Russia and the EU

friends or foes?
A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit
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 Russia and the EU:
friends or foes?

Contents

Introduction2

The EU-Russia relationship: conflict or co-operation? 3

Russia: a divisive issue for the EU 3

Both sides have an interest in co-operation 4

Russia has more to lose than the EU 5

The EU will remain Russia’s main strategic partner 7

Friends8

Greece and Cyprus: friends in need 8

Italy: uninfluential friend 8

Hungary: ties that bind 9

Turkey: uneasy ally 9

Foes  11

Baltics: bitter enemies 11

Romania: historic enmities 11

Poland and Russia, the best possible enemies?  12

The UK: old ally turned foe 12

Appendix14

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 Russia and the EU:
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Introduction

O n February 27th 2014, only four days after the closing ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics,
Russian troops entered the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. Russia’s subsequent annexation
of Crimea and its backing of separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine marked a turning point in the
relationship between the EU and Russia: for the first time since the end of the cold war and after a
rehearsal in Georgia in 2008, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, openly flouted the rules of the
post-second world war global order.
The objectives of Russia’s foreign policy appear to be threefold.
l First, Russia wants to prevent any of the former Soviet countries, which it sees as belonging to its
sphere of interest, from entering Western institutions such as the EU or NATO.
l Second, Russia wants to prove that it is still a major player on the international stage, having lost its
cold-war status as a global superpower and having perceived its treatment in the post-cold war era at
the hands of the US in particular, and the West in general, as a humiliation.
l Finally, Russia wants to see a multipolar world order, one that is not dominated by a single
superpower (the US).
There is very little chance that presidential elections in Russia (in 2018) and Ukraine (in 2019)
will change the essential dynamics of the relationship between the EU and Russia. The Economist
Intelligence Unit believes that Mr Putin will remain president of the Russian Federation until 2024;
that the Minsk II ceasefire agreement will not put an end to the Ukrainian conflict in 2017-22; and that
Russia will retain control of Crimea. The situation in eastern Ukraine now appears to be frozen, which
serves the interests of Russia since it effectively prevents Ukraine from joining the EU and NATO.
As a result, Russia’s relationship with the EU is likely to remain difficult, competitive and conflict-
prone over the next five years. In 2012, 43% of Russians believed that Russia should join the EU,
according to Levada, a Russian polling agency. Only 25% of them still think so today. Relations
between Russia and the EU are in bad shape as 2017 draws to a close.
There is a risk that the current, mainly conflictual, relationship will persist over the medium term.
Russia has more to lose than the EU in the economic, political and diplomatic spheres if this situation
persists or if its relationship with the European bloc deteriorates further. However, for several reasons
outlined in this paper related to shared economic, energy and security interests, there is a chance that
relations could be repaired.
Our baseline forecast is that EU-Russia relations will be an uneasy mix of conflict and co-operation;
there will be periods of high tension, but there will also be instances of the two sides coming to an
agreement and working together. In this White Paper we analyse the key determinants of the EU-Russia
relationship and highlight the points of conflict and of potential co-operation. We also take a closer
look at some of the key protagonists and at the dynamics of their past, present and future relations
with Russia.
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 Russia and the EU:
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The EU-Russia relationship: conflict or co-

operation?

S ince early 2014 the relationship between the EU and Russia has gone from bad to worse. There
are now few areas of agreement between the two sides. European financial sanctions and Russian
counter-sanctions are likely to remain in place for years. This prevents Russian companies in the
energy, defence and financial sectors from raising funds in European capital markets, while EU
companies cannot export food products to Russia. Even if they were lifted, EU sanctions would have a
long-term impact, since Western companies would remain wary of conducting business in Russia for
many years for fear of a possible snapback of sanctions, as is now happening in Iran.
Furthermore, the EU and Russia disagree on virtually any diplomatic topic, as exemplified in Syria,
where Russia supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad, whereas the EU favours an orderly political
transition. In addition, the EU appears to be increasingly anxious about the recent Russian military
build-up in terms of defence spending and modernisation of the army, as demonstrated by the media
attention around the Zapad Russian military exercise in September 2017. Finally, Russia’s increasing
use of information warfare techniques—which are meant to sow doubt in public opinion in the West in
a way that advances Russian interests—as well as its alleged meddling in recent Western elections have
also contributed to the growing divide between the two sides.

