EN BANC which the DENR-NCR approved for a "facilitation cost" of ₱500,000.
00; second, get a favorable MMDA
A.C. No. 8380 November 20, 2009
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client.
The Facts and the Case
The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of
respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a
dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was
the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.
In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents
he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given ₱500,000.00 on
top of his attorney’s fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." He in turn
promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done.
On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the
property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to
approve it and that the documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he
unjustifiably failed to comply despite his client’s repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce,
prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the
₱500,000.00 it gave him.
On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his
services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the ₱500,000.00. But the letter could not be
served because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found
his new address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did
not return the money asked of him.
In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses
of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the University’s application for a survey plan
endorsement for a "facilitation cost" of another ₱500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by
the Land Registration Authority for a "facilitation cost" of still another ₱500,000.00.
Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a
favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar
Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna
allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later,
Mijares said, he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacuna’s instruction.
Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an
identical application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld
this fact from him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have
difficulty recommending approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the
previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it.
Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but
they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him only
₱45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the University’s conformity that he gave the ₱500,000.00 to
Lacuna.
The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the
complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and
adduce evidence in his defense.
On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation1 in the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Phillippines’ Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not
authorize Mijares to give ₱500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares
had been unable to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted
under oath having bribed a government official.
Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon
15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the ₱500,000.00
and all the pertinent documents to the University; and c) that Mijares’ sworn statement that formed part
of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for
prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna.
On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but modifying the penalty from
disbarment to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the
₱500,000.00 and all pertinent documents to the University within six months from receipt of the Court’s
decision.2
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape
misappropriating the ₱500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating up.1avvphi1
and processing the titling of a property that it claimed.
The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBP’s recommendation that the Court include in its
The Court’s Ruling decision an order directing Mijares to return the ₱500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The
University knowingly gave him that money to spend for "facilitation" and processing. It is not naïve.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer There is no legitimate expense called "facilitation" fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money.
for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; The Court will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful money lost in a bad deal.
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.3 WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18,
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT.
promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere He is, in addition, directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his
trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that possession covering the titling matter that it referred to him.
they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately
to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the
violation of the trust reposed on him.4 A lawyer’s conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.
violation of professional ethics.5
SO ORDERED.
Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on
record that the Court can consider is the University’s evidence that he got ₱500,000.00 from
complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return
the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA
approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated
demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and
the IBP Board of Governors.

Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the same
does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the
University’s conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that,
in a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it
turned out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the University’s earlier application and
the Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement.

But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that it had
no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead,
Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could
not return the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the
University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a
dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces.

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to act
favorably on his client’s application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court
is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of
 EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012
AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed on March 3, 1993
by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes,
conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated September 29, 2008
to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution dated December 11, 2008.
In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal transmitted to the
Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of Resolution4 and the records of the case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to
represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno
paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him
P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer
fee paid.
Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several
occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would
allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they
would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately
sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988, because
the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored
television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse
party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to
comply with the court’s directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from
her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision
against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Rañeses told her
that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty. Rañeses
actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about
her discovery and showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge of
the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his client for money
to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly asked her to deliver a telegram from
Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare
P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909
that was then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her (Bueno’s) presence,
Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but Atty. Rañeses refused to issue one,
telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received from them.
Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the
hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,[7] on May 11, 20008 and on October 2,
2000.9 During the hearing on October 2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order10 declaring Atty.
Rañeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and
Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty. Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his
motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior
commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting
papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of substantial justice,
Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 200012
Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing, Commissioner
Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty. Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a copy of
the complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He
stated that if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution after
the complainant submits her memorandum.13
Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day, Commissioner Gonzaga
declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant’s submission of her
memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled another hearing
on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel were present. The Commissioner
noted that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting
because he had prior commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed an
answer and the case had already been submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner De los Reyes issued
an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence and her documentary evidence,
together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any formal offer, nor
did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as attachments to her complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses
be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications that she
indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed
been negligent in pursuing her case. Without these documents, which are not difficult to procure from
the courts, Commissioner Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations
which could not support a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited money to bribe
judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge
is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her
affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim before the investigating
commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and
Supporting Papers" that he did not receive the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt
card evidencing his receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for failure to maintain his
personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the practice of law.19
The Court’s Ruling
The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the practice of law in
accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and based on our own observations and
findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients with
competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him
liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them."20 A client is entitled to the benefit of all remedies
and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or
defenses.21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an appellant’s brief
amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court even found the respondent lawyer
guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of
appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Because
of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and
to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted by
Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with court documents that she could
have easily procured. This omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove
Atty. Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable
decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and persistently called his residence to
convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The Court found that the respondent lawyer therein
violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain
from any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing, the
court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a
fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are
exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically
disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices
given him about the case.
While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating Commissioner
found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion.
As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in
secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo
Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings
held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has not even
seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in
this investigation.25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his propensity
for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty.
Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact
and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a
lawyer’s relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is
false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent
because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the
judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through
deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses
grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the
Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow
offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their
clients and the general public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters
given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to
ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sps. Emilio and Alicia Jacinto Vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr.;
A.C. No. 8494; October 5, 2016
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in dealing with his clients, and shall only charge fair
and reasonable fees for his legal services. He should not excessively estimate the value of his
professional services. In drawing up the terms of his professional engagement, he should not practice
deceit. The clients are entitled to rescind the written agreement on his professional fees if the terms
thereof contravened the true agreement of the parties.
