Team Code A8

TEAM CODE – A8
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MANDIA
IN THE MATTERS OF:
MR. SATISH DHANKAR ...PETITIONER
VS.
UNION O F MANDIA ...RESPONDENT
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MANDIA
UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA, 1950
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
i
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix
ISSUES RAISED .....................................................................................................................xii
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.............................................................................................. xiii
WRITTEN PLEADINGS .......................................................................................................... 1
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE

SUPREME COURT OF MANDIA IS MAINTAINABLE? ............................................... 1
1.1. J URISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED WHEN A

QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE ARISES . ........................................ 1
1.2. A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW HAS ARISEN AND HAS CAUSED INJUSTICE NOT
ONLY TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY BUT ALSO TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. ......................... 2
2. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO

PRIVACY AS JUST A COMMON LAW RIGHT AND HOLDING THAT
COLLECTION OF DATA DOES NOT INFRINGE RIGHT TO PRIVACY? .................... 4
2.1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS NOT J UST A COMMON LAW R IGHT BUT ALSO A
FUNDAMENTAL R IGHT. ..................................................................................................... 4
2.1.1. INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS . ................................................... 6
2.2. COLLECTION OF INTIMATE AND PERSONAL DATA INFRINGES R IGHT TO

PRIVACY. ........................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.1. DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH RECORDS. ............................................................... 8
2.2.2. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REGARDING M ARITAL LIFE. ........................ 8
2.2.3. LINKING O F PEHCHAAN WITH PAN CARDS AND BANK ACCOUNTS. ............ 9
2.3. BIOMETRIC INFORMATION STORED IS PRONE TO BE M ISUSED. ......................... 10
3. WHETHER THE PEHCHAAN ACT AND ITS NOTIFICATIONS ARE ULTRA

VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA? ........................................................... 12
ii
3.1. THE NOTIFICATION DATED 13TH J ANUARY, 2015 FOR MAKING PEHCHAAN
CARD MANDATORY IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PEHCHAAN ACT, 2014. ............................. 12
3.1.1. NOTIFICATION AGAINST THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. ............... 12
3.1.2. NOTIFICATION AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST. ................................................. 13
3.2. THE NOTIFICATION MAKING PEHCHAAN CARD MANDATORY IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 14, 19 AND 21 OF CONSTITUTION OF M ANDIA . ............................................... 14
3.2.1. NOTIFICATION VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14. ................................................. 14
3.3. THE PEHCHAAN ACT, 2014 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW. ..................................................................... 15
3.3.1. PEHCHAAN IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14. ................................................... 15
3.3.2. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19. ........................................... 16
3.3.3. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21. ........................................... 17
3.3.4. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF S TATUTORY P ROVISIONS. ..................... 17
3.4. THE DATA S TORED IS NOT SAFE UNDER THE PEHCHAAN SCHEME. .................. 18
3.4.1. UNAUTHORIZED OUTSOURCING TO PRIVATE VENDORS. ............................. 18
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 20
iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
art. Article
cl. Clause
CONST Constitution
Ed. Edition
Govt. Government
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honorable
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
N.C.T National Capital Territory
NUIA National Unique Identification Authority
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
SLP Special Leave Petition
u/a Under Article
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
vs. Versus
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A.K Gopalan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27................................................................ 18

ABC vs. The State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 10 SCC 1 ............................................................ 22
Bidi Supply Co. vs. Union of India AIR 1956 SC 479. ........................................................... 27
Bijoe Emmanuel vs. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615. ........................................................ 29
Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59. ............................................................... 25
C.C.E vs. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298 ........................................................ 15
C.C.E vs. Venus Castings (P) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1568. ......................................................... 16
Chunnilal Mehta vs. Century Spinning & M Co. Ltd. , AIR 1962 SC 1314. .......................... 16
Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd. vs. P.K. Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212 ........................... 15
Dayal Singh vs. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593. ............................................................... 26
Delhi Judicial Service Association vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176 .......................... 15
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 65 ...................................................... 14
Directorate of Revenue vs. Mohd. Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370 ........................................ 20
District Registrar and Collector vs. Canara Bank & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 496. ........................ 17
Global Energy Ltd. vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2009) 15 SCC 570. .... 26
Gobind vs. State of M.P [(1975) 2 SCC 148. .......................................................................... 29
Griswold vs. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965). ........................................................................ 27
Haryana State Industrial Corpn. vs. Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359 . ............................... 14
I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861. .................................................. 18, 29
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union Of India And Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine SC 996. ......
................................................................................................................ 17, 20, 22, 23, 29, 30
Kathi Raning Rawat vs. The State of Saurashtra , AIR 1952 SC 123 ..................................... 16
Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1295. ................................................................ 18
Kunj Bihari Lal Butail vs. State of HP, (2000) 3 SCC 40. ................................................ 25, 26
M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212. ................................................................. 18
M.P Sharma vs. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300. ............................................................... 18
Malak Singh v State of Punjab and Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 420. ........................................... 21
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. .................................................... 18, 21
Modern Dental College & Ors vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353. ................. 27
Mohd. Arif vs. Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737.................................................... 28
v
Mr. X vs. Hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 396 ........................................................................... 21, 23
Mukesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1. ................................................................ 30
Naraindas Indurkhya vs. State of M.P & Ors., (1974) 4 SCC 788. ......................................... 28
National Legal Service Authority vs. Union Of India & Ors, (2014) 5 SCC 438. .................. 27
Nirma Ltd. vs. Lurgi Lentges Energietechnik, AIR 2002 SC 3695 ......................................... 14
Penu Balakrishna Iyer and Ors. vs. Sri Ariya M. Ramaswamy Iyer, AIR 1965 SC 195. ........ 15
Pramod K. Pankaj vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 3 SCC 723. ....................................................... 31
PUCL vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399. ................................................................... 20, 21
PUCL vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568. ......................................................................... 17
Punjab Dairy Development Board vs. Cepham Milk Specialities Ltd., (2004) 8 SCC 621. ... 28
R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632. ..................................................... 17
R. vs. Dyment, (1988) 2 SCR 417. .......................................................................................... 23
R.C Cooper vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 ................................................................. 18
Raichurmatham Prabhakar vs. Rawatmal Dugar, (2004) 4 SCC 766. ..................................... 28
Ram Jethmalani vs. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1. ............................................................. 22
Rashmi Rekha Thatoi vs. State of Orissa, (2012) 5 SCC 690. ................................................ 26
S. and Marper vs. United Kingdom, Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, Council of
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 4 December 2008 ........................................... 19
Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. vs. ESI Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346. ......................................... 31
Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union vs. State of Kerela, (2006) 4 SCC 327. ........................ 26
Sanwant Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715. ...................................................... 15
Selvi vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263. ..................................................................... 28
Sirpur Paper Mills vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, AIR 1970 SC 1520. ............................ 16
State of Bombay vs. Shivabalak Gaurishankar Dube, (1965) 1 SCR 211. .............................. 31
State of Rajasthan vs. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77. ...................................................... 25
State of U.P vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd, AIR 1977 SC 1132 ............................................ 16
State of Uttaranchal vs. Sehnaz Mirza, (2008) 6 SCC 726 ...................................................... 14
State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75 ................................................. 27
Sudhir Chandra vs. Tata Iron and Steel Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1064. .......................................... 29
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1. .......... 21
U.P.Power Corpn. Ltd vs. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008)10 SCC 139. ............................... 26
Union Carbide Corporation vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584. ....................................... 15
Unni Krishnan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645. ............................................ 18
Vasu Dev Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753. ....................................................... 25
vi
STATUTES
1) Constitution of India, 1950.