Russia: a divisive issue for the EU

EU member states appear to have reached a broad consensus about the need to adopt a tough stance
on Russia, but this issue nonetheless remains divisive. Some European countries, such as Italy, Greece
and Hungary, appear more or less friendly towards Russia, whereas others, such as Poland, the Baltic
states and Romania, are hostile towards their eastern neighbour (see Friends and Foes sections of this
report). In addition, within EU countries Russia is viewed more favourably by some populist political
parties, such as the right-wing Front national (FN) in France, the left-wing Podemos in Spain or the
anti-establishment Five Star Movement in Italy.
Still, with the exception of Greece’s ruling Syriza Coalition of the Radical Left, in power since
January 2015, none of these political parties has come to power recently, and none is in government.
It therefore appears unlikely that there will be a significant improvement in the relationship between
the EU and Russia from its current low point in the next five years. European financial sanctions
will continue to be renewed fairly smoothly every six months, even though business communities
will remain opposed to them. Crucially, the Franco-German couple made up of Emmanuel Macron,
the French president, and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, appears staunchly opposed to
compromising with Russia, even though Mrs Merkel might adopt a more pragmatic approach than
Mr Macron, who was outraged at Russia’s alleged attempts to sabotage his campaign for the French
presidency. Meanwhile, Russia is steadfastly refusing to make any concessions to the EU, a move which

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 Russia and the EU:
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Sergei Lavrov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, believes would be “at the expense of the Russian
national interest”.

Both sides have an interest in co-operation

Aside from the heated political rhetoric, the EU and Russia have a long track record of technical co-
operation on a variety of topics, chief among them security and the fight against terrorism. In April
2017, for the first time in three-and-a-half years, Russia suffered a terrorist attack in St Petersburg, a
reminder that Russia’s citizens are also at risk from Islamist terrorist plots. In addition, thousands of
Russian citizens, mainly from Chechnya, have joined Islamic State (IS) in Syria. With IS being driven
out of its last redoubts in Syria and Iraq, the prospect of returning jihadi fighters carrying out more
attacks in Russia and in EU countries is increasing. To counter extremist threats, the EU and Russia
need to co-operate on security topics even though trust between the two sides is low.
Furthermore, the EU and Russia share a common interest in co-operating on the international
diplomatic scene, at least for technical and pragmatic reasons: no international agreement can be
reached without both sides being present at the negotiating table and in broad agreement on some
basic principles. In fact, co-operation with the EU in the diplomatic sphere serves Russia’s interest in
cementing its role on the international stage, be it about Syria (where Russia acts as a go-between on
the ground between various rebel groups), North Korea (with which Russia shares a border and has
historical ties), the Arctic (in which Russia has a direct maritime interest) or nuclear non-proliferation
(Russia being a nuclear superpower in addition to being on friendlier terms with Iran than is the EU).
Finally, the energy sector appears to be an area that offers more potential for co-operation between
the EU and Russia. Some east European and Baltic countries are almost fully dependent on Russian gas
(see map on page 5), even though some are looking to expand their gas import sources, for instance
to the US in the case of Poland and Lithuania. With the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between
Russia and Germany expected to come into operation in 2019, European dependency on Russian gas is
unlikely to decrease in the coming years, making co-operation between the EU and Russia in the energy
sphere unavoidable.