Antecedents
This administrative case stems from the complaint brought on December 8, 2009 by the Spouses Emilio
and Alicia Jacinto, then 81 and 76 years of age, respectively, against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. for the
latter’s unjust and dishonest treatment of them as his clients. They hereby seek that he be sanctioned
for his actuations.[1]
The complainants averred that a private survey team had conducted a survey of Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351
on October 10-11, 2008 pursuant to the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, in Cagayan de Oro
City in connection with the reconstitution of the lost certificate of title of said lot by the owners; that
after conducting the perimeter survey, the survey team had tried to enter the premises owned by them
but they had prevented the team from doing so because their premises had already been segregated by
virtue of the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-3387; that their land covered by OCT No. P-
3387 had already been subdivided into nine lots; that the survey team had then desisted from
proceeding with their survey of their land but had nonetheless informed them that they would return
another time for the survey; and that this had forced them to consult a lawyer on the legal remedies to
prevent the intrusion on their property.[2]
The complainants further averred that they had then consulted with the respondent, briefing him on
their concern, and delivering to him the documents pertinent to their land; that after scrutinizing the
documents, he had told them that he would be initiating a case for certiorari in their behalf to nullify the
order for the reconstitution of the lost title covering Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351; that he had then insinuated
that one of their lots would be his attorney’s fees; and that they had not initially agreed to the
insinuation because the lots had already been allocated to each of their seven children, but they had
ultimately consented to giving him only a portion of Lot No. 37926-H with an area of 250 square meters
n.[3]
It appears that soon after t he respondent unilaterally prepared the document so-called Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), to wit:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., of legal age, married and a resident of Lot 13, Block 1, Xavier Heights
Subd., Upper Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, hereinafter referred as the FIRST PARTY; and
WE, SPOUSES EMILIO JACINTO AND ALICIA JACINTO, both legal age, and residents of Cagayan de Oro
City, herein referred as the SECOND PARTY;
wife which finally did not materialize because his wife was not amenable which in effect showed that
they have vested interest on the property and they are bent on taking the property at any cause. He
even challenged us to file an appropriate case in court against him rather than agree with our pleading
for payment of cash. Likewise, he refused our offer to pay his services in cash alleging that he already
filed a Manifestation in court and claimed that our possession would not be disturbed and that he will be
filing a case for Certiorari as promised.

WITNESSETH:
To our surprise though, we came to know that the Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a
preparatory pleading for certiorari. No way could it even stop the intrusion into our property. Basically,
1. That the FIRST PARTY shall be the counsel/lawyer of the SECOND PARTY, regarding their parcel of land
we were deceived by Atty. Bangot into believing that the Manifestation he filed would stop any legal
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3387 with an area of 4,138 sq. m., located at
disturbance on our property and the same is preparatory for certiorari.[5]
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, presently subdivided into 8 lots with individual certificate of titles (sic);
2. That the First Party shall get 300 sq. m., from Lot No. 37925-G covered by TCT No. 121708
Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to bring their complaint against the respondent.

3. That this agreement shall take effect immediately upon the signing of the parties (sic) cannot be
revoked, amended or modified by the Second Party without the consent of the First Party.[4] On his part, the respondent denied the allegations of the complainants. He insisted that the complaint
against him was a harassment tactic designed to intimidate him from seeking judicial remedies to settle
their dispute on the validity of the MOA;[6] that the MOA was valid; that the Manifestation for
The complainants recalled that on October 17, 2008 the respondent requested them to proceed to his
Information he had filed in court prevented the intrusion into the complainants’ land; that the
law office. What thereafter transpired and that led to the signing of the MOA were set forth in their
administrative complaint was designed to insure the derailment of his application for a judgeship
complaint, as follows:
position, and to cover up the negligence of the complainants’ counsel as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
2008-302 (for annulment and/or rescission of agreement), which case was dismissed for failure to
On October 17, 2008, my wife received a phone call from the office of Atty. Bangot directing us to go to comply with the requirement for the prior barangay conciliation proceedings; and that they had
his office to sign documents they have prepared. The phone call was relayed to me by my wife so we voluntarily signed the MOA without intimidation, fraud or undue influence.[7]
immediately proceeded to his office arriving thereat at exactly 4:00 PM. The daughter of Atty. Bangot
handed to us two sets of documents for our signatures. Because of full trust to Atty. Bangot, we did not
On August 23, 2010, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
bother reading the contents of the documents. Per instruction, we brought the papers to their friend
investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
lawyer for notarization and after the notarization returned to the office where we were given our
personal file, without reading every detail of the documents.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Upon arriving at our residence, I read the contents of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Said MOA
In due course, IBP Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero submitted his Report and
was not signed by Atty. Bangot and did not bear the signature of witnesses. I was surprised to know that
Recommendation[9] finding the complaint against the respondent meritorious, and recommending that
the terms of the (MOA) did not reflect the true intentions being contemplated in our previous
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year for his unfair and injudicious
discussions. Contrary to what I have told him, a different area which is 37925-G under TCT No. 121708
treatment of the complainants as his clients.
was written. I already told him that my other lots including the lot written in the MOA could no longer
In Resolution No. XX-2013-71,[10] the IBP Board of Governors increased the duration of the respondent’s
be. disposed of because these lots were already committed to each of my children. The lot area was also
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two years, viz.:
increased from 250 sq. m. to 300 sq. m. Because of this situation, I called my wife and children and told
them about the problem. My daughter whose share was involved reacted badly and she was hurt
because she will then be deprived of her place to live in, in the future. We continued our discussion and RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with
we decided to see Atty. Bangot to have the MOA be revoked because we felt that we were deceived, modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
Atty. Bangot took advantage of our old age, thus breaking the trust and confidence the client[‘]s and case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and finding the recommendation fully supported
lawyer should uphold at all times in the exercise of one’s profession. by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent breached
his duty of candor and fairness to his client, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
As a gesture of acknowledging his efforts, we offered to pay him in cash, fair enough for the services he
had rendered to us. However, he refused to revoke the MOA because accordingly, he would consult his
Through its Resolution No. XXI-2014-315,[11] the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s motion
for reconsideration.
Issue
Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with the
complainants?
