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of
police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate
personal property rights. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to all public laundries without distinction,
whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese,
or any other nationality. All, without exception, and
each everyone of them without distinction, must
comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no
discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly
the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry
business, and, as nearly as may be, the same
burdens are cast upon them.
The oppressiveness of the ordinance may have been
somewhat exaggerated. The printing of the laundry
receipts need not be expensive. The names of the
several kinds of clothing may be printed in English
and Spanish with the equivalent in Chinese below.
With such knowledge of English and Spanish as
laundrymen and their employees now possess, and,
certainly, at least one person in every Chinese
laundry must have a vocabulary of a few words, and
with ability to read and write arabic numbers, no great
difficulty should be experienced, especially after some
practice, in preparing the receipts required by
Ordinance No. 532. It may be conceded that an
additional burden will be imposed on the business
and occupation affected by the ordinance. Yet, even if
private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from
the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the hands of the legislative
body. The very foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the public welfare.
Numerous authorities are brought to our attention.
Many of these cases concern laundries and find their
origin in the State of California. We have examined
them all and find none which impel us to hold
Ordinance No. 532 invalid. Not here, as in the leading
decision of the United States Supreme Court, which
had the effect of nullifying an ordinance of the City
and Country of San Francisco, California, can there
be any expectation that the ordinance will be
administered by public authority "with an evil eye and
an unequal hand." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U. S., 356, which compare with Barbier vs. Connolly
[1884], 113 U. S., 27.)
There is no analogy between the instant case and the
former one of Young vs. Rafferty [1916], 33 Phil.,
556). The holding there was that the Internal Revenue
Law did not empower the Collector of Internal
Revenue to designate the language in which the
entries in books shall be made by merchants, subject
to the percentage tax. In the course of the decision,
the following remark was interpolated: "In reaching
this conclusion, we have carefully avoided using any
language which would indicate our views upon the
plaintiffs' second proposition to the effect that if the
regulation were an Act of the Legislature itself, it
would be invalid as being in conflict with the
paramount law of the land and treaties regulating
certain relations with foreigners." There, the action
was taken by means of administrative regulation;
here, by legislative enactment. There, governmental
convenience was the aim; here, the public welfare.
We are convinced that the same justices who
participated in the decision in Young vs. Rafferty
[supra] would now agree with the conclusion toward
which we are tending.
Our holding is, that the government of the city of
Manila had the power to enact Ordinance No. 532
and that as said ordinance is found not to be
oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it is valid. This
statement disposes of both assignments of error, for
the improprietry of the question answered by a
witness for the defense over the objection of plaintiff's
attorney can be conceded without affecting the result.
After the case was submitted to this court, counsel for
appellants asked that a preliminary injunction issue,
restraining the defendant or any of its officers from
enforcing Ordinance No. 532, pending decisions. It
was perfectly proper for the trial and appellate courts
to determine the validity of the municipal ordinance on
a complaint for an injunction, since it was very
apparent that irreparable injury was impending, that a
municipality of suits was threatened, and that
complainants had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. But finding that the ordinance is
valid, the general rule to the effect that an injunction
will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution
should be followed.
Judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Youmans Case, U.S. v. United Mexican State 1926
U.S. vs. Panama, 6 United Rep, Intl. Arb Awards
308
Texas Cattle Case, American Mexican Claims
Com. 1948
Germany v. U.S. ICJ June 23, 2001, Las Grand
Case
Buffalo Claim, Italy v. Venezuela, 10 UN Rep Intl.
Arb Awards 234 (1908)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4352. September 28, 1951.]
VICTOR BOROVSKY, Petitioner, v. THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondents.