2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
3) The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits And
Services) Act, 2016.
4) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
BOOKS, ARTICLES & J OURALS
1) Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 University of Pennysylvania

Journal of Interntional Law 483, 566 (2017).
2) Michael Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Constitutional Law 974(1st ed. 2012).
3) MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 230-232 (7th ed., Lexis Nexis, 2014).
4) S.K Sharma, Privacy Law: A Comparative Study 99(1st Ed., Atlantic, 1993).
vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner Mr. Satish Dhankar has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Mandia
under Article 136 of The Constitution of Mandia.1
1
Special Leave to Appeal by The Supreme Court.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave
to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any Court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.
viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
i.
The Republic of Mandia got independence from Britica on 15th September, 1946. On getting
independence, it enacted its Constitution which provided for a democratic parliamentary form
of governance with a federal structure based on the principles of free and fair elections,
equality, liberty, fraternity, transparency and accountability of the state and freedom of
religion as its core values.
ii.
The government of Mandia formulated a policy named ‘Pehchaan’ for profiling of its citizens
and to provide them a card called Pehchaan. The Pehchaan was meant to identify citizens for
various benefits given by the government and to save duplicity of identities. Philosophy
behind this policy is ‘Zero Tolerance for Corruption’. As per 12th October, 2009 government
notification, Pehchaan policy is also aimed at eliminating all forms of terrorism. The
Pehchaan cards will be provided free of cost to the citizens through established network of
cyber cells.
iii.
On 30th November, 2009, the government of Mandia constituted National Unique

Identification Authority under the Chairmanship of IT specialist Mr. Rajeev Khanna. This
Authority started its work of making Pehchaan cards and assigned this task to private entities
having expertise in this field. These private entities further outsourced this work to private
vendors in every district and block of Mandia to provide Pehchaan cards to the citizens by
taking their basic details like finger prints of both the hands, scanning of iris of the eyes,
blood group, spouse and children details, their educational qualifications, number of spouses,
the religion to which both spouse belong to, laws under which marriage is solemnized, details
of life-threatening diseases like AIDS, Cancer and Hepatitis-B, permanent infertility both in
male and female and criminal/civil cases pending in any Court and government loan or any
other liability on the citizen.
iv.
On 22nd January, 2010 Mr. Satish Dhankar, challenged this policy of mandatory Pehchaan
cards in the High Court of Nelhi., through a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) contending that
ix
the Pehchaan policy violates right to life including the right to privacy and right to speech and
expression. Mr. Dhankar contended that the information sought under Pehchaan scheme is
very intimate and integral to one’s personality and hence making it mandatory to provide
basic and intimate information is unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights. He
also challenged the policy as there is no law/statutory support for backing the mandatory
making of Pehchaan cards by the government.
v.
On 24th July, 2014 during the pendency of this PIL government of Mandia made Pehchaan
card compulsory for seeking benefits under different social welfare schemes of the
government. On 27th July, 2014 High Court passed an interim order directing the government
not to make Pehchaan cards mandatory.
vi.
On 28th July, 2014 government of Mandia filed an application for the clarification of the
interim order and to make a plea that Pehchaan cards be allowed to be made mandatory for
non-benefit schemes or programmes of the government like making of PAN Cards, Mobile
connections, applying for gas connection and opening of bank accounts. The High Court
allowed government’s plea permitting it to make Pehchaan cards mandatory for non-benefit
schemes, programmes and initiatives of the government.
vii.
On 11th August, 2014, the government of Mandia enacted a law called the Pehchaan Act,
2014 making mandatory the Pehchaan cards for all schemes (benefit and non-benefit both).
This law also provided a statutory basis to the National Unique Identification Authority.
viii.
On 13th January, 2015, the government of Mandia issued a notification making Pehchaan
mandatory for every scheme and programme. The notification said that Pehchaan card is
mandatory for issuing PAN card, Driving Licence, Passports, opening bank account and
existing bank accounts would be linked with Pehchaan Cards. On March, 2016 was fixed by
government of Mandia as the deadline for linking Pehchaan cards with bank accounts and
PAN cards and asked every citizen to comply with it and in the absence of compliance penal
actions are to be initiated.
x
ix.
Mr. Dhankar claimed Pehchaan Act, 2014 as violative of right to privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution of Mandia and data collected by government is not safe as it can be leaked to
private entities very easily threatening the life and liberty of the citizens.
x.
Mr. Dhankar also contended that 13 crore data of citizens was leaked from Pehchaan
database. It was also contended that recently an IIT passed graduate hacked into Pehchaan
database to use its data for his online payment App. The Petitioner claimed that most intimate
information/data demanded under Pehchaan scheme is integral to personality and hence
violation of right to life under Article 21 of the Mandian Constitution.
xi.
After hearing the matter in detail and going through the materials and documents submitted
by Petitioner and the Respondent, the High Court of Nelhi rejected the PIL and held that
Pehchaan Act, 2014 is constitutional and government can make the Pehchaan cards
mandatory. It further held that right to privacy is a common law right and right to deny
information to the government cannot he held to be fundamental right in the light of the
necessity to protect the state from terrorism and other security related problems.
xii.
The Petitioner has now filed a Special Leave Petition in Supreme Court of Mandia under the
provision of the Constitution of Mandia. He prayed for quashing the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court of Nelhi and to declare the Pehchaan Act, 2014 and previous policy of providing
Pehchaan cards as violative of various provisions of the Constitution. The case rests before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Mandia.
xi
ISSUES RAISED
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE

SUPREME COURT OF MANDIA IS MAINTAINBLE?
2. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO

COLLECTION OF DATA DOES NOT INFRINGE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
3. WHETHER THE PEHCHAAN ACT AND ITS NOTIFICATIONS ARE

ULTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA?
xii
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
OF M ANDIA IS MAINTAINABLE?
The present SLP filed before the Supreme Court is maintainable because firstly, the
jurisdiction of Supreme Court can always be invoked when a question of law of
general public importance arises and secondly, the current issue involves substantial
question of law and the HC erred in interpreting Right to Privacy as just a common
law right.
2. WHETHER T HE HIGH COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS

JUST A COMMON LAW RIGHT AND H OLDING T HAT COLLECTION OF DATA
DOES NOT INFRINGE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
The High Court erred in declaring right to privacy as just a common law right and
holding that collection of data does not infringe right to privacy as firstly, right to
privacy is not just a common law right but also a fundamental right. Secondly,
collection of intimate and personal data infringes right to privacy. Lastly, biometric
information stored is prone to be misused.
3. WHETHER THE PEHCHAAN ACT AND ITS NOTIFICATIONS ARE ULTRA VIRES TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA ?
The High Court of Nelhi erred in determining the Pehchaan Act, 2014 and the
notification dated 13th January 2015 as legally binding because firstly, the notification
dated 13th January, 2015 for making Pehchaan card mandatory is violative of the
Pehchaan Act, 2014. Secondly, the notification making Pehchaan card mandatory is
violative of Article 14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of Mandia. Thirdly, the Pehchaan
Act, 2014 is violative of the provisions of constitutional and statutory law. Lastly the
data stored is not safe under the Pehchaan scheme.
xiii
WRITTEN PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE SUPREME