Ruling of the Court
We find and hold that the respondent grossly violated his Lawyer’s Oath and his ethical duties as an
attorney because he did not observe candor and fairness in his dealings with his clients.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Cachapero, which sufficiently described the violations of the
respondent, provide an irrefutable insight into the gravity of the violations by the respondent, as follows:
The question to ask is, “Was the MOA fair to the parties and entered into by them in goodfaith?”
The undersigned resolves in the negative. To begin with, the conduct of Respondent had evinced an
instinctive interest in the property of Complainants. He had the MOA executed at the same time he filed
the Manifestation for Information before the court that was hearing LRC Case No. 98-010. Not only that,
Respondent’s proposal to have a MOA executed between him and the Complainant was meant to
impress that his supposed attorney’s fees would be paid on contingent basis, however, a perusal of the
MOA indicates that the payment of Respondents’ fee by way of a real property is being made
immediately effective upon execution of the agreement.
As to the agreement of the Complainant and the Respondent, the undersigned gives full faith to the
allegation of Complainant that the payment of Respondent’s attorney’s fees by way of a real property
would come from TCT No. 121709 and not T-121708. Complainants explained that the latter lot had
already been committed to their seven (7) children especially because this lot is situated in a prime
location thus they could not have picked the same over Lot No. 121709. The Respondent knew
straightforwardly that lot 121708 was a better lot yet Respondent gave a different account of their
agreement and took advantage of the frailty and advance ages (sic) of his clients.
But, the most shocking of all, is the apparent inequity or disproportion between the amount of
attorney’s fees (measured from the value of the property taken by Respondent) and the effort or service
already performed or still to be performed by him. The Complainants were not made parties to the LRC
case or any other case and Respondent filed a mere two-paged Manifestation for Information in court
which he did almost effortlessly. It is not clear how the court had reacted to the manifestation but
Respondent did not follow it up with [any] other action. Despite the same, Respondent stuck to his tale
that the Complainants had signed [the] MOA and despite his minimal representation of the
Complainants in court, he held on to his idea that he had taken from his clients valid title to a million
[pesos] worth of real estate in payment of his fees.
The undersigned does not see fairness and judiciousness to Respondent’s treatment of his clients, 81 and
76 years old, respectively, and he need not add to his brief disquisition in this regard.[12]
We adopt the findings and note the insights thus expressed.
We must, therefore, highlight the following reasons why the findings and insights should be sustained.
To determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, the following factors as enumerated in Rule 20.1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility may serve as a guide, to wit: (a) the time spent and the extent of
the services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the
importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment
as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the service; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i)
the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j) the professional standing of
the lawyer.
It was not disputed that only the filing of the two-paged Manifestation for Information constituted the
respondent’s rendition of professional services for the complainants. Although he did claim that the filing
of the Manifestation for Information had prevented any intrusion on their property, thereby fulfilling his
end of the contract,[13] the worth of such minimal effort was exaggerated and disproportionate when
taken in the context of the attorney’s fees being Lot No. 37925-G with 300 square meters in area. The
two-paged Manifestation for Information was not even the procedural precursor of the promised
petition for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the petition for certiorari as he had promised.
And, lastly, he did nothing more after filing the Manifestation for Information. He certainly transgressed
the Lawyer’s Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from the complainants after having made
them believe that he could ensure their land from intrusion by third parties. He took advantage of them
who had reposed their full trust and confidence in his ability to perform the task by virtue of his being a
lawyer. He was definitely bent on obtaining Lot No. 37925-G than in protecting the complainants’
interest in their property. He exhibited this zeal by refusing their offer to give cash for his attorney’s fees
instead of the land. We sadly note in this connection that his changing the property ostensibly agreed
upon with the bigger lot as payment for his legal services[14] reflected his deceit at the start of the
relationship. He maintained the deceit by ultimately enforcing the MOA against them through the action
for specific performance.
Surely, the totality of the respondent’s actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.
On the basis of his acts and actuations, the attorney’s fees in the form of the lot he charged from them
were unconscionable and unreasonable, and should be struck down for failing to pass muster under the
aforestated guidelines.
The respondent appears to have impressed on the complainants at the time of their negotiations that
the attorney’s fees in the form of the lot would be delivered to him only on a contingent basis. Again, he
had misrepresented himself to them because the express terms of the MOA stipulated that “this
agreement shall take effect immediately upon the signing of the parties [and] cannot be revoked,
amended or modified by the Second Party without the consent of the First Party.”
As worded, the agreement was not a contingent fee arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee arrangement
is a contract in writing in which the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right.[15] The
amount of the contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be
paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing should the suit fail. Such
arrangement is generally recognized as valid and binding in this jurisdiction but its terms must be
reasonable.[16] Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that “a contract for a contingent fee,
when sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk
and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness.” A contract of this nature is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the poor
client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has a meritorious cause of action but has no
means with which to pay for the legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract
for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, such arrangement is the
only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights
vindicated.[17]
Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely
scrutinize it to protect the client from unjust charges. The court looks in large measure at the
reasonableness of the stipulated fee under the circumstances of each case.[18] Section 24, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Courtexplicitly provides:
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis ours)
All the foregoing circumstances established that the respondent was deceitful, dishonest and
unreasonable in his dealings with the complainants as his clients. He thus violated his Lawyer’s Oath,
whereby he vowed, among others, to do no falsehood, and not to consent to the doing of any falsehood,
as well as not to delay any man’s cause for money or malice but to conduct himself as a lawyer according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion “with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
He also breached the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud.
We have said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the Law is neither a trade nor a
craft but a profession whose basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who
seek its aid. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles.[19] The respondent’s behavior and deceit demonstrated
a preference for self-gain that transgressed his sworn duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to his clients’
cause. His betrayal of his clients’ trust besmirched the honorable name of the Law Profession. These
considerations justify suspending him from the practice of law.
