LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL

1.) Imelda Marcos v Sandiganbayan

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division
denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Petitioner, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations
of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) now pending in the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these
cases, i.e., Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453, petitioner was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating §
3(g) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and was sentenced to suffer in each case imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of 9 years and 1 day as minimum to 12 years and 10 days as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public
office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which is pending resolution in the Sandiganbayan.

After her conviction in the two cases petitioner filed on December 24, 1993 a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests
and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in the People's Republic of China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening
medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines. Petitioner's motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan for failure of
petitioner to give notice to the prosecution and because the time asked (December 29, 1993) was too close for the court to inform itself
of the basis of the motion.

On December 29, 1993, petitioner filed in another case (Criminal Case No. 18742)1 an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel
Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. The motion was supported by Ambulatory BP Reports, Nuclear Medicine Reports
and Computed Tomography Scan Results prepared by her physician and cardiologist, Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, and other doctors at the
Makati Medical Center.

On January 4, 1994, petitioner filed In Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453 another "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad," to places
including the United States and Europe, "if necessary," for treatment of "hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and
anterior myocardial infarction." It was alleged that the tests needed were not available in the Philippines.

The Chairman of respondent court's First Division, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-
in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter,2 asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine," particularly on
the following questions:

1. Is [petitioner's] condition life-threatening?

2. What are the "sophisticated biochemical tests" necessary (not merely desirable), if any are needed at all, to ascertain and remedy
her condition?

3. Are these tests available here?

4. Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines adequate to respond to her condition?

The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestation interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on
humanitarian grounds provided that the accused comply with the terms and conditions for travel as may be imposed" by respondent court.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor,3 on the other hand, opposed the motions, contending that:

1. the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated;

2. no statement was made by the accused that medical equipment and facilities here were "sorrily" inadequate for the needs of the
movant;

3. the conviction of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 17450 and No. 17453 might motivate her not to return if she were to be
authorized to leave the country.

On January 7, 1994 hearing was held on petitioner's motion, during which petitioner presented Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio. After the hearing,
the Sandiganbayan informed the parties that a copy of petitioner's first motion and its supporting documents had been sent to Dr. Patacsil
for study and comment by a committee of cardiologists.

After consulting Dr. Anastacio, petitioner's counsel asked the court to include among the questions to the committee the following: "Without
the Biochemical test, may proper treatment be administered to Mrs. Marcos?" Petitioner's counsel also asked the court to include the list
of medicine being taken by petitioner as part of the study. These requests were granted by the court.

Thereafter, a "Supplement to the Motion for Leave Abroad" was filed on January 17, 1994 together with additional documents, consisting
of the following:

(a) a faxed letter from Dr. Denton A. Cooley of the Texas Heart Institute dated January 11, 1994;

(b) a letter dated May 9, 1990 from David B. Case, M.D. addressed to lawyer Gerry Spence;

(c) a letter dated May 23, 1990 from Dr. Vincent De Quattro of the University of Southern California Hypertension Diagnostic
Laboratory;

(d) two letters, both dated January 3, 1994 from China, one from the Tranjin Medical College, and another without letterhead from
one F.S. Tsui, both letters offering their facilities for diagnosis and treatment of hypertension and related illness through the "Classic Art
of Chinese Medical Technology."

On January 20, 1994, the Sandiganbayan received by FAX machine the report of the committee,4 containing findings which were contrary
to the conclusions of petitioner's physicians. The Presiding Justice immediately informed by phone petitioner's counsel, Attorneys Vicente
D. Millora and Manuel M. Lazaro, of the committee's report. Atty. Lazaro requested that a copy of the report be sent to him by FAX
machine, while Atty. Millora got his copy personally from the court.

On January 26, 1994, Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr. was heard by the court on his committee's report. Present at the hearing were the two
lawyers of petitioner and Dr. Anastacio.
On February 11, 1994, the court accepted petitioner's "Supplemental Motion to Travel Abroad" and heard the rebuttal testimony of Dr.
Roberto V. Anastacio, as well as the testimony of Dr. Jorge Garcia, heart surgeon from Washington, D.C., in support of petitioner's motion
to travel abroad.