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 Russia and the EU:
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Dependency on natural gas imports from Russia

(% of Russian natural gas in total extra-EU gas import volumes, 2016)

0–25 0–50 50–75 75–100

FINLAND

SWEDEN

ESTONIA RUSSIA

LATVIA
DENMARK LITHUANIA

NETHERLANDS
IRELAND
UK POLAND
GERMANY
CZECH
REPUBLIC
BELGIUM SLOVAKIA
LUXEMBOURG AUSTRIA
FRANCE HUNGARY
SLOVENIA ROMANIA

CROATIA
ITALY BULGARIA

PORTUGAL SPAIN
GREECE

MALTA
CYPRUS
Source: Eurostat.

Russia has more to lose than the EU

Both sides therefore have much to lose if their relationship deteriorates further. However, there
seems to be more at stake for Russia than for the EU. In October 2016 Mr Putin cancelled a trip to Paris
after the then French president, François Hollande, hinted that he might refuse to meet him owing to
sharp disagreements over Syria. This event illustrates that beyond the political rhetoric Russia cares
deeply about its relationship with European countries, at least from the perspective of protecting its
international standing and prestige.
In fact, and even though their view of the EU is unfavourable and deteriorating, a growing number
of Russians see their country as a European one: 44% of Russians currently think so, compared with
32% in 2015. For this reason, a rapprochement between Russia and the EU remains a possibility
after the 2018 Russian presidential election. It is, in fact, very probable that in private the Russian
government acknowledges that improved relations with the EU—and the lifting of EU sanctions—are
necessary to support long-term economic growth in Russia.

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 Russia and the EU:
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Russians' attitude to the EU

(%) Good Difficult to say Bad
90 90

80 80

70 70

60 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0
2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Source: Levada centre (http://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/).

Russia’s elite and its people therefore see Russia as primarily a European power whose interests
lie in Europe more than anywhere else in the world. Two other factors may serve to strengthen that
orientation towards Europe. First, the prospect of a rapprochement between Mr Putin and Donald
Trump, the US president, which had been widely discussed during the US presidential election
campaign in 2016, seems to have faded—at least in the short term—owing to intense media scrutiny
of the Trump team’s relations with Russian officials and the anti-Russian sentiment that pervades the
US political and military establishment (as exemplified by the recent imposition of new US sanctions
against Russia).
Second, Russia’s much-publicised pivot towards Asia appears not to be as successful as the Russian
government had originally hoped. Asian countries take only a third of Russian exports, whereas
European countries take more than half. In
Extra-EU imports of natural gas volumes, 2016 addition, despite the fanfare, the Power of
(% share)
Siberia gas pipeline between Russia’s far east
Libya, 1.5 Others, 2.3 and China will not be operating until at least
Nigeria, 2.1
2019. Furthermore, the negotiation of energy
Qatar, 5.8
Russia, contracts between Russia and China has always
38.2
Algeria, been difficult and lengthy. On a political level,
14.3 China does not appear to consider a closer
relationship with Russia—which it sees as
a junior partner rather than an equal—as a
priority. This may be to avoid antagonising
the US.
Norway, Finally, in the energy sector, Russia needs
35.8 Western technology to develop its oil and gas
Source: Eurostat. fields, and it remains heavily dependent on its

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 Russia and the EU:
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commodity exports to Europe—the bloc absorbs the vast majority of Russia’s gas exports—to subsidise
domestic gas prices. This may explain Russia’s efforts to appear as a rational and reliable supplier of
gas: even at the height of the Ukraine crisis in 2014-15 Russian gas supplies to European countries
through Ukraine were never cut. In this regard, liquefied natural gas (LNG) appears to be a growing
concern for Russia, since competition with LNG suppliers such as Qatar, Australia and the US is fierce.
More flexible and sometimes cheaper LNG deliveries to Europe might therefore gradually weaken the
rationale of building massive and expensive gas pipelines between the EU and Russia.

