Partnership

Dissolution ISSUES

JOSEFINA P. REALUBIT vs. PROSENCIO D. JASO and EDENG JASO 1. Whether there was a valid assignment or rights to the joint venture

G.R. No. 178782 September 21, 2011 2. Whether the joint venture is a contract of partnership

FACTS 3. Whether Jaso acquired the title of being a partner based on the Deed of Assignment

Petitioner Josefina Realubit entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Francis Eric Amaury RULING
Biondo, a French national, for the operation of an ice manufacturing business. With Josefina as
1. Yes. As a public document, the Deed of Assignment Biondo executed in favor of Eden not
the industrial partner and Biondo as the capitalist partner, the parties agreed that they would
only enjoys a presumption of regularity but is also considered prima facie evidence of the facts
each receive 40% of the net profit, with the remaining 20% to be used for the payment of the
therein stated. A party assailing the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document
ice making machine which was purchased for the business. For and in consideration of the sum
is, consequently, required to present evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
of P500,000.00, however, Biondo subsequently executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all
preponderant. In view of the Spouses Realubits failure to discharge this onus, we find that both
his rights and interests in the business in favor of respondent Eden Jaso, the wife of respondent
the RTC and the CA correctly upheld the authenticity and validity of said Deed of
Prosencio Jaso.With Biondo’s eventual departure from the country, the Spouses Jaso caused
Assignment upon the combined strength of the above-discussed disputable presumptions and
their lawyer to send Josefina a letter apprising her of their acquisition of said Frenchmans
the testimonies elicited from Eden and Notary Public Rolando Diaz.
share in the business and formally demanding an accounting and inventory thereof as well as
the remittance of their portion of its profits.
2. Yes. Generally understood to mean an organization formed for some temporary purpose,
a joint venture is likened to a particular partnership or one which has for its object determinate
Faulting Josefina with unjustified failure to heed their demand, the Spouses Jaso commenced
things, their use or fruits, or a specific undertaking, or the exercise of a profession or vocation.
the instant suit for specific performance, accounting, examination, audit and inventory of
The rule is settled that joint ventures are governed by the law on partnerships which are, in
assets and properties, dissolution of the joint venture, appointment of a receiver and damages.
turn, based on mutual agency or delectus personae.
The said complaint alleged that the Spouses Realubit had no gainful occupation or business
prior to their joint venture with Biondo and that aside from appropriating for themselves the
3. No. It is evident that the transfer by a partner of his partnership interest does not make
income of the business, they have fraudulently concealed the funds and assets thereof thru
the assignee of such interest a partner of the firm, nor entitle the assignee to interfere in the
their relatives, associates or dummies. The Spouses Realubit claimed that they have been
management of the partnership business or to receive anything except the assignees
engaged in the tube ice trading business under a single proprietorship even before their
profits. The assignment does not purport to transfer an interest in the partnership, but only a
dealings with Biondo.
future contingent right to a portion of the ultimate residue as the assignor may become
entitled to receive by virtue of his proportionate interest in the capital. Since a partner’s
The RTC rendered its Decision discounting the existence of sufficient evidence from which the
interest in the partnership includes his share in the profits, we find that the CA committed no
income, assets and the supposed dissolution of the joint venture can be adequately
reversible error in ruling that the Spouses Jaso are entitled to Biondos share in the profits,
reckoned. Upon the finding, however, that the Spouses Jaso had been nevertheless subrogated
despite Juanitas lack of consent to the assignment of said Frenchmans interest in the joint
to Biondos rights in the business in view of their valid acquisition of the latters share as
venture. Although Eden did not, moreover, become a partner as a consequence of the
capitalist partner. On appeal before the CA, the foregoing decision was set aside
assignment and/or acquire the right to require an accounting of the partnership business, the
upon the following findings that the Spouses Jaso validly acquired Biondos share in the CA correctly granted her prayer for dissolution of the joint venture conformably with the right
business which had been transferred to and continued its operations and not dissolved as granted to the purchaser of a partner’s interest under Article 1831 of the Civil Code.
claimed by the Spouses Realubit.