On February 18, 1994 the court denied petitioner's motions. The dispositive portion of its resolution reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the judgment of this Court that the imperative necessity of the accused to undertake a trip abroad
for diagnosis and treatment has not been established and for this reason DENIES the various motions of accused Imelda R. Marcos to
leave for abroad.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." The
Clinical Summary was a recent medical report on petitioner's condition after she had undergone another medical examination at the
Philippine Heart Center5 Petitioner also filed a "Motion to Admit Recognizance in Support of, and to Resolve Soonest, the Motion for
Reconsideration to Travel Abroad." Attached to the motion were letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for
the return of petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives6 requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad.

In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit even as it expressed
disapproval of the intervention of the Vice President and the twenty four congressmen and warned them and petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez, that "repetition of any attempt to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of [respondent
court] will be responded to appropriately."

Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the resolutions dated February 18, 1994 and April 19, 1994 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that

1. [The Sandiganbayan] arbitrarily disregarded or misinterpreted the testimonies, medical findings and recommendations of
petitioner's attending physicians and relied on or substituted them with the academic views of Dr. Abarquez and the Committee, who
never examined or treated personally the petitioner, and erroneously concluded "that the necessity for trip abroad by the accused for
diagnosis and treatment has not been established";

2. It adopted an unusual and unorthodox conduct of trial as demonstrated by the following: (a) it motu propio contacted a third party
asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings; (b) it unusually participated in the examination of petitioner's
witnesses; (c) thru its PJ, it presented as own witness; (d) it requested the formation of a committee to study the evidence presented; (e)
it did not decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented; (f) it decided on the basis of evidence (academic) it sought;

3. It failed to resolve that, in the clash between basic constitutional rights of the petitioner and the authority of the court over the
petitioner, the basic constitutional rights must prevail;

4(a). It considered the conviction of petitioner in two (2) criminal cases which are pending reconsideration as factors in denying the
rights of petitioner to life, health and liberty and depriving the penumbras of such right to give life and substance;

4(b). Respondent court violated the cluster of rights of "personhood", "privacy" or "personal liberty".

5. It perceived that there is no "imperative necessity" for petitioner to avail of medical examination and treatment abroad not
withstanding that such perception/conclusion cannot constitute a cause to deny or deprive petitioner of her constitutional rights, nor can
it refute the medical findings of petitioner's attending physicians.

Called upon to comment, the Solicitor General, in representation of the prosecution in the criminal cases, contends that respondent court
acted properly in seeking the advice of medical experts in regard to petitioner's motion to travel; that in any event petitioner is estopped
from questioning the referral of her medical condition to other experts by agreeing to submit additional questions for their consideration;
and that the right to life is not absolute but must be balanced by the State's right to prosecute and enforce the judgments of its courts,
and that petitioner's conviction in two cases is relevant along with "humanitarian and equity" considerations.

The question for decision is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's request to travel abroad for
medical treatment. After due consideration of the parties' arguments, we find that it did not.

Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not
be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. The subject lay beyond
its competence and since the grant of the request depended on the verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a medical
condition that was alleged to be serious and life threatening, the respondent court, we think, followed the only prudent course available
of seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field.

Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law,
there is no reason for denying them assistance on other subjects. Presiding Justice Garchitorena's letter to Dr. Patacsil is notable in this
regard for its sedulous concern for "greater need for information and expert advise" to the end that respondent court may be able to
determine "whether or not it is necessary and urgent for petitioner to travel abroad."

What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
deciding a case against them. Then the parties could justifiably complain that their right to due process has been violated. But, in this
case, everything was on the level, with the parties taking part in the proceedings of the court.

At all events if petitioner did not agree to the procedure adopted by the court, her counsel should have objected when informed by the
court on January 7, 1994 that it had referred Dr. Anastacio's report to the Philippine Heart Center for advice and opinion. Counsel did not
object. Instead, after consulting Dr. Anastacio, he requested the court to submit additional questions for referral to the Philippine Heart
Center and later took part in cross examining Dr. Abarquez, Jr. when the latter testified. Petitioner is thus estopped from questioning what
she now calls the "unusual and unorthodox" manner of resolving her request for permission to travel abroad.