Victor Borovsky in his own behalf.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto Gianzon and
Solicitor Florencio Villamor, for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ALIENS; STATELESS ALIENS HABEAS
CORPUS. — Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines
have no right of asylum therein (Soewapadji v. Wixon,
Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290) even if they are
"stateless." It is no less true however that foreign
nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal
charges have been formally made or judicial order
issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The
protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed
against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine
citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy
aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who
entered the country in violation of its immigration laws
may be detained as long as the Government is unable
to deport him, is beside the point. Therefore, the writ
of habeas corpus will issue commanding the
respondents to release the petitioner from custody
upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed
under the surveillance of the immigration authorities
or their agents in such form and manner as may be
deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and
be available when the Government is ready to deport
him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the
question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this
Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for
decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond
for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with
sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact
by Section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by
the petitioner with this Court, the first having been
denied in a decision promulgated on June 30, 1949.
Victor A. Borovsky, the petitioner, claims to be a
stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian
parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and
had resided therein ever since, if the period of his
detention be included.
On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of
Immigration, the petitioner was arrested for
investigation as to his past activities. Following his
arrest, a warrant for his deportation was issued by the
Deportation Board, which is said to have found him an
undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard.
The petitioner protests that he was not given a
hearing, nor informed of the charges preferred against
him. This point however is unimportant in this
proceeding.
In May, 1947, the petitioner was put on board a ship
which took him to Shanghai, but he was not allowed
to land there because he was not a national of China
and was not provided with an entry visa. He was
therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to
the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa until December 8,
1947, when he was granted provisional release by the
President through the Secretary of Justice for a period
of six months. Before the expiration of that period,
namely, on March 20, 1948, the Commissioner of
Immigration caused his rearrest and he has been in
confinement in the abovementioned prison ever since.
In his return to the writ, the Solicitor General in behalf
of the respondents alleges that the Commissioner of
Immigration "has availed of every opportunity
presented to carry out the deportation order as shown
by the fact that when the petitioner was enjoying his
provisional release after the unsuccessful attempt to
deport him to Shanghai, China, he was again re-
arrested and flown to Cebu for the purpose of placing
him on board a Russian vessel which had called at
the port, with a view to carrying out the deportation
order issued against him, but said deportation was not
carried out for the reason that the captain of the said
boat refused to take on board the herein petitioner on
the ground that he had no permission from the
Russian government to take on board the petitioner."
It is further alleged that "the immigration officials have
taken steps regarding the disposition of those
foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting
availability of transportation or arrangements to the
place where they may be sent."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In this Court’s majority decision on the first application
it was observed that the applicant’s detention was
temporary, and it was held that "temporary detention
is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or
expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government
has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable length of time." It took
note of the fact that "this Government desires to expel
the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the
people’s expense . . . making efforts to carry out the
decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land."
No period was fixed within which the immigration
authorities were to carry out the contemplated
deportation beyond the statement that "The meaning
of ’reasonable time’ depends upon the circumstances,
specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the
availability of transportation, the diplomatic
arrangements with the governments concerned and
the efforts displayed to send the deportee away," but
the Court warned that "under established precedents,
too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus."cralaw virtua1aw library
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this
decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice
Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the prisoner
from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent
by stating that he might agree "to a further detention
of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if
after six months, the Government is still unable to
deport him." This writer joined in the latter dissent but
thought that two months constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision
aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not
found ways and means of removing the petitioner out
of the country, and none are in sight, although, it
should be said in justice to the deportation authorities,
it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country
would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right
of asylum therein (Soewapadji v. Wixon, Sept. 13,
1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no
less true however as impliedly stated in this Court’s
decision, supra, and numerous American decisons,
that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no
criminal charges have been formally made or judicial
order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without
due process of law and except for crimes committed
against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine
citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy
aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who
entered the country in violation of its immigration laws
may be detained for as long as the Government is
unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need
not decide. There is no allegation that the petitioner’s
entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the
contrary, the inference from the pleadings and the
Deportation Board’s findings is that he came to and
lived in this country under legal permit.
Moroever, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of Nation." And
in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on
December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to all human
beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that
"All human beings are born free and equal in degree
and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other
status (Art. 2); that "Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile" (Art. 9); etc.