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Luzviminda Villareal vs Donaldo Efren Ramirez The Supreme Court also noted that Ramirez cannot demand his equity shares from Villareal
and Carmelito – because it should be the partnership – the partners and the partnership has a
Business Organization – Partnership, Agency, Trust – Dissolution and Winding Up – Need for separate and distinct personality.
Accounting Proceedings to Determine Partner’s Share
In determining Ramirez’ share in the equity, losses must be accounted for. He cannot ask for an
In 1984, Villareal, Carmelito Jose and Jesus Jose, formed a partnership for the purpose of amount equivalent to his capital contribution especially in this case where the partnership
operating a restaurant. Each contributed P250,000.00. In 1984, Ramirez was added as a incurred debts and losses. At any rate, Ramirez’ share is 1/3 of whatever assets the partnership
partner after he contributed P250,000.00. In 1987, Jesus withdrew from the partnership and still has after debts and losses are deducted. Hence there is a need for a proper proceeding for
his capital share of P250k was returned to him as agreed upon by the other partners. the accounting, liquidation, and distribution of the remaining partnership assets. A share in a
partnership can be returned only after the completion of the latter’s dissolution, liquidation
Thereafter, the restaurant suffered losses. Without informing Ramirez, Villareal and Carmelito
and winding up of the business.
shut down the restaurant. They then turned over the restaurant equipments to Ramirez.
On the issue of whether or not the turning over of the restaurant equipments to Ramirez
Later, Ramirez sent a letter to Villareal and Carmelito telling them he’s no longer interested in
served as payment of the latter’s share, it is wrong for Villarreal and Carmelito to assert that it
being a partner and that he’s demanding his shares in the partnership. Villareal and Carmelito
served as a payment. Ramirez was merely made to believe that said equipments are being
ignored the request of Ramirez hence the latter sued them.
stored in his place and not being given to him as payment.
In their defense, Villareal and Carmelito said that the restaurant equipments served as
Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill G.R. No. L-27343, February 28, 1979, Fernandez, J.
payment to Ramirez when they were delivered to them; that Ramirez cannot ask for share in
equity because the restaurant incurred debts (P240,658.00) and irreversible business losses.
Facts: In 1951, defendants entered into a contract of partnership under the firm name “Isabela
Ramirez argued by saying that the equipments were merely placed in their house for storage as
Sawmill”. In 1956 the plaintiff sold to the partnership a motor truck and two tractors. The
the two partners allegedly searched for a better restaurant location; that he was not aware of
partnership was not able to pay their whole balance even after demand was made. One of the
any losses or any indebtedness because he never took part in the management of the
partners withdrew from the partnership but instead of terminating the said partnership it was
restaurant.
continued by the two remaining partners under the same firm name. Plaintiffs also seek the
annulment of the assignment of right with chattel mortgage entered into by the withdrawing
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and it
partner and the remaining partners. The appellants contend that the chattel mortgage may no
further ordered Villareal and Carmelito to pay Ramirez P253,114.00. The computation was
longer be nullified because it had been judicially approved and said chattel mortgage had been
done as follows: (Original Partnership Capital – Partnership Debt = Partnership Asset) ÷
judicially foreclosed.
Number of partners; hence: (P1,000,000.00 – P240,658.00 = P759,342.00) ÷ 3 = P253,114.00.
Issue: Whether the withdrawal of one of the partners dissolved the partnership.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
Ruling:
HELD: No. It is impossible that the said P1,000,000.00 original capital did not fluctuate. It could
not have remained stagnant. Further, the Court of Appeals missed to note that one partner left
It does not appear that the withdrawal of the partner was not published in the newspapers.
and his contribution was returned (Jesus Jose). Generally, in the pursuit of a partnership
The appellees and the public in general had a right to expect that whatever, credit they
business, its capital is either increased by profits earned or decreased by losses sustained. It
extended to the remaining partners could be enforced against the properties of the
does not remain static and unaffected by the changing fortunes of the business.
partnership. The withdrawing partner cannot be relieved from her liability to the creditor of
the partnership due to her own fault by not insisting on the liquidation of the partnership.