Moreover, the respondent made the following allegations in his motion for reconsideration filed with the
IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
9. It is quite disturbing that to cover up Atty. Palasan’s negligence and reckless filing of Annulment
and/or Rescission of Agreement titled Spouses Emilio Jacinto and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot
docketed as Civil Case No. 2008-302 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City
where the subject matter was the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the complainant and
respondent, said counsel resorted to another forum by filing this administrative case where his chance of
oppressing and harassing respondent is far greater because when he filed said administrative case Atty.
Roan Libarios then one of the Officers of the IBP National Chapter and member of the Board of
Governors, representing Eastern Mindanao, was holding office at IBP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City as such,
his officemate or law partner at Butuan City (sic). Unfortunately, for respondent, Atty. Libarios eventually
became the IBP National President;
xxxx
18. The statement by Commissioner Cachapero in his Report and Recommendation, 1st sentence,
2nd par., thereof that: “On October 10 & 11, 2008, a survey was conducted on Cadastral Lot No. 1351
situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the reconstitution of the lost title of the
lot which was then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, R-10, Cagayan de Oro City.” is
quite confusing and designed to put down respondent probably at any cost and probably by an “unseen
but influential hands (sic)”;[20]
The aforequoted allegations indicated that the respondent had readily attributed the filing of the
administrative charge to the lawyer representing the complainants in the suit against him to annul or
rescind the MOA, as well as to “unseen but influential hands” in the hierarchy of the IBP. The attribution
was bereft of factual and legal justifications, however, because he did not even attempt to establish it
with satisfactory proof. We cannot but dismiss the attribution as malicious and unfounded in view of the meted on him for a similar offense; and DECLARES that he is not entitled to recover any attorney’s fees
record establishing his serious ethical violations. He displayed an unmitigated lack of professionalism by from the complainants.
casting aspersions against his peers, and exhibited a dangerous propensity to disparage others, which
should move us to consider his violations as aggravated.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator.
To be now considered, therefore, is the condign penalty of the respondent. A review of precedents
shows that the penalty of suspension, or even disbarment, has been meted on similar violations and
The Office of the Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to all courts of the Philippines.
transgressions. In Santeco v. Avance,[21]the respondent attorney was suspended for five years for
abandoning the cause of her client without notice despite her having collected her legal fees. She also
failed to account for the money of the client and constantly refused to submit herself to the proceedings SO ORDERED.
of the IBP. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[22] this Court disbarred the respondent attorney who did not promptly
account for the funds he had received for the benefit of his client, and for his deceit in dealings with his
client. In Overgaard v. Valdez,[23] the respondent attorney was disbarred for assuring the complainant
that his property involved in a civil case would be safeguarded, and then collecting the full amount of
legal fees amounting to P900,000.00, only to desert the complainant after receiving the fees. The THIRD DIVISION
respondent attorney had further failed to submit an answer as well as to attend the proceedings before
the IBP. A.C. No. 11059, November 09, 2016

Although the complainants appeared to have initially bound themselves to give a part of their land as the JOSE ANTONIO F. BALINGIT, Complainant, v. ATTY. RENATO M. CERVANTES AND ATTY. TEODORO B.
respondent’s professional fees, they did so apparently because he had misrepresented to them the DELARMENTE, Respondent.
gravity and extent of their legal matter. His misrepresentation was undeniably calculated to make them
part with their valuable asset in lieu of cash. He did not thereafter render any worthy professional legal DECISION
service in their favor. Verily, as the cliche goes, they did not get their money’s worth from him. Even if
this charge was his first infraction, the grossness of his violations of the Lawyer’s Oath and the various
JARDELEZA, J.:
relevant canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted earlier absolutely warranted his
suspension from the practice of law for five years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with warning
of sterner sanctions should he hereafter commit a similar offense. This duration of suspension was the This resolves the administrative complaint1 filed by Jose Antonio F. Balingit (complainant) against Arty.
penalty we prescribed in the recent case of Mercullo v. Ramon[24] where the respondent lawyer had Renato M. Cervantes and Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente (respondents).
deceived the complainants into parting with the substantial sum of P350,000.00 as her attorney’s fees
but did not subsequently perform her professional undertaking. Facts

In addition, the respondent should not be entitled to receive any attorney’s fees in view of the
worthlessness of the professional services he supposedly rendered. There is no question, as ruled
in Sanchez v. Aguilos,[25] that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client; and that for as
long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client,
he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. Yet, equally without question is that the
attorney should not accept the engagement that is way above his ability and competence to handle, for
there will then be no basis for him to accept any amount as attorney’s fees; or that he should at least
begin to perform the contemplated task undertaken for the client to entitle him to be compensated on
the basis of quantum meruit.[26]
WHEREFORE, this Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR. guilty of violation
of the Lawyer’s Oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility; SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for five (5) years effective upon notice of this decision, with warning that sterner sanctions will be
Complainant is a former Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized British citizen.2 On July
9, 2011, complainant's two (2) sons, Jose Antonio Balingit, Jr. (Jose Antonio, Jr.) and Carlo Balingit (Carlo),
who were on board their respective motorcycles, figured in a head-on collision with the car driven by
David A. Alizadeh (David). Carlo sustained serious physical injuries, while Jose Antonio, Jr. was
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Kristopher Rocky Kabigting, Jr. (Kristopher), Jose Antonio Jr.'s
passenger, also suffered physical injuries. As a result, on July 13, 2011, an information3 for criminal
negligence was filed against David with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Antipolo City.
Subsequently, complainant, together with Carlo, Kristopher, and the heirs of Jose Antonio Jr., engaged
the legal services of respondents in filing a separate civil suit for damages and an administrative case
with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) against David, who recently passed the physician
board exam at that time.4 Thus, on August 8, 2011, Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter5 to David for
payment of P2,000,000.00 plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Also, on August 22, 2011, Atty. Cervantes
sent a letter6 to the PRC informing the latter of the pending criminal case against David and requesting
that the issuance of David's license to practice medicine be deferred or suspended until the termination
of David's criminal case. On September 16, 2011, the PRC replied7 and informed Atty. Cervantes of the
requirements in order to file an administrative case against David.