COURT OF MANDIA IS MAINTAINABLE?
1.1. JURISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED WHEN A
QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE ARISES.
I. It is humbly submitted that the special leave petition filed by the Petitioner against the
judgment of Hon’ble high Court of Mandia [hereinafter as HC] is maintainable under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the jurisdiction of Supreme
Court [hereinafter as SC] under Article 136 can always be invoked when a question of
law of general public importance arises and even question of fact can also be a subject
matter of judicial review under Art.136. Also, the issues involves substantial question of
law and the HC erred in holding Right to Privacy as just a common law right.
II. The jurisdiction conferred under Art. 136 on the SC are corrective one and not a
restrictive one.2 A duty is enjoined upon the SC to exercise its power by setting right the
miscarriage of justice through the judgments is well-settled that injustice must not be
allowed to be perpetrated and failure by the SC to interfere with the same would amount
to allowing the illegality to be perpetuated.3 It has been held in plethora of cases that
when the question of law of general public importance arises, the jurisdiction of SC can
be invoked by filing special leave petition.4 In the present case, the issue involves matter
of General Public Importance and hence, entitled to be maintainable.
III. Moreover, the SC has imposed on itself a restriction that before invoking the jurisdiction
of this Court u/a 136, the aggrieved party must exhaust any remedy which may be
available under the law before the lower appellate authority or the HC.5 Here, the
petitioner has already exhausted the original jurisdiction of the HC by filing a writ u/a
226 of the Constitution of Mandia. It is further submitted before this Hon’ble Court that
SLP can be filed not only by the aggrieved party but also by a person who is not a party
to the case, but is adversely affected because of the decision of the HC.6 The SC has got a
2
Haryana State Industrial Corpn. vs. Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359.
3
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 65.
4
Ibid.
5
Nirma Ltd. vs. Lurgi Lentges Energietechnik, AIR 2002 SC 3695.
6
State of Uttaranchal vs. Sehnaz Mirza, (2008) 6 SCC 726.
1
plenary jurisdiction to grant leave and hear appeals against any order of the Court of
tribunal. This confers on the SC power of judicial superintendence over all Courts and
tribunals in India.7
IV. It has been held by this Hon’ble Court that when a question of law of general public
importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court, its jurisdiction can
always be invoked. Article 136 is the residuary power of the SC to do justice where the
Court is satisfied that there is injustice.8 The principle is that this Court would never do
injustice nor allow injustice being perpetrated for the sake of upholding technicalities. In
any case, special leave would be granted from a second appellant decision only where the
judgment raises issues of law of general public importance.9
1.2. A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW HAS ARISEN AND HAS CAUSED INJUSTICE NOT
ONLY TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY BUT ALSO TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE .
I. It is humbly submitted before the Court that the power given under Art. 136 is special or
residuary powers which are exercisable outside the purview of the ordinary law in cases
where the needs of justice demand interference by the Supreme Court.10 Leave will be
granted in cases where there is some violation of principles of natural justice, and where
substantial and grave injustice has been done.11
II. It is humbly submitted that the expression "substantial question of law"12 is not defined
in any legislation. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various
judicial pronouncements. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while explaining the
import of the said expression, observed that:
“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is
substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is
either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the
7
Delhi Judicial Service Association vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176.
8
C.C.E vs. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298.
9
Penu Balakrishna Iyer and Ors. vs. Sri Ariya M. Ramaswamy Iyer, AIR 1965 SC 195.
10
Union Carbide Corporation vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584.
11
Sanwant Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715.
12
Dale & Carrington Investment Ltd. vs. P.K. Prathapan, (2005) 1 SCC 212.
2
Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion
of alternative views.”13
III. It is further submitted that in the case of State of U.P vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd14, this
Court held that where the question raised is a pure question of law, leave has to be
granted. Leave is also granted where special or peculiar circumstances exist”.15 In
another case16 the Court was of the opinion that special leave will be granted when there
is uncertainty in law so far as the High Courts are concerned. Where it is a matter of
which gives rise to substantial question of law to know its rights under statue, i.e. where
the authority raises points as to its powers under the statue for its future guidance and
exercise and the question raised is of great importance leave may be granted.
IV. Moreover, the SC is not precluded from going into the question of facts under article
136, if it considers it necessary to do so.17 Article 136 uses the wording ‘in any cause or
matter’. This gives widest power to this Court to deal with any cause or matter.29 It is,
plain that when the SC reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with
arbitrarily or that a Court or tribunal has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no
technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts, or otherwise can stand
in the way of the exercise of this power.
V. It is submitted that, the present facts in issue satisfy all of the above mentioned criteria.
The case involves the matter of general public importance and it directly and
substantially affects the rights of the parties as the order is erroneous and prejudicial to
the interest of the citizens of India. Also, in the light of the facts that huge amount of
cases aroused under same facts and circumstances, it is submitted that the question is
indeed an open question.
13
Chunnilal Mehta vs. Century Spinning & M Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314.
14
State of U.P vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd, AIR 1977 SC 1132.
15
Sirpur Paper Mills vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, AIR 1970 SC 1520.
16
C.C.E vs. Venus Castings (P) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1568.
17
Kathi Raning Rawat vs. The State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123.
3
2. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO
COLLECTION OF DATA DOES NOT INFRINGE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
2.1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS NOT JUST A COMMON LAW RIGHT BUT ALSO A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.
I. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that there is no merit in the defence of
Union of Mandia that there is no right to privacy provided in any provision of the
Constitution of Mandia.18 Privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges
primarily from the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the
Constitution.19 It is unconscionable for any government in the contemporary world to
contend that privacy is not a fundamental right. It is part of liberty within the meaning of
that expression in Article 21. It was rightly observed in the case of R. Rajagopal vs. State
of Tamil Nadu20 that the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty
guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21.
II. Privacy is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from
State and non-state actors and allows the individual to make autonomous life choices
regarding the construction of her identity, not only in seclusion from others but in the
personal, familial, and social contexts.21 Though the right to privacy is a fundamental
right, the same is not absolute. However, the ability of the State to assume or exercise
any power that would impinge upon the right to privacy is limited. State intrusion can be
a reasonable restriction only if it has reasonable basis or reasonable materials to support
it.22
III. Furthermore, privacy constitutes the basic, irreducible condition necessary for the
exercise of ‘personal liberty’ and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The same
view was affirmed in the case of PUCL vs. Union of India23, where this Hon’ble Court
was of the opinion that they have no hesitation in holding that right to privacy is a part of
18
¶ 22, Moot Proposition.
19
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union Of India And Ors, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 996.
20
R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632.
21
Michel Rosenfeld, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 974 (1st Ed., Oxford University Press,
2012).
22
District Registrar and Collector vs. Canara Bank & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 496.
23
PUCL vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568.
4
the right to “life” and “personal liberty” enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted.
IV. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Right to Privacy has been expressly
declared as a Fundamental Right in the case of K.S Puttaswamy vs. Union of India24,
where the Court held that the right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right
to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by
Part III of the Constitution. Natural rights like privacy exist equally in all individuals,
irrespective of class, strata, gender or orientation. Not only Right to privacy but “several
unenumerated rights fall within Article 21 since personal liberty is of widest amplitude.25
V. It is further submitted that privacy has the nature of being both a common law right as
well as a fundamental right. Its content, in both forms, is identical. According to S. A.
Bobde, J.26 “Liberty and privacy are integrally connected in a way that privacy is often
the basic condition necessary for exercise of the right of personal liberty”. Every right
which is integral to the constitutional rights to dignity, life, personal liberty and freedom,
as indeed the right to privacy is must itself be regarded as a fundamental right. Therefore,
the HC erred in holding Right to privacy as just a common law right.
VI. Lastly, it is submitted that relying on the judgments in M.P. Sharma vs. Satish Chandra27
and Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P28 which had made certain observations that right to
privacy was not a guaranteed right‘ under Part III were premised on an understanding of
Part III as per the law laid down in A.K. Gopalan.29A.K Gopalan was specifically
overruled in R.C. Cooper v Union of India30, and thereafter further clarified to be so in
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India31. Thereafter, consistently for almost four and half
decades, this Hon‘ble Court has in a catena of judgments32 held that A.K Gopalan is bad
law.33 It is too late in the day to urge that the distinctive rights test of Gopalan ought to be
applied.
24
Supra 19.
25
Unni Krishnan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645.
26
Supra 19.
27
M.P Sharma vs. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300.
28
Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
29
A.K Gopalan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
30
R.C Cooper vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248.
31
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
32
M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
33
I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.
5
2.1.1. INDIA AND I NTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
I. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that recognition of privacy as a fundamental