Though she had acted in good faith, the appellees also acted in good faith in extending credit

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to the partnership. Where one of two innocent persons must suffer, that person who gave
occasion for the damages to be caused must bear the consequences. Technically, the
partnership was dissolved by the withdrawal of one of the partners. Through her acts of
entering into a memorandum with the remaining partners misled the creditors that they were
doing business with the partnership. Hence, from the order of the lower court ordering the
withdrawing partner to pay the plaintiffs, she is thus entitled for reimbursement from the
remaining partners.
SINGSON VS ISABLEA SAWMILL
GRN L-27343 February 28, 1979
Fernandez, J.:
FACTS:
Isabela Sawmill was formed by partners Saldajeno, Lon and Timoteo. S withdrew from the
partnership and after dissolution, L and T continued the business still under the name Isabela
Sawmill. The partnership is indebted to various creditors and that Sheriff sold the assets of
Isabela Sawmill to S and was subsequently sold to a separate company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabela Sawmill ceased to be a partnership and that creditors could no longer
demand payment.
RULING:
On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of the
business. It does not appear that the withdrawal of S from the partnership was published in the
newspapers. The appellee and the public had a right to expect that whatever credit they
extended to L and T doing business in the name of Isabela Sawmill could be enforced against
the properties of said partnership. The judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage executed in
favor of S did not relieve her from liability to the creditors of the partnership.
It may be presumed that S acted in good faith, the appellees also acted in good faith in
extending credit to the partnership.Where one of the 2 innocent persons must suffer, that
person who gave occasion for the damages to be caused must bear the consequences.
Benjamin Yu vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was hired as the Assistant General Manager of Jade Mountain Products Company
Limited primarily responsible for the overall operations of marble quarrying and export
business of said partnership. He was hired by a virtue of a Partnership Resolution in 1985 with
a monthly salary of P4,000.00. Initially he received only half of his stipulated monthly salary
and was promised by the partners that the balance would be paid upon securing additional
operating funds from abroad. However, in 1988 without his knowledge the general partners as
well as one of the limited partners sold and transferred their interest to Willy Co and
Emmanuel Zapanta. Thus the new major partners decided to transfer the firm’s main office but
opted to continue the operation of the old partnership under its old firm name and with all its
employees and workers except for the petitioner. Upon knowing of the changes in the
partnership, petitioner went to the new main office to meet the new partners and demand the
payment of his unpaid salaries, but the latter refused to pay him and instead informed him that
since he bought the business from the original partners, it was for him to decide whether or
not he was responsible for the obligations of the old partnership including petitioners unpaid
salaries. Hence, petitioner was dismissed from said partnership.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the partnership which had hired the petitioner as Asst. General Manager had
been extinguished and replaced by a new partnership composed of Willy Co and Emmanuel
Zapanta.
2. Whether petitioner could assert his rights under his employment contract as against the
new partnership
HELD:
1. Yes. The legal effect of the changes in the membership of the partnership was the
dissolution of the old partnership which had hired the petitioner in 1984 and the emergence of
the new firm composed of Willy Co and Emmanuel Zapanta in 1988. This is based on the
following provisions:
Art. 1828. The dissolution of partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as a distinguished from the winding up
of the business.
Art. 1830. Dissolution is caused:
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1. without violation of the agreement between the partners;
b. by the express will of any partner, who must act in good faith, when no definite term
or particular undertaking is specified.
2. in contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do
not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this article, by the express will
of any partner at any time;
However, the legal consequence of dissolution of a partnership do not automatically result in
the termination of the legal personality of the old partnership as according to Art. 1829, “ on
dissolution of the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of the
partnership affairs is completed. The new partnership simply continued the operations of the
old partnership under its old firm name without winding up the business affairs of the old
partnership.