In U. S. v. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said
that the court "has the power to release from custody
an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long
period of time by the Department of Justice after it
has become apparent that although a warrant for his
deportation has been issued, the warrant can not be
effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is
given the power to act is that the warrant of
deportation, not having been able to be executed, is
functus officio and the alien is being held without any
authority of law." The decision cited several cases
which, it said, settled the matter definitely in that
jurisdiction, adding that the same result had been
reached in innumerable cases elsewhere. The cases
referred to were United States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis,
2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404; Caranica v. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F.
2d 955; Saksagansky v. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13,
16 last paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D.
Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis v. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug.
28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to
find, was that of Staniszewski v. Watkins (1948), 80
Fed. Supp. 132, which is nearly foursquare with the
case at hand. In that case a stateless person,
formerly a Polish national, resident in the United
States since 1911 and many times serving as a
seaman on American vessels both in peace and in
war, was ordered excluded from the United States
and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the
steamship company, when he returned from a voyage
on which he had shipped from New York for one or
more European ports and return to the United States.
The grounds for his exclusion were that he had no
passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937 had
been convicted of perjury because in certain
documents he represented himself to be an American
citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas
corpus, the Court released him upon his own
recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
said in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came
before this court, I suggested that all interested
parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the
petitioner ship out to some country that would receive
him as a resident. He is a native-born Pole but the
Polish Consul has advised him in writing that he is no
longer a Polish subject. This Government does not
claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he
is stateless. The Government is willing that he go
back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard ship
and sailed to the port (Cherbourg, France) from which
he last sailed to the United States he would probably
be denied permission to land. There is no other
country that would take him, without proper
documents.
"It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case
and that the petitioner should be released from
custody on proper terms . . .
"What is to be done with the petitioner? The
government has had him in custody almost seven
months and practically admits it has no place to send
him out of this country. The steamship company,
which employed him as one of a group sent to the
ship by the Union, with proper seaman’s papers
issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying
$3.00 a day for petitioner’s board at Ellis Island. It is
no fault of the steamship company that petitioner is an
inadmissible alien as the immigration officials
describe him . . .
"I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and
order the release of the petitioner on his own
recognizance. He will be required to inform the
immigration officials at Ellis Island by mail on the 15th
of each month stating where he is employed and
where he can be reached by mail. If the government
does succeed in arranging for petitioner’s deportation
to a country that will be ready to receive him as a
resident, it may then advise the petitioner to that
effect and arrange for his deportation in the manner
provided by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent,
the case aforecited offered a happy solution to the
quandary in which the parties here find themselves,
solution which we think is sensible, sound and
compatible with law and the Constitution. For this
reason, and since the Philippine law on immigration
was patterned after or copied from the American law
and practice, we choose to follow and adopt the
reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski
decision with some modifications which, it is believed,
are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of
peace and order in the Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing of the petition
at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the petitioner
was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was
expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal
elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the
Government’s allegation in its answer that "the herein
petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the
Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no longer
at war with the United States or the Philippines nor
identified with the countries allied against those
nations, the possibility of the petitioner’s entertaining
or committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest
and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a
possibility exists, still the petitioner’s unduly prolonged
detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to
eliminate a danger that is by no means, actual,
present, or uncontrollable. After all, the Government is
not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by
such measure as that just outlined. The thought
eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court in connection with the
application for bail of ten Communists convicted by a
lower court of advocacy of violent overthrow of the
United States Government is, in principle pertinent
and may be availed of at this juncture. Said the
learned Jurist:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Government’s alternative contention is that
defendants, by misbehavior after conviction, have
forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is
said to result from what they may be expected to do,
in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed
to commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to
Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile
with traditional American law the jailing of persons by
the courts because of anticipated but as yet
uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society
from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with
danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to
resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique
to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of
which defendants stand convicted.
x x x
"But the right of every American to equal treatment
before the law is wrapped up in the same
constitutional bundle with those of these Communists.