constitutional value is part of India’s commitment to a global human rights regime.
Article 51 of the Constitution, which forms part of the Directive Principles, requires the
State to endeavour to “foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the
dealings of organized peoples with one another”. Article 12 of UDHR states:
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.34
II. Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted on 16
December 1979 and came into effect on 23 March 1976. India ratified it on 11 December
1977. Article 17 of the ICCPR provides thus:
“The obligations imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other
measures to give effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well
as to the protection of the right.”35
It is submitted that while acceding to the ICCPR, India did not file any reservation or
declaration to Article 17.
III. It is further submitted that under the ICCPR, States have an obligation to “respect”, i.e.
Government must not violate the right; “protect” i.e. Government must protect against
interference by private parties and “fulfill”, i.e. Government must take steps to realise the
right.
IV. Lastly, where the State infringes the right to privacy, there must be procedural guarantees
against abuse of such interference and the extent of such interference must be
proportionate to the need for such interference.36
34
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), (Sep. 4, 2017,
11:20 PM), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html
35
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, (Sep. 3, 2017, 02:30 AM), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html.
36
S. and Marper vs. United Kingdom, Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, Council of Europe: European
Court of Human Rights, 4 December 2008, (Sep. 4, 2017, 12:30 AM),
http://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,4937faae2.html.
6
2.2. COLLECTION OF INTIMATE AND PERSONAL DATA INFRINGES RIGHT T O PRIVACY.
I. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the HC erred in holding that the
right to deny information to the Government not being a fundamental right.37 There can
be no doubt that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be
denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior.38 If the
Court does find that a claimed right is entitled to protection as a fundamental privacy
right, a law infringing it must satisfy the compelling State interest test. Then the question
would be whether a State interest is of such paramount importance as would justify an
infringement of the right.39
II. It is submitted that in the case of Directorate of Revenue vs. Mohd. Nisar Holia40, it was
held that “An authority cannot be given an untrammelled power to infringe the right of
privacy of any person and was of the opinion that a person, if he does not break a law he
would be entitled to enjoy his life and liberty which would include the right to not to be
disturbed.” The said right cannot be curtailed “except according to procedure established
by law and therefore without any just and reasonable cause.
III. Privacy is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from
State and non-state actors and allows the individual to make autonomous life choices
regarding the construction of her identity, not only in seclusion from others but in the
personal, familial, and social contexts. Privacy expands or contracts depending on the
way the three basic variables of subject-matter, relations, and space present themselves in
the context of a concrete case.41
IV. Furthermore, in a digital age where people share all of their life on Facebook, Twitter,
WhatsApp and moreover they are constantly generating valuable data which can be used
by non-state actors to track their moves, choices and preferences, there arises a need for
data protection. In legal terms it is as basic as the fundamental right to life. The right to
privacy in this modern age emanate certain other rights such as the right of individuals to
exclusively commercially exploit their identity and personal information, to control the
37
38
PUCL vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399.
39
S.K Sharma, Privacy Law: A Comparative Study 99(1 st Ed., Atlantic, 1993).
40
Directorate of Revenue vs. Mohd. Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370.
41
Supra 21.
7
information that is available about them on the ‘world wide web’ and to disseminate
certain personal information for limited purposes alone.42
2.2.1. DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH RECORDS.
I. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the balance between transparency and
confidentiality is very delicate and if some sensitive information about a particular
person is made public, it can have a far-reaching impact on his/her reputation and
dignity.43 Without justifiable cause and a prevailing countervailing interest44 a
Government cannot compel its citizens to disclose such sensitive information viz.
diseases like AIDS, Cancer, Hepatitis-B, and details involving infertility in both males
and females.45
II. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that health records are important, private
documents, whose publication can lead to social embarrassment and worse. Even an
unauthorized parting of the medical records of an individual which have been furnished
to a hospital will amount to an invasion of privacy.46 The public disclosure of even true
facts, may amount to invasion of the right to privacy or the right to be let alone when a
doctor breaches confidentiality.47 In the case of Mr. X vs. Hospital Z48 it was observed
that disclosure of even true private facts has the tendency to disturb a person's tranquility.
Therefore it is contended that. In the words of Bhagwati, J., “Democracy should enable a
person to intelligibly exercise his right of making a choice49 and compelling a person to
disclose his medical condition would compromise with such right.
2.2.2. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REGARDING MARITAL LIFE.
I. It is further submitted before this Hon’ble Court that indirectly forcing an individual to
concede information about conjugality and number of spouses50 causes discomfort to an
individual. The Govt. here is trying to extract information not only about the citizen’s
42
Supra 19.
43
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1.
44
Supra 38.
45
46
Supra 19.
47
Malak Singh v State of Punjab and Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 420.
48
Mr. X vs. Hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 396.
49
Supra 31.
50
Supra 48.
8
marital life but details about the law under which the marriage was solemnized.51 A
person is not comfortable in sharing details about his personal life and making it
available to people or institutions. If a single parent or an unwed mother has to apply for
Pehchan card then her Right to Privacy would be violated as she would be compelled to
do so. It may generate many complexities in her and may even lead to psychological
problems52 if the child comes to know about his father and subsequently the father
refuses to acknowledge him.53
II. Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family
life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right
to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognizes the ability of the
individual to control vital aspects of his or her life.54 It is not the collection of data by the
Government which raises a concern but an absence of provable guarantees that the data
cannot be used for any purpose other than those that have been approved
.
2.2.3. LINKING O F PEHCHAAN WITH PAN CARDS AND BANK ACCOUNTS.
I. In the case of Ram Jethmalani vs. Union of India55 it was held that while the State could
access details of the bank accounts of citizens as an incident of its power to investigate
and prosecute crime, this would not enable a private citizen to compel a citizen to reveal
bank accounts to the public at large. In the present scenario the Govt. is compelling the
individuals to link not only their bank account with Pehchan card but PAN, Driving
licence and passports too.56 Details of bank accounts can be used by those who want to
harass, or otherwise cause damage, to individuals. Therefore, State cannot compel
citizens to reveal details of their bank accounts, either to receive benefits from the State
or to facilitate investigations, unless they have a proper law for protection of the same.
II. Government in furtherance to this has set up a deadline for linking Pehchaan with bank
account and asked every citizen to comply with it and non-compliance of which would
invite penal actions.57 Taking into consideration that revelation of the details of the bank
accounts of individuals without the establishment of a prima facie ground of wrongdoing
51
52
Supra 48.
53
ABC vs. The State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 10 SCC 1.
54
Supra 19.
55
Ram Jethmalani vs. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1.
56
57
9
would be a violation of the right to privacy58, therefore, this very act mandated under the
Pehchan scheme results in Privacy harms.
2.3. BIOMETRIC INFORMATION STORED IS PRONE TO BE MISUSED.
I. It is most respectfully submitted that, the biometric information is deemed to be sensitive