2. Yes. Under Art. 1840, creditors of the old partnership are also creditors of the new
partnership which continued the business of former without liquidation of the partnership
affairs. Thus, creditor of the old Jade Mountain, such as the petitioner is entitled to enforce his
claim for unpaid salaries, as well as other claims relating to his employment with the old
partnership against the new Jade Mountain.
[G.R. No. 45664. September 28, 1937.]
ANSELMO CLAUDIO, MANUEL G. GOYENA, and LUIS S. FLORES, as Directors of the "Cotabato
& Cagayan Mining Association", petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, C. P. NEUFFER, WILLIAM MEYER, ARTHUR SKILES, JOSE ARANETA, and J.
C. COWPER,respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CERTIORARI; EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that the remedy of certiorari lies to prevent acts in excess of authority or
jurisdiction as well as to correct manifest abuses of discretion committed by an inferior
tribunal, when an appeal does not prove to be a more speedy and adequate remedy (Valdez
vs. Querubin, 37 Phil., 774; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182; Salvador Campos y Cia. vs. Del
Rosario, 41 Phil., 45; Sabado vs. Cristina Gonzalez, Inc., 53 Phil., 770; Westminster Bank vs.
Torres and K. Nassoor, Inc., 57 Phil., 422).
2. RECEIVER; APPLICATION UNDER OATH NECESSARY; PROTECTION OF THE PROPERTY AND
RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS. — In order that a receiver may be appointed in a case, an application
under oath to that effect must be filed, alleging all the facts necessary to convince the court to
grant the same, for the purpose of preserving the property which is the subject of litigation and
protecting thereby the rights of all the parties interested therein. This is due to the fact that, as
stated by this court in the case of Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico & Co. (28 Phil., 39), the power to
appoint a receiver is a delicate one; that said power should be exercised with extreme caution
and only when the circumstances so demand, either because there is imminent danger that
the property sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver be lost or because they run the risk
of being impaired, endeavoring to avoid that the injury thereby caused be greater than the one
sought to be averted. For this reason, before the remedy is granted, the consequences or
effects thereof should be considered or, at least, estimated in order to avoid causing
irreparable injustice or injury to others who are entitled to as much consideration as those
seeking it (Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico & Co., supra).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTROVERSIES OF COMMON OR GENERAL INTEREST TO MANY PERSONS. —
The law certainly provides that when the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend, but this is permissible only in case where those who
do so act for the benefit of all (sec. 118, Act No. 190). There is nothing in the pleadings filed in
civil case No. 51510 from which it may be inferred that the defendants acted for the benefit of
the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining Association" or all the members thereof, much less that the
plaintiffs, in turn, sued not only for their own benefit but also for the benefit of all the other
members.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — It necessarily follows from the foregoing that in order that the respondent
judge could exercise his jurisdiction or authority to appoint a receiver in this case, he should
have required the inclusion therein, as necessary parties, of the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining
Association" or of the other members not included as such parties; or at least, the plaintiffs
should have brought the action for themselves and in the name of the association in question,
or for the benefit of the other members. Not having done so, and it appearing clearly from the
pleadings that the persons who might be affected by the remedy applied for were not parties
to the case, the respondent judge undoubtedly acted in excess of his jurisdiction and abused
his discretion.
DECISION
DIAZ, J p:
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 Partnership
The questions raised by the petition for certiorari and the answer thereto, filed in this case,
may be summarized as follows:
(a) When the facts alleged in support of a complaint praying for the appointment of a receiver,
are denied under oath in an answer thereto, and it is affirmed in both pleadings that there are
many other interested parties not joined in the case either directly or indirectly, may such
appointment be made without committing an excess or abuse of jurisdiction, no evidence of
any kind having been taken to determine in some way the truth of said facts and no order
having been issued for the joinder of the other interested parties?
(b) Did the respondent judge exceed his jurisdiction and abuse his discretion in appointing as
he did a receiver in civil case No. 51510 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled C. P.
Neuffer et al., plaintiffs, vs. Anselmo Claudio et al., defendants, for rendition of accounts,
appointment of a receiver, issuance of a preliminary injunction and dissolution of an
association?