Meanwhile, Atty. Cervantes prepared and signed an Agreement8 dated August 18, 2011 embodying the
terms of respondents' engagement. Addressed to Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr., the
Agreement provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This will formalize our agreement whereby our law firm shall represent you in the civil case for
damages to be filed against DAVID A. ALIZADEH, et al., relative to that tragic incident on July 9, 2011 that
occurred in Antipolo City. We hereby confirm the terms for the handling thereof, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Acceptance Fee. Treating you as a most favored client, our acceptance fee
is only Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) to be paid upon the signing hereof;
2. Appearance Fee. Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for every appearance by any of our lawyer/s
before the court;
3. Success Fee. Twenty Percent (20%) of any amount that may be actually collected by reason of the
successful handling of the case;
4. Official and other Fees, such as docket fees, transcript of stenographic notes, expenses for
messengerial, mailing, photocopying services and expenses for representation shall be for your
account.9 (Emphasis in the original.)
Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr. did not sign the Agreement.10 Just the same,
complainant paid the sum of P45,000.00 as partial acceptance fee for the filing of the civil suit for
damages as evidenced by a handwritten receipt issued by Atty. Delarmente.11 In addition, Atty.
Cervantes allegedly received P10,000.00 from Imelda Balingit (Imelda), complainant's daughter-in-law,
without issuing any receipt.12 However, despite respondents' receipt of the P45,000.00 and
complainant's submission to respondents of the necessary documents,13 as of December 19, 2011, when
the present complaint was filed, and until today, respondents have failed to institute the separate civil
suit for damages agreed upon.14chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, the criminal case was referred to mediation by the trial court for possible settlement of the
civil aspect of the case. During the negotiations, complainant and the representatives of David agreed to
settle.15 Thus, on October 13, 2011, a Compromise Agreement16 was signed by complainant, one
Anthony T. Balingit, Carlo, and the representatives of David. David agreed to pay P1,000,000.00 in
exchange for the execution of an affidavit of desistance in the criminal case and dismissal and/or
withdrawal of any civil case for damages.17 The Agreement was set for the consideration and approval of
the MTCC Antipolo City on November 9, 2011.18chanrobleslaw
Atty. Cervantes, upon discovering that complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement, attended
the November 9, 2011 hearing and demanded 10% of the amount of the compromise as attorney's fees
and P5,000.00 as appearance fee from complainant.19 Complainant refused on the ground that the
compromise was entered into before the mediator.20 On November 10, 2011, Atty. Cervantes sent a
demand letter21 to complainant seeking payment of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, representing 10% of
the amount of the compromise, and appearance fee of P5,000.00 for his attendance in the November 9,
2011 hearing. As complainant still refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes filed a criminal
complaint22 for estafaagainst complainant, his wife, and his sons, as well as a complaint for deportation
with the Bureau of Immigration, on the ground that complainant and his family are undesirable British
aliens.23chanrobleslaw
On December 19, 2011, complainant filed the present disbarment case against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).24 On even date, the latter
required respondents to file their answer.25cralawred Respondents filed separate motions for extension
of time to submit their answers praying that they be given until February 9, 2012 to file their respective
answers.26chanrobleslaw
Atty. Delarmente failed to file his answer whereas Atty. Cervantes filed a motion to admit his verified
answer27 only on March 27, 2012.
Atty. Cervantes denies receiving P10,000.00 from Imelda and claims that he learned of complainant's
payment of P45,000.00 only later.28 As for his failure to file the separate civil suit for damages, Atty.
Cervantes claims that he has not received the acceptance and docket fees to file the
case.29chanrobleslaw
Atty. Cervantes also argues that the Compromise Agreement has no legal effect since complainant is not
a compulsory heir of Jose Antonio, Jr., who was legally married with two (2) children. Hence, it should
have been the heirs of the deceased that entered into the Compromise Agreement. Just the same, Atty.
Cervantes asserts that he should be paid his portion of the settlement as his attorney's fees since it was
due to the demand letters he sent to David and the complaint he filed with the PRC that moved David's
family to enter into a Compromise Agreement.30chanrobleslaw
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Peter Irving C. Corvera (Commissioner Corvera) set the case for
mandatory conference and required the parties to submit their respective mandatory conference
briefs.31Respondents, however, did not submit their conference briefs and repeatedly failed to appeal in
the mandatory conference despite notice. On motion of complainant's counsel, Commissioner Corvera
terminated the mandatory conference and required all parties to submit their respective verified
position papers.32 Complainant complied with the Commissioner's directive and filed his Position
Paper33 on October 11, 2012 but respondents again failed to submit their verified position papers.
In his Report and Recommendation34 dated January 2, 2014, Commissioner Corvera found respondents
guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Rule 1.03, Canon 15, Canon 20, and Rule 20.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that they be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-88635 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner but reducing the penalty
to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
Ruling
We affirm the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD finding respondents guilty of being remiss in
their duties as counsels for complainant.
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients' cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in them. They are duty bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty
in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.36 Every case lawyers handle deserves their full and
undivided attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether they
accept it for a fee or for free, and to constantly keep in mind that not only the property but also the life
of their clients may be at stake.37 Relevant provisions of the CPR provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
profession.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Respondents clearly transgressed the foregoing rules when they failed and refused to file the separate
civil action for damages against David despite their receipt of payment and the relevant documents from
complainant. We cannot give credence to Atty. Cervantes' defense that because complainant did not pay
the requisite filing and acceptance fees, he was not able to file the separate civil case for damages. The
receipt Atty. Delarmente issued clearly indicated that the sum of P45,000.00 paid by the complainant
covers the acceptance and filing fees for the civil suit.38chanrobleslaw
We have repeatedly held that when a lawyer accepts a case, he undertakes to give his utmost attention,
skill, and competence to it. His client has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently
and exert his best efforts, learning, and ability to prosecute or defend his client's cause with reasonable
dispatch.39chanrobleslaw
Worse, Atty. Cervantes demanded payment of P5,000.00 appearance fee and 10% of the settlement as
success fee even though the hearing was for the criminal case and the Compromise Agreement was
entered in the course of the criminal proceedings; thus, outside the scope of respondents' engagement.