personal information.59 Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal
intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual
orientation. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognizes the ability of the
individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of
life are intrinsic to privacy.60 Informational privacy which reflects an interest in
preventing information about the self from being disseminated and controlling the extent
of access to information.61 This notion of privacy derives from the assumption that all
information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or
retain for himself as he sees fit.62
II. It is further submitted that an individual data like his name, address, telephone numbers,
profession, family, choices, etc. are often available at various places like schools,
colleges, banks, directories, surveys and on various websites. Passing of such
information without consent to interested parties can lead to intrusion in privacy like
incessant marketing calls. The main principles on privacy and data protection enumerated
under the Information Technology Act are defining data, civil and criminal liability in
case of breach of data protection and violation of confidentiality and privacy.63
III. Privacy protects liberty and that “privacy protection gains for us the freedom to define
ourselves and our relations to others”. This rationale understands the relationship
between liberty and privacy by stipulating that while liberty is a broader notion, privacy
is essential for protecting liberty. Recognizing a constitutional right to privacy is a
reaffirmation of the individual interest in making certain decisions crucial to one’s
personality and being.64
58
Supra 55.
59
§ 43A, Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000.
60
Supra 19.
61
Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 University of Pennysylvania Journal of Interntional Law 483,
566 (2017).
62
R. vs. Dyment, (1988) 2 SCR 417.
63
Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
64
Supra 19.
10
IV. It is humbly submitted before this Court that Pehchaan Act disallows individual access to
the biometric information that forms core of his unique ID65 which leaves no room to
verify whether biometrics have been recorded correctly or not in the first place.
[Arguendo] Moreover such process leaves open the possibility of fraudulently replacing
a person’s biometric identity and the enrolment operator could upload someone else’s
biometrics against another person.
V. [Arguendo] Lastly, biometric authentication can even be faked externally without any
software or hardware hack. Fingerprints can be copied from a variety of surfaces (even
from the surface of the scanner itself) and same is for iris image. A few rounds of trial
and error are all that would be needed to perfect the fraud. Biometric authentication is a
risky element in making of the Pehchaan card. Biometric identity once breached is
unusable for life. The penal provisions66 to punish anyone are immaterial here because
the damage has already been done. Therefore, it is contended that Pehchaan Act should
meet the necessary criteria and be implemented only if there is a guarantee of data
protection.
65
§ 28(5), The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014,
No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2014.
66
The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014, No. 18,
Acts of Parliament, 2014.
11
3. WHETHER THE PEHCHAAN ACT AND ITS NOTIFICATIONS ARE ULTRA
VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA?
3.1. THE NOTIFICATION DATED 13TH JANUARY, 2015 FOR MAKING PEHCHAAN CARD
MANDATORY IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PEHCHAAN ACT, 2014.
3.1.1. NOTIFICATION AGAINST THE INTENTION OF T HE LEGISLATURE .
I. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, the Pehchaan Act, 2014 has been
passed by the legislature which gives a choice to the citizens of Republic of Mandia to
enroll for the registration of Pehchaan Card as per the Section 8(2) (a)67 of the Aadhaar
Act, 2016. Further this shows the basic intention of legislature behind passing the
Pehchaan Act which was to make the registration discretionary at the instance of public,
as there is no mention of a compulsory registration in the impugned act and on the
website of NUIA.68 So, if an Aadhaar number is not assigned to an individual, the
individual shall be offered alternate and viable means of identification for delivery of the
subsidy, benefit or service69. Hence, in no case a person should be deprived to avail the
benefits of government services due to lack of Pehchaan Card.
II. It is most respectfully submitted that, the legislature cannot delegate its essential
'legislative functions which consist in the determination or choosing of the 'legislative'
policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. What is
permitted is the delegation of ancillary or subordinate functions, or, what is fictionally
called, a power to fill up the details70. Delegation of essential legislative function is
impermissible71. So, making Pehchaan mandatory is an exercise of essential legislative
function which can be interpreted from the preamble because the preamble is a key to
unlock the legislative intent72, which makes the process of registration a voluntary
process.
67
The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014, No. 18,
Acts of Parliament, 2014.
68
Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59.
69
§ 7, The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014, No.
18, Acts of Parliament, 2014.
70
Kunj Bihari Lal Butail vs. State of HP, (2000) 3 SCC 40.
71
Vasu Dev Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753.
72
State of Rajasthan vs. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77.
12
III. Further it most humbly submitted that, the Administrator will have no jurisdiction to
issue a notification which would have a permanent impact. The Administrator cannot
change the basic features of the law or act contrary to the 'legislative' policy73. A
delegated power to legislate by making rules "for carrying out the purposes of the Act" is
a general delegation without laying down any guidelines74; it cannot be so exercised as to
bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by
the provisions of the Act itself75. Hence this introduction of the mandatory provision is
nothing more than acting beyond the scope of the act; hence this notification is ultra-
vires of the act and is liable to be struck down.
3.1.2. NOTIFICATION AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST.
I. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, nothing can be read by implication where
the language is plain and unambiguous76. This goes in lines with the doctrine that “what
cannot be done directly, should not be done indirectly”77. So, the notification of the
government should stand disqualified because it is compelling everyone to register for
Pehchaan irrespective of their choice.
II. Moreover it is submitted that, the notification is also unreasonable and arbitrary as the
non-compliance of it leads to penal sanctions.78 This lies in the fact that the act nowhere
authorizes the Central Government to pass such an erroneous notification. Hence, it is
pleaded before this Hon’ble Court that this notification dated 13th January 2015 must be
stayed with immediate effect.
73
Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union vs. State of Kerela, (2006) 4 SCC 327.
74
Global Energy Ltd. vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2009) 15 SCC 570.
75
Supra 70.
76
Dayal Singh vs. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593.
77
Rashmi Rekha Thatoi vs. State of Orissa, (2012) 5 SCC 690.
78
13
3.2. THE NOTIFICATION MAKING PEHCHAAN CARD MANDATORY IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 14, 19 AND 21 OF CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA.
3.2.1. NOTIFICATION VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14.
I. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Article 14 is designed to prevent
discrimination.79. The twin test must be satisfied that is, classification must be found on
an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from
others.80 And the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act.81 The object of the act was to give a right of voluntary choice to the
citizens but making pehchaan mandatory through notification violates the object that is to
be achieved by the act. Thus, notification is violative of Article 14 as it discriminate
against persons who do not want to give their information or cannot make pehchaan
because they suffer from disability.
I. The notification of mandatory linking of pan card and bank account violates the freedom
of trade under article 19(1)(g) , to determine whether there has been violation of Article
19, the test of proportionality has to be determine which involves the means chosen to
achieve the “public interest” goals were themselves narrowly tailored; that is, Article
19(6) could not save a statute if it could be shown that some other method, which
infringed rights to a lesser degree, could achieve the same goal 82. As there are numerous
identity cards available for providing same benefit to the citizens. Hence, notification for
making Pehchaan mandatory is violative of Article 19 of Constitution of Mandia.
I. The mandatory notification violates Article 21 as it is against the personal autonomy of