Now, if the respondent court disregarded the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physician, it was because in light of the report
of the panel of experts which reviewed the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physicians, petitioner failed to prove the necessity
for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two
of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the
country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical
treatment in foreign countries.7

Nor is there warrant for the claim that respondent court acted arbitrarily in disregarding the findings of petitioner's physicians and relying
on the opinion of specialists from the Philippine Heart Center because the latter did not personally examine her and for that reason their
opinion is allegedly "academic." The question raised by petitioner's motion was not whether petitioner was suffering from a serious and
life threatening medical condition. Rather the question before the Sandiganbayan was whether on the basis of reports attached to the
motions for travel there was evidence to show that she was suffering from such ailments (i.e., coronary artery disease and labile
hypertension) and there was need for diagnostic tests which could only be performed abroad. Consequently, it was unnecessary for the
Philippine Heart Center's specialists to examine the petitioner personally. Given the findings of petitioner's own physicians, they found
that petitioner had not been shown to be suffering from coronary artery disease and uncontrolled high blood pressure (labile hypertension).

The claim that petitioner is suffering from a life threatening medical condition is based on a letter dated November 4, 1993 of Dr. Roberto
V. Anastacio, cardiologist at the Makati Medical Center, to Dr. Jorge M. Garcia, heart surgeon of the Washington Heart Institute at
Washington D.C., recommending diagnostic tests abroad for petitioner. In his letter (marked Annex B of petitioner's first "Motion for Leave
to Travel Abroad") Dr. Anastacio claimed that petitioner complained of chest pains; that she had an uncontrolled high blood pressure with
"a spread of 200/100-100/70;" that the ambulatory blood pressure monitoring device showed her highest systolic BP to be from 184 to
204 mmHg at 6 P.M., 1:35 A.M. and 3 A.M., and her highest diastolic pressure to be 120 mmHg; that an Electrocardiogram indicated a
myocardial infarction; that an Exercise-HexaMibi Tc-99m myocardial perfusion imaging showed an "abnormal myorcardial injury in the
anterior region." Dr. Anastacio concluded:

Definitely, we have established that Mrs. Marcos is suffering from a dangerous level of rises in blood pressure provoked by high level of
emotional stress and now complicated with a strong evidence of myocardial injury.

Her significant family history of hypertension in her father and siblings (eldest sister and brother) and that indeed two of them have
experienced sudden cardiac death as complicating manifestations of uncontrolled high blood pressure of this type place this patient in
the high risk category of sudden cardiac death. (Emphasis added)

He recommended:

Definitely, Mrs. Marcos should undergo immediate studies [abroad] to define the following:

1. To investigate invasively (Coronary Arteriogram) to correlate the severity of coronary obstruction and the recent development of
myocardial infarction in relation to sudden cardiac death.

2. To do biochemical studies at the same time e.g. Continuous-Serial Vasopressine-Arginine and Catecholamine level
determination in relation with her uncontrolled high, dangerous level of high blood pressure not only in the stratification of her "Sudden
Death" risk staging but likewise, equally important is the control of her uncontrolled high blood pressure.

3. The observed sensitiveness to the drugs administered, makes drug therapy risky without a concomittant close monitoring of the
hemodynamic and biochemical parameters which will help avert a possible iatrogenic, fatal cardiovascular event.

Based on these findings, Dr. Roman F. Abarquez, Jr., Dr. Homobono B. Calleja and Dr. Romeo A. Divinagracia, however, found the
diagnosis of "definite coronary artery disease" to be "questionable" for the following reasons:

1) The location and character of the chest pain (sharp pain lasting for a few seconds left mid axillary and not related to effort) is not
the common presentation of pain due to coronary artery disease (angina pectoris).

2) The Stress Test done during the Thallium Scan was adequate (maximum predicted heart rate of 106%) and yet was negative
for ischemia.

3) The Thallium Myocardial imaging (Nuclear scan) showed only a small questionable perfusion defect on the anterior wall. It can
also be considered as a false positive finding due to soft tissue artifacts as mentioned in the report. (Emphasis added)

In fact the finding that petitioner did not have ischemia8 and that there was only a small perfusion defect on the anterior wall which could
be considered a "false positive finding" is based on petitioner's own nuclear medical report.9 prepared by the Makati Medical Center,
which contains the following conclusions:

CONCLUSIONS: ABNORMAL MYOCARDIAL PERFUSION IMAGING. EVIDENCE FOR PRIOR MYOCARDIAL INJURY IN THE
ANTERIOR REGION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FOR STRESS INDUCED MYOCARDIAL ISCHEMIA.

ALTHOUGH THESE FINDINGS ARE SUGGESTIVE OF CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE, PHOTON ATTENUATION SECONDARY TO
SOFT TISSUE ARTIFACTS CAN BE EXCLUDED.