Indeed, it is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which
were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.40chanrobleslaw
Assuming respondents are entitled to additional payment of professional fees, their manner of enforcing
it still warrants disciplinary sanction. Rule 20.4 of the CPR advises lawyers to avoid controversies with
clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. This is because matters of fees present an irreconcilable conflict of interests between a
client and his lawyer.41 Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when
circumstances force lawyers to resort to it,42 such as "when [a] conflict has reached such point that it
only becomes the lawyer's duty to withdraw from the action but to assert his right to compensation
because of the intolerable attitude assumed by his client, x x x."43chanrobleslaw
In these exceptional circumstances, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary
petition as an incident of the main action in which his services were rendered.44 Thus, in Malvar v. Kraft
Food Philippines, Inc.,45 We approved the filing of a motion for intervention as a measure to protect a
counsel's right to the fees agreed upon with his client. Alternatively, an aggrieved lawyer may also file an
independent civil action against his client for the payment of his fees. The former is preferable to avoid
multiplicity of suits.46chanrobleslaw
In the present case, when complainant refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes proceeded to file a criminal case
for estafa and deportation proceedings against complainant and his family, This we cannot countenance.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,47 We suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for filing a groundless case
for estafaagainst his own client when the latter refused to pay his attorney's fees due to disagreements
as to the amount. Relatedly, in Alcantara v. De Vera,48 We held that there is nothing ethically remiss in a
lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with
the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness.49 Here, We
find that the estafa and deportation proceedings filed against complainant and his family were meant to
harass and compel the latter to accede to respondents' demand for additional professional fees.
As for the appropriate penalty, Commissioner Corvera recommended that respondents be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors reduced the recommended
penalty to three (3) months. We observe that the resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the
bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which
mandates that "[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." We frown on the unexplained change
made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Absent any justification on the
reduction of the penalty, We sustain the IBP-CBD's recommended penalty.
Regarding the issue of whether respondents should be directed to return the filing fees they received
from complainant, We ruled in Anacta v. Resurreccion50 that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the
Court's disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability,
and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would
be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court's
disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental
and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether
the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the
Court's disciplinary authority.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, we have previously held that when a lawyer receives money from his client for a particular
purpose and the lawyer does not use the money for such purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client.52chanrobleslaw
In the present case, respondents received P45,000.00 to file a separate civil action for damages against
David. Atty. Cervantes also allegedly received P10,000.00 from complainant's daughter-in-law but no
evidence was adduced to support this claim. Thus, respondents should be ordered to return the amount
of P45,000.00 to complainant.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty. Renato M. Cervantes are hereby SUSPENDEDfrom
the practice of law for six (6) months. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant the amount of
P45,000.00. Finally, respondents are DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of their receipt of this
Decision to enable this Court to determine when their suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents' personal records with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
of the land.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 11059, November 09, 2016
JOSE ANTONIO F. BALINGIT, Complainant, v. ATTY. RENATO M. CERVANTES AND ATTY. TEODORO B.
DELARMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint1 filed by Jose Antonio F. Balingit (complainant) against Arty.
Renato M. Cervantes and Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente (respondents).
Facts
Complainant is a former Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized British citizen.2
On July
9, 2011, complainant's two (2) sons, Jose Antonio Balingit, Jr. (Jose Antonio, Jr.) and Carlo Balingit (Carlo),
who were on board their respective motorcycles, figured in a head-on collision with the car driven by
David A. Alizadeh (David). Carlo sustained serious physical injuries, while Jose Antonio, Jr. was
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Kristopher Rocky Kabigting, Jr. (Kristopher), Jose Antonio Jr.'s
passenger, also suffered physical injuries. As a result, on July 13, 2011, an information3 for criminal
negligence was filed against David with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Antipolo City.
Subsequently, complainant, together with Carlo, Kristopher, and the heirs of Jose Antonio Jr., engaged
the legal services of respondents in filing a separate civil suit for damages and an administrative case
with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) against David, who recently passed the physician
board exam at that time.4 Thus, on August 8, 2011, Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter5 to David for
payment of P2,000,000.00 plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Also, on August 22, 2011, Atty. Cervantes
sent a letter6 to the PRC informing the latter of the pending criminal case against David and requesting
that the issuance of David's license to practice medicine be deferred or suspended until the termination
of David's criminal case. On September 16, 2011, the PRC replied7 and informed Atty. Cervantes of the
requirements in order to file an administrative case against David.
Meanwhile, Atty. Cervantes prepared and signed an Agreement8 dated August 18, 2011 embodying the
terms of respondents' engagement. Addressed to Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr., the
Agreement provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This will formalize our agreement whereby our law firm shall represent you in the civil case for
damages to be filed against DAVID A. ALIZADEH, et al., relative to that tragic incident on July 9, 2011 that
occurred in Antipolo City. We hereby confirm the terms for the handling thereof, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Acceptance Fee. Treating you as a most favored client, our acceptance fee
is only Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) to be paid upon the signing hereof;
2. Appearance Fee. Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for every appearance by any of our lawyer/s
before the court;
3. Success Fee. Twenty Percent (20%) of any amount that may be actually collected by reason of the
successful handling of the case;
4. Official and other Fees, such as docket fees, transcript of stenographic notes, expenses for
messengerial, mailing, photocopying services and expenses for representation shall be for your
account.9 (Emphasis in the original.)
Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr. did not sign the Agreement.10 Just the same,
complainant paid the sum of P45,000.00 as partial acceptance fee for the filing of the civil suit for
damages as evidenced by a handwritten receipt issued by Atty. Delarmente.11 In addition, Atty.