(c) Is the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining Association" a legally organized association in the sense
that it is entitled to acquire mining properties in the Provinces of Cagayan and Cotabato and to
be joined as party in civil case No. 51510?
It should be borne in mind that civil No. 51510 of the Court of First Instance of Manila was
instituted by the respondents, except the respondent judge and J. C. Cowper, to ask for: (1) the
dissolution of the association named "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining Association"; (2) an
accounting by the petitioners, the defendants in the above-entitled case, of the money and
property, personal or otherwise, belonging to said association, that have passed through their
hands, and of those still in their possession; and (3) the appointment of a receiver to take
charge of the properties of the association until the court directs otherwise. To this effect it
was alleged: (a) that the articles of association of the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining Association"
have not been registered in the Mercantile Registry of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry,
as required by law; (b) that notwithstanding the fact that the herein petitioners, defendants in
the above-entitled case, had not secured a permit to sell shares of said association, as required
by law, they had been selling and offering for sale to the public, and they themselves acquired,
some of said shares; (c) that notwithstanding the fact that the association has 279 members
who have subscribed to the original shares thereof, no meeting was ever held with the
exception of that held in September, 1936, at which M. W. Rice was elected president of the
executive committee, Anselmo Claudio as vice-president, Manuel G. Goyena as secretary-
treasurer, and Luis S. Flores and C. P. Neuffer as members; (d) that as M. W. Rice had resigned
his position as president, Anselmo Claudio was elected to succeed him by the members of the
executive committee; (e) that notwithstanding the fact that the association had been formed
for purposes of location, exploration and exploitation of mining claims in Cagayan, Island of
Luzon, and Cotabato, Island of Mindanao, it never had and does not actually have any mining
claim of any kind; (f) that as said association has no legal existence, the defendants, as
members of the executive committee thereof, are not authorized to discharge the offices to
which they were elected; (g) that the defendants have squandered the funds of the association
for salaries and in payment of other expenses, and have abandoned the properties thereof
located at Palimbang River, Cotabato; and (h) that to avoid the squandering of the funds of the
association and the loss of its other properties, a receiver should be appointed in the
meantime to take charge of keeping and preserving the same.
The therein defendants, petitioners herein, answering the petition of the therein plaintiffs and
herein respondents for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and for the
appointment of a receiver, admitted it as a fact that they organized the "Cotabato & Cagayan
Mining Association" on August 28, 1936, claiming, however, to have done so at the instance
and solicitation of M. W. Rice. They specially alleged under oath that said M. W. Rice is the
moving spirit of the association, being the owner of one-fifth of its subscribed capital; that in
spite thereof, the plaintiffs did not include him in their complaint either as a plaintiff or as a
defendant, and did not even mention him therein, although said fact is known to their
attorney, who is the one who filed the complaint, for the reason that said M. W. Rice is also his
client for whom he had been negotiating with the executive committee of the association, up
to the last hour, the payment to him of certain salaries due him and of other sums allegedly
owed him by the executive committee; that the allegation of the plaintiffs that the association
has been offering its original shares for sale to the public is false and malicious; that certificates
of shares were issued only to those who have completed payment of their subscriptions; that
the allegation that they abandoned the properties of the association situated at Palimbang
River is likewise false, and that it was precisely M. W. Rice, in connivance with the plaintiff C. P.
Neuffer, who did so; that the true interested party in the case is M. W. Rice, who is attempting
to collect from the association his salaries and other sums which he claims to have paid for the
association; and that if the plaintiffs did not include him in their complaint, it was to prevent
the court from acquiring jurisdiction over his person so as not to compel him to transfer to the
association the 45 mining claims located and registered by him in the registry with money
belonging to the association.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the remedy of certiorari lies to prevent acts in excess of
authority or jurisdiction as well as to correct manifest abuses of discretion committed by an
inferior tribunal, when an appeal does not prove to be a more speedy and adequate remedy
(Valdez vs. Querubin, 37 Phil., 774; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182; Salvador Campos y Cia.
vs. Del Rosario, 41 Phil., 45; Sabado vs. Cristina Gonzalez, Inc., 53 Phil., 770; Westminster Bank
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vs. Torres and K. Nassoor, Inc., 57 Phil., 422). This being known, it is now the duty of this court
to determine, by taking into consideration the facts inferred from the pleadings of the parties,
which are the ones briefly stated hereinbefore, whether or not the respondent judge acted in
excess of his jurisdiction and abused his discretion, there being as there is no necessity of
determining whether or not he had authority to appoint a receiver because he has authority to
do so under certain circumstances, by virtue of the provisions of sections 173 et seq. of Act No.