If in anger or disgust with these defendants we throw
out the bundle, we also cast aside protection for the
liberties of more worthy critics who may be in accused to bail pending appeal of his case, as in the
opposition to the government of some future day. case of the ten Communists, depends upon the
discretion of the court, whereas the right to be
x x x enlarged before formal charges are instituted is
absolute. As already noted, not only are there no
charges pending against the petitioner, but the
"If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these prospects of bringing any against him are slim and
abstract or theoretical matters of principle, there is a remote.
very practical aspect of this application which must
not be overlooked or underestimated - that is the Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding
disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice the respondents to release the petitioner from custody
if I should now send these men to jail and the full upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed
Court later decide that their conviction is invalid. All under the surveillance of the immigration authorities
experience with litigation teaches that existence of a or their agents in such form and manner as may be
substantial question about a conviction implies a more deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and
than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience be available when the Government is ready to deport
lies back of our rule permitting and practice of him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the
allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this
hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for
consequent reproach to our system of justice. If that is decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond
prudent judical practice in the ordinary case, how for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000.00
much more important to avoid every chance of with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
handing to the Communist world such an ideological Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact
weapon as it would have if this country should by Section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. No
imprison this handful of Communist leaders on a costs will be charged.
conviction that our own highest Court would confess
to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ.,
granting or refusing bail. I am not naive enough to concur.
underestimate the troublemaking propensities of the
defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert Jugo, J., concurs in the result.
to the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the
short time it will take to end the litigation is preferable EN BANC
to the possibility of national embarrassment from a G.R. No. L-40177 March 15, 1934
celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of LI SENG GIAP & CO., applicant-appellant,
Communist leaders. Under no circumstances must we vs.
permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of Manly and Reyes for appellant.
martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
those men until it is finally decided that they should DIAZ, J.:
stay jailed."cralaw virtua1aw library On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a
partnership composed of individuals who are not
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United
presented, its underlying principle is of universal States, but aliens, instituted these proceedings in the
application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for the
greater force to the present petition, since the right of registration in its name in the registry of deeds, of the
three parcels of land described in the plans Exhibits A
and B, and technical descriptions attached to its
application, in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 496 and of Chapter VIII or Title II of Act No. 2874.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said
application alleging as his grounds that the three
parcels of land in question were public lands
belonging to the Government of the United States
under the administration and control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and that, being
an alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the
benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said Act
No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in
Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act invoked by the
applicant. The Director of Lands has made no
reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the
reason that the Act in question merely prescribes, in
general terms, the manner or procedure to be
followed by an applicant in the obtainment of the
certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or
issuance thereof, as the case may be, by the court or
by the Government agencies therein mentioned.
After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur rendered judgment therein denying the
application of the applicant partnership on the ground
that it is an alien, and holding, at the same time, that
the parcels of land it sought to register in its name are
a portion of the public domain. The said applicant took
exception to and appealed from such judgment,
claiming that the trial court committed the following
alleged errors, to wit:
I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li
Seng Giap & Co. being a partnership made up of
individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine
Islands nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this
reason, to register the land described in its application
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land
described in the application a part of the public
domain.
III. The lower court also erred in denying the
applicant's motion for reconsideration as well as its
motion for new trial.