The EU will remain Russia’s main strategic partner

Despite the occasional spike in tensions and frequently hostile rhetoric, the EU and Russia have long-
standing historical diplomatic, political and economic ties that mitigate a complete breakdown of
relations. The relationship between the two sides has been difficult in recent years, but both the EU and
Russia have always stopped short of taking harsh measures that would have caused irreparable damage
to their relationship, such as severing diplomatic ties or directly fighting each other in the Ukraine and
Syria proxy wars.
Since the 2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine Russia seems to have achieved many of its goals
by annexing Crimea, preventing Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU and NATO and becoming an
unavoidable negotiating power in the Syrian conflict. With Russia having achieved its objectives, it has
little interest over the coming years in antagonising the West further.
There are therefore good reasons to think that a rapprochement may eventually occur for some of
the reasons discussed above. Russia will need the know-how, investment and financing of European
countries to diversify its economy away from oil and gas. Given that Russia is increasingly seeking to
contest US hegemony on the international stage, a thaw in relations with the EU would seem to be a
natural step. This should be welcomed by the EU.
Exports to Russia as a share of total exports
(%) 2012 2016
20.0 20.0
18.0 18.0
16.0 16.0
14.0 14.0
12.0 12.0
10.0 10.0
8.0 8.0
6.0 6.0
4.0 4.0
2.0 2.0
0.0 0.0
Lithuania Latvia Estonia Finland EU Poland Slovenia Slovakia Czech Germany Croatia Hungary Austria
average Republic
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

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 Russia and the EU:
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Friends

A mong the few countries in the EU that Russia can count as friends—namely Italy, Greece, Cyprus,
Hungary and, to a degree, the Czech Republic—domestic political concerns have played an
important role in shaping their attitudes towards their eastern neighbour and towards EU sanctions.
By virtue of history, geography, religion, culture and energy needs, some of these countries
(though not Hungary and the Czech Republic) have traditionally had closer ties to Russia. However, in
recent years economic and political difficulties at home and in relations with the EU have been much
more important in shaping their attitude towards Russia and the sanctions issue. Similarly, Turkey’s
efforts to rebuild relations with Russia after the crisis that followed the shooting down of a Russian
plane by the Turkish air force in late 2015 should be seen primarily as a response to difficult domestic
and regional political challenges.

Greece and Cyprus: friends in need

Greece, Cyprus and Russia have close historical, religious (Eastern Orthodox), cultural and diplomatic
relations. But it is contemporary factors that have led both Greece and Cyprus to express support for
Russia and opposition to EU sanctions in recent years. Both countries have suffered particularly severe
economic hardship in the aftermath of the global economic and financial crash, and both have been
subject to euro zone bail-outs that have come at a high political price. Their overtures to Russia and
complaints about EU sanctions should thus be seen in the context of their domestic politics.
When Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, went to Russia in April 2015, at the height of the
confrontation between Greece and its euro zone creditors, it was above all a political gesture aimed at
Greek voters, designed to demonstrate that Greece still had sovereign control over its foreign policy,
if not over its economic policies. Mr Tsipras was tapping a deep well of popular resentment of the EU
among the Greek electorate. According to a Eurobarometer poll at the time, only about 23% of Greeks
had a favourable view of the EU, while 63% had a positive view of Russia. Most Greeks feel that their
country has been treated unfairly and harshly by the EU, and particularly by its most powerful member,
Germany. Greek Cypriots felt similarly upset about the harsh terms of the Cyprus bail-out agreement in
2013, but the island had also received substantial financial aid from Russia two years earlier and is the
destination of Russian business capital and tourists.
However, despite historical ties and strong resentment of the EU among sections of the population,
neither Greece nor Cyprus was prepared to break ranks with the EU over sanctions. Greece’s main
orientation is to the West, and its relationship with the EU will continue to be the main fulcrum of
foreign policy. However, if Greece were to leave the euro zone, this would fuel anti-EU sentiment, and
Russia’s influence would increase.