Cervantes allegedly received P10,000.00 from Imelda Balingit (Imelda), complainant's daughter-in-law,
without issuing any receipt.12 However, despite respondents' receipt of the P45,000.00 and
complainant's submission to respondents of the necessary documents,13 as of December 19, 2011, when
the present complaint was filed, and until today, respondents have failed to institute the separate civil
suit for damages agreed upon.14chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, the criminal case was referred to mediation by the trial court for possible settlement of the
civil aspect of the case. During the negotiations, complainant and the representatives of David agreed to
settle.15 Thus, on October 13, 2011, a Compromise Agreement16 was signed by complainant, one
Anthony T. Balingit, Carlo, and the representatives of David. David agreed to pay P1,000,000.00 in
exchange for the execution of an affidavit of desistance in the criminal case and dismissal and/or
withdrawal of any civil case for damages.17 The Agreement was set for the consideration and approval of
the MTCC Antipolo City on November 9, 2011.18chanrobleslaw
Atty. Cervantes, upon discovering that complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement, attended
the November 9, 2011 hearing and demanded 10% of the amount of the compromise as attorney's fees
and P5,000.00 as appearance fee from complainant.19 Complainant refused on the ground that the
compromise was entered into before the mediator.20 On November 10, 2011, Atty. Cervantes sent a
demand letter21 to complainant seeking payment of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, representing 10% of
the amount of the compromise, and appearance fee of P5,000.00 for his attendance in the November 9,
2011 hearing. As complainant still refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes filed a criminal
complaint22 for estafaagainst complainant, his wife, and his sons, as well as a complaint for deportation
with the Bureau of Immigration, on the ground that complainant and his family are undesirable British
aliens.23chanrobleslaw
On December 19, 2011, complainant filed the present disbarment case against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).24 On even date, the latter
required respondents to file their answer.25cralawred Respondents filed separate motions for extension
of time to submit their answers praying that they be given until February 9, 2012 to file their respective
answers.26chanrobleslaw
Atty. Delarmente failed to file his answer whereas Atty. Cervantes filed a motion to admit his verified
answer27 only on March 27, 2012.
Atty. Cervantes denies receiving P10,000.00 from Imelda and claims that he learned of complainant's
payment of P45,000.00 only later.28 As for his failure to file the separate civil suit for damages, Atty.
Cervantes claims that he has not received the acceptance and docket fees to file the
case.29chanrobleslaw

Atty. Cervantes also argues that the Compromise Agreement has no legal effect since complainant is not
a compulsory heir of Jose Antonio, Jr., who was legally married with two (2) children. Hence, it should
have been the heirs of the deceased that entered into the Compromise Agreement. Just the same, Atty.
Cervantes asserts that he should be paid his portion of the settlement as his attorney's fees since it was
due to the demand letters he sent to David and the complaint he filed with the PRC that moved David's
family to enter into a Compromise Agreement.30chanrobleslaw
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Peter Irving C. Corvera (Commissioner Corvera) set the case for
mandatory conference and required the parties to submit their respective mandatory conference
briefs.31Respondents, however, did not submit their conference briefs and repeatedly failed to appeal in
the mandatory conference despite notice. On motion of complainant's counsel, Commissioner Corvera
terminated the mandatory conference and required all parties to submit their respective verified
position papers.32 Complainant complied with the Commissioner's directive and filed his Position
Paper33 on October 11, 2012 but respondents again failed to submit their verified position papers.
In his Report and Recommendation34 dated January 2, 2014, Commissioner Corvera found respondents
guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Rule 1.03, Canon 15, Canon 20, and Rule 20.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that they be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-88635 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner but reducing the penalty
to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
Ruling
We affirm the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD finding respondents guilty of being remiss in
their duties as counsels for complainant.
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients' cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in them. They are duty bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty
in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.36 Every case lawyers handle deserves their full and
undivided attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether they
accept it for a fee or for free, and to constantly keep in mind that not only the property but also the life
of their clients may be at stake.37 Relevant provisions of the CPR provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
profession.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Respondents clearly transgressed the foregoing rules when they failed and refused to file the separate
civil action for damages against David despite their receipt of payment and the relevant documents from
complainant. We cannot give credence to Atty. Cervantes' defense that because complainant did not pay
the requisite filing and acceptance fees, he was not able to file the separate civil case for damages. The
receipt Atty. Delarmente issued clearly indicated that the sum of P45,000.00 paid by the complainant
covers the acceptance and filing fees for the civil suit.38chanrobleslaw
We have repeatedly held that when a lawyer accepts a case, he undertakes to give his utmost attention,
skill, and competence to it. His client has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently
and exert his best efforts, learning, and ability to prosecute or defend his client's cause with reasonable
dispatch.39chanrobleslaw
Worse, Atty. Cervantes demanded payment of P5,000.00 appearance fee and 10% of the settlement as
success fee even though the hearing was for the criminal case and the Compromise Agreement was
entered in the course of the criminal proceedings; thus, outside the scope of respondents' engagement.
Indeed, it is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which
were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.40chanrobleslaw
Assuming respondents are entitled to additional payment of professional fees, their manner of enforcing
it still warrants disciplinary sanction. Rule 20.4 of the CPR advises lawyers to avoid controversies with
clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. This is because matters of fees present an irreconcilable conflict of interests between a
client and his lawyer.41 Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when
circumstances force lawyers to resort to it,42 such as "when [a] conflict has reached such point that it
only becomes the lawyer's duty to withdraw from the action but to assert his right to compensation
because of the intolerable attitude assumed by his client, x x x."43chanrobleslaw
In these exceptional circumstances, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary
petition as an incident of the main action in which his services were rendered.44 Thus, in Malvar v. Kraft
Food Philippines, Inc.,45 We approved the filing of a motion for intervention as a measure to protect a
counsel's right to the fees agreed upon with his client. Alternatively, an aggrieved lawyer may also file an
independent civil action against his client for the payment of his fees. The former is preferable to avoid
multiplicity of suits.46chanrobleslaw
In the present case, when complainant refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes proceeded to file a criminal case
for estafa and deportation proceedings against complainant and his family, This we cannot countenance.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,47 We suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for filing a groundless case
for estafaagainst his own client when the latter refused to pay his attorney's fees due to disagreements
as to the amount. Relatedly, in Alcantara v. De Vera,48 We held that there is nothing ethically remiss in a
lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with
the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness.49 Here, We
find that the estafa and deportation proceedings filed against complainant and his family were meant to
harass and compel the latter to accede to respondents' demand for additional professional fees.