the person which includes both the negative right of not to be subject to interference by
others and the positive right of individuals to make decisions about their life, to express
79
U.P.Power Corpn. Ltd vs. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008)10 SCC 139.
80
State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75.
81
Bidi Supply Co. vs. Union of India AIR 1956 SC 479.
82
Modern Dental College & Ors vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353.
14
themselves and to choose which activities to take part in self-determination is an integral
part of personal autonomy and self-expression and falls within the realm of personal
liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of Mandia.83
II. In furtherance to the above argument, it is submitted that, personal liberty has the
components of freedom of locomotion, right to privacy, right to marital and domestic life
and other residual rights.84 Importance of personal autonomy must be recognized in
aspects such as choice between remaining silent and speaking. An individual's decision
to make a statement is the product of a private choice and there should be no scope for
any other individual to interfere with such autonomy.85 Thus, disclosure of personal
information like marital status and domestic life violates Article 21 of the Constitution of
Mandia. Moreover, since the notification is discriminatory of certain class of people, fails
on test of proportionality in public interest and infringes the personal autonomy of a
citizen, hence violating the holy trinity consisting of “golden triangle”86.
3.3. THE PEHCHAAN A CT, 2014 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW.
3.3.1. PEHCHAAN IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14.
I. It is most respectfully submitted that the impugned act is also violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution of Mandia, because if power conferred by statute on any authority of the
State is vagrant and unconfined and no standards or principles are laid down by the
statute to guide87 and control the exercise of such power, the statute would be violative of
the equality clause88, because it would permit arbitrary and capricious exercise of power,
which is the anti-thesis of equality before law89. Similar is the situation in the Pehchaan
Act, 2014 which consists of various provisions where the impugned act resorts to the
notifications by the Central Government which are not supported by any principle or
83
National Legal Service Authority vs. Union Of India & Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 438.
84
Griswold vs. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
85
Selvi vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263.
86
Mohd. Arif vs. Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737.
87
Raichurmatham Prabhakar vs. Rawatmal Dugar, (2004) 4 SCC 766.
88
Punjab Dairy Development Board vs. Cepham Milk Specialities Ltd., (2004) 8 SCC 621.
89
Naraindas Indurkhya vs. State of M.P & Ors., (1974) 4 SCC 788.
15
provision within the act. Hence, such an arbitrary power must be struck down as violative
of Article 1490.
II. In furtherance to the above argument, it is most respectfully submitted that, the impugned
act leaves the ambit of Biometric Information91 at the mercy of notification by Central
Government, hence leaving it unclear as there are no guidelines to regulate the power
unlike the Demographic Information92 which has defined boundary. Further, in case of
deactivation of Pehchaan “an agency nominated by UIDAI” may conduct a field enquiry
and may hear the person affected93. These regulations do not even mention the
designation of an official who will conduct such an enquiry. As in the case of Sudhir
Chandra vs. Tata Iron and Steel Ltd.94, this Hon’ble Court held that, “equality before law
and granting absolute discretion to deny or grant a benefit is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of Mandia”, hence mandating an absolute discretion to the Authority shows
inherent error in the mentioned provisions which are liable to be struck down.
3.3.2. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19.
I. Moreover it is submitted that, the provisions of the impugned act are in violation with the
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Mandia. Right to freedom of speech and
expression has wider scope and it includes right to remain silent as a negative right.
Therefore, the Court in the case of Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala95 has recognised
the negative of a fundamental right as also a fundamental right. The petition has been
allowed on ground of violation of Article 19(1) (a) which guarantees freedom of speech
and expression, for violation of the right to remain silent by the impugned circular which
obligated otherwise.
II. In furtherance to the above argument, it is submitted that, the right to privacy has been
implied in Articles 19(1) (a) and (d) and Article 2196. So, an implicit part of privacy is the
right to choose what personal information of ours is to be released into the public space97.
90
Supra 22.
91
§ 2(g), The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014, No.
92
§ 2(k), The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014, No.
93
Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016, Notification 12th September, 2016.
94
Sudhir Chandra vs. Tata Iron and Steel Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1064.
95
Bijoe Emmanuel vs. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615.
96
Gobind vs. State of M.P [(1975) 2 SCC 148.
97
Supra 19.
16
According to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India98, it was held that Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution has been expanded to include the right to receive and disseminate
information. So, it must be noted here that, the impugned act cannot force the citizens to
disseminate information which otherwise, they don’t want to disclose, therefore violates
their freedom of speech and expression. Since the impugned act forms a golden triangle
99
by violating the Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of Mandia hence must be
declared unconstitutional.
3.3.3. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21.
I. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, the Pehchaan Act, 2014 is
violative of Article 21 as it infringes the Right to Privacy of an individual by asking his
personal information like fingerprints, iris scan, religion, details of life threatening
diseases, etc. The information mentioned above is treated as Sensitive Personal
Information100. Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the
sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation101. Privacy
also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and
recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life102.
3.3.4. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
I. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, disclosure of 'identity information' by an