As to the ambulatory blood pressure monitor reports, the Abarquez panel noted:

The diagnosis of hypertensive heart disease is questionable. Mrs. Marcos has transient (labile) hypertension. In the ambulatory BP
monitoring records — there were only 2 transient rises of elevated systolic pressure and 3 episodes of elevated diastolic pressure. 5
episodes of transient systolic BP elevation and 5 episodes of transient elevated diastolic pressure occurred in the 2nd ambulatory
recording. The patient did not submit a diary during both occasions when her ambulatory BP recording was performed.

A patient is considered to have sustained hypertension if 30% or more of the recorded blood pressures on ambulatory monitoring are
hypertensive levels. The term hypertensive heart disease is used to denote heart involvement due to effects of long standing (chronic)
hypertension. There is no evidence in the medical brief to show that there is left ventricular hypertrophy or left ventricular dysfunction. In
fact, the previous echocardiogram was reported to be normal.

For this reason the committee questioned the need for petitioner to have biochemical tests abroad. Even without these tests, it noted, Dr.
Anastacio had "already been treating her with medicines that are used for hypertension and coronary heart disease."

With respect to Dr. Anastacio's claim that petitioner is in the high risk group of sudden cardiac death, the committee stated that a history
of sudden death in the family alone will not support such a conclusion:
The known direct determinants for sudden cardiac death are: (1) ventricular electrical instability (ventricular arrhytmias), (2) extensive
coronary artery narrowing, (3) abnormal left ventricular function, (4) electrocardiographic conduction and repolarization abnormalities.

In the absence of the above factors for sudden cardiac death, the presence of a family history of sudden cardiac death alone cannot
stand as a strong argument for a high risk of sudden cardiac death. Even the family history of sudden cardiac death in this case is still
questionable since we are not furnished with definite evidence that the said members of the family actually died of sudden death.

In summary, the evidence submitted do not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group for sudden cardiac death.
(Emphases added)

The group made the following conclusions and recommendations:

RECOMMENDED TESTS:

1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the
disease.

2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardlography — to demonstrate the presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.

3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.

CONCLUSIONS:

1) The diagnosis or significant coronary heart disease is not confirmed from the brief presented.

2) Marcos has transient elevation of blood pressure" which be reactive to situations but there is no evidence to indicate the presence
of hypertensive heart disease.

3) The tests we have recommended are available in the Philippines. Proper treatment can be given to Mrs. Marcos even in the
absence of the suggested biochemical tests. (Emphasis added)

4) The present facilities and expertise in the Philippines are more than adequate to diagnose and treat patients with hypertension
and/or coronary heart disease. (Emphasis added)

Dr. Abarquez, Jr. testified on January 26, 1994 on the report of his committee. Dr. Anastacio was present at that hearing, but he did not
refute Dr. Abarquez, Jr.'s conclusions. Instead it appears that he performed the tests recommended by the committee, namely:

1) Coronary Angiography — to definitely establish the presence or absence of coronary artery obstruction and severity of the
disease.

2) 2-D Echo Doppler Echocardiography — to demonstrate the presence of ventricular dysfunction or hypertrophy.

3) Ambulatory Holter Monitoring — to find out whether serious arrhythmias (irregularities of heart beat) are present or not.

The results, as the Sandiganbayan said in its resolution, were:

Dr. Roberto Anastacio, accused Marcos' attending physician, appears to have subsequently subjected accused Marcos to another set of
tests during her latest confinement at the Makati Medical Center, principally the Echo Doppler Test and the Holter 24-hour monitoring
test.

The 2-D Echo Doppler test, which the Committee of Cardiologists recommended was administered on February 1, 1994 (Exhibit "D-
Supplemental") and all findings read normal.

Dr. Anastacio said that the handwritten notes of Drs. Dy and Lapitan who had read the results of the Ambulatory Hotter Monitor, i.e., an
ambulant electrocardiogram, and the readings did not show that there was anything wrong with accused Marcos. In fact, the readings
themselves said that the average pulse rate was at 68 beats per minute (from 50 to 134) no blockages, no PVCs, no PACs, no indication
of arrythmia.

It would appear that earlier on January 31, 1994, petitioner had also undergone electrocardiogram tests at the Makati Medical Center in
which cardiologists are rotated to do the readings. Dr. Esperanza Cabral found the electrocardiogram results to be "Normal." The results
of the echocardiogram were read by another cardiologist, Dr. Adoracion Nambuyan-Abad, and her finding was approved by Dr. Benjamin
N. Alimurong. The results were also "Normal."