It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three
parcels of land in question. The record shows that
they are agricultural lands which at present contain
coconut trees, abaca and cacao with which they have
been planted for over forty years. The coconut trees
there on range from one to forty years in age. The
said three parcels had likewise been cultivated and
had actually been occupied for many years during the
Spanish regime by several natives of the Province of
Camarines Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro
Ceron, Margarita Labordes, Doroteo Quitales and
Cornelio Vargas. The occupation or possession
thereof by the above-named persons was under claim
of ownership but neither the exact date when such
possession began nor the circumstances under which
they acquired the property in question has been
determined. However, it seems certain that such
occupation began some fifty-five years ago and
continued without interruption from that time until said
persons decide to sell them to Sebastian Palanca
who is also an alien like the herein applicant. Neither
is there anything of record to show when the sale was
made but it also seems certain that it took place
during the Spanish regime. Sebastian Palanca
continued in possession of the aforesaid three parcels
of land from the time he acquired them in the manner
hereinbefore stated until July 22, 1930, when he sold
them to the herein applicant-appellant. However,
before selling them and while he was in possession
thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he failed
to obtain a gratuitous title or even a mere possessory
information therefor, which would serve to protect his
claim of ownership, by taking advantage of the
benefits afforded by the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, which was promulgated in the Philippines and
published in the Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April
17th of the same year.
The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also
articles 1, 19 and 21 of the Maura Law, and which
had been in force in the Philippines during the last
years of the Spanish regime and continued to be so
until the enactment of the Public Land Act and the
amendments thereto, read as follows:
ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and
mountains not included in the following exceptions
shall be considered alienable public lands: First, those
which have become subjected to private ownership
and have a legitimate owner. Second, those which
belong to the forest zones which the State deems
wise to reserve for reasons of public utility.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under
cultivation who have not obtained nor applied for
composition on the date this decree shall be
published in the Gaceta de Manila, may obtain a
gratuitous title of property, by means of a possessory
information in conformity with the law of civil
procedure and the mortgage law whenever they
establish any of the following conditions:
First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation
without interruption during the preceding six
years.1ªvvphi1.ne+
Second. Having had possession of them for twelve
consecutive years, and having had them under
cultivation until the date of the information, and for
three years before that date.
Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and
without interruption, for thirty or more years, although
the land is not under cultivation.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted
order to perfect the informations referred to in articles
19 and 20.
Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the
Royal Decree above-mentioned provided as follows:
ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, the inextensible
period for carrying out the informations referred to in
the two preceding articles, shall be counted as on the
17th day of April, 1895.
Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator
and possessors to the obtainment of free title shall
lapse, and the full property right in the land shall
revert to the State or, in a proper case, to the public
domain.
Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the
last aforecited article the three parcels of land in
question reverted to the State as property of the
public domain upon the expiration of the period
specified therein, by reason of negligence on the part
of the possessors thereof.
The applicant-appellant contends that under the
provisions of section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926,
it has necessarily acquired the right to have the
corresponding certificate of title issued to it upon
registration of the said parcels of land in its name in
the registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had actually
been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession thereof, under claim of ownership, not
only by itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from
whom it had purchased them, for more than ten years
prior to July 26, 1904, the date on which the aforesaid
Act went into effect, in accordance with the
proclamation of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of the same date.
The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads
as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their
legal successors in right, occupying public lands in
the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such
lands have not been perfected, may apply to the
Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor to wit:
1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States had fulfilled all the
conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal
decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of
public lands, including the payment of the purchase
price, but who failed to secure formal conveyance of
title;
2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States, having applied for
the purchase of public lands and having secured a
survey, auction, and an award, or a right to an award,
of such lands, did not receive title therefor through no
default upon their part;
3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States, having applied for
the purchase of public lands and having secured a
survey and award of same, did not, through
negligence upon their part, comply with the conditions
of full or any payment therefor, but who after such
survey and award shall have occupied the land
adversely, except as prevented by war or force
majeure until the taking effect of this Act;
4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did
apply for adjustment or composition of title to lands
against the Government under the Spanish laws and
royal decrees in force prior to the royal decree of
February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, but who failed to receive title therefor through no
default upon their part;
5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to
public lands by "possessory proceedings" under the
provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of the royal
decree of the King of Spain issued February
thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and
who, having complied with all the conditions therein
required, failed to receive the title therefor through no
default upon their part; and
6. All persons who by themselves or their
predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred
and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except
as against the Government, for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except
when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and to
have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of
this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two,
three, four and five of this section must establish by
proper official records or documents that such
proceedings as are therein required were taken and
the necessary conditions complied with: Provided,
however, That such requirements shall not apply to
the fact of adverse possession.