Italy: uninfluential friend

Even though Italy has always punched below its economic weight in the international sphere, it
is a much weightier player in European politics than either Greece or Cyprus and has strong trade
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 Russia and the EU:
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and investment ties with Russia. However, it too has occasionally been an outlier where Russia is
concerned, mainly for domestic political reasons.
In the face of a mounting populist challenge at home the former prime minister, Matteo Renzi,
became an outspoken critic of EU sanctions policy in 2015-16, questioning but not blocking the
renewal of existing sanctions and opposing additional sanctions following the bombardment of Aleppo
in Syria in 2016. His motivation was not so much to cement relations with Russia, but rather to bolster
his domestic political position among a population that had become increasingly disaffected with the
EU and its own political class as Italy struggled through the post-crisis years.

Hungary: ties that bind

Since the nationalist, socially conservative Viktor Orban became prime minister of Hungary in 2010,
his country has become one of Russia’s closest friends in the EU. Mr Orban, who has met the Russian
president, Vladimir Putin, for bilateral talks on eight occasions, has repeatedly called for the lifting of
EU sanctions against Russia.
There is no historical precedent for such warm relations between the two countries: in the four
decades of communist rule after the second world war Hungary was an unwilling Soviet satellite.
Hungarian officials justify the friendly ties with Russia on economic grounds, especially their country’s
dependence on Russian energy. There is also an ideological reason for Hungary’s pro-Russia policy:
Mr Orban has embarked on building an “illiberal state”, and he has drawn inspiration from Mr Putin’s
authoritarian style of leadership.
Hungary is set to forge closer links with Russia, with work on two new Russian-built and -financed
nuclear reactors at the Paks power station due to begin in January 2018. Hungary’s accommodative
policy towards Russia is unlikely to change in the medium term, given that Mr Orban’s party is the
favourite to win a third consecutive four-year term at the next election, expected in April 2018.

Turkey: uneasy ally

Turkey has steadily distanced itself from its traditional Western allies, bringing relations with the EU to
an all-time low, but the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has painstakingly rebuilt his country’s
ties with Russia since the crisis that followed the downing of a Russian plane by the Turkish air force on
the border between Turkey and Syria in November 2015.
These diverging trends are frequently interpreted as Turkey turning eastwards, away from its
European perspective based on Western, liberal democratic values towards a more authoritarian model
epitomised by the regime of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. However, Turkey’s current trajectory
should not be construed as Turkey choosing Russia over the EU or its other traditional Western allies.
Strengthening ties with Russia helps to increase Turkey’s leverage with its Western allies, but it is
largely a response to the political challenges that Mr Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) have to deal with at home, as well as a reflection of the limitations of Turkish foreign policy
in the face of a series of regional challenges.
Mr Erdogan’s anti-Western rhetoric is aimed primarily at maintaining his nationalist support base at
home. Mr Erdogan and the AKP need this support if they are to win the presidential and parliamentary

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 Russia and the EU:
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elections that are due to take place in late 2019 but may be held earlier. The elections will be the final
hurdle on the way to achieving Mr Erdogan’s goal of being elected president with executive powers
under the revised constitution approved in a controversial, close-run referendum in April 2017, in
effect paving the way for the establishment of one-man rule.
For similar reasons, Mr Erdogan and the AKP have executed a hard rightward shift on the Kurdish
issue both in Turkey and in the surrounding region, notably in Syria and more recently in Iraq.
Having spent two-and-a-half years in peace negotiations with the jailed leader of the outlawed
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the government is once again engaged in a war against the PKK and a
clampdown on Turkey’s pro-Kurdish political opposition. Both began in mid-2015, after the AKP lost its
parliamentary majority in the June general election. Presenting itself as the only guarantor of security
and stability, the party won the second general election in November 2015 and restored its majority.
It is in this light that Turkey’s restored relations with Russia should be viewed. When Turkey downed
the Russian aircraft in late 2015, the government was supporting Syrian rebel forces fighting the
Russian-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Since last year Turkey has abandoned its calls for Mr
Assad to be removed, but in return it is hoping that Russia will use its position in Syria to prevent the
emergence of an extended autonomous Kurdish region in the country. That may be wishful thinking
on Turkey’s part. Russia maintains close ties with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the
US-backed PKK affiliate fighting Islamic State in Syria. When the Kurdistan Regional Government
in northern Iraq held an independence referendum on September 25th, Turkey threatened it with
economic sanctions and military action. Russia’s response was more measured, stating that it
supported Iraq’s territorial integrity but was respectful of Kurdish national aspirations—a view that is
entirely unacceptable to Turkey, but one which it has refrained from criticising.