As for the appropriate penalty, Commissioner Corvera recommended that respondents be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors reduced the recommended
penalty to three (3) months. We observe that the resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the
bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which
mandates that "[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." We frown on the unexplained change
made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Absent any justification on the
reduction of the penalty, We sustain the IBP-CBD's recommended penalty.
Regarding the issue of whether respondents should be directed to return the filing fees they received
from complainant, We ruled in Anacta v. Resurreccion50 that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the
Court's disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability,
and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would
be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court's
disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental
and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether
the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the
Court's disciplinary authority.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, we have previously held that when a lawyer receives money from his client for a particular
purpose and the lawyer does not use the money for such purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client.52chanrobleslaw
In the present case, respondents received P45,000.00 to file a separate civil action for damages against
David. Atty. Cervantes also allegedly received P10,000.00 from complainant's daughter-in-law but no
evidence was adduced to support this claim. Thus, respondents should be ordered to return the amount
of P45,000.00 to complainant.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty. Renato M. Cervantes are hereby SUSPENDEDfrom
the practice of law for six (6) months. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant the amount of
P45,000.00. Finally, respondents are DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of their receipt of this
Decision to enable this Court to determine when their suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents' personal records with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
of the land.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
June 28, 2017
A.C. No. 8371
SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY, Complainants
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 filed by Spouses Gerardo Montecillo and Dominga
Salonoy (complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian (respondent) before the Office of the Bar
Confidant charging him of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for being negligent in
handling complainants' case. In a Resolution2 dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Facts
Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an ejectment case in which they were the
defendants.3After filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a notice from the court
setting the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants went
to respondent's office to confer with him about it, the latter told them that he did not receive the notice
and that he could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict in his schedule. Complainants
expressed that they can attend the conference even without him. He allegedly advised them not to
attend anymore as he would arrange with the court for a new schedule when he is available. 4
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not attend the preliminary conference anymore.
Thereafter, they found out that respondent not only failed to attend the scheduled preliminary
conference, but also failed to take any steps to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also
learned that, contrary to respondent's representation, he did receive the notice setting the date of the
preliminary conference. Subsequently, complainant received an Order 5 dated March 25, 2009 that
deemed the ejectment case submitted for decision due to complainants' failure to appear during the
preliminary conference. When they approached respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told
them not to worry as he would take care of it.6
Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision7 dated April 21, 2009 adverse to the complainants.
Respondent received it on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform complainants about the status of the case as
to enable them to prepare the next course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse ruling
upon inquiring with the trial court only on May 13, 2009, or nine (9) days after respondent's receipt
thereof, when their period to appeal was almost about to lapse. 8
Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards,
complainants terminated respondent's legal services and engaged another lawyer to prepare their
Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal, the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin.9
In sum, complainants assail respondent's negligent and complacent handling of their case. 10
In his Comment, 11 respondent contended that when complainants informed him about the scheduled
preliminary conference, he told them that he would be unable to attend due to a conflict in schedule, as
he was committed to attend a criminal case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he instructed
complainants to attend the preliminary conference even without his appearance and inform the court
about the conflict in schedule. He denied having advised complainants not to attend the preliminary
hearing and belittled the Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged that the Order dated March 25,
2009 was complainants' fault, due to their failure to attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling
this to complainants, they terminated his legal services. 12
On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP, complainants filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Withdraw Complaint. 13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the IBP's Report and Recommendation14 dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for breach of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the submission of the
ejectment case for resolution and the eventual adverse decision against complainants were attributable
to respondent's negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule, respondent should have
prepared and filed an appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of the scheduled
preliminary conference. Whether he advised complainants to attend the preliminary conference on
March 25, 2009 or not is immaterial. What was relevant was his course of action when confronted with a
conflict of schedule in his court appearances. 15
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found complainants' version of facts more in line with
common experience as opposed to respondent's version. Notably, there was no cogent explanation why
complainants would dismiss his alleged instruction to attend the conference without him. 16
In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied m a Resolution18 dated September 23, 2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and competence, and never neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients' cause20 and, accordingly is
expected to exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. 21 Consequently, he is
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote one's full attention,
skill, and competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or for free. 22 The relevant provisions
of the CPR read thus:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence include not merely
reviewing cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly representing a client before any
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so.23 A lawyer's negligence in fulfilling these duties
subjects him to disciplinary action. 24
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of
lawyers in handling complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the necessary motion to
postpone the hearing due to a conflict in his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their
opportunity to present their evidence in the ejectment case. As complainants' counsel in the ejectment
case, respondent was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been more circumspect in
preparing and filing the motion, considering the serious consequence of failure to attend the scheduled
preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a
judgment,25 as what happened in this case.
The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial
court's adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding
the status of a case as expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them without
delay about matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed
to immediately notify complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants
not inquired with the trial court, they would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason,
respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their
clients' affairs by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients about court decisions, the
Court suspended them from the practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de Saldivar v.
Cabanes,26 a lawyer was suspended for failure to file a pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled
preliminary conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 27 a lawyer was likewise suspended for not
attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients about the dismissal of their case, and failing to file position
papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 28 a lawyer suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a
scheduled hearing despite due notice, which resulted in the submission of the case for decision.
Consistent with these cases, the Court agrees with the IBP's recommendation to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 Furthermore, let copies of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.