190.
In order that a receiver may be appointed in a case, an application under oath to that effect
must be filed, alleging all the facts necessary to convince the court to grant the same, for the
purpose of preserving the property which is the subject of litigation and protecting thereby the
rights of all the parties interested therein. This is due to the fact that, as stated by this court in
the case of Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico & Co. (28 Phil., 39), the power to appoint a receiver is a
delicate one; that said power should be exercised with extreme caution and only when the
circumstances so demand, either because there is imminent danger that the property sought
to be placed in the hands of a receiver be lost or because they run the risk of being impaired,
endeavoring to avoid that the injury thereby caused by greater than the one sought to be
averted. For this reason, before the remedy is granted, the consequences or effects thereof
should be considered or, at least, estimated in order to avoid causing irreparable injustice or
injury to others who are entitled to as much consideration as those seeking it. (Velasco & Co.
vs. Gochuico & Co., supra.)
In the complaint itself, which is at the same time a petition for the appointment of a receiver
filed by the herein respondents in civil case No. 51510, it has been emphatically alleged that
the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining Association" is composed of 279 members; but in spite
thereof, the respondents failed to include them as parties in said case, except only the
petitioners, personally and as members of the executive committee of the association, without
pretending that they brought the action not only for their own benefit but also for the benefit
of the other members. Neither did they include said association, in spite of the fact that their
principal purpose is to obtain the dissolution of the same. The association, as a party affected
thereby, is undoubtedly as much entitled, if not more entitled than the plaintiffs and
defendants, to be heard in the case, in matters affecting its existence as well as the
appointment of a receiver applied for. It is of no avail to allege that it has no legal personality
or existence because if it has none under the provisions of the Code of Commerce (arts. 116,
117, 119, 123 and 17 of the Code of Commerce), or under those of the Corporation Law, it
undoubtedly has legal personality or existence by virtue of the provisions of articles 38, 37, 36
and 35, paragraph 2, in connection with article 1667 of the Civil Code. (Compañia Agricola de
Ultramar vs. Reyes, 4 Phil., 2).
The law certainly provides that when the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend, but this is permissible only in cases where those
who do so act for the benefit of all (sec. 118, Act No. 190). There is nothing in the pleadings
filed in civil case No. 51510 from which it may be inferred that the defendants acted for the
benefit of the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining Association" or all the members thereof, much less
that the plaintiffs, in turn, sued not only for their own benefit but also for the benefit of all the
other members.
It necessarily follows from the foregoing that in order that the respondent judge could exercise
his jurisdiction or authority to appoint a receiver in the case under consideration, he should
have required the inclusion therein, as necessary parties, of the "Cotabato & Cagayan Mining
Association" or of the other members not included as such parties; or at least, the plaintiffs
should have brought the action for themselves and in the name of the association in question,
or for the benefit of the other members. Not having done so, and it appearing clearly from the
pleadings that the persons who might be affected by the remedy applied for were not parties
to the case, the respondent judge undoubtedly acted in excess of his jurisdiction and abused
his discretion.
For all the foregoing, and holding as it is hereby held that the question raised should be
answered favorably to the petitioners, that is, the first, in the negative sense, and the last two,
in the affirmative sense, the remedy applied for is granted, and the order of the respondent
judge, of July 19, 1937, appointing J. C. Cowper receiver in civil case No. 51510 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, is hereby declared null and void, with the costs to the respondents C.
P. Neuffer, William Meyer, Arthur Skiles and Jose Araneta. So ordered.