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Foes

Baltics: bitter enemies

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—are among the most hawkish countries on the
issue of EU sanctions against Russia and have consistently advocated their renewal. For reasons of
history and geography the three countries are both hostile towards Russia and fearful of being in the
frontline of potential Russian aggression. Relations between them and Russia have been marked by
permanent distrust owing to Soviet rule (1940-91): despite having been part of the pre-first world war
Russian empire, the Baltic countries regard the post-second world war period as one of invasion and
occupation by the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, the Baltic states pushed for rapid Western integration
at the end of the cold war after 1989, joining NATO and the EU in 2004 and the euro zone between 2011
and 2015.
A complicating factor is that ethnic Russians make up around 25% of the population in Estonia and
Latvia (but just 4.6% in Lithuania). The fear is that Russia could claim that the rights of ethnic Russians
are being suppressed to justify meddling in the Baltics. Russia is also one the most important export
markets for the three countries, and a vital source of gas.
Tensions between the Baltic states and Russia deteriorated following events in Crimea in 2014 and
have persisted as a result of Russia’s frequent airspace violations and propaganda campaign in the
region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have responded with increased defence spending and NATO-led
military exercises. They have also tried to enhance their energy security. Lithuania has constructed an
LNG terminal and increased co-operation with Norway, which became its biggest gas supplier in 2016.
The construction of the Baltic Connector pipeline between Estonia and Finland (to be completed by
2020) and the gas interconnection between Poland and Lithuania are further examples of their efforts
to reduce their energy dependency on Russia. Lithuania—a major consumer of Russian gas—became
the first former Soviet country to import natural gas from the US.
There is no prospect of an improvement in relations between the Baltic states and Russia in the next
five years.

Romania: historic enmities

The deterioration in relations between the EU and Russia following the latter’s annexation of Crimea
and the conflict in Ukraine have increased Romania’s geopolitical and logistical significance and
strengthened its strategic links with NATO (and the US). This has angered Russia, as has Romania’s
continued pressure for Moldova’s integration into Western political, economic and security
structures. Romania has been one of the most vociferous EU member states in its support of sanctions
against Russia.
In May 2016 the US officially activated a land-based missile shield system at a former air base at
Deveselu, in southern Romania. In April 2017 Romania announced the purchase of US Patriot missiles

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 Russia and the EU:
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to boost its defence systems. In response, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement
arguing that the missile defence systems violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
More recently, relations with Russia have also been strained following the decision by the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to refuse permission to Dmitry Rogozin, a Russian deputy prime minister,
to overfly Romania in July. Mr Rogozin, who is among the Russian officials banned from entering EU
territory or airspace, had planned to fly over Hungary and Romania in a civilian airliner to visit the
pro-Russian president of Moldova, Igor Dodon. Russia responded by temporarily banning pork imports
from Romania.
An easing of tensions between Romania and Russia in the coming years is unlikely.

Poland and Russia, the best possible enemies?

Poland’s relationship with Russia has always been difficult. On the Polish side, the Soviet invasion of
Poland in 1939, the Katyn massacre (when the NKVD, a former Russian secret service, executed several
thousand Poles) and being turned into a satellite state of the Soviet Union will not be forgotten. A
majority of Poles regard Russia as a brutal and aggressive power. Poland’s decision to join the EU and
NATO after the collapse of the former Soviet Union was never accepted by the Russian elite.
Recent rhetoric has been tense, with Poland and Russia agreeing on virtually no topic, be it
energy (Poland is trying to diversify its gas supply away from Russia), diplomacy (Poland is a staunch
supporter of a strengthening of EU sanctions against Russia) or defence (Poland feels threatened by
Russia’s installation of Iskander missiles in the nearby Kaliningrad enclave, while Russia has reacted
strongly to NATO’s deployment of troops in Poland). In addition, the crash in 2010 of the Polish
president’s aircraft in Russia led to conspiracy theories about Russian involvement in the crash; Russia
has refused to return the plane to Poland.
Given the fact that the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party is strongly Russophobic, no
improvement in the Poland-Russia relationship is to be expected in the coming years.