officer of the rank of Joint Secretary or above without the consent of the individual
concerned103. It does not disclose as to how disclosure of 'identity information' will be
reversed once the disclosure is done and the same is going to be stored forever without
any legal mandate, as under the Identification of Prisoners Act 1920, biometric
measurements like fingerprints of prisoners are taken with the permission of Magistrate
98
Supra 31.
99
Supra 33.
100
§ 3 of Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Notification, 11th April 2011.
101
Supra 19.
102
Mukesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1.
103
§ 33, The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits And Services) Act, 2014, No.
17
and these records of the prisoners are destroyed on acquittal and after they have served
their sentence.104
3.4. THE DATA STORED IS NOT SAFE UNDER THE PEHCHAAN SCHEME.
I. It is most humbly submitted that, there are many instances where the data stored has been
leaked which raises a big question on the authenticity of the scheme. Further without
sufficient technology it would be a very premature step to go for the unique identification
scheme. The IIT graduate who hacked into the system for his Online Payment App is a
nightmare105. This shows the lack of technology to protect the highly sensitive data
collected by the government.
3.4.1. UNAUTHORIZED OUTSOURCING TO PRIVATE VENDORS .
I. It is submitted that, when Parliament has specifically appointed authority to discharge a

function, it cannot be readily presumed that it had intended that its delegate should be
free to empower another person or body to act in its place 106. So, the Central
Government’s total disregard to the fact that, the private authority appointed by the
government has outsourced its work without any authority, to private vendors who
worked for more than 5 years, since 2009 and no action has been taken against them by
the Government or the NUIA.
II. In furtherance to the above argument, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court
that, as per the maxim "Delegatus non potest delegare" which means in absence of any
power a delegatee cannot sub-delegate its power to another person107. Hence attracting
principle of excessive delegation108 since these private vendors have been working
without authority, so the data collected is not safe and it can be leaked by private
entities109, given that these authorities were unauthorized and no action was taken against
them, this shows a tacit consent by the government as the authority reserves an absolute
104
§ 7, Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1920.
105
106
Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. vs. ESI Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346.
107
Pramod K. Pankaj vs. State of Bihar, (2004) 3 SCC 723.
108
State of Bombay vs. Shivabalak Gaurishankar Dube, (1965) 1 SCR 211.
109
18
discretion to terminate the contract without assigning any reason110. This could be further
corroborated by the fact that, in 2014 Pehchaan Act provided a statutory basis to
NUIA111, hence acknowledging all its acts.
III. Moreover it is submitted that, the private authority had no power to further assign or
delegate any function of the Pehchaan Scheme without prior approval of the NUIA112.
So, this method of outsourcing in such a sensitive matter where personal information of
the citizens is involved must not be allowed there are prima-facie faults by the private
authority and in such a case the Petitioners most humbly prays the Court to put an
immediate stay on the centers where information is collected by these unauthorized
private vendors.
110
Bid for Selection of Enrollment Agencies for Implementation of UIDAI Aadhaar Project, Termination of
Agreement, (Sep. 5, 2017, 10:10 PM), https://www.utiitsl.com/UTIITSL_SITE/tenders/UTIITSL_6669.pdf.
111
112
Bid for Selection of Enrollment Agencies for Implementation of UIDAI Aadhaar Project, Standard Contract,
(Sep. 5, 2017, 10:10 PM), https://www.utiitsl.com/UTIITSL_SITE/tenders/UTIITSL_6669.pdf.
19
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the lights of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
 That, the present Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court of Mandia is
maintainable.
 That, Right to Privacy is also a Fundamental Right.
 That, the Collection of Data under Pehchaan Scheme infringes Right to Privacy.
 That, the Pehchaan Act is ultra vires to the Constitution of Mandia.
And pass any such order, other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
And for this, Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
20

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BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MANDIA

IN THE MATTERS OF:

MR. SATISH DHANKAR ...PETITIONER

UNION O F MANDIA ...RESPONDENT

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MANDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA, 1950

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix

ISSUES RAISED .....................................................................................................................xii

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.............................................................................................. xiii

WRITTEN PLEADINGS .......................................................................................................... 1

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE

1.1. J URISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED WHEN A

2. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO

2.1.1. INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS . ................................................... 6

2.2. COLLECTION OF INTIMATE AND PERSONAL DATA INFRINGES R IGHT TO

2.2.1. DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH RECORDS. ............................................................... 8

2.2.2. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REGARDING M ARITAL LIFE. ........................ 8

2.3. BIOMETRIC INFORMATION STORED IS PRONE TO BE M ISUSED. ......................... 10

3. WHETHER THE PEHCHAAN ACT AND ITS NOTIFICATIONS ARE ULTRA

3.1.1. NOTIFICATION AGAINST THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. ............... 12

3.1.2. NOTIFICATION AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST. ................................................. 13

3.2. THE NOTIFICATION MAKING PEHCHAAN CARD MANDATORY IS VIOLATIVE OF

3.2.1. NOTIFICATION VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14. ................................................. 14

3.2.2. NOTIFICATION VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19. ................................................. 14

3.2.3. NOTIFICATION VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21. ................................................. 14

3.3. THE PEHCHAAN ACT, 2014 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF

3.3.1. PEHCHAAN IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14. ................................................... 15

3.3.2. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19. ........................................... 16

3.3.3. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21. ........................................... 17

3.3.4. PEHCHAAN ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF S TATUTORY P ROVISIONS. ..................... 17

3.4.1. UNAUTHORIZED OUTSOURCING TO PRIVATE VENDORS. ............................. 18

AIR All India Reporter

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

N.C.T National Capital Territory

NUIA National Unique Identification Authority

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

SLP Special Leave Petition

u/a Under Article

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

A.K Gopalan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27................................................................ 18

1) Constitution of India, 1950.

BOOKS, ARTICLES & J OURALS

1) Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 University of Pennysylvania

On 30th November, 2009, the government of Mandia constituted National Unique

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE

2. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO

3. WHETHER THE PEHCHAAN ACT AND ITS NOTIFICATIONS ARE

2. WHETHER T HE HIGH COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS

THE CONSTITUTION OF MANDIA ?

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE SUPREME

1.1. JURISDICTION OF SC UNDER ARTICLE 136 CAN ALWAYS BE INVOKED WHEN A

QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE ARISES.

ONLY TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY BUT ALSO TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE .

I. It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that recognition of privacy as a fundamental

2.2.1. DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH RECORDS.

2.2.2. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REGARDING MARITAL LIFE.

2.3. BIOMETRIC INFORMATION STORED IS PRONE TO BE MISUSED.