Although Dr. Anastacio subsequently conducted another electrocardiogram test on petitioner and found the existence of myocardial
infarction, as the Sandiganbayan noted, Dr. Anastacio's finding was not read or concurred in by another cardiologist, contrary to the
procedure followed at the Makati Medical Center.10 It is, therefore, also questionable.

The evidence submitted to it, according to the Abarquez committee, "[did] not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk
group of sudden cardiac death." Perhaps the best proof that she is not in the group is the fact that she ran in the last election for a seat
in the House of Representative and won. It may be assumed that she waged an arduous political campaign but apparently is none the
worse for it.

Considering the foregoing we cannot say that respondent court trifled with petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed right to life, health and
liberty. What petitioner denounces as the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it
would seem, from the latter's robust and rather active personality rather than to any ill motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner,
the latter's counsel or her witnesses. It is matter of record that on three different occasions, petitioner had been permitted to travel abroad.
But her later conviction in two cases dictated the need for greater caution. To be sure, conviction is not yet final view of a motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner. But a person's right to travel is subject to the usual contraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian
reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion.
The active intervention of respondent Presiding Justice in the trial the case was justified by the fact that the subject with which the court
was dealing was a highly technical one and he wanted to clarify for himself a number of medical question. That a judge has the power —
if not indeed a duty — to do this teaching of People v. Obngayan; 11

There are obviously certain rights to the trier of facts due to the nature of (a judge's) function. Among these is the right to question a
witness with a view to satisfying his mind upon a material point which present itself during the trial as to the credibility of such witness.

This Court quoted the following from Justice Labrador's opinion Ventura v. Judge Yatco: 12

While judges should as much as possible refrain from showing partiality to one party and hostility to another, it does not mean that a trial
judge should keep mum throughout the trial and allow parties to ask the questions that they desire, on issues which they think are the
important issues, when the former are improper and the latter, immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must take a leading part
therein, by directing counsel to submit the evidence on the facts in the dispute by asking clarifying questions, and by showing an interest
in a fast and fair trial. Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the result of a game; they should
have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to point at issue
that are overlooked, directing them to ask the question that would elicit the fact on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, etc. Unless they take an active part in trials in the above form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions whether
pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the speedy administration of justice which is the aim of the Government and of the people
cannot be attained. Counsel should, therefore, not resent any interest that the judge takes in the conduct of the trial, they should be glad
that a trial judge takes such interest and help in the determination of truth.

The active participation of respondent court in examining petitioner's witnesses in the case merely indicated the court's deep concern
with the truth of petitioner's medical condition.

What perhaps should have been done was for petitioner to request an examination of her medical condition by a joint team of cardiologist
and other medical experts instead of having the findings of her physician reviewed by the other specialists. A joint investigation will have
the advantage of not being unduly adversarial since the purpose is the common objective of arriving at a consensus among the experts.

It is not late for the petitioner to ask for this. She can file another motion before the Sandiganbayan. This observation is made because
after the petitioner in the case had been filed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to travel, this time on the ground that she is suffering from
a difficult type of glaucoma which threatens to make her blind. Her motion is supported by a medical certificate of Dr. Manuel B. Agulto,
opthalmologist and glaucoma expert, who recommends that petitioner see Dr. Richard J. Simmons of Boston, Massachusetts, and avail
herself of his "internationally renowned expertise and recognized authority in this particularly difficult glaucoma type." 13 Dr. Agulto's
certificate states:

This certifies that above patient has been treated by the undersigned by since 1980 for Low Tension Glaucoma which was initially
diagnosed by Richard J. Simmons, M.D. of Harvad Medical School and New England Glaucoma Research Foundation of Boston,
Massachussetts.

Since then the patient has been monitored closely to prevent irreversible visual field and acuity loss. Lately we have noted a progression
of her visual field changes.

Latest pertinent clinical findings (as of April 19, 1994) include the following:

Corrected Vision: 20/20, Jaeger 1

Automated Visual field: positive paracentral depression, both eyes (April 11, 1994, copies of result appended)
Tensions: (Diurnal Range) 13-15mm Hg, right eye
13-16mm Hg, left eye
Disc: Cupping of 0.6-0.7, both eyes

Remarks:

We suggest that the patient see her primary eye physician in Boston so as to avail herself of his internationally renowned expertise and
recognized authority in this particularly difficult glaucoma type.