The UK: old ally turned foe

The relationship between the UK and Russia is now more strained than at any time since the end of the
cold war. This is the result of a succession of crises and disagreements since the mid-2000s, including
the murder in London of Alexander Litvinenko by polonium poisoning in 2006; the 2008 war between
Russia and Georgia; cyber-attacks; the 2014 annexation of Crimea; conflict in eastern Ukraine; Russia’s
intervention in Syria; and alleged attempts by Russia to interfere in elections in the West. The UK has
also been in the forefront of allegations that Russia has committed war crimes in Syria and has focused
on the rise of so-called fake news in the UK, calling into question the role of organisations such as RT
(formerly Russia Today, an English-language news channel) and Sputnik, a news agency. The UK is one
of the strongest Western supporters of sanctions against Russia.
It is unclear whether the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement will apply to UK-Ukraine political and
economic relations post-Brexit. The UK may also begin to diverge from the EU over sanctions on Russia,
as the EU is more likely to be open to softening the regime. A united Western position on sanctions may
even become a bargaining point during Brexit negotiations. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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 Russia and the EU:
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(FCO) is expected to publish its analysis of how the UK would impose sanctions post-Brexit by March
2018. The UK might leave the European Convention on Human Rights after Brexit is completed. This
might damage the UK’s credibility in raising human rights concerns with Russia.
Post-Brexit rapprochement?
A lot may depend on who leads the UK post-Brexit. After Theresa May succeeded David Cameron as
prime minister following the Brexit referendum in 2016, the newly appointed foreign secretary, Boris
Johnson, stated that he wished to normalise relations between the UK and Russia. Mr Johnson has
since stepped back from this stance and reverted to a hawkish rhetoric on Russia. He was, for example,
vocal in alleging that Russia sought to conduct a coup in Montenegro in late 2016. However, were he
to become prime minister in a post-Brexit Britain, Mr Johnson might again make overtures to Moscow.
Mrs May, by contrast, is unlikely to change her hawkish position. In 2017 relations between the UK
and Russia became even more tense when in a meeting with the US president, Donald Trump, Mrs May
called for sanctions on Russia to be continued, and at a meeting with the Ukrainian president, Petro
Poroshenko, she stated that Britain was ready to support Ukraine in the event of a Russian attack.
A lot may also depend on how relations between the US and Russia develop. This would also probably
affect the UK-Russian relationship post-Brexit. Mr Trump has drawn criticism for favourable comments
that he has made about the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. In January 2017 the then president-
elect said in an interview that he would like to “make some good deals with Russia” and implied that he
would consider lifting sanctions on Russia in exchange for an agreement on nuclear arms reduction.
However, Mr Trump has been constrained in seeking a rapprochement with Moscow by the “Russiagate”
investigations in the US into alleged Russian meddling in the 2016 US election.

© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 13

Appendix Russia and the EU:
friends or foes?