It may be noted that the case of the applicant does
not come under paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the
aforecited section, which, by the way, conclusively
shows that prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, the
said Maura Law was the last law which regulated the
acquisition of alienable public lands and the issuance
of the corresponding title to those who could establish
their claim that they were entitled thereto. Being
aware of this fact, the applicant has never invoked
said paragraphs. He merely confines himself to
invoking the provisions of paragraph 6 thereof, in
support of which he cites the rulings of this court in
the cases of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42
Phil., 128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil.,
883).
In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the
applicant Tan Yungquip, who was a Chinaman, had
proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land
which he sought to register in his name, some by
purchase and others by inheritance; that he and his
predecessors in interest had been in the open,
peaceful, continuous and notorious possession of the
same for at least thirty years, and that such parcels of
land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was entitled
to have them registered in his name under the
provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926,
for the reason that he filed his application to that
effect more than one year prior to the enactment and
enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held
therein that the matter should be decided in favor of
said Tan Yungquip on the ground that no valid law
could be found, at least on that occasion, which
prohibited the registration in his name in the registry
of deeds, of the parcels of land of which he claimed to
be the owner.
In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of
Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, it was likewise held that
lands held in private ownership constitute no part of
the public domain and cannot, therefore, come within
the purview of said Act No. 2874 on the ground that
said subject (lands held in private ownership) is not
embraced in any manner in the title of the Act, and
that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the same
was to limit the application thereof exclusively to lands
of the public domain.
Although nothing has been said in the decision
rendered in the aforecited case of Tan Yungquip vs.
Director of Lands to the effect that the application of
the therein applicant should be granted on the ground
that the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, which
were therein under consideration and interpretation,
do not distinguish between citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States and aliens, however,
the appellant contends that the aforecited section has
such scope and that the question raised in this case
should be decided under the latter interpretation.
We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two
cases and that in the case of Agari vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are decisive and
applicable to the case under consideration, on the
ground that although it is true that Agari, who was the
applicant in the last case, was an alien, it was likewise
true that the persons, from whom he had acquired the
land which he sought to register in his name in the
registry of deeds during the time Act No. 926 was still
in force, were natives of the Philippine Islands, who,
in turn, had acquired it through their father, who was
likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with
the State in accordance with the laws then in force;
nor that, under the provisions of the aforecited section
54 of Act No. 926, the applicant-appellant Li Seng
Giap & Co. could have succeeded in securing the
certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first place,
because the three aforecited decisions refer to cases
which are different from the one now under
consideration; in the second place, because said
decisions were based on the supposition that the
parcels of land in question therein were of private
ownership and at that time no law was known to be in
existence, which prohibited the registration of said
parcels of land in the registry of deeds, in the name of
the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz
and Agari, and in the third place because while Act
No. 926 was still in force (it is no longer in force,
having been expressly repealed by section 128 of Act
No. 2874, on December 28, 1919), it should have
been interpreted in the light of the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known as
the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch
as the former had been approved under the authority
of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act. The
very title of Act No. 926 above referred to shows that
one of the purposes for which it was approved was to
carry out the provisions of sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62
of the aforecited Act of Congress, which title reads in
part:
An Act . . . providing for the determination by the
Philippines Court of Land Registration of all
proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and for
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in said Islands, as authorized
by sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixty-two of
the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred
and two, entitled "An Act temporarily to provide for the
administration of the affairs of civil government in the
Philippine Islands, and for other purposes".
Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress,
which bear relation to the question under
consideration, provide as follows:
SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine
Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact
rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to
public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer
of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had
fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the
Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of
Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed
to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents, without
compensation, to any native of said Islands,
conveying the title to any tract of land not more than
sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands
and had been actually occupied by such native or his
ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine
Islands in hereby authorized and empowered, on
such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation,
to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to
actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of
said Islands such parts and portions of the public
domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the
United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not
exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for
the sale and conveyance of not more than one
thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation
or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or
sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be
paid at once or in partial payments, shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for
a period of not less than five years, during which time
the purchaser or grantee cannot alienate or encumber
said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall
not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance
under the laws for the distribution of the estates of
decedents.
It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections
provide that gratuitous title to property may be issued
only to natives of the Philippine Islands who are in
possession of the necessary qualifications specified
therein. It may therefore be inferred from the
foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a different
scope from that given it by the aforecited Act of
Congress and, therefore, the phrase "all persons"
employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of the former
Act should be understood to mean only citizens of the
Philippine Islands or citizens of the United States or of
any insular possession thereof.
The parcels of land involved in this case, which as
hereinbefore stated, have reverted to the State after
April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of
private ownership. Neither were they so on or after
the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show
any title thereto either by possessory proceedings or
otherwise, which may be considered as having been
issued by the Government. The only basis on which it
now claims the right to have them registered in its
name is its alleged possession thereof together with
that of Sebastian Palanca and of the former
possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to the
registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the
parcels of land in question already belong to it, having
acquired them by prescription through the continuous,
open, exclusive and notorious possession thereof,
under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish
regime in the Philippine Islands. However, the truth is
that the law expressly provides that no public land
may be acquired by prescription, and that such mode
of acquisition does not hold as against the
Government. This provision is contained precisely in
the very law invoked by the applicant, that is section
54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case of
Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang(50 Phil., 380, 386), this court
said:
". . . in a controversy between private individuals,
where the Government has not intervened, and where
it appears that the land has ceased to be of public
domain and has come to be of private ownership, a
petitioner may obtain registration of land upon a title
acquired by adverse possession as against individual
opponents. The same rule does not maintain with
respect to land claimed by the Government and as to
which the Government is opposing." In the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abad (56
Phil., 75, 80), this court, deciding a question similar to
the one raised herein by the appellant, said as
follows: "Subsection (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874
is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relied
upon by the appellant, as depriving the appellant of
property without due process of law. That provision
has reference to property to which the citizen has
acquired a vested right. It does not extend to
privileges and inchoate rights which have never been
asserted or perfected. The contention of the appellant
. . . is therefore without merit." There is no justifiable
reason for disturbing the holdings of this court in the
aforecited two cases. On the contrary, it is considered
timely to reiterate them herein inasmuch as they
decide the same question.
The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as
those of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874
should necessarily be so construed as not to permit
aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It should
not be understood, however, that the constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws, is violated thereby, because,
as this court has said in the case of In re Patterson (1
Phil., 93, 95, 96), "Unquestionably every State has a
fundamental right to its existence and development,
as also to the integrity of its territory and the exclusive
and peaceable possession of its dominions which it
may guard and defend by all possible means against
any attack . . . . Superior to the law which protects
personal liberty, and the agreements which exist
between nations for their own interest and for the
benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and
fundamental right of each State to self-preservation
and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty." It
is upon grounds of public policy that the rights of
individuals, particularly of aliens, cannot prevail
against the aforesaid right of the Government of the
Philippine Islands. and more particularly when, as in
the present case, far from violating any constitutional
law, it deals precisely with the enforcement of the
provisions of the first organic law of the country and
those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that
lands of the public domain should not be disposed of
or alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or
citizens of the Philippine Islands.
Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is
in accordance with the law, it is hereby affirmed in
toto, with the costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte,
JJ., concur.
Imperial, J., concur in the result.

Radick v. Hutchins 95 US 210

U.S. v. Guatemala, Shufeldt Claim, 1930, 5
Hackworth, p 485 2 UN Rep Arb Awards 1079
Sambiaggo Case, (Italy v. Venezuela) Venezuela
Arbitration of 1903,, p 666