Considering the irreversible nature of glaucoma blindness and the documented progression of her field changes plus additional and
strong clinical evidence of the unrelenting course of visual loss as was recently documented in a younger brother and patient, Alfredo T.
Romualdez, who was recently declared legally blind from the same familial glaucoma, we urge Mrs. Marcos who is much older and
therefore at greater risk, to consult immediate Dr. Simmons so as to delay if not prevent the onset of very real and absolute blindness.

This motion should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan not only because whether petitioner should be allowed to leave the country is its
primary concern but also because the determination of petitioner's eye condition is question of fact to be made in the first instance by the
Sandiganbayan. The court should order a joint examination of petitioner's eye condition and resolve her motion accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner
still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of
medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.

Petitioner's motion for leave to travel for medical treatment of her alleged failing eyesight is hereby referred to the Sandiganbayan with
directive to the latter to appoint a joint panel of eye specialists as outlined above.

SO ORDERED.

2.) Yap vs CA

The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.

For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City[1]
and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in
addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.[2] He
filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17, 1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the
Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the
area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant.[3] Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of his right
against excessive bail.

The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals[4], issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General; thus,
its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal is hereby
GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million
Five Hundred Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz.:

(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court;

(2) The Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold departure order against accused-appellant;
and

(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its
return;

(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellants bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his
immediate arrest and confinement in jail.

SO ORDERED.[5]

A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution
issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail for the provisional liberty of petitioner pending
appeal in the amount of P5.5 million.

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner on his
civil liability.

The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioners constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions
for the grant of bail.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges
the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private
complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the
accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the
maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the
amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case.[6]

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing
the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and
the gravity of the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to
civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case
petitioner is released on bail, it having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left
the country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that petitioner used different names
in his business transactions and had several abodes in different parts of the country.

As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court of Appeals requires is notice in case
of change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioners right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of
residence during the pendency of the appeal.

Petitioners case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. --- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.[7]

There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to petitioner on appeal.
Respondent court stated that it was doing so for humanitarian reasons, and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioners
admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to
peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.

The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.[8] The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case
of De la Camara vs. Enage,[9] is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor
vs. Abao,[10] this Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the
latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable
conditions.

xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant
sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality,
such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that
any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced
as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required
could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically
that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words
of Justice Jackson, a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a paupers will. xxx[11]

At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the
setting of the amount of bail:

(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded
from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the
person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.[12] In the present case, where petitioner was
found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport
and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk
of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of
residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find
that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,[13] or whenever so required by the court[14] The amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.[15] To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit
the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because
bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court.

At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioners submission that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail
Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the
amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail
Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the
courts, merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the
enforcement of criminal laws.[16] Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide
due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice.[17] This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in
petitioners case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is
dictated by the circumstances.

It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear
that although the grant of bail on appeal in non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused
exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail,
or his bail previously granted should be cancelled.[18] In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact
convicted by the trial court.[19] In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Franciscos disquisition on why bai l should be
denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that
the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if
liberated on bail than before conviction. xxx [20]

Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount
of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --- the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
allowed by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations
and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified
as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner,
we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.

Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place
of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case
he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted
by the court which issued the order.[21] In fact, the petition submits that the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient
guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary.[22]

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision.[23]
The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned
condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioners bail pending appeal is reduced from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

3.) Marcos v Manglapus

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility
of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as
the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p,
443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of
citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the
Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider
its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene
M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from
implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as
to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return',
including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses'
incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be
denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that
there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling
reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which t he
Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic
effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the
return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal,"
claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be
brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department
and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S.
Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander
Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it
in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language
of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted
that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal
articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity
with other parts of the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the
Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power
was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct
expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of
inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution
are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is
implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the
stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should
not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that
in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the
1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied.
Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the
present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this
decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

4.) Manotoc v CA

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities,
Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-
position in said business, but acts as president of the former corporation.

Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the
United States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The
petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a
Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a
management committee was organized and appointed.

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then Commissioner of
Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on
February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate
criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities,
Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542
to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities."1 The prosecution opposed
said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:

Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all embracing ground that his trip is ... relative to his business
transactions and opportunities.