Appendix
Table 1
National political system ties with Russia
Colour key: Green: unfriendly towards Russia. Red: friendly towards Russia
Q7 - Relations with Q8 - Sanctions Q9 - Support for Q12 - Party Links
Russia Ukraine
Hungary -0.98 -0.97 0.88 -1.96
Austria -0.78 -0.76 -0.62 -1.45
Greece -1.34 -1.22 0.01 -1.84
Slovakia -0.76 -0.94 0.07 -0.92
Bulgaria -0.56 -0.47 -0.14 -1.66
Czech Rep. -0.43 0.24 0.59 -0.49
Finland 0.37 -0.15 0.62 -0.55
France -0.35 0 0.18 -0.21
Italy -0.2 -0.4 0.61 -0.93
Sweden 0.95 0.73 0.67 0.73
Poland 2.12 1.78 1.69 1.34
Malta 0.3 0 2 -0.57
Denmark 1.37 0.75 0.81 0.48
Romania 1.4 1.48 1.95 -0.32
Spain 0.04 0.52 0.59 -0.24
Germany 0.49 0.8 0.68 0.64
Belgium -0.02 0.21 0.74 0.78
Netherlands 0.02 0.18 0.7 0.87
Portugal -0.3 0 1.08 0.54
UK 1.59 1.58 1.6 2.02
Slovenia 0.24 2.33 2.29 0.68
Estonia 2.05 1.84 2.32 1.08
EU average 0.238 0.342 0.877 -0.09
EU north 0.976 0.82 1.055 0.753
EU south -0.107 0.118 0.794 -0.484
North-south difference 1.083 0.702 0.261 1.237
Source. European Council on Foreign Relations - Fellow travellers: Russia, anti-westernism, and Europe’s political parties
Link: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR225_-_FELLOW_TRAVELLERS_ANNEX2.pdf
Item scores range from +3 to -3 (in extreme cases -4), with +3 representing the most pro-Western score and -3 the most
anti-Western score.
Q7. Relations with Russia. Pro-Western scores regard Russia as a revisionist power intending to change the current
European order, while anti-Western scores regard it as a ‘normal’ great power with ‘legitimate’ interests in its
neighbourhood or even as a strategic partner and ally, particularly in the ‘fight against terror’.
Q8. Sanctions on Russia. This is a follow-up to question 7. The pro-Western scores state that Russia needs to be punished
for its ongoing violations of international law, while the anti-Western scores want lift sanctions as quickly as possible for
the sake of own economic interest as well as to forge ties with Russia.

14 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017

 Russia and the EU: Appendix
friends or foes?

Q9. Support for Ukraine. The pro-Western scores state that every country has the right to choose its alliance and role model
for social, political, and economic modernisation – as long as Ukraine is committed to Westernisation it deserves support.
The anti-Western scores deny this, stating that Moscow’s interests in the neighbourhood come first, and that great power
interests come before self-determination.
Q12. The party’s links to Russia. The pro-Western scores distance political parties from the Russian regime, and/or they
support Russian civil society and opposition movements. On the anti-Western side, parties either promote Russia’s
economic interests, are a mouthpiece of Russian propaganda, or cultivate close ties with the Kremlin.

Table 2
The public’s view of Russia
(% of total)
Very favourable Somewhat favourable Somewhat Very unfavourable DK/Refused
unfavourable
France 5 31 38 24 2
Germany 4 23 53 14 6
Greece 14 50 23 8 5
Hungary 3 36 38 10 13
Italy 5 30 39 15 11
Netherlands 2 13 41 41 4
Poland 2 19 44 25 10
Spain 8 19 35 25 14
Sweden 2 16 49 29 4
United Kingdom 4 22 35 24 15
Turkey 6 26 25 37 6
Source.Pew Research Center - Publics Worldwide unfavorable toward Putin, Russia
Link: http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/
Answers are in percentages

Table 3
The public’s view of Russia
(% of total)
Major threat Minor threat Not a threat DK/Refused
France 45 39 14 2
Germany 33 53 12 2
Greece 24 24 50 3
Hungary 28 45 22 6
Italy 31 35 25 9
Netherlands 44 44 10 2
Poland 65 25 5 5
Spain 47 28 18 6
Sweden 39 52 8 1
United Kingdom 43 41 10 6
Turkey 54 25 15 6
Source.Pew Research Center - Publics Worldwide unfavorable toward Putin, Russia
Link: http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/
Answers are in percentages
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 15
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