The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed
trip.

In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated
.2

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:

6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety
companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was
the Court which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not
to return.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED. 3

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's
memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9
and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.

On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition
to which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.7 In
his motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of foreign investment in
Manotoc Securities, Inc."8 He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of
Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be
involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the ground that after
verification of the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities,
Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner,
instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that petitioner was
president and to substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984, the
Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 12

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and
Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to
put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. 13

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes
will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines
they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the
custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been
regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the
principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state.14

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely
derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact,
this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-
R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:
... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not limit such
undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable
if the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all,
liberty operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law
or jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country.

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and generalized
statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail
does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessity
for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she
would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:

A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to
the United States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities. From the tenor
and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto.
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that
the alleged business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's
absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any
showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his
surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the
assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any
proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety
on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his
assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases,
or to permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale
behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the
consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission
to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the
appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail
bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision.

Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court finds that no gainful purpose will be
served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

5.) Silverio v CA

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the
Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside.

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-
6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent
ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone
abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel
Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country.
This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has
not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court"
(Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on
30 July 1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide the case.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous,
claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding
that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public
safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the
filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-
appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and
conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be
arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason
for accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;

2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person before the Court;

3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the
same reason –– failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long
been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner
would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for
arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to travel can be
impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest
had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having
been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so
required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A
person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional
Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of
a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode
within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision.1âwphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof
reads:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.

The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health (Article IV, Section 5).

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security,
public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without
Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive
phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently,
the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there
was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs.
Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all
means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court
or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer
(Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an
accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained
unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation
of that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court
when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were
to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case
within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines.
It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused
holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.

SO ORDERED.

6.) DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v VASQUEZ

Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as
will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof.

The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and perspective of
our disposition of this matter, thus:

1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with
the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1

3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:

xxx xxx xxx

3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time,
her injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot
for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . .

4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having
placed herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further seeks
leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly
accepted, and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing
of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.

Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional
liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her
physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other
legal fees.4

5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita,
Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty.
Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5

6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the
accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy
clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991.6

7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty
upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions
of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless.7

8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and
a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with
Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46),
and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining
the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This
Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991,
was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any
remedial right to meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the
Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through
counsel.8

10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the
temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in
this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.

11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner which
reads as follows:

Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad
for study purposes, considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992,
although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been
arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed,
all of which were overtaken by a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991,
the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure
of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court.10

The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United
States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption.

In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:

1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure
order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when
it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court.

3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined
not only in the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent
criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.

4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing circumstances which suggest political harassment and
persecution.

5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her characteristic transparency and candor, there is no
reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes.11

I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither
been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court
and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended
to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired
by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.13

In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing
of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein
she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes
of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be
duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot
now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had
earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt
No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further
buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her
provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and
necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance
which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond,
thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the
cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from
her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand
on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.

II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order despite
the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle
of judicial comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more reason
should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the tempo rary
restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.

It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing
of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined
from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention
which is bereft of merit.

Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall
not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of
a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency
of an appeal,14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale
therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend
the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.15

It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final.16 A
dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution.18
Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction.19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial
power.20

The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:

. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction
continued the injunction in force. The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting
opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on
notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or
court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can,
by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this
court." . . . Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a
construction unless absolutely shut up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . .21

This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent vintage:

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not
premature, despite the petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court
of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc
resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22

On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and the lifting of
the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against
herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in
our resolution dated September 10, 1992.

Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction
over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no
reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.

The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory
powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case
pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.23 The
inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no
impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the
principal action.

III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of
speech.

First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there
was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero
motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them.24 These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction;25
or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts,26 as well as to the due administration of justice;27 or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers;28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in
the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing
out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction.30 Such being the case,
with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud
on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done
depends upon the particular circumstances. 31

Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every
intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan
in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in
justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent
power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient justification
for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may
be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at
the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency
of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,32 to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of
the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to
put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):

. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security,
public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without
Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive
phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently,
the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there
was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v.
Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all
means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer
(Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.33

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold
departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate
conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the
present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the
appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application
for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be inv oked
through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.

WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.